The Fate of Western Hungary 1918-1921 - Corvinus Library ...
The Fate of Western Hungary 1918-1921 - Corvinus Library ... The Fate of Western Hungary 1918-1921 - Corvinus Library ...
all possible means but not officially as that would have adverse diplomatic ramifications. The withdrawal of civil administration is, thus, to be suspended for the interim. The Szombathely headquarters and all military commands in the region were ordered to offer any and all assistance to Col. Lehár in his attempt to organize the Western Hungary force. The colonel was deemed to be independent and not part of the command of the regional command structure. Forty officers of the National Army were selected to form Lehár’s staff and command structure who were from the annexed territory. These officers were officially retired by the Defense Ministry but would later be reactivated into the armed forces without any hindrance. On proclamation of independence, all public security (gendarmerie, police, customs, revenue and border security) would come under the jurisdiction of Col. Lehár. Cooperation with the organization and operation of the new defense force would take the form of relocating two infantry companies of the Vas County infantry regiment, and a company of machine guns, to the areas of Vas County intended for annexation (Felsőőr, [Nagy]Szentmihály és Németújvár) on the same day the Trianon Treaty was ratified. These would remain stationed there until the disputed areas were vacated, meaning the linkage with Trans-Danubia was satisfied. According to the action plan, the following material was made available to Col. Lehár: 5,000 rifles, 3,000 officers and men with all their gear, 1,000 grenades, 18 heavy and 18 light machine guns, a fully equipped mounted company, 2 field cannons and 2 mortars (from equipment hidden from the Entente supervising committee), 3 cars, 4 trucks and 3 ambulances, which was to be bought. 243 At the April 28 session, the artillery complement of the autonomous area was raised to two batteries. The secret action plan and directives were acknowledged by the thencommander of the Szombathely military region, Lt.Gen. Pál Hegedüs, and Col. Antal Lehár. Lehár, most probably intentionally, left Lt.Col. Pál Prónay, who he met in the capital, out of the plans. The later leader of the insurrection recounted it as: “I noted in my journal of my meeting in the spring of 1921 in Budapest with Col. Baron Antal Lehár, commander of the Szombathely region, 244 when I reproached him on why he does not make all of Burgenland, including Sopron and Szombathely, independent based on the selfdetermination of people and why he does not order a draft and organize the necessary armed force in the territory to be handed over when its detachment from the mother country to Austria is already impending. (…) However, Lehár answered evasively and opined confidently regarding the loyalty of Burgenland to the mother country, which was so covered by his propaganda organs that it would never be Austrian. (…) My surprise was all the greater when, during the same summer, young Ivan Töpler, along with several Sopron citizens, led by mayor [Mihály] Thurner looked me up in Budapest, in the Nádor Barracks, as their last refuge. – Help us, Sir! Western Hungary must be handed over – It is a 243 Ibid, p. 309. 244 More accurately: division commander. 102
closed case – Please do something, at least let us save Sopron. (…) On hearing the above, I immediately issued the necessary instructions within the battalion, as well as to the associated irredentist organizations.” 245 The then-Foreign Minister, Miklós Bánffy, wrote in his memoirs that the previously mentioned action plan regarding the situation of Western Hungary was worked out in June of 1921 (in actual fact, the first half of April) during meetings chaired by Prime Minister Bethlen. Bánffy sensed exactly that: “The Hungarian public (i.e., the nation) felt the handing over as the greatest humiliation. The two of us (i.e., with Bethlen—J.B.) also saw it that way. Hence, we had to do something to prevent it. (…) We were certain that not only the mostly German-speaking population of Sopron but also the local Hungarian and Croat communities and also the German villages want to stay with us. It is only the Germans of the Pinka [River] valley and along the Lajta [River] that are drawn to Vienna, and they only because they sell their [fruit and vegetable] produce in the Austrian capital and Graz.” It is not by accident that Bánffy notes that organizing the population of Western Hungary posted to be handed over was not his task, and hence he knew very little of the preparations. On the other hand, he did mention that Interior Minister Gedeon Ráday “very carefully hid his role, giving the impression that it was the people who were getting ready to act in response.” 