Airman Scholar Sp05-1.indd - United States Air Force Academy

In this issue…
This publication is devoted to papers written by
cadets at the US Air Force Academy and represents an
excellent cross section of thinking from the 34th Education
Group’s Military Strategic Studies classes. The
Airman-Scholar devotes a large percentage of its space
to showcasing USAF Academy cadet writing on military
topics. To this end we include the best papers obtainable
from the History, Political Science, Philosophy and Military
Strategic Studies programs. We welcome all departments
focusing on the general theme of Contemporary
Military Thought which guides the Airman-Scholar.
In seeking to present current military thought
by cadets at USAFA we are also trying to illuminate
some of the issues with which future USAF leaders are
grappling as they prepare for an uncertain future. As
these future leaders express themselves in recommendations
for solutions or suggest methods of thinking about
solutions, we hope to capture the “nuggets” of truly
useful concepts and thoughts.
For the first time we include a broader specturm
of work which includes Fourth class cadets as well as
upper classmen. We think that you will find these submissions
interesting and useful.
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The Airman-Scholar invites both full-length articles and
short “letters to the editor” comments. Please submit in
accordance with the following guidelines:
1. Full-length articles should be approximately 6,000
words in length, although all submissions will be considered.
2. Articles should be submitted as hard copy with accompanying
3.5 disk (not returned)
3. Articles will be edited to conform with Airman-Scholar
format; proofs will not be sent to authors prior to publication.
4. Articles are encouraged from all knowledgeable members
of the academic and military communities. Publication
of outstanding papers by USAFA cadets and other
service academy students is a particular goal of Airman-
Scholar.
5. Articles must be received by 1 September 2005.
6. Send articles to:
34th Education Group
Attn: Airman-Scholar
2354 Fairchild Drive, Suite 2A2
USAF Academy, CO 80840-6264

AIRMAN SCHOLAR
Published by the 34th Education Group
at the
United States Air Force Academy
Spring 2005
Vol XI, No 1
Commandant of Cadets
Commander 34th Training Wing
Brig Gen Johnny Weida
Commander and Professor of USAFA
34th Education Group
Col Thomas A. Drohan
Editors
Glenn Ferguson
John Farquhar
Brent Talbot
The 34th Education Group’s mission is to oversee curriculum
development and instruction in Military Strategic Studies for
the cadets of the US Air Force Academy. This consists of courses
covering Military Theory and Strategy, Officership, Airmanship,
Aerospace Theory and Doctrine, and Joint and Coalition
Operations. Group personnel conduct research on a variety of
topics, including international security, space-related issues,
military service culture, and educational modeling. Research
activities are coordinated through the 34th Education Group
Research Office.
The opinions expressed in AIRMAN SCHOLAR do not represent
any official policies of the Commandant of Cadets, US Air
force Academy, US Air Force, or US government. They are presented
to stimulate discussion on military issues and domestic
and international affairs.
AIRMAN SCHOLAR is published twice annually. If you have
comments concerning articles, would like to contribute an article
for publication, or desire to receive AIRMAN SCHOLAR,
please contact us at:
34th Education Group
att: AIRMAN SCHOLAR
2354 Fairchild Drive, Suite 2A2
USAF Academy CO 80840-6264
(719) 333-3255 or DSN 333-3255
e-mail: glenn.ferguson@usafa.af.mil
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TABLE OF CONTENTS
1 From the Editor
By Glenn Ferguson
3 IS MISSILE DEFENSE A GOOD IDEA
by C4C Rob Auflick
7 WHERE OD PRIORITIES LIE, WITH MEN
OR WITH THE MISSION?
By C4C Michelle Bonneau
11 THE ANATOMY OF CLOSE AIR SUPPORT
by C1C Brandon Burns
24 IS DEMOCRATIC IMPERIALISM VIABLE?
ASSESSING THE VALIDITY OF THE BUSH
DOCTRINE.
By C4C Whitney Camp
27 MORALLY BOUND TO NATIONAL
SECURITY
By C3C Brady Cilo
30 MIND OVER MATTER: THE CASE FOR
DECENTRALIZING PSYCHOLOGICAL
OERATIONS (PSYOPS) IN MODERN
WARFARE
By C1C Kristen L. Fagen
43 SPACE ASSETS: THE ACHILLES HEEL IN
NATIONAL DEFENSE
By C1C Alexander K. Goldfein
57 NO COERCION HERE: THE SOVIET
MILITARY EXPEDITION IN
AFGHANISTAN, 1979-1989
By C3C Roland W. Olmstead
65 ETHICS IN WARFARE
By C3C David Schill
69 AIR CONTROL: THE FALLACY OF COER
CIVE AIR STRATEGY IN BRITISH COLO
NIAL ADMINISTRATION, 1919-1924
By C1C Colby Sullins
81 FALLOUT: THE QUESTION OF NEXT GEN
ERATION NUCLEAR WEAPONS
By C1C Damon A. Wagoner
94 THE MYTH OF ISSUE NETWORKS: A
REBUTTAL TO GIBSON AND SNIDER
By C1C William L. Wisehart
98 THE JUST WAR TRADITION AND EAST
ERN MILITARY THEORY: APPLICATIONS
TO IRAQ
By C3C Matthew H. Yan

IS MISSILE DEFENSE A GOOD IDEA?
By C4C Rob Auflick
The Cold War was in full swing. Both the United
States and the Soviet Union were positioning themselves to
be the world’s one and only great superpower. In 1983, one
side thought that they had come up with a weapon which
would give them the upper hand in the military realm of this
ideological conflict. “Obe Ron Kanobi strapped on his cape,
headed up to the podium, and announced his plan to slay the
evil Dark Side, or the Soviet Union with the Strategic Defense
Initiative (SDI), known then as ‘Star Wars’ (Freedman 57).”
“Star Wars” was to be a multi-layered missile defense system
which would protect the United States in case of an attack
by thousands of Soviet warheads. “Since 1983, the U.S. has
spent more than $55 billion trying to make President Ronald
Reagan’s dreams a reality (Information 22).” This program,
once considered abandoned and a relic of the Cold War, has
found itself once again the center of national security.
While the end of the Cold War signaled a reduction
in the likelihood of global conflict, the threat from foreign
missiles has grown steadily as sophisticated missile technology
becomes available on a wider scale. The proliferation of
weapons of mass destruction and the ballistic and cruise
missiles that could deliver them pose a direct and immediate
threat to the security of U.S. military forces and assets in
overseas theaters of operation, our allies and friends, as well
as our own country. “Since 1980, ballistic missiles have been
used in six regional conflicts (Report 3).“
Basics of Ballistic Missile Defense
All ballistic missiles share a common, fundamental
element. “They follow a ballistic trajectory that includes
three phases. These phases are the boost phase, the midcourse
phase, and the terminal phase (Project 4).” The boost phase
is the portion of a missile’s flight in which it is thrusting to
gain the acceleration needed to reach its target. This phase
usually lasts between three to five minutes. During this phase
the rocket is climbing against the earth’s gravity and either
exiting the earth’s atmosphere, or in the case of shorter range
missiles, only reaching the fringes of outer space.
Once the missile has completed firing its propulsion
system, it begins the longest part of its flight, which is known
as the mid-course phase. During this phase the missile is
coasting, or freefalling towards it target. This phase can last
as long as 20 minutes in the case of intercontinental ballistic
missiles (ICBMs). Most missiles that leave the atmosphere
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shed their rocket motors by this time in order to increase the
range that the missile’s weapon, known as a warhead, can
travel. For medium and long range missiles this phase occurs
outside the earth’s atmosphere.
The final phase of a missile’s flight is the terminal
phase. During this phase the missile’s warhead re-enters the
earth’s atmosphere at incredible speeds, some at over 2,000
mph. This phase lasts approximately 30 seconds for ICBM
class missiles.
There are advantages and challenges to set up
engagement opportunities against an incoming missile in
each of these phases. “The capability to defend against an
attacking missile in each of these phases is called a layered
defense, and it may be expected to increase the chances that
the missile and its payload will be destroyed (From18).” “By
attacking the missile in all phases of flight, we capitalize on
opportunities that could increase the advantage of the defense
(Project 30).” A capability to intercept a missile in the boost
phase, for example, can destroy a missile regardless of its
range or intended aim-point and provide a global coverage
capability. In addition, the destroyed missile would threaten
the launching nations territory with debris. A midcourse
intercept capability can provide wide coverage of a region
or regions, while a terminal defense reduces the protection
coverage considerably to a localized area. When we then add
shot opportunities in the midcourse and terminal phases of
flight to boost phase opportunities, we increase significantly
the probability that we will be successful. “Improving the
odds of interception becomes critical when ballistic missiles
carry weapons of mass destruction (Project 52).” “When
defending against more lethal payloads, a capability to
intercept a missile near its launch point is always preferable to
attempting to intercept that same missile closer to its target
(Missile 40).”
Figure 1.

History
“Nike-Zeus was one of the first U.S. efforts whose
objective was to develop long range defenses against ballistic
missiles (From 2).” “The logic driving the program called
for an exoatmospheric (60 miles or higher above the earth’s
surface) or very high altitude, long range interceptor carrying
a 400 kiloton nuclear warhead that, when detonated, would
destroy incoming missiles (From 5).”
While rocket science had put the concept within
reach, the tracking radars were still too primitive to cope with
a large number of missiles. The radars could be spoofed by
countermeasures such as chaff and decoys, and were physically
vulnerable. “The tight defense budgets of the 1950s also
acted as a restraint since a widely deployed system would be
costly (Evolution 8).”
Replacing Nike-Zeus program was Project
Defender, what today might be classified as an Advanced
Technology Demonstrator program that explored possible
new technologies that could be incorporated into future
missile defense programs. “One concept that emerged,
called Ballistic Missile Boost Intercept (BAMBI), envisioned
satellite launched, hit-to-kill missiles containing huge wire
mesh arrays that would destroy offensive missiles in the first 5
minutes (the “boost phase”) of flight (Lethbridge 61).” Low
funding and high projected costs, together with new estimates
of Soviet progress on offensive systems and doubts about the
survivability of the BAMBI system, ended this effort in 1968.
Under President Kennedy, Nike-Zeus was canceled
in 1961 and replaced by Nike-X. This program incorporated
three major advances. “These advances were a phased-array,
electronically guided radar, and an upgraded Nike-Zeus
missile renamed Spartan (From 45).” Nike-X, in turn, was
superceded by Sentinel in 1967. “Recognizing that the
U.S. could not stop an all-out attack by Soviet ICBMs, the
Johnson Administration elected to proceed with a “thin”
anti-ballistic umbrella designed to protect major U.S. cities
(Missile 40).” When Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara
announced this plan in September 1967, he made two points
that have become part of the current debate about 21st
century U.S. national missile defense: (1) attempts to deploy
a comprehensive ABM system will only fuel the offensive
missile race, and (2) what is needed is enough of an umbrella
to counter very limited threats such as that posed by the small
Communist Chinese ICBM fleet.
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The Nixon Administration refocused the Sentinel
system from guarding cities to guarding vital military
locations by employing as many as 12 ABM sites around the
country. “Renamed Safeguard, the system would provide
protection to Minuteman ICBM missile fields, Strategic Air
Command bases, and the National Command Authority
in Washington, DC (From50).” In August 1969, Senate
approved this plan after the Vice President broke a tie vote.
Furthermore, the new Administration, like its predecessor,
justified the “light ABM” deployment as a means of
preventing the Chinese from ever using their emergent ICBM
force to blackmail the United States.
“In fact, the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks (SALT)
negotiations became entwined with separate talks on limiting
anti-ballistic missile deployments (From 82).” In 1972
the United States and the Soviet Union signed the ABM
Treaty which limited both sides to two anti-ballistic missile
interceptor sites. “A 1974 Protocol reduced the two sites to
one each and to 100 interceptors (Missile 13).” The Soviets
elected to defend Moscow with their nuclear tipped Galosh
system, which is an upgraded “Gazelle” system and is still in
place today. Meanwhile, the United States opted to defend
the Minuteman missile site around Grand Forks, North
Dakota. On October 1, 1975, the Grand Forks
site became operational. “The next day, the House of
Representatives voted to close the system down because the
Soviet program to put multiple independent reentry vehicles
(MIRV) on their missiles meant that Safeguard would be
easily overwhelmed (From 84).” Furthermore, it was finally
recognized that the radars that were part of the system would
be blinded by the electromagnetic pulse from exploding
nuclear warheads on the Safeguard interceptors. The Senate
concurred with the House action in November, and in
February 1976, the system went into “caretaker” status after
only four months of operation. Except for its supporting
radar, Safeguard was closed completely in 1978.
This was how things were until on March 23, 1983,
in five paragraphs near the end of a televised nationwide
address, President Reagan conveyed his vision of how the
U.S. could counter Soviet ICBMs by developing defenses that
would make “nuclear weapons impotent and obsolete (Reagan
1).” Mr. Reagan conceded that some other nations might
regard defensive measures “paired with offensive systems. . .
as fostering an aggressive policy (Reagan 2).” This has been
a concern that remains to this day.

Several United States Congressmen and Senators
believe that this futuristic “star wars” scheme was nothing
more than another excuse to increase defense spending which
had little impact on the program. The Strategic Defense
Initiative (SDI) was born. In 1985 the Pentagon’s SDI
Organization (SDIO) proposed a multi-layer, space-based
system to defend 3,500 “targets” against Soviet missiles. By
1987 the reality of technological limitations had set in, and
many anti-missile concepts were abandoned as unworkable.
“Nonetheless, with about $4 billion per year being spent
on SDI, the program anticipated a deployment decision in
1993 and initial operational status by 1997 employing both
ground and space-based interceptors (Report 4).” But by
1992 the Warsaw Pact had disintegrated and the Soviet Union
imploded. Under President Bush, the idea of a nationwide
defense against a massive Soviet missile strike was abandoned
in favor of Global Protection Against Limited Strikes or
GPALS. This envisioned an integrated system that would
provide protection against tactical/theater missiles as well as
up to 200 nuclear warheads mounted on land or sea launched
intercontinental ballistic missiles.
But again outside events intervened. In the 1991
Persian Gulf War, America suffered its first combat casualties
caused by ballistic missiles. Air Force and special operations
missions to find and destroy Iraq’s Scud missiles and their
launchers met with no better success than the World War
II effort, Operation Crossbow, to locate and hit the Nazi
V-2 launch sites. The one apparent bright
spot came from initial reports that the Patriot Air Defense
system had achieved notable success in knocking out Scuds
in their terminal ballistic phase, which was later modified
substantially by engineers. Congress responded by enacting
the Missile Defense Act that specified a ground only system of
interceptors to protect U.S. territory to be deployed by 1996.
“The Pentagon, however, said that meeting the 1996 deadline
was not possible, but deployment by 2002 was (Rumsfeld 6).”
When the Clinton Administration came to power
in 1993, SDIO became the Ballistic Missile Defense
Organization (BMDO). “Estimates that Iraq had been
within 6 months of having a nuclear weapon with which
it could have attacked its neighbors or used to blackmail
the United States, fueled the psychology of missile defense,
particularly deploying defenses in theatres around the world
(Rumsfeld 7).” When the Republicans gained control of both
Houses of Congress in 1995, the stage was set for a major
push not just for developing and deploying theater systems,
but for a National Missile Defense (NMD) system to be
5
deployed by 2003. Technological setbacks caused this date
to slip to 2005, which is also the year in which, according to
a 1999 National Intelligence Estimate, North Korea could
field a missile capable of hitting the U.S. homeland. But in
late 1999, North Korea agreed to stop developing its Taepo
Dong 2 ICBM, which led a number of analysts to add a year
to the Korean “threat development” time line. Concurrently,
in mid-2000, retired Air Force General Larry Welch, the head
of the National Missile Defense Independent Review Team
created by the Pentagon to evaluate NMD, told the Senate
Armed Services Committee that NMD’s “high risk” made a
2005 deployment “unlikely (Rumsfeld 8).”
Threats and World Impact
To an extent seldom seen since Cold War days, the
growing debate over the need for a NMD system has split
public opinion. Pros and cons are discussed in increasingly
emotional confrontations, which lead not to understanding
but to angry, emotional, rejection of opposing views. What is
there about NMD that produces such friction when the issue
arises? It is because the decision to deploy an NMD system
rests on the most fundamental issues of America’s role in the
world and our relationship not only with our adversaries
but with our closest allies as well. “It is not surprising that
Russia and China are loud critics of NMD, but Germany,
France, Great Britain and other western nations are also
questioning the wisdom of proceeding with a program that
threatens to ignite a new nuclear arms race (Evolution 19).”
It may be possible to shrug off the anticipated arguments
of countries often treated as enemies, but the United States
must give thoughtful consideration and great weight to
the same criticism from its friends.
President Clinton said that a final decision to deploy
NMD must await satisfactory answers to four criteria. First,
there must be a real threat. Secondly, the United States must
have the technological means to address that threat effectively.
Thirdly, the U.S. response must be affordable. Finally, NMD
deployment must do acceptable damage to the stability of
current and future international security arrangements. The
fourth criteria is clearly the most critical. What good does a
defense system do if it weakens the current strategic nuclear
stability which was built over the last 30 years? Repeated
U.S. threats to break the Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM)
Treaty of 1972, ignore the fact that there is a comprehensive
arms control structure in which the individual treaties are
interdependent. The first Strategic Arms Limitation Treaty
(SALT I) of 1972 was negotiated in tandem with the ABM
Treaty as a complementary measure, in which neither one was

possible without the other. Subsequently SALT II and the
Strategic Arms Reduction Treaties I and II (START I and II)
were erected on the SALT I/ABM foundation.
The existence of this stabilizing arms control structure was
recognized by other nations, most importantly by China, and
thereby inhibited the expansion of other nuclear arsenals,
while contributing to global nuclear non-proliferation efforts.
“To pull out a keystone of arms control by breaking of the
ABM Treaty could weaken nuclear stability worldwide,
particularly because of the sensitivity of Chinese, Indian and
Pakistani nuclear programs (Evolution 33).”
Of equal concern is that NMD will certainly disrupt progress
on future arms control agreements, which are essential to
genuine reductions in still excessive nuclear arsenals. President
Jacques Chirac of France identified this problem when he
declared: “Nuclear disarmament will be more difficult
when powerful countries are developing new technologies
[NMD] to enhance their nuclear capabilities (Evolution 16).
According to Chirac, “The great danger is that other nations,
most notably China and Russia, will seek to enhance their
own nuclear capabilities in response to the deployment of
an American NMD system. In the political effort to justify
deployment of defenses against a highly unlikely threat, the
United States might undo significant arms control measures
and end up facing much greater real nuclear dangers.
While the end of the Cold War signaled a reduction
in the likelihood of global conflict, the threat from foreign
missiles has grown steadily as sophisticated missile technology
becomes available on a wider scale. The proliferation of
weapons of mass destruction and the ballistic and cruise
missiles that could deliver them, pose a direct and immediate
threat to the security of U.S. military forces and assets in
overseas theaters of operation, our allies and friends, as well as
our own country. We have already witnessed the willingness
of countries to use theater ballistic missiles for military
purposes. Since 1980, ballistic missiles have been used in
six regional conflicts. Strategic ballistic missiles, including
intercontinental (ICBMs) and submarine launched ballistic
missiles (SLBMs) exist in abundance in the world today.
This is why the U.S. is seeking to deploy a
national missile defense system. By such an action the U.S.
will signal to the world that they are willing to pursue illusory
defenses against non-existent threats even though we subject
all nations to continued nuclear competition and increased
risks of a future nuclear war.
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Works Cited
Ballistic Missile Defense: Evolution and Current Issues. General
Accounting Office Report GAO/NSIAD-93-
229, July 1993.
Ballistic Missile Defense: Information on Directed Energy
Programs for Fiscal Years 1985 Through 1993. General
Accounting Office GAO/NSIAD-93-182, June
1993.
Freedman, Lawrence. U.S. Intelligence and the Soviet Strategic
Threat. Princeton University Press, 1986.
From Nike-Zeus to Safeguard: U.S. Defenses Against ICBMs
1958-1976. Union of Concerned Scientists, 1999.
Lethbridge, Cliff. History of Rocketry Part I-Ancient Times
up to World War II. New York: Bergeman, 1989.
Missile Defense Milestones 1944-1993. Strategic Defense Initiative,
Department of Defense, March 1993.
Project Defender, Congressional Research Service Report 87-
689S, July 1987.
Reagan, Ronald. Peace and Security. March 23, 1983,
Transcript of Television Address to the Nation, U.S.
Department of State, Bureau of Public Affairs, Current
Policy Series No. 472.
Report to Congress: Plan for Deployment of Theater and
National Ballistic Missile Defenses. Department of
Defense, June 1992.
The Rumsfeld Commission Report. The Congressional
Record, July 31, 1998 (pp. S9522-9523).

WHERE DO PRIORITIES LIE, WITH MEN OR WITH
THE MISSION?
By C4C Michelle Bonneau
General George S. Patton Jr. states, “Officers must
be made to care for their men. That is the sole duty of all
officers” (Contrails, 64). Throughout military history, leaders
have asked themselves which is priority: one’s men or
the given mission? As Patton clearly stated, it is the leader’s
responsibility to take care of his/her soldiers, to train them
and then to lead them in the accomplishment of the mission.
This concept of duty is simple enough in writing but there is
one thing that officers and soldiers must accept: when there
is a battle or a war, people will die. Not only that, but during
the time of war, soldiers are tested physically, emotionally, and
mentally. The question is how far is a commander willing
to push his men to accomplish any mission? Or perhaps in
some instances, the better question becomes how many men
is the commander ready to lose for the mission? The answers
are controversial, but taking into account military history
and past battles, successful leaders encouraged their men and
exemplified high morale, but also realized men and resources
often must be sacrificed to accomplish the more important
mission. A vital mission with a clear objective should take
precedence over men’s welfare in battle, but the men take priority
during preparation operations before the mission.
Doolittle Raiders
On 18 April 1942 Lt. Col James H. Doolittle, after a
few months of training, decided that accomplishing his mission
was more important than the lives of the men he risked.
Although this seems a harsh and unjust statement, such a
thought could not be farther from the truth. After the Japanese
destruction of Pearl Harbor in Hawaii, the United States
public and government called for retribution! Doolittle was
selected by General of the Air Force, Henry H. “Hap” Arnold
as commander of a bombing raid on Japan’s mainland. The
objective of this raid was not to annihilate the enemy so much
as to cause confusion, demoralize the Japanese and boost
American morale. If Japan was driven to task resources for
defensive operations as opposed to strictly offensive as seen
in events such as Pearl Harbor, the United States would have
more time and breathing room in which to plan future attacks
( Whited ).
After some deliberation, it was agreed that an attack
on Japan would have to be launched from aircraft carriers.
Japan itself was too far away from any Allied held air bases
and the aircraft flown were too large, with no fuel to spare,
to return to the carrier from which they launched. Doolittle
painstakingly selected 24 crews for a force that was planned
7
to consist of 20 North American B-25B Mitchell medium
bombers. After training the crews in takeoff procedures from
the short runway available on top of a carrier ship, Doolittle
briefed the crews on their mission (Chun, 152). Before they
even knew they were going to bomb Japan, Doolittle made
sure that they were properly trained, properly cared for and
had the proper motivation and determination to conduct
such a trip where so many things could go wrong. At this
point, Doolittle’s priority was the well-being of his crews.
Completing the mission was the end goal, but without
trained men the mission was sure to fail.
Trained and ready, the crews and aircraft boarded
the USS Hornet, one of the four American carriers left in the
Pacific, and set across the ocean to the Japanese islands. The
air strike was originally set for the early hours of 20 April
under the cover of night. Doolittle wanted the Hornet 450
miles from Japan when the B-25’s were launched (Chun,
153). At this distance the aircraft would have enough fuel to
make it to Chinese landing sights which were predetermined.
At most, Doolittle would accept a launch site of 550 miles.
However, the aircraft ended up launching on 18 April in
broad daylight from a range of 800 miles from the Japanese
coast (Whited).
The American attack force spotted a Japanese patrol
boat that eventful day, causing the mission and launch to be
undertaken immediately. Although forces sunk the patrol
boat, Doolittle considered the possibility of a radio transmission
getting through to Japanese forces. In order to keep the
element of surprise and the best advantage towards accomplishing
the mission, Doolittle launched his aircraft (Chun,
153-154). He knew that after the mission was accomplished,
his men may not have enough fuel to make it to safe ally territory
in China. He also knew that safely landing the aircraft
with a shortage of fuel would be miraculous feat (Whited).
Months of training and extensive planning went into
the Doolittle raid, only to be modified to the peril of those
involved on split second decisions. But again, Doolittle had
trained his crew--his raiders-- to complete their tasks for the
greater good of the American nation and morale. Turning
back was not an option. Failing to accomplish their mission
was not an option. Sacrificing lives of his men would
be a military casualty, but also a military victory in the wider
scheme of the war. In the end, the mission was the ultimate
priority.
As a side note, only sixteen aircraft were selected
for the Japanese bombing mission as opposed to the originally
planned 20 aircraft force. Fifteen of the sixteen aircraft
launched from the Hornet landed in China in relative safety.
All the crews had to either bail out or crash landed their
aircraft. The Japanese believed that the bombers had come

from Midway since their forces never found the USS Hornet
or Enterprise (Whited). This led them to plan an attack on
the islands where their navy met with considerable resistance,
although the American forces were not always the greater in
number or in arms. The Americans were simply blessed with
capable leaders. These commanders knew the value and worth
of their men would be tested in battle. They knew too that
the mission comes first no matter the sacrifices or odds.
Battle of Leyte Gulf
Admiral Clifton A. F. Sprague defended Leyte Gulf
and the Philippine islands from Japanese invasion. His victory
is one of the most impressive battles against the Japanese
in World War II. Outnumbered and outgunned by Japanese
Vice Admiral Takeo Kurita, Sprague did everything he could
to outmaneuver and outwit his enemy. Taffy 3, a 13 ship task
force, relied on its courageous crews and the sacrifices they
made in order to maintain their objective: keep the Japanese
out of the Philippines and protect
American ground forces ( Wukovits, 141).
Sprague was assigned the command of Carrier Division
25, which included the flagship Fanshaw Bay, an escort
carrier and four destroyer escorts. He was later assigned the
command of Taffy 3 with six escort carriers, three destroyers,
and four destroyer escorts. Due to a previous negativeminded
commander, Sprague’s flagship crew’s morale was
extremely low (Wukovits, 111-112). His first task was to
start building up the ship’s and unit’s morale. The Admiral
knew men and therefore knew that low morale contributes
to bad performance, whereas high morale achieves desired
performance. Bad performance leads to unneeded deaths and
loss of lives which was to be avoided when possible. Although
his crew was still undermanned and overworked, because of
the personal and sincere attention the crew received from
their commander, their morale improved drastically. The
crew also developed a loyalty and trust in Sprague which
became fundamental for Sprague’s tactics in the later battle for
Leyte Gulf (Wukovits, 113).
The Japanese planned a massive attack centering
on the Philippine islands consisting of multiple elements.
Kurita, who didn’t have much faith in the Japanese plan,
moved his fleet down the San Bernardino Strait right into
Sprague’s miniscule force (Wukovits, 132). Vice Admiral William
F. Halsey was to assist Sprague with an impressive fleet
dubbed Task Force 34. However, Halsey fell for a Japanese
diversion and ended up chasing Japanese carriers, bringing
vital American forces away from aiding Sprague ( Wukovits,
133-135).
A time had come to face death or failure. Sprague
realized this when he first viewed the Japanese fleet set against
him. Sprague valued his men’s lives and well-being but he
8
also knew where his true loyalty at the time of the battle lay.
He gave his men and ships 15 minutes against what he was
sure would be a Japanese onslaught (Wukovits, 145). However,
instead of retreating and saving the lives of his men and
himself, Sprague chose to hold out and defend Leyte Gulf as
ordered against almost impossible odds. This focus on priorities
and the task at hand was an advantage that Sprague had
over Kurita and it played a vital role in the two-and-a-halfhour,
not 15 minute as
Sprague originally expected, battle that ensued.
Kurita didn’t believe in his commander’s complicated
strategy. The Japanese forces were composed of three main
parts. One would be “bait”, luring Admiral Halsey and the
destructive, speedy American ships away. The other two
would rendezvous at the Philippines simultaneously and take
on whatever American forces were there. Kurita, arriving earlier
than his counterpart commander, was sure that his forces
would be demolished going against the Americans as planned
(Wukovits, 116-117). He had no faith in his mission, which
clouded his judgments. Even when he faced 13 small ships
he should have destroyed easily, Kurita was expecting a large
force and was surprised. As Sprague strategically maneuvered
towards a rain squall away from Kurita’s ships, the enemy
was confused. Kurita could stick to the mission and charge
on to Leyte Gulf and the Philippines, or he could follow and
destroy Sprague, fully expecting Sprague’s forces were superior
compared to his (Wukovits, 146). He sacrificed his mission
and advantage by fighting on Sprague’s terms.
American forces commanded by Sprague put up a
steady, yet somewhat desperate defense. Sprague called for
aerial support to come to his aid, but was still out gunned.
His ships and planes eventually ran out of ammo. Still,
Sprague commanded them to continue harassing Kurita’s
ships, even if simply a diversion. Lt Commander R.S. Rogers’s
account of Sprague’s orders clearly illustrates the emphasis
on defending Leyte Gulf at all costs, even at the high price of
losing all men. As Squadron commander of Fanshaw Bay aircraft,
he radioed in stating that his planes were out of ammo
after three runs on the Japanese. Sprague replied, “Well, look.
You just make dummy runs on the ships because every time
you do, you draw fire away from my ships” (Wukovits, 155).
Considering the alternative, American forces would
lose many more men if one ship was sunk as opposed to aircraft.
And because of the care and attention Sprague devoted
to gaining his men’s trust and promoting courageous actions,
they all knew that following his orders, at their own peril, was
necessary. Strategically, Sprague’s reasoning was correct. Sentimentally,
Sprague seems callous, but he reduced casualties
overall and became victorious. Rogers also knew that men
had to be sacrificed:

Sprague had to give the order to make dummy runs.
It shows you the type of leader he was, he had his priorities
in order and he did what he had to do. There’s
a time you’ve got to do things for the greater good,
like falling on a grenade. This was one of those times
(Wukovits, 155).
American forces had succeeded in knocking out
Japan’s communication system. Therefore, Kurita, at the two
hour mark, was unaware of how his ships vs. the Americans
were faring. Thinking that his forces were losing, he called
off the chase on Sprague and recalled his ships (Wukovits,
175-178). In a battle he should have won, Kurita lost because
he thought to save his men, his resources and didn’t strive to
accomplish his mission. He was outwitted by a leader who
had his priorities straight, which cost him and the Japanese a
vital victory in WWII.
The Red Army
In relatively modern warfare, Russia has been the
only nation to put mission completion far above the wellbeing
and lives of its military soldiers. It is irrefutable that
men are considered an essential resource for any military
force during war, especially the army. Throughout history,
the more men in a nation’s army the more probable that the
nation would win the battle and the war. However, a nation’s
fighting soldiers can amount to such a staggering number that
the men lose their human identity and simply become tools
to be used and disposed of at the government’s or their superior’s
will. The Soviet Army during WWII used its citizens
to amass a great standing army, but also forgot that so many
men require care, coordination, and proper training in order
to be an asset to the military. The prevailing mentality of the
Red Army was to defeat the enemy by overrunning them with
a greater force, despite the probability of substantial casualties
(Sysa). Men were expendable…just achieve the military goal.
Nikolai Lenin, leader of the Bolshevik party that
started a revolution and participated in the civil war that
took place in Russia, realized early-on that the old Imperial
Army under the Tsar’s command had to be immobilized and
destroyed. He set out to create an “army of a new type,” an
army for the people to protect their rights and spread Russian
influence and ideals. The Bolshevik party focused on
mobilizing Red Guards, who were armed worker detachments
(Reese, 7-9). The party also sought out peasants, first
allowing them to volunteer, then instituting a military draft to
increase the size of the Red Army since there were few volunteers.
Eventually, the army would grow to 5 million soldiers
by the end of Russia’s civil war. However, desertion rates
were considerably high. The army and its leaders had a hard
time equipping, arming, housing, feeding, and paying its sol-
9
diers which carried over into the eve of World War II ( Reese,
12-14). With their basic needs unmet and forced against their
will to enter into the army, many felt desertion was their only
way out.
To curb desertion and set a future principle, Russian
leader Leon Trotsky instituted Order Number 65, which
illustrated his “no tolerance” mindset. It also conveyed to
the men that they were expendable and should they choose to
forfeit their duty, they would also forfeit their lives to armed
fellow citizens. The Order stated that any “scoundrel” who
encourages retreat, desertion or not fulfilling an order was
to be shot. Any soldier who left his rifle or sold parts of his
uniform was to be shot. Any soldier who deserts on the front
line was to be shot. Lastly, Trotsky also stated that should any
deserter be harbored, the people are liable to be shot and their
house will be burnt down (Reese, 13). Again, with Order
Number 65, Trotsky aimed to motivate Russian soldiers to
succeed in battle, succeed in their mission and never think
about retreating from their line of duty…or else!
Leading up to World War II, conditions and morale
of the Red Army did not improve much, if at all. Housing
was horrible and in short supply. Barracks sometimes
lacked indoor plumbing and lighting. The buildings were
often cheaply and poorly constructed as well. Food was also a
huge morale depressor. There wasn’t enough, especially when
famine struck during 1923 – 1933, when many men suffered
from malnutrition. On the flip side, it was discovered the
officers were eating well, taking most of the scant food for
themselves (Reese, 65-66). Not only does this show the leaders’
irresponsibly, such actions demonstrate the callousness of
the officers towards their men’s health and their lack of duty.
Malnourished soldiers are a liability to the accomplishment of
any given mission.
In 1939, Stalin could not avoid World War. His
army lacked leadership and properly outfitted and trained
men. Still, he wrote a set of “regulations” to give the military
some scope of an objective and a basis for all missions to be
carried out in the future. One, Stalin indicated that any
enemy who attacks the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics
would be mercilessly crushed by the Red Army. If the enemy
forced Russia into war, the army would proceed to launch an
offensive relying on vast numbers of human resources to gain
the advantage in the ensuing battle ( Reese, 94). With such
guidelines, Stalin left no room to doubt which he held higher
in importance, mission or men.
Like Trotsky before him, Stalin issued Order 227
stating that soldiers should take “not one step backwards”
in battle, else they would be shot by their fellow Russians.
Stalin could always find more men due to the Soviet Union’s
vast territory. The Red Army even started enlisting women

to fight as well. ( Reese, 115) So the choice faced by Russian
soldiers was to kill the Germans or be killed by the
Germans; kill the enemy or be killed by Russians. Order
227 was provided for proper “motivation” to accomplish
their duty and defend their homeland by overwhelming
the enemy.
In sum, Russia’s extreme priorities of completing
the mission at all costs led to many victories in World
War II. However, battles were won at the expense of millions
of lives. The Battle of Berlin cast 300,000 Russian
soldiers, a sum greater than all American losses during the
entire war. Russia by far had the highest fatality and causality
rate out of all nations involved in World War II.
What is more important, men or accomplishing
missions? Although there is no straight answer to this
question, it stands to reason that training men and combat
readiness has one end in site: battle. And in every battle
or war there is a military objective to gain, which makes
training men and seeing to their overall readiness vital to
the success in obtaining the objective. Leaders should
motivate their men, encourage them to excel at their training
and promote military awareness. As witnessed with
Admiral Sprague and Doolittle in World War II, during
the preparation phase, men take initial priority and a commander’s
focus. But it should not be forgotten that every
military decision a commander makes is foreshadowed by
something that is bigger than the lives of his men. A successful
mission is the ultimate goal.
The United States military forces have striven to
avoid massive amounts of casualties. Russian losses during
WWII were drastic, though the army did succeed in winning
many of its battles. Russian leaders also knew the
importance of mission over men but perhaps at too drastic
a cost. More men may be more advantageous in battle
but as Sprague and Doolittle demonstrated, few highly
motivated and exceptionally well trained men can have
just as devastating an impact on their enemy, succeeding
and sometimes surpassing mission objectives. Either way,
large army or small, multiple resources or minimum force,
the military is always striving to accomplish something,
achieve a goal. Men, technology, and strategies are all just
parts working together to obtain and surpass a given task.
Victory lies in mission completion.
10
htm >
Works Cited
Chun, Clayton K.S. War, Military, Theory, and Strategy.
Boston, New York:
Houghton Mifflin Company, 2002.
Contrails, Volume 49. United States Air Force Academy,
2003.
Reese, Roger R. The Soviet Military Experience.
New York: Routledge, 2000.
Sysa, Andrey. “Tactics in the Winter War.” Winterwar.com.
2003. Sam
Korhonen. < http://www.winterwar.com/tactics.
Whited, Bert W. “The Bombing of Tokyo.” USS Salt
Lake City.com. Sandy
Thompson. 13 October 2003.
Wukovits, John F. Devotion to Duty. Annapolis,
Maryland: Naval Institute Press,

“THE ANATOMY OF CLOSE AIR SUPPORT”
BY
C1C BRANDON BURNS
INTRODUCTION
The birth of the airplane had a revolutionary effect
on warfare, adding a much needed third dimension to the
battlefield. During the course of World War I, airpower came
to be employed in various types of missions to include strategic
bombardment, air interdiction, air superiority, and close
air support. Since gaining independence from the U.S. Army,
the Army has made claims that the Air Force is not committed
to close air support. 1 Despite such attitudes, the Air Force
has sought to provide close air support systems comprised
of trained pilots, well suited aircraft, command and control
(C 2 ) capabilities, and a variety of additional components that
join to form the close air support (CAS) system or “body”
(see “Limitations of the Study” below for further discussion
of the analogy to the human body). From the legendary P-
47 Thunderbolt to the respected A/OA-10 Thunderbolt II,
the U.S. Air Force has kept its guarantee to provide CAS. 2
However, military aircraft have not been the only systems to
evolve with the times. The introduction of new technologies
has resulted in significant progress in CAS and the U.S. Air
Force has chosen to incorporate technology into all aspects of
the CAS mission. Doctrine, capabilities, and technology are
interrelated, and there is debate about whether the new technology
and the addition of new capabilities will adequately
fulfill the prescribed doctrine for CAS. The complete answer
to this debate requires an understanding of the CAS body.
The latest edition of Air Force Basic Doctrine states
that:
Close Air Support (CAS) consists of air
operations against hostile targets in close proximity
to friendly forces; further, these operations require
detailed integration of each air mission with the fire
and movement of those forces. CAS provides direct
support to help friendly surface forces carry out their
assigned tasks. To be most effective, however, CAS
should be used at decisive points in a battle and
should normally be massed to apply concentrated
combat power and saturate defenses. 3
To fulfill this mission the aircraft requirements for
CAS have changed little since its debut as an Air Force mission.
A specialized aircraft, the A/OA-10, has been developed
for the CAS mission and is therefore especially well suited for
such tactical employment. The Air Force plans to introduce
11
the F-35 Joint Strike Fighter (JSF), a multi-role fighter that
will replace the venerable Fairchild Republic A/OA-10 as
the primary CAS weapons platform. Other aircraft, such as
the Rockwell B-1B, have also recently proven their combat
effectiveness while supporting ground operations. With such
aircraft readily available to carry out the CAS mission, it is
arguable that combinations of A/OA-10s, B-1Bs, and other
aircraft may be able to efficiently support CAS operations for
the foreseeable future. Possibly having more attention than
necessary, the Air Force has concentrated on one component
of the CAS body: weapons platforms. Weapons platforms,
which unarguably need to be upgraded over time, combine to
form just one system, the muscular system, of the CAS body.
True fulfillment of the CAS mission lies in the development
of the entire CAS organization.
Research Question
The U.S Air Force must concentrate on acquiring
new or upgrading existing tools that can successfully be
employed during CAS operations based on application of the
desired doctrine. CAS is a specialized and unique mission,
and recent U.S. Air Force trends support future CAS capabilities,
especially for weapons platforms. Based on recent
U.S. combat experiences, adaptations to current U.S. aircraft,
and the transformational approach towards the military as a
whole, the question remains: Given its cultural disposition
to focus on platforms, has the U.S. Air Force neglected other
systems of the CAS body, while seeking to produce optimum
capabilities for CAS? Recognition of this is crucial to ensure
that the U.S. Air Force is heading in the right direction to
prepare to meet new and growing challenges involving lowintensity
conflicts which may be expected to impose increased
requirements for CAS.
Limitations of the Study
The purpose for this research is to identify and
support the best approach for Air Force CAS development
through an analysis of capabilities based on needs and requirements.
This paper seeks to view CAS as a body consisting of
many systems that work together, much like the systems in
the human body. This paper approaches CAS broader than
most CAS analyses; however, the paper will dissect CAS and
examine each system to see how each system is intertwined
with another. After examining all these systems, there will
be a diagnosis of the CAS body and an explanation of where
problems may exist that require treatment. Training is not a
focus of this paper. Although training is mentioned in a discussion
of the CAS systems, training at any level, is not part

of CAS capabilities.
Definitions and Assumptions
Definitions
Before examining the CAS body however, there are
some terms and ideas that must be defined.
Command and control, or C 2 is:
The exercise of authority and direction
by a properly designated commander over
assigned and attached forces in the accomplishment
of the mission. Command and
control functions are performed through
an arrangement of personnel, equipment,
communications, facilities, and procedures
employed by a commander in planning,
directing, coordinating, and controlling
forces and operations in the accomplishment
of the mission. 4
Capabilities – Hardware used in CAS
Hardware – includes assets such as weapons platforms,
munitions, information networks and infrastructure,
command and control infrastructure.
JSTARS – Joint Surveillance Target Attack Radar
System
SAMS – Surface-to-Air Missile
IADS – Integrated Air Defense
AAA – Anti-Aircraft Artillery
PGM – Precision Guided Munition
LGB – Laser Guided Bomb
GPS – Global Positioning System
JDAM – Joint Direct Attack Munition
AOC or CAOC – Air Operation Center or Combined
Air Operation Center
ATO – Air Tasking Order
SATCOM – Satellite Communication
CFACC – Combined Force Air Component Commander
CFLCC – Combined Force Land Component Commander
ISR – Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance
Many terms used in this paper will have a biological
connotation. Because this paper is treating CAS as a body,
words such as system: CAS body as related to functions in a
human body. For instance, muscular system, nervous system,
circulatory system, and skeletal system.
Assumptions
In order to propose a convincing diagnosis, the fol-
12
lowing two points will be assumed as being known. First, one
must have a basic understanding of how CAS is executed tactically
because it is essential in developing the mission requirements
for CAS and prescribes a rudimentary depiction of the
environment where CAS operates, thus indirectly identifying
mission essential capabilities. This point will be expanded in
the following sections. This will then enable a link between
CAS as a mission to CAS as a body.
Understanding of basic CAS is incomplete without
knowledge of the overall trend for current operations.
Second, given the current international environment and
associated security issues, the need for the Air Force to provide
CAS is likely to increase. Most modern combat consists
of relatively small scale ground engagements that require air
support. Because of the countries and organizations that
military force is being used against, enemy air-to-air conflict
is rarely encountered, but surface-to-air threats still exist. The
little air-to-air threat that is present is comprised of obsolete
aircraft and/or ill trained crews. This is a significant consideration
because emphasis must be placed on treatment of a
system that will ensure proper CAS development. If the goal
is to develop a cross-country runner, then a doctor should not
prescribe treatment that is tailored for a boxer. In much the
same way, knowing the combat environment specifies the type
of treatment needed for CAS. If the environment dictated
CAS in an open battlefield against tanks, the treatment would
be different than for urban operations.
Preview of Argument
First, this paper will determine what the systems are
that make up the CAS body. This will be done by describing
the doctrine and tactics of Air Force CAS. The doctrine
portion will explain what the Air Force already knows about
CAS and how it should be conducted. Second, tactics will be
examined to describe how the Air Force conducts CAS operations.
Additionally, this will explain what coordination takes
place and what military assets are used to yield a successful
CAS mission. Once it has been established what assets are
used, these assets and prescribed tactics will be linked to the
body systems for analysis.
Next, the analytical step will have both a description
and analysis of each system. This will take each system, which
has been paired to a function or assets used to perform CAS,
and dissect the system. The dissection is an in-depth examination
to determine the intricate workings and how the Air
Force has attended to or neglected the development of this
system. At the end of each system analysis, this paper will
provide a possible answer for the research question with disregard
to other systems. This preliminary diagnosis, which will

consider multiple possible answers to the research question
from each system analysis, will be scrutinized in the following
section.
The third section will introduce counter arguments
against the preliminary diagnosis. It will evaluate existing
arguments against the preliminary diagnosis and determine
if the premise and support for the counter arguments can be
applied to a physical or metaphysical flaw of the CAS body.
This section will then take the evaluations and support the
diagnosis or establish a new diagnosis.
The forth section and conclusion will study the
current and predicted environment for CAS operations.
Although this paper may have established a diagnosis for
CAS, no evaluation is complete without treatment. To establish
the best possible treatment it must be known what CAS
is being treated for, e.g. CAS operations in European style
battles with tanks, or low intensity conflicts characterized by
urban operations. The conclusion will then establish where
the possible flaw for CAS exists, if any, and the best possible
treatment to ensure the U.S. Air Force is heading in the right
direction to develop CAS to meet new and growing challenges.
It will also include areas for future research and touch
on developing capabilities that may aid in developing the
CAS body.
LITERATURE REVIEW
What is CAS and How is It Performed?
Literature defining CAS lends itself to a fair amount
of criticism because most students of strategic studies tend to
side one way or another. One side of the argument takes the
Air Force stance, claiming that CAS is important, that it is an
important Air Force mission, and that the Air Force is committed
to it. On the other, there are those who side with the
Army, stating that the Air Force neglects CAS. Since there
are two sides to this argument, there arises a fundamental difference
in defining CAS. Doctrine is a fairly reliable place
to start, but doctrine has its limitations. Air Force doctrine
defines what CAS is, but it takes CAS to the extreme side of
this two sided argument, and the same holds true for Army
doctrine. One major flaw that the Air Force doctrine makes
is the use of the words “close proximity” and “detailed integration”
5 . Although catchy, they have a vague translation,
especially if one considers that the Army and Air Force may
interpret these differently. What is in close proximity? Is it
the distance between friendly troops and supporting aircraft,
friendly troops to munitions impact, friendly troops and the
enemy, or is it friendly troops and enemy fire? Doctrine provides
a starting point, but because of translation issues it can
13
only establish a loose description of CAS.
A better approach to defining what CAS is, and how
it is really conducted, is to use case studies. Although case
studies are a better approach, they too have misleading flaws.
The case studies on the first Gulf War (Operation Desert
Storm) are extensive. An analysis by Maj Leon Elsarelli
helps to establish a case that there are limitations created by
the environment where CAS operations take place. Elsarelli
makes the claim that the U.S. failed to control the low altitude
environment. This may be true, but he does not identify
why we failed. Knowing why the U.S. failed may change the
conclusion. He went further by stating that the U.S. needs
specialized aircraft with capabilities to withstand attacks. If
one knows why the U.S. failed to control low altitudes, then
a conclusion may be formed such that the U.S. needs more
JSTARS aircraft to observe the area. For this reason, case
studies surrounding CAS can be too general in their description.
Some provide a detailed description of the environment
while others describe the environment only enough to support
their argument, much like Elarelli. Col Edward Mann
has a similar flaw when stating that B-52s lacked significant
strategic objectives, so they became CAS platforms. 6
Most case studies, however, do provide important
information, albeit sometimes indirectly. LtCol Philip
“Goldie” Haun, writing on Operation Allied Force in 1999,
identifies the anti-aircraft threats and the U.S. concern for
casualties, then explains what aircraft were used to attack Iraqi
targets in the first Gulf War in 1991. 7 On the basis of Haun’s
comments, it can be inferred that CAS requires a system to
detect threats and relay that information to planning cells and
aircrews. Direct descriptions, however, do exist and Elsarelli
explains that CAS requires aircraft to fly at low altitudes, use
visual identification of targets, and that friendly troops may
be so close that they could be wounded by CAS. 8 Both indirect
and direct descriptions provide significant information
because they identify what CAS is and how it is performed.
The conflicts in the Balkans are another significant
low-intensity conflict. These conflicts for analysis include
Bosnia-Hercegovina (Operation Deliberate Force), and Serbia
(Operation Allied Force). LtCol Richard Sargent details the
CAS operations during Operation Deliberate Force. Like
Haun and Elsarelli, Sargent focuses on the operational environment.
He identifies conditions that inhibit CAS operations,
such as weather, foliage, and terrain. 9 This implies that
CAS is not limited to missions during daytime and optimal
weather. Both Sargent and Elsarelli examine the surface-toair
threats in the environment. Sargent explains that CAS
aircraft, particularly A/OA-10s usually orbit outside of target
areas for on-call CAS. 10 Elsarelli adds that when CAS is called
upon it requires aircraft to fly low over the target areas, put-

ting the aircraft within rage of anti-aircraft weapons. 11 This
creates the need for a rugged design to withstand damage.
Although neither Sargent nor Elsarelli directly state what
aircraft capabilities are most effective, Sargent explains valuable
performance enhancing additions that were used e.g.,
LANTRIN pods. 12
Haun assesses the use of CAS in Operation Allied
Force. The environment is analogous to that of Operation
Deliberate Force, and much of the same derived capabilities
can be extracted. Haun, however, makes one statement of
particular interest in acknowledging problems with locating
and identifying targets, and limiting collateral damage
while still successfully attacking. 13 This examination provides
important facts from which inferences can be drawn about
capability enhancements and munitions.
The Somalia conflict is centered on the Army’s
delivery of CAS, but Elsarelli identifies through it the special
attention required for urban warfare. Low-intensity conflicts,
characterized by this type of warfare, are points of interest.
Like Haun’s statement concerning visual identification,
Elsarelli uses this environment to highlight visual identification
as a problem due to the use of “technicals”, which are
regular vehicles mounted with weapons. 14 Even with guided
munitions, it can be difficult to decipher between technicals
and ordinary vehicles when using high altitude imagery.
Afghanistan (Operation Enduring Freedom) and
the second Gulf War (Operation Iraqi Freedom) are two of
the most recent military operations, and are requiring more
time to evaluate. To aid in evaluating Operation Enduring
Freedom, however, Maj Anton Eret of the 34 th Education
Group, U.S. Air Force Academy, provides substantial primary
information about the CAS operations. Maj Eret is a B-1B
Weapons System Officer, a U.S. Air Force Weapons School
graduate, and actively participated in Operation Enduring
Freedom. He has furnished a detailed account of Air Tasking
Orders (ATO) and how they were designed to support CAS
operations. 15 He also explains how the physical and combat
environment presented specific problems for smaller aircraft
like the A/OA-10.
CAS platform problems during Operation Enduring
Freedom were open to the use of the strategic bomber force.
Eret describes how the combat environment, mainly due to
altitude restrictions, allowed operations of large aircraft with
large payloads. He also cites new munitions that allowed
pin-point accuracy from higher altitudes. This information,
provided by Eret, will help to evaluate other potential CAS
aircraft characteristics that cannot be extracted in any of the
previous operations.
By extracting the needed capabilities from all of the
case studies, a comparison to CAS body functions can be
14
made. This section relies on Air Force instruction manuals
and pamphlets because they explain how integration among
systems within the CAS body is supposed to work. Information
from manuals, however, only provides a “perfect world”
operation. No matter how smoothly an operation goes,
there will be some problems. The manuals explain how an
Air Operation Center works, but do not address problems
that are encountered during actual operations, thus it is also
important that case studies and reports are also examined to
provide data on issues that have significant problems.
Munitions study has a limited number of sources.
The munitions data to include capabilities, delivery platforms,
and other such information, can be obtained through the
1999 Weapons File and the Federation of American Scientists.
16 These sources provide the basic data, but fail to incorporate
an explanation of the most effective delivery in terms
of munitions combinations, altitudes, speeds, and delivery
volume. Maj Anton Eret is the core source for the munitions
study and a key to this research because of his U.S. Air Force
Weapons School background. His knowledge and practical
experience in current operations provide a cornerstone for the
application of munitions in CAS operations. His comprehension
of the current weapons will provide the needed information
for effective munitions research.
A recent scholarly study conducted by Dr. David
Mets, The Long Search for a Surgical Strike, analyzes the effects
new weapons technology has had on operations such as CAS,
similar to the information from Eret. 17 The limitations of this
munitions analysis stems from the lack of previous research
conducted on effective operation during deployment. Until
recently, little evaluation has been placed on munitions capabilities;
rather the focus has been on the weapons platforms
themselves. Further research will be required as well as an
updated weapons guide.
THESIS BODY
The CAS Anatomy
Close air support is a complex entity. Similar to the
way in which a human body is comprised of a collection of
systems with specialized functions, the CAS body can only
function efficiently and effectively if all of its systems are
integrated together. CAS is supported by systems that can
be likened to the muscular, skeletal, circulatory, and nervous
systems, much like systems in the human body. The skeletal
system for CAS provides the same function as any other
skeleton: structure. In the context of CAS, the structure is
not formed by bones, but by doctrine. Military doctrine,
especially in the United States Air Force, is the foundation
that shapes military operations and, therefore, the CAS
operational architecture. Doctrine is limited because it only
provides a general frame upon which other functions build.

