report on the derailment strathmiglo scottish region british railways

MINISTRY OF TRANSPORT
RAILWAY ACCIDENTS
REPORT ON THE DERAILMENT
which occurred on
27th November 1949 near
STRATHMIGLO
in the
SCOTTISH REGION
BRITISH RAILWAYS
LONDON : HIS MAJESTY'S STATIONERY OFFICE
1950
SIXPENCE NET

SCOTTISH REGION
BRITISH RAILWAYS
MINISTRY OF TRANSPORT,
Berkeley Square House,
London, W. 1
3rd May, 1950.
1 have the honour to <strong>report</strong> for the information of the Minister of Transport, in accordance with the
Order dated 29th November, 1949, the result of my Inquiry into the accident which occurred at 7.40 am.
on 27th November, 1949, on the single line between Strathmiglo and Gateside in Fifeshire, in the Scottish
Region.
A loaded ballast train proceeding to a point on the line where relaying operations were to take place,
reached there at the moment when the gang, who had arrived by road a few minutes earlier, had removed
one rail length of track, including the sleepers. The driver was unable to stop in time and the engine and
tender, plunging into the bare formation, were completely derailed. No flagmen had been sent out to
protect the work.
1 regret to <strong>report</strong> that Driver P Robertson was killed and that 10 other railwaymen who werc
travelling in the train were slightly hurt. Skilled help for the injured was quickly available, as four of the
men on the work were trained in first aid, and a doctor and ambulance arrived on the scene within
25 minutes of the occurrence.
Damage to the train was of a superficial nature. The engine was rerailed at 4.40 p.m. on the same
day, and normal working on the line resumed on the following morning. No delay was occasioned to
traffic because the line is usually closed on Sundays.
The train, consisting of 2 empty rail and sleeper wagons, 6 wagons loaded with ashes, an engineer's
coach and a 20-ton brake van, was drawn by an 0-6-0 tender engine with left-hand drive, travelling chimney
first. The weight of the engine and tender when full was 95 tons, and the total weight of the trailing load
was 162 tons. The length of the train was 130 yards. The steam brake was in operation on engine and
tender wheels, and there was a hand brake on the tender. The braking power of the engine and tender
was 60.4%, and of the brake van 98.5% of their weights, and the maximum braking power available on
the whole train, including the brake van, was 30% of the total weight of 257 tons.
The weather at the time was fine and clear, but visibility was restricted to about 250 yards by the half
light of early morning.
1. The accident occurred at a place known as Corstanmill on the branch single line which runs
between Ladybank and Mawcarse Junctions. Traffic is very light, and on Sunday the line is closed. It
is worked under the Regulations for Train Signalling on Single lines of Railway by the Electric Token Block
System, and the intermediate stations are Auchtermuchty, Strathmiglo and Gateside There is a signal
box at Auchtermuchty, and the token sections are from Ladyhank to Auchtermuchty and thence to
Mawcarse.
Distances from Ladybank are :--
Auchtermuchty . . . . . . . . 4 miles 59 ch
Strathmiglo . . . . . . . . 6 ,, 59 ,,
Location of accident (Corstanmill) . . 7 ,, 33 ,,
Gateside . . . . . . . . . . 8 ,, 63 ,,
Mawcarse . . . . . . . . 11 ,, 37 ,,
2. Corstanmill is a farmhouse which is close beside the line between Strathmiglo and Gateside, and
about &mile from the former. The line, after leaving Strathmiglo, curves slightly to the right under a
road bridge, and then continues straight : it rises continuously, and for the last 500 yards before reaching
the scene of the accident, the gradient is I in 100 ; in clear daylight an approaching train can first be seen
from Corstanmill as it passes underneath the road bridge by Strathmiglo Station.
REPORT AND EVIDENCE
3. Resleepering operations had been planned to take place at three places between Ladybank and
Mawcarse. Job No. 2533 was at Corstanmill, and Nos. 2534 and 2535 were between Gatcside and
Mawcarse Junction. No. 2533 was scheduled to take place on the Sunday, 27th November, and No. 2535
was to be undertaken at some future date : No. 2534 had already been completed on the Thursday before
the accident, November 24th.

4. The Notices for Job No. 2533 had been properly issued and were as follows:-
"TEMPORARY SPEED RESTRICTIONS
PERMANENT WAY OPERATIONS
SIGNAL $LTERATIONS, Etc.
