A JOURNAL OF ACADEMIC WRITING VOLUME 8

2008). Their decision contained a number of points: 1) The
2001 Executive Order was not authorized by Congress, 2)
the military commissions as proposed by President Bush were
“structurally and procedurally deficient” and, 3) all detainees
held at Guantánamo Bay (including al-Qaeda) are protected
by the Geneva Conventions (Cutler 2008:36). The Supreme
Court Justices agreed that Hamdan should be tried by a
“regularly constituted court” that affords “judicial guarantees
[…] recognized as indispensable by civilized peoples” (Cutler
2008:38). They did not address the individual habeas claim but
rather regulated the ability of the Executive branch to develop
military commissions without Legislative action (de Londras
2008).
As a reaction to the Hamdan decision, Congress enacted
the Military Commissions Act (MCA) of 2006 to codify how
the Geneva Conventions are applicable to suspected terrorists
and to establish new rules for military commissions for the
prosecution of detainees (Cutler 2008). The MCA revoked
the right of the US Supreme Court to enforce the Geneva
Conventions and instead offered examples of what constituted
a “grave [breach]” of the Conventions (Cutler 2008:43). The
guidelines for military commissions used relaxed due process
considerations concerning the admissibility of evidence.
Hearsay and evidence obtained through coercion is admissible if
the presiding judge affords it “probative value,” and defendants
are not allowed to hear classified evidence against them; rather,
they are provided with a “declassified summary of information”
(Cutler 2008:40). The MCA also includes an explicit provision
stripping federal courts of the jurisdiction to hear pending
habeas cases (de Londras 2008).
Colonel Morris D. Davis (2007) defends the MCA and
argues that the trials conducted exceed the standards set forth
by other formal UN tribunals. Furthermore, the procedures
utilized in military commissions meet the requirements outlined
in the Hamdan decision. Davis (2007) concedes that some due
process standards in the MCA are broader than those used in
civilian courts, but the same rights afforded US citizens are not
automatically warranted in the case of “alien unlawful enemy
combatants” (p33).
In 2007, the US Court of Appeals for the D.C Circuit
refused to grant a writ of habeas corpus in the case of
Boumediene v. Bush (Boumediene) citing lack of jurisdiction
under the MCA (Cutler 2008). Moreover, since the detainees
were foreign nationals held outside the US they lacked a
constitutional right to habeas corpus. After initially refusing
to consider Boumediene, the US Supreme Court unexpectedly
altered their decision and granted a review (Cutler 2008). De
Londras (2008) believes this occurred out of a new willingness
to finally settle the issue of constitutionality concerning habeas
rights. Indeed, in June 2008 the US Supreme Court granted
Guantánamo Bay detainees the constitutional right to the writ
of habeas corpus (DoJ 2008). In their decision, the Supreme
Court rejected the Bush Administration’s claim that the absence
of US sovereignty negated the applicability of the Constitution
(Boumediene v. Bush, 553 US 2008).
The US Supreme Court’s decision necessitates close
examination by the review panel President Obama has set up to
determine the best course of action for closing the Guantánamo
Bay facility within one year from the date he issued his
Executive Order (January 22, 2009). As it stands, the Order
leaves open the option of military commissions or some other
trial mechanism, as well as the continued detention of some of
the detainees (Wittes 2009).
Ongoing debate reveals an interesting twist: during the
Bush Administration liberal scholars advocated for POW status
and conservative “hawks” argued against it; now, conservatives
tend to favor a continuation of the provision of POW status
and an improved mechanism for onshore preventive detention
and liberals are clamoring for the transfer of the remaining
detainees into the civilian criminal justice system. Nonetheless,
liberals and conservatives alike are inclined to agree that
President Obama needs to make a clean break from policies
associated with President Bush and promote a greater balance
between national security concerns and the humanitarian rights
of detainees (Goldhaber 2009).
President Obama appears to have taken steps to define
a “new standard” for the detention of terrorist suspects and
has revoked the phrase “enemy combatant” (DoJ 2009b).
Individuals who “planned, authorized, committed, or aided”
the attacks of September 11, 2001 will remain in detention,
in addition to those who “harbored those responsible” (DoJ
2009c:1). Members of al-Qaeda and the Taliban who engage
in attacks against coalition forces in Afghanistan or provide
“substantial support” from elsewhere will also be detained (DoJ
2009c:7). The Department of Justice (2009c) has yet to define
exactly what constitutes “substantial support,” but for now it
will be determined on an individual basis depending on the
facts of each case.
The Obama Administration exhibits a greater willingness
than the previous Bush Administration to ensure that the
treatment of detainees is progressive with the nation’s values.
The long-term, indefinite nature of the “War on Terror” invites
the question of whether a war-like or military approach is best
suited for the task of managing terrorist suspects. It is on this
point that the Geneva Conventions, once seized upon by liberal
scholars in defense of Guantánamo Bay detainees, begins to
fade in significance.
As previously noted, the Geneva Conventions were
conceived in the context of two state actors in conflict. Al-
Qaeda and deposed Taliban forces are non-state actors, meaning
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