The CAS skeletal system provides abilities and limitations
for other CAS functions, allowing them to strengthen or
weaken, grow or atrophy as required by a given CAS operation.
This is not too difficult to understand when one realizes
that modern U.S. military planning is formulated on the basis
of effects-based operations. Without a solid structure that
provides a construct for other systems to grow upon, the CAS
body would be a conglomeration of unorganized systems ineffectively
attempting to perform complex operations.
While the skeletal structure is essential, it is hopelessly
inadequate to perform functions unless it is combined
with other systems. In the same way, doctrine cannot fight
a war without troops, equipment, training, and orders. The
CAS body’s version of the muscular system can be viewed
as the kinetic means in which operations take place. This
idea is indicative of a muscular system; however, it is hard
to conceptualize in the context of CAS operations. Within
the CAS body, there are only two forms of kinetic activities:
the employment of munitions and the mode or platform
from which they are delivered. In the context of CAS, the
weapons delivery platforms are synonymous to legs and feet,
while the munitions can be thought of as hands. The legs
(weapons platforms) provide a mode of transportation for
the hands (munitions) to actively engage the target. When
power (muscles) is combined with a frame (skeleton), one can
see the importance of having both; all the power in the world
is only dead weight if it is not given a framework for projection.
Likewise, a structure is unable to provide force without
a means of execution.
The CAS mission, unfortunately, is too intricate
to be performed by a mindless creature of massive structure
and power. CAS must be integrated with detailed coordination
in order to perform the mission in close proximity to
friendly forces and in a dynamic environment. The circulatory
(personnel) and nervous (training) systems are the two
mechanisms that allow for such functions to take place.
These systems combine to form the heart and soul of the
CAS mission as part of the nervous system and all of the circulatory
system concentrate on the trained people who work
together to perform a CAS operation. Although training and
personnel issues are not topics of discussion in this paper,
they cannot be disregarded as key features to the efficiency
and effectiveness of the CAS body. It is important to note the
contribution of the circulatory system. In the CAS body, it
allows for the flow of new personnel with innovative ideas and
methods to each part of the body. These ideas can help foster
growth or adaptations of other functions. New outlooks and
methods, dubbed “transformation” in the military realm, is
an important part of the modern U.S. military, but transformational
changes can only be executed by technically skilled
15
operators. 18
These technically skilled operators, found in many
diverse career fields to include the cockpits, Air Operations
Centers, High Value Aerial Assets, command and control centers,
and intelligence processing centers, are the neuromuscular
connections that convert information to motion. Included
in the nervous system is also the eyes, ears, brain, and nerves;
each can be associated with a part of the CAS body. When
the nervous system is combined with the other three systems,
CAS becomes a fully integrated, functional, and effective
military operation.
The CAS body does have vulnerabilities and weaknesses
that can be exploited or cause functional problems,
just as human bodies are not immune to diseases, trauma,
and minor injuries. Unlike a human, however, the CAS body
cannot just visit a local doctor; it must be dissected and analyzed
to form a proper diagnosis.
The Muscular System
The United States Air Force has spent billons of dollars
to research and develop some of the most sophisticated
aircraft the world has ever seen. The legacy of U.S. CAS platforms
dates back to World War II and the P-47 Thunderbolt.
Its eight 50 caliber machine guns and robust body construction
allowed the P-47 to prevail at lower altitudes and under
fire when other aircraft were more likely to develop malfunctions
due to enemy fire. 19 Continuing with these design characteristics,
the Air Force adopted the A-1H Skyraider during
the Vietnam War, and the A-10 Thunderbolt II. These aircraft
have design characteristics that allow them to be effective
CAS platforms based on their durability, firepower, and ironically,
their slow speed.
The A-10 has become a trusted sight for many of the
troops serving on the ground due to its firepower. The A-10’s
30mm Gatling gun and uranium depleted rounds can make
quick work of enemy armored units. The cockpit is designed
around the gun barrel and is enclosed by a titanium shell,
providing increased protection for the pilot and avionics. The
uniquely cambered wings allow greater lift when loaded with
a variety of munitions. The wings are not swept and have
eleven pylons that can be loaded with 16,000 lbs of bombs
and missiles including the AGM-85 Maverick, AIM-9 Sidewinder,
and Mk-82, -83, and -84 bombs. 20 The two twin
turbo fan engines are set higher than the wings to increase
protection. The A-10 also has an internal feature that is
unlike most modern aircraft, a non-hydraulic powered control
capability that allows the pilot to fly the aircraft even if all the
hydraulics have failed. 21 Ugly at best, the A-10 is designed to
be the tank of the sky with the sole mission of providing CAS
to those who need it.

Platforms, however, are moving away from A-10
type aircraft and becoming less mission-based. Advances in
technology and new tactics have made mission titles for aircraft
obsolete. Strategic bombers, attack fighters, and fighter/
bomber designations are becoming combined. Desert Storm
in 1991 saw the use of B-52 bombers as CAS platforms. 22
Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF) and Operation Iraqi
Freedom (OIF) employed B-1s, B-52s, F-16s, F-15Es, and
A-10s in support of CAS missions, though each aircraft was
designed for another mission (long range strategic bombing
(B-52), low level nuclear strikes (B-1), short range inexpensive
fighter (F-16), and air superiority tactical fighter (F-15). 23
Each aircraft has been refitted with avionics that allow it to
execute the CAS mission.
The legs of CAS are also being improved. The introduction
of the F/A-22 will exhibit increased survivability
because of its stealth, speed, and avionics. Like the F/A-22,
the F-35, which is slated to be the true CAS platform replacement,
has similar features to the F/A-22. Neither, however,
has the same robust construction, payload, or main gun of
the A-10. When examined with respect to the effectiveness
of replacing the A-10, the Air Force argues that there
is a dwindling need for aircraft such as the A-10 in modern
CAS operations because technology has created the ability
to achieve precision at a distance – distance that is needed to
keep aircraft out of range from enemy anti-aircraft fire.
The changing operational environment has played
a massive roll in the Air Force’s CAS evolution. Modern
combat operations take place in areas that are usually
defended by SAMs threats. Less expensive than having an
air force, many countries have IADs that center on the use
of SAMs and AAA. Such systems are much cheaper to buy,
maintain, and train crews for than are aircraft on alert. To
counter this surface-to-air threat, the Air Force flies at altitudes
at or above 25,000 feet for as many missions as possible
because at 25,000, seventy-five percent of the ground threat is
negated. 24 The A-10 cannot be used effectively at these altitudes
for CAS, but aircraft like the F-15E, F-16, B-52, B-1,
F/A-22, and F-35 can. What makes these aircraft effective at
such altitudes is not dependant on actual design as much as it
is on avionics and munitions capabilities.
Munitions give the CAS body the ability to physically
touch the enemy. All the systems in a human body
cannot help a boxer in a fight if he does not have hands. CAS
is equally vulnerable without munitions. Without these
“hands,” none of the aircraft capabilities would be of any
advantage to CAS. Mets, a premier scholar, has noted that
the U.S. Air Force spends a considerable amount of money on
research and development of aircraft but little on the development
of weapons. 25 This is a terrible mistake on behalf of the
16
Air Force because the CAS body needs a variety of munitions.
Light weapons like the small diameter bomb are extremely
important so aircraft can load more weapons without increasing
weight. Furthermore, these weapons must give CAS the
ability to provide a solid fist- punch (2,000 lb bomb on building),
or a finger poke (PGM into a C 2 structure), but this
ability correlates to the munitions rather than the aircraft.
Although the Air Force has paid less attention to
munitions development, which is not to say that they have
neglected it altogether. Research and development in the field
has been ongoing. LGBs debuted in the early 1970’s and saw
limited operational use in Vietnam. 26 Since then, there have
been multiple munitions advancements to provide airpower
with much needed accuracy. As Mets points out, this new
surge to produce weapons with launch-and-leave capabilities
and pin-point accuracy started with the maturation of the
GPS at the end of the first Gulf War in which the GPS signals
are received by small computers on the weapon. 27 Once
launched, satellite signals continuously up-date the bomb or
missile until impact. The key capability of the aircraft now
becomes its avionics. The aircraft operators have to input the
target coordinates and launch the weapon. Only aircraft with
computers on board that can “talk” to the weapons are able to
exploit PGM capabilities. JDAM, which is the GPS package
on a Mk-80 class bomb body, are becoming the main air-toground
weapons of choice because they provide all weather,
night-day drop capabilities. 28 LGBs are still used, but they are
susceptible to fog, clouds, foliage, or any other medium that
can block a laser beam from the targeteer (whether it be an
aircraft or ground party) to the target.
It would be presumptuous to say that any aircraft can
now become a CAS platform with proper avionics and guided
bombs, but such a trend is becoming more apparent with the
development of new technology. The days of single mission
aircraft are coming to an end, evidenced by the F/A-22 and F-
35. Multipurpose or multi-role, however one wants to define
it, is the catch phrase of modern aircraft design. From 25,000
feet or higher, the Air Force is becoming capable of providing
CAS without the need to build aircraft for a threat environment
it can fly over.
The Nervous System
The AOC is the processing center and workhorse for
the CFACC, where the ATO is built and executed. The ATO
is the daily physical list of air operations that will be executed
over a period of twelve hours. Within it, aircraft are allocated
to a variety of commanders and assigned everything from
their missions and targets to what they will be armed with.
The AOC has two primary responsibilities, often broken
down into Combat Plans and Combat Operations. The

Combat Plans division “builds” the ATO and Combat Operations
executes it, though other divisions participate in both
responsibilities. 29 Planning and Operations are done with
both aircraft operators and non-rated personnel because the
AOC must incorporate all aspects of modern combat, from
logistics to intelligence, in order to compose the aerial ballet.
Considerations that are dealt with in the AOC range from
munitions inventory, battle damage assessment, saturation of
SATCOM links, to the details of aircraft turning at the correct
times. Thus it is important that each of the involved elements
actively participate in air operations coordination. 30
Joint Publication (JP) 3-56.1, Command and Control
for Joint Air Operations, states that the responsibilities of the
CFACC include: “functioning as the supported commander
for…theater airborne reconnaissance and surveillance.” 31
Intelligence plays a critical role in joint air operations because
of the speed, range, and flexibility of air power. Timely, tailored
intelligence is essential to the effective application of
combat air assets. It plays an integral part in the development
and execution the Joint Air Operations Plan, shapes key planning
products prepared by the CFACC and the CFACC’s
staff, and is vital to the development of a comprehensive, prioritized
target list and allocation of CAS sorties. Air-focused
intelligence is necessary for combat planners and combat
operations to be able to plan and execute the ATO. 32
The majority of information-related operations that
are located in the AOC fall under the heading of ISR. Overall
integration of ISR functions and C 2 of ISR assets is accomplished
by establishing a single focal point for ISR in the
AOC – ISR Division (ISRD). 33 The AOC is the best location
to integrate the war fighter’s ISR capabilities. The ISRD is
functionally associated, yet fully integrated, to embed sensor
experts, platform experts and intelligence experts within the
other divisions of the AOC. The ISRD is an essential aspect
of all AOC operations and is integrated into every part of
the air tasking cycle. ISRD responsibilities are constant,
whether the AOC is engaged in combat operations or in
military operations other than war. 34 The ISRD’s primary
mission is to provide a fused, constantly updated intelligence
picture throughout the AOC. That mission is accomplished
through teams within the ISRD and liaisons to the other
AOC divisions and through the synchronization of ISR assets
and capabilities. 35 The ISRD concept is to centrally manage
intelligence responsibilities. Through this concept, the
ISRD ensures a consistent intelligence picture is maintained
throughout the air tasking cycle. Additionally, ISR personnel
are integrated within the Strategy Division, Combat Plans
Division, and Combat Operations Division to provide dedicated
and tailored ISR support for specified CAOC processes.
It is the AOC’s focal point for integrating ISR throughout the
17
CFACC’s full range of operations. 36
The Chief, ISRD (CISR) is responsible for all ISR
activities required to support CFACC planning and operations.
The CISR controls, coordinates, and directs the ISR
tasking process through the other division chiefs, as directed
by the CAOC Director. 37 The CISR is responsible for synchronizing
ISR with aerospace strategy, planning, and operations,
and achieves this through centralized control via an ISR
Division and decentralized execution by embedded elements
in the other AOC divisions. 38 The CISR integrates numerous
cross-functional disciplines, enabling the core processes
of the other AOC Divisions to continue. Centralized, fused
ISR control forms a single ISR picture in the AOC. Decentralized
ISR execution provides each JAOC division with the
flexibility to tailor the unified ISR perspective to the unique
processes and products of each division. 39 These products and
processes require continual update of the ISR picture, which
is accomplished through feedback from the ISR personnel in
each division to the ISRD. The CISR’s authority to manage
this process creates a single fused ISR picture, ensuring that
each division has ISR tailored to meet specific ATO requirements.
40
The ISRD develops, maintains, and disseminates
information, threat estimates, intelligence updates, and threat
alerts, manages intelligence collection requirements, and
provides targeting and weaponeering support. The division
integrates numerous cross-functional disciplines and provides
direct support to the other AOC divisions’ core processes
through embedded ISR elements. There are five ISRD elements:
Analysis, Correlation, and Fusion (ACF) Team;
Targeting and Battle Damage Assessment (BDA) Team; ISR
Management Team; Processing, Exploitation, and Dissemination
(PED) Team; and Sensitive Compartmented Information
(SCI) Management Team. ISRD Core Team personnel provide
intelligence products and services that support the entire
AOC, joint force, and subordinate units. 41 In addition, ISRD
core personnel provide oversight and management of JFACC
ISR processes to ensure that the appropriate ISR reporting,
planning, tasking, and deconfliction occurs in order to build a
common source threat and targeting picture. As the adversary
does not operate according to the ATO cycle, core personnel
ensure continuity of the threat picture and horizontal integration
of ISR processes across the AOC. 42
It is critical that intelligence personnel understand
CFACC operations to support decision-making as well as
ATO preparation and execution. From conception to execution
the ATO is created in seventy-two hours. Support of
the seventy-two hour cycle requires an understanding of the
missions and tasks to be achieved and supported. 43 Central to
this understanding is a strong operations-intelligence interface

ased on working side-by-side, knowing each other’s requirements,
and having maximum access to operational and intelligence
information. In this regard, key CFACC intelligence
personnel must have access to all plans and programs so that
intelligence planners are aware of the operations’ requirements,
plans, and programs and can formulate collection
planning or any special tasking required. 44 Likewise, operational
planners should have access to all available intelligence
information that might affect CFACC operations. To attain
such information, the CAS body relies on its eyes and ears.
Feeding the brain constant information are the eyes
and ears of the CAS body, comprised of many elements to
include Special Operations troops, Air Liaison Officers, Forward
Air Controllers, ISR aircraft, and space assets. These
assets give the CAS body the ability to see and hear the
enemy. Human assets (ALOs and FACs) are personnel on the
ground who can provide real time information to those who
need it. In typical CAS operations, ground controllers use a
variety of techniques to communicate target information to
the pilots flying CAS missions. 45
Aircraft also play an important role in providing the
CAS body with situational awareness. E-8 JSTARS, RC-
135 Rivet Joint, MC-130s and E-3 AWACS all have specific
functions that are relayed both to operators and to the AOC.
Combined, these aircraft also function as a sort of spinal cord.
RC-135s, built on a Boeing 707 airframe, and MC-130s,
built on the C-130 airframe, have the primary function of
electronic surveillance. 46 They monitor electronic activity
in the area of responsibility and report to the AOC. With
proper guidance from the AOC, these aircraft can inform
CAS pilots of electronic signatures that may pose a threat
such as radar waves from a hostile surface to air missile sight
or enemy communications. Similar to the RC-135, the E-3
scans the sky to pick up enemy aircraft and radar signatures
and warn CAS pilots of possible enemy aircraft. 47 Although
important to the CAS body for situational awareness, these
functions do not directly affect the relationship between aircraft
and troop engagements.
The E-8, however, does directly support such activities.
The JSTARS is the AWACS for ground movement.
Designed with the U.S. Army, this aircraft scans the surface
and can detect enemy vehicle movement or engaged friendly
troops. 48 Using low mounted radar on the JSTARS, trained
operators monitor ground activities and provide real-time
information to ground units, the AOC, and air crews overhead.
Should situations arise that require CAS, JSTARS can
vector in CAS aircraft and provide coordinates to pilots for
targets. The target information is loaded into the avionics for
weapons deployment. Such situations are known in the AOC
as XCAS missions, those without a predetermined target.
18
Aircraft performing such missions loiter at altitude until a call
is received. In this situation, the JSTARS cannot provide a
picture of the battlefield; all it can relay are coordinates and
elevation. Battlefield imagery and predetermined targets are
gathered by space assets.
Space is the final instrument used by the CAS body
to see and hear enemy activities. Satellite imagery, whether
electro-optical, radar, or infrared, provides a capability that
can feed the AOC endlessly. 49 However, spaces assets are not
limited to imagery. Space assets can perform many of the
same missions as aircraft. The difference between the two is
that space can provide a constant theater-wide watch without
nearly as many trained crews.
Information flow is the key to making the CAS body
function effectively and efficiently. In humans, when a brain
lacks the ability to communicate with the body to create muscular
movement, that body is paralyzed. The same holds true
for the CAS body. In a similar manner, information overload
or sporadic information can cause the body to function
improperly; the CAS body has the same vulnerabilities. In
a properly running body information flows from the brain
continuously. Sights, sounds, smells, and tactile stimulants
are gathered and analyzed. If something is threatening in the
environment, say a bright light, the brain will send a signal
to the neuromuscular junctions and the innervations there
will cause the eye lids to close. Some information may cause
a muscular reaction before the information is even sent to the
brain, such as the reflex when one touches a flame. Immediately
the human body reacts with a quick relay of information
from the finger to spinal column and back, the reflex being to
withdraw one finger. Some reflexes can also be overridden by
the brain. If there is some conscious motivation to continue
through the flame and pain, the brain can override the reflex
and keep the reaction from occurring. The caveat to overriding
a reflex response, however, is that one is aware of the
repercussions of one’s actions. Simple reflexes are the standard
reaction when something happens unexpectedly; CAS works
in a similar manner but with some key differences.
The AOC and ATO are designed to analyze an environment
and preplan accordingly. Information from the
environment is supplied from all ISR assets and sent to the
brain. What may take a human a few hours, minutes, or seconds
to analyze will take seventy-two hours for the CAS brain
to analyze. 50 From the brain, the ATO is sent to all commanders
for execution, just as information is sent to the neuromuscular
junctions. From there operators take the information
and transform it into action. Sorties are launched and
attacks are made.

Diagnosis
All the systems I have discussed play a critical role
in making CAS operations work. Information flow is by far
the system needing the most treatment, but it is not independent
in its damaging effect. Areas of the skeletal, muscular,
and nervous systems all aid in causing the nerves to function
improperly, however the nervous system has the largest
responsibility in the breakdown of information flow, particularly
during action/reaction situations.
While the AOC is fairly efficient at seventy-two hour
planning, it lacks the ability to make effective action/reaction
judgments. During ATO planning, CAS can be allocated a
percentage of assets that will be used strictly for their operations.
Those assets are then given to the CFLCC, the Army’s
equivalent to the CFACC. From the there the CFLCC subdivides
his allocated sorties to subordinate commanders. 51 Up
to this point, it may be somewhat confusing as to action/reaction
situations, but a simple example should aid in clarifying.
Suppose the CFLCC is given 30 sorties, which are then subdivided
among his subordinate commanders. The 1 st Division
Commander may be given 10 sorties, the 2 nd given 5 and
the 3 rd given 15. Suppose the 1 st and 2 nd divisions are engaged
in combat and require CAS, while the 3 rd has had no contact
with enemy forces. If the two engaged divisions require
more CAS, they will call the AOC via their ALO and request
additional support. From there, the CFACC coordinates
with the CFLCC commander, who then pulls those 15 sorties
from 3 rd Division. It should be obvious that is not an efficient
way of reacting to a situation. By the time all the coordination
is completed and CAS is reallocated, the ground battle
may be over. Yet this is merely one part of a larger problem.
Suppose the 3 rd Division had light contact and
launched its 15 sorties for CAS, but then determined that no
CAS was necessary. Since those aircraft are already in the air,
coordination may be conducted quickly through the AOC
and those 15 sorties may be redirected to aid the 1 st and 2 nd
Divisions. As soon as those 30 aircraft drop their payload and
return, all 30 sorties assigned to CAS have been spent. What
happens if 3 rd Division is suddenly counter-attacked and
needs CAS? It is ludicrous to think that the Air Force will
not provide aid to those troops, and this example illustrates
the problem with planning and information flow at the AOC
level.
Part of the treatment that could be prescribed is to
change joint doctrine regarding CAS sortie allocation. Once
the Air Force allocates CAS sorties to the CFLCC (typically
an Army or Marine officer), CAS is executed just as it was in
World War II, with disregard for the lessons learned at Kasserine
Pass. 52 Airpower is not effective when controlled in
19
pockets by ground commanders, thus CAS should not be
slotted to individual ground commanders. One solution for
centralized command of CAS involves integration of the U.S.
Marine Corps. Suppose Joint Doctrine establishes a new
position under the Joint Force Commander. This position,
commanded by a marine aviator, becomes the CAS Operations
Center (CASOC), and bridges the needs of the Ground
Commander to the capabilities of the Air Commander. Sorties
slotted for CAS are not given to the JFLCC, but rather
to the CAS Commander. Units needing assistance call the
CASOC via ALOs and one commander directs and redirects
aircraft as required. Since the CASOC is linked to the AOC,
the AOC can update the CASOC on aircraft that are available
to provide extra support should it be requested. Doctrine can
easily accommodate such a position, but the flow of information
must also be changed. Requests for air support must
be channeled straight to the CASOC and executed without
interference from either the CFACC or CFLCC.
The next problem that is encountered regarding
information flow relates to munitions. More than a few
CAS missions have ended in fratricide, where our forces
have engaged friendly forces. This, unfortunately, is not an
uncommon problem. Training is very important in limiting
such events, but as this paper does not focus on training it
is forced to look deeper for an explanation. After evaluating
the methods used to conduct CAS operations with regard to
ground and cockpit operations, there is evidence that operator
error is to blame for this problem. That is not to say that
these operators are not sufficiently trained. On the contrary,
they are trained to a high level of technical skill. Forward air
controllers and pilots are subject to some of the longest training
in the U.S. military. What is not surprising is that these
operators do make mistakes – mistakes that are fatal. Miscommunicated
coordinates, wrongly programmed munitions,
and unclear friendly positions are all reasons for fratricide
unlinked to training. Rather, they are linked to information
flow.
Broadening Dr. Mets’ thoughts on munitions development,
there is another advancement that could reduce fratricide.
Blue Force Tracking is a system that uses GPS through
a small transmitter worn on an individual, vehicle, or friendly
unit. This system provides a constant feed on the location of
friendly forces. Currently Blue Force Tracking is not issued
to every soldier on the ground, but further development
may enable each soldier, vehicle, and ground asset to have
this system. Should developments allow this, could there be
way to integrate such information into a JDAM kit or into
the avionics of aircraft? If JSTARS can actively locate each
ground asset via Blue Force Tracking, there should be a way to
integrate such information into a failsafe mechanism on the

aircraft. Bomb blast patterns for and each type of ordinance
has a measurable pattern. That information should be stored
into a small data base on board the aircraft. This would allow
pilots to target units, but should a Blue Force signal be picked
up within the pattern based on the targeted impact point, the
bomb will not release from the aircraft.
This system would have some limitations. The database
for blast pattern sizes would not be capable of seeing
the impact point in three dimensions. Friendly troops on
higher ridge lines or inside a building may be out of range for
fragments, but two dimensionally they may be within range.
Three dimensions may be overcome, but barriers, walls,
ground units with armor, and other such obstacles will be
difficult to take into account. These situations may provide
adequate cover for friendly units, but a computer will only see
the units, the blast pattern, and the relative distance between
the point of impact.
Smarter weapons and changing doctrine may
improve the information flow between the different systems
of the CAS body. Since CAS’s inception there has been a
continual need for improvement, but (unlike past attempts)
aircraft are not at the focal point of this examination. In a
sense, aircraft are the shoes for the CAS body. It doesn’t really
matter what is on your feet, but some shoes are better suited
for specific activities, just as some aircraft are better suited for
specific CAS operations.
CONCLUSION AND SUMMARY
The development of the CAS body has experienced
growing pains, and there will always be room for improvement.
From a muscular standpoint, there has been a tremendous
advance in aircraft design. In modern aviation
single mission aircraft are not the only aircraft that are able
to provide CAS. Current aircraft such as the F-15E, F-16,
B52, and B-1 have been given another mission thanks in part
to advances in avionics. Future aircraft such as the F/A-22
and F-35 will enable the Air Force to fulfill all missions with
a single airframe. The largest contributor to the capability
for multi-role missions stems primarily from the advances in
munitions. GPS and laser guided bombs have enabled accuracy
at altitude, altitudes that negate seventy-five percent of
the world’s surface-to-air threat.
As impressive as PGMs may be, fratricide is still a
tragic risk of CAS. No matter how rugged, fast, or maneuverable
the aircraft, or how accurate the munitions may be,
neither can overcome communication issues that may lead
to friendly troops being in the area when a bomb impacts.
The integration of the Blue Force Tracking system into the
on-board computers of aircraft and weapons may prove a
failsafe trigger. This concept does have limitations, but such
a system, if developed properly, could drastically reduce CAS
20
fratricide.
In the context of the CAS body, this aforementioned
munitions development is considered improvement of the
muscular system, but it is intertwined with the nervous
system and a flow of information. By computerizing this
failsafe system with Blue Force Tracking, the human operator
is removed from having to keep such an intense situational
awareness of troop movements, targets, flying, navigating, and
targeting. Additional tasks, such as monitoring Blue Force
Tracking information inside the cockpit and on the ground,
without the aid of a failsafe mechanism can lead to task saturation,
and possibly increase fratricide. Weapons systems
that combine information and precision must be the focus of
newer weapons.
Technology has provided a solution that allows
one airframe capable of carrying out air superiority, strategic
attack, interdiction, and CAS missions. The F-35s can fly
high and fast and are extremely maneuverable, allowing these
aircraft to fight their way into an area in order to provide
CAS. Such performance characteristics combined with the
ability to drop PGMs gives the F-35 an edge over the aging
A/OA-10. Just because troops cannot see the F-35 or feel the
heat from its engines like they could the A-10 does diminish
the aircraft’s ability to deploy precision munitions on target
and provide CAS. 53
Precision from high altitudes is where the Air Force
plans to take CAS in the twenty-first century. From a ground
commander’s point of view, “close proximity” is defined as the
distance between the aircraft and the friendly troops on the
ground. Air commanders, however, define “close proximity”
as the distance between the munitions impact and the troops.
In spite of this difference in definitions, neither high nor low
altitude has proven to be any more or less risky from a fratricide
point of view.
Developments in structure could aid in timely information
flow from requests to air support reactions. Currently,
the Air Force has a division of the AOC, the Air Support
Operations Center (ASOC), that acts in a similar role to the
proposed CASOC. 54 The difference between the two is that
the current division reports directly to the CFACC, whereas
the CASOC has a CAS Commander, which is equal to that
of the CFACC and CFLCC. The proposed CASOC could
bridge the gap between fundamental doctrinal disputes, like
the definition between “close proximity”, between the Air
Force and the Army. Furthermore, the Marines have a solid
grasp on CAS operations, thus they may provide a better flow
to CAS action/reaction missions.
The drawback to such a change will inevitably bring
conflict between the services as the Air Force would be unwilling
to release control of its air assets and the Army would be

unwilling to let go of it option to package out its assigned
CAS support to subordinate ground commander. Even more
complicating would be the problems that surround the ATO.
The ATO is critical to synchronizing operations, and should
CAS be placed under control of a new Commander, the ATO
process would be severely damaged unless further development
of such an alteration takes place.
The two diagnoses presented in this paper are examples
of developments that do not focus on aircraft design.
Although is seems plausible that a munitions development
would occur before such a doctrinal change, one must not be
closed-minded when brainstorming avenues to develop the
CAS body. As this paper has also discussed, no one system
can be examined independently because all systems in the
CAS body are intertwined. Each change or advance in one
system can cause a change, either for better or for worse, in
another system.
The limits of this paper must be acknowledged. This
paper has taken systems and analyzed them with respect to
the others in a medical context, yet it has disregarded parts
of the nervous and circulatory systems. As mentioned in
the beginning of this paper, these omitted analyses focus on
training and the flow of new ideas. New ideas keep military
transformation alive. Innovative ideas, tactics and techniques
can only improve CAS. New ideas are constantly appearing
in student works published at the Air University. No
matter who the author, each publication has potential to be
expanded upon and developed. For this reason, it is worthy
to take time and educate oneself about the books and papers
produced at the Air University.
Within the writings at the Air University new ideas
regarding training can be revealed. Training is an extremely
important part of CAS operations. Training does not center
only on pilots and FACs, but encompasses every operator,
rated, and non-rated officer who participates in CAS operation.
Training ideas that could be researched include CAS
training with the Marines. It may be a feasible option to send
our A-10, F-15E, and F-16 crews to a CAS training program
run by the Marine Corps. The Air Force has implemented
training programs to improve not only CAS but all air operations,
moreover the Air Force must not forget how vital all
members of the CAS team are and that their training is just as
important as that of the operator’s.
Other areas that are worthy of continued research are
the use of Unmanned Combat Aerial Vehicles (UCAVs), the
use and implications of the Small Diameter Bomb (SDB),
and offensive and defensive couterspace operations. Publications
in Popular Mechanics, Aviation Weekly, and military publications
may facilitate new ideas that could aid in developing
some of the aforementioned topics. One particular publica-
21
tion of interest is LtCol Mike “Wolf” Smith’s thesis from the
Air University. In his paper entitled “Ten Propositions of
Spacepower”, the tenth proposition makes the powerful statement
that “weaponizing space is inevitable.” 55 Could weaponizing
space present a new CAS platform?
The debate over CAS may still rage on, but there is
little doubt that the Air Force lacks a commitment to performing
CAS missions. The Air Force uses all it assets as
effectively and efficiently as possible to maximize firepower,
maneuverability, and exploitation of the theatre of operations.
Situations dictate priorities, and as future conflicts
become more frequent and low-intensity in nature, CAS may
become an even more critical mission. Airpower is dependant
upon flexible response and since Kasserine, the Air Force has
endeavored to commit to CAS operations while maintaining
the integrity of its other responsibilities. The Air Force must
seek solutions to optimize CAS capabilities that are not solely
dependent on new aircraft or on a particular development in
one system.
BIBLIOGRAPHY
A-10/OA-10 Thunderbolt II. Federation of American Scientists,
2003. [database on-line]; available from http://
www .fas.org/man/dod-101/sys/ac/a-10.htm; Internet;
accessed 22 September 2003.
Air Force Doctrine Document (AFDD) 1. Air Force Basic
Doctrine, 1 September 1997. Maxwell AFB, AL: HQ
AFDC.
Air Force Doctrine Document (AFDD) 2-1.3. Counterland,
27 August 1999. Maxwell AFB, AL: HQ AFDC.
Cooling, B. Franklin. Case Studies in the Development of Close
Air Support. Washington, D.C.:U.S. Government
Printing Office, 1990.
E-3 Sentry (AWACS). Federation of American Scientists,
2003. [database on-line]; available from http://www
.fas.org/man/dod-101/sys/ac/a-10.htm; Internet;
accessed 22 September 2003.)
Elsarelli, Leon E. “From Desert Storm to 2025: Close Air
Support in the 21 st Century.” Research Paper. Air
Command and Staff College, 1998.
Eret, Anton. Interviewed by author, 5 September 2003,
USAF Academy.

Eret, Anton. Briefing for Military Strategic Studies 368.
“Weapons Technology and Employment Strategies.”
Spring 2005.
Fawcett, John M., Jr. “The JFACC Team.” Air and Space
Power Chronicles. , accessed 17 March
2004.
Haun, Philip. “Air Power Versus a Field Army.” RAF Air
Power Review 4, No. 4 (Winter 2004): 65-91.
Hebert, Adam J. “The Long Reach of Heavy Bombers.” Air
Force Magazine, November 3003.
Joint Aerospace Command and Control Course (JAC2C).
Hurlburt Field, FL: USAF C2 Warrior School).
FUN-132, 3.
Joint Forces Command Glossary [on-line]. United States Joint
Forces Command; available from http://www.jfcom.
mil/about/glossary.htm; Internet; accessed 18 October
2003.
Joint Publication (JP) 3-56.1. Command and Control for Joint
Air Operations. 14 November 1994.
Joint Strike Fighter (JSF). Federation of American Scientists,
2003. [database on-line]; available from http://www
.fas.org/man/dod-101/sys/ac/jsf.htm; Internet;
accessed 22 September 2003.
Joint Surveillance Target Attack Radar System (Joint STARS /
JSTARS). Federation of American Scientists, 2003.
[database on-line]; available from http://www .fas.
org/man/dod-101/sys/ac/a-10.htm; Internet; accessed
23 April 2005.
Kent, John. “The ‘F’ Stands for ‘Future’.” Air and Space
Power Journal 17 (Spring 2003): 41-46.
Mann, Edward C., III. Thunder and Lightning: Desert Storm
and the Airpower Debates. Maxwell AFB, AL: Air
University Press, 1995.
Mets, David R. “The Long Search for a Surgical Strike: Precision
Munitions in Military Affairs.” The Cadre
Papers, no. 12 (October 2001): 1-79.
“The Republic Thunderbolt,” Jane’s Fighting Aircraft of World
22
War II, (London: Bracken Books, 1989), 254.
Rife, Shawn P. “Kasserine Pass and the Proper Application of
Airpower.” Joint Forces Quarterly (Autumn/Winter
1998-99): 76-77.
Rivet Joint. Federation of American Scientists, 2003. [database
on-line]; available from http://www .fas.org/
man/dod-101/sys/ac/a-10.htm; Internet; accessed 23
April 2005.
Sargent, Richard L. “Deliberate Force Tactics.” In Deliberate
Force: A Case Study in Effective Air Campainging, ed.
Robert C. Owens, 297-239. Maxwell AFB, AL: Air
University Press, 2000.
Smith, Mike V. “Ten Propositions of Spacepower.” School
of Advanced Airpower Studies Thesis, Air University,
Maxwell AFB, AL, 2001.
VanHook, Richard. Briefing for Military Strategic Studies
485. “Space Operations.” Fall 2004.
Wills, Steve. Briefing for Military Strategic Studies 400. “Joint
and Coalition Warfare.” 10 Feb 2005.
1999 Weapons File. Eglin AFB, FL: Office of the Armament
Production Group Manager, 1999.
DOCUMENTATION
Dr Titus and Dr Karolick reviewed my structure and made
suggestions for my headers, sub headers and some of
my footnotes.
Maj Eret gave some suggestions about the AOC in respect to
my formulation of the CASOC. These changes will
be incorporated into the next draft. He also gave me
an additional source for CAS and the A-10.
C1C Rebecca Simpson reviewed my paper and made grammatical
corrections.
C1C Joe Mobbley gave me the information and source for the
definition of C 2 .
(Endnotes)
1 B. Franklin Cooling, Case Studies in the Development
of Close Air Support (Washington, D.C.: Office of Air
Force History, 1990), 250.
2 Leon E. Elsarelli, “From Desert Storm to 2025:
Close Air Support in the 21 st Century,” (Research Paper, Air

Command and Staff College, 1998), 2.
3 Air Force Doctrine Document (AFDD) 1, Air Force
Basic Doctrine, (Maxwell AFB, AL: HQ AFDC: 1997), 49.
4 2003. Joint Forces Command Glossary: C2 [on-line].
United States Joint Forces Command; available from http://
www.jfcom.mil/about/glossary.htm#C; Internet; accessed 18
October 2003.
5 Ibid.
6 Edward C. Mann III, Thunder and Lightning:
Desert Storm and the Airpower Debates (Maxwell AFB, AL: Air
University Press, 1995), 157.
7 Philip Haun, “Air Power Versus a Field Army,” RAF
Air Power Review 4(Winter 2004): 71.
8 Elsarelli, “Desert Storm to 2025,”11.
9 Richard L. Sargent. “Deliberate Force Tactics,” in
Deliberate Force: A Case Study in Effective Air Campainging,
ed. Robert C. Owens, (Maxwell AFB, AL: Air University
Press, 2000.), 317.
10 Ibid, 318.
11 Elsarelli, “Desert Storm to 2025,” 8.
12 Sargent, “Deliberate Force,” 318.
13 Haun, “Air Power Versus a Field Army,” 72.
14 Elsarelli, “Desert Storm to 2025,” 24.
15 Anton Eret, interviewed by author, 5 September
2003, USAF Academy.
16 1999 Weapons File (Eglin AFB, FL: Office of the
Armament Production Group Manager, 1999), Preface.
17 David R. Mets, “The Long Search for a Surgical
Strike: Precision Munitions in Military Affairs,” The Cadre
Papers, no. 12 (Maxwell AFB, AL: Air University Press, 2001):
56.
18 Transformational changes, or the term
“transformation”, as meant by the author, includes the
contemporary, substantial changes in the way the U.S.
military approaches organizing, training, and equipping its
forces. The subject of military transformation is addressed
in greater detail by Colin S. Gray. His entire book is about
Modern Strategy, but his ideas , especially chapter 7, embrace
the idea of transformation. Colin S. Gray, Modern Strategy
(London: Oxford University Press, 1999), 175-206.
19 “The Republic Thunderbolt,” Jane’s Fighting
Aircraft of World War II (London: Bracken Books, 1989), 254.
20 A-10/OA-10 Thunderbolt II, (Federation of
American Scientists: 2003) [database on-line]; available from
23
http://www .fas.org/man/dod-101/sys/ac/a-10.htm; Internet;
accessed 22 September 2003.
21 Ibid.
22 Mann, Thunder and Lightning, 157
23 Eret interview.
24 Ibid.
25 Mets, “Long Search for Strike,” 35
26 Ibid, 1.
27 Ibid, 42
28 1999 Weapons File, 5-13.
29 Joint Aerospace Command and Control Course
(JAC2C) (Hurlburt Field, FL: USAF C2 Warrior School),
FUN-132, 3.
30 Ibid.
31 Joint Publication (JP) 3-56.1. Command and Control
for Joint Air Operations. 14 November 1994.
32 Text for JAC2C, 3.
33 Ibid.
34 Ibid.
35 Ibid.
36 Ibid.
37 Ibid, 1.
38 Ibid, 4.
39 Ibid.
40 Ibid.
41 Ibid, 6.
42 Ibid.
43 Ibid, 1.
44 Ibid.
45 LtCol Steve Wills, Briefing for Military Strategic
Studies 400, “Joint and Coalition Warfare,” 10 Feb 2005.
46 Rivet Joint, (Federation of American Scientists:
2003) [database on-line]; available from http://www .fas.org/
man/dod-101/sys/ac/a-10.htm; Internet; accessed 23 April
2005.
47 E-3 Sentry (AWACS), (Federation of American
Scientists: 2003) [database on-line]; available from http://
www .fas.org/man/dod-101/sys/ac/a-10.htm; Internet;
accessed 23 April 2005.
48 Joint Surveillance Target Attack Radar System (Joint
STARS / JSTARS), (Federation of American Scientists: 2003)
[database on-line]; available from http://www .fas.org/man/
dod-101/sys/ac/a-10.htm; Internet; accessed 23 April 2005.
49 LtCol Richard VanHook, Briefing for Military
Strategic Studies 485, “Space Operations,” Fall 2004.
50 JAC2C, 1.
51 Maj Anton Eret, Briefing for Military Strategic
Studies 368, “Weapons Technology and Employment
Strategies,” Spring 2005.
52 Shawn P. Rife, “Kasserine Pass and the Proper

Application of Airpower,” Joint Forces Quarterly (Autumn/
Winter 1998-99), 76-77.
53 Adam J. Hebert, “The Long Reach of Heavy
Bombers,” Air Force Magazine, November 3003, 24.
54 Eret interviewed.
55 Mike V. Smith, “Ten Propositions of Spacepower”
(M.A. thesis, School of Advanced Airpower Studies, Air University,
Maxwell AFB, AL, 2001), 98.
24
IS DEMOCRATIC IMPERIALISM VIABLE?
ASSESSING THE VALIDITY OF THE
BUSH DOCTRINE
By C4C Whitney Camp
The Roots of Democratic Imperialism
As the federal convention convened and Federalists
and Anti-Federalists joined in debate and discussion, the
issues of domestic policy in collaboration with expansion
came to the front of the agenda. Recently liberated from the
imperialistic British Empire, most of the founding fathers
assured that “conquest or superiority among powers is not
or ought not ever to be the object of republican systems”
(“A Strategy” 1). Since the late 18 th century, the foreign
and domestic policies of the United States have changed
significantly and altered their focus based on the global
community’s status. George W. Bush’s National Security
Strategy has been under the microscope of politicians, civilians
and military leaders with the invasion of Afghanistan
and the occupation of Iraq. In his January 2005 State of the
Union address, Bush said, “We are all part of a great venture:
To extend the promise of freedom in our country, to renew
the values that sustain our liberty, and to spread the peace
that freedom brings” (State 4). The expansion of democracy
within the world is significant to the daily lives of Americans
and to the perpetuation and stability of the United States of
America. In order to assess the validity of the Bush doctrine,
it is essential to analyze the role of a democratic republic in
the world order, explain why opponents believe the Bush
doctrine crosses the line, and finally, clarify the necessity of
United States’ international intervention as a global power
and economic stronghold.
The Democratic System in Today’s World Order
Classical military theorists to modern political analysts
have continually assessed the place of democracy in the
world order. When does a democracy retain the right to
infringe its own form of government upon another nation?
T.E. Hulme, a British conservative who enlisted in WWI
attacks the pacifist and the passive politician by articulating
that skepticism about war arises for two reasons. The primary
reason is “the fatuous belief that liberty cannot at any rate be
permanent endangered, for Germany herself will inevitably
develop toward democracy” (Hulme 251). Furthermore, as
international institutions such as the United Nations and capitalistic
superpowers like that of the United States begin to see
the necessity of the people’s voice, sovereignty becomes redundant.
In Jihad vs. McWorld, Benjamin Barber says, “Sovereignty
is indeed in a twilight, condemned to a shadow world

y government’s myriad postmodern detractors—ex-Communist
and postindustrialist alike” (Barber 277). Democracy has
taken on a new role in the international society—to bring the
basic human rights and beliefs of the Enlightenment to every
culture and race. Many liberal nations and constituents claim
that democracy, with its basic tenant of the “right to choose”
has no right to infringe upon other nations and peoples.
However, the uniqueness of democracy resides in the fact that
as soon as it is instituted, it can be changed to become the
people’s will. In Hobbe’s social contract theory, he explains that
citizens of a state abandon certain rights for the prosperity
of the state, but as soon as that government infringes on the
inalienable rights of man, the people have the responsibility to
overthrow the government (Lutz 100). The National Security
Strategy offers nations in the Middle East the right to execute
Hobbe’s theory and to choose how they want to be governed.
The Bush doctrine attempts to give every person throughout
the world the right to choose, thereby clarifying the place of
the democratic system in a world of diverse nations. In a 7
March 2005 editorial, Michael Barone affirms: “George W.
Bush gambled that actions can change minds. So far, he’s winning”
(Barone 29).
Opponents to the National Security Strategy
Stanley Kurtz questions, “Could such a venture
in democratic imperialism be harmonized with out liberal
principles?” (Kurtz 1). Many United States Democrats and
angry foreign nations believe the answer is no. Bush has met
extreme opposition against his foreign policies, which have
thereby affected his domestic policies through legislation
such as the Patriot Act. Seamus Mine in an editorial in The
Week claims: “It is not democracy that is on the march in the
Middle East. It is the U.S. military” (Milne 15). He extends
his analysis by asserting that the 140,000 troops patrolling the
streets of Iraq do not equate to liberty and freedom. However,
Stanley Kurtz uses an analogy to the British Empire’s
occupation of India, recalling that democracy came to India
“very slowly.” Many opponents of the Bush doctrine want
instantaneous satisfaction and expect Bush to deliver freedom,
liberty and immaculate human rights in an immediate turnaround.
“It takes democracy to make democracy” (Kurtz 9).
However, no matter the dissent against Bush, Democrats,
Republicans and nations across the world do agree with
the obligation of the War on Terror. And if the majority of
Americans agree with this specific policy, all citizens have to
do is look towards the sweeping democratic changes taking
place all over the world. As general elections in Iraq took
place with a higher voter turnout than the United States’
and a presidential Palestinian election was successful, things
are beginning to change in the Middle East. In Febru-
25
ary, thousands of Lebanese took to the streets to protest the
Syrian occupation, demanding democracy. In Egypt, Hosni
Mubarak agreed to allow a second party to the presidential
elections. In Saudi Arabia, the first multi-candidate elections
took place in February. However, in a 5 March 2005
article of the Economist, the writer blatantly says, “The Middle
East is still a dangerous mess. The despots are not becoming
democrats overnight” (Democracy 9). Even if the Middle
East is not perfect yet, Americans must realize that democracy
cannot be linked with immediate satisfaction. Mortimer
Zuckemeran, in an 11 April 2005 US News and World
Report reminds his readers: “Our strategy to push for democratization
is admirable. But let’s recognize that the social and
cultural changes of the Middle East mean it will take time”
(Zuckerman 84).
Opponents of the National Security Strategy are not
merely confined within the borders of the country. The Bush
administration must recognize the true meaning of democracy,
even when it comes at a cost to the Untied States. In
Venezuela, Hugo Chavez, the popularly elected president still
holds onto anti-American tendencies. Bush must accept the
dissent and embrace the opponents to his policies, in order
not to lose the pathway to true democratic establishments
(Kurtz 9). The United States faces the problem of democratizing
cultures that hold different ideals and spiritual values
than what our government is based on. John Stuart Mill in
Representative Government insists that democracies in “uncivilized
countries” must arise first from the formation of democratic
assemblies until full representative government can
be achieved (Kurtz 8). When applied to Iraq, this assembly
is the Iraqi governing council. Whether critics to the Bush
administration lie within or outside the United States, George
W. Bush must take each opinion carefully and proceed cautiously
as he attempts to provide democracy empirically. The
true line between democratic imperialism and imperialism
will be drawn according to the Bush administration’s reaction
to democratically-induced anti-US sentiments.
The US as a necessary hegemonic power
The article: “A Strategy for Republican Empire?”
emphasizes that Bush’s foreign policy is correct and justified
in order to maintain world order. Hegemonic stability theory
believes that economic prosperity can only be gained through
the presence of a powerful state that is willing to provide
international security (“A Strategy 2). America is now that
hegemonic power. As soon as economic prosperity is gained,
peace will follow. Many others agree with this theory and
America’s homeland security is maintained in the process of
intervening abroad. “Terrorism against American interests
‘over there’…should be regarded just as we regard terrorism

against America ‘over here’” (One 32). Foreign powers must
realize the necessity of a world superpower, both economically
and politically. “The Europeans, with the French and Germans
to the fore, have been gracelessly loth to admit that the
Bush doctrine, however crassly simplistic in expression and
implementation, has moved the scenery—in the right direction”
(Democracy 9).
Bush has caused a sudden democratic stirring in the
Middle East, with the original intent to keep Americans safe
at home. Thucydides believed that countries went to war for
three reasons: fear, honor and interest. The Bush doctrine
is influenced by theses three reasons, though it is primarily
honor and fear. Furthermore, Thucydides also believed that a
state is most secure when it is surrounded by those like itself
(‘A Strategy” 2). In such a global and technological age, it
is no longer the neighbors of a state who can pose harm to
one country; therefore, Bush realizes the necessity of containing
terrorism overseas as well. Not only is Bush preaching
classical military theorists through his actions, but he is also
echoing the doctrine and beliefs of Woodrow Wilson, who
believed in a liberal and free world order (Ajami 31).
Bush boldly declares again and again that American
presence in the Middle East is necessary during the times of
terrorism. The hegemonic stability theory and the current
times of crisis throughout the world dictate the United States
to be the world’s democratic imperialist. For, “peace is maintained
ultimately by the power of the strong” (“A Strategy” 2).
Altering the Bush Doctrine in the face of change
Even if the Bush doctrine has been accepted as successful
to a certain degree by Democrats, Republicans and
foreigners alike, there is always room for alteration. “American
foreign policy thinking also suffered from a reluctance to
abandon, alter or at times even reconsider policies adopted to
meet Cold War needs” (Huntington 309). Now that analysts
have determined the necessity of US power abroad, and met
the opposition head-on, it is time for the Bush administration
to address the challenges of creating new democracies
and allowing them to be sovereign. “For the United States
to be fully secure and prosperous, everyone must be secure
and prosperous” (“A Strategy” 2). Security and prosperity
ultimately stem from rule by the people. As soon as the Bush
administration can achieve democracy in these areas, Americans
will be better off—both domestically and internationally.
Democracy, however, takes time and the formation of a cohesive
political policy requires analysis first and foremost, but
can only be implemented through trial and error. The Bush
administration has taken the first and the hardest steps to creating
a peaceful world through the power of one, but the next
democratically elected administration must maintain the same
26
lofty goals in order to secure the prosperity of the global community.
Therefore, the political motives of Bush and his successors
and the military implementation are inherently linked.
As Clausewitz once said, “War is politics by other means.”
Works Cited
Ajami, Fouad. “A sudden, powerful stirring.” US News and
World Report. 14
Mar. 2005: 30.
“A Strategy for Republican Empire? Understanding the Bush
doctrine.”
Online posting. 22 Oct. 2003. 15 Apr. 2005.
Barber, Benjamin R. Jihad vs. McWorld. New York: Ballantine
Books, 1996.
Barone, Michael. “Minds are changing.” US News and World
Report
7 Mar. 2005: 29.
“Democracy stirs in the Middle East.” The Economist 5 Mar.
2005: 9.
Hulme, T E. “Essays on War.” Conservatism: An Anthology
of Social
and Political Thought From David Hume to the
Present. Comp. Jerry
Z. Muller. Princeton: Princeton UP, 1997. N. pag.
Huntington, Samuel P. The Clash of Civilizations and the
Remaking of World Order. New York:
Touchstone, 1996.
Kurtz, Stanley. Democratic Imperialism: A Blueprint. Stanford
University. 15 Apr. 2005.
Lutz, Donald S. A Preface to American Political Theory.
Lawrence: University P of Kansas, 1992.
Milne, Seamus. “America’s Real Agenda is Power.” The Week
25
Mar. 2005: 15.
“One nation after all.” The Economist 11 Sept. 2004: 32.
State of the Union Address. 2 Feb. 2005. White House. 15
Apr. 2005 .
Zuckerman, Mortimer B. “Good Things Take Time.” Editorial.
US News
and World Report 11 Apr. 2005: 84.

