The Fate of Western Hungary 1918-1921 - Corvinus Library ...

I resigned. Not three times, many more, but officially that number was
published. Twice, he sent a messenger after me, just so I would stay. At the
end, I could not stay under any circumstance. In any case, I told the king that he
was running to his end. “Majesty, you will even lose your throne, if you
continue like this,” I told him, and not just once, but he refused to listen. And
yet, everything could have been saved, possibly only Bosnia would have to
have been sacrificed. I know … that even that will be counted as my fault that
we did not bring home the Hungarian soldiers, and yet I appealed many times
in this matter. The former king made me a solemn promise, the last one on
October 2, that he will order the Hungarian soldiers home to defend the
threatened borders. But that is not how it happened. The Czechs only came
under Charles, obviously at the covert encouragement of the Court, to demand
the Hungarian counties. Their secret hope was not the Entente but Vienna. I
learned all these intrigues only later, after the fact. The secret reports are on file.
I can prove how my honest efforts were frustrated by the Viennese hand.” 10
As is known, the former prime minister, Count Tisza (1861-1918), was sent
by King Charles IV in September of 1918 on a southern circuit. The former
government leader’s two week tour of 3,451 kms. was in vain. The trip, on
narrow gauge railway, by car and on the Italian submarine-threatened Adriatic,
ran Zágráb/Zagreb – Zára/Zadar – Raguza/Dubrovnik – Cattaro/Kotor – Cetinje
– Mostar – Sarajevo – Brod – Eszék/Osijek – Újvidék/Novi Sad. This last royal
assignment of Tisza, to hold consultations with South Slav politicians eager to
secede, brought little concrete results. 11
In the meantime, on September 14, Count István Burián (1851-1922, the
common Foreign Minister for the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy, [Under the
terms of the 1867 Compromise, Austria maintained control over Foreign
Affairs, Treasury and Defense. Hungary had its own ministers for all other
ministries-ed.] approached the Allied countries with a diplomatic note in the
name of the Central Powers. He suggested that the warring parties open a
confidential and non-binding conference in a neutral place, regarding the
fundamental premises of a peace treaty, while “acts of war carry on unabated.”
The tone of the note did not reflect the true military situation of the Austro-
Hungarian Monarchy or Germany at the time, and did not suggest the adoption
10 Gelsei Bíró, Zoltán: A Habsburg-ház bűnei. Magyarország négyszázéves
szenvedésének története [The sins of the House of Habsburg. The history of 400 years
of Hungarian suffering]. Budapest, 1918, p. 96. (Bolding mine–J.B.) For the views and
policies of prime minister Wekerle (third time from Aug. 20, 1917 to Oct. 30, 1918) in
the South Slav and Croat-Magyar question, see: Bajza, József: IV. Károly és a
délszlávok [Charles IV and the South Slavs]. In: Új Magyar Szemle, year I, vol. III,
issue 1, November 1920, pp 31–46. Korosetz (variants: Korosec,Korošec), Anton
(1872–1940) Catholic priest, politician, member of Austria’s parliament from 1906.
From 1917, president of the South Slav Club, whose members are South Slav
politicians.
11 Palotás, Zoltán: Tisza István “délszláv missziója” [István Tisza’s “South Slav
mission”]. In: Új Magyarország, May 22, 1992, p. 10.
10