Saturday, November 26th
to
Friday, December 2nd, 1949 (inclusive)
Temporary Speed Restrictions
Saturday, November 26th to Friday, December 2nd, 1949
Location of Lines Mileage Speed
Work Affected At or Between Restriction
M. Chs. M. Chs. m.p.h
Ludybank South Junction and Mawcarse Junction.
Remarks
Gateside and
Strathmiglo Single 7 30 7 70 20 Resleepering
Commences
Nov. 27.
Temporary Engineering Works.
At or Between Lines Aflected
. Sunday, Nov. 27th Branch Line
Gateside and Blocked
Strathmiglo
"RELIEF EXCURSION AND SPECIAL
TRAIN ARRANGEMENTS.
From Saturday, November 26th,
To Friday, December 2nd, 1949.
Engineer's Operations - Ballast Train Working.
Sunday, November 27th
Remarks
7.30 a.m. to 4.30p.m.
resleepering, 7m. 35chs. to
7m. 70chs.
Mawcarse Jrt. and Auchtermuchty
Signal Boxes open."
(12) Ballast train will leave Ladybank at 7.0 a.m. for Gafeside and, after working as required,
will return about 4.30. p.m. District Operating Superintendent, Burntisland, to provide Guard.
Engineer to provide Carriage and Brake Van."
5. As some spare labour had become available, a start was made with Job 2533 on Friday, November
25th. Permanent Way Inspector Henderson who was in charge of the work, took the usual steps for its
protection under Rule 217, and later posted a Flagman and erected "C" and "T" indicators in accordance
with Rule 218. On the evening of Saturday, November 26th, after the last train bad passed and the line
had closed to normal traffic over the week-end, the Flagman was withdrawn, but the indicators were left
in position with their lamps lighted.
6. Driver Robertson, who was the senior driver at the Ladybank Shed, had received copies of the
Notices, and had extracted the relevant items and chalked them on a black board for the guidance of the
enginemen at his shed. The following was included in these items :-
"27.11.49
P. Robertson
J. McKenrie
6.0 a.m.
6.0 a.m.
7 a.m. Ballast
Gateside."
7. On the morning of November 27th, the ballast train left Ladybank at 7.17 a.m. in charge of
Driver Robertson, Fireman McKenzie and Guard Hargreaves, and reached Auchtermuchty at 7.27 am.
It slowed down nearly to a stand at the signal box, and was then cautioned by a green hand signal. As he
exchanged tokens, the signalman told the fireman to stop at the station platform to pick up some of the
gang who were to work on the job. After doing this, the train drew forward to Strathmiglo, where it
slowed down again in case there were more of the gang to be picked up. There was, however, no one on
the platform, and the train continued towards Gateside.
.

E
On approaching Corstanmill at between 25 and 30 m.p.h., McKenzie suddenly saw the figure of
Permanent Way Inspector Henderson on the right-hand cess a few yards ahead of the engine, running
towards it, waving his arms and shouting. He at once informed Robertson who thereupon closed the
regulator and put on the steam brake (leaving the reversing gear in the full forward position), and McKenzie
at the same time started to put on the hand brake. They were, however, unable to stop the train
before the engine ran on to the bare formation where the track had been completely removed ; this was
about 150 yards from where Henderson was first seen. The engine and tender sank into the soft ground
and folded into a shallow V-shape before coming to rest. Driver Robertson, in attempting to jump, was
unfortunately trapped between the engine and tender, and his leg was practically severed. He was quickly
released by the gang who were on the ground but was so severely injured that he died within a few minutes.
8. Signalman W. Christie was in charge of Auchtermuchty Signalbox when the ballast train reached
it at 7.27 am. As the train slowed down, he cautioned it with a green hand signal, exchanged the tokens
and told the Fireman to stop at the station platform, which was about 100 yards ahead, to pick up some
of the gang. He did not speak to the driver. Christie had received a copy of the Weekly Notices, and
understood from them that the train was to work in the section and then proceed on to Gateside. He did
not know, without referring to the Notices, exactly where the work was taking place, and had not been
informed, when he cautioned the train into the section, that the line was not clear or that the rails had been
lifted.
9. 1. McKenzie was the Fireman of the train. He had examined the sand boxes of the engine before
leaving the shed and found that they were full, but he did not know whether Driver Robertson tested the
brakes ; they had no difficulty however, in stopping later on, and McKende was satisfied that the engine
was in good order. McKenzie thought that he heard the Guard telling Driver Robertson before leaving
Ladybank at 7.5 am., that the work was between Auchtermucbty and Gateside, but he was not certain
df this point.