MORALLY BOUND TO NATIONAL SECURITY
By C3C Brady Cillo
More and more often we see headlines in the news
about powerful people, the nation’s leaders, who have dismissed
ethics from their practices in an effort to get ahead by
any means available. Recently, corporate leaders of Enron,
Martha Stewart, and Sammy Sosa, along with many others,
have allegedly forgone personal ethics by opting to take the
easy route and cheating. While the integrity of these individuals
will always be compromised, their lives will continue to
go on, despite attention from the media. A serious problem
occurs when, rather than a well known celebrity, a military
professional chooses to forgo basic morals and puts national
security into question. One way to circumvent this problem
before it manifests itself lies in the acceptance and commitment
to a moral or ethical code that acts as a stepping-stone
in developing one’s own ideals. True adherence to a moral
code such as the United States Air Force Academy’s Cadet
Honor Code develops the character, integrity, and honor
necessary of an officer in today’s military and remains essential
to protecting national security. Past examples of national
security breaches help illustrate the breakdown in morals
and further display the need for an effective honor code. An
analysis of today’s Honor Code reinforces the concepts behind
instilling a value system in every person.
On 14 June 2000, a man named George Trofimoff
was arrested by the FBI for supplying the USSR with information
critical to the security of the United States. The case
was notable because Trofimoff was the nation’s highest ranking
military member ever convicted of espionage. The Army
Reserve Colonel was charged for and admitted to 25 years
of spying for the USSR and Russia, earning over $250,000
during his career (George). Recruited by the KGB in 1969,
Trofimoff allegedly supplied the USSR/Russia with documents
regarding what the US knew about the defense capabilities
of the USSR and Warsaw Pact nations (Ex-colonel).
On 28 September 2001, Trofimoff was given a break, when,
instead of the death penalty for treason, he was sentenced to
life in prison without possibility of parole (George).
John A. Walker Jr. was sitting in a hotel room pondering
the possible reasons he had not received his payment.
After he had placed the paper bag full of 129 stolen classified
US Navy documents at the drop location, he went to find
his payment of $200,000 in another location, but never succeeded.
Suddenly, he received a phone call from the front
desk that he believed to be a ploy to lure him out of the
room. He looked out the window and saw no police cars in
the parking lot, so he left the room. He was immediately
apprehended by two FBI agents, who promptly strip-searched
27
him and effectively ended his spy career. John Walker, a US
Navy warrant officer, had been engaging in espionage for the
USSR for 18 years. He formed a spy ring, composed of his
son, Michael Walker, and his older brother, Arthur James
Walker. Michael was a petty officer on the USS Nimitz, and
was in charge of disposing of classified documents. Arthur,
a retired Navy Lieutenant Commander, worked for a defense
contractor and was in the position to easily smuggle defense
documents to John. With these sources, John would take the
documents and sell them to the KGB in return for large sums
of money. The most disturbing information that John passed
to the Russians was the ‘keylists’ or encryption codes that
could decipher the Navy’s secret transmissions (Earley 1-4).
In an interview with Russian KGB agent, Vitaly Yurchenko,
Yurchenko admitted that “[the USSR] deciphered millions of
[US] messages. If there had been a war, [the USSR] would
have won” (Earley 1). In the end, John and Arthur received
life imprisonment, and Michael earned 25 years in prison,
lessened by his father’s divulgence of information to the FBI
(Earley 4).
These examples bring to light a true American tragedy.
American citizens, and, more importantly, military
members, who are driven by nothing else than greed for
foreign money, have betrayed the greatest free country in the
world. They compromised national security on the basis of
a big pay-day. Besides a collapse of national security, a total
breakdown of morals occurred on the parts of Trofimoff and
Walker. They completely disregarded character, honor, and
integrity, and were left with nothing except lifetime jail sentences,
the loss of others’ trust, and dishonor to their names.
A case can be argued as to whether these men would have
committed the same crimes had they been under some type
of moral code for a period of four years, like cadets at the Air
Force Academy.
A recent article by Darryl Goldman of the Military
Review claims that the Department of Defense has a dilemma
of military members not having the same ethics and values
that they once had. He claims that “the young men and
women joining the military today are a diverse aggregation,
generally without the homogeneous values of their grandparents”
(Goldman). He implies that the values once instilled
by a strong family background no longer exist today as they
once did. Goldman also points out that the military has “no
effective mechanism for teaching [its members] the values
traditionally esteemed by our military services” (Goldman).
This seems to be a reality in the operational Air Force, as
there seems to be no unified approach to achieving this goal.
Instead, the new trend has become isolated human relations
initiatives, such as a program on violence prevention that
divides into smaller subdivisions like workplace violence,

sexual assault, and suicide prevention (Goldman). These
individual topics draw attention away from the underlying
goal of more improved ethics training. It appears as though
a more encompassing, universal code is necessary to promote
the kind of morals and ethics that the military requires. Once
again, the reference to a moral code such as the Air Force
Academy Cadet Honor Code conveys its importance and significance
in today’s society.
In order to understand the benefits of the Honor
Code, an analysis of its purpose, components, and future
outlook is necessary. In the beginnings of the newly formed
United States Air Force in 1947, a main concern was the
lack of a sufficient supplier of professional, honorable officers
(Charles 178). Many government leaders agreed that a separate
institution such as West Point or Annapolis was necessary
for the Air Force as well. The bill for this new institution
was signed into law in early 1954, and the rest is history
(179). The Academy’s first superintendent, General Hubert
R. Harmon realized the need for some sort of honor structure
that would promote and develop the values necessary of
future Air Force officers. He also knew that the system must
not only be accepted by cadets, but implemented and maintained
by cadets as well (180). Captain Leonard J. Mahony
of the Academy’s first class reflected on the initial process by
saying, “it was clearly transmitted that the code belonged to
us—to accept, change or even reject” (181-2). An almost
unexpected unanimous acceptance of the newly formed code
occurred even without a vote, and established the statement:
“We will not lie, cheat, or steal, nor tolerate those who do”
(182).
The purpose of the newly adopted Code was
summed up beautifully by General Mark Clark, Allied Commander
in WWII, when he said, “A stern code of ethics, a
strong sense of personal morality, ‘obedience to the unenforceable”—these
are qualities a leader must have at the core
of his being…without a firm moral base a man is too unsure
of himself to be an effective leader” (Charles 70). The Honor
Code acts as the code of ethics and the firm moral base to
which Clark refers. It undeniably chips away at the core of
every person’s being, until that person’s foundation has been
replaced with a rock solid base of values that allows him or
her to instinctively make honorable decisions. The honor
system is based on the condition that cadets are willing and
insist on having the Code for themselves, which strengthens
its effectiveness. Exercising the right to modify the Code in
1961, cadets reworded it to its current statement: “We will
not lie, steal, or cheat, nor tolerate among us anyone who
does” (184). These four precepts truly embody the essence of
an honorable leader and provide common values for everyone
under the Code.
28
By definition, the code is meant to guard against the
liar, the cheat, the thief, and the acceptance of their deceitful
acts (Charles 185). Lying constitutes any statement, written
or spoken, that is not entirely true. It includes direct
untruths, but also involves other statements, such as not telling
the whole truth. Suppose an upperclass cadet asks if a
fourthclassman has shined his shoes, implying on the same
day. By responding “yes,” because he shined his shoes the
day before, the fourthclassman conveyed a false image, and
committed an honor violation (186). In the above examples
of national security breaches, both Trofimoff and Walker
lived lives of deceit by masking their true feelings and actions
toward the United States. These men became immune to the
fact that they were lying to everyone, and this helped them
rationalize their actions. Lying must be eliminated from the
thoughts of a leader, or else he too may become desensitized
by such words and actions.
Stealing deals with the taking of someone else’s
property, thus depriving the true owner of its use (Charles
188). In order to borrow an item, a cadet must have actual
or implied permission, and must leave a note explaining the
case. Stealing can also include destruction of government
property, because in doing so, others are effectively deprived
of the property’s use. When it comes down to it, people must
realize that if it does not belong to them, then they shouldn’t
take it. A big controversy occurs at the Academy when cadets
believe that even small things like the condiments of peanut
butter, ketchup, and honey, and utensils are somehow free for
the taking. Actions as seemingly small as this are considered
honor violations (188-90). Obviously, Trofimoff and Walker
were both stealing on a large scale. They used their power to
steal secrets vital to national security, and handed them over
to the enemy for money. A moral breakdown occurred in
both men when they deliberately took what was not theirs. A
true leader understands that stealing is a means used by cowards
who are never worthy of the things they obtain.
Cheating involves having an unfair advantage over
another in an academic or other situation (Charles 191).
Whether during a test in the classroom, down on the intramural
fields, or in the squadron, cheating remains unfair and
immoral. The Dean of the Faculty tries to eliminate many
cases by disallowing take-home tests, employing an alternating
day system, and using the method of academic security.
The Dean understands the importance of academics in class
standing, and realizes that in this area, many people will be
tempted to cheat. Overcoming this temptation forms one
aspect of the foundation a leader acquires while under the
Code. Trofimoff and Walker cheated the system by earning
income not included in their job descriptions. They found
ways to carefully and meticulously take unfair advantages

over others through exploitation of national secrets. A leader
must be strong-willed and confident in his abilities to disallow
himself from cheating.
Toleration is the element of the Code that separates
the Academy’s honor code from that of other institutions.
This clause keeps the Code in check because it forces cadets
to be proactive in their pursuit of exposing dishonesty. The
clause, however, is also the one that many people find hard to
enforce for themselves. Many cadets may be confident that
they would never lie, steal, nor cheat, but become hesitant
when they observe others doing those deeds. One must realize
that if a friend would ask to cover for his dishonesty, he
cannot be that much of a friend (Charles 194). The families
of Trofimoff and Walker undoubtedly knew of their relatives’
spy careers, but tolerated their actions and delayed exposing
them because they were family. In Walker’s case, he convinced
his two brothers to join in his criminal activity. Time
and time again, toleration proves to be the hardest decision a
cadet and future leader can make. Tragically, a cadet may be
ostracized by his or her peers because he turned in, or ‘ratted’
on the person who actually committed the violation. A leader
must be firm in his morals, and although one of the toughest
decisions to make is ruining the career of another, the leader
must also never forget that the person brought the violation
on himself.
Many issues with the Honor Code occur because
cadets may view the whole system as something negative that
is ‘always out to get them.’ Although accepting the Code is a
critical choice in one’s life, and should remain of utmost priority,
viewing the precepts by their positive complements may
help some people on the fence make that important choice
more easily. Instead of viewing the concepts of lying, stealing,
cheating, and tolerating as always negative, many people react
better to positive counterparts, by being able to associate these
with the true values of leadership.
The complement of lying becomes honesty. Honesty
should be something every person attains just by living under
the Code. Cadets should not try to find ways to bend the
truth that could be construed as lying, they should just understand
that being honest is part of life. Instead of thinking of
stealing, the quality of respect is easier to measure. Whether
it is respect for other’s property, or respect for them as people,
the concept remains central to the overall spirit of the Honor
Code. Mutual respect ties into attitudes about others, especially
when faced with the decision to lie to them, steal from
them, or cheat in spite of them. The counterpart of cheating
takes the shape of fairness. If one acts fairly in all endeavors,
cheating will never cross the mind. When faced with that terrible
temptation of copying an answer or plagiarizing an essay,
one must remember how fair it would be to take advantage of
29
his peers like that, and act accordingly. Toleration remains the
toughest precept for most cadets, and can be equivocated with
support. As long as cadets support each other and do not let
themselves fall into the pits of dishonesty, they will never have
to make those tough decisions. These alternate perspectives
of the Honor Code precepts help to better convey their true
intentions.
By observing and living the Honor Code on a dayto-day
basis, cadets become accustomed to it and strive to
live up to its standards. Edgar Holt, author of the History
of the United States Air Force Academy, noted that “one of
the most significant features of the cadet way of life was the
part the Honor Code played in every facet of cadet activities”
(Calkins 15). From the beginning of the cadet career, the
cadet is bombarded with encouragement to live honorably
under the Code. By commissioning date, “observance of the
Code on every occasion would have become so much a part
of the inner being of each man that he would be guided by it
throughout his life” (15). This fortunate side effect of living
under the Code is the key to a secure nation for the future.
Some may argue that men like Trofimoff and Walker
were inherently prone to crime and unethical behavior, and
that living under the Code may not have prevented their
actions. However, if this were true, some manifestation of
their lacking integrity would likely have shown while under
the Code and they would have been weeded out. It may be
true that some men and women cannot be swayed by the
Code, but if so, at least this fact becomes apparent and these
individuals are not placed in positions that could compromise
national security in the first place. These people comprise
a minority, because most people living under the Code will
develop and reinforce the continued morals necessary of Air
Force officers.
In a world of changing technology, ruthless competition,
and getting ahead by any means possible, one thing
must remain absolutely steadfast: a person’s morals. The Air
Force Academy cadets do their best to support and enforce
the Honor Code, in hopes to eliminate cases like those of
Trofimoff and Walker. These past and current threats to US
national security from the homeland side all stem from a
breakdown or lack of morals. The Honor Code prevents this
breakdown in morals by daily exposure to the officer values of
respect, honesty, fairness, and support that become so deeply
instilled in the cadet that nothing will be able to budge his
will-power throughout his career. A moral or ethical code like
that of the Air Force Academy is extremely crucial to national
security in the future of our Air Force and nation.

Bibliography
Calkins, Raymond. The Morality of the Air Force Academy
Honor Code. Washington, DC: 1966.
Charles, William. Honor Codes: Can They Develop Integrity
in Future Military Leaders? Fort Leavenworth,
Kansas: 1968.
Earley, Pete. “Family of Spies: The John Walker Jr. Spy Case.”
Crime Library: Criminal Minds and Methods.
. 19 October 2003.
“Ex-colonel of USA Trofimoff’s Arrest.” Timeline: On Behalf
of National Security. .
20 October 2003.
“George Von Trofimoff Biography.” Office of the National
Counterintelligence Executive. . 19 October 2003.
Goldman, Darryl. “The Wrong Road to Character Development?”
Military Review, Jan/Feb 98, Vol. 78, Issue
1. EBSCOHost Searchable Database. 18 Oct 2003.
30
“MIND OVER MATTER: THE CASE FOR DECEN-
TRALIZING PSYCHOLOGICAL OPERATIONS
(PSYOP) IN MODERN WARFARE”
BY
C1C KRISTEN L. FAGEN
INTRODUCTION
Statement of Research Question
“There are but two powers in the world, the sword
and the mind. In the long run the sword is always beaten by
the mind,” stated Napoleon Bonaparte, describing the power
of the mind in battle over the physical aspects of war. 1 Psychological
warfare involves the use of mental persuasion in
manipulating the enemy to give in to military objectives without
the use of weapons or destruction. Psychological operations
(PSYOP) have been utilized in military conflict since the
beginning of warfare. The importance of PSYOP is evident
in the writings of Sun Tzu and documented in the military
theory and doctrine of such historic figures as Clausewitz and
Napoleon. PSYOP have been officially utilized under organized
commands in the U.S. military since World War I and
is likely to play an ever increasing role in military operations
into the future. 2
The organization and use of PSYOP in the U.S.
military has been inconsistent throughout the last century as
a result of the fluctuating requirements for PSYOP in different
conflicts and varying combat situations. This leads to my
thesis question: “Has the U.S. military developed the optimum
organizational potential for the delivery of psychological
operations in an era of expanding contingency operations?”
This question demands an examination of current U.S. military
PSYOP organization and of the roles PSYOP play in
military operations. In addition, the need for better PSYOP
organization and defined PSYOP roles will be analyzed and
our present PSYOP capabilities will be determined. This
paper will evaluate how well the U.S. is prepared to utilize
PSYOP in the future. On the basis of this analysis, recommendations
will be offered on ways to improve the conduct
and organization of PSYOP. Sophisticated and well-organized
PSYOP are critical to a modern U.S. military that is prepared
to fight the wars of the twenty-first century.
Background and Significance of the Problem
PSYOP has the potential to play a vast role as a force
multiplier and a combat reducer in the post-Cold War era. 3
PSYOP allow a military force to mentally counteract and
overcome the enemy with limited manpower, limited physical
fighting, and limited carnage. Serving as a force multiplier,
PSYOP expands force capability without the need for more
personnel. Also, PSYOP reduces the need for combat since
the enemy can be persuaded to surrender without physically

fighting. Sun Tzu stated “that the most noble victory [is]
to subdue the enemy without a fight”. 4 PSYOP seeks to do
this. As an adjunct to conventional warfare, PSYOP are used
to facilitate a country’s war fighting capability by mentally
weakening the enemy forces or civilian population in order to
reach a military goal without the spilling of enemy or friendly
blood. PSYOP virtually persuade an adversary to give up the
fight.
Despite the attractiveness of successful psychological
warfare, the use of organized PSYOP in U.S. military operations
was limited in the twentieth century and is still limited
today, partially due to a lack of PSYOP organization. The
lack of organization can be linked to the inconsistent use of
PSYOP in past U.S. military operations. The U.S. military
limited its use of PSYOP in the twentieth century. This is
evident in the rise and fall of PSYOP use during and after
wars or conflicts. 5 Interest in PSYOP would rise during war
then fall after the conflict was over, making PSYOP a forgotten
form of warfare in the interwar periods. This lack of
interest yielded limited PSYOP organization efforts, and left
the Army the only military service with permanent operational
PSYOP groups. Currently, the only existing active
PSYOP group in the U.S. military is the Army’s 4 th Psychological
Operations Group (Airborne) at Fort Bragg, North
Carolina. 6 Their mission is “to deploy anywhere in the world
on short notice, and plan, develop, and conduct Civil Affairs
and Psychological operations in support of Unified Commanders,
coalition forces, or other governmental agencies as
directed by the National Command Authority”. 7 Reserve and
guard units also participate in PSYOP delivery, including the
Pennsylvania Air National Guard’s 193 rd Special Operations
Wing and a number of Army Reserve components. 8 The Air
Force’s 39 th Information Operations Squadron at Hurlburt
Field is involved in information warfare training which contributes
to PSYOP strategy, but the squadron does not have
an active, operational PSYOP component that is involved in
the delivery of PSYOP. 9
As the only U.S. military PSYOP forces, the 4 th
PSYOP group and reserve and guard PSYOP units, are tasked
with several PSYOP roles. One of the key roles of PSYOP
is to “ensure a seamless information effort by designing an
organization that can coordinate PSYOP efforts at the strategic,
operational and tactical levels”. 10 This task requires the
coordination of PSYOP among multiple PSYOP units, since
one unit cannot seek to control all combat levels at once. A
defined PSYOP organization is necessary to direct the activities
of multiple PSYOP units at the varying levels of war.
PSYOP can be utilized at all levels of war: strategic, operational,
and tactical, and they can also be utilized in all phases
of war, including operations preceding war, during war, and
31
after war. 11 PSYOP are also applicable to any type of military
operation, including the support of conventional warfare,
special operations, peacetime efforts, major military conflicts,
or small, less intense military contingencies. 12 While PSYOP
may be relevant to several types of military operations, phases,
and levels of war, PSYOP efficacy and use are limited by poor
organization of forces responsible for PSYOP delivery. A
better-organized and better-defined PSYOP force would result
in a more modern and better-prepared U.S. military.
Limitations
The limitations surrounding this study pertain to
PSYOP aspects that do not directly influence the organization
and the roles of PSYOP. PSYOP doctrine will be discussed,
but equipment, technology, and training aspects of PSYOP
will be disregarded, since these categories do not apply to the
organization of PSYOP delivery. Equipment and advanced
technology are critical to successful PSYOP but they are not
critical to the study of PSYOP organization. While equipment
and technology play a large role in the modernization of
PSYOP, description of these elements would only add complex
scientific information to the study. Finally, the importance
of training this study is negligible since training cannot
be a focus until PSYOP organization is determined.
This study will focus on U.S. Army and U.S. Air
Force PSYOP doctrine and organization. The U.S. Navy and
Marine Corps’ use and organization of PSYOP will not be
considered in depth. While the Navy and Marine Corps have
PSYOP capabilities, those services play a very limited PSYOP
role at this time. For the purposes of this study, it is assumed
that the Air Force and the Army will be the key actors in
military PSYOP in future contingencies. Accordingly, recommendations
for PSYOP organization will center on Air Force
and Army needs.
Relevance to current problems involving PSYOP
organization will determine selection of specific case studies.
Moreover, specific emphasis will be given to the most
recent U.S. military operations, specifically Operation Desert
Storm and Operation Allied Force, since they appear to hold
the most significance for the future of PSYOP organization.
While earlier operations involving the role of PSYOP
do pertain to historical PSYOP organization, they are not as
applicable to this study regarding the future of the PSYOP
organization.
Definitions and Assumptions
Several definitions are critical to the analysis and
arguments proposed in the study. The following terms will be
used throughout the study:
Information Operations (IO). According to Joint Publication
3-53, Doctrine for Joint
Psychological Operations, Information Operations are

defined as “actions taken to affect
adversary information and information systems while
defending one’s own information and information
systems”.
32
13 IO includes several types of operations,
including military deception, psychological operations,
electronic warfare, operational security, and
computer network operations. 14
Psychological Operations (PSYOP). According to the Doctrine
for Joint Psychological
Operations, PSYOP are defined as “planned operations
to convey selected information and indicators
to foreign audiences to influence the emotions,
motives, objective reasoning, and ultimately the
behavior of foreign governments, organizations,
groups, and individuals”. 15
Organization. The official parties in control, their strategy,
what specific operations they are in
control of, how they utilize their control, and if they
share or do not share control with other parties.
Delivery. Refers to the act of conducting PSYOP as opposed
to the strategic planning of
PSYOP.
Strategic PSYOP. Utilized by “U.S. government departments
and agencies…to influence
foreign attitudes, perceptions, and behavior in favor
of U.S. goals and objectives…These activities take
place predominantly outside the military arena, but
frequently use DOD assets and receive support from
military PSYOP forces”. 16
Operational PSYOP. “Conducted prior to, during war or
conflict, and at the conclusion of open
hostilities in a defined geographic area to promote the
effectiveness of the area commander’s campaigns and
strategies”. 17
Tactical PSYOP. “Conducted in the area assigned a tactical
commander during conflict and war
to support the tactical mission against opposing
forces”. 18
Iraqi Freedom. Finally, organizational recommendations will
be offered for enhancing PSYOP in the future.
Before the question --“Has the U.S. military developed
the optimum organizational potential in the delivery of
psychological operations in an era of expanding contingency
operations?”-- is fully examined, a review of the pertinent literature
is necessary to determine what information is available
from previous research on the topic of PSYOP.
LITERATURE REVIEW
General History of PSYOP
The use of PSYOP has existed since the beginning of
warfare. Documented as far back as biblical times, PSYOP
have been used to mentally manipulate the enemy to meet
certain military objectives. James Radvanyi mentions several
uses of PSYOP throughout history:
Psychological operations are as old as the history of
mankind; indeed, the Bible records numerous cases,
such as the ‘torch-game’ deception of Gideon against
the Midianites that forced them to retreat…the Athenians’
clever use of psychological warfare against the
Melians in the Peloponnesian War…the Romans’
disinformation and blackmail campaigns that ultimately
forced the Carthaginians to surrender in the
Punic Wars…And, one should never forget that the
success of the Golden Horde of Genghis Khan partly
depended on frightening rumors about the savagery
and the greatly exaggerated numbers of the Khan’s
horsemen army.
Preview of Argument
The argument presented in this study will address
the organizational requirement for a modern and successful
PSYOP force ready to face the demands of expanding contingency
operations. It will be determined if the U.S. military
has achieved the optimum organizational arrangements for
PSYOP delivery, or whether organizational changes are necessary
to more effectively utilize PSYOP in contemporary warfare.
It is this researcher’s contention that such changes are
indeed required. My argument will be supplemented by an
evaluation of PSYOP in several recent or current U.S. operations,
such as Operation Desert Storm, Operation Joint Force
in Bosnia, Operation Allied Force in Kosovo, and Operation
19
Many great warriors of the past wrote of the necessity for psychological
means in warfare. As reported by James Rodgers,
while Sun Tzu never used the term “PSYOP,” he did encourage
his commanders “to know the enemy and know yourself;
in a hundred years you will never be in peril,” and he recommended
“[attacking] the enemy where weak, [defending]
only where strong, and [achieving] deception” in warfare. 20
Deception in warfare pertains to PSYOP and the resulting
mental manipulation of the enemy. Differing from Sun Tzu’s
teachings, U.S. PSYOP forces today rely more on sharing
facts with the enemy rather than on deceiving the enemy, in
order to expose true shortcomings in the enemy’s objectives,
mentality, or leadership. More recent historical figures also
have expressed their faith in the effectiveness of psychological
warfare. Mao Zedong stated that, “The mind of the enemy
and the will of his leaders is a target of far more importance
than the bodies of his troops”. 21 This statement epitomizes
the motive of PSYOP to this day; to wage war against the enemy’s
mind and will rather than seeking the physical destruction
of the enemy’s troops. According to Dr. Frank Goldstein,
“Because soldiers and civilians have not fundamentally

changed in nature or psychology since Sun Tzu wrote these
observations, they remain appropriate today”. 22
History of PSYOP in the United States
Like other civilizations and nations, the United
States has utilized PSYOP in warfare throughout its history.
While psychological warfare was used by Americans as early
as the Battle of Bunker Hill, PSYOP did not become a formal
activity of the U.S. military until World War I. 23 Goldstein
mentions that several countries used both strategic and tactical
PSYOP during WWI, including the use of propaganda
created by specialized PSYOP units. 24 PSYOP officially
became known as “psywar” during World War II and was
employed mainly via public broadcast radio. 25 During the
Korean Conflict and then the Cold War, PSYOP were best
used by the Soviets. Western powers, including the U.S.,
lagged behind in PSYOP potential through the Vietnam War.
As expressed by Goldstein, the “North Vietnamese mastered
the art of using the international media for their PSYOP”. 26
In contrast, “U.S. PSYOP planning was not effectively formalized
or coordinated with operations and troop mobilizations”.
27 Following the Vietnam War, PSYOP was utilized in
other combat operations including conflicts in the Falklands,
Afghanistan, Africa, South and Central America, Grenada,
Panama, and the Persian Gulf. 28
American use of PSYOP has changed drastically over
the years, but one theme has remained – the theme of fluctuating
employment of PYSOP in U.S. military operations.
According to Alfred Paddock, the use of PYSOP in warfare
has fluctuated greatly throughout U.S. history. 29 Radvanyi
agrees that American PSYOP can be considered inconsistent
throughout American history, but he interprets this inconsistency
as mere hesitancy to realize PSYOP’s effectiveness
in war. He claims that, “Throughout its history, the U.S.
approach toward practicing PSYOP can only be characterized
as mild, if not timid”. 30 The episodic and timid nature of
PSYOP has placed inadvertent limitations on the U.S. military’s
use of PSYOP in warfare, for its full operational potential
may still be unknown due to its restricted use in the past.
The Role of PSYOP
The roles PSYOP can play in military operations are
boundless. According to Paddock, “PSYOP can be used to
demoralize, disorient, and confuse hostile groups….Against
such groups, PSYOP are employed as an offensive weapon
to enhance the overall effectiveness of military operations”. 31
Pugmire agrees and adds that “PSYOP are used throughout
[a] campaign to support and achieve the commander’s
objective...[the commander’s] PSYOP assets represent his only
organic means to communicate directly with the enemy forces
or civilians within his theater of operations”. 32 In addition to
33
the offensive and communicative nature of PSYOP, Goldstein
claims that, “The ultimate objective of American PSYOP is
to convince enemy, friendly, and neutral nations and forces to
take action favorable to the U.S. and its allies”. 33 This objective
is met by PSYOP at many different operational levels, in
multiple phases of war, and in several types of war.
As expressed by Pugmire, “Different levels of PSYOP
have emerged that span the entire operational continuum”. 34
These PSYOP levels include Strategic PSYOP, Operational
PSYOP, and Tactical PSYOP. Strategic PSYOP are used to
“influence foreign attitudes, perceptions, and behavior in
favor of U.S. goals and objectives”. 35 Operational PSYOP
are “conducted prior to, during war or conflict, and at the
conclusion of open hostilities…to promote the effectiveness
of the area commander’s campaigns and strategies”. 36 Tactical
PSYOP are “conducted in the area assigned a tactical commander
during conflict and war to support the tactical mission”.
37 Goldstein goes into detail concerning both strategic
and tactical uses of PSYOP. He asserts that “Strategic PSYOP
are usually considered an aspect of public diplomacy and are
normally established and guided by inter-government working
groups created for a particular short-term situation or
regional area of concern”. 38 Goldstein says that differing from
strategic PSYOP, “In tactical or battlefield PSYOP, commanders
use such techniques as loudspeaker broadcasts and leaflet
drops with the intent of generating a force multiplier without
having to increase force size”. 39 He further observes, “Psyopsers
support tactical deception, counterterrorism, counterpropaganda,
and other nontraditional means as the tactical situation
merits”. 40
The “operational continuum” expands with the
multiple phases of war and types of conflict in which PSYOP
may play a role. The three official phases are prior to, during,
and after conflict or war. 41 It should be noted that war is not
a prerequisite for the use of military PSYOP. PSYOP may
be used in peacetime operations or in other types of conflict
including conventional warfare, special operations, major
military conflicts, and smaller, less intense military contingencies.
Paddock emphasizes that “while PSYOP do have a
mission in support of special operations, both in high-intensity
conflicts and in low-intensity operations, they also have
a much broader application in peacetime and crisis, with or
without accompanying military operations, and across the
entire spectrum of conflict”. 42 In another article, Paddock
stresses that “First priority…must go to planning military
PSYOP that will assist the unified commands- the combatant
commands- and the conventional forces assigned to support
them for various contingencies”. 43 Paddock includes a list of
additional PSYOP roles that pertain to peacetime and lowintensity
requirements:

Peacetime and low-intensity requirements…may
include humanitarian assistance, peacekeeping,
disaster relief, counter-drug operations, civic action,
unscheduled studies and assessments oriented to
crisis areas, advisory mobile training teams for the
military forces of friendly nations, staff assistance to
unified commands, counterterrorism, foreign internal
defense, and support for DOD and non-DOD agencies.
44
This list proves that there are virtually no limits to the contributions
PSYOP may make in military operations. Since
there are so many possible PSYOP applications, there is great
potential for a high demand for PSYOP in future contingency
operations.
The Current PSYOP Force Structure
Despite the vast roles that PSYOP can play in warfare
and other operations, the current U.S. PSYOP organization
restricts PSYOP potential for future operations. The structure
is limited by the small number of active duty members dedicated
solely to PSYOP. The structure is also limited by the
lack of organization among the U.S. military services. The
different branches of the armed forces have individual PSYOP
capabilities but their PSYOP responsibilities are not well
defined and delineated from those of the other branches. The
Army’s 4 th Psychological Operations Group (POG) at Fort
Bragg is the only active duty group whose efforts are dedicated
entirely to PSYOP. 45 The 4 th POG makes up 26 percent
of all Army PSYOP units, while the remaining 74 percent is
made up of reservists. 46
“The majority of [delivery] expertise [resides] in the
Army Reserve Components (RC),” explains Randall Bowdish,
while the other Armed Forces branches have limited numbers
of their own reserve or guard units dedicated to PSYOP. 47
The other services have capabilities of their own to contribute
to PSYOP:
The Air Force’s radio and TV broadcast capability
resides primarily in four EC-130 Commando Solo
aircraft, assigned to the Pennsylvania Air National
Guard…the Navy can produce audiovisual products
from a host of imaging commands…and Marine
Corps PSYOP support consists of shore-based loudspeaker
broadcasting, aerial and artillery leaflet dissemination
and audiovisual equipment. 48
In addition to the aforementioned capabilities of the Marines,
Navy, and Air Force, “A handful of Air Force officers with
PSYOP expertise are serving in key positions in the Pentagon,
among the unified commands, and at their Special Operations
School at Hurlburt Field”. 49 Also, according to Paddock,
34
“The Marine Corps has two civil affairs groups with PSYOP
as a secondary mission in its reserves”. 50 Despite the available
capabilities of all four services, the Army and the Air Force
combined have the most capabilities to carry out PSYOP missions,
as was demonstrated in both Operation Desert Storm
and Operation Allied Force.
While all four services have some PSYOP capabilities,
their potential for successful PSYOP is retarded due to a continually
“‘top-down’ centrally controlled, deliberate approach”
to PSYOP and an “outdated Cold War strategy of force,”
according to Steven Collins in Parameters, a professional journal
published by the US Army War College. 51 Collins argues
that while centralized control of PSYOP is good for “mid to
high intensity” conflicts like Desert Storm, decentralized control
would be more beneficial in the utilization of PSYOP in
modern peacekeeping operations, since “tactical commanders
need a high degree of local autonomy in order to be responsive”.
52 The “Cold War strategy of force” refers to the focus
on strategic PSYOP, rather than the more recently applicable
tactical PSYOP.
PSYOP Organization in Operation Desert Storm (Case Study)
American PSYOP coalition efforts in Iraq during
Operation Desert Storm were mainly tactical in nature and
involved the combination of both ground and air components.
53 There were four modes of delivery of PSYOP in
Operations Desert Storm including radio transmissions,
loudspeaker broadcasts, leaflet disseminations, and enemy
prisoners of war (EPW) team actions. 54 The USAF and its
EC-130 aircraft were responsible for the radio transmissions
from the air, the 4 th POG was responsible for the loudspeaker
broadcasts from the ground, and the leaflets for leaflet disseminations
were prepared and packed into leaflet bombs by
the Army and dropped out of Air Force aircraft. 55 The joint
nature of PSYOP in the Gulf War is described in greater detail
by Robert Adolph. Adolph mentions that “the 4 th PSYOP
Group broadcast ‘Voice of the Gulf’ (VOG)…from fixed
stations on the ground in Saudi Arabia and Turkey…and
from specially modified Air Force EC-130 aircraft from the
Pennsylvania Air National Guard, known as Volant Solo”. 56
The Army also assisted the joint PSYOP coalition in leaflet
drops with the Navy’s F/A-18 Hornet aircraft and the Marines
“successfully directed a psychological operation over Faylaka
Island in Kuwait Bay…with aid from a specially configured
Marine helicopter mounted with a 2,700-watt loud speaker
system…which [talked] enemy forces into laying down their
weapons and surrendering en masse”. 57 The joint PSYOP
coalition in Operation Desert Storm proved PSYOP to be
very effective in fighting the war against Saddam’s regime.
The temporary wartime organization of Army units and
Air Force units, specifically, led to successful PSYOP that

esulted in 73 thousand Iraqis reached via PSYOP messages
and 70 percent of the EPWs claimed that PSYOP messages
had “impacted their surrender”. 58 A more tactical PSYOP
approach proved successful in this operation.
PSYOP Organization in Operation Deliberate Force (Case
Study)
Unlike Operation Desert Storm, Operation Deliberate
Force was more focused on peacekeeping, thus there
was even more need for “local autonomy” of the military
commanders at a tactical PSYOP level, as noted above by
Collins. 59 Collins claims that based on poor U.S. PSYOP
performance in Bosnia, PSYOP needs to better “support
tactical elements,” especially as the “U.S. military finds itself
more involved in protracted struggles at the lower end of the
spectrum of conflict,” for “low-intensity conflict is basically
a struggle for people’s minds”. 60 Collins argues that three
limitations beset PSYOP in Bosnia: 1) leaders’ inability to
conduct an adequate reconnaissance or local media assessment
before December 1995, 2) a lack of facilities and personnel in
Sarajevo to conduct operations, and 3) a muddled policy with
uncertain enforcement. 61 All of these issues relate to poor
PSYOP organization and a poor definition of roles.
PSYOP Organization in Operation Allied Force (OAF) (Case
Study)
PSYOP in OAF proved that a combined Army/Air
Force PSYOP coalition could deliver effective results in the
war in Kosovo. The temporary organization of Army and
Air Force PSYOP units under a joint command in Kosovo
resulted in over 104.5 million dropped leaflets on Yugoslavia
during OAF, according to Ellis of the 4 th POG at Fort Bragg. 62
Once again, the Army’s 4 th POG and the Air Force’s EC-130s
of the 193 rd Special Operations Wings, Pennsylvania Air
National Guard, combined efforts with the 7 th Special Operations
Squadron in dropping leaflets that were intended to
influence the Serbian people to turn against Slobodan Milosevic
and his plans to purge Kosovo of the ethnic Albanians. 63
The 193 rd also “assisted the PSYOP effort with airborne radio
and television broadcasts”. 64 The beneficial results of PSYOP
contributions during OAF determined that “PSYOP will
continue to be a weapon of first choice as a combat and diplomatic
multiplier and a combat reducer for future military
operations”. 65 On the other hand, Robert Wall and David
Fulgham argue that the “PSYOP tools” used in OAF were
“largely ineffective,” for the “‘art’ of massaging the view of
locals was not as successful as it might have been”. 66 This
argument points to a significant difference of opinion on the
success of PSYOP in OAF. Perhaps PSYOP was not used to
its full potential in Kosovo due to its poor organization and
ill-defined roles in the operation. This case study suggests
that coalition organization of PSYOP has the potential to
35
reap positive results in military contingencies, but that it also
requires that enhancement of PSYOP organization be considered
and implemented in the future.
PSYOP in Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF) and Operation
Iraqi Freedom (OIF)
(Case Study)
Interestingly, Osama bin Laden has more successfully
utilized PSYOP via media in the country of Afghanistan than
the U.S. has utilized PSYOP in defeating bin Laden. According
to James Poniewozik and others in “The Battle for Hearts
and Minds,” bin Laden has manipulated the minds of the
Afghani people to see America as the enemy of their Muslim
faith and their country. 67 This is surely successful PSYOP, and
much can be learned from bin Laden’s aggressive approach.
While many pamphlets have been dropped into Afghanistan
and Iraq and intensive broadcasts are being made, the people
are not as receptive to PSYOP suggestions as they were in
Operation Desert Storm or even the operations in the Balkans.
It is essential that PSYOP groups understand the nature
of the “sophisticated adversary” and the deep-seated attitudes
of civilian audiences in countries like Afghanistan and Iraq. A
more culturally informed and tailored tactical response by a
PSYOP group would likely prove more successful.
The Need to Modernize the PSYOP Organization
While Operation Desert Storm, Operation Deliberate
Force, and OAF showed combined forces PSYOP can be
reasonably effective, it is evident that PSYOP organization
needs to be modernized and structured in order to fully tap
the potential of PSYOP in current and future military operations.
As expressed by Paddock, there is a “need to modernize
our PSYOP force structure, both in terms of personnel
and equipment…not surprisingly, a considerable shortfall in
PSYOP forces exists”. 68 Adolph agrees, saying that “America’s
only active PSYOP organization is stretched to the limit…
more force structure and fully trained personnel are required
in the active component to accomplish the mission”. 69 The
4 th POG is not capable of handling all PSYOP in the future
as U.S. military contingencies expand. As emphasized by
Adolph, “Even in time of peace, the operational tempo of the
4 th PSYOP Group is one of the most demanding in any of
the services, in that it provides support to all levels of DOD,
and to special operations forces and conventional forces”. 70 In
order to utilize PSYOP to its full potential, a larger, structured
organization is needed. Bowdish calls for “a full-time cadre
of PSYOP personnel,” perhaps a joint PSYOP unit with the
necessary number of people to be prepared for all types of
PSYOP, all over the world, at any given time. 71
Current PSYOP Organizational Recommendations
Several recommendations for future PSYOP organization
already exist. Paddock claims that “three broad areas

must be addressed if the PSYOP community is to emerge
from this period of transition to play a viable role in our
nation’s security”: (1) education of senior civilian and military
officials on the value of the psychological dimension; (2) planning
for the use of military PSYOP in a changing world; and
(3) continued modernization of the PSYOP force structure. 72
Paddock’s PSYOP plan calls for a structured organization that
can conduct psychological operations in a time of increasing
resort to the military instrument of power. He challenges the
military community to question whether full PSYOP organizational
potential has been reached.
Brooks makes some similar PSYOP recommendations.
Brooks believes that in the future “we will be faced
with ‘asymmetric’ multi-echeloned adversaries”. 73 These
adversaries “will be more likely to attack our interests using
information technology rather than traditional military
means” and Brooks claims that PSYOP are necessary to
counter that form of an offensive against the U.S. 74 In order
to best modernize U.S. PSYOP forces, Brooks argues that
PSYOP must select and retain quality people, provide quality
training, focus on core PSYOP capabilities, and ensure a
seamless information effort by designing an organization that
can coordinate PSYOP efforts at the strategic, operational,
and tactical levels. 75 The “seamless integration” requires
that PSYOP forces “foster active and habitual relationships
between agencies, between services, and between the active
and reserve components”. 76 Like Paddock, Brooks is calling for
the design of a PSYOP organization that can successfully span
the “operational continuum” of future PSYOP contingencies.
Another recommendation from both Collins and
Maiers/Rahn is that the “PSYOP Task Force is on par with
other Joint Task Force (JTF) component commanders and
should be under the direct operational control of the Joint
Forces Commander, rather than a sub-entity of the component
commanders. Collins refers to this poor organization of
PSYOP as due to the “lack of rank,” saying that the PSYOP
Task Force is “on par with the other Joint Task Force component
commanders and should be under the direct operational
control of the Joint Forces Commander”. 77 Maiers/Rahn also
suggest that PSYOP is not properly integrated into the overarching
JTF plans and that information operations should
be organized under a “centralized commander to coordinate
activities on the JTF level”. 78 They recommend a joint information
operations task force (JIOTF) that would be “critical
[in] establishing and maintaining the knowledge superiority
needed to execute rapid decisive operations” in an efficient
and well-organized PSYOP community. 79
THESIS BODY
Modern psychological operations are based on a joint
perspective due to the broad spectrum of operations to which
36
PSYOP is applicable and the overall joint nature of warfare
in military contingencies today. According to the Doctrine
for Joint Psychological Operations (JP 3-53), which “addresses
military [PSYOP] planning, and execution in support of
joint, multinational, and interagency efforts across the range
of military operations”, the joint psychological operations
task force (JPOTF) is considered a “subordinate joint command
of a joint force” that has “coordinating authority with
tactical forces for developing, producing, and disseminating
PSYOP products”. 80 The joint nature of PSYOP imposes
complex organizational challenges. Despite the current focus
on the implementation of PSYOP tactics in modern American
warfare, there is still much confusion as to the command
structure and responsibility for PSYOP actions. The military
is recognizing that PSYOP should be more decentralized and
tactical, with responsibility devolving to commanders at the
operational level. Decentralization of PSYOP will allow the
U.S. military to more effectively face an unpredictable security
environment characterized by counterterrorism operations
and other contingencies requiring the measured application
of force. It is also essential that PSYOP become more of
a focus in all branches of the military, so that self-contained
Army, Air Force, or Navy PSYOP units have the ability to
wage psychological warfare against an enemy at the tactical
level, with the supplies and capabilities specific to the PSYOP
needs at that level.
Currently, the Secretary of Defense delegates PSYOP
product approval and dissemination to combatant commanders,
who in turn may delegate PSYOP product approval to
a joint task force (JTF) commander, but no lower than that
without Secretary of Defense approval. 81 This highly centralized
PSYOP organization inhibits PSYOP from being utilized
at its greatest potential efficiency. In particular, the centralized
approach to PSYOP prevents operational commanders
from having effective authority to use PSYOP in a way that
responds to the unique circumstances that confront them.
According to Collins, the product approval delegation is “satisfactory
in a quickly evolving mid- to high-intensity conflict
like Desert Storm where the focus is the decisive application
of maneuver and firepower, but in a peacekeeping operation,
where tactical commanders need a high degree of local autonomy
in order to be responsive, it creates great difficulties”. 82
Today, the U.S. military faces more and more peacekeeping
and low-intensity conflicts, so the need for PSYOP delegation
to operational commanders and tactical levels is critical. As
suggested by Collins, U.S. joint forces should “loosen PSYOP
policy and doctrine when operating in low-intensity conflicts,
giving tactical commanders the latitude to conduct their own
PSYOP plan, within given constraints […]; theater-level
PSYOP must remain the prerogative of the Joint Forces Com-

mander or Geographic Combatant Commander”. 83
In order to improve PSYOP capabilities and utilization
in modern war it is critical that the military stop treating
PSYOP as a purely strategic-level consideration. Rather,
PSYOP should be commanded and executed at a decentralized
level best suited to operations in a certain region or
conflict. Doctrine for Joint Psychological Operations (JP 3-53),
states that “because of the strategic and operational importance
of the PSYOP contribution to the combatant commander’s
strategic concept, centralized planning of PSYOP
should be focused at that level”. 84 While PSYOP should
have a strategic impact, they are most successful when they
are immediate and responsive to specific action in a theater,
which can only occur when component commanders have
access to PSYOP when needed. Currently, in most command
structures joint operational control of PSYOP falls under the
Geographic Combatant Commander and the Joint Task Force
(JTF) Commander, as depicted in the figure below (See figure
1). 85
Figure 1. Current joint force organization chart from Joint
Pub 3-53, 2003.
Referred to as the Joint Psychological Operations Task Force
(JPOTF), joint PSYOP are often overlooked until a crisis
occurs and the need for PSYOP arises. Instead of giving the
JTF Commander control over accessions of required PSYOP
personnel in an area of operations, the Combatant Commander
is in charge of attaching PSYOP forces to subordinate
component commanders to enhance PSYOP planning
and capability. 86 Ideally, the transfer of operational control
of the JPOTF from the Combatant Commander to the JTF
Commander would allow PSYOP to be more readily used at
the operational and tactical levels. Rather than just giving
the JTF Commander control over JPOTF exercises, the JTF
Commander could directly oversee PSYOP action in the area
of operations.
37
Figure 2. Recommended joint force organization.
In order to remedy the situation and promote efficiency
in the use of PSYOP, this study finds that the JTF
Commander should be placed directly in control of the
JPOTF, making it an equivalent component to, rather than a
sub-component of, the component commanders (As shown
in figure 2). In support of this recommendation, Capt Mary
Cohen, Chief of Influence Operations of the 7 th Information
Warfare Flight at Osan AFB, Korea, emphasizes that “control
of how PSYOP is planned and implemented needs to rest
with theater/JTF commanders.” 87 This structure change will
not be an easy feat, for it would require the officer in charge
of the JPOTF, currently a staff section within the JTF command,
to become equivalent in rank to the air, land, sea, and
marine component commanders. The issue, as explained by
Collins, is “that the limited rank structure in PSYOP often
leads to the PSYOP Task Force being under the command
of a lieutenant colonel, or, at best, a colonel” since there is a
“reluctance to treat a field grade officer on a par with a flag
officer exercising land, air, or sea component command”. 88
Typically a Joint Task Force staff section job does not merit
the rank of general. However, the critical nature of PSYOP in
current contingencies raises its importance in war fighting and
there should be a certain sense of urgency in making sure that
proper attention is given to PSYOP by the JTF commander.
It is essential that PSYOP be prepared and practiced
like all other military operations before crises occur. As
expressed by Mark Maiers and Timothy Rahn in “Information
Operations and Millennium Challenge,” information
operations, including PSYOP, “cannot be simply an afterthought
addressed immediately before a conflict […] shaping
and influencing activities must occur continuously throughout
peace, crisis, and combat, [for] it is almost impossible to
change a popular negative view of JTF efforts once shots are
fired”. 89 In the current organization, the JPOTF is not adequately
linked to the component commanders, which leads
to an inefficient use of PSYOP. According to Collins in his
assessment of Army PSYOP in Bosnia, the lack of imbedded
PSYOP troops in the Geographic Combatant Commander’s
area of responsibility led to a lack of “intangible physical and
mental links between the supported [combatant commander]
and the regional PSYOP battalion,” because this relationship
is rarely forged before a crisis occurs. 90 The integration of
PSYOP in theater operations should not be an afterthought.
Instead, PSYOP should be considered essential before conflict
arises and the necessary PSYOP experts and trained personnel
should already have a relationship with other component
forces.
The transfer of command authority from the Com-

atant Commander to the JTF Commander and emphasis on
planning and practicing PSYOP prior to a crisis have already
been successfully implemented at Osan AFB, Korea. Due to
the urgent nature of being prepared in a theater that is always
on the brink of potential war, PSYOP is practiced in six different
exercises per year at Osan AFB. According to an Air
Force PSYOP specialist currently assigned to Osan, “PSYOP
has not become a forgotten form of warfare here, [at Osan],”
for Korea’s JTF PSYOP preparation is an “example of good
organization and ever-present need to conduct PSYOP planning
and targeting”. 91 The PSYOP task force at Osan is
called the Combined Psychological Operations Task Force
(CPOTF), which “has equal footing with the other components
at targeting and planning meetings and is headed by
an active duty O-6, equivalent rank to the ground, air, navy,
marine and special forces component commanders” of Joint
Task Force Korea. 92 The fact that the CPOTF commander
holds a rank equivalent to the other component commanders
signals the emphasis on PSYOP in the Korean AOR. CPOTF
is in charge of all PSYOP tasking and implementation, so the
other components must funnel all PSYOP requests through
the CPOTF. 93
This PSYOP organization has proven to be very
successful in Korea and could be used as a model for a
new perspective on PSYOP organization in other theaters.
The CPOTF at Osan suggests that PYSOP reorganization
- moving the CPOTF from its traditional place under the
component commanders to a position equivalent to that of
the other component commanders - is possible and effective.
Capt Cohen credits the efficiency of this organization to the
fact that control of PSYOP is placed at a theater level where
the “Combined Forces Commander (Geographic Combatant
Commander) in theater is the person with ultimate control
over what is said and what effects need to be achieved”. 94
This leadership organization is guarded from “risky off-peninsula
concepts as much as possible,” due to the decentralization
of PSYOP at JTF Korea. 95 Their JTF Commander has
chosen to not adopt the traditional form of PSYOP organization
used in other U.S. military commands. Rather, he has
delegated PSYOP control for all influence operations in Korea
to the CPOTF, and the results have proven effective. Other
commands should follow the example of PSYOP organization
at Osan AFB, Korea, in order to be as well prepared for using
PSYOP in warfare.
Another issue that needs to be addressed in the
PSYOP community is the lack of organizational consistency
across military services. The Army, Air Force, and Navy all
have their own PSYOP structure, but each service varies in
how it implements PSYOP at the strategic, operational, and
tactical levels. With the evolving joint nature of warfare it is
38
necessary to make sure these PSYOP forces can work together
under the designated Geographic Combatant Commander.
While the different services may have different PSYOP
responsibilities, they should be tactically compatible with each
other and PSYOP practitioners should understand the roles
and capabilities of their sister service counterparts. Knowing
what each service contributes to the broad PSYOP picture
allows for better implementation, and can also help distinguish
what capabilities are missing.
Even in a joint atmosphere, the branches can be
quite different. At Osan AFB, Korea, the Air Force considers
PSYOP to be a part of Information Operations (IO) while the
Army considers PSYOP an entirely separate entity from IO,
according to Capt Celina Croteau, who was previously the
Air Force PSYOP Planner in Korea and is now a member of
the 381 st Information Squadron at Elmendorf AFB, Alaska. 96
She adds that the Air Force tends to look at the “big picture
without focusing on technical details” even to the extent that
Air Force PSYOP practitioners do not possess a specific Air
Force Specialty Code (AFSC) which, in turn, leads to a lack
of clearly stated training requirements. 97 In relation to her
own experience as the only Air Force PSYOP planner at Osan
AFB, Capt Croteau said “I could coordinate efforts and plans,
but I would never have been able to actually conduct PSYOP
on my own.” 98
In contrast, the Army PSYOP components in joint
commands are much more self-contained and self-sufficient
in carrying out operations. In Korea the Army had a cell
with the responsibility and capability of carrying out PSYOP
efforts until reservists arrived to back them up. According to
Croteau, the Army is very different in that it is more technically
oriented, focusing on “the hands-on training aspects of
how to conduct PSYOP – how to design the most effective
leaflets and use broadcast media”. 99 Based on the lack of technical
PSYOP training in the Air Force, Capt Cohen suggests
from her experience that even though Air Force PYSOP personnel
may believe they are actively participating in PSYOP,
they are more in charge of “research or support [of PSYOP]
than actual planning/implementation [of PSYOP]”. 100
Based on the reports from these individuals’ experiences
in joint PSYOP situations, it is apparent that there
should be some efforts, especially on the Air Force’s part, to
become more familiar with the tactical side of PSYOP. Following
the example of current Army PSYOP organization,
the Air Force should strive to become more self-sufficient
and better able to better utilize PSYOP independently, at
least until additional PYSOP forces are available for support.
Organizationally, Air Force PSYOP units should include
more active duty personnel with a high order of specialized
expertise, including planning, implementation, research, and

