Copy of attorney James Milligan's motion - Knoxville News Sentinel

IN DISCIPLINARY DISTRICT II
OF THE
BOARD OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY
OF THE
SUPREME COURT OF TENNESSEE
IN RE: JAMES L. MILLIGAN, JR. DOCKET NO.: R-170-2(K)-SG
B. P. R. No.: 001559
AN ATTORNEY FORMERLY LICENSED TO
PRACTICE IN KNOX COUNTY, TENNESSEE
MOTION FOR RELIEF FROM JUDGMENT PURSUANT TO RULE 60 OF THE TENNESSEE
RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE
COMES your petitioner Jatnes L. Milligan. Jr.. Pro se. and does hereb.n- rnove this Board. tltrott-ult a
duly assigned hearing panel. to set aside the prior order of this Board in denf ing reinstatet.nent to the said
James L. Milligan. Jr.. and in support thereof uould state as fbllou's:
A. PROCEDURAL HISTORY
That.larnes L. Milligan, Jr, rvas originalll licensed to practice lar.v itt the state of Tennessee in 1975
and practiced continually thereafter until suspended frlr a period of two (2) years or order of the Tennessee
Suprerne Courl via a rvritten opinion on or about June 28. 2005. Mr. Milligan rvas suspetrded fbr said peliod
of tr.vo (2) 1,ears for events rvhich had transpired in 1999-2000.
That Mr. Milligan thereupon closed his practice and notified all clients and attornels and coltl-ts
pursuant to Rule 9. Section I 8. of the Sttprerne Coufi Rules of his suspetlsion.

Finally, after awaiting the requisite t,,ro (2) 1ears, Mr. Milligan filed a Petition for Reinstatelnent on
June 18,2007, in accordance r.vith Tennessee Supreme Court Rule 9, Section 9 Sec. 19. A Hearing Panel
rvas duly appointed. This original panel had thereon Hon. John Harbeq an attorne) licensed to practice in
Knox Count1,, Tennessee. in addition to two other members. Mr. Harber, after being notified of the
appointrnent, recused himself frorn presiding as a judicial ofTlce due to an apparent conflict of itrterest. and
the Hon. Williarn Soaper Lockett. Jr.. nas appointed in his place and stead. Also serving on the hearitrg
panel for Mr. Milligan's reinstaternent petition r.rere Hon. Todd J. Moody and Hon. Ster.'e Erdely. lV. uitlr
Mr. Lockett being the senior mernber of the parrel.
A hearing was conducted on December l3 2007. lasting until 7:00 pm that evening. A
decision rvas rendered by the Hearing Panel on January' 10" 2008. This decision ruled that Mr. Milligan's
Petition for Reinstatement r.vas denied. At no time did the Iton. William Soaper Lockett. Jr.. make knoutr
that he an)'any problerns or difficulties at all uhich nould reflect on his ability to preside as a jurist on Mr.
M illigan's Petition for Reinstatement.
Mr. Milligan thereafter filed a Writ of Cerliorari to the Chancery Courl of Knox Cottntl' otr
February, 14.2008. which resulted in Chancellor Kerrl'Blackwood affirrning the decision of the Hearing
Panel pursuant to the standard of revierv set fort in Suprerne Court Rule 9. Section 1.3 perlaining to
Disciplinary enforcement. Mr. Milligan then appealed tc the Suprerne CoLrrt of Tennessee. w'hich also
afflnned the decision of the hearing panel. Both rer,'ielving courls were constrained in the scope of their
review by Rule 9 Section 1.3 of the Rules of Disciplinar'1'Enfbrcement. The decision of the Supreme Cottrt
rvas entered on December 8. 2009.

