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Joaquim da Silva Fontes, Significação e Estabilidade do Género no ...

Joaquim da Silva Fontes, Significação e Estabilidade do Género no ...

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certain community, our subjective responses trigger a second order of signification, but this<br />

time linked to what the theorists refer to as “intersubjectivity”, which is culturally<br />

determined, and therefore deriving from a given ideology.<br />

The image of Marilyn Monroe can also be understood as an icon of over<strong>do</strong>sing on<br />

se<strong>da</strong>tive drugs or her phase of depression, and therefore our understanding of that picture<br />

and our reading or interpretation of it is <strong>no</strong>w formed at the ideological level. Metz affirms<br />

that all these elements and levels of order constitute and reproduce a stronger perception of<br />

our cultural belonging and certainly stress our national identity, “the cinematic institution<br />

(…) is also the mental machinery – a<strong>no</strong>ther industry – which spectators “accustomed to the<br />

cinema” have internalised historically” (Metz 1982:7).<br />

It is also for this reason that semiotics in film theory became interwoven with other<br />

strands, namely theories of ideology and of subjectivity, or Marxism and psychoanalysis<br />

(as described in Part II). The filmic text gained a new dimension and all of these areas of<br />

studies addressed the issue of the spectator and his/her role in meaning-production. Seen as<br />

an ideological operation, rather than being a reflection of reality, film was <strong>no</strong>w understood<br />

as a form of language and a kind of preferred positioning offered to the subject.<br />

Saussure came up with his theory of the sign, presenting itself as a self-contained<br />

dyad: the sign, he argues, can be a representamen, that is, the form the sign takes (and<br />

which is <strong>no</strong>t necessarily material); or an interpretant, that is to say, the “mental effect” or<br />

the sense made of the sign. Many other followers of this model, such as Umberto Eco or<br />

Hjelmslev, substituted the term “sign” for “sign function”, establishing therefore the<br />

relationship between an expression (or a material occurrence) and its content. Here it is<br />

also relevant to state that the interpretant <strong>do</strong>es <strong>no</strong>t refer to the person or the interpreter, but<br />

to the sign. Charles Peirce also formulated his own taxo<strong>no</strong>my regarding Saussure’s dyad.<br />

His model, in fact, brings a new dimension, offering thus a triadic model: including the<br />

object – for which the sign stands or to which the sign refers. Thus, he concludes that:<br />

A sign [in the form of a representamen] is something which stands to somebody for<br />

something in some respect or capacity. It addresses somebody, that is, creates in the<br />

mind of that person an equivalent sign, or perhaps a more developed sign. That sign<br />

which it creates I call the interpretant of the first sign. The sign stands for<br />

something, its object. It stands for that object, <strong>no</strong>t in all respects, but in reference to<br />

a sort of idea, which I have sometimes called the ground of the representamen.<br />

(Peirce 1998:228)<br />

259

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