246 Also that neither former prime minister Friedrich, nor Prónay (according to his cited memoirs) knew that the Hungarian government was behind the movement. In the end, armed resistance in Western Hungary was not organized by Col. Lehár because he sided with Charles IV in his March 1921 attempt to regain the throne, for which the new PM, Bethlen, in the weeks after assuming the post on April 14, forced him into the background and relieved him of his command with the Szombathely division. The armed resistance of the Borderland was begun by the Etelköz Association [Etelköz was the first known Hungarian principality, established circa 830AD. The territory was located around the rivers Dnieper, southern Bug, Dniester, Prut and Siret-ed.] in May, whose leadership PM Bethlen entrusted to one of his trustworthy men, a professional soldier, staff captain Gyula Gömbös 247 because we know from historical 245 Prónay Pál emlékezései az 1921. évi nyugat-magyarországi eseményekről. Első rész [Memoirs of Pál Prónay of the Western Hungary events of 1921. Part One]. In: Soproni Szemle, 1986, issue 1, p. 27. 246 Bánffy, 1993, op. cit., pp. 66, 70. 247 Gyula Gömbös, born in 1886. During WWI, he served as a staff officer with the XIII. Corps in occupied Serbia, then fought in East Galicia as a captain. He was wounded in June, 1916. After his recovery, he was posted to the Defense Ministry. After the armistice, he served as military attache in the Defense Ministry (Nov.-Dec. 1918), then head of operations for the Balkan theater (Dec. 1918-Jan. 1919). He became the first president (Jan. 1919-Jan. 1925) of the Right-wing officers’ alliance, MOVE, and took a forceful stand against the Leftward shifting Károlyi government. He was ordered to Nagykanizsa as a staff officer, at which he had himself placed on inactive status (Feb. 21, 1919). Four days later, ahead of his expected arrest and 103
- Page 51 and 52: István Széchenyi (1791-1860) and
- Page 53 and 54: and consultation of the affected po
- Page 55 and 56: Also significant was the trade in p
- Page 57 and 58: Austria,” and Zoltán Palotás,
- Page 59 and 60: August 16, stating that every armed
- Page 61 and 62: Finally, and once more, we must fir
- Page 63 and 64: The center of the Vend region, 143
- Page 65 and 66: Szombathely travelled to the Vend r
- Page 67 and 68: his co-nationals in the Vend region
- Page 69 and 70: force - 7 battalions, 8 mounted com
- Page 71 and 72: Incidentally, to bolster their clai
- Page 73 and 74: two Szekler battalions and an artil
- Page 75 and 76: odies and contact with foreign enti
- Page 77 and 78: large volumes of maps and statistic
- Page 79 and 80: agenda.” Lansing: “Perhaps it w
- Page 81 and 82: the subject matter and content of t
- Page 83 and 84: consideration the existing western
- Page 85 and 86: external political education, raisi
- Page 87 and 88: Proclamation: “Our historical iss
- Page 89 and 90: amount).” 210 French Prime Minist
- Page 91 and 92: 31, 1920. 215 French forces pulled
- Page 93 and 94: supported by the Styrian government
- Page 95 and 96: stronger stance with regard to West
- Page 97 and 98: continue talks with Hungary. Howeve
- Page 99 and 100: Hungarian Cabinet meeting, that und
- Page 101: involvement in the royal coup attem
- Page 105 and 106: it was a secret report by Lt.Col. O
- Page 107 and 108: e ceded to Austria. The area is to
- Page 109 and 110: trade concessions. This was justifi
- Page 111 and 112: etained lawyer József Östör to a
- Page 113 and 114: manifestation, any encouraging word
- Page 115 and 116: ackground of this institution becau
- Page 117 and 118: Chapter 6: The Western Hungary insu
- Page 119 and 120: destination of Felsőőr, the distr
- Page 121 and 122: the first clash of Ágfalva. This w
- Page 123 and 124: they expressed their thanks for our
- Page 125 and 126: of Borostyánkő or the vicinity of
- Page 127 and 128: and not to start to travel towards
- Page 129 and 130: doctors, and, based on purely their
- Page 131 and 132: in the skirmish and the gendarmes t
- Page 133 and 134: evening. 348 Still back on the 4 th
- Page 135 and 136: international news media and focuse
- Page 137 and 138: Zárány was taken into custody by