support operations. Instead of being in the same situation
as Capt Croteau, whose role was limited only to coordinating
and planning PSYOP at Osan AFB, Air Force personnel
could potentially participate in active PSYOP implementation
as is the case with Army PSYOP members. In order to create
and sustain this enhanced focus on PSYOP in the Air Force,
it is proposed that PSYOP become an official AFSC. This
step would promote formal training for the creation of true
PSYOP specialists, rather than relying on personnel drawn
from kindred AFSCs, such as intelligence or public affairs.
In addition to further expanding the Air Force’s role
in PSYOP implementation, it is further recommended that
the Marine Corps be better equipped to execute PSYOP missions.
Due to their typically close contact with adversary
forces and civilian populations, Marines have the potential to
drastically influence the perception of U.S. military forces in
foreign countries and intimidate enemy troops, persuading
them to not fight against American troops. According to the
Doctrine for Joint Psychological Operations, the Marine Corps
currently does not possess a formal PSYOP organization
structure, although it is recognized as possessing the “capability
to execute […] actions designed to convey specific impressions
to an adversary”. 101 Like the U.S. Army, the Marine
Corps should offer PSYOP-specific training and develop
specialists with linguistic abilities and cultural knowledge of
specific regions. Such specialists could then be attached to
tactical battalions, supporting special operations and conventional
task forces, a practice that has proven successful for the
Army. 102 Army and Marine Corps forces arguably could work
together more readily than any of the other branches combined,
because their support needs are similar. Going a step
further, joint Marine and Army PSYOP groups could be utilized
effectively in several regions in which the U.S. military is
involved today.
While the Navy does have some PSYOP capabilities,
mainly “audiovisual products”, the sea service is more
limited when it comes to the actual tactical employment of
PSYOP. The Navy has the capability to produce PSYOP
documents and posters that can be distributed to other
PSYOP forces for use. It also has the TARBS radio station
that broadcasts messages from ship to land and several aircraft
that support the PSYOP mission. 103 While this is evidence
that the Navy has played a role in joint PSYOP over the years,
its PSYOP capabilities are largely untapped. This potential
could be exploited by creating tactical Naval PSYOP groups,
similar to the existing Army groups, which are able to assist
component commanders in joint situations.
Of all the services, the Army has best exploited
the potential of PSYOP. As the only service with an active
PSYOP unit, the Army has a proven tactical PSYOP capabil-
39
ity. The Air Force, Navy, and Marine Corps would do well to
embrace the Army PSYOP model. The Army has recognized
a need for PSYOP in our current military endeavors, and the
Air Force regularly supports those Army units. There is a
great need to tap this joint potential of PSYOP, which would
allow the services to quickly join and unite tactically against
the enemy. The more prepared each individual service is
for PSYOP, the better prepared each will be to support each
other. The coordination of PSYOP at the tactical level, by the
JTF Commander and JPOTF Commander, will allow PSYOP
to be utilized efficiently and appropriately for the current situation.
PSYOP will reach its optimum potential, becoming a
more recognized and more utilized form of warfare.
CONCLUSION
The role of PSYOP in modern warfare is critical
for influencing the enemy or foreign populations. Recent
operations have shown that tactical level PSYOP can greatly
contribute to joint success. The likelihood of continued US
involvement is a variety of contingency operations--from
peacekeeping missions to special operations to major military
conflicts--underscores the need to strengthen US PSYOP
capabilities. The diverse nature of PSYOP makes it an effective
tactic at all levels of warfare – strategic, operational, and
tactical. The effective organization of PSYOP resources can
be expected to enhance the role and effectiveness of PSYOP
in the future warfare. PSYOP will become more capable of
targeting the enemy’s mind because of an emphasis on tactical
operations tailored to a specific area of operations.
The best way to ensure that PSYOP meets its full
potential is to enable commanders to plan, coordinate, and
implement PSYOP at decentralized and more tacticallyfocused
levels. Especially within a Geographic Combatant
Command, it is essential that the JTF Commander be given
authority over PSYOP planning and employment within the
theater of operations. PSYOP may then be better utilized
in conjunction with other JTF operations. It is also recommended
that the JPOTF hold a position equivalent to the
component commanders under the JTF Commander. This
would elevate PSYOP from a subordinate staff section of the
JTF command to a more substantial organization headed by
a colonel or officer of equivalent rank to that of component
command officers. Coordination and communication would
become greatly facilitated if component commands and the
JPOTF held equal rank.. The current PSYOP organization
at Osan AFB should be used as a model for other commands
because of the successful planning, preparation, and practice
of PSYOP encouraged by JTF Korea. Decentralizing planning
and implementation of PSYOP to the theater JTF commanders
at Osan AFB has created an ideal and very effective
PSYOP organization. Additionally, each U.S. military service

should prepare itself to better utilize PSYOP as the need for
this tactic increases, especially in operations at the lower end
of the spectrum of warfare. Following the model of Army
PSYOP, the Air Force should create its own PSYOP AFSC.
That would be the first necessary step to produce airmen
capable of planning and implementing PSYOP. Moreover,
the Marine Corps and Navy should also devote more attention
to PSYOP and its potential for contributing to joint
operations.
The efficient organization of PSYOP is crucial
because of PSYOP’s ever increasing role in military operations
today and in all likelihood, the future. In response to
the thesis question: “Has the U.S. military developed the
optimum organizational potential for the delivery of psychological
operations in an era of expanding contingency operations?”
the answer is the U.S. military has yet to achieve its
full PSYOP potential. Overall, current PSYOP organization
is not meeting operational requirements.
As we have seen, a well organized and highly trained
PSYOP force can be expected to increase prospects for future
military success. The recommendations set forth above are
reasonable and should be implemented to better utilize U.S.
PSYOP forces and capabilities. A tactically-based PSYOP
focus will promote the most effective use of PSYOP. In addition,
decisive and purposeful planning and practice of PSYOP
prior to a conflict will promote a higher level of operational
effectiveness when hostilities commence. With the excellent
examples of the Korean JTF model to draw upon, the U.S.
military should take timely action to strengthen its PSYOP
capabilities.
Future research on this topic will be essential in order
to determine the optimum organizational arrangements for
PSYOP. The arguments proposed in this thesis are based
entirely on unclassified research and the author’s limited interaction
with current PSYOP practitioners. As a cadet who
has yet to experience PSYOP on a firsthand basis, this writer
nevertheless does recognize the vast importance of PSYOP
in modern warfare. In addition to considering the PSYOP
structure adopted by JTF Korea, future research on this topic
should include careful examination of other joint PSYOP
offices for possible alternative organizational constructs.
Needless to say, many other key questions concerning PSYOP
cannot be addressed without access to classified information.
In conclusion, a fully capable PSYOP force can
have a lasting impact on adversary behavior. Accordingly, an
effective PSYOP organization will be critical to future military
success. Effective PSYOP can subdue the enemy’s mind in
a manner that promotes military success without physically
striking the enemy. As stated by German Field Marshall Carl
Gustav Baron von Mannerheim, “For a strong adversary the
40
opposition of twenty-four squadrons and twelve guns ought
not to have appeared very serious, but in war the psychological
factors are often decisive. An adversary who feels inferior
is in reality so”. 104
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Operations: An Introduction,” in
Psychological Operations: Principles and Case Studies,
ed. Frank L. Goldstein and Benjamin F. Findley, Jr.
Maxwell AFB, AL: Air University Press, 1996, 5-24.
____________________________________. “PSYOP in
Desert Shield/Desert Storm,” in
Psychological Operations: Principles and Case Studies,
ed. Frank L. Goldstein and Benjamin F. Findley, Jr.
Maxwell AFB, AL: Air University Press, 1996, 341-
355.
Joint Chiefs of Staff. Doctrine for Joint Psychological Operations,
Joint Pub 3-53. Washington,
D.C. 10 July 1996.
Joint Chiefs of Staff. Doctrine for Joint Psychological Opera-

tions, Joint Pub 3-35. Washington,
D.C. 5 September 2003.
Maiers, Mark W. and Timothy L. Rahn. “Information Operations
and Millennium Challege.”
Joint Forces Quarterly 35 (Autumn 2004): 83-87.
Paddock, Alfred H., Jr. “No More Tactical Information
Detachments: U.S. Military
Psychological Operations in Transition,” in Psychological
Operations: Principles and Case Studies, ed. Frank
L. Goldstein and Benjamin F. Findley, Jr. Maxwell
AFB, AL: Air University Press, 1996, 26-50.
_______________. “U.S. Military Psychological Operations:
Past, Present, and Future,” in
Psychological Operations and Political Warfare in Longterm
Strategic Planning, ed. Janos Radvanyi. New
York: Praeger Publishers, 1990, 19-35.
Poniewozik, James, et al. “The Battle for Hearts and Minds.”
Time Europe 158 (October 2001).
Pugmire, Brian M. “Psychological Operations: Will the Real
Approval Authority Please Stand
Up?” Naval War College Thesis. Newport, RI: Naval
War College, 2002.
Radvanyi, Janos. “Introduction to PSYOP,” in Psychological
Operations and Political Warfare
in Long-term Strategic Planning, ed. Janos Radvanyi.
New York: Praeger Publishers, 1990, 1-7.
Rodgers, James L. “Information Warfare: Nothing New
Under the Sun.” Marine Corps Gazette
81 (April 1997): 23-29.
Wall, Robert and David Fulgham. “Putting the Spin on
Modern War.” Aviation Week and Space
Technology 154 (February 2001).
4 th Psychological Operations Group [on-line]. available from
http://www.psywarriors.com/4thpog.html; Internet;
accessed 12 September 2003.
39 th Information Operations Squadron [on-line]. Hurlburt
Field AFB, FL; available from
http://www.hurlburt.af.mil; Internet; accessed 12
September 2003.
41
(Endnotes)
1 Brian M. Pugmire, “Psychological Operations: Will the Real
Approval Authority Please Stand Up?,” Thesis (Naval War
College, 2002), 1.
2 Alfred H. Paddock, “No More Tactical Information
Detachments: U.S. Military Psychological Operations in
Transition,” in Psychological Operations: Principles and Case
Studies (Maxwell AFB, AL: Air University Press 1996), 20.
3 Paul R.M. Brooks, “A Vision for PSYOP in the Information
Age,” Special Warfare 13 (Winter 2000): 21.
4 Frank L. Goldstien and Daniel W. Jacobowitz,
“Psychological Operations,” in Psychological Operations:
Principles and Case Studies (Maxwell AFB, AL: Air University
Press, 1996), 11.
5 Paddock, “No More Tactical Information,” 26.
6 Ibid., 35.
7 th 4 Psychological Operations Group [on-line]. available from
http://www.psywarriors.com/4thpog.html; Internet; accessed
12 September 2003.
8 Randall G. Bowdish, “Information-Age Psychological
Operations,” Military Review 78 (December-February 1999):
30.
9 th 39 Information Operations Squadron [on-line]. Hurlburt
Field AFB, FL; available from http://www.hurlburt.af.mil;
Internet; accessed 12 September 2003.
10 Brooks, “A Vision,” 21.
11 Pugmire, “Psychological Operations,” 3.
12 Paddock, “No More Tactical,” 47.
13 Joint Chiefs of Staff, Doctrine for Joint Psychological
Operations, Joint Publication 3-53 (Washington, DC: 10 July
1996): GL-6.
14 Mark W. Maiers and Timothy L. Rahn, “Information
Operations and Millennium Challenge,” Joint Forces Quarterly
35 (Autumn 2004): 83.
15 Joint Chiefs of Staff, Doctrine for Joint Psychological
Operations, 1996, ix.
16 Pugmire, “Psychological Operations,” 3.
17 Ibid., 3.
18 Ibid., 3.
19 Janos Radvanyi, “ Introduction to Psyops,” in Psychological
Operations and Political Warfare in Long-term Strategic
Planning (New York: Praeger Publishers, 1990), 1.
20 James L. Rodgers, “Information Warfare: Nothing New

Under the Sun,” Marine Corps Gazette 81 (April 1997): 24.
21 J.O. Ellis, Psychological Operations Support to Operation
Allied Force (Fort Bragg: 4th Psychological Group, 14 July
1999), 5.
22 Goldstein, “Psychological Operations,” 15.
23 Ibid., 13. According to Goldstein, during the Battle of
Bunker Hill PSYOP leaflets were used to try and persuade
British soldiers to switch sides. These leaflets were distributed
by colonials and tempted the British soldiers with reports that
food and provisions were better on the Patriot side. Some
leaflets also mentioned the farmland available to British
soldiers who left the fight.
24 Ibid., 13.
25 Ibid., 13.
26 Ibid., 14.
27 Ibid., 14.
28 Ibid., 14.
29 Alfred H. Paddock, “U.S. Military Psychological
Operations: Past, Present, and Future,” in Psychological
Operations and Political Warfare in Long-term Strategic
Planning (New York: Praeger, 1990), 35.
30 Radvanyi, “Introduction to Psyops,” 1.
31 Paddock, “U.S. Military,” 19.
32 Pugmire, “Psychological Operations,” 1.
33 Goldstein, “Psychological Operations,” 5.
34 Pugmire, “Psychological Operations,” 2.
35 Ibid., 3.
36 Ibid., 3.
37 Ibid., 3.
38 Goldstein, “Psychological Operations,” 10.
39 Ibid., 10.
40 Ibid., 10.
41 Pugmire, “Psychological Operation,” 3.
42 Paddock, “U.S. Military,” 29.
43 Paddock, “No More,” 47.
44 Ibid., 47.
45 Ibid., 35.
46 th 4 Psychological Operations Group, 1.
47 Bowdish, “Information Age,” 30.
48 Ibid., 30.
49 Paddock, “No More,” 34.
50 Ibid., 34.
51 Steven Collins, “Army PSYOP in Bosnia: Capabilities and
Constraints,” Parameter, 29 (Summer 99).
52 Ibid.
53 Frank L. Goldstein and Daniel W. Jacobowitz, “PSYOP
in Desert Shield/Desert Storm,” in Psychological Operations:
Principles and Case Studies, ed. Frank L. Goldstein and
Benjamin F. Findley, Jr. (Maxwell AFB: Air University Press,
1996), 349.
42
54 Ibid., 349.
55 Ibid., 350-355.
56 Robert B. Adolph, “PSYOP: Gulf War Force Multiplier,”
Army 42 (December 1992): 18.
57 Ibid., 19.
58 Goldstein, “PSYOP,” 349.
59 Collins, “Army PSYOP in Bosnia,” 2.
60 Ibid.
61 Ibid.
62 Ellis, Psychological Operatons, 18.
63 Ibid., 2.
64 Ibid., 2.
65 Ibid., 17.
66 Robert Wade and David Fulgham, “Putting the Spin
on Modern War,” Aviation Week and Space Technology 154
(February 2001).
67 James Pniewozik, et al. “The Battle for Hearts and Minds,”
Time Europe 158 (October 2001).
68 Paddock, “U.S. Military,” 26.
69 Adolph, “PSYOP: Gulf War,” 22.
70 Ibid., 21.
71 Bowdish, “Information Age,” 37.
72 Paddock, “No More,” 44.
73 Brooks, “A Vision,” 20.
74 Ibid., 20.
75 Ibid., 21.
76 Ibid., 23.
77 Collins, “Army PSYOP in Bosnia,” 2.
78 Maiers, “Information Operations and Millennium
Challenge,” 87.
79 Ibid.
80 Joint Chiefs of Staff, Doctrine for Joint Psychological
Operations, Joint Publication 3-53 (Washington, DC: 5
September 2003): xi.
81 Ibid., xii.
82 Collins, “Army PSYOP in Bosnia,” 2.
83 Ibid., 9.
84 Joint Chiefs of Staff, Doctrine for Joint Psychological
Operations, 2003, III-1.
85 Ibid., III-4.
86 Ibid., III-2.
87 Mary E. Cohen to the author, 3 February 2005, emailed
letter held by author.
88 Collins, “Army PSYOP in Bosnia,” 2.
89 Mairs, “Information Operations and Millennium
Challenge,” 87.
90 Collins, “Army PSYOP in Bosnia,” 2.
91 Cohen emailm 3 Feb 05.
92 Ibid.

93 Ibid.
94 Ibid.
95 Ibid.
96 Celina Croteau, to author, 5 February 2005, emailed letter
held by author.
97 Ibid.
98 Ibid.
99 Ibid.
100 Cohen email, 3 Feb 05.
101 Joint Chiefs of Staff, Doctrine for Joint Psychological
Operations, 2003, A-5.
102 Ibid., A-2.
103 Ibid., A-4.
104 Joint Chiefs of Staff, Doctrine for Joint Psychological
Operations, 2003, II-1.
43
“SPACE ASSETS: THE ACHILLES HEEL IN
NATIONAL DEFENSE”
BY
C1C ALEXANDER K. GOLDFEIN
INTRODUCTION
Statement of Research Question
In a world of technology and space exploration,
space assets have taken on an unexpected level of value to the
United States military. So great has their value become that
destruction of these assets could greatly reduce the combat
effectiveness of the United States armed forces. Space assets
are defined as any satellite or piece of technology in orbit
capable of providing an advantage or important synergies to
war fighters. 1 Growing reliance on space assets highlights a
host of military considerations for protecting these crucial
assets and raises a myriad of applicable questions. Foremost
to the debate is a question which this research paper will
examine: Has the United States Air Force developed the optimum
capabilities for defending U.S. military and commercial
space-based systems of strategic importance? Accordingly,
this paper will evaluate space defense capabilities and propose
changes or improvements in order to overcome any possible
gaps present in current U.S. space defenses. Space defense is a
crucial security issue this nation must address if it is to remain
the world’s greatest military power in years to come.
Background and Significance of the Problem
Throughout the last fifty years of airpower history,
space assets providing a myriad of advantages including imagery,
intelligence, and navigation have played a vital role in
successful military operations. Each helps maintain the victor’s
edge in combat, as pointed out in conflicts such as Desert
Storm and Iraqi Freedom, and are critical to the preservation
of our national defense. Additionally, these tools play a fundamental
part in the United States Air Force remaining the
world’s greatest air and space force with the most extended
global reach and advanced capabilities of any nation. Clayton
Chun explains that since the Cold War, space assets have
proven their worth as force multipliers in combat. 2 With the
space race still underway, new weapons designed to incorporate
space attack could destroy or otherwise disable our critical
space tools. Accordingly, a key mission of the U.S. Air
Force must be protection of the space assets on which we so
heavily rely. Without our space-based technology, it is feasible
that the U.S. military would be unable to conduct operations
with the precision or effectiveness we have come to expect.

Warfare has reached every battle medium with the
exception of space, and it is simply a matter of time until this
next evolution occurs. The U.S. Air Force must prepare for
that day and create an effective system of space defense. In
the words of Giulio Douhet, “Victory smiles upon those who
anticipate the changes in the character of war, not upon those
who wait to adapt themselves after the changes occur.” 3 A
forward-looking stance is critical for preparedness against
threats to our space assets and the strategically significant
capabilities they provide.
Limitations
Space research is limited on a number of levels
based primarily on the novelty of the subject. Space warfare
has been hypothesized for a long time, but application is
extremely new. It is also evident now that since discovery and
innovation concerning space are constantly changing at high
speed, the literature is constantly trying to “keep up” with
the most accurate information. In addition, many important
materials on space are classified and thus not accessible to the
general public. Satellites go into space constantly, and technology
is in constant evolution. Furthermore, the topic of
defense of space assets is relatively new to military researchers
and it is not surprising that documents and research on the
topic are fairly limited. Another limitation is the relatively
short time frame during which this research will be conducted
and synthesized.
The last limitation to the paper is the generally
overlooked nature of the topic. Most people do not have
the foresight to see the demand for continued space development
and protection. However, it is this lack of interest that
gives an independent scholar the ability to help shape the way
such developments evolve into military doctrine. Although
limited, the freedom to create is ever present and this research
may potentially make a modest contribution to our understanding
of current gaps in U.S. space defenses.
Definitions
For reasons of clarity, certain military acronyms are
clearly defined. Acronyms important to this paper include
Space Assets, ASAT, RAND, GPS, ICBM, Force Multiplier,
ABL, and GBL.
Space Assets: “The indispensable systems of force
enhancement available in the medium of space.” 4
ASAT: An anti-satellite weapon or technology system
used for interference or destruction of space assets.
RAND: The Research and Development Corporation,
a non-profit institution that conducts a large
amount of research on the military application of
space. Some of their past work has concentrated on
space warfare and ASATs.
GPS: The Global Positioning System of the U.S., a
44
network of twenty-four satellites in known orbits for
determining ground positions and navigational directions.
5
ICBM: An inter-continental ballistic missile capable
of long distance flight and attack between continents.
Force Multiplier: Any asset that enhances the ability
of another weapon to function. For example, a
Humvee giving security forces troops the ability to
move faster over more terrain instead of walking.
ABL and GBL: The Airborne Laser and Groundbased
Laser systems used for offensive action in order
to defend against specific forms of attack.
One major assumption informs the approach of this
study to the subject of space defense: other nations
have, or will acquire, the technology, concepts, and
will to attack United States assets in space. Such
technology already exists and potential adversaries are
not likely to forsake its use.
Preview of the Argument
To answer the research question, the value of current
space technology as a military force multiplier must be
examined and placed into a hierarchy of United States security
requirements. Therefore, technical government reports
on the strengths and values of space assets will be critical for
understanding what those assets truly provide to our nation
and our combat forces. To obtain this data, information
must be derived from technical military sources to include
current doctrine, and from officers in the space field who
are concerned with satellite technology. Drawing on their
training and experience in the field, subject matter experts
are expected to provide accurate information or objective
assessments. After assessing the value of this technology, the
research will consider the nature of U.S. dependence on space
assets, current threats to those assets, and current U.S. space
defenses already in place. It will then be determined whether
or not a gap exists between possible threats and available U.S.
space defense capabilities. This distinction provides the basis
for the development of concepts to overcome such vulnerabilities
in the space field. Proposals for improvements will then
be offered. This analysis will be the focus of the paper and
will reflect critical thinking to determine possible solutions
to the research question based on the evidence that has been
assembled. These solutions will be individually evaluated for
risks, benefits, and costs in order to rectify the current lack of
protection. Finally, a proposal or proposals will be offered for
increasing space defenses against the threat of possible attack.
LITERATURE REVIEW
Today space assets have reached unprecedented levels
of use in military operations. Their military value has drastically
increased since their introduction and now has become

an essential element in how the U.S. conducts modern battle.
The first major application of space systems in
armed conflict was the integration of satellites into war fighting
during Operation Desert Storm in 1991. According to
Curtis Peebles, Desert Storm was the first “space war” and its
conduct suggests how space assets will be employed in future
conflicts. 6 Such has been the case in all subsequent U.S. conflicts
to date including recent wars in Iraq and Afghanistan.
Daniel Goure argues that space power “came of age” in the
Gulf War where its military value began to be understood
and space doctrine developed. 7 For example, of all the bombs
dropped in Desert Storm, only 9 percent were precision satellite-guided
weapons, but they accounted for over 42 percent
of targets struck in the theatre. 8 The effect of such enhanced
weapons was critical for missions requiring accuracy and efficiency.
This is the basis for current U.S. battle tactics which
emphasize preserving civilian and military lives and limiting
collateral damage. Targeting based on satellite guidance is
also valuable as it meets many current U.S. Air Force guidelines
adopted to encourage the fighting of just war. These
include:
-Use of only what munitions are needed to adequately
destroy a target
-Reduce all numbers of sorties to the minimum
required to destroy the target without
repeat missions
-Destroy only what needs to be destroyed without
civilian and other unnecessary
casualties or destruction of public property
-Provide attack and support operations under any
conditions where visibility may be less
than adequate for conventional bombing 9
These guidelines on targeting are easily met by the use of
space technology.
In addition to targeting applications, space assets are
commonly employed for long-range communications and
detection of enemy forces. High-capacity worldwide secure
voice communications were readily available in the Gulf War
due to satellite technology connecting 128 tactical terminals. 10
This is critical to conducting secure, well-planned and coordinated
operations in enemy territory. In terms of surveillance,
satellites in the Gulf War could detect the smoke plume of a
SCUD missile thirty seconds after launch. 11 Although technology
was not available for missile intercept, the value of
early warning for units under attack is beyond measure. The
element of surprise from missile attack can be nearly eliminated
using space technology.
The final components of space assets of great value
to military operations are GPS and mapping capabilities.
45
In early airpower conflicts, such as WWI and WWII, aerial
photography was undertaken with a camera held out of the
side or mounted to the bottom of an airplane, generally while
flying over dangerous territory. Satellites can safely produce
images with resolution superior to that of a still camera used
in flight. To provide good coverage and map accuracy based
on photography, 80 percent overlap must exist and that can
be hard to attain at high rates of speed in the air, as many
frames must be taken to meet this requirement. 12 When
linked with GPS, maps with unprecedented and constantly
improving detail are created and active coordinate systems
implemented in order to provide accurate positioning locations
at any time. Lastly, directions of the utmost precision
can be provided for successful and smooth operations,
when getting to a target or checkpoint becomes an issue. In
summary, the value of space assets for military applications
in peace or war is unmatched by virtually any other force
enhancement system. Satellites and space systems give Air
Force weapons the edge to make them the most advanced and
capable in the world.
When considering the military value of space assets,
it is vital to understand the degree of current reliance on these
force enhancement systems. In Operation Enduring Freedom,
the on-going war in Afghanistan, satellites provide the
ability to conduct effective operations against a tough and
determined enemy many miles from our shores. According
to Daniel Goure, space assets give the U.S. Air Force the ability
to “strike at global ranges on short notice with devastating
intensity and accuracy.” 13 Our current capabilities would
be severely limited without satellites upon which many of
our weapon systems are dependent. Militarily, to assault an
enemy thousands of miles away, satellites are of the utmost
importance. They are the very cornerstone of U.S. Air Force
operations and reliance on them in the form of precision
bombardment, e-mail transmitted directly into cockpits of
strike aircraft, and delivery of precision weapons are commonplace
features of our modern force. 14 Space assets make these
capabilities possible.
The Air Force also relies on space assets in order to
provide better security for U.S. forces, especially those in
combat. For example, satellite communication linked with
the airborne Joint Surveillance and Target Attack Radar
System (J-STARS) detected a column of Iraqi units enroute
to engage allied forces in the Gulf War. 15 Benjamin Lambeth
describes how suddenly commanders responded with an air
assault that destroyed the Iraqi forces and prevented a major
attack on our forces in theatre. 16 The military reliance on
satellites to date is directly tied to troop support such as this.
Reorganization of conflict and protection of American soldiers’
lives is a critical value of any military asset. Col Mark

Wells agrees that the value of target-spotting by satellites is
high and led to attacks of unprecedented success against Iraqi
vehicles fleeing Kuwait. 17
The final level of military reliance on space assets
involves their value in providing security for the American
homeland. Peebles makes the point in describing the creation
of early space systems, including the ballistic missile early
warning system (BMEWS), in order to provide the timely
warning of USSR aircraft and missile attacks. 18 Although
only a limited deterrent factor and not capable of stopping
an onslaught, it provided a precious twenty minutes maximum
warning time before an inbound missile would strike
our soil. 19 Given the threat of a massive nuclear war using
inter-continental ballistic missiles (ICBMs), a new concept
was born during the Cold War: missiles and effective missile
defenses were to be developed. The increased build-up under
President Kennedy to fill the perceived “missile gap” against
the Soviets led to even more development of these immensely
destructive weapons which still exist around the world today. 20
Preston agrees that missile warning is critical and incorporates
it into an overarching concept for attaining U.S. space superiority.
21 It became the “Dawn of the Space Age” and missile
warning should be employed to its utmost extent where early
detection is paramount for the continued mission of defending
the United States against threats from adversarial nations.
In considering the value of satellites to military
forces, it is important not to overlook the multiple civilian
space systems currently aiding the military in capacities far in
excess of the military. It is a consumer world and the commercial
dimension of space today has led to the increased
appearance of civilian entrepreneurs in space. By using civilian
satellites instead of military satellites, the military satellites
will last longer, civilians have increased business, and the military
has more resources to use in their warfighting attempts.
So it is reasonable to assume that civilian satellites are equally
a vulnerability with harmful implications in the event of their
destruction. For example, when the Galaxy 4 communications
satellite failed on 20 May 1998, 80-90 percent of the
40-45 million pagers in use in the United States instantly lost
service. 22 This did not directly impact the U.S. military, but
could in other cases. Civilian space assets provide services
to include: imagery, communications, and weather information.
23 The most dominant military use, however, remains
communications. In Operations Iraqi Freedom (OIF) alone,
90 percent of all military communications were made through
civilian satellites. 24 This emphasis will always be in place and
the limited assets of civilians are clearly just as valuable and in
need of protection as military satellites.
It is now clear that satellites are both relied on and
valuable to the warfighter. However, who is allowed to attack
46
a satellite? According to Article III of the Outer Space Treaty,
activities in space shall be:
“conducted in accordance with international law,
including the Charter of the United Nations, in the interest of
maintaining international peace and security and promoting
international cooperation and understanding.” 25
This makes all laws ordained by the UN Charter applicable
in space. Article 2(4) of the UN Charter then forbids the use
of force against a nation, its people, and its resources. 26 With
that in mind, an attack against a satellite is an attack on that
nation and what it possesses and represents. So, by law, no
one should attack a satellite, but a possible enemy could lead
a massive space attack in the event of a war, making the provisions
of the treaty essentially useless. Due to the vulnerability
and value of space assets, it can be assumed that they can
and will be targeted in a variety of ways through a variety of
means.
There are many methods for attacking US satellites
either from space, land, air, or the sea. The aforementioned
value of these space tools and our growing reliance upon them
serve to make this a dangerous threat to our highly sophisticated
military forces. There are several ways that an attack
potentially could destroy or disable U.S. satellites in orbit. As
described by Preston, these include:
-Kinetic-energy weapons where mass is delivered to
target by a guided or unguided
projectile using velocity as its key destructive power.
-Directed-energy weapons utilizing the propagation
of destructive energy at very high
speeds.
-Conventional high-explosive munitions delivered by
missile, ICBM, or through other
means generally with advanced targeting capabilities.
-Nuclear strike where thermonuclear weapons are
detonated in space to knock out
potentially large numbers of satellites while avoiding
the damages that are caused by
nuclear detonation on Earth. 27
Kinetic-energy weapons are effective in many ways
and one of the most difficult weapons to effectively stop when
deployed at a target. For example, an F-15 based Altair-II
missile capable of orbit, could launch into space, establish a
heading to intercept the satellite, and deploy a hardened projectile
to make the interception. 28 The warhead needs only
a few small boosters to reach the target where the shear mass
of the moving object rips through the target and destroys
it without any form of explosives beyond fuel necessary to
make the journey. Key advantages of such weaponry are

that it avoids the heated issue of arming satellites and can
be deployed from anywhere in the United States. However,
satellites and ground stations also can both be armed with
this technology. The missile Nike-Zeus, for example, has
been used to intercept reentry vehicles falling out of orbit
from space on thirteen different occasions. 29 The payload was
small, effective, and hit a variety of targets in near Low-Earth
orbits. The on-board targeting technology was almost identical
to that used in the Gulf War to identify and help destroy
ground targets.
An emerging technology capable of attacking satellites
involves the employment of directed-energy weapons to
include laser, light, radio, and other forms of energy that can
interfere with mechanical operation. 30 The first satellites to
contain similar technology of x-ray and gamma-ray carried
equipment for enhanced photographic and detection capabilities.
31 Although not dangerous, this technology’s usefulness
and ease of operation paved the way to continued experimentation
with energy in space. Currently, ABL and GBL
systems can enhance energy into laser form powerful enough
to shoot down enemy missiles and possibly satellites if applied
in that manner. 32 The relatively vulnerable nature of satellites
possibly could make these attacks very effective. If a key
component of a satellite can be damaged or destroyed, even a
minor assault can render the entire system ineffective. Moreover,
simply the employment of radio frequencies or lesser
energy forms can effectively jam a space tool.
Now finally out of testing stages and into U.S. Air
Force operations is the “Counter Communications System”
(CCS). Brought online in late October 2004, the CCS uses
ground-based jamming based on electromagnetic radio frequency
energy to knock out satellite transmissions for a short
period of time in a reversible manner. 33 This technology
offers a way to achieve satellite damage without the pain of
destruction and impending war. A truly simple system based
on off-the-shelf products, even the poorest nations can afford
this technology and be a threat in regards to denying, or at
east interfering with, our space assets.
Finally, conventional and nuclear strike options exist
that can destroy satellites. Standard munitions, when linked
with a launch engine such as an ICBM, can disable a satellite
or destroy it. 34 These could be deployed in the same nature
that current missiles are launched, or in the fashion of kineticenergy
weapons launched from airborne platforms. It should
be noted here that the only weapons prohibited in space by
international law are nuclear weapons. 35 According to the
Limited Test Ban Treaty of 1963, there will be no nuclear
testing in space, underwater, or in the atmosphere. 36 The devastation
would be completely satisfactory for attacking a satellite,
but would involve a large amount of damage for a small
47
goal. Far less mayhem is truly needed and nuclear weapons
operate in a realm the general public undeniably rejects. 37
The electromagnetic pulse (EMP) alone from the detonation
could eliminate a satellite from effective operations, much
less the shockwave from the blast. 38 These weapons can be
deployed from air, space (in smaller size), land and the sea for
use by an ICBM to carry munitions to orbit. This is a good
method to undertake if a space tool needed total destruction,
but other methods exist that do not jeopardize one’s own satellites
in the instance that two space powers were fighting.
Currently, the U.S. military uses virtually no methods
to actively defend against ASAT attacks or any other form
of interference or sabotage of our crucial space assets beyond
the safety afforded by the nature of planetary orbit. 39 The
one primary example of a defensive satellite is the MILSTAR
communications constellation. In a geosynchronous orbit
(extremely high altitude), the MILSTAR system boasts virtually
unjammable UHF transmissions, a small jamming “footprint,”
and low nuclear scintillation (nuclear survivable). 40 In
the past, knowledge of space attack was something considered
unachievable, so few precautions were taken. In general, satellites
are unarmored, crafted for mission execution instead
of defense and armament, and deemed safe in their orbits. 41
This leaves a considerable gap in the defense structure of our
space assets when aligned with the numerous methods of
attack previously established. It must then become the goal of
the United States military to find methods available, or establish
new techniques to give our space assets the safety they
deserve for the services they render.
While few man-made defenses are in use, there are
several natural aspects of space that give satellites an increased
level of safety. In addition, certain pre-launch measures could
be made to increase the effectiveness and security of satellites.
First, satellites exist in a vast number of orbits, each
with significantly different characteristics, which include lowearth,
sun-synchronous, geostationary, geosynchronous, and
Molniya orbits. 42 These orbits vary in speed and altitude, so
weapons would have to be designed specifically to reach satellites
in each orbital region of space. This is a natural safety
feature of the space environment that has kept our assets safe
to this day and will keep them secure until these conditions
can be reasonably overcome.
There are numerous options for defensive systems
that will protect U.S. space assets from enemy attack. Technology
is so advanced to date that ideas simply need to be
worked out and put into reality. However, some critics think
that there is still no need for weaponization or defenses in
space. Maj Kirk J. Taylor, USA, thinks that “the right time
has not yet arrived” for the arming of space and contends
that space attack and that the belief in imminent attack is

unfounded. 43 Most authors, on the other hand, find the reality
of the U.S. coming under space attack a near-term danger
and one not to be taken lightly. Maj James L. Hyatt, III,
USAF, claims that many systems exist and should be used in
efforts of bolstering defenses.
These conceptualized space defense systems include
simple anti-jam features, increased maneuverability, or more
advanced armor systems that can deflect, block, or intercept
incoming attack. 44 The armor placed on a satellite
could potentially stop certain conventional munitions or be
deployed outward to disrupt kinetic-energy weapons on their
route to destruction while additional position thrusters allow
satellites to “dodge’ incoming threats. All of this can be done
while blocking incoming jamming signals that are attempting
to disorient and incapacitate the satellite. These systems
constitute moderately simple, yet practical means of defense.
However, money will always remain as the major limiting
factor. The average cost to put one pound of cargo into space
is $2,000. 45 This is so even in the heaviest lifting vehicles
available such as the Titan IV-B (only one remaining) which
possesses the ability to ferry 47,800 pounds of cargo to lowearth
orbit. 46 This limitation will always create difficulties in
implementation. In addition, certain technologies, such as
advanced armor, may be ruled out completely when costs and
benefits are analyzed.
Other possible systems counter low-level EMP disruption
by means of electrical fail-safes that can maintain the
satellite’s basic functions in the event of a nuclear blast occurring
outside of destructive distance. 47 Finally, laser or other
interception weapons could be mounted on a limited scale on
satellites to deflect or destroy oncoming munitions. These
solutions are simple enough to be implemented in the near
future in order to effectively protect against current weaponry
intended to knock our satellites out of the sky.
In summary, satellites are crucial tools for the United
States military and give us the capabilities to conduct warfare
in a manner unlike any other nation. In addition, our level
of reliance on space-based systems has increased exponentially
over the years while the ability to destroy those systems
has also become more feasible. The methods of attack that
could harm a satellite must be examined, linked with available
defense systems, and a method created to protect what is so
important to the United States and its war fighting capabilities.
In this way, the gap between vulnerability and effective
defense can be bridged and our space assets made more
secure.
THESIS BODY
There is a well-established gap in U.S. satellite
defenses that leave our nation highly vulnerable in the event
of a planned space attack. Space assets are a clear strategic
48
tool for the military, an economic tool for the civilian sector,
and platform for scientific research and the betterment of
mankind. If the United States lost any or all of these critical
assets, a clear disadvantage would be established that other
nations could take advantage of, primarily in the fighting of
wars.
Space attack is a reality. Since even before the Soviet
launch of Sputnik over 47 years ago in October of 1957, the
two great super powers of the time, the United States and
Soviet Union, were devising methods to employ space for
attack against its enemy and limit their space power. 48 Even
now, this process continues though it hides under many guises
as the world tends to shy away from ripping space away as
a sanctuary for all to enjoy. Satellites are being considered
for many strategic missions of which ballistic missile defense
(BMD) has taken a forefront position, and for good reason.
A weapon in space capable of destroying an inbound missile
is an appealing concept and one strongly advocated by President
Bush, though the U.S. has been primarily concerned
with terrestrially-launched intercept vehicles. A way ASAT
development hides itself is through BMD development where
armed satellites are being conceived to knock out missiles,
while having secondary capabilities of space attack. In fact, it
is then reasonable to say that BMD development could possibly
fuel more ASAT development in a spiral to battlefield
employment. 49
As development continues into the future, it is
important not to forget what exists in space today and has
and still poses a threat to satellites in orbit. As early as 1947,
the U.S. started its first ASAT program designated Bold
Orion which tested the launch of ASAT missiles from B-47
aircraft. 50 Though unsuccessful in eliminating a satellite, this
led to other programs including Project Mudflap from 1963-
1966, Program 437 in 1976, Program 706 designated SAINT
from 1962 on, and other secret programs (satellite interceptor).
51 Of these, the first successful launch was conducted by
Project Mudflap, otherwise known as Program 505. In 1963
under the Kennedy Administration, a variant of the Army
Nike Zeus system, developed as early as SAINT, destroyed
a low-earth satellite target. 52 The U.S. clearly possesses the
most basic capabilities of removing a satellite (at least in a
low-earth orbit) and although these programs were cancelled
in succession, it can be intuitively derived that progress in the
field has never truly ceased completely.
In regard to the Soviet Union, rigorous testing of
ASAT weapons began in 1968 after the concept began being
explored as early as 1963. Though little data is available even
today, it was known that targets launched from Tyuratam
launch station and interceptors from Plsestsk resulted in a
success rate somewhere between 45% and 65% in attacking

satellites as high as 1,000 km exceeding even U.S. capabilities.
53 The launch vehicle was a SL-11 liquid-fueled booster
which deployed an interceptor that then used a co-planar
(same orbital plane) orbit to get close enough to a satellite
to deploy an explosive charge sending shrapnel at the target
satellite. 54 These tests were conducted thoroughly up to
1982, far longer than any documented U.S. ASAT technology
development program. The last of which is documented
as Program 437 which underwent development from 1963-
1975, attempting to develop a nuclear anti-satellite weapon
based on “spare parts.” 55 When considering the possible range
of these interceptors, the only satellite within striking range
is one traveling in the low-earth orbit (LEO) range. These
satellites operate at approximately 400 km though some operate
as high as 1,500 km. However, these would be the only
satellites remotely possible to intercept. A semi-synchronous
orbit, otherwise known as a middle-earth orbit (MEO), operates
at 20,000 km while geosynchronous orbits (GEO) are
positioned 35,900 km from the Earth’s surface. 56 With this
in mind, it is quite unreasonable to assert that all satellites
are in danger. Technology has come a long way since these
programs of the past, but the cost and difficulties involved in
launching to a deep space orbit is not readily wasted on such
ventures. Rockets capable of placing a satellite into a GEO
orbit are extremely limited in themselves and would most
likely be required to accomplish this type of intercept.
As space budgets around the world are stretched thinner
and thinner, the concept that “wasting” launch vehicles
for intercepting satellites has taken hold. In addition, applying
what was previously mentioned, several unique systems,
each capable of reaching different orbital parameters, would
be required to mass a complete space attack. Hundreds of
satellites circle the earth day in and day out. To successfully
eliminate a fair portion of these satellites (one nation’s), these
unique systems would also have to be heavily armed with
what has come to an extremely limited technology. The concept
of a massive space attack is unfounded and not possible
in this day and age. However, the threat still remains against
a single satellite serving a critical mission.
Those satellites existing in LEO space are most often
noted for their applications in remote sensing and communications.
57 Using their low-altitude, they can produce the best
visual imagery and relay information in the shortest period
of time. As space entrepreneurship has developed around the
world, more and more civilian industries also find this the
most suitable realm for business. Launches decrease in price,
drastically making the mission affordable and in conjunction
with their financial goals and limitations. These victims in
the instance of attack have no defense capabilities. In addition,
the military relies heavily on these systems to enhance
49
their own and limit demands on satellites tasked specifically
for military missions. 58 So the ultimate target within reason
of a potential adversary is the lone satellite in a LEO orbit.
This would be done in hope of reducing military strength
while creating a devastating blow to the U.S. government.
Since the Soviet Union posed the only feasible threat
before becoming a “friend” to the United States, there are
rarely any space adversaries available today. However, the
looming threat continues to exist in which a rogue nation
or terrorist organization acquires dangerous technology for a
deployment escaping the bounds of deterrence. According
to Thomas Schelling, deterrence is the bargaining power that
comes from the physical harm a nation can do to another
nation reflected in threats and assured retaliation. 59 Another
definition reads, “deterrence is the ability to dissuade or discourage
an opponent from taking certain actions based on the
opponent’s fear of the costs or consequences.” 60 This method
of diplomacy (bargaining for a political goal) is effective when
applied face to face such as the U.S. – Soviet standoff that
ensued during the Cold War. When applied to space, attack
has been limited over the years because the opposing nations
so feared retribution in the event of an unprecedented assault
that they never utilized their technology. The ultimate fear
of a deterrent nation is the lone militant commander without
regard for others and no tools susceptible to retaliation in
kind. 61 To better explain this, a rogue nation without satellite
technology has no reason not to attack U.S. space assets.
They have nothing to lose in return and they know the magnitude
of the effects of their actions. Though a simplification
of world affairs, this risk is simply the only one that reasonably
falls into the context of the potential adversary yet to
be faced in the space realm. In the words of the Honorable
Richard E. Horner, Assistant Secretary of the Air Force, “we
are all too susceptible to oversimplification.” 62 Thinking outside
the box at potential threats is the most important phase
for taking a protective and well-oriented stance.
Though terrorists and small, destructive groups desire
this technology, acquisition is a completely different story.
The technology involved is expensive, limited, and something
that can be considered a national strategic asset. This is noted
in terms of U.S. policy in which space is known for providing
a safe haven for military systems that contribute to strategic
stability. 63 As such technology is strategic, the defense of
these assets and exploitation of an enemy’s asset is a strategic
goal as well. Therefore, satellite intercept technology is not
something that can be sold, exported, or employed by a new
user easily. It is considered crucial for the efforts of negating
military benefits while further establishing personal safety. 64
In these terms, the reference is being drawn to an intercept
weapon which not only requires the launch vehicles, but a

launch site capable of handling a space launch. Only a few
sites even exist capable of such action. For example, all USSR
tests were conducted out of specifically Tyuratam launch facility
though Plesetsk was certainly capable as well. 65 If a rogue
nation were to even acquire such technology, they would have
few options for deployment. In addition, when most technology
finds itself reaching secondary consumers, it is outdated.
These old systems are effective, but not in comparison to
what have been developed in the years following. On top of
all of these barriers, it is also difficult to use these systems.
The technology is something easily appreciated, but hardly
feasible for employment by low-tech forces utilizing terrorist
tactics to exploit their limited forces.
What can be drawn from this analysis is that acquiring
and effectively using ASAT technology that falls into the
categories of kinetic-energy, conventional, or nuclear is nearly
impossible for a nation attempting to quickly enter into space
combat. First, kinetic energy specifically fails as it tends to be
the most expensive and demanding technology. For this to
work, you need either a homing missile or projectile, both of
which require advanced technology and an adequate launch
site. 66 They also demand the most complex targeting systems
as not only do they have to find a satellite, but actually
shoot it down as opposed to simply creating a large explosion.
Therefore, conventional weapons are just as complicated, but
typically lack a small deal of targeting finesse. The U.S. has
spent most of its time in this realm, although research has
been conducted in many fronts. Finally, nuclear weapons detonated
in space have typically been abandoned as it is against
international agreements, promotes nuclear retaliation, and
may cause harm to or interfere with nearby friendly space
assets. 67 The law is unavoidable as it has been established
that nuclear testing will not occur in the atmosphere under
the aforementioned provisions of the 1963 Limited Test
Ban Treaty. 68 Not only do scientists not readily know what
will happen if a nuclear weapon is detonated outside of our
atmosphere, it is generally considered a taboo practice to test
nuclear weapons in modern times knowing the consequences
that can await those who engage in such actions for a hostile
purpose. Deterrence and the latent retributional violence it
entails is still a driving policy force in the world today and its
implications can even be identified on the most irrational terrorist
levels. 69
The remaining ASAT category and the only with
viable enemy options, is the realm of directed-energy weapons.
These can range from high-energy lasers (HEL) to
light interference, or jamming systems specifically designed
to interfere with radio signals. 70 The concept is said to have
been initially developed by the Soviets with their Radio Electronic
Combat (REC) system. The capabilities were intended
50
to include saturating satellite transponder and ground station
receivers to block out normal communications receiver functions.
71 In regard to lasers, no nation is yet known to actually
possess a ground-based laser capable of delivering a strong
enough and tightly focused beam capable of either disrupting
or destroying a satellite. Also, these lasers require absolutely
immense amounts of power on top of lengthy “reload” times
as only a few “shots” may be potentially fired while a satellite
is in view. It is important to remember that this technology
is currently being developed as it coincides with U.S. nuclear
ballistic missile defense goals. 72 Development of a laser capable
of stopping a missile en route to its target will undoubtedly
be capable of destroying a low-earth orbiting space asset
with minor alterations. Since this technology is not even fully
available to U.S. users, it will then also be ruled out as a possibility
for use by terrorist organizations or other groups identified
as the primary threats in the development and employment
of weapons against strategic U.S. space assets.
What remains may not even be considered weapons
at all, but rather a unique design capable of limiting satellite
use if not rendering it useless altogether. 73 What is implied
here is that the use of jamming technology in the form of
radio waves or other wave frequencies can easily degrade satellite
communications making it incapable of reaching and
transmitting data to enemy ground users. Every satellite has
some link to the ground. To use gathered information, satellites
must transmit vast amounts of data to earth through
either direct transmission or transmission via other satellites
to reach specific stations on the surface. 74 The benefits of
this system then are that it can be used from anywhere on the
earth within the satellite’s footprint, anonymously, and with
little fear of immediate tracking. Jamming is intended to
degrade signals and it does it so well that locating a jamming
system is typically very difficult. The next benefit is that it is
an inexpensive means of accomplishing a strategic goal. The
earliest attempts at using this method occurred during the
second Gulf War. Iraqi troops used portable GPS jamming
kits in an effort to block GPS signals making it nearly impossible
to use joint direct attack munitions (JDAMs) based on
targeting through GPS guidance systems. 75 The result was
a failure for the Iraqi soldiers as GPS munitions inevitably
destroyed the jamming equipment, but set the stage for
future development. Another example of this type of weapon
employment recently occurred involving the effective jamming
of a U.S. communications satellite broadcasting TV
programs in Iran. 76 The results were a loss in satellite communication
with ground stations, resulting in signal transmission
failure, and ultimately complete mission degradation.
What makes this situation difficult is that the source took
many engineers a good deal of time to assume that Cuba was

