Book V - Snyder Bible

The Preaching of Simeon Kefa 303
ality neither good nor evil in the life of man; but that men call
things good or evil as they appear to them, prejudiced by the
use and custom of life. For not even murder is really an evil,
because it sets the spirit free from the bonds of the flesh. Further,
they say that even just judges put to death those who
commit crimes; but if they knew homicide to be an evil, just
men would not do that. Neither do they say that adultery is an
evil; for if the husband does not know, or does not care, there
is, they say, no evil in it. But neither, say they, is theft an evil;
for it takes away what one does, not possession from another
who has it. And, indeed, it ought to be taken freely and openly;
but in that it is done secretly, that is rather a reproof of his inhumanity
from whom it is secretly taken. For all men ought to
have the common use of all things that are in this world; but
through injustice one says that this is his, and another that
that is his, and so division is caused among men. In short, a
certain man, the wisest among the Greeks, knowing that these
things are so, says that friends should have all things common.
Now, in all things unquestionably wives are included. He says
also that, as the air and the sunshine cannot be divided, so neither
ought other things to be divided, which are given in this
world to all to be possessed in common, but should be so possessed.
But I wished to say this, because I am desirous to turn
to well doing, and I cannot act well unless I first learn what is
good; and if I can understand that, I shall thereby perceive
what is evil, that is, opposite to good.
Chapter VI: Kefa
But I should like that one of you, and not Kefa, should answer
what I have said; for it is not fitting to take words and instruction
at his hand, with questions; but when he gives a deliverance
on any subject, that should be held without answering
again. And therefore let us keep him as an umpire; so that if at
any time our discussion does not come to an issue, he may
declare what seems good to him, and so give an undoubted
end to doubtful matters. And now therefore I could believe,
content with his sole opinion, if he expressed any opinion; and