B. BASIS FOR SETTING ASIDE DECISION OF HEARING PANEL
Your Petitioner James L. Milligan, Jr. uor"rld earnestll and respectfirlly rrove and beseech both the
Board and any Hearing Panel assigned to hear this Motion to set aside the decision of the Hearing Panel as
constituted on December 13.2Q01 and the ruling resulting thelefrom pursuant to Rule 60 of the Tennessee
Rules of Civil Procedure and also pursuant to the lnolant's Due Process rights under both Constitutiorts of
the United States and the State of Tennessee. This Rule, as is n'ell known, specificalll'prol'ides fbr relief
frorn judgrnents u'hich "vere obtained b1 "fiaud" or "(5) any'other reason justifl,ing relief from the
operation of the j udgment."
It is the contention of your pelitioner that Mr. Willianr Soaper Lockett rvas guiltl of such fl'aud
upon the Supreme Couft, this honorable Board of Prof'essional Responsibility' and upon the said respondent
Jarnes L. Milligan. Jr., hirnself, being an unfit jurisl to try Mr. Milligan's Petiton for Reinstatenrent. that the
Judgrnent of the Hearing Panel on January 10.2008. should be reversed and set aside and a treu hearit.tg
ordered. Otherwise, there rvould be a contiuuing violation of petitioner's rights to Due Process utrder the
Constitutions of the United States and the State of I'ennessee.
At this time of the hearing in 2007 (and indeed since 2005) Mr. Lockett rvas etrgaging in f-elonious
activities unbeknorvnst to anyone but hirnself-. Mr. Lockett u'as thus unfit to serve as a jurist regarding Mr.
Milligan's petition and should have recused himself fl'orn the hearing or at least tnade known to the parties
the nature and extend of his misconduct so the parties could judge for thernselves rvhether they rvanted to
challenge Mr. Lockett's presence as a.jurist and decider on the hearing panel. Mr. Lockett's tlisconduct at
the time of Mr. Milligan's hearing on his Petition fbr Reinstatement involved several issues sitttilarto those
for rvhich Mr. Milligan had been disciplined. Mr. Lockett orr the hearing panelr.ras acting both as a.jLrdge of
the law and of the facts.
The Knox Countl. Tennessee. OfIce of the District Attornel' General subsequentll returned an
Infbrrnation against Williarn Soaper Lockett. Jr.. statinq that "through a continr.ring colrrse of conduct fiorn
a

on or about May 24, 3005 through ALrgust 31. 2008. in the State and Countl aforesaid. and befbre the
finding of this Presentment did unlaii,firllv, felonioLrsll and knowingly obtain or exercise control of over
$10.000 in U.S. Currency. the propertl of Kennerll. Montgorrery'. and Finley, P.C., with intent to deprive
the said Kennerly. Montgomerl,. and Finley, P.C. of sarre, contrary'to T.C.A.39-14-103. a Class C felonl.
and against the peace and dignity of the State of Tennessee.'' (A copy of this presentrnent is attached heretcr
as Exhibit 1),
The the said Williarn Soaper Lockett. Jr.. havin-s been confronted r.vith overultelmirtg el'idence of
his defalcation (i.e. embezzlement) did on the 8''' da1 of April 2010. enter a volLurtar\ plea of guiltr to this
presentment. Mr. Lockett plead guill'to a Class C felonl. i.e. theft under $60.000.00 and receir,ecl a
sentence of three y'ears irnprisonment. rvhich \\as verv leniently suspended. and he u'as placed on
unsupervised probation forthree years. Mr. Lockett uas fufther ordered to pa)'restitutiott in the alr-rount of
$32.022.99 to the law finn of Kennerll'. Montgornerl'and Finler. and not to appll'for diversion. (A copl of
the guilty plea is attached hereto as Exhibit 2.) Mr. Lockett uas rendered infarnous.
Then, compounding the seriousness this his crimes. Mr. Lockett plead gLrilty' to n'illfully' failing to
file income tax retums in Federal Court in Knorrille. Mr. Lockett plead guilty to u'illfirlll failing to flle
income tax returns in order to hide his ill-gotten gains. He even failed to reporl on any retums that he had
earned over $100,000 per year in 2006 and 2007 as repofted income from Kennerly. Montgonrerl and
Finleyl P.C. His actions irr not reporting his inconre on the ill-gotten gaius rras an atternpt to defi'aud the
TreasuryoftheUnitedStatesofArnerica.ThecosttotheUnitedStatesTreasun \\'asover$16.000.00.
Unfortunately, Mr. Lockett sau flt to rur.r fbr and obtain electiort to a public office. that of Lau
Director, for Knox County Tennessee. l,r'hilst in the midst of his defalcations (embezzlement and tar
evasion). One can only surmise that Mr. Lockett is a man of f-eu u'ords u'hen it comes to rnaking knou'n his
unfitness to hold public office, either as a jurist of as an elected ofllcial. That is. until forced to do so.