to blame. Tracking the signal is difficult when the possibilities
of location range from parts of eastern North and Latin
America to Cuba. 77
So why then is jamming so appealing? There are
several reasons for this shift in ideologies. First and foremost,
it is affordable. Jamming technology is nothing more than
off-the-shelf parts. This in turn lowers costs and greatly opens
the possibilities for enemy acquisition. Next, it debilitates
capabilities while avoiding outright destruction. Although a
shaky issue that can be viewed in two distinct ways, the results
prove far friendlier than other options. The initial view is
that interference is attack. By ridding capability you are
attacking the underlying structure, integrity, and mission of a
satellite. Even the most minor interference deprives military
action which can be viewed as a threat. On the other hand,
no physical damage is done. This second argument tends
to hold the most influence and is shaping U.S. policy as the
technology propagates and continues to develop. Jamming
is both “benign” and “passive” while it can turn on and off in
the blink of an eye and leaves no trace behind. 78 Therefore, it
is not an attack, but rather a safe posture and position without
any aggression or decisive interference on the part of the
enemy.
When considering this development, it is easy to
use Sputnik as an example of how technologies develop and
U.S. policy is directed in that regard. Some elements of the
United States government favored allowing the Soviet Union
to launch the first satellite as it created a precedent of safe
and allowable over flight of the opposing nation from space. 79
Since the United States did not oppose nor deny the ability of
the Soviets to survey their land from space, the international
policy was established that information collection from over
flight is both legal and an addition to common international
law. As small nations have begun to use these simple methods
to acquire jamming systems, the United States has not openly
complained about the concept, except publicly that this
action has political consequences, since U.S. broadcasting to
Iran is an important diplomatic objective. 80 But why establish
such a precedent when at a disadvantage? By allowing its use,
you may then pursue this technology and better it for yourself
instead of creating international policy against its use. Since
these incidents, the United States has introduced its Counter
Communications System (CCS). The 76 th Space Control
Squadron recently unveiled the system which boasts the ability
to deny the communications abilities of multiple satellites
simultaneously, making them useless to their benefactor. 81
What this development ultimately points to is the
direction of space attack in the years to come. Due to the
complex nature of ballistic or guided ASAT weapons, the few
rogue enemies in the world today do not have the faculties or
51
capabilities to attain or successfully use such a tool. In addition,
the United States is more interested in ballistic missile
defense than satellite attack, based primarily on the fear that
retaliation will cause great harm. Since the priorities have
shifted, the less expensive and equally effective jamming technology
will hit the forefront in development. A precedent
has been set and the world will follow the lead as it has been
established as a unique possibility in warfare.
From a legal perspective, this is a truly innovative
and clever method to evade certain policies that are in place
that help establish space as a sanctuary. Attack is defined in
many ways, but one potent definition is “the onset of a corrosive
destructive process.” 82 This specifies the non-repairable
nature of an attack. Since it is not an attack nor causes any
irreversible damage, sanctuary is preserved. In addition, to
retaliate, there is typically the need for a premeditated and
malicious attempt to deny certain military, political, or diplomatic
capabilities. 83 Therefore, there is no pressing fear of
retaliation in regard to jamming a satellite. It may not necessarily
be a wise political move to jam a signal of a supposed
“ally,” but it does not qualify as an attack.
This analysis then must reiterate how critical it is
to protect against ASAT threats and retain space dominance
against potential enemies. As the background suggests, vulnerabilities
exist and few satellites were designed with jamming
avoidance in mind as an active defense system. Antijamming
systems need to be supplemented in order to deter
enemy interference and prepare for an unstable world where
U.S. space assets remain critical military tools and valuable
civilian assets. Bolstering defenses is thus the first step with
an inevitable goal of veritable safety from influence. But what
challenges await in defending against systems designed “to
load enemy receivers with strong signals?” 84 How can satellites
circumvent this influence and retain usable communications
with ground stations?
By establishing international policy allowing for the
unannounced jamming of satellites in orbit, it has clearly been
established that this activity will occur again. To accomplish
the mission of defense, several courses can be pursued, all of
which can be implemented in the mediums of the air, land,
sea, or space. By increasing the frequency of a transmission,
the footprint is lowered and jamming capability reduced. 85
The resultant effect of such technology is secure transmission
capability and increased awareness of a jamming location as
it is identified within the footprint. The Defense Satellite
Communications System (DSCS) utilizes ten satellites each
possessing the capability to transmit over six super high frequency
transponder channels. 86 The system is secure, and
rightly so, as it is designed to send crucial information to
military commanders during conflict. This technology placed

directly on the satellite is an ideal system as it is virtually
untouchable, especially if ground resources to protect the satellites
are removed through hostile action. The most important
consideration for bringing this tool to the fight is again
cost, primarily for the civilian sector of space. Space launch
carries so large a price; extra funds to increase protection are
typically overlooked. The mantra is simply to use what works
as opposed to what is the most resistant. This unfortunately
leaves virtually all companies beyond the United States government
unable to afford such a venture. Though this may
be a long-term goal, the more likely solution rests in groundbased
technology.
When considering these upgrade options, it is possible
to consider placing them on satellites currently in orbit,
thus taking special care to protect the most essential satellites
in the growing U.S. network. However, cost is still the driving
factor. The proposed Hubble telescope repairs, brought
to the attention of NASA nearly 2 months ago, were estimated
to be nearly $2 billion. 87 This large sum was required
to repair merely one fourteen-year old satellite that has previously
needed attention to maintain its functioning capabilities.
Satellite repair is not easy, nor is it the safest action, as
it requires a manned crew which places astronauts in danger.
This assertion has been proven in the past as the Columbia
shuttle was lost on 1 February 2003, creating a certain level
of fear in what was once considered routine space operations.
88 With ever limited space budgets, there is no current
feasible way to ever be capable of affording missions to repair
every crucial satellite. Though all may not be considered
important, over 700 U.S. satellites alone orbit the earth. Too
many exist, the danger is increasingly high, and the cost is
phenomenal. In addition, manned repair crews must travel
to space in the shuttle, which is only capable of operating in
the low-earth space environment. Any satellites currently in
higher orbits are, therefore, considered unreachable for repair
and augmentation unless completed by theoretical robotic
“astronauts.” Therefore, missions that fall in the category of
launching to augment satellites in orbit are not a possibility
for future protection of U.S. space assets. 89
A British company known as QinetiQ, Europe’s largest
science and technology organization, boasts the ability to
detect satellite signal interference to within ten kilometers in a
matter of seconds. 90 By using two intercept stations, it tracks
the target satellite and an adjacent orbital element to locate
the “beam” and utilize position and velocity analysis to locate
the source of transmission. 91 Not only is this easy, but the
system is itself ready for purchase and implementation. This
alternative is a financial blessing when compared to the other
aforementioned methods. A single set of stations could track
multiple jamming frequencies simultaneously providing safety
52
of transmissions. If this technology can be implemented, it
is the start needed in the process of space protection against
U.S. enemies of today and tomorrow.
The recommendations, then, that best suit meeting
the mission of closing the gap between possible satellite interference
and available defenses is a three-fold process. First,
to ensure security and a limitation of jamming incidents,
ground-based systems must be made operational as soon as
possible. Systems such as QinetiQ can bolster awareness and
prevent lengthy problems such as those encountered in operations
already undertaken such as the jamming conducted
by Cuba. Several redundant systems will provide adequate
security to a large area and provide coordinates of jamming
sites, enabling targeting and destruction of the threat. Next,
new satellites with missions of the utmost security (specifically
communications) shall, to the highest degree available,
be fitted with jam resistant transmitters as they are launched
in the future. This is a long-term enabler, and although more
expensive, will give added protection and satellite independence
of operation that the U.S. desires in completing the
missions it sees fit and retaining the value of its strategic assets
in space. Finally, satellites armed with jamming detection
technology should be launched in order to facilitate the detection
of threats. Space has been identified as a realm capable
of very precise analysis, mapping, and oversight of the earth.
Therefore, pinpointing something from space based on satellite
triangulation, such as that already done by GPS satellites,
is inherently more accurate than a land-based system. This
would add the final ability of receiving increasingly accurate
threat location information for its removal or destruction.
CONCLUSION
The growing reliance of the Unites States and other
nations on their strategic satellite systems has identified
these assets as critical for military operations, bolstering the
economy, and providing deterrent measures. Space attack
has been developed for years in the form of kinetic-energy,
directed-energy, conventional munitions, and nuclear munitions
that have ASAT application. Destroying a satellite is a
major blow to the morale and national strength of another
country. This then must be protected against in the instance
that a nation comes into possession of technology capable of
delivering such a blow. However, due to the complex nature
of the space environment, limited finances for ASAT development,
and difficulty in acquisition for terrorist or other rogue
groups, most forms of attack are negligible as a threat.
What remains is the previously tested and implemented
technique of satellite signal jamming. Since all
satellites must communicate their message to be effective,
jamming offers an inexpensive, non-destructive means to
eliminate satellite effectiveness while not taking a war stance

or violating international agreements. This is the method
of choice and the primary threat to be defended against and
prepared for in years to come. Due to the costs of space
launch, the most reasonable and effective method for space
defense involves three phases. The first introduces several
ground-based jamming systems to locate threats in order for
conventional forces to eliminate them or allow politicians to
pressure the adversary to stop, given the knowledge of the
jamming and its location parameters. Next, deploying more
satellites with increased onboard jamming protection will
create the independence in space needed to operate without
fear. Finally, to fully ensure future protection against jamming
technology, space-based jamming-signal locators should
be employed to accurately locate the threat.
Space has proven time and again to be the best means
of locating, mapping, and targeting what is encountered
on the surface of the earth. From this, we develop strategy.
Though many years away, this goal would be adequate to
close the gap currently present between vulnerabilities and
defenses. Space is a strategic realm and extremely important
in supporting military operations which have grown increasingly
reliant on these systems. Space assets are one of the
greatest military enablers ever devised, but if exploited by the
enemy, our “Achilles Heel” in national defense. The damage
would be devastating. Therefore, protective action can and
will be pursued in the years to come in order to retain the
superiority of United States strategic space assets.
Although these solutions pose a sound method for
solving the problem at hand, additional research should be
pursued to ensure the best execution. The research should be
directed at determining which of the proposed solutions best
meets mission requirements in light of costs and other limiting
factors. In addition, each method must be fully examined
in terms of its practicality and applicability to civilian space
assets. What remains is fully verifying the usefulness of the
defense techniques now that the threat and solutions have
been laid out. The pursuit of space dominance begins here
and additional research must be pursued to ensure taking the
best course of action possible.
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Lambeth, Benjamin S. “The Synergy of Air and Space.” Airpower
Journal12 (Summer 1998):
4-14.
___________________. “Air Power, Space Power, and
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___________________. The Transformation of American
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Weaponization Debate.”
Astropolitics 1 (Summer 2003): 4-28.
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in Space: Anit-Satellite Weapons
and the Evolving Space Regime. Lanham, MD: University
Press of America, 1987.
Pace, Scott. Assessing Options for Anti-Satellite Arms Control:
The Analytical Hierarchy
Process. Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation,
1986.
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Military Space Program.
Washington, D.C.: Air Force History and Museums
Program, 1997.
Preston, Bob et. al. Space Weapons: Earth Wars. Santa
Monica, CA: RAND, 2002.
“QinetiQ Counters Satellite Jamming,” Space Newsfeed 4
54
March 2004 [on-line]; available from
http://www.newsfeed.co.uk/2004/7March2004_
23.html; Internet, accessed 176 March
2005.
Reynolds, Glenn H. and Robert P. Merges. Outer Space:
Problems of Law and Policy. Boulder,
CO: Westview Press, 1997.
Schelling, Thomas C. Arms and Influence. New York, NY:
University Press, 1996.
Stares, Paul B. Space and National Security. Washington,
D.C.: The Brookings Institute, 1987.
Sterner, C. Douglas. 2003. Cast a Giant Shadow [on-line].
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walker.html; Internet; accessed 19
November 2003.
Stever, Guyford H. and Heinz R. Pagels, ed. The High Technologies
and Reducing the Risk of
War. New York, NY: The New York Academy of Sciences,
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Straubel, James H., et. al. Space Weapons: A Handbook of
Military Astronautics. New York,
NY: Praeger Publishers, 1959.
Taylor, Kirk J., Maj, USA. Arming the Skies: The Right Time
has not Arrived. Kansas: School
of Advanced Military Studies, 2000.
Tirpak, John A. “Securing the Space Arena” [on-line]. Air
Force Magazine Online. Internet;
available from http://www.afa.org/magazine/
July2004/0704space.asp; Internet, accessed
17 March 2005.
U.S. Air Force Academy Department of Economics and
Geography. Geospatial Data Systems.
Colorado Springs, CO: John Wiley and Sons, Inc,
2003.
VanHook, Richard, Maj, USAF. “Satellite Communications.”
Class Presentation to MSS 485
Class on 12 October 2004. USAFA: Vandenberg
Hall, CO.
Wells, Mark K., Col, USAF, ed. Airpower: Promise and Reality.
Chicago, IL: Imprint
Publications, 2000.
Wrachford, Jason S., Capt, USAF. “Space Law.” Class Presentations
to PS 465 Class from 30
September to 10 November 2004.
(Endnotes)
1 Peter L. Hays, ed., et. al., Spacepower for a New
Millennium: Space and U.S. National Security (New York,
NY: McGraw-Hill, 2000), 3.

2 Clayton K. S. Chun, Shooting Down a “Star”:
Program 437, the U.S Nuclear ASAT System and Present-Day
Copycat Killers (Alabama: Air University Press, 2000), 8.
3 C. Douglas Sterner, Cast a Giant Shadow (Home of
Heroes) [on-line]; available from http://www.homeofheroes.
com/wings/part2/03_walker.html; accessed 19 November
2003.
4 Benjamin S. Lambeth, “Air Power, Space Power,
and Geography,” The Journal of Strategic Studies 22 (June/
September 1999): 74.
5 U.S. Air Force Academy Department of Economic
and Geography, Geospatial Data Systems (Denver, CO: John
Wiley and Sons, 2003), 33.
6 Curtis Peebles, High Frontier: The U.S. Air Force
and the Military Space Program (Washington, D.C.: Air
Force History and Museums Program, 1997), 73.
7 Daniel Goure and Christopher M. Szara, Air and
Space Power in the New Millennium (Washington D.C.: The
Center for Strategic and International Studies, 1997), 8.
8 Ibid.
9 Clayton K. S. Chun, Aerospace Power in the
Twenty-First Century: A Basic Primer (Maxwell AFB, AL: Air
University Press, 2001), 144.
10 Benjamin S. Lambeth, The Transformation of
American Air Power (New York: Cornell University Press,
2000), 236.
11 Benjamin S. Lambeth, “The Synergy of Air and
Space,” Airpower Journal 12 (Summer 1998): 7.
12 Mark K. Wells, USAF, ed. Air Power: Promise and
Reality (Chicago: Imprint Publications, 2000), 232.
13 Goure, Air and Space Power, 106.
14 Lambeth, The Synergy of Air and Space, 8-9.
15 Benjamin S. Lambeth, “Air Power, Space Power,
and Geography,” 68.
16 Ibid.
17 Wells, Airpower: Promises and Reality, 301.
18 Peebles, High Frontier, 34.
19 Ibid.
20 Clayton K. S. Chun, Shooting Down a “Star”, 8.
21 Bob Preston, ed., Space Weapons: Earth Wars
(California: RAND Publishers, 2002), 9.
22 Corporation for Atmospheric Research, “U.S.
Pagers Silenced” [on-line], Window to the Universe; available
from http://www.windows.ucar.edu/tour/link=/headline_
universe_e_pagers.html; Internet, accessed 15 Sep 2004.
23 Stephen Lambakis, On the Edge of Earth
(Kentucky: University Press of Kentucky, 2001), 20-23.
24 Maj Burmister, USA, “Space Policy” (Class
Presentation to PS 465 Class on 21 October 2004).
25 Nathan C. Goldman, American Space Law:
55
International and Domestic (Iowa: Iowa State University
Press, 1988), 71.
26 Capt Jason S. Wrachford, USAF, “Space Law”
(Class Presentations to PS 465 Class from 30 September to 10
November 2004).
27 Ibid., 24, 36, 45.
28 Peebles, High Frontier, 65.
29 Chun, Shooting Down a “Star”, 8.
30 Karl P. Mueller, “Totem and Taboo: Depolarizing
the Space Weaponization Debate,” Astropolitics1 (Summer
2003): 5.
31 Peebles, High Frontier, 79.
32 Preston, Space Weapons: Earth Wars, 25.
33 CNN, “U.S. Deploys Satellite Jamming System”
(Washington, D.C.; 1 November 2004), 1.
34 Mueller, “Totem and Taboo,” 7.
35 Ibid.
36 Glenn H. Reynolds and Robert P. Merges, Outer
Space: Problems of Law and Policy (Boulder, CO: Westview
Press, 1997), 52.
37 Goure, Air and Space Power, 107.
38 Chun, Shooting Down a “Starr”, 4.
39 Ibid., 35.
40 Maj Richard VanHook, USAF, “Satellite
Communications” (Class Presentation to MSS 485 Class on
12 October 2004).
41 Ibid., 36.
42 Ibid., 35.
43 Maj Kirk J. Taylor, USA, Arming the Skies: The
Right Time has not yet Arrived (Ft. Leavenworth, KS: School
of Advanced Military Studies, 2000), 1.
44 Maj James L. Hyatt, III, USAF, Space Power 2010
(Maxwell AFB, AL: Air University Press, 1995), 5.
45 Maj Richard VanHook, USAF, “Satellite
Communications.”
46 Ibid.
47 Chun, Shooting Down a “Star”, 35.
48 Frank G. Koltz, Space, Commerce, and National
Security (New York, NY: Council on Foreign Relations Press,
1998), 1.
49 John H. Gibbons, Anti-Satellite Weapons,
Countermeasures, and Arms Control (Washington D.C.:
Office of Technology Development, 1985), 22.
50 Bhuphendra Jasani, Space Weapons – The Arms
Control Dilemma (Philadelphia, PA: Taylor and Francis,
1984), 11.
51 Ibid, 12-13.
52 Joan Johnson-Freese, The Viability of U.S. Anti-
Satellite (ASAT) Policy: Moving Towards Space Control
(USAFA, CO: USAF Institute for National Security Studies,

2000), 5.
53 Jasani, Space Weapons, 14.
54 Paul B. Stares, Space and National Security
(Washington D.C.: The Brookings Institute, 1987), 85.
55 Clayton K. S. Chun, Shooting Down a “Star”,
xiii.
56 David Darling, “Orbits” [on-line]. The
Encyclopedia of Astrobiology, Astronomy, and Spaceflight;
Internet; available from http://www.daviddarling.info/
encyclopedia/O/orbit.html; Internet, accessed 16 March
2005.
57 Maj Richard VanHook, USAF, “Satellite
Communications.”
58 Maj Burmister, USA, “Space Policy.”
59 Thomas C. Schelling, Arms and Influence (New
York, NY: Yale University Press, 1966), 5.
60 Scott Pace, Assessing options for Anti-Satellite
Arms Control: The Analytical Hierarchy Process (Santa
Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, 1986), 5.
61 Ibid., 95.
62 James H Straubel, et. al. Space Weapons: A
Handbook of Military Astronautics (New York, NY:
Praeger Publishers, 1959, 11.
63 Joseph S. Nye, Jr. and James A. Schear, Seeking
Stability in Space: Anti-Satellite Weapons and the Evolving
Space Regime (Lanham, MD: University Press of America,
1987), 5.
64 H. Guyford Stever and Heinz R. Pagels, The
High Technologies and Reducing the Risk of War (New
York, NY: The New York Academy of Sciences, 1986), 49.
65 Jasani, Space Weapons, 14.
66 H. Guyford Stever and Heinz R. Pagels, The
High Technologies, 23.
67 Ibid.
68 Glenn H. Reynolds and Robert P. Merges,
Outer Space, 52.
69 Thomas C. Schelling, Arms and Influence, 5.
70 CMD Joe A. Baker, USN, A U.S. ASAT: Do
We Need It? (Maxwell AFB, AL: Air War College, 1989),
17-18.
71 Ibid., 18-19.
72 Johnson-Freese, Joan, The Viability of U.S.
Anti-Satellite (ASAT) Policy, 9.
73 CMD Joe A. Baker, USN, A U.S. ASAT: Do
We Need It?, 18.
74 Maj Richard VanHook, USAF, “Satellite
Communications.”
75 John A. Tirpak, “Securing the Space Arena”
[on-line], Air Force Magazine Online Internet; available
from http://www.afa.org/magazine/July2004/0704space.
56
asp, accessed 17 March 2005.
76 “Cuba Identified as Likely Jamming Source of U.S.
Satellite Programming to Iran” [on-line], Primedia; Internet;
available from http://broadcastengineering.com/news/
broadcasting_cuba_identified_likely/, accessed 17 March
2005.
77 Ibid.
78 Joseph S. Nye, Jr. and James A. Schear, Seeking
Stability in Space, 6.
79 Glenn H. Reynolds and Robert P. Merges, Outer
Space, 8.
80 “Cuba Identified as Likely Jamming Source of U.S.
Satellite Programming to Iran” [on-line], Primedia.
81 John A. Tirpak, “Securing the Space Arena” [online],
Air Force Magazine Online.
82 “Attack” [on-line], Google Dictionary, Internet;
available from http://www.google.com/search? hl=en&lr=&
oi=defmore&q=define:attack; Internet, accessed 17 March
2005.
83 Thomas C. Schelling, Arms and Influence, 22.
84 John H. Gibbons, Anti-Satellite Weapons,
Countermeasures, and Arms Control, 9.
85 Maj Richard VanHook, USAF, “Satellite
Communications.”
86 “Defense Satellite Communications System Phase
III,” USAF Fact Sheet February 2000 [on-line]; available
from http://www.losangeles.af.mil/SMC/PA/Fact_Sheets/
dscs_fs.htm; Internet, accessed 17 March 2005.
87 “Congress Balks at Hubble Repairs,” Associated
Press; 2 February 2005 [on-line]; available from http://www.
wired.com /news/space/0,2697,66486,00.html; Internet,
accessed 17 March 2005.
88 Ibid.
89 Maj Richard VanHook, USAF, “Satellite
Communications.”
90 “QinetiQ Counters Satellite Jamming,,” Space
Newsfeed 4 March 2004 [on-line]; available from http://
www.spacenewsfeed.co.uk/2004/7March2004_23.html;
Internet, accessed 17 March 2005.
91 Ibid.

NO COERCION HERE:
THE SOVIET MILITARY EXPEDITION IN
AFHGANISTAN, 1979-1989
By:
C3C Roland W. Olmstead
Introduction
The Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan in 1989
was a result of the pressures that were building towards the
impending collapse of the Soviet Union rather than military
defeat at the hands of the mujahideen and its foreign supporters.
This paper seeks to accomplish four goals: (1) create
a framework for analyzing coercion based on Robert Pape’s
theory of coercion and additional considerations based on
politics and the difficulties inherent in coercing non-state
actors; (2) understand the objectives and strategy of each participant
in the conflict along with the reality on the ground;
(3) consider the course and results of the war from the point
of view of each of the participants through the lens of coercion
as established in the framework; (4) draw conclusions
and ‘lessons learned’ from this war and apply them to the current
US involvement in Afghanistan.
Framework
To understand what coercion is, it must first be
understood what it is not. Coercion is not brute force.
Although the two concepts share the use of force as a means
of conforming an enemy’s behavior to the coercer’s will they
differ in that brute force imposes that conformity, whereas
coercion convinces the enemy to comply. 1 Coercion is also not
deterrence. The difference is the desired end state: deterrence
aims at maintaining the status quo while coercion seeks to
alter the enemy’s behavior. 2
In his book, Bombing to Win: Air Power and Coercion
in War, Robert Pape defines coercion, analyzes the three
type of coercive strategies, and offers six propositions concerning
the success or failure of conventional coercion. He
defines coercion as “efforts to change the behavior of a state
by manipulating costs and benefits”. 3 To better understand
these costs and benefits, Pape has created an equation that
relates the resistance of an enemy (R) to the benefits of resistance
(B), the probability of successful resistance (p(B)), the
costs of resistance (C), and the probability of suffering those
costs (p(C)), which mathematically is expressed as R = B*p(B)
- C*p(C). 4 Thus, when the costs of resisting exceed the benefits,
resistance will cease (R becomes negative) and the enemy
will comply with the coercer’s demands.
This breakdown into factors affecting an enemy’s
decision leads to three coercive strategies, each one specifi-
57
cally targeted at one of the variables. The punishment strategy
inflicts maximum death and destruction on the civilian
population. 5 The risk strategy also targets the civilian population
but with scheduled intervals of no hostilities to give the
people the opportunity to consider changing their policy. 6
Finally, the denial strategy targets the enemy’s military strategy
and capabilities, including both fielded forces and logistical
support. 7 Pape argues that the benefits of resisting (B)
cannot be manipulated by a coercer but that the other three
variables can be targeted by the three coercive strategies: punishment
aims at increasing the cost of continued resistance
(C), risk tries to increase the probability of costs (p(C)), and
denial seeks to decrease the probability that resistance will be
successful or beneficial (p(B)). 8 The success of each of these
strategies, punishment, risk, and denial, will be tested in light
of the Soviet-Afghan conflict.
Having defined coercion and its three associated
strategies, Pape puts forward six propositions regarding conventional
coercion. The validity of these conclusions will also
be cross-examined against the author’s findings in regards to
the Soviet decision to withdrawal from Afghanistan, the culmination
of which occurred in 1989. They are:
1. Punishment strategies will rarely succeed
2. Risk strategies will fail
3. Denial strategies work best
4. Surrender of homeland territory is especially
unlikely
5. Surrender terms that incorporate heavy additional
punishment will not be accepted
6. Coercive success almost always takes longer than
the logic of either punishment or denial alone would suggest. 9
Pape’s theory, while concise and scientific, suffers
from two serious shortcomings: the failure to consider political
limitations that restrict coercive efforts and the inherent
difficulties of coercing non-state actors, both of paramount
importance in the case of Afghanistan in the 1980’s. First,
political limitations to prosecuting successful coercion include
the necessity of popular domestic support, the effect on the
economy, the costs in terms of people, money, resources, and
opportunity costs, the reality that limited operations equates
to limited options, and the need to balance commitments. 10
All of these factors may restrict the coercer from choosing
the optimal or the best mix of coercive instruments. Second,
non-state actors (NSAs), as implied by their name, do not
behave like states. They act in their own interest and often
ignore the state government if one exists. 11 Indirect coercion
is often fruitless because the NSAs simply do not care. Thus
coercive measures must be that much more precise when
identifying and targeting a non-state actor’s centers of gravity.

Further difficulties include gathering accurate intelligence,
the lack of viable targets, the traditional adaptation to coercive
efforts by NSAs, and the fact that the leaders of NSAs
often have only nominal control of their organizations. 12 If
the difference between conventional coercion and coercing
NSAs is not properly understood, much effort may be misdirected,
especially if conventional coercive strategies are applied
against a non-state actor, leading to great frustration and
waste and possible defeat.
Having defined what coercion is, and what it is not,
set up the three coercive strategies, put forward six propositions
concerning coercion, and added political and NSA
considerations to Pape’s theory, it is time to examine the facts
surrounding the Soviet invasion, occupation, and withdrawal
from Afghanistan during the decade lasting from 1979-1989.
Facts
The history of Afghanistan has been more cyclical
than linear. Although time has moved on, technology
has progressed, and enemies have changed, the Afghan pattern
has remained the same. The Afghans have fought each
other until a foreign power would invade, at which time they
united against their common enemy and, as soon as the foreigners
had been repelled, immediately returned to fighting
one another. This pattern has repeated itself multiple times
against the Russians and the British and the Soviet intervention
would be no different, nor would its aftermath.
To outsiders, Afghanistan has always been a means
rather than an end in itself. The British originally became
involved in Afghanistan not because they wanted to colonize
it but because it would serve as a buffer to protect the crown
jewel of the British Empire: India. Likewise, the Soviets in
1979 did not want Afghanistan for itself but as a stepping
stone to Iran, which was home to much-coveted warm water
ports and oil. 13 The Soviets were not the only foreigners
who would try to use Afghanistan during the 1980’s. All of
the mujahideen’s supporters offered their help with their own
interests in mind, none of which happened to coincide with
the well being of the Afghan people.
The Soviets had a long history of dealing with the
Afghans but put it to surprisingly poor use. They were also
accustomed to ruling large populations of Central Asian Muslims,
50 million of whom were living under the aegis of the
USSR as of 1990. 14 This led to the second objective pursued
by the Soviets in Afghanistan: suppression of growing Islamic
radicalism, particularly before it could spread to the Islamic
populations directly under Soviet control. 15 A third more
immediate objective prompted the Soviet intervention and
that was the establishment and immediate teetering of a communist-style
government in Afghanistan. The Soviet leadership
felt a strong need to support socialist and communist
58
governments wherever they appeared, especially in a country
in such close proximity to the USSR.
At the outset of the conflict, the Afghans lacked
any kind of national identity or purpose save one: evict the
Soviets. Independence was achieved from British interference
in 1919 and the King Muhammad Zahir Shah ruled
for forty years until he became a constitutional monarch in
1964 and was subsequently overthrown in 1973. 16 Although
Afghanistan tried to remain non-aligned, Soviet influence
began to creep in during the 1960’s. 17 Tribal and religious
loyalties remained strong and often superseded nationalistic
or political allegiance. In 1978, the Afghan communists, with
Soviet support, seized power and began implementing socialist
reforms. 18 Such secular communism was too much for
most Afghans, including both radical and nominal Muslims. 19
Some declared a jihad (literally: struggle) against the Afghan
communists and many army units mutinied. 20 The resistors,
irrespective of their tribal or religious affiliation, collectively
became known to the world as mujahideen, or those who
practice jihad.
By 1979, it was clear that Afghanistan’s experiment
in communism had gone drastically wrong. Three problems
led to eventual Soviet intervention. First was the resistance of
the people to the new government’s socialist-based reforms.
Mir Husain quotes Olivier Roy who said that this reaction
“was expressed in the garb of a defense of Islam, because Islam
was inextricably bound to tradition in the worldview of the
Afghan peasantry.” 21 Second, infighting plagued the Afghan
communist party, known as the People’s Democratic Party of
Afghanistan (PDPA). 22 Nur Muhammad Taraki and Hafizullah
Amin, the prime minister and deputy prime minister,
respectively, ended up in conflict with the eventual murder of
Taraki. 23 Third, the final straw was the falling out between
Amin and the Soviets, specifically after his appeal to the West
for aid. 24 So prompted, the Soviets invaded in December,
murdered Amin, and installed their own puppet: Barbak
Karmal. 25 Thus began an occupation that would last over
nine years (). It would be a time of great suffering for both
the Soviets and the Afghans, with the only real success being
achieved on behalf of the radical Islamists, especially the Taliban
and Al Qaida.
The Soviet invasion provoked an outcry around the
world but it was in the Muslim world that the cry resonated
the deepest. It was as if a match had been struck and lit the
fire of Islamic unity, which previously had only been achieved
during the Arab-Israeli Wars. The Islamists who sent money
and those who went themselves shared the single-minded
vision of the Afghans but with a slight twist: evict the atheists
from dar Al-Islam (the House of Islam). 26 They saw the invasion
through a religious rather than a political lens: that this

was an attack on Islam. 27 Radical Muslims from a myriad of
countries made their way to neighboring Pakistan to support,
train, and fight with the mujahideen. Many of their governments,
under the threat of growing domestic problems such as
severe unemployment, were facing opposition from Islamists
and were glad to see them go, moreover, privately hoped that
they would become martyrs in the Afghan jihad. 28 The Saudis
even subsidized one-way plane tickets to Pakistan. 29 Thus, the
war expanded from an Afghan civil war, to attempted subversion
and colonization by the USSR, to a ‘clash of civilizations’
between Atheism and Islam.
The United States saw and used Afghanistan strictly
in terms of the Cold War. Prior to Soviet involvement,
the US turned down Afghan requests for aid and generally
ignored the region. After the Soviet withdrawal, the US
would again turn its back on Afghanistan until it was attacked
by the Afghan-based Al Qaida on 11 September 2001. In
the interim period, the primary US objective was to prevent
Soviet expansion into southwest Asia in general and in the
direction of the Persian Gulf, whose oil was considered to
be in the US national interest, in particular. 30 The strategy
chosen to check this Soviet aggression was largely colored by
the US’s recent exit from Vietnam and the strong desire to
avoid getting involved in another ‘dirty war.’ 31 Thus, the massive
amounts of financial aid and weapons (ironically, most
of which were Soviet manufactured 32 ) supplied to the mujahideen
was given with no US oversight. “For as long as these
mujahedin were giving the Soviets a “hard time”, Washington
remained oblivious to, and unconcerned about, their anti-
US posture, penchant for terrorism, involvement in the drug
trade, and even their alienation from the vast majority of the
Afghan population in whose name, and for whose liberation,
these mujahedin were ostensibly fighting.” 33
Following the traditional use of Afghanistan as a
‘means,’ the initial US policy was to only supply enough aid
to make the Soviets bleed but not enough to give the mujahideen
the decisive edge needed to obtain victory. 34 This covert
aid changed when President Ronald Reagan issued National
Security Directive #166, which called for all available means
to be employed to evict the Soviets from Afghanistan. 35 The
two immediate results of this Directive were the establishment
of training camps in Pakistan and Stingers. 36 Approximately
900 man-portable Stinger surface-to-air missiles were supplied
to the mujahideen who put them to use against the Soviet and
Afghan Air Forces. 37 The Afghans inflicted significant but not
irreproachable casualties, particularly against Soviet helicopters.
The Soviets had pursued a three-pronged strategy in
trying to subdue Afghanistan. First, they set about dividing
and destroying the Afghan leadership. 38 Second, they wanted
59
to erode the mujahideen base of popular support by destroying
the social and economic infrastructure of the country. 39
Third and finally, they tried to isolate the region from the
outside world. 40
The Afghans responded in accordance with their
own great military tradition: let them come and suffer. They
pursued a classical insurgency strategy of raising the cost of
remaining in country to the point that it become unbearable
for the Soviets to pay. The other component of their strategy
is what saved the Afghans a myriad of times throughout history:
great endurance and patience. This time was different
in that it is unlikely that the mujahideen would have survived
without external support.
The effectiveness of the non-Afghan fighters, especially
the so-called ‘Arab Afghans,’ against the Soviets has long
been highly overrated, especially by the Arabs themselves.
This should not diminish their contribution but it was propping
up and keeping the mujahideen alive rather than militarily
defeating the Soviets. Their largest contribution was
monetary not military. They built training camps and Islamic
schools across Pakistan in support of the resistance and to
provide Islamic motivation and education.
As in most wars, the objectives and the strategies
of the parties varied dramatically with the reality on the
ground. The Soviets kept the larger strategic picture in mind
and nearly won, despite incredible tactical deficiencies. The
Afghans margin of success was much slimmer than is usually
portrayed, especially by the Western media. The Islamists,
while contributing little towards defeating the Soviets, made
incredible gains in Afghanistan that would rapidly spread
throughout the Islamic world and beyond. The US strategy,
while beneficial to the mujahideen, had only a minimal
impact in compelling the Soviets to withdraw and had the
unintended consequence of building and funding radical
Islam, which would redirect its wrath from the Soviet Union
to its former patron, the West and the United States in particular.
Of the three strategies pursued by the Soviets two
were successful. Throughout the war, the Soviets kept the
mujahideen divided and constantly checking their backs
against potential treachery. Afghan unity is an oxymoron
and the Soviets played it to full effect. Secondly, the Soviets
inflicted an incredible amount of punishment on the Afghan
people, with an estimated one million dead in Afghanistan
and “significant numbers of the 3 to 5 million refugees living
in Pakistan [who] were also killed.” 41 Their goal was to
undermine mujahideen’s base of popular support and to show
that they were incapable of protecting the people from Soviet
retribution. In this they were again largely successful. The
problem lies in the third objective, which was not realized.

Although the mujahideen were divided and lost the support of
the Afghan people over the course of the war, they managed
to survive because the Soviets could not effectively isolate
them. The majority of the engagements between communist
and mujahideen forces took place on or near the Afghan
border. Pakistani support in particular was critical to keeping
the Afghan resistance alive and was largely supplemented by
both the Muslim world and the United States.
What is most often highlighted when recounting the
Soviet-Afghan War is the tactical success of the mujahideen
against the Soviets. The question is often posed: how were a
rag-tag bunch of guerillas able to defeat one of the world’s two
great superpowers? While strategically the mujahideen were
very near defeat, they scored many tactical successes because
of Soviet ineptitude in fighting insurgents. 42 Afghanistan’s
rugged terrain and porous borders provide the ideal environment
for guerilla tactics such as ambushes, hit-and-run
raids, sniping, etc. Likewise, the Limited Contingent of
Soviet Forces in Afghanistan (LCSFA) was a conventional
force assigned an unconventional mission. 43 The motorized
rifle companies employed against the mujahideen were not
trained, equipped, or motivated to fight under such conditions.
Morale among the conscripted Soviet solders plummeted,
especially as the war dragged on for a decade. One
of the greatest Soviet failures was the slow pace at which they
adapted their tactics and applied ‘lessons learned.’ 44 There
was no sense of urgency and very limited sharing of experiences.
Thus, the Afghan resistors could frequently re-employ
the same traps and tactics and the Soviets simply absorbed the
punishment. As the war dragged on the Soviets did improve,
introducing a special Counter-Insurgency Force, taking
advantage of their total air superiority, and, increasingly, providing
combat support to the Afghan communists. 45 Also,
the Limited Contingent of Soviet Forces in Afghanistan was
just that: limited, and it remained so throughout the war. 46
More forces might have provided the mass needed to overcome
the mujahideen but not necessarily. More rapid progression
of counterinsurgency tactics and cutting off outside aid
would have harmed the mujahideen far more than the introduction
of additional Soviet troops.
Despite their incredible tactical shortcomings, the
Soviets nearly won and throughout the conflict they kept the
larger strategic vision firmly in view. The United States was
not the only one to learn from Vietnam. The Soviet leadership
observed and made sure that Afghanistan did not become
‘their Vietnam,’ despite frequent allegations to the contrary.
They did this by keeping Afghanistan from dominating the
larger strategic picture because, in reality, their intervention
there was not that important to the Soviet national interest
and by imposing and adhering to a strict limitation on the
60
number of troops. They did not allow Afghanistan to become
a ‘black hole’ of men and materiel that Vietnam was to the
United States. This larger strategic vision, while ultimately
successful in preventing Soviet over commitment in Afghanistan,
also proved exceptionally frustrating for the troops in
theater. Because Afghanistan was intentionally a low priority,
so too was improving tactics, learning proper counterinsurgency,
and providing the necessary troops and equipment that
would be necessary for victory. 47
The Afghans won, as do many insurgents, by not
losing. Although they remained divided and absorbed tremendous
punishment, they were kept alive by outside intervention.
Their military success, and even more so of the ‘Arab
Afghans,’ has been greatly inflated but this does not take away
from their courage, tenacity, and perseverance. The value of
US involvement also tends to be grossly overestimated, especially
the effectiveness of the Stinger surface-to-air missiles.
Even after the implementation of National Security Directive
#166, at no time were the Soviets ‘bled white.’ During the
war the Soviets suffered 13,000 killed in action and many
more in non-combat related accidents and fatalities but at no
time was the punishment inflicted excessive or unbearable.
Even the celebrated Stingers, while quite effectively employed,
did not bring about a change in the Soviet mind. These casualty
figures are actually quite miniscule when considered in
light of the Soviet history of absorbing millions of casualties
during World War II.
The results of this conflict, so often misconstrued,
were nonetheless far reaching. The Soviet withdrawal, completed
in 1989, and the subsequent collapse of the Soviet
Union are frequently linked in the minds of the Afghans and
Arabs. Essentially, they claim that they fought and defeated
a superpower and thereby caused its collapse. However, this
is a fallacy known as post hoc ergo propter hoc, which literally
means ‘after this therefore because of this.’ Because the
collapse of the USSR occurred shortly after the Soviet withdrawal
from Afghanistan, many in the Islamic world, most
prominently Osama bin Laden, attribute the withdrawal as a
major cause of the collapse. The truth is the exact opposite:
the impending collapse of the USSR led to the withdrawal
of Soviet forces from Afghanistan. However fallacious, bin
Laden and many of his colleagues’ conclusion has led to their
belief that a small group of Muslim fighters can defeat and
moreover destroy a superpower. They have turned their attention
to the United States and attacked her, most dramatically
on 11 September 2001, in hopes that the US would be drawn
into Afghanistan and defeated, repeating the Soviet experience.
Although the Soviet Union collapsed shortly after the
1989 withdrawal, Russia has remained involved in Central

Asia in general and Afghanistan in particular. Two problems
linger from the Soviet-Afghan War and they both revolve
around Islamic radicalism. Immediately after the Soviet
withdrawal, the world turned its back on Afghanistan and
this allowed the radical Taliban to seize power and moreover
to export it, particularly to the newly created Central Asian
republics. Thus, the original Soviet objective of checking
the growth of radical Islam was a dismal failure. Chechnya
illustrates this problem even closer to home; but there is also
another inherited problem of the Soviet-Afghan War: tactical
incompetence when fighting insurgents. The Russian Army
suffers today against Chechnyan rebels from many of the
same deficiencies that the LCSFA had against the Afghans.
Many in the West expected the almost immediate
collapse of the Afghan communist government upon the
withdrawal of the last Soviet forces, similar to collapse of
South Vietnam after the American withdrawal. But such was
not the case. Najibullah remained in power until 1992, when
his government finally collapsed and chaos ensued until order
was restored by the Taliban. This was because the mujahideen,
never united, began fighting each other even before the
Soviet withdrawal was complete. Another factor was that
outside support for the mujahideen rapidly dried up, while
Najbullah continued to receive significant Soviet assistance.
The conflict in Afghanistan between religion and
tribalism was successfully manipulated by outsiders, ensuring
further chaos in the wake of the Soviet withdrawal. The
Pakistani government, fearful of Pashtun desires for autonomy
within their own country, helped create the madrassahs
(Islamic schools) that spawned the Taliban desiring to unite
the people under the banner of Islam rather than tribalism.
The Soviets, in the process of their retreat northwards, reignited
Pashtun and Uzbek nationalism as a counterweight to
radical Islam. These forces have been at work up to the present
day, seen in the rise and subsequent fall of the Taliban.
Fit
Now that a framework has been created for analyzing
coercion and the case study of Afghanistan has been examined
in depth, the question remains, were any of the participants
able to successfully execute a coercive strategy? The answer
in every case, for the Soviets, for the mujahideen, for the
Islamists, and for the United States, is a resounding ‘no!’
The Soviets were successful at employing both punishment
and risk strategies against the Afghans but they failed
miserably at denial. The Soviets inflicted tremendous pain on
the Afghan population and even undermined their support of
the mujahideen, but it did not matter; this was not critical to
the resistance. They also successfully killed and divided the
Afghan resistance factions; in Pape’s words, the risk strategy of
decapitation. Again, this was important but not crucial to the
61
survival of the mujahideen. Although some could argue that
the Soviets also attempted a denial strategy, in reality it was
brute force. It failed because of the tactical incompetence at
the outset of the conflict and the lethargic pace at which the
LCSFA adapted.
The underlying reasons for the Soviet failure mesh
well with Pape’s propositions regarding conventional coercion.
As predicted, punishment and risk failed and denial, which
has the potential for success, did not occur. Furthermore,
the costs of surrendering were too great for the Afghans to
accept. Pape notes that the surrender of homeland territory is
unlikely. Even more than this, the Afghans were being asked
to accept a completely new culture, ideology, and worldview,
which the Afghan communists tried to impose. The Soviets
recognized that trying to impose such drastic and draconian
changes would be counterproductive and advised the PDPA
accordingly. But the Afghan communists preceded and successfully
stirred up nearly all the Afghans against the communists.
The Soviets, once they directly intervened, were thus
compelled to use brute force against the Afghans as nothing
short of total defeat would be enough to make the Afghans
into communists.
The Afghans also failed to coerce the Soviets to leave
their country. They pursued primarily a punishment strategy,
hoping to make the cost of remaining in Afghanistan
outweigh the benefit by killing as many Soviet soldiers as
possible. Their problem was that the Soviet Armed Forces
(SVS) could absorb tremendous losses with no real effect on
capability or their will to continue the war. Casualties paled
in comparison to Soviet losses during World War II or even
American losses in Vietnam. Also, by keeping the LCSFA
truly limited, there was never any real danger that Afghaninflicted
punishment would rise to unacceptable levels.
The mujahideen were never in a strong enough position
to effectively employ a denial strategy. Although they
won many small engagements, the Soviets retained the strategic
initiative throughout the war and could do anything they
wanted, provided they were willing to pay the price. 48 “Significantly,
throughout the lengthy and bitter war in Afghanistan
the resistance was unable to challenge the Soviet hold
over even a single strategically-important asset.” 49
The Islamic supporters of the mujahideen saw their
objective accomplished, namely Soviet withdrawal, but they
contributed very little to that success. Their real contribution
was in propping up the mujahideen, and so they did not exercise
any type of coercion.
Likewise, the US achieved its objective only at a tremendous
cost. The massive aid provided to the mujahideen
also meant that anti-American factions would subsequently
turn against their Western patrons. Not only did the US have

a minimal impact on the Soviet decision to withdraw from
Afghanistan, its attempts spawned disastrous side effects.
Having established that there was no successful coercion
from 1979-1989 in Afghanistan, the question remains,
what caused the Soviet withdrawal? The answer lies beyond
Pape’s theory in the larger political context of the Cold War.
The Afghans won not because of any military success
against the LCSFA, but because of the one thing they
did not do: surrender. In 1985, Mikhail Gorbachev came
to power in the USSR and he immediately began to consider
how to remove the LCSFA. 50 He did this not because
of the punishment that the Afghans were inflicting on the
Soviets, but because he recognized the “long-festering Soviet
weaknesses…[that] later brought the collapse of the Soviet
Communist power and the USSR itself.” 51 Ronald Reagan
was effectively ‘spending the Soviets into the ground’ by
building cold war arms at a rate at which the Soviet economy
could simply not compete. As Gorbachev embarked on his
reformation of communism he encountered growing public
outrage against Soviet troops in Afghanistan. The width and
breadth of the tactical disaster was getting back to the Soviet
people, who could not see the larger strategic picture and how
close the LCSFA was to victory. Having opened Pandora’s
box by allowing criticism of the Soviet system, he was then
unable to contain it in regards to Afghanistan. The impending
economic collapse of the USSR, combined with growing
public pressure, is what finally drove Gorbachev to withdraw
the LCSFA.
Future
The decade of foreign interference in Afghanistan
from 1979-1989 carries many lessons for others who dare
to tread the same ground, especially the United State since
it began an armed intervention in Afghanistan in November
2001 following the terrorist attacks of September 11 th . Key
Soviet failures and successes can be avoided and applied by
the United States in order to accomplish its objectives and
avoid becoming bogged down in a never ending engagement
between US forces and Afghan insurgents.
The United States must first recognize the will and
motivation of the Afghan people. Over the course of history
they have fiercely opposed attempted occupation by the Russians,
the British, and the Soviets. They will not accept undue
American influence. If forced to fight, they have the stomach
for a long drawn-out war of attrition, in stark contrast to the
American people who are impatient for total victory 52 . The
Afghans have proven over and over again their willingness to
persevere and outlast their enemies. The United States would
do well to avoid becoming such an enemy.
The second Soviet mistake was the imposition of
an extreme form of government on the Afghan people. The
62
Soviets actually recognized that Taraki and Amin were too
radical and tried to restrain them. 53 Secular communism
proved to be completely unpalatable to the average Afghan. 54
The Soviet efforts were too late and, once they invaded, they
were forced to deal with the consequence: namely, a people
galvanized against the Soviet ideology. The lesson for the
United States is clear: do not try to impose a foreign system
of government. Any new constitution must be sufficiently
‘Afghan’ and, consequently, Islamic.
The United States military involvement today in
Afghanistan shares one great similarity with the decade of
Soviet occupation: most of the fighting is between US forces
and insurgents, remnants of both the Taliban and Al Qaida,
and it is occurring on and near the Pakistani border. This
carries two implications, both of which were major Soviet
failures. First, the US forces engaged must learn, refine, and
perfect counterinsurgency tactics. Politically, the US cannot
afford to lose tactical engagements nor suffer casualties anywhere
on the order of the Soviet losses. A system must be
developed to share ‘lessons learned’ and thereby improve
tactics and avoid repeating mistakes. Second, Pakistan must
cease to be a sanctuary for insurgents, who traverse the border
with relative ease. Just as the United States and sympathetic
Muslim nations supplied the mujahideen via Pakistan, so the
remaining anti-American forces are operating out of Pakistan.
Either the border must be sealed, which geographically is difficult
to impossible, or the fight must be taken to Pakistan,
preferably by Pakistani government forces rather than American
or Western troops, whose presence would likely do more
harm than good. The bottom line is that there will be no
peace or victory in Afghanistan as long as the insurgents have
secure bases to operate out of in Pakistan.
The last lesson for American forces in Afghanistan to
learn from their Soviet predecessors is to clearly grasp the conflict
between ideology, religion and tribalism that so fractures
Afghan society. Afghani, Pakistani and Soviet leaders encouraged
and supported communism, radical Islam and tribalism,
respectively, as a counterweight to the other. The United
States, perhaps unwittingly, has fallen to supporting tribalism
through its alliance with the likes of Uzbek General Dostum
and other ethnically-based groups who opposed the Taliban.
To bring permanent peace and democracy to Afghanistan,
the United States must find something that supersedes both
ethnic and religious identity. Such a centrifugal force, that is
sufficient to overcome Afghanistan’s many schisms, has yet to
be discovered and applied.
Bibliography
Anonymous, Through Our Enemies’ Eyes: Osama bin Laden,
Radical Islam, and the Future of America, (Washington:

Brassey’s, 2002).
Bodansky, Yossef and Evgeny Nikitenko, “Reflections on
Afghanistan,” Defense & Foreign Affairs’ Strategic
Policy, February 1999.
Bradsher, Henry S., Afghan Communism and Soviet
Intervention, (Oxford: Oxford UP, 1999).
Ewans, Martin, “America and Afghanistan: A Troubled
History,” World and I, 1 March 2002.
Husain, Mir Zohair, Global Islamic Politics, 2d ed., (New
York: Longman, 2003).
McMichael, Scott R., Stumbling Bear: Soviet Military
Performance in Afghanistan, (London: Brassey’s, 1991).
O’Ballance, Edgar, Afghan Wars: Battles in a Hostile Land,
1839 to the Present, rev. ed., (London: Brassey’s, 2002).
Pape, Robert A., Bombing to Win: Air Power and Coercion
in War (Ithaca: Cornell UP, 1996).
Phillips, James A., “Consolidating Victory in Afghanistan,”
Heritage Foundation Reports, 20 February 1990.
Rogers, Tom, The Soviet Withdrawal from Afghanistan, Analysis
and Chronology, (Westport: Greenwood, 1992).
Thomas, Troy S. and Stephen D. Kiser, Lords of the Silk
Road: Violent Non-State Actors in Central Asia (US
Air Force Academy: Institute for National Security Studies,
2002).
Acknowledgements
I would like to thank Major Melton for proofreading a draft
of my paper.
I would also like to thank Dr. Talbot for proofreading a draft
of my paper.
Many of the ideas and concepts incorporated into this paper
were discussed and refined during Major Melton’s
MSS 365, T1 class and I would like to thank all those that
took part in those discussions whose ideas were not
directly cited.
(Endnotes)
1 The idea that there is a difference between brute
force and coercion was discussed in Major Melton’s Military
Strategic Studies 365 class, section T1, on 16 January
2004. The example given for brute force was Rome’s total
destruction of Carthage during the Third Punic War.
2 Robert A. Pape, Bombing to Win: Air Power and
Coercion in War (Ithaca: Cornell UP, 1996), 4.
3 Ibid.
4 Ibid., 16.
5 Ibid. 21.
63
6 Ibid., 18-19.
7 Ibid., 19.
8 Ibid., 18.
9 Ibid., 20.
10 These factors were covered on 19 February 2004
while discussing the Byman theory of diplomatic coercion in
Maj Melton’s MSS 365 class, section T1.
11 Troy S. Thomas and Stephen D. Kiser, Lords of
the Silk Road: Violent Non-State Actors in Central Asia (US
Air Force Academy: Institute for National Security Studies,
2002), 73.
12 These five challenges to coercing non-state actors
were discussed on 25 February 2004 in Maj Melton’s MSS
365 class, section T1.
13 Yossef Bodansky and Evgeny Nikitenko,
“Reflections on Afghanistan,” Defense & Foreign Affairs’
Strategic Policy, February 1999, 8.
14 James A. Phillips, “Consolidating Victory in
Afghanistan,” Heritage Foundation Reports, 20 February
1990, 1.
15 Bodansky, 8.
16Mir Zohair Husain, Global Islamic Politics, 2d ed.,
(New York: Longman, 2003), 297.
17 Edgar O’Ballance, Afghan Wars: Battles in a Hostile
Land, 1839 to the Present, rev. ed., (London: Brassey’s, 2002),
viii.
18 Husain, 297.
19 Bodansky, 8.
20 Husain, 297.
21 Ibid, 261.
22 O’Ballance, viii.
23 Husain, 262.
24 O’Ballance, viii.

