The positivist repudiation of Wundt - Kurt Danziger
The positivist repudiation of Wundt - Kurt Danziger The positivist repudiation of Wundt - Kurt Danziger
230 KURT DANZIGER in the inevitability of progress. (Max Weber, Gesammelte Aufsatze zur Wissenschaftslehre [Tiibingen: J. C. B. Mohr, 19681, pp. 49-63. Original date, 1905). 77. It is noteworthy that this is one point on which Titchener explicitly disagrees with Avenarius, who attempted to use phenomenal experience as a starting point, which would include the experience of value, because he wished to avoid the crude metaphysics of a position like Titchener’s. 78. 79. 80. 81. 82. 83. 84. Titchener, Systematic Psychology, p. 32. Boring, Physical Dimensions, p. 6. Ibid., p. 7. Ibid., pp. 6, 8. Ibid., p. 31. Ibid., p. 222. Clark Leonard Hull, “Knowledge and Purpose as Habit Mechanisms,” Psychological Review 37 (1930): 511-525. 85. See Brian D. Mackenzie, “Behaviourism and Positivism,” Journal of the History of the Behavioral Sciences 8 (1972): 222-23 1. 86. Some psychologists continued to draw their inspiration from the earlier Machian positivism, and this entailed certain differences among the schools of behaviorism. B. F. Skinner, at any rate, has always been clear about the status and antecedents of his behaviorism: “To me behaviorism is a special case of a philosophy of science which first took shape in the writings of Ernst Mach, Henri Poincark and Percy Bridgrnan.” See B. F. Skinner in Edwin G. Boring and L. A. Lindzey, A History of Psychology in Autobiography, vol. 5 (New York: Appleton-Century-Crofts, 1967). 87. There is a useful bibliography on the fundamental objections of Boltzmann, Max Planck, and Albert Einstein to Mach’s conception of physics in John T. Blackmore, Ernst Mach (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1972). 88. Some aspects of this topic are pursued elsewhere. See Kurt Danziger, “The Social Origins of Modern Psychology: Positivist Sociology and the Sociology of Knowledge,” in The Social Context of Psychological Theory, ed. A. R. Buss (New York: Irvington, 1979). 89. Wilhelm Wundt, Die Psychologie im Kampf ums Dasein (Stuttgart: Kraner, 1913). 90. Wundt, “Uber reine und angewandte Psychologie.” 91. Quite recently there has been a revival of interest in Wundt’s formulations in the areas of psycho- linguistics, emotion, and cognition. In many respects his approach has stood the test of time far better than that of his successors. See especially Arthur L.. Blumenthal, The Process of Cognition (Englewood Cliffs, N. J.: Prentice Hall, 1977).
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230 KURT DANZIGER<br />
in the inevitability <strong>of</strong> progress. (Max Weber, Gesammelte Aufsatze zur Wissenschaftslehre [Tiibingen:<br />
J. C. B. Mohr, 19681, pp. 49-63. Original date, 1905).<br />
77. It is noteworthy that this is one point on which Titchener explicitly disagrees with Avenarius, who<br />
attempted to use phenomenal experience as a starting point, which would include the experience <strong>of</strong> value,<br />
because he wished to avoid the crude metaphysics <strong>of</strong> a position like Titchener’s.<br />
78.<br />
79.<br />
80.<br />
81.<br />
82.<br />
83.<br />
84.<br />
Titchener, Systematic Psychology, p. 32.<br />
Boring, Physical Dimensions, p. 6.<br />
Ibid., p. 7.<br />
Ibid., pp. 6, 8.<br />
Ibid., p. 31.<br />
Ibid., p. 222.<br />
Clark Leonard Hull, “Knowledge and Purpose as Habit Mechanisms,” Psychological Review<br />
37 (1930): 511-525.<br />
85. See Brian D. Mackenzie, “Behaviourism and Positivism,” Journal <strong>of</strong> the History <strong>of</strong> the Behavioral<br />
Sciences 8 (1972): 222-23 1.<br />
86. Some psychologists continued to draw their inspiration from the earlier Machian positivism, and this<br />
entailed certain differences among the schools <strong>of</strong> behaviorism. B. F. Skinner, at any rate, has always been<br />
clear about the status and antecedents <strong>of</strong> his behaviorism: “To me behaviorism is a special case <strong>of</strong> a philosophy<br />
<strong>of</strong> science which first took shape in the writings <strong>of</strong> Ernst Mach, Henri Poincark and Percy Bridgrnan.”<br />
See B. F. Skinner in Edwin G. Boring and L. A. Lindzey, A History <strong>of</strong> Psychology in Autobiography,<br />
vol. 5 (New York: Appleton-Century-Cr<strong>of</strong>ts, 1967).<br />
87. <strong>The</strong>re is a useful bibliography on the fundamental objections <strong>of</strong> Boltzmann, Max Planck, and Albert<br />
Einstein to Mach’s conception <strong>of</strong> physics in John T. Blackmore, Ernst Mach (Berkeley: University <strong>of</strong><br />
California Press, 1972).<br />
88. Some aspects <strong>of</strong> this topic are pursued elsewhere. See <strong>Kurt</strong> <strong>Danziger</strong>, “<strong>The</strong> Social Origins <strong>of</strong> Modern<br />
Psychology: Positivist Sociology and the Sociology <strong>of</strong> Knowledge,” in <strong>The</strong> Social Context <strong>of</strong> Psychological<br />
<strong>The</strong>ory, ed. A. R. Buss (New York: Irvington, 1979).<br />
89. Wilhelm <strong>Wundt</strong>, Die Psychologie im Kampf ums Dasein (Stuttgart: Kraner, 1913).<br />
90. <strong>Wundt</strong>, “Uber reine und angewandte Psychologie.”<br />
91. Quite recently there has been a revival <strong>of</strong> interest in <strong>Wundt</strong>’s formulations in the areas <strong>of</strong> psycho-<br />
linguistics, emotion, and cognition. In many respects his approach has stood the test <strong>of</strong> time far better than<br />
that <strong>of</strong> his successors. See especially Arthur L.. Blumenthal, <strong>The</strong> Process <strong>of</strong> Cognition (Englewood Cliffs,<br />
N. J.: Prentice Hall, 1977).