C. THE RULES OF JUDICIAL ETHICS AND RULES OF PROFESSIONAL-
RESPONSIBILITY PROHIBITED MR. LOCKETT FROM PRESIDING AS A JURIST IN MR.
MILLIGAN'S PETITION FOR REINSTATEMENT
Rule 10 of the Tenrressee Supreme Court sets forth the Code of Judicial Conduct. Concenting tlte
application of the Code of Judicial Contact, it is specificalll,stated therein as follou's: "An1'one. nhetheror
not a lalvyer, who is an officer of a jLrdicial svstern and rrho performs judicial functiotts- including att
officer such as a magistrate, couft cornn-rissioner. -judicial comrnissioner. special master. divorce ref'eree.
juvenile referee, or any other referee performing .iudicial functions, is a judge within the meaning of this
Code. Alljudges shall comply with this Code except as provided below.'"
Canon 2 specifically provides that "A Jud-ee Shall Avoid lmproprietl' and the Appearattce of
Ir-npropriety in All of the Judge's Activities." Moreover. Canon 3 requires attd detrands that the -f ulist
perfonn his or her duties irnpartially and diligentlr. Subsection E of this same Catron t.nandates that the
jurist shalldisqualifl' hirnself ''in any'proceeding uhere his imparlialitl'might reasonabll'be questioned."
The ''Tennessee Rules of Prof-essional Conduct"'also uere violated by Mr. Lockett in acting as a
jurist in Mr. Milligan's reinstatement proceeding. Mr. Lockett violated Rule 8.4 and predecessor rules
regarding "Misconduct". This rule. in its present manifestation. states explicitly that it is "profbssional
misconduct for a lawyer to:
(a) violate or attempt to violate the Rules of Professional Conduct,
knowingly assist or induce another to do so, or to do so through the acts of
another.
(b) commit a criminal act that reflects adversely on the lawyer's honestv,
trustworthiness, or fitness as a larvver in other respects.
( c) engage in conduct invoh'ing dishonest-vo fraud, deceit or

misrepresentations.
(d) engage in conduct that is prejudicial to the administration of justice. ....
Before. during and after Mr. Milligan's rcinstaternerrt hearing. Williarn Soaper Lockett. Jr.. was
engaging in acts of dishonesty rvhich rendered hinr r-rnfltto be a county lalv directoq unfitto be an attornel.
and certainly unfit to act as a jurist.
One does not necessarily have to postulate as to the efl-ect of Mr. Lockett's criminal actir ities upon
the decision in Mr. Milligan's reinstatement case. l1'he u'as r"rnfit. a priori^ then the decision of the parrel is
void or, at the very least, voidable.
Rule 60.03 of the Tennessee Rules of Ciril Procedure quite specificall;. provides for the tlpe of
relief sought herein: relief from a flnal order. judgrnent or proceeding based Lrpon '-an1,' other reason
justiff ing relief fiom the operation of the judgnient."
WHEREFORE, your movant pral's that
I . A hearing panel be fonned for the purpose of deciding the merits of this rnotion.
2. That upon the hearing. the panel set aside the decision of the hearing panel on
January' 20, 2008. rvhich denied Mr. Milligan's application for reinstatemertt and that a
new hearing be conducted rvith a nell' panel. based both upon the rnandates of Rule 60 of
the Tennessee Rules of Civil Procedure and the Due Process rights of the rnovant.
3. That the lnovant would also call upon the Board of Professional Responsibility of
this state, as the Supreme Courl's chief enfbrcerrent arrn of rules of ethics goveming
attomeys and rnernbers of the judiciarr'. and also as the icon of legal ethics to ri'hich all
people of this state look. to join rvith the rro\ant in lequesting the setting aside of the
prior hearing panel's decision on reinstatentent.

RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED.
ES L. MILLIGAN, JR:. PRO
905 Teaberry Lane, No. 2
Krroxville. Tennessee 31 9 1 9
T:865-224-6410
Fax: 865-223-5790
e: j lm i ll iganjr@gmai l.com
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
This is to ceftify that I, James L. Milligan..lr.. the rno\,ant named herein. has served upon Hon.
Sandy'Garrett, counsel forthe Board of Prof-essional Responsibilitl,, a true and exact cop) of the foregoin-e
Motion fbr Relief, by placing same in the U.S. Mail. first class postage prepaid. to her address of 10
Cadillac Drive. Suite 220. Brentr.vood. Tennessee 37027 .
This t
MES L. MILLIGA

caseNo q43ai
STATE OF TENNESSEE:
COUNW OF KNOX:
iNFORMATION
COUNT ONE
The Disirict Attorney General Pro Tern for Knox County, Tennessee, upon his
information presents and says that he has been informed that WILLIAM S. LOCKET,T,
JB., through a continuing course of conduct from on or about May 24,2005 through
August 31, 2008 in the State and County aforesaid, and before the finding of this
Presentment did unlaMully, feloniously and knowingly obtain or exercise control of over
$10,000 in U.S. currency, the property of Kenner-ly. Montgoffi€ry, and Finley, P.C. with
intent to deprive the said Kennerly, Montgomery, and Finley, P.C. of same, contrary to
T C.A. 39-'14-103, a Class C felony, and
Against the peace and dignity of ihe State of -lennessee,
K GREnEYWA-LSJR
CRIMINAL COURT
e HARGE: Theft Over $10,000
DISTRICT ATTORNEY GENERAL PRO TEM
r \iltBlr O\E,

INTHE CRIMINAL COURT I.]OR KNOX COUNTY, TET{NESSEE
DIVIS]oj{I
STATE OF TENNFSSEE
Y.
WILLIAM SOAPER LOCKET'T, IR. *
cAsE No.,3-V321
D.u.B. oTijBires4
\\rAIVER OI TRIAI. LiY I-L RY Al\]D REOUEST
FOR ACCEPTAN--aEIII PLE-A OF PUILTY
FiLED
ApR 0 I 2010
By Jcy R, i,1c0ros,

have in this case and has advised me of aliy lesser included offenses to u'hich I may be
subject. I am completely satisfied rvith the legai advice and representation provicled to Ine
by my attorney in this case, and I have absolutely no con-iplaints to make to the Court
concerning his representation.
(4) 1 understand that I am charged in the inforn'ration with ti-re offense listed
below and that the Srate has not filed a Notice of Intcnt to Seek Enhanced Punishment'
My artorney has discussed with me the possible punishments if I am found guilty, and I
understand them to be as follows'
POSSIRLE PIJNISHMENTS
DOCKET # COUNT OFFENSE CLASS MINIMUM ]'4TryIMUM
ONE THEF'| UNDER C 3 ]RS. 6 YRS. IMPRISONMENT
$60,000
PROBATION $1O,OOO FINE
RESTITUTION
(5) It has been ful\' explained to me aLrd 1 understand that I may, if I so choose,
plead "not guilry" to any offense charged againsr me, and that If I choose to plead "not
guilty" the consritution guarantees and this Court will provicle ille the right to a speedy and
ptiblic trial by jury; that the State must provc to a jury my guilt beyond a reasonable doubt
as to e\.ery elenrent of the offense with rvhich I am charged; the rigl-rt to see and hear all
witpesses against me, and these may be cross examinecl by -y
attorney; the right to use the
power ai'id process of the court to compel the production of any evidence, including the
atendance of any favora.ble witness, further that I n'ray testifo if I wish but if I feel that it
u,ould be ro my interest not to testifu, I may remain silent, no comment may be made ai'rd I

may not be forced to tesrify, also I need not make al'Iy statements or give testimony that my
tend to incrirninate me of this or any other o{fense; and the right to havc the assistance o[
counsel in ny deferlse at all stages of thc proceedings; and that if I am indiger-rt and calll-Ior
afford any attorney the Court u'ill appoinr one to reprcscnt me.
(6) I understand that if I plead guilty to the offense listed in paragraph nine(9), I
am waiving my right to a rrial to determine my guilty or innocence and there rviil not be a
further triai of any kind except as to the appropriate sentcnce. I further understanrl that if
I plead guilry- to the of'fense listed in paragraph nine (9), I am waiving my right to have a
jury fix the amount of my fine. i further undersrand that if I plead guilry, the Court may
ask me questions under oath, on the record, and in the presence of counsel about thc
offense to which I am pleading guilry, and my ans\vers may later be used agailst me in a
prosecution for perjury or false statcment, ar-rd that if necessary, any convictions on my
record may be used in determining the proper sen[ence.
Q) I understand thar by pleading guilty, I am rvaiving or giving up nry righr to
appeai all non-jurisdictional defects or errors in tl'rese proceedings, inciuding any
complaints I might have that i was unlawfully arrested, that my property or possessions
rvere unlawfully searched or seized, that my right againsc self-incriminacion or righr tcr
counsel rvere violated, or that I was denied a rlght to a speedy trial. However, if I am rried
on a plea of r-rot guilty and am dissatisfied with rhe jury's verdi* or rhe judgmenr of the
Coutt, I may appeal to the Court of Criminal Appeals, be furnished counsel and if
necessary have the transcript furnislied by the Statc at no cost ro me.