25 Husain, 262.
26 Anonymous, Through Our Enemies’ Eyes: Osama
bin Laden, Radical Islam, and the Future of America,
(Washington: Brassey’s, 2002), 109.
27 Ibid.
28 Ibid., 111.
29 Ibid.
30 Bodansky, 8.
31 Ibid.
32 Martin Ewans, “America and Afghanistan: A
Troubled History,” World and I, 1 March 2002, 20.
33 Bodansky, 8.
34 Ewans, 20.
35 Ibid.
36 Ibid.
37 Ibid.
38 Bodansky, 8.
39 Ibid.
40 Ibid.
41 Pape, 353.
42 Bodansky, 8.
43 Scott R. McMichael, Stumbling Bear: Soviet
Military Performance in Afghanistan, (London: Brassey’s,
1991), xix.
44 Bodansky, 8.
45 McMichael, 52.
46 Ibid.
47 Bodansky, 8.
48 Bodansky, 8.
49 Ibid.
64
50 Tom Rogers, The Soviet Withdrawal from
Afghanistan, Analysis and Chronology, (Westport:
Greenwood, 1992), 3.
51 Henry S. Bradsher, Afghan Communism and Soviet
Intervention, (Oxford: Oxford UP, 1999), xi-xii.
52 The shortness of the American attention span is illustrated
in questions currently being raised such as “why are
Americans still in Iraq one year after the takeover?” whereas
history tends toshow that it takes many years to secure and
rebuild a country.
53 Bodansky, 8.
54 Ibid.

ETHICS IN WARFARE
By C3C David Schill
“For as long as men and women have talked about
war, they have talked about it in terms of right and wrong”
(Walzer 3). From tribal warfare thousands of years ago, to the
stories of King David defeating Goliath and the Philistines,
and to the trench warfare in the recent World Wars, warriors
have fought and killed each other mercilessly. Is this right?
Should the human race be allowed to take the bare essence of
human life away from another? If so, when is this permissible
and what limitations must be placed upon warfare? In order
for warfare to be considered morally right and even allowable,
all actors involved must fight for the correct justifiable purpose,
and they must fight justly and morally.
As in any discussion about ethics or philosophy, it is
necessary to begin with assumptions that lead to the cohesion
of an argument. To begin, morality needs to have a common
definition. Immanuel Kant provides a definition which has
three propositions. First, an action must be done from duty
in order to have any moral worth. The second follows the
first; that this action is not judged by the outcome of the
action, but on the principle of the action itself. Finally, “Duty
is the necessity of an action done out of respect for the law”
(Kant 12-13). Without further definitions of these propositions,
morality is, in essence, doing the right thing because
the action is right in and of itself and because it follows societal
law. This societal law can be determined to be based on
cultural relativism, specifically the cultural attitude founded
on current day Western society. Keep in mind, as James
Rachels states, that cultural relativism “…says that there is
no such thing as a universal truth in ethics, there are only the
various cultural codes” (Rachels 50). Because of the importance
of morality and ethics in warfare to the Western World
in the twenty-first century, this is the best and most natural
viewpoint to take and understand in the discussion.
Now, in order for warfare to exist and occur between
two nations, there must be a conflict or disagreement of some
sort between the two. There must be a purpose for going to
war. For example, the citizens of Great Britain living in the
Americas during the eighteenth century went to war because
of unfair taxation and representation, as well as a desire to
govern themselves. Hitler went to war in order to destroy
inferior races and gain land for the supreme German race.
What is the difference between the two reasons?
Jus ad bellum, the justice of war, requires the judgment
of the reason or purpose for going to war. It questions
the moral worth of aggression, self-defense, and human integrity
in warfare (Walzer 21). Did Hitler have a just purpose
65
of going to war? Obviously to destroy an inferior race and
conquer land is not a just purpose for going to war. Did the
soon to be American citizens have a just purpose for going to
war? Were they pushed to war with extreme and unfair taxation
and lack of representation, and have to defend themselves
against such treatment?
The principles of jus ad bellum can easily answer
these questions and determine which action of warfare was
moral and which was not. John Locke, in the seventeenth
century, developed these widely used principles. To begin, he
states that governments have the responsibility and the duty
to provide national security to their people. Secondly, the
citizens have the responsibility of supporting wars of national
defense and resisting aggression by foreign states. Lastly,
the citizens also have the right to oppose domestic or international
aggression by their own governments. Just as individual
men have no natural right to commit attack on the life,
liberty, health, and possessions of others, governments have
no right to attack its neighbors lives, liberties, and possessions
(Davidson 130-131).
If no government has the right to attack another
government, then the only just and moral action in warfare
is self-defense. In all wars, one nation is the aggressor, while
the other is the victim of this aggression. The nation then,
who pursues this initial attack, is then acting aggressively in
an unjust manner. The victim nation, by defending itself,
and eventually defeating and punishing the aggressor, is acting
justly. The case of World War Two is obvious, in which the
Axis Powers were the unjust aggressors. However, are the
colonists of Great Britain, who desire their own nation, unjust
because they initiated the attack? Or were they acting in selfdefense
to protect their rights and liberties. This answer is
not as clear cut as the first, and can be argued either way. Its
ambiguity provides evidence of jus ad bellum, or the need to
have justice in determining the purpose of warfare. Just ad
bellum also forces the actors to have a justifiable reason for
being in the war.
“It is perfectly possible for a just war to be fought
unjustly and for an unjust war to be fought in strict accordance
with the rules” (Walzer 21). For example, General
Sherman of the Union Army devastated Atlanta and the
Confederate South in his “March to the Sea.” In all considerations,
the Civil War was just, but he used extremely brutal
and unjust tactics to achieve the end. Likewise, what if a
nation is attacked and fights unjustly. For example, the Royal
Air Force and the United States Army Air Force in Operation
Overlord during World War Two performed civilian morale
raids on Germany. Was the action taken against Hamburg
just? What is the difference between Hitler’s unjust war and
the unjust method used by the Allied forces?

Walzer asks the question, why is it wrong to begin
a war? He answers it with saying, “War is hell” (Walzer 21).
Large numbers of soldiers and citizens die in conflict. For a
given purpose, whether it is territorial gain or in self-defense,
the outcome has to have certain means used to reach the
desired end. These means can also be what makes war wrong;
these means or military tactics and strategy can be considered
evil. How does one achieve victory over an enemy? The easiest
way is for one country to kill all the citizens and soldiers of
the enemy country.
If logic is followed, it is possible and unarguable to
say that killing is always wrong. It also follows that warfare
between nations involves killing. The obvious conclusion
is developed into the idea that warfare is wrong. If this is
believed strictly word for word, then it must be said that all
warfare is wrong. However, these assumptions are not always
true.
Take for example the case of the thousands of little
children who are living with a terminal disease. One boy
living across the country has the genetic material to save the
lives of all these children. However, they can only be saved if
the one boy gives up all his blood for the others, and dies as a
result. Although many arguments from many philosophical
perspectives can be used to consider the case, it is easy and
understandable to say that the one boy should sacrifice his life
in order to save the others. In other words, it is right to kill
the boy in order to save thousands of other lives.
Therefore, the assumption that killing is always
wrong is changed to killing is sometimes wrong. This brings
up the question: in warfare, when is killing permitted and
when is it not?
Jus in bella, or justice in war, really brings about “…observance
or violation of the customary and positive rules of
engagement” (Walzer 21). These rules of engagement are
fairly complex, and at times they are also extremely clear.
The action of attacking noncombatants and those considered
innocent has moral connections to it. Also, the mere act of
killing another human in warfare has severe consequences
mentally and can play a huge part in the moral world.
In past battles, many individuals and their decisions
can be observed and stacked against morality. For instance,
how moral is Douhet’s theory which centers on national
morale decadence through civilian bombing? The whole
treatment of prisoners of war has its roots in morality. In
addition, think of General Sherman’s tactics during the Civil
War and the used of the atomic bomb against Japan.
During 1864 in the American Civil War, the Northern
morale was at an all time low. Many Northerners were
extremely upset at the duration of the war, and they were
especially upset with their army’s performance and lack of
66
success in the war. “Many Northerners began to feel that
perhaps the only way to end the war lay in a negotiated,
compromised peace” (Doughty and Gruber 436). Because
of this, Lincoln felt quite unsure about the upcoming election
of 1864, for many voters might choose a candidate who
does not support the war or a strong, centralized government.
However, Major General William Tecumseh Sherman, one of
the most trusted Union generals during the war, became the
chief maker of increased morale and increased optimism in
the North.
General Sherman was in Northern Georgia during
the summer of 1864, and his first goal was to destroy the city
of Atlanta. After two months of evasion and preparation,
the battles for Atlanta began. Sherman formed a quasi-siege
on the city, and began lobbing artillery shells against the city,
aimed at anything and everything. Eventually, General Hood,
the Confederate commander, and his troops became overwhelmed.
With supplies dwindling, the city burning, and
after failed attempts to counterattack, Hood withdrew from
Atlanta. Sherman then ordered a complete evacuation of the
civilian population of Atlanta. When the mayor of Atlanta
protested to the inhumanity of this action, Sherman replied,
“My orders are not designed to meet the humanities of the
case but to prepare for the future struggles … War is cruelty,
and you cannot refine it … You might as well appeal against
the thunder storm as against these terrible hardships of war”
(Doughy and Gruber 443). It would take the city of Atlanta
nearly one hundred years to fully restore and fix the aftereffects
of the damage done by Sherman in the summer of
1864. Sherman’s victory did, on the other hand, provide an
enormous boost in Union morale (Doughty and Gruber 441).
After finishing off Atlanta, General Sherman realized
the impact that Southern raids were having on his supplies.
Something had to be done, and in a letter to Ulysses Grant,
he proposed the famous “March to the Sea,” in which he
would seek the Confederate General Hood’s army. He concluded
this letter with the quote, “I can make the march, and
make Georgia howl” (Doughy and Gruber 444). On November
15, the Union army advanced and carved out a sixty-mile
wide path of destruction. One of Sherman’s men wrote home
to his family about the march, and this is what he said. “We
had a gay old campaign … Destroyed all we could not eat,
stole their niggers [sic], burned their cotton and gins, spilled
their sorghum, burned and twisted their R. Roads and raised
Hell generally” (Doughy and Gruber 444). These marches
traveled through Savanna, Georgia, and eventually lead all the
way through the Carolinas in equal and greater destruction.
They ruined Southern morale by not only destroying what
aided the army directly, but also by demolishing anything in
their path. Sherman’s march exemplified the concept of total

war perfectly.
Besides utterly devastating the morale of the South,
it has been argued that this action took the fight out of the
Confederate states and directly lead to the surrender at Appomattox
Court House. This can be considered quite a successful
plan by the Northerners. However, although successful,
the lack of morality is obviously a topic for discussion. Not
only did the march affect thousands of noncombatants, these
noncombatants were the actual target. Up to this point, warfare
had rarely seen attacks on those not involved in the war,
especially to this magnitude. It is even possible to compare
Sherman’s slaughter of the innocents to the slaughter of the
innocents by the Nazis in World War Two.
On the other hand, some might argue, didn’t the
positive outcome of the march, namely victory in war, far
outweigh the negative method in which it was carried out?
The proponents of this approach assume that the greatest
good was to win the way, no matter what means, strategies,
and tactics were used. The contradicting side would say that
this is entirely unjust, that all means leading to the outcome
must indeed be moral and just. Whichever side is taken, this
example proves the necessity of ethics in warfare.
Likewise, the Italian, Giulio Douhet, who continues
to have a far reaching impact on the strategy and development
of airpower, had a similar viewpoint to that of Sherman.
“The linkage between civilian morale and ending a conflict
was the key to Douhet’s theory of airpower” (Chun 28). In
all certainty, Douhet would have supported Sherman’s tactics
in the Civil War. Whereas Sherman would destroy everything
with his army, Douhet would destroy everything with airpower.
Douhet’s main purpose was strategic bombardment.
Besides advocating a war against civilians to break the will to
fight, Douhet also promoted the use of poison gas and incendiary
weapons. When discussing Guilio Douhet, how many
people talk about the ethics of his theories and not just the
theories themselves? Imagine if every war followed Douhet’s
theory of strategic bombardment of civilian populations; warfare
would be entirely different. Primary targets of oil refineries
and military headquarters would be changed to apartment
complexes and shopping malls. This would lead to the complete
lack of ethics in warfare.
One subject that continues to create an enormous
amount of debate is the use of nuclear weapons. The atomic
bomb was created and developed during the end of the
Second World War. During the attacks on Hiroshima and
Nagasaki, the unit charged with delivering the bomb was
Col. Paul Tibbetts’ 509 th Bombardment Group. The airmen
were well aware of their mission and the destructive power of
the atom bomb, and “there was some sentiment among the
airmen that the nuclear weapons ought not to be used” (Mets
67
302). Even those involved in the war itself need to have
vision of the morality of their actions.
Twenty years later, the American forces were in Vietnam
fighting a new type of warfare.
Besides obvious cases of unethical attacks, such as Mei Lai,
there are also cases where ethical decisions and situations are
totally ambiguous. A soldier, upon receiving fire on a routine
walk through a village, immediately turned to the direction of
the attack and replied with a couple rounds from his M-16.
He killed the assailant, and upon further inspection, what he
saw was extremely disturbing. On the ground lay a twelve
year old girl, her blood pooling beneath her as she still held
tight to the smoking rifle.
When is it ever ethical to kill a twelve year old girl?
Never? When she is attempting to take your life? Imagine
the soldier, who one day has to return home to his own
family, and his own daughter, and then will have to realize the
terrible nature of his actions. Was the soldier acting unethically
by returning fire on a child, or was the child unethical
for picking up that rifle? “Public opinion tends to focus
on the concrete reality of war and on the moral meaning of
killing and being killed” (Walzer 64). However, there are
numerous cases where the concrete reality of war and killing
crumbles to obscure ash.
If there is one overlaying moral principle, which
stands above all others, it would be that taking the life of
another human is absolutely immoral. Any domestic action
which results in the deliberate elimination of the life of
another is always punished. Warfare, conversely, allows situations
in which this deliberate elimination of life is permitted.
Because of this, it is absolutely necessary to define these situations,
and they are defined on the basis of ethics.
It is important to note that this paper does not decide
on whether the examples of warfare are or are not just. Many
differing perspectives and theories can be used in order to
accomplish that task. A situation can be considered ethical
or unethical depending on the reasoning of the individual.
This paper does, however, reflect on the importance of having
ethics in warfare, and also emphasizes why individuals in
warfare need to act justly and morally. Walzer sums up the
proposition of ethics in warfare properly when he says, “Until
wars are really fought with pawns, inanimate objects, and not
human beings, warfare cannot be isolated from moral life”
(Walzer 64).

Bibliography
Chun, Clayton K.S. Air and Space Power for the Twenty-
First Century. Carlisle Barracks,
Pennsylvania: Houghton Mifflin Custom Publishing,
2002.
Davidson, Donald. “The Development of the Just War Tradition.”
Moral Dimensions of the
Military Profession. Ed. Martha Wagner. Cincinnati,
Ohio: Thomson Learning Custom Publishing,
2001. 125-133.
Doughty, Robert A. and Gruber, Ira D. Warfare in the Western
World. Ed. Martin Lew.
Boston, MA: Houghton Mifflin Custom Publishing,
2001.
Kant, Immanuel. Grounding for the Metaphysics of Morals.
3 rd Ed. Indianapolis, Indiana:
Hackett Publishing Company, Inc., 1993.
Mets, David R. Master of Airpower: General Carl A. Spaatz.
Novato, CA: Presidio Press, 1988.
Rachels, James. “The Challenge of Cultural Relativism.”
Moral Dimensions of the Military
Profession. Ed. Martha Wagner. Cincinnati, Ohio:
Thomson Learning Custom Publishing, 2001. 49-
54.
Walzer, Michael. Just and Unjust Wars. Basic Books: New
York, 2000.
68
AIR CONTROL:
THE FALLACY OF COERCIVE AIR STRATEGY
IN BRITISH COLONIAL ADMINISTRATION,
1919-1924
C1C COLBY SULLINS
Airpower is not the silver bullet that will cheaply
and effectively win a war, even a very limited one; early airpower
theorists formulated this idea of airpower as a fast
and efficient panacea and propagated it throughout their
governments, erroneously touting the economy and effectiveness
of the British concept of “air control” used to police her
Middle Eastern colonies after World War I. Air control was
not, however, effective in every case, and those cases in which
it was effective were due primarily to causes other than the
effects of the bombs that were dropped. Making strategic
policy decisions based on a flawed and incomplete theory of
airpower coercion is therefore dangerous, and may very well
result in a prolonged escalation of involvement in a conflict
originally planned to be quick and decisive. Thus it is necessary
to determine the true causes for any successes enjoyed by
the Royal Air Force in its campaigns of air control in order to
obtain a more reliable framework for making good coercive
policy decisions.
PART I
INTRODUCTION TO COERCION
Carl von Clausewitz said, “War is an extension of
politics by other means 1 .” This means that military action
is but one of several tools that states may use to realize their
national strategic policies. The first of these tools is diplomatic,
the second is economic. The former is the most preferable,
discussing a conflict in an open forum in order to seek
a resolution that is mutually beneficial to both parties; the
latter requires a greater level of commitment, so before it can
be undertaken more consideration must be made regarding
the desired outcome. The economic tool uses a carrot-andstick
approach to conflict-resolution in which cooperation
is rewarded with favorable trade relations and opposition
is punished with unfavorable relations or even embargoes.
The third and most intensive policy tool is the military tool.
This involves the use of carefully applied violence to force
an adversary’s cooperation, either through coercion or the
exhaustion of the adversary’s defensive means. Of the three
policy tools, the military tool is the riskiest, most destructive,
and the hardest to resolve in the long-term sense. For these
reasons, it should be used as a last resort—yet it is all too
often one of the first tools used to impose the will of one government
upon another.

The political nature of war is essential to defining
violent conflict; war is not an end unto itself but a means by
which governments might attain some other end. Clausewitz
outlined the nature of war by likening it to a triad comprised
equally of three conflicting elements: the Government, the
People, and the Military, with war itself being the interaction
between the elements 2 . The Government represents control,
restraint; the People represents passion, mania, and loss of
control; the Military represents uncertainty, the fog of war,
the role of fate. These three interact, determining the nature
of the constantly evolving conflict.
The nature of war is fluid, constantly ebbing and flowing
between the three elements with varying degrees of intensity
based on the predominant element in the conflict. The
People element is ruled by emotion, passion, and ideology 3 .
It is the most basic and human of the three elements. Raw
passion blends seamlessly into hatred, hatred into cruelty, and
cruelty into brutality, terrorism, or worse. The People element
constantly tends to bring a conflict closer to the essential
nature of war: absolute, horrific violence 4 . Fortunately,
the other two elements are able to hold the People in check
and keep conflict more limited. The Military element might
also be called Fate 5 . Clausewitz called this the fog of war,
the confusion and uncertainty that guarantees that there can
be no guarantees. This entropy can dash a well thought out
strategy to pieces within days, hours, or even minutes after
a conflict begins. The confusion also serves to mitigate the
violence of human emotion on the battlefield. Fate serves
to limit the violence of the conflict, yet also makes it more
difficult to control forces and predict the outcome of the
conflict. The Government element is directed at control 6 . It
therefore tends to limit conflict, to keep the action at a lesser,
more manageable level. The more limited a conflict, the less
emotion is involved and the easier it is to prevent the conflict
from escalating unnecessarily. This allows the conflict to be
resolved with minimal cost in treasure and life. That is the
principle aim of coercion: accomplish national strategic goals
using the minimum force, resources, and treasure necessary.
There are two predominant theories governing the
application of force to affect strategic policy. The first, suggested
by Clausewitz, is called exhaustion 7 . It might also be
called annihilation, because it demands the absolute destruction
of the adversary’s defensive ability. The adversary, left
defenseless, will have no other recourse than to acquiesce.
Cooperation is thereby achieved and the conflict resolved.
Annihilation strikes at the ability of the adversary to resist.
This traditional method of conflict is very effective but tends
to be costly and time-consuming, and therefore is not very
efficient. The other theory, coercion, is designed to be much
faster and less costly. Coercion is a calculated process of hard-
69
hitting, precise attacks engineered to convince an adversary
that the costs of continuing non-cooperation greatly exceed
any benefits, thereby inducing the adversary to choose the
less-costly option, cooperation. Coercion strikes at the will of
the adversary to resist.
Robert Pape, in his book Bombing to Win: Air
Power and Coercion in War, outlines three basic strategies to
coerce an adversary. The first, punishment, strikes at the will
of the adversary by placing the adversary’s people in peril 8 .
The society itself is threatened with attack, siege, annihilation—any
means available that might frighten the people
into begging their leaders to end the conflict, thereby inducing
the adversary’s cooperation. The second strategy is called
risk strategy and aims at the will of the adversary by gradually
escalating the level of conflict in increments 9 . First, the threat
of escalation is made. Then, the level of conflict is increased
and the threat of further escalation is made. This goes on
until the adversary can no longer support further escalation
and chooses to acquiesce. The third strategy is called denial.
Denial strikes at the will of the adversary by attacking the
adversary’s military capability 10 . Denial differs from Clausewitzian
annihilation of the adversary’s forces because its aim
is not to completely disarm the adversary. On the contrary,
the more soldiers and materiel the adversary retains at the end
of the conflict, the more effective the denial strategy. Denial
seeks to induce the cooperation of the adversary by demonstrating
that the adversary’s military is no longer capable of
making a viable defense. Denial attacks the adversary’s military
strategy.
Enter the latest medium in which force is brought to
bear on an adversary: the air. Since the First World War, airpower
has offered many advantages over traditional groundbased
operations. Air operations are inherently offensive in
nature—they take the fight to the adversary and keep the
war away from the people at home. Air operations are by
nature faster than ground operations, and provide the ability
to attack, with surprise, virtually anywhere on the battlefield,
beyond the front lines, and even into the very heart of the
adversary’s capital. Airpower is extremely flexible, which
means that it may be used in a wide variety of situations to
engage any number of different types of targets. Fewer lives
are put at risk in air operations than in ground operations.
Airpower is tailor-made to inflict fast, precision damage with
great cost to the adversary at comparatively low cost. All of
this makes airpower extremely attractive in undertaking a
coercive strategy.
If airpower is used as the means of applying force, all
of Pape’s coercive strategies simply become coercive air strategies
11 . A punishment air strategy inflicts maximum force on
the civilian population, pushing their endurance to the break-

ing point. A risk air strategy attacks military and civilian targets
on a very limited scale at first, but incrementally increases
in intensity until the adversary must submit. A denial air
strategy is achieved by three distinct methods: direct support
to ground forces, strategic interdiction, and operational
interdiction 12 . The first of these, direct support, is essentially
close air support and is most effective in conflicts where the
battle lines are static as in World War I or the Korean War.
The second method, strategic interdiction, is meant to slowly
and systematically destroy the critical components of an
adversary’s industrial base and sever the production of war
materiel. The third method is operational interdiction. This
aims to cut off logistical support to the adversary’s operational
forces and is most effective in fluid-front conflicts where the
two combatant forces require a great deal of consumables in
order to fight, such as fuel and ammunition. When using
airpower to achieve coercion, Pape argues that another strategy
is possible that could not be used otherwise: a strategy of
decapitation 13 . This calls for two possible options in targeting.
The most common coincides with a theory proposed by
John Warden in which the primary series of targets should
be designed to separate commanders from their troops in the
field, sowing confusion and rendering an adversary’s military
forces ineffective 14 . The other, less common option calls for
a deliberate attack against the leader of the adversarial state in
the hope that any successor will be more willing to cooperate.
All of the coercive strategies of Robert Pape have one
thing in common: coercion is a military option, and the use
of force in coercion is a forgone conclusion. The success or
failure of coercive policies depends solely on the political wills
and military abilities of the two primary adversaries in the
conflict.
Daniel Byman, with the help of Matthew Waxman
and Eric Larson, argues a somewhat more dynamic theory
of coercion than that of Robert Pape in the book Airpower
as a Coercive Instrument. Coercion is no longer regarded
as just a simple cost/benefit analysis, but something a little
more complicated. It is not a yes/no proposition, it does not
have a certain start or stop time, there is no real success or
failure and both sides may get all, some, or none of what they
desired initially, and political and economic factors become
real considerations in formulating a coercive strategy 15 .
Coercion, according to Byman, is not simply a manner by
which to employ military force. Coercion is the use of the
threat of force, possibly backed by actual force and combined
with political and economic means, to induce the adversary
to change some behavior. There are two types of coercion.
Compellance coercion seeks to persuade an adversary to cease
a behavior, and deterrence coercion seeks to ensure that an
adversary does not begin an undesirable behavior 16 . Deter-
70
rence, in turn, has two distinct types: general, or long-term,
deterrence aims to prevent an action whether it is planned by
an adversary or not, and immediate deterrence that seeks to
prevent an imminent, planned action 17 .
Byman’s concept of coercion has many factors which
determine how successful coercion will be. The first is escalation
dominance 18 . In a conflict, the party with the ability to
control the escalation of the conflict will win. This ability to
control the level of intensity of a conflict depends on credibility,
pressure, capacity, and will. It is vital an adversary believes
that any threats will be carried out. Pressure must be maintained
so that the adversary does not have the ability to counter
any escalation in intensity. The capacity to follow through
with any escalation, the military ability to make good on any
threatened escalation, is every bit as important to deciding
the level of escalation as the political will to see it through.
Escalation dominance as a factor of coercion resembles Pape’s
theory of a risk strategy; however, escalation according to
Byman does not necessarily mean increasing pressure on civilians.
Rather, coercion is the sum product of several different
factors in which the will of the populace—the populace of the
coercer as well as that of the adversary—is only a small factor,
the domestic factor. The military abilities of the two parties
are also only a factor. Additional factors include, but are
not limited to, coalitions or alliances, non-state actors, economic
factors, over-arching strategic goals, religious or social
mores, international media coverage, even weather, climate,
or season. All of these play a role in the ability of one state to
coerce another. The challenge, then, is to determine to what
extent each of the many variables will affect the adversary’s
decision to continue opposition and manipulate the factors in
order to attain the most favorable position possible. It is also
important to remember that, according to Byman, the coercer
may very well end the conflict in a worse position than that
when the conflict started.
One might sum up the definition of coercion by say
that it is the threat of force, as well as the actual use of force,
used in conjunction with political and economic actions,
meant to induce an adversary into cooperation. It does this
by persuading that adversary to refrain from beginning some
undesired behavior or ending an undesired behavior that is
currently being done by the adversary. Airpower coercion,
then, might be said to be the use of airpower, by means of
punishment, risk, decapitation, or denial strategies, to coerce
an adversary using weaponry and shock value. It is essential
to take into careful consideration the many variables affecting
the particular strategic situation and attempt to exploit them
to some advantage against the adversary. Airpower is the most
cost-effective means, in terms of lives, time, and treasure, of
ensuring escalation dominance, the key to coercion.

Why is coercion important, however? Wars are
slow and brutal. Wars require men and materiel, both of
which will be lost. Wars require commitment on the part of
the political leadership and the national will to support the
leadership’s decisions. Most importantly of all, wars require
time. With time, all of the aforementioned components dissipate
away towards nothing—men are lost, there exists only
so much materiel, the national will can easily turn against
the war, and, most importantly to democratic societies, if the
will of the people is lost the political leadership can quickly
change. Time, in war, is the enemy of all. Coercion seeks to
deprive time of its power by making conflict fast and costeffective
in terms of both men and materiel. The sheer speed
of coercion, combined with its economy, ensures that national
will and thus political commitment will last the duration
of the conflict. Coercion strategies, properly undertaken,
thereby increase the odds that a conflict will end in success for
the government that elects to use military force as the means
by which to attain its strategic aims.
PART II
SETTING THE STAGE: BRITAIN AT THE END OF
THE FIRST WORLD WAR
During the First World War, over ten million young men
from around the world lost their lives from the skies over
Great Britain to the mountains of northern Italy, from the
western borders of Russia to the Hellespont, and south into
the deserts of Palestine and Mesopotamia and everything in
between 19 . The prolonged war of attrition consumed the
economies of Europe for four years, leaving a shattered wreck
of the prosperity that had been before the war. In 1918, the
world was further wracked by a plague of influenza that killed
over twenty-one million people in a matter of months 20 . In
Russia, a revolution was underway in the name of a political
ideology called communism, and the class-based strife threatened
to erupt spontaneously throughout Europe. German
soldiers returned home to find their country on the very brink
of civil war, their country’s economy in ruins, and their prospects
for the future grim indeed. France found itself rebuilding
hundreds of miles of utterly blasted countryside while
dealing with an army of hundreds of thousands of former
conscripts flooding a job market that simply was no longer
there. Great Britain also struggled to find itself anew, demobilizing
its vast forces, restructuring its economy, and trying
to find a balance of power between the radically differing
political parties struggling for control.
Great Britain’s situation, however, was somewhat more
delicate even still. After the defeat of the Turks and the dissolution
of the Ottoman Empire, Great Britain found itself with
a mandate to manage colonial holdings that almost doubled
the size of the Empire before the war 21 . The power struggle
71
within Parliament rose ever-higher in pitch and intensity, and
the battle lines between the Labour Party and the conservatives
were drawn along the issue of military spending 22 . Britain
emerged from World War I with almost twice the area to
control as before, but with less than half the military budget
and many fewer troops. The Empire, its money, and its forces
were all spread dangerously thin.
During the war, Great Britain had managed to
develop a separate air arm, the Royal Air Force. Early on,
the Ministry of Armaments decided that command and control
of air assets could best be obtained by way of a separate
command structure working in close concert with the Army
and the Navy. The first real commander of the air service
was General Jan Smuts, a South African who realized that
airpower had the potential to be much more than simply a
weapon to augment the power of the Army and the Navy.
Working closely with then-Prime Minister David Lloyd
George, the two created an Air Ministry and laid the foundation
for the Royal Flying Corps 23 . The second commander
was General Hugh Trenchard. He picked up the reigns where
Smuts left off—creating a functional organizational structure
based on centralized command and decentralized execution
in which air support for the ground forces in France would be
coordinated at higher staff levels and the orders would trickle
down to the individual squadron level to be carried out 24 .
Trenchard left his position in command of the air service in
France in early 1918 and became the Chief of the Air Staff.
Trenchard’s successor, General John Salmond, took up control
of the air service in France when the Royal Flying Corps
and the Royal Naval Air Service became one entity, the Royal
Air Force, in April of 1918. Salmond focused on directing
the RAF into an offensive arm, striking back at Germany in
reprisal for attacks on London and focusing heavily on providing
air support for ground offensives 25 . Salmond’s brother,
General Geoffrey Salmond, commanded the air forces in the
Middle East, and played a pivotal role in the development of
the unique concepts of air support that would later be used by
Trenchard to formulate his theory of Air Control.
After the war, the Ministry of Armaments was dismantled
and the purging of the defense budget began. At the
end of the war, the RAF consisted of 30,000 officers, 263,410
enlisted members, 23,000 aircraft, 401 aerodromes in Great
Britain and 274 overseas, and a total of 185 operational
squadrons 26 . Prime Minister Lloyd George found himself
dealing with civil war in Ireland, an uneasy and suspicious
relationship with Britain’s former ally France, and greatlyincreased
expanse of colonial territory that was as peaceful
now as it had been during the war, all while trying to reduce
military spending and appease the rumblings of the War
Office, the Admiralty, and the Labour Party. The Royal Air

Force found itself in a fight for survival.
PART III
GENERAL HUGH TRENCHARD
Fortunately for the Royal Air Force, Winston
Churchill was named Air Minister—a political hot potato at
the time—as the price for also being given the War Office. 27
Churchill asked Trenchard to come back as the Chief of the
Air Staff after he had resigned due to a dispute with a former
Air Minister. Trenchard agreed, and immediately went about
saving the Royal Air Force from the Army, the Navy, and the
Parliament.
Trenchard’s solution was twofold: create a peacetime
mission for the RAF that could not be accomplished by the
Army or by the Navy, and establish a strong, well-trained
cadre of officers, pilots, and maintenance personnel while
focusing on research and development into better aircraft
technology. This small, highly-trained core of experienced
personnel could weather the storm of post-war cutbacks in
the greatly reduced Royal Air Force, but could immediately
train a larger force to use the new and improved weapons systems
once the money was available to fund it all 28 .
General Trenchard is known best to historians for
his role in the formation of the independent RAF, and for his
theories regarding the role of strategic bombing. Trenchard
was himself a devoted believer in the absolute necessity of
close concert between air and ground forces. However, in
1918 and 1919 he found himself in the unique position of
defending the very survival of the air force he had worked so
hard to build. It is not surprising that he began to report to
Parliament that strategic air power could be utilized in some
future conflict as a means of shortening the war and limiting
its costs. However, strategic bombing alone would not have
saved the Royal Air Force from being delivered piecemeal
back into the eager control of the Army and Navy—after all,
following the First World War, it did not appear to Parliament
that there were any more great wars to fight 29 . France was the
closest thing to an adversary, and it seemed unlikely that there
would be any great conflict for another twenty years. There
was therefore no immediate need for strategic bombers.
However, there was an urgent need to pacify the vast
Empire-Commonwealth. During the war, Great Britain’s
entire attention had been devoted to fighting Germany and
the Ottoman Turks in the many different theaters of the
war. In the meantime, renegades and rebellions rose up and
began challenging Great Britain’s authority around the world.
Estimates made by the Army put the costs of pacifying the
smallest of these rebellions, in Somaliland, at two divisions
of regular troops and an entire railway system constructed to
move them around 30 . Trenchard saw in this an opportunity
72
to forge a real, tangible mission for the Royal Air Force that
would keep it alive: air control.
The essence of air control was an extremely mobile,
highly flexible force comprised of flying squadrons and levies
of local and colonial troops. The flying squadrons would provide
for their own base defense, and would also be equipped
with an equal number of armoured cars as aircraft 31 . This
would give the squadrons equal hitting power on the ground
and from the air. Combined with battalions of low-cost colonial
conscripts to provide the bulk of the ground forces and
to augment aerodrome defense, each squadron could offer the
fighting power of an entire division at a small fraction of the
cost. Furthermore, the inherent advantages of airpower—
speed, flexibility, offense, and surprise—would be present at
no extra charge. Army divisions would need such air support,
anyway.
It is interesting to note that Trenchard’s plan for Air
Control at first glance refers only to air power, but after closer
examination is heavily reliant upon ground forces. This is in
contrast to the popularly held belief that Trenchard advocated
an airpower-only approach to conflict 32 . Perhaps one of the
major reasons why the role of ground forces used in Great
Britain’s campaigns of Air Control was understated by those
praising the colonial victories was the political significance of
the Royal Air Force’s successes. Churchill was Air Minister,
and in 1921 he left the War Office to become head of the
Colonial Office 33 . Any successes the RAF had in administering
the colonies, especially by itself with minimal help from
the Army, reflected all the brighter upon Winston Churchill.
Regardless, Air Control was effective for the sum of
its parts, the aircraft, the armoured car detachments, and the
battalions of local levied troops that provided the anvil for the
hammer of the two more mobile elements. Not long after
Trenchard began building his Air Control squadrons, Great
Britain had its first opportunity to try airpower as a means
of defending its colonial power. The Third Afghan War had
begun.
PART IV
AFGHANISTAN
The abdication of the Tsar of Russia in 1917 and the
ensuing revolution inspired the hereditary ruler of Afghanistan,
the Amir Ammanullah, to seize power in 1918 and
renounce all treaty obligations that Afghanistan had made
with Great Britain following the Second Afghan War in
1880 34 . The Amir believed that, after four long years of terrible
and bloody war, Great Britain would not be willing to
put up any real defense. The time was ripe for an invasion of
northern India.
The Amir began his invasion of India with over

50,000 regular troops. The army of Afghanistan was small,
but Ammanullah relied on the might of his irregular forces,
the warrior tribesman that comprised over sixty percent of
Afghanistan’s population, to swell the ranks to match the
combined British and Indian force of 150,000 troops 35 . The
war initially went very well for the Amir. His forces smashed
through British outposts along the border and captured
strong positions in rough terrain that could be held by the
resourceful Afghan troops indefinitely. The Afghans advanced
relentlessly the first week of the war until they finally met the
main British and Indian force 36 . The war bogged down into a
stalemate, the two sides battering each other mercilessly.
Enter the Royal Air Force. Though there were only
two operational squadrons in India at the time, aircraft from
both joined the conflict. They provided air support for troops
engaged in mountain-fighting, reconnaissance and intelligence
for commanders with no accurate maps of the region,
and even ferried supplies to troops surrounded in isolated
mountaintop defensive positions 37 . The Royal Air Force
even attempted limited strategic bombing. One raid, against
the major Afghan city of Jalalabad, managed to set aflame
the entire military quarter of the city while the garrison was
conducting a parade for visiting tribesmen 38 . The tribesmen,
numbering in the thousands, became uncontrollable in
the ensuing confusion and looted the city. This might have
served to convince the Amir that his tribesmen were not reliable
and their allegiance was beginning to fade, but he probably
already knew that prior to the bombing raid. The other
major raid was conducted against the capital of Afghanistan,
Kabul. British pilots dropped several bombs on the city, with
four of them striking the grounds of the Amir’s Palace, and
one of actually causing damage to the roof 39 . Soon after the
bombing of Kabul, the Amir began negotiating an end to
hostilities.
Within four weeks of the invasion of India, around
the same time as the raids on Kabul and Jalalabad, the British
and Indian forces had regained nearly all of the territory
lost in the first week of the war 40 . The combined force, with
340,000 troops, was poised to invade Afghanistan when
a peace settlement was agreed upon and the war ended.
Afghanistan had achieved independence from the last remaining
vestiges of British control left over from the Second
Afghan War, while Great Britain had gained a little territory
from Afghanistan. At only four weeks long, the Third Afghan
War was the bloodiest and most arduous in Britain’s history of
colonial warfare 41 .
British airpower enthusiasts at the time pointed to
the critical role the two operational RAF squadrons played
in shortening the war. They cited the air support operations
conducted to help the situation on the ground, the vital
73
importance of aerial reconnaissance, and the impact of the
strategic bombing raids in coercing Amir Ammanullah to agree
to a peace settlement 42 .
Coercion strategies achieved by means of strategic
bombing raids? Contemporary theories on strategic bombing
were based upon what Pape would call, at their most discriminative,
strategic interdiction and, by far the most popular,
punishment strategies. In terms of coercive airpower, the
RAF conducted operations in keeping with the great theories
of the age. The bombing raids on Kabul and Jalalabad were
meant to inflict damage on the population, thereby destroying
their will to support the war in a classic punishment
strategy. Strikes were made against the war-production capacity
of Afghanistan, trying to eliminate the munitions factory
in Kabul as part of a limited strategic interdiction strategy.
Finally, the bombs dropped on the Amir’s palace were done as
part of a deliberate, if ineffective, decapitation strategy. The
most effective coercion strategy, however, was the use of British
airpower in the role of direct support to the British ground
forces.
Airpower played a vital role in the support of the
British ground offensive, and probably made the war much
less costly than it otherwise would have been by providing
close air support and aerial resupply to British and Indian
troops high in the mountains. At the time, there were no useable
maps of the region 43 . The reconnaissance aircraft using
aerial photography to “build” maps doubtless saved thousands
of lives for the British and shortened the war by years. To
credit the end of the war to two attempts at strategic bombing
raids, however, might be stretching things a bit. The
Amir was beginning to lose his hold on the loose confederation
of warrior-tribesmen that represented the bulk of his
force. Their poor discipline was made frighteningly evident
by the looting of Jalalabad. This loss of control over what was
essentially two-thirds of his army was no doubt all the more
worrisome to the Amir as the British forces poised along the
borders of Afghanistan swelled to over 340,000, three times
as many troops as the Amir had even before he began losing
control of his tribesmen.
This is where the absolute importance of what
Byman called “escalation dominance” comes into account.
The British forces were poised along the border between India
and Afghanistan, waiting only for the word from their leaders
to spring into the offensive. The Afghans, however, had no
option by the fourth week of war but to defend their territory
from the inevitable crush of the British forces. Thus, the British
had the power to control the pitch of the conflict more so
than the Afghans. The Afghans failed to see that the British
would be unable to sustain such a massive conflict for more
than a mere few weeks, or the Amir might have opted for a

prolonged guerilla conflict. Instead, he saw only the British
force of 340,000 troops and the will of the British commanders
in India to invade and chose to end the conflict.
It seems that in light of the other factors affecting
the war in its fourth week, it is more than reasonable to
surmise that the real winner of the Third Afghan War, as in
the two Afghan Wars that preceded it, was ground power.
The ground forces were greatly supported by the RAF, but
these only increased the abilities of the ground troops. Furthermore,
the logistical situation in India by the end of
the war was so over-extended that the same two squadrons
were unable to sortie sufficient aircraft to put down a tribal
rebellion that flared up the following year in a region called
Waziristan 44 . In Afghanistan, ground operations and the
political will to initiate a ground invasion were the effective
policy tools, with air power providing some backup.
PART V
SOMALILAND
Since 1884, the British controlled a colony in the
northern part of the Horn of Africa, from which they were
able to control the Gulf of Aden and ensure the safe passage
of shipping into and out of the Red Sea. This colony
was called Somaliland. Prior to British administration, it
had belonged to Egypt and to Abyssinia—Ethiopia—before
that. In 1905, control of Somaliland was transferred from the
Indian Office to the Colonial Office. The same year, a Somali
warlord named Mohammed bin Abdullah Hassan, began
his first war against the British authorities. He spent a year
rampaging through the eastern areas of Somaliland before
he was finally brought under some measure of control. He
struck out again in 1910, this time staging raids and hit-andrun
attacks throughout the colony before disappearing into
Somalia, 45 also located on the Horn of Africa but to the south
of Somaliland. Both territories now make up what is known
simply as Somalia.
By now known as the Mad Mullah by the British
authorities for his many eccentricities and his barbarism to
his victims, Hassan took advantage of the Great War to wage
his own war 46 . Uniting several tribes together, Hassan began
his campaign of pillaging along the eastern tip of the Horn,
bringing the entire area under his control. The British colonial
governor levied and trained extensive forces to combat
the warlord. By the end of the Great War colonial forces
had wrested control away from Hassan once again, and what
remained of his army fled with him once again into Somalia
47 . The majority of the colonial forces were then disbanded,
retaining only the Somali Camel Corps, an elite, fast-moving
battalion of five-hundred men and camels 48 . Then, in 1920,
the Mad Mullah returned and began pillaging in southern
74
Somaliland. Lord Milner, Secretary of the Colonial Office
called upon Winston Churchill—at the time the Secretary of
the War Office—for aid in bringing Hassan to ground once
and for all.
Churchill first posed the question of solving the
Somaliland problem to the Army. The responded with the
suggestion of two divisions of troops, with at least one of
those being of regulars, and a railroad to be constructed in
territory taken by the British to ensure that future uprisings
could be quashed quickly and easily 49 . Almost as an afterthought,
the Army requested a squadron of aircraft from
the Royal Air Force to support them. Churchill was reluctant
to accept this expensive plan, and turned to the Chief
of his other service, the Air Ministry, General Trenchard.
Trenchard’s Air Control squadrons were ready, and he suggested
that they be used along with forces already in the
area. One squadron of twelve DH-9 light-bombers, an equal
number of vehicles in an armoured car squadron, a battalion
of King’s African Rifles comprising the light infantry element,
and the 500-man strong Camel Corps were the regular forces
available 50 . A levy of 1,500 troops would be used to supply
base defense and garrison known water-holes. All forces were
in place by January of 1921.
Almost immediately, the war turned against Hassan.
The very mobile forces of the Camel Corps and the squadron’s
armoured cars were more than capable of keeping pace
with Hassan’s raiding forces, while aircraft kept the Mullah
under constant surveillance and ceaseless harassment by aerial
bombardment and machine-gun fire. The hammer-and-anvil
of the aircraft, the mobile ground forces, and the battalion of
African Rifles proved too much for Hassan, who fled to his
fortress at Tale in Somalia 51 . The British forces pursued and
captured the fortress by early February. The Mad Mullah fled
to Abyssinia with a handful of followers, where they were all
killed by local tribesmen later that year. The total cost of the
war was a mere £77,000, touted by airpower advocates as the
cheapest war in colonial history 52 .
Yet, how effective was airpower in coercing Hassan
to flee from his forces and his Somali fortress and escape to
Abyssinia where his eccentric behavior could get him killed?
For over fifteen years, colonial troops—mostly from the elite
Camel Corps—had been battling Hassan’s camel-mounted
army in a campaign based on an aggressive denial strategy.
By destroying Hassan’s forces, the British hoped to remove
his will to continue fighting. By 1920, Hassan’s forces were
a mere shadow of their former strength, and the Mad Mullah
himself was in his fifties—old to be galloping around on
a camel battling the world 53 . The importance of Hassan’s
age—quite old for a Somali warlord—cannot be overemphasized
as a factor affecting his eventual abandonment of his

forces. Airpower was a shock to the forces of Hassan, and
their constant harassment using small bombs and machinegun
fire no doubt made the going a little rougher on the old
man and his weary troops; against such constant harassment,
Hassan’s hit-and-fade strategy was torn to shreds. However,
more than anything else it was Hassan’s inability to make a
decent camp near water because of the constant harassment
from the Camel Corps, the armoured car detachment, the
King’s African Rifle battalion, and the 1,500 conscripted
troops who were guarding all of the water wells in Somaliland
that compelled him to seek refuge in his fortress, as he had
done in years past 54 . Pape would call this strategy operational
interdiction, keeping Hassan’s forces away from the resources
essential to their war effort. Pape, however, argued that
this was an airpower strategy. Air control achieved success
through operational interdiction utilizing ground forces.
Hassan’s numbers were greatly reduced when the
British forces surrounded his fortress, and he was in no condition
to wait out a siege and still survive the inevitable assault
that would follow. Furthermore, at over fifty years of age,
Hassan was beginning to feel the strain of constant fighting
and fleeing. Therefore, I argue that while airpower was effective
in increasing the pressure on Hassan and denying him his
fast-paced hit-and-run strategy, without the mobile ground
forces constantly harassing the Mullah and keeping him from
water there is no way that he could be induced to abandon
his forces. Coercion, if it was achieved at all, was achieved
through ground power interdicting vital water supplies and
providing the threat of further punishment to Hassan and the
meager scraps of his raiders.
PART VI
MESOPOTAMIA
The British took control of Mesopotamia, which
would later be known as Iraq, during the First World War.
The British ground offensive to take the Ottoman Turk territory
began in what is now known as Kuwait. The British
charged northwards and took the port city of Basra, from
which they were able to resupply their offensive as it moved
northwards along the Tigris River 55 . While support operations
were being conducted by special operations forces, comprised
of Arab tribesmen led by British officers, to control the
western part of Mesopotamia, the bulk of the British mechanized
advance moved steadily on towards Baghdad until
the offensive was halted on the outskirts of Al Kut 56 . The
Royal Air Force came to the aid of the beleaguered ground
forces, allowing them to break through the Turkish lines and
take Baghdad, the principal city of the region. The British
continued advancing northwards and were stopped again in
early 1918 at the city of Kirkuk 57 . A terrible battle ensued,
75
and the majority of British forces, outnumbered and cut-off,
were forced to surrender. In the summer of 1918, the British
launched a new offensive from Baghdad, relying more heavily
on mobile armoured car companies and air support 58 . The
British smashed through the Turkish lines, blew past Kirkuk
and captured Mosul, the northernmost city in Mesopotamia
and the last city before the Turkish border. Turkey sued for
peace and the war came to an end in the Middle East.
Or so it seemed on paper. The British signed a peace
treaty with the Sultan of Turkey, and as far as the Sultan was
concerned all of his territories in Mesopotamia, Transjordan,
Palestine, Syria, and Egypt were lost. There was, however,
no peace for the colonial administration of the Protectorate
of Mesopotamia 59 . Baghdad was a safe city for the British,
heavily defended by whole divisions of Indian troops and
several battalions of British regulars. Additionally, there were
still multiple squadrons of attack and pursuit aircraft in the
region, left over from the Great War. The regions around
Baghdad, however, belonged to no man and immediately
became an area of unrest and rebellion. Renegade raiding
parties belonging to warlord chieftains began attacking other
tribes and British officials. Shiite and Sunni clerics, interested
in their own personal power base, began trying to rouse
public support against the British and against each other. Terrorist
attacks and brutal massacres of small Imperial defense
forces and British administrators became common, forcing
the British into the safety of Baghdad, Mosul, and Basra, leaving
the rest of the country to itself 60 .
To make matters worse, Bolshevik agents from the
Soviet Union infiltrated into Mesopotamia from the former
Russian territory of Northern Persia and began to fund
nationalist rebellions against the British in the east 61 . Agents
of the young Turkish revolutionary, Kemal Ataturk, penetrated
into northern Mesopotamia into a region known as
Kurdistan. Supplying some funding and munitions to the
Kurds, Turkish agents began trying to inflame the Kurdish
chieftains to rise up and fight the British to obtain an
independent Kurdistan 62 . By 1920, there were over 130,000
tribesmen violently under arms around the region 63 . British
forces suddenly found themselves desperately huddled atop
scant high ground with the flood waters of civil war rising up
around their ankles.
The British garrison in Mesopotamia was raised
to 17,000 British regulars and 85,000 Indian troops. The
estimated annual cost of supporting these forces rose to £30
million 64 . Winston Churchill had been placed in charge of
the Colonial Office following the brilliant success of the Air
Ministry in controlling Somalia, and now called a meeting
of all of the regional governors to decide what could be done
about the Middle East. In regards to Mesopotamia, it was