They proceeded uneventfully to Sttathmiglo, as previously described, and the first indication to
McKenzie that anything was wrong was when a man jumped out from the four-foot on to the right-hand
cess a few yards in front of the engine, waving his arms and shouting to him to stop. McKenzie at once
warned the Driver and started to apply the hand brake, while Driver Robertson closed the regulator and
put on the steam brake. Almost immediately after this, the engine came off the road and McKeKie was
thrown against the boiler back plate and so dazed that he remembered little more.
He thought tbat the speed of the train was between 15 and 20 m.p.h., and that he first caught
sight of the man on the track at a point about 100 yards from w6ere the rails had been removed.
10. Guard P. Hargreaves was in charge of the ballast train. He had known for some time about the
three resleepering works that were to he carried out on the line as he had already taken materials to the
sites about three weeks earlier. On the Thursday before the accident, he had been over the line again, in
company with Driver Robertson, and had been surprised to find, in passing the "middle" job, No. 2534,
that it had already been completed. He was surprised because he thought it was for this job that the ballast
train was booked on the following Sunday, November 27th. He therefore raised the question later in the
day, while speaking casually to Driver Robertson and two Inspectors, and they discussed the matter between
them ; as a result, Hargreaves then realised that it was Job 2533, and not 2534, for which he was booked.
On the following day, Friday, he and Robertson had again talked about the Sunday job, No.
2533 and had wondered at which end of it they would be required to stop ; they decided that the far end
i.e. that nearer to Gateside, would be the more probable, for the train could then go on to Job 2534 and
pick up the old sleepers.
In view of these conversations, Hargreaves was quite satisfied that Robertson knew that the ballast
train was to go to Job 2533, and so he did not refer to it again when they started from Ladybank on the
Sunday morning.
Hargreaves continued that it was quite usual, when working on a Sunday, to arrive at the site
and find some of the gang already there, but hc would not expect to find the rails removed. On this
occasion, he had been told that the Permanent Way Inspector and some of the gang were going by road to
the site, but he said that he would normally expect to find a responsible member of the engineering staff
on the train who knew exactly where the train was required to stop and who would pilot it to the site.
11. Ganger W. Bradley was one of the nicn travelling in the engineer's coach at the rear of the train.
He had boarded it at Auchtermuchty and knew exactly where the work was. Shortly after passing
~trath&~lo, he thought that the driver was going a little too fast to stop at the "bottom" (Strathmiglo)
end of the job, so he went to the window and lookcd out. As he did so, he saw, as he went by, Inspector
Henderson standing by the line and holding up his hands ; after travelling another 20 or 30 yards he felt
the train buffering up as the engine came off the rails. He thought that the point where Henderson was
standing was about 200 yards from the gap in the line. Bradley was properly reluctant to give a firm
estimate of the speed of the train, judged in the semi-darkness, but he said that it might have been about
30 m.p.h.

When the accident happened, Bradley was thrown on to the floor, but he was able to pick himself
up and leave the coach. He then met Fireman McKenzie going back to protect the train. Realising that
he was not in a fit state to do so, Bradley arranged for the protection to be done by one of the gang, and
then went to the nearby Corstanmill Farm to telephone to Auchtermuchty for a doctor and an ambulance.
I He did this at 7.45 am. and the doctor arrived at 805 am., followed by the ambulance five minutes later.
j
12. Relayer F. J. Smith was travelling in the train. He was not paying any particular attention, but
be remembered that, shortly after leaving Strathmiglo the train speeded up. Some of the men said that
the driver was surely not going to stop at the bottom end of the job hut must be going to the top end ;
these men then went to the window, and almost immediately the jerk of the derailment occurred and they
were all thrown to the floor.
1
i 13. Acting Permanent Way Inspector D. Henderson, who was in charge of the three resleepering jobs,
i
was 48 years of age and had 29 years experience on the railway, and had been an Acting Permanent Way
l
Inspector for nearly a year. He had made arrangements in the early part of the week for the necessary
gangs to go to the site of Job 2533 on the following Sunday morning ; of these, a few men were to be picked
up by the ballast train at Ladybank and Auchtermuchty, and the remainder were to proceed by lorry.
