The positivist repudiation of Wundt - Kurt Danziger

224 KURT DANZIGER
sensation. Because the addition of “context” is itself frequently not a conscious act, “the
test of such a meaning can only be behavioural.” 83 Meaning is a matter of dis-
criminatory response, and Titchener’s context theory of meaning finally fathers
behaviorism. Knowledge and purpose become “habit mechanisms,” 84 and value is a
matter of preferential response.
The victory of behaviorism, from its first self-conscious announcements to its cap-
ture of the main citadels of American psychology, was accomplished with extraordinary
speed. If this was a “scientific revolution” it must surely be the fastest revolution known
to the history of science! Indeed, it has frequently been observed that the gospel of
behaviorism fell on ears that had been very well prepared to receive it. The role that func-
tionalism played in that regard needs no elaboration. But it may well be that from a
wider perspective the role of positivist sensationalism must be judged to have been of
more fundamental importance.
Such judgments depend on the level of generality at which a theory such as
behaviorism is examined. Any scientific theory involves a hierarchy of assumptions and
associated prescriptions at various levels of abstraction. The point, however, is not that
more and less abstract concepts exist side by side but that the same concept has both a
more specific content as well as a base of more abstract assumptions that usually remain
implicit. Thus, the prescription that all psychological phenomena are to be analyzed into
stimulus and response elements is a specific instance of the more general prescriptions
that complex psychological events consist of elements and that these elements are to be
such as can be described in a physical “thing” language. Now, the concepts of
behaviorism have a rather specific level whose content will vary with the particular ver-
sion of the doctrine one happens to be dealing with, but they also involve more abstract
prescriptions which are shared by all the varieties of behaviorism as well as by many psy-
chological theories that might not be self-consciously behavioristic. These abstract
prescriptions are derived from a positivist philosophy of science. The distinctive feature
of most twentieth-century psychology lay in the fact that positivism became its form of
scientific orthodoxy.8S Therein lies the historical importance of the positivist reform of
psychology which we have traced to the effcnts of a group inspired by Mach around the
turn of the century. Their work is of interest, not only because it establishes a real
historical link between Machian positivism and the mainstream of academic psychology,
but also because it expresses rather directly certain basic preconceptions which later
generations simply took for granted. The important role played by Machian positivism
at the period when psychology formed its self-conception as an independent discipline
also explains the peculiar susceptibility of psychology to subsequent infusions of
positivist philosophy in the form of operationism and logical positivism.86 No other
science showed this effect; no other science had started off by defining its aims in a
framework of positivist philosophy. Among his fellow physicists Mach’s philosophy of
science remained the object of considerable controversy and never gained general accep-
tance.81
What behaviorism did contribute was the strong practical interest of American psy-
chology. For the purpose of manipulating individuals in the context established by real
social institutions the older, descriptive form of psychological positivism was indeed
useless. But, in taking this turn, behaviorism was actually restoring the positivist
philosophy of science to its traditional role. Because of its emphatic rejection of any
possible role for science in providing insights into a real world behind appearances, this
philosophy was left with only two ways of justifying scientific activity. One was to justify