decided that Amir Feisal would be made King of the wartorn
protectorate. Feisal was brother to Amir Abdullah, King
of neighboring Transjordan. Churchill believed that it was
vitally important that Amir Feisal be chosen by the people
of Mesopotamia, which would be renamed Iraq, in order for
him to truly have sovereignty65 the first time, was Air Control truly effective in coercing the
Kurds to abandon their rebellion. Though the armoured car
companies were helpful to the flying squadrons, the rocky
terrain made it difficult for the vehicles to keep pace with the
fast-moving mounted Kurdish warriors. However, the sheer
. In order to achieve support number of planes available to Salmond—eight full squadrons
for Feisal, it was necessary to put down the rebellions. with excellent logistical support, as opposed to one squadron
The many divisions based in Mesopotamia by the in both Somaliland and Afghanistan with hit-or-miss logis-
end of 1921 began going about rounding up the more militics—allowed air power to be supplied with much greater
tant renegades and bringing them to justice. The less militant
leaders and clerics were bribed into cooperation by the British
administration 66 . With several additional squadrons from
the Royal Air Force providing reconnaissance, air support,
and aerial resupply, the British forces were able to destroy
the larger concentrations of renegade forces. Soon, the initial
furor that had caused so many rebellions abated and the
tribesmen and villagers lost interest. By 1922, the region was
mostly pacified except for parts of Kurdistan, and many village
referendums were held in which Amir Feisal was chosen
for their King 67 . Feisal was a gifted negotiator, and his com-
76
force and effectiveness.
Air forces, using machine guns and small-diameter
bombs, were directed against war parties of Kurdish horsemen
moving in the open. The massed airpower was very effective
at inflicting losses 71 . Airpower, practically by itself, ended
the forays and raids by the Kurdish rebels through coercive
methods. The tribes still maintained several warriors—who
still conducted raids from time to time, and still do to this
day—but the rebellion was ended. Therefore, in subduing
Kurdistan, the hammer-and-anvil denial strategy of Air Con-
mand presence demanded the respect and obedience of all the
tribal chieftains he met with68 . Peace finally came to Mesopotamia,
and the process of drafting a constitution and beginning
self-rule began in earnest.
The bulk of the British ground forces in Mesopotamia
returned to India, leaving behind nine battalions of
British and Indian infantry, eight flying squadrons with six
armoured car companies as support, and the local levies of
Iraqi troops69 . These were tasked with dealing with the last
remaining renegade forces in the north. These forces were
predominantly Kurdish tribesmen urged on by the Turks to
fight for an independent Kurdistan, and they were supported
by Turkish advisors and even companies of Turkish troops70 trol was effective as a coercive air strategy.
In regards to pacifying the rest Mesopotamia, however,
once again it was not airpower alone that made it work.
Although the costs of putting down the rebellions dropped
considerably from £30 million in 1922 to £3 million by
1923, it was still the 120,000 troops of the British forces
that managed to quash the more militant leaders and clerics
.
General Geoffrey Salmond, head of the Air Service in the
Middle East during the Great War, had administered the air
support operations that had enabled the ground forces to reassert
control in Mesopotamia. He now turned his attention
to applying the hammer-and-anvil of Air Control to dealing
with the sporadic fighting in the north.
In this, the mobile ground forces of the armoured
car companies worked in concert with the flying squadrons
to harass and weaken Kurdish war parties and Turkish troop
incursions both of them utilizing denial strategies to destroy
the rebel forces coupled with operational interdiction sorties
to deny the rebels access to food, munitions, and information.
Meanwhile, other armoured car detachments worked
in concert with levies of Iraqi troops to occupy Kurdish territory
and flush out renegades in the guerilla-warfare equivalent
of strategic interdiction, denying the renegades access to
their greatest logistical base. It may be argued that here, for
72 . The more moderate leaders and clerics were bought
by the administration, and their subsequent support further
helped the British cause73 . The single most important factor,
however, in pacifying and controlling Mesopotamia was the
installation of Amir Feisal as King. No longer could the scattered
tribes unite to fight some foreign control apparatus in
the form of the British Colonial Office, but rather united
under their charismatic King and began working to form a
viable self-rule with their own constitution. With King Feisal
governing in the place of a colonial governor, Britain was able
to win the hearts and minds of the majority of the people of
Mesopotamia and the widespread cooperation allowed Britain
to rebuild the country better than it had been under the
Ottoman Turks. It is certainly interesting to note that the
most effective means of coercion, to date, involved very, very
little force and a very, very great amount of diplomacy.
In pacifying the Kurds in the north, and in 1923
putting down a small jihad led by a renegade Iraqi magistrate
named Sheik Mahmud who proclaimed himself King of
Kurdistan74 , the winner was airpower alone. Fast, maneuverable,
and hard-hitting, the eight squadrons of Mesopotamia
under General Salmond were able to smash any organized
rebel forces before they could do any damage. The mobile
squadrons of armoured cars provided the effective ground

ase to mop up after the airpower had finished, cutting off
the renegades from their strategic logistics bases in their own
villages and in Turkey. This effective combination, combined
with waning support from the Turks, persuaded the Kurds to
cease their rebellion and turn instead to conducting sporadic
raids on one another.
PART VII
LESSONS TO BE LEARNED
In controlling the very-different situations in the
three colonies mentioned, there were certain over-arching
measures which proved effective. Among them was the close
coordination between ground forces and air forces. At one
time, ground forces alone might have been able to do the
job, but at the cost of hundreds of millions of pounds and
hundreds of thousands of lives lost. After the Great War, the
British people would never have supported such endeavors,
military action would have ended in failure and political
fiasco, and it is likely the colonies would simply have been
left to fend for themselves. Airpower allowed the British
commanders the ability to strike hard and fast, with good
reconnaissance and aerial intelligence, with accurate and
timely air support in harsh and mountainous terrain where
artillery could not be used, and even with resupply. The
mobile ground forces of the armoured car detachments and
squadrons worked very well to complement the attacks of the
flying squadrons, creating a hammer-and-anvil that gave the
adversary no rest from denial-based attack and operational
interdiction. This is in keeping with the concepts of coercion:
constant pressure keeps the adversary from developing
new strategies or counterstrategies. Meanwhile, the adversary
has no ability to escalate the situation while friendly air
and ground forces are constantly maneuvering to deny the
adversary even the slightest hope of success. The adversary is
compelled to cease the conflict, though the actual ability to
continue resistance may very well be present.
Measures which were tried but which did not work
were the use of ground forces by themselves, and the use of
airpower by itself. The ground forces, for example in Somaliland,
simply did not have the information or the speed to
bring Hassan’s raids to an end without the use of airpower or
without ensnaring the Empire Commonwealth in a brutal
quagmire of slow attrition warfare. In Somaliland, the Royal
Air Force’s constant denial and decapitation campaign against
Hassan and his raiding forces wrested away the one advantage
that Hassan had possessed in his earlier conflicts against
ground forces—his mobility and stealth.
However, neither could coercive airpower strategies
alone end any conflicts. In Afghanistan, although strategic
bombing raids were conducted against the armaments factory
77
in Jalalabad—strategic interdiction—and against the palace of
Amir Ammanullah—decapitation—the war did not end until
the 340,000 ground troops of the British forces were about to
invade Afghan territory.
This is critical—all too often airpower is seen as the
more sanitary, cost-effective means of coercing an enemy.
However, such an approach lacks the teeth that give coercion
its real bite—the believable threat of escalation. With
airpower, the limit to the level of escalation that is possible is
using nuclear weapons, and unfortunately that level of escalation
is reached decidedly soon in the coercion process. Trying
to assess a probability of success in nuclear coercion begins to
enter heavily into games theory and brinksmanship—psychology,
sociology, and social calculus, desperately attempting to
see how close the opponent will go towards total annihilation.
Suffice to say, with nuclear weapons coercive air strategies
cease to be, and thus may reasonably be termed a failure of
airpower coercion. Ground forces, however, retain almost
limitless escalation. After all, a young soldier occupying an
adversary’s street corner has the ability to do quite a bit more,
overall, than a pilot flying at twenty-thousand feet.
It can therefore be concluded that coercive air strategies—in
effect, using airpower alone to achieve coercion in
any of the many forms outlined by Pape and Byman—will
not work against a determined adversary, especially one who
has military training and whose people are also well-acclimated
to warfare. Only through the use of coordinated air
and ground forces working in close concert might coercion be
achieved. Airpower may be used to affect a denial-strategy on
the adversary’s military capabilities while razing the logistical
base of the adversary’s forces through operational interdiction,
while ground forces are poised to finish the job and continually
harass the adversary as the anvil of an aggressive denial
strategy and separate adversarial forces from any strategic
logistical support that might be found in the local populace.
Most importantly of all, while airpower is making a fast denial
strategy possible, overwhelming ground forces must be standing
by to invade in order to provide a believable threat of conflict-escalation.
PART VIII
IN CONCLUSION
The British turned to Air Control as a means of putting
down rebellion throughout the Empire-Commonwealth
cheaply and effectively. Though Air Control did reduce the
costs of the several frontier wars in which it was utilized, it
did not solve all of Britain’s problems. Each conflict still
demanded a high level of commitment, and even the smallest
of the wars, in Somaliland, demanded over a thousand
ground troops to occupy the area, and over five-thousand

local troops levied before the end of the war. It requires vast
amounts of treasure, national will, and even blood to build
and maintain influence around the world. There is no quick
and easy way of asserting such influence, there are no halfmeasures,
and most importantly, there are simply no surgical
strikes that can paralyze an adversary completely, shocked to
the point where the will to fight no longer exists.
Airpower can help shorten the duration and cost of a
conflict, in terms of blood and treasure. Airpower can shock
the adversary into realizing vulnerability, and can weaken the
adversary’s forces for the great decisive blow that can only be
delivered by ground forces. However, what is necessary for
any conflict is a clearly defined end-state that national will
can focus on and the political commitment to stay the course
and see the campaign through. Escalation dominance, the
ability to increase pressure on the adversary at will, is the real
key to any coercive strategy. Escalation dominance, however,
can only be achieved if the national will is present to follow
through with what the adversary has to believe is a real, imminent
threat.
There is a real danger, however, in resolving conflict
by means of threatening even worse conflict: that the lesson
learned by the adversary is to strike in a different manner in
the next conflict, in a manner that will be unanticipated and
have a much greater chance of success. The sad truth of coercion,
and war for that matter, is that there is no way of absolutely
winning. There is only postponement, posturing, and
renewal of hostilities at some later date.
The closest way to ensure successful coercion is
actually not through violence at all but through the hearts
and minds of the people. The British were trying to control
colonies through the use of airpower, yet the flying squadrons—and
their armoured car counterparts—were directed
at their adversary’s military capabilities, the formations of
troops, the raiding parties, very much a denial-based strategy.
Meanwhile, the whole time in every colony the British
authorities were trying to ensure that when the conflict was
over there would still be colonials loyal to Britain. The concept
of Air Control relied heavily on the use of local levies of
troops, who cost less than British and Indian troops and were
more numerous in the immediate area. These local levies
could never have been possible if British authorities weren’t
ensuring that the majority of the people agreed that the British
needed their help and were willing to give it. The British
accomplished this by building schools and educating the
people of their colonies, by undertaking construction projects
using local labor and thereby providing a job market, and by
simply bribing local leaders into supporting the British cause.
Of the 130,000 tribesmen under arms in Mesopotamia just
after the First World War, only a small fraction would actually
78
be engaged by the British forces in the protectorate. The vast
majority simply began to agree with British rule. This seeming-impossible
reversal was accomplished by converting the
tribal leaders and clerics to the British cause by way of bribes,
gifts, and assurances that their own personal power-base
would not be threatened as long as the supported the British.
Thus, the vast majority of Mesopotamia was coerced
into cooperating with the British without any military
involvement whatsoever, but through the work of positive
public relations, imaginative and effective diversion of funds,
and projects designed to educate the people and build them
a way of life better than they had known before. Imagine—
influencing an entire population through education, health
care, development of infrastructure, and a sense of pride and
self-determination. Perhaps a lesson in real coercion can be
learned from that.
WORKS CITED
Armitage, Sir Michael. The Royal Air Force: An Illustrated History.
New York, NY:
Sterling Publishing Co., 1993.
Billings, Molly. The 1918 Spanish Influenza Pandemic. Stanford
University, June 1997.
http://www.stanford.edu/group/virus/uda/
Byman, Daniel L., Matthew C. Waxman, and Eric Larson.
Air Power as a Coercive
Instrument. Santa Monica, CA: Rand, 1999.
Clausewitz, Carl von. On War. New York, NY: Random
House, Inc., 1993.
Pape, Robert A. Bombing to Win: Air Power and Coercion in
War. Ithaca, NY:
Cornell University Press, 1996.
Scovill, Elmer B. The Royal Air Force, the Middle East, and
Disarmament, 1919-1934.
Ann Arbor, MI: Michigan State University Press,
1973.
Smith, Malcom. British Air Strategy Between the Wars. New
York, NY: Oxford
University Press, 1984.
St. George Saunders, Hilary. Per Ardua: The Rise of British Air
Power 1911-1939. New
York, NY: Oxford University Press, 1945.

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS
Special thanks go to Major Robert Melton, Jr.,
USAF, for all of his help in writing this. Before he read it,
it was long. After he read it, it was long and was actually
worth taking a look at. Thank you so much, sir, for getting
me back on track! Thanks to my boys in the MSS Class of
’04. We’re so ready. Thanks to the website that provided the
excellent story of the First Afghan War and to Major Melton
for vaguely remembering something about it, and to the old
British pilot that killed the Mad Mullah’s camel, thanks for
reminder that some days it’s chickens and some days it’s feathers!
Thanks to my fiancée Stephanie—no one has ever helped
me more.
Ditat Deus
(Endnotes)
1 Clausewitz 90-99. Excellent, excellent book. Clausewitz is
usually considered a must-read by the military-types (at least
the Cliff’s Notes), but the social theorist and the political
scientist should definitely read it as well; not only is there
much to learn from it, but reading a work is the only way to
be free of misquotations!
2 Clausewitz 101. The terminology is actually People,
Commander, Government. The Commander interacts with
fate, resulting in my explanation which, though a slight
misquote, cuts right to the chase!
3 ibid
4 Clausewitz 85. The writings on this subject are frightening
to contemplate. Absolute war.
5 Clausewitz Chapter One. This is much more effective
documentation. You are charged with reading the entire
chapter and becoming wiser not only concerning the nature
of war but of humanity.
6 ibid
7 ibid
8 Pape 20. The strategist may be confused and perhaps even
bored by this Joministic approach. The political scientist
may not have thought much into the psychological and
circumstantial maelstrom that defines the nature of conflicts
and may see Pape’s arguments as a road to panacea. This
is not the case! Perhaps large-n surveys and application of
chi-squared modeling may help in other aspects of political
science, but in the conduct of military operations, a silverbullet
approach will not be of any value and might actually
be harmful if attempted without proper safety precautions.
To paraphrase Sun-Tzu, we must look at the characteristics
of each individual situation, for they are always different but
often similar.
79
9 ibid
10 ibid
11 Pape 55-58. Pape’s coercive air strategies have some
merit to them, I think. However, readers who wish to learn
about them should be sure to prepare themselves by reading
Clausewitz, Sun Tzu, Cohen, and any history book worth its
salt about any conflict.
12 ibid
13 ibid
14 ibid
15 Byman Read this book. It is short, it is sweet, it is potent,
and it is free online at RAND’s website.
16 ibid
17 ibid
18 ibid
19 Scoville 5-7. A most excellent read. Scovill’s book, written
in 1973 shows striking similarities between the British
experiences in the Muslim world and the experiences the
United Status is having now. It is actually quite eery.
20 Billings. I don’t understand why a virus that became the
worst pandemic in recorded history by killing 20-40 million
people in one year does not get more attention. Everybody
knows about “Black Death.” Who’s heard of Spanish
Influenza? I think it’s an injustice.
21 Scoville, Chapter 2.
22 ibid
23 Scovill, Chapter 5
24 ibid
25 ibid
26 ibid
27 ibid. It is amazing to think that Churchill went from the
Admiralty to the War Office and the Air Ministry to the
Colonial Office.
28 ibid
29 ibid. Scovill is an outstanding source on the “interwar”
period of RAF. He is an even better source on the concept of
Air Control in the Middle East.
30 Scovill,Chapter 6.
31 ibid
32 ibid
33 ibid
34 ibid. It’s necessary to tell a story of the First Afghan War to
show how brutal the fighting was between the British and the
Afghans since the mid-1800s: The British had been warring
against Afghanistan for almost a hundred years by the time
of the Third Afghan War. The First Afghan War was a terrible
debacle. The British Army had found itself embroiled
in a conflict in some of the most unforgiving terrain in the
world against an entire culture of warriors. They fought using
Napoleonic tactics against a mounted force of guerillas and

hardy mountain troops, and though they initially met with
success against the scattered tribes, they soon found themselves
outnumbered by a unified Afghanistan. In the retreat
from Kabul in the January of 1842, a force of over four thousand
soldiers and more than ten-thousand women, children,
and support personnel left the city to join the British garrison
at the city of Jalalabad. Jalalabad was ninety miles from
Kabul, over high, snow-covered mountain passes and rough
terrain. The column was under constant attack by tribesmen
and guerillas. Of the 16,000 souls that left Kabul in the British
retreat, only one made it to Jalalabad, severely wounded
and half-dead from hunger and thirst.
35 Armitage, 33. I liked this book and found it to be an
excellent companion to Scovill’s work. It has nice pictures!
36 Scovill, Chapter 6
37 ibid
38 ibid
39 ibid
40 ibid
41 ibid
42 Armitage, 33
43 Scovill, Chapter 3
44 Armitage, 33; Scovill, Chapter 5. The fight for Waziristan
took years, more than a decade, to quell. The reason that the
British public supported such an extended military action was
that, first off, they for the most part knew nothing about the
conflict and, secondly, the war was relatively “inexpensive.”
45 Armitage 35, Scovill Chapter 6. Excellent story!
46 ibid
47 ibid
48 ibid
49 Scovill, Chapter 6
50 ibid
51 ibid. The following story is from a British pursuit pilot’s
attack. The British were trying to perform decapitation
strategies without precision munitions! On one of the raids
against Hassan, a British pilot dropped a bomb which landed
quite fortunately. Hassan was well-known to ride a white
camel with a long black banner carried high on the wind, a
mark of his eccentric fascination with himself. The young
pilot saw the white camel with the black banner and aimed
his bombs at Hassan, sure that there was no possible way he
could even come close to hitting him. To his surprise, when
he looked back the camel had disappeared, blown to bits, and
Hassan was struggling to get to his feet. At over fifty years of
age, this had to be quite a blow to Hassan. The black banner
was not to be seen flying again behind any camels.
52 ibid
80
53 ibid
54 Scovill, Chapter 6
55 Scovill, Chapter 3
56 Scovill, Chapter 3
57 ibid
58 ibid
59 ibid
60 Scovill, Chapter 3
61 Scovill, Chapter 6
62 ibid
63 ibid
64 Armitage, 37
65 Scovill, Chapter 6. Scovill had an absolutely brilliant idea.
I wonder if we could try it or not in Iraq?
66 ibid
67 ibid
68 ibid
69 ibid
70 Armitage, 35-51
71 Scovill, Chapter 6—probably the best chapter in the entire
book!
72 ibid
73ibid 74 Armitage, 37

FALLOUT:
THE QUESTION OF NEXT GENERATION
NUCLEAR WEAPONS
By C1C Damon A. Wagoner
INTRODUCTION
Statement of the Research Question
As the United States enters the twenty-first century,
the question of how best to provide for the common defense
remains a primary concern for both the government and the
military. With ever-increasing threats of terrorism and the
proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, the U.S. needs
to take a close look at its own inventory of weapons and evaluate
their usefulness in the coming years. The purpose of the
following research is to evaluate whether or not the United
States should develop a new generation of nuclear weapons
given the potential threats to its national security. The specific
question that the research seeks to answer is this: Should
the United States design, build, and test low-yield earth-penetrating
nuclear weapons?
Background and Significance of the Problem
Since the development of the atomic bomb in the
1940s, politicians and military leaders have wrestled over
the employment of nuclear weapons in the name of defense
and national security. During the Cold War, the testing and
stockpiling of nuclear weapons led to an incredible arms race
between the United States and the Soviet Union. The primary
purpose of these weapons was clear: the complete annihilation
of the other nation should it be deemed necessary.
However, the collapse of the Soviet Union left each nation
with a multitude of weapons that no longer could be used
for the mission for which they were created. Limited by the
Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty and the Comprehensive Nuclear
Test Ban Treaty which prohibit the research and development
of precision nuclear weapons, American’s atomic program
came to a grinding halt. 1 Today, however, new threats have
presented themselves in the form of rogue states and non-state
actors such as terrorists. Both groups have started to develop
nuclear capabilities, either through their own research or
through the purchase of such weapons.
Unlike the Soviet Union in the Cold War, these
new nuclear actors are undeterred by the United States’ large
nuclear arsenal, which currently exceeds 10,000 weapons. 2
The idea of mutually assured destruction is no longer feasible,
since none of the new actors have the ability to completely
destroy all of America’s strategic points as did the Soviet
Union. However, some of these actors, such as North Korea,
have the ability to strike American allies such as Japan and
81
South Korea. As American troops are stationed in both of
these areas, the United States has a vested interest in deterring
North Korea from launching nuclear warheads. Nuclear
retaliation is the only real military threat the U.S. possesses to
discourage North Korea from an atomic strike. It is unlikely
that the U.S. would retaliate with a nuclear attack, because
the weapons that comprise our current nuclear inventory are
too large and would create too much collateral damage. For
this reason, President Bush and members of his administration
are calling for a study of the need to update our nuclear
arsenal. The purpose of the investigation is to analyze
whether or not our current nuclear capabilities adequately
address the threats facing the U.S. In 2002, after declining
further participation in the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty and
opting to construct a missile defense system, President Bush
requested Congress to approve the research and development
of nuclear weapons in general. Congress approved the President’s
proposal in May of 2003. 3
The research and development of new nuclear
weapons is a significant decision that will greatly affect the
military’s operations. Most research is currently directed at
the development of low-yield nuclear weapons. Often called
“mini-nukes,” these weapons are meant to penetrate into the
earth to destroy underground facilities while theoretically
minimizing collateral damage. As a result of the ongoing
research, the potential use of such weapons becomes much
more likely. That, in turn, could have dramatic effects on
current military doctrine.
Limitations of the Study
This study will evaluate the research, development,
and employment of a new generation of nuclear weapons
from a military point of view. The study is limited to examining
how these weapons could affect military operations, and
whether or not a different approach could be used to achieve
the same objectives. It is important to realize there are very
significant domestic political and international issues associated
with the development of new nuclear weapons. Nonproliferation
is a major component of international politics.
The idea of developing a new nuclear program will provoke
strong opposition from both American political spokesmen
and foreign governments. Congressional resistance to a
nuclear program has already been voiced by Senators Dianne
Feinstein and Edward Kennedy, as they have attempted to
halt funding for nuclear weapons research, arguing that it
could result in a new arms race. 4 Such opposition will be
crucial to consider before the Bush administration produces a
new generation of weapons. Although the politics of nuclear
weapons development is not the focus of this study, it is
important that the reader be aware of the political dimension

of this issue.
This study will focus on the effectiveness of nuclear
weapons as a deterrent or usable military instrument. Therefore,
domestic and international political considerations will
not be considered. An additional limitation includes the
availability of information. The highly sensitive nature of
nuclear weapons means much of the relevant information
about this subject is classified. While this should not significantly
affect the findings of the present study, it is still worth
acknowledging the limits of research and analysis based on
unclassified information.
Definitions and Assumptions
To fully understand the significance of developing
a new nuclear arsenal, it is important to define and describe
weapons in the U.S. nuclear arsenal and what they are capable
of doing.
Nuclear Weapons: Nuclear weapons are based on the
physics of atomic fission and fusion. The first nuclear weapons
developed by the U.S. were fission bombs. Both types
of bombs require some form of a radioactive material such as
plutonium or uranium. Due to radiation, the bombs are very
dangerous environmentally as radioactive dust can travel hundreds
of miles away from the blast area.
Nuclear Fission Bombs: “Nuclear fission is the process
that occurs when a neutron strikes the nucleus of an atom
of one of the heavy radioactive elements. The atom splits
apart and two or more lighter elements are formed and one
or more neutrons are ejected along with beta particles and
gamma rays.” 5 The continued splitting of atoms within a fission
bomb causes a chain reaction that results in an enormous
release of heat and energy. These types of weapons require the
use of a fissile material which is usually either highly enriched
uranium (HEU) or plutonium.
Nuclear Fusion Bombs: The second type of weapon
is a hydrogen or thermonuclear device. This weapon works
on the basis of nuclear fusion. Whereas a fission device is a
chain reaction of breaking atoms, fusion devices work on the
combination of atoms. Fusion devices are much more complex
but have a higher destructive yield. For a fusion reaction
to occur, it is necessary to first create a fission reaction. 6 This
heats the hydrogen core to approximately twenty million
degrees, and forces the hydrogen atoms to fuse together into
helium creating an incredibly large explosion. 7 Nuclear detonations
are measured according to the equivalent amount of
TNT it would take to create the same explosion. For fission
weapons, this is generally in the kiloton (KT) range. Fusion
weapons are much larger and are measured in the megaton
(MT) range. For example, the largest thermonuclear weapon
ever detonated was by the Soviet Union was about 50 megatons.
8 Therefore, it would take about 50 million tons of
82
TNT to create an explosion of the same size.
Radioactive fallout: Fallout is the name given to
radioactive material that is dispersed after the detonation of
a nuclear device. Radiation is caused by excess energy within
an atom due to an imbalance of protons and neutrons. 9 The
excess energy within the atoms is released through alpha and
beta particles and gamma rays, which constitute the dangerous
material in a radioactive element. Alpha and beta particles
are relatively simple to repel, requiring at most a thin
sheet of metal. Gamma rays are highly dangerous and are
very difficult to stop. Thick blocks of lead or concrete are
required to repel gamma rays. They easily penetrate the skin
causing severe damage to both the exterior and interior of the
body. Radioactive fallout is an inevitable side-effect of any
nuclear weapon. Factors affecting fallout include the weapon
size, the fissile material used, the altitude at which the weapon
detonated, and the prevailing winds after detonation. Fallout
can have lasting consequences long after the weapon explodes,
making the surrounding area uninhabitable for decades.
Final definitions for consideration in this study
include the terms “proliferation”, “rogue state”, “non-state
actor” and “collateral damage”.
Nuclear proliferation: Proliferation is the dispersion
of nuclear weapons capabilities throughout the world. Counter
or nonproliferation is a main goal of the U.S. government
as a means of underwriting its national security. The spread
of nuclear weapons makes it more likely that America will be
the victims of a nuclear attack.
Rogue States: For the purposes of this study, a rogue
state will be defined as a nation led by a corrupt regime that
poses a potential threat to both the U.S. and its allies based
on its actions. North Korea, Iran, and Syria are examples
of rogue states because their continued hostile actions are
inconsistent with international efforts towards peace. The
Non-Proliferation Treaty, designed to control the diffusion
of nuclear weapons capabilities, is one example of current
international attempts at peace. In January of this year, North
Korea rejected the treaty.
Non-state Actor: In general, a non-state actor is a
self-governing body that is not an internationally recognized
nation. No physical boundary encircles non-state actors
because they do not posses a physical piece of geography. The
Kurds are an example of a non-state actor. Though they claim
to be a legitimate and self-governing nation, they are not
internationally recognized as a sovereign state and there is no
geographic entity known as “Kurdistan.” For the purposes of
this study, the term “non-state actors” will be used to denote
terrorist groups.
Collateral Damage: Collateral damage is defined as
the unintended destruction of people and/or property. Inno-

cent civilians and noncombatants that are injured or killed in
an attack on a legitimate target are the main types of collateral
damage that the U.S. wishes to avoid. The reduction of collateral
damage is a major concern regardless of the type of
weapon being used.
Preview of the Argument
It is clear that the United States does not have a
weapons arsenal commensurate with security requirements of
the twenty-first century. Both the conventional and nuclear
arsenals of the United States require serious modernization.
Current capabilities are ill-suited to destroy a growing number
of hardened underground facilities that effectively neutralize
U.S. strategic bombing. U.S. adversaries can easily store
weapons of mass destruction in these bunkers, and there are
currently no weapon systems that can damage or destroy these
facilities. The U.S. must adapt to this changing security environment,
or it can seriously negate non-proliferation attempts
around the globe. These facilities make it very difficult to
track and stop the spread of weapons of mass destruction.
Within the Departments of Defense and Energy, the
most popular concept to counter this emerging threat is the
low-yield earth-penetrating nuclear weapon. The major argument
of this paper is that employment of this specific weapon
will create far too many negative consequences, and that the
U.S. should consider developing non-nuclear alternatives.
Today, the United States is fighting non-state actors and must
be careful not to cause large amounts of collateral damage in
the process. This specific nuclear weapon does not prevent or
reduce collateral damage. On the contrary, this weapon will
only create additional problems for the military. Most importantly,
there is a strong possibility that this weapon cannot
achieve its stated objective of destroying hardened underground
facilities.
LITERATURE REVIEW
The terrorist attack on the United States in September
of 2001 caused the government and the military
to quickly evaluate America’s nuclear stockpile and policy
regarding the use of atomic weapons. The majority of experts
before September 11 were concerned with nonproliferation
and the elimination of nuclear arsenals worldwide. Post
9/11 experts are very critical of America’s nuclear arsenal and
have raised the question of whether or not it is still an effective
deterrent against attacks on U.S. soil. Some experts are
vehemently against the development of new atomic weapons,
while others are in favor of new research. Still others argue
that prolonging the life of the current weapons is the best
course of action. At this point, the U.S. still has not taken a
clear direction. President Bush has only called for research
83
into the feasibility of small-yield nuclear weapons. Full-scale
development and production has not started, and many
experts contend that nuclear testing, if restarted at all, is still a
long way off.
The issue of re-evaluating America’s nuclear arsenal
has evoked very strong opinions. Joseph Cirincione, director
of the Non-Proliferation Project at the Carnegie Endowment
for International Peace in Washington, expressed his concerns
over the manufacture of new nuclear weapons in an interview
with the National Journal. 10 Cirincione argues that conventional
weapons would be more effective in destroying underground
facilities if they were employed by “repeated precision
strikes” that “bore deeper and deeper until you reach your
target.” 11 This idea does seem to provide a seemingly acceptable
alternative to using nuclear weapons.
Cirincione believes that the most effective way to
destroy underground facilities would be “repeated strikes”
with conventional weapons. If the enemy realizes that we
know the whereabouts of his facility, and if it takes several
strikes to destroy that facility, the enemy might have time
to escape and possibly salvage important equipment. Cirincione’s
argument does allow for a non-nuclear solution, but
it requires more time, resources, and money, as it will take a
number of missions and a number of conventional weapons
to destroy the facility. An earth-penetrating nuclear weapon
(EPW) could theoretically destroy the facility in one pass.
According to Cirincione, the EPWs are only effective to a
depth of fifty yards or less, thus requiring the use of a highyield
weapon which defeats the necessity of decreased collateral
damage. A test conducted in Alaska confirmed Cirincione’s
conjecture as an earth penetrating bomb dropped from
40,000 feet went only 20 feet into the ground. 12 A key aspect
of this test, is that it was a bomb being dropped, which means
it was dependent upon gravity alone. A propulsion device
could propel the warhead even deeper into the earth.
Robert W. Nelson, in an article for the Journal of the
Federation of American Scientists, agrees with Cirincione about
the futility of the “mini-nukes.” 13 Citing the same example
of how these weapons fail to bury themselves deep enough
into the ground, Nelson argues that “mini-nukes” would only
cause a fallout disaster for the local population. Nelson states
that even a .15 KT weapon failing to penetrate deep into the
soil would create a large radioactive crater, throwing contaminated
dirt around the area. 14 The amount of contamination
is dependent on the size of the bomb. Contamination could
be limited to a few square miles. Prevailing winds after the
blast are unpredictable and could spread the radiation over
several hundred square miles. If there is no possibility of the
mini-nukes penetrating any farther into the dirt, then Nelson
offers a very compelling argument. However, he does make a

large assumption. His fear of a large radioactive crater is only
legitimate if the underground facility is around a population
center. If the underground facilities are in an isolated area,
then the risk of fallout, though still critical to consider, would
be minimized. However, as will be discussed later, there is
little reason to believe that U.S. enemies would place these
facilities in a rural area, because it would only reduce inhibitions
about using these weapons.
Henry Kelly and Ivan Oelrich agree with Nelso and
Cirincione about the problems associated with the mininukes.
15 They introduce a different argument in their article,
stating that “you can’t attack bunkers if you don’t know where
they are – unless you contemplate nuclear carpet bombing.” 16
Failure of American intelligence seems to be a large assumption
in this argument. The idea of nuclear carpet bombing is
an unreasonable proposition, and no where else in the literature
is that even remotely suggested as an alternative. Obviously
carpet bombing with nuclear weapons would create hazards
not only to the local population, but to American troops
in the theater, and also to neighboring countries where winds
could spread the fallout. These authors fail to give enough
credit to the armed forces’ ability to pinpoint important
targets. Current Air Force doctrine places high importance
on precision bombing. Technology such as smart bombs,
GPS-guided munitions, and infrared targeting are essential
tools for hitting the right target and minimizing risks to noncombatants.
Operation Enduring Freedom in Afghanistan
serves as a prime example of how the U.S. military can hit a
target with notable accuracy. Air Force bombers successfully
destroyed a vast amount of al Queda’s network of caves with
remarkable precision.
John Swomley argues that success with conventional
precision bombing in Iraq still had negative consequences
because the ordnance “sent high-speed shrapnel flying as far as
a mile, causing many civilian casualties.” 17 Swomley actually
makes a valid point since the results of a nuclear blast, even
small-yield, are likely to be much more severe. But Swomley’s
argument is applicable only for congested areas. As was the
case in the previous arguments, Swomley fails to address the
issue of a rural area. If there will be high civilian casualties,
then the arguments against mini-nukes are very valid. None
of the above arguments, however, mention the use of nuclear
weapons in largely uninhabited regions where the risk of collateral
damage is very low or non-existent. Unless a clear and
immediate threat exists to America’s national security, the use
of nuclear weapons in an urban area is difficult to justify. In
a rural environment it becomes much easier to justify, but
those who oppose a new nuclear research program fail to consider
this possibility. Again, one must consider, though, the
strong possibility that hardened underground facilities will be
84
located mainly in urban areas.
In a report for the Congressional Research Service,
national defense specialist Jonathan Medalia evaluates the
positive aspects of EPWs. 18 According to Medalia’s report,
the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) estimates that over
1,400 underground facilities exist throughout the world. 19
Unfortunately, this report does not discuss whether or not
they are located in urban or rural areas. Nevertheless, Medalia
is very balanced in his report, and admits that it is possible
to disable underground facilities with conventional weapons.
But he also notes that to actually destroy the facilities, it will
be necessary to create a shock wave that can only be achieved
by a nuclear blast. 20 The disabling of an underground facility
means that the personnel inside the bunker would be
killed, but the facility itself could continue to function if new
personnel were introduced. Destruction of a facility means
that it has been damaged beyond repair and is no longer
usable. This is an interesting point, because there may be a
case where disabling the facility is all the military needs to do.
This could be particularly effective in areas of high civilian
populations. Disabling facilities in crowded environments
and destroying facilities in rural areas would serve as a balance
between nuclear and conventional forces.
A strong argument for developing mini-nukes comes
from the fact that underground facilities were created in order
to negate the threat of U.S. conventional weapons. Such
facilities are used to house enemy weapons caches and also
serve as laboratories for research on nuclear, chemical, or biological
weapons. In an interview with the National Journal,
C. Paul Robinson, the director of Sandia National Laboratories,
expressed his belief that “nations have gone to school on
our conventional military capabilities,” which is why they are
“moving their high-value targets out of our reach by locating
them in deeply buried tunnels and inside mountains.” 21 If
our enemies are finding ways to neutralize our conventional
threat then it is understandable why nuclear alternatives are
being considered. This does not mean, however, that nuclear
weapons are the only alternative. Medalia’s report to Congress
concurs with Robinson’s findings: “Adversaries learned from
the Persian Gulf War and elsewhere that U.S. conventional
forces can readily destroy unprotected assets. In response,
they have buried key facilities. The U.S. needs EPWs to
respond to their moves.” 22
Both Robinson and Medalia see the importance of
designing weapons that can penetrate the earth and strike
underground facilities. Though mini-nukes currently seem to
be the most popular way in which to accomplish this mission,
neither of these men are completely sure that nuclear weapons
are the only way in which to proceed. Robinson says, “I
would argue that the United States must respond by main

taining a robust deterrent against whatever is hidden in those
underground facilities.” 23 Notice that Robinson does not
say that the U.S. needs only a conventional or only a nuclear
deterrent. He realizes that it will likely take a variety of different
weapons to form a robust deterrent. The U.S. cannot
put all of its effort and reliance on a single system and hope
to succeed. Medalia believes that “nonnuclear earth penetrators
could also be improved.” 24 As noted above, he further
believes that conventional weapons have the ability to damage
underground facilities but not completely destroy them.
Whether nuclear or conventional warheads are used, both
men argue that it is necessary to better develop the earth-penetrating
cone. If the missiles or bombs can penetrate deeper
into the ground, there is a much higher chance of success for
either disabling or completely destroying the facilities. This
will also decrease the possibility of collateral damage, since the
explosions will occur deep within the soil.
Until a new program is decided upon, America’s current
nuclear stockpile needs to remain ready for deployment.
Colonel Rick Patenaude, the chief of Deterrence and Strike
for Air Force Space Command (AFSPC) at Peterson Air Force
Base, is in charge of keeping the U.S. nuclear missile program
at an operational level while considering possible future
upgrades. 25 Kelly and Oelrich disagree with Patenaude’s
attempt to develop a replacement nuclear program. They use
a review by the National Academy of Science to support their
contentions that the U.S. can remain confident in its existing
nuclear arsenal due to the routine and complex maintenance
on the intricate parts of the warheads. 26 It is true that the
Air Force puts a great deal of effort into maintaining the current
U.S. nuclear arsenal, but there is a point at which a new
program must be developed. The current system has outlived
its usefulness with the end of the Cold War and has little to
no applicability in today’s world. In an interview with the
Colorado Springs Gazette, Colonel Patenaude observed that
the U.S. needs to build a new generation of ICBMs because
the Cold War is over. 27 Colonel Patenaude appears to realize
that a transformed security environment requires changes in
how the military provides for the national security. Though
he cannot foresee the precise future of the U.S. nuclear program,
he does understand that an upgrade will be required to
replace the outdated Minuteman III program. John Bolton,
the Undersecretary of State for Arms Control and International
Security, was quoted in Medalia’s report to Congress,
“‘I think the nuclear arsenal is central to our ongoing security
needs…where deterrence failed…we would certainly want an
arsenal that was capable of being used and being used with
effectiveness.’” 28 Mr. Bolton’s quote supports Colonel Patenaude’s
judgment that it is necessary to begin conceptualizing a
new nuclear agenda.
85
A key element of any research and development
program involves vigorous testing of the findings. Unfortunately,
there is still a taboo on nuclear testing in the United
States and in the international community. There are three
main nuclear laboratories in the U.S. including Los Alamos
National Laboratory in New Mexico, Lawrence Livermore
National Laboratory (LLNL) in California, and Nevada
Test Site (NTS) outside of Las Vegas. Testing today consists
mainly of high explosives and non-fissile materials. At LLNL,
depleted uranium-238 (D38) is used for testing because it
lacks the ability to sustain a nuclear chain reaction. President
George H. W. Bush put an end to nuclear tests at NTS
in 1992. 29 The current Bush administration, however, has
expressed interest in beginning nuclear tests, since it would
assist in evaluating new nuclear programs while examining
the functionality of our current arsenal. A key component
of testing is the loss of expertise in the field. The declining
number of nuclear physicists responsible for America’s current
weapons is leaving very little expertise in the field.
Although Congress has approved President Bush’s
proposal to reduce the preparation time required to begin
nuclear testing at NTS, many believe that the U.S. is still a
long way off from reinstituting tests. 30 In his interview, Robinson
said, “I can categorically state that no one is proposing
returning to nuclear testing.” 31 This interview occurred
in August of 2003, and since that time, President Bush has
worked with Congress to gradually introduce the idea of
nuclear testing. This contradicts what former Secretary of
State Colin Powell said that same month: “The President has
no intention of resuming nuclear tests, and there is no need
for us to do so.” 32
This leads to some confusion as former Secretary
Powell is assuring the American people that there is no reason
for testing to resume, while President Bush is lobbying Congress
for quicker preparation time for testing. Kelly and
Oelrich believe that the constant upkeep and inspections of
the U.S. nuclear arsenal has removed any reason for our current
weapons to be tested. 33 Senator Jon Kyl, chairman of
the Subcomittee on Technology, Terrorism, and Homeland
Security, disagrees and believes we should resume nuclear
tests: “ ‘We’ve had a self-imposed moratorium on testing.
Has it stopped other countries [North Korea and Iran]? No.
It shows a failed strategy.’ ” 34 Senator Kyl’s comments show
a possible reason for ending the tests in the 1990s. The
U.S. ended testing on its own, without requests or international
pressures. A possible reason, according to Senator
Kyl, was to set an example for the rest of the world. It seems
that he believes the U.S. hoped that ending its own nuclear
tests would convince other nations to follow suit. Most the
nations throughout the world did exactly that. Other nations

such as Pakistan, India, North Korea, and Iran did not, and
now they pose legitimate threats to our national security.
The creation of a new nuclear program for the
United States is a hotly debated topic among experts in the
government, military, and civilian world. Several civilians,
along with a number of Democratic members of Congress
including Senators Feinstein and Kennedy, believe that the
current nuclear program adequately provides for our national
security. They see a revived testing and development program
as an unnecessary expenditure. Much of the civilian opposition
comes from a belief that the mini-nukes are not militarily
feasible. Opponents make strong arguments that new weapons
will not succeed in minimizing collateral damage. Using
the evidence provided by tests of EPWs, they claim that a
nuke detonated in a shallow part of the ground will spread
radioactive dust killing thousands of innocent people. Those
in favor of a new nuclear program realize that the current
system is outdated and will not work to deter rogue states
and non-state actors. Medalia and Robinson have good arguments
for strengthening all “bunker-busting” casings for all
types of warheads. This will allow the military to remain flexible
and have both nuclear and conventional weapons at its
disposal. Unfortunately, there seems to be only two extremes.
Either we keep our current nuclear capabilities or we go completely
to mini-nukes. Colonel Patenaude appears to have the
best outlook, as he is trying to gather a number of ideas in
order to determine the best way to upgrade the U.S. nuclear
arsenal.
THESIS BODY
Background Information
What first began as a scientific discovery has now
become the source of the most powerful weapons on earth.
In the early 1940s, few realized the intensity of the energy
released through the splitting of atoms. It was this energy
that helped bring the Second World War to an end. Though
there are considerable political concerns about the use of
nuclear weapons, the fact remains that they are still the most
lethal component in the United States arsenal, and they are
highly sought by rogue nations and terrorist organizations.
The U.S. has consistently sought to halt the proliferation
of nuclear weapons throughout the world, but the ability to
detonate an atomic bomb has become an indication of a technologically
advanced culture. The inherent problem that the
U.S. now faces is how to maintain a credible defense posture
with nuclear weapons while still attempting to keep other
nations from developing their own nuclear programs.
Before undertaking a discussion about the future
of the U.S. nuclear armament, it is essential to look at how
U.S. nuclear policy has developed over the past sixty years.
86
The U.S. nuclear weapons program began when intelligence
reports raised concerns over the possibility of Nazi Germany
developing an atomic weapon. President Franklin Roosevelt
authorized the creation of the Manhattan Project which was
the U.S. program responsible for the research and development
of a nuclear weapon. In early 1943, J. Robert Oppenheimer,
the civilian director of the program, and Major General
Leslie R. Groves, the military commander, founded Los
Alamos National Laboratory in New Mexico. 35 The sole purpose
of this laboratory was to create and test a nuclear weapon
for use against U.S. adversaries in World War II.
The world’s first nuclear weapon was detonated at
Trinity Test Site in New Mexico on the morning of 16 July,
1945. 36 This area of theoretical physics had now become an
astonishing reality. None who witnessed the explosion were
quite prepared for what they saw and felt. One scientist at
the base camp, ten miles away from the explosion said, “ ‘The
thing that got me was not the flash but the blinding heat of a
bright day on your face in the cold desert morning.’ ” 37 This
successful test proved the incredible power contained in a fissile
weapon, and convinced President Harry Truman that a
nuclear weapon could be employed effectively in the Pacific
Theatre.
Now that a nuclear weapon had become a reality,
President Truman faced a daunting moral and political decision
– whether or not the U.S. should use an atomic bomb in
order to achieve a military victory. A weapon of this magnitude
would indiscriminately kill tens of thousands of Japanese
citizens within a matter of seconds. Thousands more would
suffer the effects of radiation exposure in the following weeks.
There were several contributing factors to President Truman’s
decision. An invasion of the Japanese home islands would be
costly both in American and Japanese lives, and in time. The
Soviets were now turning their attention towards the Pacific
Theatre, and President Truman did not want them to enter
the war against Japan. The Japanese had made it clear that
they would not surrender unconditionally. Finally, there was
a moral question about slaughtering innocent Japanese civilians.
The U.S. gave the Japanese one final chance at surrender
when it issued the Potsdam Declaration which called
for “…Japan to proclaim now the unconditional surrender of
all Japanese armed forces…,” or it would face “prompt and
utter destruction.” 38 Japan did not accept the conditions of
the declaration, and elected to continue fighting. Then Secretary
of War Henry L. Stimson recommended to President
Truman that they use the atomic bomb in the hopes of forcing
Japan to surrender. Stimson later recalled:
My chief purpose was to end the war in victory
with the least possible cost in the lives

of the men in the armies which I had helped
to raise. In the light of the alternatives
which, on a fair estimate, were open to us
I believe that no man, in our position and
subject to our responsibilities, holding in
his hands a weapon of such possibilities for
accomplishing this purpose and saving those
lives, could have failed to use it and afterwards
looked his countrymen in the face. 39
Following the advice of his Secretary of War and military
advisors, President Truman gave the order to employ the use
of a nuclear weapon against Japan.
On 6 August 1945, the Enola Gay B-29 Superfortress
dropped the atomic bomb nicknamed “Little Boy” on
the city of Hiroshima. “Little Boy” was a uranium-fueled
device that was considered to be so reliable that it was never
tested prior to its use in Japan. 40 Three days later, a second
bomb was dropped on the city of Nagasaki. This bomb was
an exact replica of the uranium device tested at Trinity. The
use of these weapons in Japan was the first and only time in
world history that atomic bombs have been employed in a
combat situation. Though the necessity for their use is still
a highly controversial topic even today, the fact remains that
it did force Japan to accept an unconditional surrender and
promptly end World War II.
Though nuclear weapons can be credited with ending
one great struggle, they can almost certainly be cited for
the creation of the ensuing confrontation -- the Cold War.
During the years after World War II and until the collapse
of the Soviet Union, the true mark of a world power was the
possession of a nuclear arsenal. Of course, the only way to
increase the number and effectiveness of such weapons was by
means of an intense schedule of testing. Between 1957 and
1992, Nevada Test Site alone conducted 825 underground
nuclear tests. 41 This does not even take into account the
number of tests that occurred in the atmosphere and at the
various test facilities in the South Pacific. Testing became
even more intense with the creation of thermonuclear or
fusion devices which had yields in the megaton range. In late
1961, the Soviet Union detonated a 50-megaton thermonuclear
device, which still remains the largest atomic weapon
ever tested. 42 The high tempo of testing by both the U.S. and
the U.S.S.R. during the early years of the Cold War encouraged
the accumulation of a vast number of nuclear weapons.
The unfortunate result was that each nation had the power
to destroy the world several times over. Since the end of the
Cold War, both nations have had to face the reality of finding
ways to reduce the number of nuclear weapons in attempts to
promote non-proliferation.
87
The nuclear posture of the U.S. throughout much
of the Cold War was based on the idea of Mutually Assured
Destruction (MAD). Since both nations had a strong nuclear
capability, an attack by one country would almost insure the
destruction of both countries. Deterrence was the main goal
of a strong nuclear arsenal. Due to the U.S. nuclear triad
of bombers, ballistic submarines and intercontinental ballistic
missiles, it was impossible for the Soviet Union to be
prepared for all possible strikes. The same held true for the
Soviet Union’s offensive capabilities against the U.S. The fear
of retaliation was the single-most important aspect of each
nation’s nuclear strategy during the Cold War.
Though maintenance of a strong and determined
image was important during the Cold War, there were several
attempts during these years to begin reducing the frequency
of tests. This legislation was important because it has helped
shape the current U.S. nuclear strategy. In October of 1963,
the U.S. passed the Partial Test Ban Treaty which terminated
nuclear tests aboveground, underwater, and in outer
space. 43 In the following years, a number of other treaties
were passed to further reduce the impacts of testing on the
environment, and to help aid the reduction of each nation’s
nuclear arsenals. Today, the U.S. is still faced with the difficult
stance of attempting to reduce nuclear proliferation
while still maintaining a legitimate nuclear presence in order
to deter potential adversaries. In 1993, Congress passed the
Spratt-Furse ban on the research and development of a new
small-scale nuclear weapon with a yield of five kilotons or less;
this legislation placed additional restrictions to the nuclear
testing moratorium enacted by President George H. W. Bush
that same year. 44 This ban was repealed in 2003 as President
George W. Bush called for an investigation into the practicality
of a new low-yield earth penetrating nuclear weapon to
defeat hardened underground facilities.
Presentation of the Argument
During the Cold War, the strategy of deterrence
worked in the sense that a nuclear war never occurred
between the U.S. and the Soviet Union. Deterrence worked
because each nation apparently was unwilling to accept the
destruction of major cities and the deaths of tens of thousands
of innocent civilians. Yet today the strategy of deterrence
seems archaic with little prospect for influencing international
behavior. Most nations are aware that the U.S. would be
hesitant if not completely unwilling to use a nuclear weapon
against an adversary simply because of the political turmoil
that would ensue. The Cold War presented the U.S. with a
single major enemy that happened to be a sovereign nation.
The ongoing campaigns in the Middle East, suggest today’s
enemies are much harder to identify. Therefore, it is under-

standable why the United States is now rethinking its nuclear
posture. Weapons with yields in the high kiloton and megaton
range simply no longer serve a valid purpose in today’s
security environment.
In order to modernize the U.S. nuclear inventory, the
Bush administration tasked the Departments of Defense and
Energy to evaluate the effectiveness of low-yield nuclear weapons.
With the repeal of the Spratt-Furse ban in 2003, these
departments quickly began researching potential replacements
to the nation’s traditional nuclear force. The most popular
concept is the Robust Nuclear Earth Penetrator (RNEP)
bomb, and the administration plans on spending $484.7 million
in research and development over the next four years. 45
The idea of a RNEP was born out of the emerging threat of
hardened underground facilities and the weapons of mass
destruction that were potentially stored inside. Theoretically,
a RNEP would burrow into the ground and detonate in close
proximity to the shelter. The shock of a nuclear explosion
would destroy the facility, while the resultant intense heat and
radiation would destroy the chemical and biological weapons
stored inside. 46 The relatively low yield of the weapon (5 kilotons
or less) would hypothetically allow the surrounding soil
to absorb the radioactive fallout and prevent a hazard to the
local population. The RNEP concept is very simple, and in
theory, appears to be a suitable replacement to the high-yield
weapons in the current inventory. However, these weapons
have several drawbacks and are not suitable for employment
in any situation. The U.S. should cease the research of these
devices and consider non-nuclear alternatives to defeat hardened
underground facilities.
The physics of a nuclear earth-penetrator is the first
area of concern when considering its reliability. There are two
components of an earth-penetrating weapon: the warhead and
the weapon casing. The entire unit must travel fast enough
to penetrate deep into the ground. However, the unit cannot
travel too fast, or the weapon casing may become deformed
and potentially damage the warhead. Given the relatively
fragile nature of nuclear weapons, it is essential that the warhead
remain intact or the weapon could fail to detonate.
The U.S. Air Force conducted a test in 2003 to
examine the penetration capabilities of current systems. A
B-2 Stealth Bomber dropped an unarmed B61-11 earth
penetrating bomb from an altitude of 40,000 feet and it was
able to penetrate the earth only to a depth of twenty feet
deep. 47 This test only proved what many physicists already
had hypothesized about penetrating the earth’s soil. Earthpenetrators
get their energy from gravity. They are simply
dropped from an aircraft at a high altitude and depend upon
the acceleration of gravity to give them a high enough rate of
speed to burry into the ground. Upon impact, most gravity-
88
dependent bombs have speeds around 450 meters per second.
This can be doubled by adding rocket propulsion and would
increase the penetrating depths of the weapon by 75 percent
in hard rock and almost 1,000 percent in soft soil. 48 Though
a simple increase in speed seems to be the logical answer,
the strength of the bomb casing represents another important
consideration. It is simple enough to add a propulsion
device to the back of a bomb, but that creates a risk of hitting
the surface at such a high rate of speed that the weapon is
destroyed almost immediately. Robert W. Nelson of Princeton
University has studied the strengths of various materials
that can be used for earth-penetrating weapons. According
to his research, he found that twenty meters of penetration
may be a theoretical maximum. 49 Thus, there is a strict balance
between speed and strength for these weapons. If twenty
meters is in fact the maximum depth of penetration, these
weapons are entirely infeasible.
The threat of nuclear fallout, which will be discussed
later, is simply too great if a nuclear device were to be detonated
at a depth of twenty meters. Moreover, underground
facilities could be located several hundred feet underground.
If a nuclear weapon, even at a low-yield, is detonated at
twenty meters or less, there is a strong possibility that the
facility will not even receive damage. The shock of the blast
would simply reverberate off of the ground into the atmosphere.
The only answer to this problem would be to increase
the yield of the weapon in order to ensure the destruction
of the facility. But this would only defeat the purpose of a
low-yield RNEP, and is effectively the same idea as detonating
a nuclear weapon on the surface. The physics of this type
of weapon is a major limiting factor in its usefulness. An
increase in speed allows a deeper penetration, but there are no
existing materials strong enough to withstand such an increase
in velocity. A small-yield detonation will likely not achieve
the objective of destroying an underground facility if it can
only bury twenty meters into the soil, and larger yields would
only cause a great deal of radioactive fallout.
The high risk of radioactive fallout is quite possibly
the strongest argument against the military use of nuclear
earth-penetrators. Proponents of these weapons hypothesize
that the depth and the low-yield of the nuclear explosion
would allow the radiation to be absorbed by the surrounding
soil. As discussed above, the depth of the explosion will be
relatively shallow. In order to completely contain the radiation
from a one-kiloton weapon, an explosion would need
to be at least ninety meters underground. 50 Both scientific
studies and actual tests make clear that this depth is currently
unobtainable by an airdropped bomb or missile. Instead of
absorbing the shock and fallout, the surrounding soil would
most likely be thrown into the atmosphere creating an envi-