! During the previous week, he had completed Job 2534 on Thursday, November 24th, and had
made a start on No. 2533 on the Friday. The reason for starting these works before their planned time
i was that there were two relaying gangs which had become available, and it was a good opportunity to
employ them. He agreed that No. 2534 had not appeared in the Weekly Notices or in a Special Notice,
l although it involved breaking the tracks, but he had protected the work properly at the time by putting
out flagmen in accordance with Rules 217 (a) and (e), i.e. one man at a distance of one mile and another
close to the obstruction. He had also protected No. 2533 correctly on the Friday and Saturday in accordance
with Rule 218, i.e. with a flagman and "C" and "T" indicators, but had given instructions for the flagman
to be withdrawn on the Saturday evening after the last train had passed, as the line was then closed for the
week end. The "C" and "T" indicators had, however, been left in position and were lighted, but no
Warning Board had been erected as the work had not appeared in Notices for those days, vide Rule 218 (d).
On the Sunday morning, he arrived at Corstanmill by lorry with a gang of 18 men about 7.15 am.
It was too dark to commence work at once, so they carried their lunches and gear to a portable hut, and
waited there for five or ten minutes. At about 7.30 a.m. Henderson gave instructions for work to start,
and told the gang to take out the first pair of rails. Soon afterwards he heard the sound of the ballast
train coming under the bridge at Strathmiglo and realised that he had forgotten to put out flagmen to
protect the work and to erect the Warning Board. He had no flags or detonators with him, and was unable
to find any quickly, so he ran along the four foot way towards the oncoming train in the hope that he would
be able to stop it.
Henderson thought he had run about 220 yards when he met the engine, and stepped from the
four foot on to the cess on his left, shouting and waving his arms. He thought the Fireman saw him as
he passed, although he received no acknowledgement from him, and a few seconds later he heard the sound
of the crash. Henderson continued that, at the time of the accident, he could see about 300 yards in the
half light; he had no lights on the work and did not consider that they were necessary. He had not
previously spoken to the Signalman to tell him exactly where the work was taking place because he thought
that he would know this from the Notices. He also expected that the Driver would have known from the
Notices where the job was, so he had no conversation with him about it, neither had be informed him at
which end of the job he was required to stop.
14. The cause of the accident was the failure of Acting Permanent Way Inspector Henderson to take
the fundamental safety precaution of putting out handsignalmen to protect the work in accordance with
the provisions of Rule 217. He acknowledged this with complete frankness, and admitted that he quite
forgot about it although he knew well that the ballast train was coming. In addition, he appears to have
made no effort to co-operate with the signalman or train crew by giving them information ofhis requirements,
nor did he arrange for any of the engineering staff who travelled on the train to guide it to the site.
These were grave mistakes for which he must inevitably shoulder the main responsibility. 1 find
it surprising that a man of his good record and 29 years railway experience could fail in this way, and omit
to take precautions which one might have expected to be almost instinctive.
15. In fairness, however, and having regard to the unhappy consequence of his error, it must be stated
that it is difficult to understand why the ballast train was travelling at such a speed that it was unable to
stop in time, and that iT it had approached more cautiously in the uncertain light, as it perhaps should have
done, the accident might not have occurred. On the rising gradient of 1 in 100, if the train bad been travelling
at 15-20 m.p.h. it should have been able to stop in about 100 yards, and longer warning than this was almost
certainly given. There is little doubt that the late Driver Robertson knew exactly to which job he was to

go, and was not confused by the other two. It is possible, however. that the wording of the Special Train
Notice, which stated that the train would leave "for Gateside", coupled with the conversation which he
had with Guard Hargrsves, and in which they decided that they would probably be required to stop a1
the top end of the job (i.e. the Gateside end, 770 yards furtbcr on), may have produced a preconceived idea
in his mind that he was, in fact, expected to go through to the top end
These considerations in no way excuse Inspector Henderson for h~s very serloub mistake, but I
bring them to notice because, though responsible for the accident, 1 do not consider that he should also be
held fully responsible for its unfortunate outcome.
16. 1 have no recommendations to make. Rules 217 and 218 are adequate and clearly worded, and
there should be no difficulty in understanding them. In the interests of safety, these rules are absolute and
essential, and they must be strictly and rigidly obeyed at all times. It is satisfactory to note, therefore,
that special steps have since been taken in the Region to stress their importance to the staff concerned,
and to insist on their strict observance.
The Secretary,
Ministry of Transport
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