(8) I undersrand thar if the Court accepts my plea of guilty and I am convicted
of rhe offense to which I an pleading guilry, this conviction will be public record, u'ill
render me infamous, derrying me access to the elective process and making my swom
testimony subject to attack: and may be used to increase the punishment I mighr reccivc if I
am later coirvicted of any crinre and may be used in combination u'ith other feiony
convictions to establish the status of career criminal if I am later corivicted of another
felony.
(9) \SAIVER OF IURY TRIAL AND ENTRY OF GUILTY PLEA.
BEING AWARE OF MY CONSTITUTIONAL AND STATUTORY RIGHTS, I
HEREBY \fAIVE MY RIGHT TO A IURY TRIAL AND THOSE OTHERS LISTED
ABO\T AND PLEAD GUItrY TO THE OFFENSE LISTED BELOW
My decision to plead guilry is voluntary and not the result of force or threars or o[
promises apart from the plea agreement. I arn pleading gLrilty because I feel it is in my best
inrerest. I understand that the possible pur-rishmcnts for the offense to which l am
pleading guilty are as follou's and that as a result of my plea of guilry, the District Attorney
Gerreral or his represelltative will recomulend the following sentence as to this offelrse' t
understand that this is onlv a -recommendation and that the Court is r-rot bound by this
rgcommendatio.rl ir-r any rvav,

DOCKET NO,
POSSIBLE SENTENCE ON THE CNE COUNT OF THE INFORMATION,
C FELONY, THEFT UNDE,R $60,000,
M]NIMUM SENTENCE: 3 YEARS PROBATION.
MAXIMUM SENTENCEI 6 \TARS IN PRISON, MAXIMUM IO,OOO FINE, AND
RESTITUTION,
RECOMMENDED SENTENCE AS TO TFIE CNE COUNT OIT THE INFORMATION,
C FELONY THEFf UNDER $6O,OCO. THREE YEARS IMPRISONMENT,
SUSPENDED; PLACED ON UNSUPERVISED PROBATION FOR THREE YEARS;
RESTITUTION iN THE AMOUNT OF $32,022.99, TO BE PAID THE LA\(/ FIRlvl OF
KENNERLY MONTGOMERY & FINLEY DURING THE TERM OF THE
PROBATION; NO FINE IMPOSED. DEFE,NDANT AGREES NOT TO APPLY FOR
DIVERSION.
Further hearing on the day of
Tennessee.
20-, at Knoxville,

CERTI F'ICATE OF DEFENDANT
I hereby certifi/ that I have read the foregoing clocument or that ir has bee' reacl ro
me' I understaud what it says and i am in agreemenr rhar ir is in my best interest to give up
my right to a juty rrial and enter a plea of guitry to the charge listed in this document, I
understa'd that the District Attorney General may make a recor)1me'clation tci thc court
about what my sentence should be. I urrcle.rsrancl that the court is nor bou*d to follorv
this recommendarion.
ENTER this the day of
CtsRTTFICATE OF DEFENSE ATTORNEY
I hereby certifi' a.d declare ttrat rriy clie^r has eirher read rhis fbregoing document
or that i have read it to him' I am satisfiecl thar my clicnt understancls rhe conrents of this
document and that his decision to waive his right to a trial by jury and ro enrer a plea of
guilry has bee. made by him volunrarily, k'o,,i,ir-rgry a.!,intelligenrly,
by jury,
20
\(/, TFIOMAS DTLLARD lspn #002020]
ATTORNEY FOR DEFENDANT
for the purpose of waivine trial
DISTRICT ATTORNEY GENERAL