- Page 139 and 140: enemy incursion into Hungarian terr
- Page 141 and 142: The second battle of Ágfalva - as
- Page 143 and 144: Mayor Mihály Thurner of Sopron and
- Page 145 and 146: On September 12, the prime minister
- Page 147 and 148: insurrection was the already mentio
- Page 149 and 150: the Hungarian government for financ
- Page 151 and 152: police bodyguards, which he might n
all possible means but not <strong>of</strong>ficially as that would have adverse diplomatic<br />
ramifications. <strong>The</strong> withdrawal <strong>of</strong> civil administration is, thus, to be suspended<br />
for the interim. <strong>The</strong> Szombathely headquarters and all military commands in<br />
the region were ordered to <strong>of</strong>fer any and all assistance to Col. Lehár in his<br />
attempt to organize the <strong>Western</strong> <strong>Hungary</strong> force. <strong>The</strong> colonel was deemed to be<br />
independent and not part <strong>of</strong> the command <strong>of</strong> the regional command structure.<br />
Forty <strong>of</strong>ficers <strong>of</strong> the National Army were selected to form Lehár’s staff and<br />
command structure who were from the annexed territory. <strong>The</strong>se <strong>of</strong>ficers were<br />
<strong>of</strong>ficially retired by the Defense Ministry but would later be reactivated into the<br />
armed forces without any hindrance. On proclamation <strong>of</strong> independence, all<br />
public security (gendarmerie, police, customs, revenue and border security)<br />
would come under the jurisdiction <strong>of</strong> Col. Lehár. Cooperation with the<br />
organization and operation <strong>of</strong> the new defense force would take the form <strong>of</strong><br />
relocating two infantry companies <strong>of</strong> the Vas County infantry regiment, and a<br />
company <strong>of</strong> machine guns, to the areas <strong>of</strong> Vas County intended for annexation<br />
(Felsőőr, [Nagy]Szentmihály és Németújvár) on the same day the Trianon<br />
Treaty was ratified. <strong>The</strong>se would remain stationed there until the disputed areas<br />
were vacated, meaning the linkage with Trans-Danubia was satisfied.<br />
According to the action plan, the following material was made available to Col.<br />
Lehár: 5,000 rifles, 3,000 <strong>of</strong>ficers and men with all their gear, 1,000 grenades,<br />
18 heavy and 18 light machine guns, a fully equipped mounted company, 2<br />
field cannons and 2 mortars (from equipment hidden from the Entente<br />
supervising committee), 3 cars, 4 trucks and 3 ambulances, which was to be<br />
bought. 243 At the April 28 session, the artillery complement <strong>of</strong> the autonomous<br />
area was raised to two batteries.<br />
<strong>The</strong> secret action plan and directives were acknowledged by the thencommander<br />
<strong>of</strong> the Szombathely military region, Lt.Gen. Pál Hegedüs, and Col.<br />
Antal Lehár. Lehár, most probably intentionally, left Lt.Col. Pál Prónay, who<br />
he met in the capital, out <strong>of</strong> the plans. <strong>The</strong> later leader <strong>of</strong> the insurrection<br />
recounted it as: “I noted in my journal <strong>of</strong> my meeting in the spring <strong>of</strong> <strong>1921</strong> in<br />
Budapest with Col. Baron Antal Lehár, commander <strong>of</strong> the Szombathely<br />
region, 244 when I reproached him on why he does not make all <strong>of</strong> Burgenland,<br />
including Sopron and Szombathely, independent based on the selfdetermination<br />
<strong>of</strong> people and why he does not order a draft and organize the<br />
necessary armed force in the territory to be handed over when its detachment<br />
from the mother country to Austria is already impending. (…) However, Lehár<br />
answered evasively and opined confidently regarding the loyalty <strong>of</strong> Burgenland<br />
to the mother country, which was so covered by his propaganda organs that it<br />
would never be Austrian. (…) My surprise was all the greater when, during the<br />
same summer, young Ivan Töpler, along with several Sopron citizens, led by<br />
mayor [Mihály] Thurner looked me up in Budapest, in the Nádor Barracks, as<br />
their last refuge. – Help us, Sir! <strong>Western</strong> <strong>Hungary</strong> must be handed over – It is a<br />
243 Ibid, p. 309.<br />
244 More accurately: division commander.<br />
102