onmental hazard and risking the lives of those in the surrounding
area.
The exact amount of fallout is difficult to predict, but
the existence of fallout after the use of a RNEP is almost certain.
Regardless of how deep the bomb is able to penetrate,
it is going to leave a trail of open space in the soil through
which fallout can escape. 51 Once radioactive fallout escapes
into the atmosphere, there is little that can be done to protect
local populations. The situation would deteriorate even
further if winds began spreading the fallout over a wide area.
The following circumstances give an idea of the problems
associated with radioactive fallout:
Consider a one-kiloton bunker buster bomb
set off at relatively shallow depth – less than
10 meters – in wind conditions averaging
10 kilometers an hour. Although the numbers
will vary slightly depending on detonation
depth, geology and weapon details, the
basic results will be similar. If it takes six
hours for people in the vicinity to evacuate,
then calculations show that nearly everyone
downwind of the blast within approximately
five kilometers would still be killed by
fallout, and half the inhabitants eight kilometers
away would die. Only if the nearest
population center is 10 or more kilometers
downwind will the fallout lead to few if any
rapid fatalities. 52
America’s enemies are well aware of U.S. policies on
collateral damage. The American military does everything
within its power to ensure there are no unnecessary casualties
to noncombatants. Military commanders will always have
a legal advisor to evaluate potential targets and ensure that
operations abide by international laws and treaties. Technology
is used to limit the accidental deaths of innocent civilians.
Based on the above situation, the use of a RNEP defies the
very principles of war that the U.S. military seeks to embrace.
The military cannot choose when and where it will recognize
the protections afforded to noncombatants. If a nuclear
option creates too much of a danger to surrounding populations,
then the military must find a way to employ conventional
munitions. U.S. enemies are well aware of its stance on
collateral damage. It is therefore logical to surmise that these
enemies will place underground facilities in highly populated
areas. A nuclear weapon, regardless of yield, would not be a
viable option in these situations.
Aside from the concern for collateral damage, radioactive
fallout from a RNEP could cause further complications
for military operations. The U.S. Air Force, in particular, is
89
concerned with Bomb Damage Assessment (BDA). This is
and has been a critical part of airpower doctrine since World
War II. The Air Force must know the effectiveness of its
strikes against an enemy target so that it can make appropriate
plans for future attacks. Since the RNEP is an airdropped
weapon, it is likely that the Air Force will be the primary
branch to use these weapons. BDA will be extremely difficult
if RNEPs are utilized against an enemy target. Surveillance
from space-based satellites will be of little use because they
will not be able to see deep enough into the ground to assess
the damage to enemy facilities. Fallout will make it extremely
dangerous if not completely impossible for military personnel
to examine the facility. The area will likely be closed off to
any type of military operations due to the danger to our own
forces. The RNEP was designed to give the military additional
options in dealing with hard-to-reach targets, but the
negative repercussions are numerous and have the potential to
actually hinder operations.
Though not the primary focus of this research, some
attention must be given to the matter of politics, albeit only
as it applies to military operations. The U.S. has taken a firm
stance in preventing the proliferation of nuclear weapons
throughout the globe. The U.S. military plays a crucial role
in this area of international relations. Regional combatant
commanders are often the primary ambassadors to other
countries on military matters. Nuclear weapons are a threat
to the national security of the United States, and therefore
their proliferation is a key concern of the Department of
Defense. Thus it seems ironic that while the DoD is attempting
to stop the spread of nuclear weapons abroad, it is pushing
the development of a new generation of nuclear weapons
at home. These actions severely diminish the political credibility
of the U.S. in the international arena. The U.S. wants
to retain, and indeed expand its own nuclear arsenal, while
proclaiming to other nations the importance of nuclear nonproliferation.
53 In the end, this hypocrisy may only serve to
place more stress on the American military. Other nations
will likely view the U.S. development of RNEPs as a threat
which, in turn, could cause some heretofore “nuclear free”
nations to begin development of their own nuclear arsenals.
If RNEPs are not the answer to destroying underground
storage facilities, the question then becomes how
can the U.S. combat this emerging threat? Advocates of the
RNEP state that there are no conventional alternatives and
that the only way to get an explosion big enough to destroy
an underground facility is to use a nuclear device. But critics
counter, “… if a bomb can be delivered close to its target
bunker, the explosive power of a nuclear warhead may be
superfluous; a conventional warhead will usually do.” 54 The
key issue, therefore, is how to get any weapon close enough to

the target so that it can inflict enough damage. The RNEP
is the convenient option for the military right now. It does
not need to get very close in order to inflict damage simply
because the nuclear explosion will likely be large enough to
cause damage to the facility from a relatively large distance.
The consequences of using the RNEP far outweigh
the benefits. There are ways to destroy or incapacitate these
facilities without using the RNEP. One concept is the Deep
Digger, which would bore into the ground and then deliver
the warhead once it was in close proximity to the target. 55
Though this would take longer than the simple detonation
of a RNEP, it would not produce the negative effects and
resultant controversy that look to come with using a nuclear
weapon. Another idea is to hit the access points to the facility.
Of course, the obvious problem is finding these points,
but it is also difficult to find underground facilities in the first
place. Conventional bombs or ground forces could seal off or
destroy the access points to the facility, thereby neutralizing
their effectiveness. A final option would be kinetic-energy
space weapons. Sometimes called “Rods from God”, the basic
principle of these weapons is based upon high rates of speed.
After entering the atmosphere from an orbiting space platform,
these weapons, in theory, can hit a target with remarkable
precision and devastation. It would be interesting to
investigate the feasibility of using these weapons on hardened
underground facilities.
With so many viable conventional options, it is
unclear as to why the U.S. continues to make the RNEP such
a high priority. C. Paul Robinson, the aforementioned director
of Sandia National Laboratory, has stated, “Our primary
focus is still to accomplish this [destruction of hardened
underground facilities] with conventional weapons, and we
work hard on that problem. Nuclear weapons remain a blunt
instrument of last resort.” 56 If this is truly the case, why does
it appear that the RNEP is the only weapon the DoD and
DoE are researching? It is no secret that the current U.S.
nuclear inventory is out-dated. However, this is not an excuse
for developing a system that will turn out to be as equally
useless. More time, effort, and funding should be dedicated
to the research of non-nuclear options. The U.S. nuclear
arsenal needs to be modernized, but that does not necessarily
mean that it needs to be modernized with additional nuclear
weapons. Perhaps a strong conventional force can offset the
reliance on nuclear weapons. The consequences of using a
nuclear weapon, whether it be a RNEP, or a traditional highyield
weapon, are simply too great. For now, if it still provides
a welcome measure of deterrence, the current nuclear arsenal
should be retained. But with a nod to the “iron law of unintended
consequences,” there is no need to exacerbate political
and military problems by developing a new generation of
90
nuclear weapons.
CONCLUSION
Summary of Findings
Military history is filled with examples of how one
side must adapt to the changes created by an adversary. It is
this adaptation that creates new doctrine, new procedures,
and new technology. The U.S. is currently faced with a
change in the nature of its adversaries. The U.S. has long
depended upon its ability to fly over enemy territory and
destroy high-value targets using various methods of airpower.
Now new enemies have devised new technologies for negating
U.S. airpower. Placing high-value assets underground
has effectively neutralized the U.S. ability to reach important
enemy targets. The U.S. must adapt to this new situation.
Conventional “bunker buster” bombs have been highly effective
against exposed targets in Iraq and Afghanistan. However,
these weapons are of little use against deeply buried
targets. Believing it necessary to update the U.S. nuclear
posture and to have the capability to strike at hardened facilities
underground, the Bush administration has called for the
research into a robust nuclear earth-penetrating bomb.
The Cold War is over, and the idea of nuclear deterrence
no longer appears to be a credible threat to a new generation
of U.S. enemies. The threat of nuclear retaliation certainly
did not hinder attacks on New York City and the Pentagon
in 2001. Nor has nuclear deterrence restrained North
Korean dictator Kim Jong Il from testing ballistic missiles and
developing weapons grade fissile material. America’s nuclear
posture is no longer a credible threat to its adversaries. The
world is very much aware that there are almost no circumstances
in which the U.S. would be willing to kill thousands
of innocent people by using a nuclear device. Therefore, it
is essential that the United States develop a new posture to
thwart an attack by its enemies.
The RNEP has become the favored weapon for modernizing
the U.S. nuclear inventory and for serving as a deterrent
to underground facilities. Proponents argue that it will
bury deep into the soil and that the surrounding earth will
absorb the fallout so as not to endanger local populations. By
all indications, this simply is not true. There are several problems
with the RNEP that make it a poor choice for a future
U.S. weapon.
First, the basic physics of this weapon suggest that
it will not do in practice what it is expected to do in theory.
There are no materials strong enough to withstand the forces
of speeds necessary to penetrate deeply into the earth. The
bomb casing will likely disintegrate on contact with the
ground and render the warhead useless. Studies have shown
that the limit of penetration is around twenty meters, which

is not nearly deep enough for the earth to absorb the fallout.
Furthermore, there is a strong possibility that if the facility
were buried deep enough, the shock of the bomb would never
even reach the target. This would make the bomb completely
ineffective. Development of this weapon becomes pointless if
it cannot achieve its stated objectives.
Second, the risk of radioactive fallout associated with
the RNEP is too great. Regardless of how deep the weapon is
able to penetrate, there will be a trail that the fallout can trace
back into the atmosphere. The U.S. military prides itself
on its ability to hit targets with precision and accuracy with
little collateral damage. The RNEP would create a dramatic
end to this selective targeting. Even if the RNEP successfully
destroyed an enemy bunker, the negative impacts of the bomb
would overshadow its accomplishments. These targets are not
worth the deaths of thousands of innocent civilians. Though
the short term effects of radiation exposure would be easy to
track, it would be almost impossible to determine precisely
the long term consequences on the local population if an
RNEP was detonated in theatre. The threat not only affects
civilians, but also personnel in the U.S. military. Soldiers
could very well be in the path of the prevailing winds after
detonation and therefore be exposed to lethal doses of radiation.
The high costs of the RNEP with respect to fallout far
outweigh the potential benefits.
Third, the research and development of the RNEP
can actually hinder military operations throughout the world.
The DoD plays an essential role in combating nuclear proliferation.
For the U.S. to pursue development of new nuclear
weapons while attempting to halt the spread of nuclear
weapons elsewhere is nothing short of hypocrisy. The U.S.
strives to be an example to other nations. Accordingly, U.S.
attempts to increase its own arsenal will only encourage other
nations to do the same. This creates increased security risks
for DoD personnel stationed abroad, and can hinder military
diplomacy between U.S. regional commanders and our allies.
Finally, the U.S. has not put enough effort into
studying conventional alternatives to the RNEP. There are
many theories about how best to strike underground facilities,
but the DoD and DoE seem to be focused solely on
the RNEP. Conventional weapons will never have the same
explosive yield as nuclear devices, but a nuclear explosion may
not be necessary. The funding allotted by Congress for the
RNEP over the next four years could be better spent on developing
conventional means of destroying hardened shelters.
The research in this area may very well lead to the realization
that a strong conventional force is the answer to the question
of the current nuclear arsenal.
Direction for Future Research
91
This research was narrowly focused on the military
use of a robust nuclear earth-penetrator. There are several
related matters that could be examined in greater detail. The
question of using a nuclear weapon in combat is fraught with
political controversy. Many nations have a problem with the
U.S. simply considering the use of these weapons. What type
of response can the U.S. expect from the international community
if it did indeed use the RNEP? RNEP employment
could easily lead to a global arms race, and if the U.S. used
these devices, other nations would likely be more willing to
use nuclear weapons as well. The political turmoil could be
expected to have domestic consequences as well. Any Administration
that actively pursued development of RNEPs could
expect to face a great deal of opposition from the American
public.
Additional research would also be useful regarding
the feasibility of the conventional options mentioned earlier.
For example, what sort of studies are being conducted
on the Deep Digger? This weapon system may not have
the same destructive force as the RNEP, but if it can place a
conventional weapon closer to the target, a lesser amount of
force may suffice. Finally, the concept of kinetic-energy space
weapons, while still in its infancy, is quickly gaining support.
The politics of space weaponization alone could develop into
a broad study, but specifically, would space-based weapons
have the capability to destroy an underground target? If so,
how would these weapons compare to other conventional
systems? Regardless of what type of weapon is used, we ultimately
will depend on the quality of our intelligence. In that
respect, it would be useful to have studies that can help us
develop methods for identifying underground facilities and,
in particular, the key access points to such facilities.
The questions proposed above go beyond the scope
of this paper. But it seems clear that answers to these questions
will only serve to broaden our understanding of what
has been discussed here.
Notes
1. Robert W. Nelson, “Low-Yield Earth-Penetrating
Nuclear Weapons,” Journal of the Federation of American Scientists
54, (2001): 1-8.
2. Ben Friedman. 2002. United States Nuclear Arsenal
[on-line]. Washington, D.C.: Center for Defense Information;
available from http://www.cdi.org/issues/nukef&f/
database/nukearsenals.cfm#United%20States; Internet;
accessed 30 October 2003.
3. John Swomley, “World Domination via Nuclear

Weapons,” The Humanist 63, (2003): 35.
4. Colorado Springs Gazette, 27 September 2003.
5. Wayne LeBaron, America’s Nuclear Legacy ( New
York: Nova Science Publishers, 1998), 7.
6. Ibid, 10.
7. Ibid.
8. Ibid, 11.
9. Ibid, 6.
10. James Kitfield, “The Pros and Cons of New
Nuclear Weapons,” National Journal 35 (2003): 2566.
11. Ibid.
12. Robert W. Nelson, “Low-Yield Earth-Penetrating
Nuclear Weapons,” Journal of the Federation of American Scientists
54, no. 1 (2001): 1-8.
13. Ibid.
14. Ibid.
15. Henry Kelly and Ivan Oelrich. 2003. Will New
Nuclear Weapons Make us More Secure? [on-line]. Washington,
D.C.: Federation of American Scientists; available from
http://www.fas.org/ssp/docs/030916-newnukes; Internet;
accessed 30 October 2003.
16. Ibid.
17. Swomley, “World Domination”, 35.
18. Jonathan Medalia. 2003. Nuclear Earth Penetrator
Weapons [on-line]. Washington, D.C.: Federation of
American Scientists; available from http://www.fas.org/spp/
starwars/crs/RS20834.pdf; Internet; accessed 30 October
2003.
19. Ibid.
20. Ibid.
21. Kitfield, “The Pros and Cons”, 2566.
92
22. Medalia, Penetrator Weapons.
23. Kitfield, “The Pros and Cons”, 2566.
24. Medalia, Penetrator Weapons.
25. Andrew Koch. 2003. US Considers Major
Changes to Strategic Weapons [on-line]. Alexandria, VA:
Jane’s Defence Weekly; available from http://ebird.dtic.
mil/Sept2003/s20030915217115.html; Internet; accessed 10
October 2003.
26. Kelly, More Secure.
27. Colorado Springs Gazette, 27 September 2003.
28. Medalia, Penetrator Weapons.
29. Julain Coman. 2003. Pentagon Wants ‘Mini-
Nukes’ to Fight Terrorists [on-line]. Washington, D.C.:
London Sunday Telegraph; available from http://ebird.afis.
osd.mil/ebfiles/s20031027228041.html; Internet; accessed 30
October 2003.
30. Ibid.
31. Kitfield, “The Pros and Cons”, 2566.
32. Zhu Iizhen. 2003. US Plots to Develop Small
Nukes [on-line]. Beijing, China: People’s Daily; available
from http://english.peopledaily.com.cn/200308/13/
eng20030813_122264.shtml; Internet; accessed 30 October
2003.
33. Kelly, More Secure.
34. Coman, Fight Terrorists.
35. Richard Rhodes, The Making of the Atomic
Bomb (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1986), 451.
36. Ibid, 667.
37. Ibid, 673.
38. Ibid, 692.
39. Ibid, 696.
40. Kevin O’Neill, “Building the Bomb,” in Atomic

Audit, ed. Stephen I. Schwartz
(Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution Press, 1998), 58.
41. Ibid, 83.
42. Ibid, 78.
43. Ibid, 83.
44. Michael Levi, “Nuclear Bunker Buster Bombs,”
Scientific American 291 (Aug 2004): 74.
45. Ibid, 66.
46. Ibid.
47. Nelson, 2.
48. Levi, 67.
49. Ibid.
50. Ibid.
51. Ibid.
52. Ibid.
53. John Deutch, “A Nuclear Posture for Today,”
Foreign Affairs 84 (Jan/Feb 2005): 51.
54. Levi, 68.
55. Ibid.
56. Kitfield, “The Pros and Cons”, 2566.
Bibliography
Alexander, Brian, and Alistair Millar, ed. Tactical Nuclear
Weapons. Washington, D.C.:
Brasseys, Inc., 2003.
Colorado Springs Gazette, 27 September 2003
Coman, Julian. 2003. Pentagon Wants ‘Mini-Nukes’ to Fight
Terrorists [on-line]. Washington,
D.C.: London Sunday Telegraph; available from
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http://ebird.afis.osd.mil/ebfiles/s20031027228041.
html; Internet; accessed 30 October
2003.
Deutch, John. “A Nuclear Posture for Today.” Foreign Affairs
84 (Jan/Feb 2005): 49-61.
Freedman, Lawrence. The Evolution of Nuclear Strategy. New
York: St. Martin’s Press, 1981.
Gray, Colin S. Modern Strategy. Oxford: University Press,
1999.
Kellerhals, Merle D. 2003. Congress Agrees to Let Pentagon
Study Low-Yield Nuclear
Weapons [on-line]. Washington, D.C.: U.S. Department
of State; available from
http://usinfo.state.gov/topical/pol/terror/
texts/03052300.htm; Internet; accessed 30
October 2003.
Kelly, Henry and Ivan Oelrich. 2003. Will New Nuclear
Weapons Make us More Secure? [online].
Washington, D.C.: Federation of American
Scientists; available from
http://www.fas.org/ssp/docs/030916-newnukes;
Internet; accessed 30 October 2003.
Kitfield, James. “The Pros and Cons of New Nuclear Weapons.”
National Journal 35 (2003):
2566.
Koch, Andrew. 2003. US Considers Major Changes to Strategic
Weapons [on-line].
Alexandria, VA: Jane’s Defence Weekly; available
from
http://ebird.dtic.mil/Sept2003/s20030915217115.
html; Internet; accessed 10 October
2003.
Levi, Michael. “Nuclear Bunker Buster Bombs.” Scientific
American 291 (Aug 2004): 66-74.
Iizhen, Zhu. 2003. US Plots to Develop Small Nukes [online].
Beijing, China: People’s Daily;
available from http://english.peopledaily.com.
cn/200308/13/eng20030813_122264.shtml;
Internet; accessed 30 October 2003.
LeBaron, Wayne. America’s Nuclear Legacy. New York: Nova

Science Publishers, 1998.
Medalia, Jonathan. 2003. Nuclear Earth Penetrator Weapons
[on-line]. Washington, D.C.:
Federation of American Scientists; available from
http://www.fas.org/spp/starwars/crs/RS20834.pdf;
Internet; accessed 30 October 2003.
Nelson, Robert W. 2001. Low-Yield Earth-Penetrating
Nuclear Weapons [on-line].
Washington, D.C.: Federation of American Scientists;
available from
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Internet; accessed 10 October 2003.
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of American Scientists;
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test.htm; Internet; accessed 10
October 2003.
O’Neill, Kevin. “Building the Bomb.” In Atomic Audit, ed.
Stephen I. Schwartz. Washington,
D.C.: Brookings Institution Press, 1998.
Rhodes, Richard. The Making of the Atomic Bomb. New
York: Simon and Shuster, 1986.
Swomley, John. “World Domination via Nuclear Weapons.”
The Humanist 63 (2003): 35.
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and American Politics. Reno and
Las Vegas: University of Nevada Press: 1986.
94
THE MYTH OF ISSUE NETWORKS:
A REBUTTAL TO GIBSON AND SNIDER.
BY
William L. Wisehart
In the article, Civil-Military Relations and the
Potential to Influence: A Look a the National Security Decision-Making
Process by Christopher Gibson and Don Snider,
the issue of a crisis in civil-military relations is argued away
as being a natural phenomena related to a “changing of the
guard”. Gibson and Snider present a thorough argument supporting
the “non-crisis” party. This argument supports the
theory that it is natural for the civilian and military sectors to
experience tension due to a highly experienced and educated
military elite teamed up with inexperienced and relatively
under-educated civilian elite. They argued that as time progressed,
military and civilian counterparts would eventually
establish a relationship of mutual respect and trust, thus arguing
away the assertion that there was a growing linear gap
between the military and civilian sectors. While this argument
is well researched and fundamentally sound, its Achilles
heel lies in the idealism and lack of true historical evidence
to back it up. Drawing heavily upon the works of Richard
Kohn as well as two well known case studies, McNamara and
the Vietnam crisis as well as the resignation of CSAF General
Ronald R. Fogleman, I intend to show that in truth, an environment
of mutual respect and trust between military and
civilian elite may never come to fruition.
With the advent of the Clinton Administration, the
issue of civil-military relations had escalated to an unprecedented
height. It seemed that the gap between the military
and civilian sectors was expanding at an alarming rate. Many
scholars began questioning whether or not there was a civilmilitary
relation crisis looming on the horizon. Indeed,
during the Clinton administration America would witness the
controversial retirement of six four star flag officers. 1
A myriad of academic speculation ensued, all trying
to decipher the cause of such an erosion of civil-military relations
in American society. Two parties emerged throughout
all this speculation, the crisis party and the non-crisis party. I
have already covered the basic premise of the non-crisis party
in describing Gibson and Snider’s basic arguments. Before
continuing I will cover some of the basic arguments of the
crisis party.
The crisis party has many well known academics
within its ranks, perhaps the most prominent being Richard
Kohn, one of the leading experts on civil military relations.
The crisis argument asserts that there is a growing gap in civil
military relations and that unchecked, it is very likely that we

may have a fundamental breakdown between the civilian and
military elite within our country. Kohn attributes the growth
in the crisis or “gap” to several issues, most notably the growth
in partisanship within the military, the emergence of a powerful
JCS chairmen, and the ghost of Vietnam and the McNamara
years. 2 All of these issues combined with other lesser
topics have combined to create a seemingly unbridgeable gap
in civil-military relations.
With the rise of the Clinton Administration would
come a drastic change in office. Republicans had dominated
the White House for twelve years, and with this dominance
a relatively stable foundation in civil-military relations had
existed. This stable foundation would end as Clinton naturally
replaced many positions. What ensued was a disruptive
“changing of the guard”. Now the military elite had
to work hand-in-hand with a new, relatively inexperienced
staff. While the military remained solidly educated in political
and military topics, the civilian sector of especially the
Department of Defense was fresh and inexperienced with its
particular nuances. Ensuing tension resulted as inexperienced
and relatively under-educated civilians went head to head
with experienced and adept military elite that were used to a
large degree of control. It was not that the civilian sector was
undereducated in the traditional sense, but more accurately in
regards to national security policy and studies. What it truly
boils down to is a lack of experience on the part of the civilian
sector. They had not been dealing with the day-to-day
national security issues like their military counterparts had for
years before. In this sense alone where they considered undereducated
when compared to the military elite. This then is
the premise of the Gibson/Snider argument; that initially
tension was expected between a “new order” and older established
military elite.
Gibson and Snider rely heavily upon an issue network
framework to come to this hypothesis. This framework
asserts that over time, an environment of trust and mutual
respect between civilian and military counterparts would blossom.
3 Gibson and Snider assert that initially, there was a clash
between civilian and military counterparts. This clash was a
result of first and foremost a lack of experience and education
on the part of civilian political leaders. Gibson and Snider
focus primarily on the educational levels of civilian elite and
its relation to the military elite as well as the amount of military
experience of the civilian elite then in power 4 .
Their findings indicate that for the civilian sector,
the educational level of the civilian elite as compared to the
military elite was inferior. 5 In addition they also find that
the level of personal military experience of the civilian elite
had decreased over the last four decades. 6 Conversely, they
assert that the level of political experience in the military elite
95
had risen over the same period of time. 7 From these findings
Gibson and Snider assert that there was bound to be an initial
clash between the military and civilian sector in the government.
8 They conclude however that despite this initial clash,
overall tensions would eventually disappear as time progressed
and both parties gained experience in dealing with the other.
They assert that over time, civilian and military counterparts
would begin to trust each other.
While this argument appears sound and is certainly
logical, I find that it assumes far too much in its conclusion.
My primary issue is with Gibson and Snider’s assertion that
over time, military and civilian counterparts will grow to
overlook educational and experience gaps between the two
parties. Ideally this would absolutely be the case, but Gibson
and Snider are in many ways far too detached from the reality
of civil-military relations in making that assertion. They are
conveniently discounting the effect the McNamara crisis continues
to have on the memory of the military. They far too
quickly choose to gloss over such monumental events as the
resignation of General Fogleman and the indication that provides
on the true nature of civil-military relations in current
society. By investigating both the McNamara Age and the
resignation of General Fogleman, I will prove that the conclusion
Gibson and Snider assert will in many cases never come
to fruition.
Robert McNamara’s rise to power occurred during
the Kennedy and Johnson administrations at the height of
such controversies as mutually assured destruction and the
Cuban missile crisis. Over the ensuing years, McNamara
would strive to regain control over the military establishment.
The true conflict with McNamara and the Service Chiefs
would arise during the Johnson administration and the Vietnam
conflict. During this time McNamara would prove that
the pendulum had swung too far in the direction of civilian
control over the military. Much to the great disdain of the
military, McNamara and Johnson had gone as far as personally
selecting the targets to be struck by the military. Perhaps
McNamara’s intentions were good as he would assert time and
time again that he was merely trying to prevent the escalation
of the Vietnam Conflict into a potential World War III.
During the McNamara reign, constant tension
between the JCS existed. McNamara was always going
against JCS recommendations to escalate specifically air
strikes against North Vietnamese targets. In one particular
case, McNamara directly opposed the JCS recommendation
to attack North Vietnamese surface to air missile sites, recommending
instead that the MiG airfields needed to be targeted
first. 9 In another instance, McNamara removed six of fourteen
targets recommended by the JCS in the Rolling Thunder
campaign, completely undermining their advisory role on the

issue. 10 Such tactical scrutiny by the Secretary of Defense was
utterly absurd, yet situations like this plagued the Vietnam
Conflict on a regular basis.
McNamara extended his campaign to further civilian
control of the military in other non-war fighting realms of the
military. Financial issues also became a heated area of contention
between the JCS and the Secretary of Defense. With
the advent of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the control of financial
issues shifted from individual services to that of the JCS.
With the rise of McNamara, the control of lower-level military
policy was again shifted from the JCS to the Secretary of
Defense. 11 This of course only added to the growing tensions
between the military and civilian elite of that time.
The tension between McNamara and the JCS
would grow to a heightened state with Senate hearings in the
summer of 1967 that would pit McNamara against the JCS.
All five Chiefs of Staff as well as numerous other high ranking
officers would testify against the McNamara strategy in
Vietnam and the “meddling by the civilians in Washington. 12 ”
After the Stennis hearings, the subcommittee issued a unanimous
declaration that McNamara was micromanaging the
war and that “careful controls and restrictive ground rules had
resulted in the application of our air power in a manner which
was of limited effectiveness.” 13 In the end it was reported that
the JCS had nearly revolted after the testimony of McNamara
and although it was partially untrue, even McNamara admits
and partially understates, “strong differences of judgment did
divide us [,] and the frictions they caused created stress, which
took its toll.” 14
McNamara’s aggressive policy of asserting civilian
control over the military would be highly criticized. Many
scholars like James M. Roherty, author of Decisions of Robert
S. McNamara attack McNamara’s failure to “engage in consensual
policy-making.” 15 Roherty asserts that McNamara
represented a threat to the “integrity of the new military
professionalism that had developed during the 1950’s.” 16
Roherty “emphasized the importance and McNamara’s neglect
of this importance of military judgment to force structure
planning.” 17
In the end McNamara would completely lose face
with both the military and the Johnson administration. The
tension between civil-military relations was catastrophic to an
almost immeasurable degree. While it could easily be attributed
as one of the major factors in our eventual defeat in Vietnam,
its larger impact on the future of civil-military relations
draws the most importance in this argument. It shows that
Gibson and Snider’s thesis that eventually tensions between
military and civilian authorities will decrease over time is
flawed. It proves that in many cases, issues between civilian
and military officials may not be resolved, often times con-
96
tributing to a catastrophic failure in American foreign policy
and operations.
In my second case study, I will examine the events
and repercussions surrounding General Fogelman’s early
retirement from his position as Chief of Staff of the Air Force.
This is intended to provide a contemporary example of the
lack of resolution that can result form civil-military tension.
Throughout General Fogleman’s tenure as CSAF, he admits to
openly clashing with his civilian counterparts, both Secretary
of Defense Cohen and Secretary of the Air Force Widnall. It
is imperative to note that many of the controversies occurred
at a later date in the Clinton administration, which provide a
direct rebuttal to Gibson and Snider’s argument that over an
extended period of time civil-military tension would decrease
if not disappear between civilian and military counterparts.
Some of the major controversies surrounding General
Fogleman’s early retirement were his disagreement with the
Secretary of the Air Force’s decision in the Kelly Flinn fiasco.
In this particular case, the year was 1997, well into the Clinton
administration. Secretary Widnall was contemplating
issuing 1 st Lt. Flinn an honorable discharge for the offense of
adultery 18 . General Fogleman disagreed with this and felt it
was in direct opposition to his assertion that a dishonorable
discharge be issued.
Another major controversy during General Fogleman’s
tenure as CSAF was the blocking by Secretary Cohen
of Brigadier General Schwalier’s promotion to Major General.
In this particular instance, General Fogleman had conducted
an extensive investigation into the Khobar Towers bombing
and concluded that Brigadier General Schwalier had done
everything and more to provide for the security of his base.
This did not suit the Clinton Administration and in the
end Secretary Cohen blocked Brigadier General Schwalier’s
promotion to Major General. General Fogleman was disgusted
with the “Washington scene, the pressure from the
Hill—from people who were uninformed.” He was unwilling
to stand by and watch as the DoD “treated this man [BGen
Schwalier] and the Air Force” poorly 19 .
As a result of these two main incidents, General
Fogleman realized that he had “simply lost respect and confidence
in the leadership that I was supposed to be following.” 20
General Fogleman goes on to state that
“As chief of staff of the United States Air
Force, charged with providing military
advice to the civilian leadership that the
civilian leadership did not value for whatever
reason, I had become ineffective as a spokesman.”
21
This kind of “loss of confidence” is a primary example of
how civil-military relations eventually worsened instead of

improved over time. After three years of service General
Fogleman decided that early retirement was a much better
alternative to continued service in such a stifling atmosphere.
In this particular case study one can see the opposite
of Gibson and Snider’s thesis at work. Instead of civil-military
relations improving over a period of time, they naturally
degraded to the point that General Fogleman felt compelled
to retire. This is a direct and strong rebuttal to Gibson and
Snider’s argument that over time relations between civil
and military counterparts improve. Here we have a mature
administration in direct conflict with a mature military leader.
The facts simply speak for themselves. How is
that General Fogleman, after completing three quarters of
his assignment cannot resolve a conflict with an administration
that had been in place for well over four years? Simply
put, what we have is a complete failure in the hypothesis of
Snider and Gibson’s non-crisis theory. If we followed Gibson
and Snider’s argument, General Fogleman and his civilian
counterparts should have been able to resolve these situations.
There should have been some form of mutual respect and
trust gained over the years between Fogleman and the DoD
that should have prevented both of these occurrences. Instead,
there is a severe lack of respect and trust on both sides of the
spectrum to the unprecedented point that an early retirement
on the part of General Fogleman was the only resolution.
What Gibson and Snider fail to estimate correctly
is the impact Vietnam and the McNamara years had on the
minds of the military member. They fail to fully appreciate
the fact that in the minds of leaders like General Fogleman, a
repeat of the McNamara years was the last thing they wanted.
General Fogleman himself is quoted as stating that the McNamara
situation had a direct impact on his decision. He states
that he saw a similar situation brewing in what he refers to as
the “tank” and did not want to be a part of such a notorious
reconstruction of events. That was in many ways a primary
motivator for his early retirement from his position. Rather
than make the same mistakes as the service chiefs made
during Vietnam, he wanted to end the situation at the cost of
his own early retirement. 22
Both the McNamara and Fogleman case study prove
that while Gibson and Snider’s arguments are ideally sound,
they have no historical evidence to support their premise. In
addition, these case studies represent two strong refutations
against their argument. They show that the stark reality of
civil-military relations in the Washington political arena can
be far from the sometimes “rosy” picture Gibson and Snider
paint. The fact that in both cases very senior political and
military members with several years of experience under their
belts failed to resolve severe conflicts of civil-military policy
shows that the crux of the non-crisis theory presented by
97
Gibson and Snider can neither explain away the friction in
civil-military relations or predict the outcome of future tensions.
Perhaps if Gibson and Snider had presented significant
historical cases in the argument of their thesis, they may have
had more validity in their non-crisis theory, nonetheless, their
conclusion is fundamentally flawed without it.
Bibliography
Gibson, Christopher P. and Snider, Don M. Civil Military
Relations and the Potential to Influence: A Look at the National
Security Decision Making Process. (Armed Forces and Society,
Winter 1999).
Kohn, Richard, The Erosion of Civilian Control of the Military
in the United States Today. (Chapel Hills, University of North
Carolina at Chapel Hill Press, 2002).
Kohn, Richard, ed., The Early Retirement of General Ronald R.
Fogleman, Chief of Staff, United States Air Force. (Aerospace
Power Journal, Spring 2001).
McMaster, H. R. Dereliction of Duty (New York: HarperCollins
Publishing, 1997).
McNamara, Robert S.. In Retrospect: The Tragedy and Lessons
of Vietnam. (New York: Times Books, 1995).
Murdock, Clark A. Defense Policy Formation: A Comparative
Analysis of the McNamara Era. (Albany: State University of
New York Press, 1974)
Palmer, Gregory. The McNamara Strategy and the Vietnam
War: Program Budgeting in the Pentagon, 1960-1968. (Westport:
Greenwood Press, 1978).
Whitehead, YuLin G., LtCol. Civil-Military Relations during
Coalition Operations in the Balkans. (National Defense University,
2001)
(Endnotes)
1 Richard H. Kohn, The Erosion of Civilian Control of the
Military in the United States Today.
2 Richard H. Kohn. Out of Control: The Crisis in Civil-
Military Relations. The National Interest (No 35., Spring
1994), 3-17.
3 Christopher P. Gibson and Don M. Snider, Civil Military
Relations and the Potential to Influence: A Look at the National
Security Decision Making Process. (Armed Forces and Society,

Winter 1999), 212.
4 Gibson and Snider, 203-205.
5 Ibid.
6 Gibson and Snider, Table 5, 207.
7 Ibid.
8 Gibson and Snider, 212.
9 H.R. McMaster, Dereliction of Duty. (New York:
HarperCollins Publishers, 1997). 285.
10 McMaster, 286.
11 Gregory Palmer, The McNamara Strategy and the Vietnam
War: Program Budgeting in the Pentagon, 1960-1968.
(Westport: Greenwood Press, 1978), 47.
12 Robert S. McNamara, In Retrospect. (New York: Times
Books, 1995), 286.
13 McNamara, 290-291.
14 McNamara, 291.
15 Clark A. Murdock. Defense Policy Formation: A
Comparative Analysis of the McNamara Era. (Albany: State
University of New York Press, 1974), 157.
16 Ibid.
17 Ibid.
18 Kohn, The Early Retirement of General Ronald R. Fogleman,
Chief of Staff of the Air Force, 2.
19 Kohn, 2.
20 LtCol YuLin G. Whitehead. Civil-Military Relations
during Coalition Operations in the Balkans. (National Defense
University, 2001).
21 Ibid.
22 Kohn, 2.
98
THE JUST WAR TRADITION AND EASTERN
MILITARY THEORY: APPLICATIONS TO IRAQ
By C3C Matthew H. Yan
The just war tradition, which has been recently manifested
in the preemptive strike by President George W. Bush would
have been seen as appropriate by the eastern military theorist
Sun Tzu but not Mao Zedong. The just war theory
describes the set of conditions that must be met for a war to
be described by modern standards as just. According to the
theory, a just war is a war that has been, “declared by a legitimate
authority, initiated for a just cause, and waged using
the correct means [with] no wrong intentions” (Fotion 107).
Although the theories on just war have evolved over time they
have continued to describe two main concepts. First, the
purpose of war and the extent in which war is to be executed.
Secondly, advances in the destructiveness of weapons have
caused political leaders, like President Bush, to reconsider the
just war theory. It has been adapted to take into consideration
terrorist factions and nations that have the potential to
irresponsibly produce and use weapons of mass destruction.
It is important to understand that the moral standard created
to distinguish what is just and not just derived from society,
and different societies have different ideas on what action is
justified. Although the just war tradition has been born out
of predominantly Christian societies, eastern military theorists
such as Sun Tzu and Mao Zedong have had similar thoughts
on why war is necessary. However, there are still distinct differences
between both Just War Tradition and eastern societies
in regards to how war should be carried out and also their
influences.
Why War is Necessary?
Sun Tzu, perhaps the most influential eastern military
theorist, felt there were several reasons to go to war,
however, “committing army to battle should be undertaken
with the greatest gravity” (Sawyer 154). Based on Sun Tzu’s
thoughts, a prince would be justified if he engaged, “in
attacking a dark and rustic country, in civilizing barbarians,
in punishing the willfully blind, or in dealing summarily with
a state going to ruin [because] such chastisements were in
accord with the Will of Heaven” (Sun Tzu 32). His theories
on warfare emphasized caution when interacting with foreign
nations or kingdoms. Sun Tzu encouraged kings to employ
espionage to its greatest effect. Spies served to provide the
king with information on both his enemies and his allies,
because Sun Tzu wrote, “never rely on the goodwill of others
or on fortuitous circumstances” (Sun 155). Instead he said,
“guarantee through knowledge, active study, and defensive

preparation that the enemy cannot mount a surprise attack or
gain a victory through simple coercion” (Sun 155). The decision
to declare war would be easier for kings with abundant
knowledge about their opponents. Though Sun Tzu describes
how victory is preferably attained without armed force, he
also states, “the government should resort to armed combat
[when] an enemy threatens the state with military action or
refuses to acquiesce without being forced into submission
through warfare” (Sun 154). Applying Sun Tzu’s theory, a
nation is justified in resorting to armed combat if the opposing
nation fails to comply with peace terms. In a modern
sense, this would include disarmament agreements as well
as agreements to discontinue weapons of mass destruction
research. (Sun 154)
Mao Zedong, a modern eastern military theorist,
captured many of Sun Tzu’s beliefs in his writings on military
theory. The primary difference between Mao and Sun
Tzu’s military theories is Mao’s belief that the only just wars
are revolutionary wars. Considering the communist context
of Mao’s writings, he would have agreed that the only wars
worth fighting are wars that contribute to the abolition of
social classes. Before a discussion on Mao’s beliefs on why
wars should be fought, it is important to present his definition
of war must be presented. Mao describes war as the, “highest
form of struggle, existing ever since the emergence of private
property and social classes, for settling contradictions between
classes, between nations, between states, or between political
groups at given stages of their development” (Mao 177).
Although there can be different types of struggles between
factions, Mao states, “there are only two kinds of wars in history,
just and unjust” (Mao 179). He believed that the sole
purpose of just wars, or revolutionary wars, was to end war.
In destroying the class system, Mao and other communists
believed that all other struggles would be eliminated, and
world peace can be achieved. Much of Mao’s military theory
described tactical theory, like Sun Tzu’s theories, but elaborated
on how to defeat the enemy through guerilla warfare.
Essentially many of Mao’s theories on war’s purpose revolve
around his communist beliefs making a comparison with Sun
Tzu and the just war theory difficult. (Mao 179)
Unlike eastern military theorists, just war tradition
theorists have beliefs that are more general on why war is
necessary. The just war theory does not only justify going to
war but also the effects of war. According to just war theorists,
“the harm of war can only be justified if it prevents an
even greater harm of the same sort, because it is rare that any
positive goals will exceed it in value” (Fotion 113). The just
war theory specifies not only when a war is necessary, but also
when ‘first strikes’ are appropriate. First strike theories were
refined during the Cold War when nuclear attacks seemed
99
most imminent, but they are still applicable today as the
threats of large scale nuclear, biological, and chemical warfare
still exist. Military theorists Fotion and Elfstrom have
distinguished circumstances justifying first strikes where, “it
is extremely likely that war is imminent anyway; they will
suffer great risks of destruction if they wait for the first blow;
there are no other means available to avert the crisis; and
their antagonist has no just cause for war” (Fotion 114). In
a modern sense, Sun Tzu’s theory on when armed combat is
necessary is in conjunction with the just war theory on first
strikes and also with George W. Bush’s decision to strike Iraq
first. George W. Bush, in his address to the United Nation
General Assembly, stated,
“We know that Saddam Hussein pursued weapons of
mass murder even when inspectors
were in his country. Are we to assume that he
stopped when they left? The history, the
logic, and the facts lead to one conclusion: Saddam
Hussein’s regime is a grave and
gather danger. To suggest otherwise is to hope
against the evidence. To assume this regime’s good
faith is to bet the lives of millions and the peace of
the world in a reckless gamble. And this is a risk we
must not take…The first time we may be completely
certain he has nuclear weapons is when, God forbid,
he uses one.” (Flippin 209).
President Bush, in his speech, questions the assumption that
Iraq has stopped pursuing weapons of mass destruction. Sun
Tzu’s ideas coincide with this because he wrote, “never rely on
the goodwill of others” (Sun 155). Furthermore, Bush identifies
Iraq as a great threat because no one can confirm their
disarmament. Following Iraqi leaders’ refusal to completely
disarm, Sun Tzu would have probably advised military action
because it revealed Iraq’s refusal to comply without the use of
force. Sun Tzu mentions that a ‘wise leader’ should attack if
a state is threatened by military action or possible danger to
its citizens, which as stated by President Bush in his speech
was the situation that the United States faced. The just war
theory, like Sun Tzu’s theory, justifies an attack if a state risks
great danger when it does not attack.
The just war theory also takes into consideration
foreigners’ circumstances because, “no nation can remain
completely indifferent to the welfare of the citizens of other
nations” (Fotion 115). A clear example can be drawn from
the Jewish extermination in Europe during World War II.
The international community neglected to identify the injustice
happening to foreign peoples, thus permitting a terrible
genocide. The just war theory considers the fact, “sometimes
nations will have the obligation to initiate war on behalf of
[endangered] citizens from other nations… [because] their

lives and well-being must matter to all” (Fotion 115). Neither
Sun Tzu nor Mao’s military theories consider foreign nations’
dispositions. Mao would probably have disapproved of most
wars justified by the just war theory they are not of the revolutionary
kind. Especially as communism seems to be dying
throughout the world, it is rare to see war based on a working
class fighting an upper-class to abolish the class system.
Although Sun Tzu stressed military action in certain dangerous
situations, he also, “stressed the vital necessity to avoid all
engagements not based on extensive, detailed analyses of the
situation” (Sawyer 154). Sun Tzu might perceive President
Bush’s Iraqi engagement as precarious because the presence
of weapons of mass destruction was likely, but still uncertain.
Sun Tzu, if alive today, might disagreed with the just
war theory and President Bush. He may have advised further
analysis and research to determine whether or not there were
weapons of mass destruction in Iraq. This hypothetical advice
would be in accordance with his ideas on combat as a last
measure and on the importance of reliable intelligence. However,
weapons of mass destruction did not exist during Sun
Tzu’s lifespan, and it is impossible to determine whether his
theory would have changed with the consideration of these
weapons.
The Extent of War
Sun Tzu is elaborate on how war should be carried
out, but states, “the best policy is to take a state intact”
(Sun 77). This would imply that Sun Tzu would disagree
with the annihilation of a population through warfare. Sun
Tzu also feels that one should not use all resources for the
purpose of war because, “when your weapons are dulled and
ardour damped, your strength exhausted and treasure spent,
neighboring rulers will take advantage of your distress to act”
(Sun 73). He would agree that nations involved in total wars,
such as World War I, make themselves vulnerable to invasion,
because these nations have practically exhausted all of their
resources, including resources used for defense. Sun Tzu also
emphasized war’s duration when he writes, “we have heard
of blundering swiftness in war, we have not yet seen a clever
operation that was prolonged” (Sun 73). The aforementioned
war elements discussed by Sun Tzu revolve around his desire
for efficiency in carrying out war.
Although Mao’s theories on war’s permissible extent
are very similar to that of Sun Tzu, Mao exchanges efficiency
for effectiveness. Mao adjusted Sun Tzu’s theories to aide
the effectiveness of guerilla warfare. He emphasized strategic
defense and prioritized the survival of the guerilla faction.
This sometimes means that retreat is acceptable, because it
allows a force to, “conserve its strength and wait for an opportune
moment for beating the enemy” (Mao 210). Unlike Sun
100
Tzu, Mao did not believe that speed or heavy damage were
factors in warfare as long as victory was achieved. However,
Sun Tzu’s theory on preventing maximum resource expenditure
was found applicable for Mao in guerilla warfare, especially
as resources were very limited. (Mao 210)
Unlike the ideas of eastern military theorists such as
Sun Tzu and Mao Zedong, the just war theory is ambiguous
about a nation’s execution of war. According to military theorist
Paul Ramsey, a just war, “must be a limited war,” and if in
response to an attack it must be a war, “that mounts destructive
power to match the increased power of attack, so long
as this can be limited directly to the objective of defeating
attack” (Ramsey 136). According to the just war theory, a war
should be executed by proportionate means with noncombatant
immunity and limited objectives. (Payne 45) Proportionate
means in warfare characterizes when, “the weaponry
or degree of force used [in war is] limited to what is necessary
to secure a just peace” (Payne 42). A victory in a just war is
achieved when peace is created, therefore the just war theory
considers anything that causes war to continue after peace as
extraneous.
Influences on Military Theory
The influences on Sun Tzu are heavily debated
because it is uncertain when and where he originated. However,
it is suspected that Sun Tzu lived between a period when,
“rulers indulged in military adventures to satisfy a whim, to
revenge a slight or an insult, or to collect booty,” and when,
“war was no longer a regulated pastime, but the ultimate
instrument of statecraft” (Tzu 9). This entire time span is
considered one of China’s most chaotic historical periods,
especially as war seemed unusually common. Warlords often
skipped non-violent policy and immediately sought combat
to resolve conflict. Sun Tzu most likely composed his theories
to aide his king in a time when strategic warfare was still fairly
new. (Sun 25)
Mao Zedong’s major influences were Chinese military
literature, especially Sun Tzu’s book, Art of War, where
most of his military strategies were derived. Also, Mao’s communist
training affected his ideas on military theory. As Mao
was forced to employ forces of significantly smaller size than
his enemy, he adapted military principles to fight a guerilla
war. Military experience also influenced Mao when, “the Red
Army failed to break up several of the enemy’s campaigns of
encirclement and annihilation” (Mao 204).
The just war tradition is by far the most evolved
theory. Being of Christian origin, Saint Augustine constructed
the just war tradition when he developed the Jus Ad
Bellum or justified war theory. (Ramsey 16) St. Augustine
gave justification to Christian warfare because Jesus instructed

man to, “Love each other as I have loved you” (Bible, John
15.12). However, Saint Augustine also found it important
that Christians were told, “Everyone must submit to himself
to the governing authorities, for there is no authority except
that which God has established” (Bible, Romans 13.1). Eventually,
Saint Augustine concluded that,
“Human government has been established by God
and given the responsibility to exercise
necessary force for keeping order, rewarding good,
and punishing evil. God has not only condoned war
in the past, he has also participated in it and promises
to do so in the future. Since we know God is perfect,
holy, and good, we cannot say that all wars are
inherently evil. There must be a distinction between
murder, which Scripture clearly condemns, and some
forms of punishment—such as war, self-defense, and
capital punishment.” (Payne 45).
After separating war from inherent evil, the just war theory
next considered when waging war was acceptable. Saint
Augustine writes, “That law therefore, which for the protection
of citizens orders foreign force to be repulsed by the
same force, can be obeyed without a wrong desire” (Ramsey
36). Retaliation for the sole purpose of protecting citizens
of the state eventually evolved into the modern idea of just
war. Modern military theorists have extended the just war
concept to justify pre-emptive strikes because, “no proportionate
reason can be assigned for permitting the extinction of
the human race” (Ramsey 76). The extinction of the human
race is a reference to the possible effect of weapons of mass
destruction if they are allowed to be employed.
Conclusion
Coincidentally, the ideas of eastern military theorists
such as Sun Tzu are not much different from those of the just
war tradition. However, there are some notable differences
in the two theories. The just war theory essentially considers
modern circumstances, while Sun Tzu’s theories do not.
The just war theory takes into consideration weapons of mass
destruction, the welfare of foreign citizens, and terrorism as a
threat to global communities, and Sun Tzu’s theories do not.
It does not seem that time or geography caused a difference
between Sun Tzu’s theories and the just war theory. However,
Mao’s ideas on military theory seem to be radically different
from the just war tradition mainly because of his communist
views. In general, Sun Tzu would have agreed with President
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George W. Bush’s method and reason used to strike first at
Iraq. Both Sun Tzu and President Bush agree that an enemy
nation’s goodwill should not be trusted, and that the only
resolution to deal with a nation that refuses to cease its threat
is in fact—military intervention.
Works Cited
Flippin, Royce, ed. The Best American Political Writing 2003.
New York: Thunder Mouth’s
Press, 2003.
Fotion, Nicholas, and Gerard Elfstrom. Military Ethics.
Boston: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1986.
Holy Bible: New International Version. Grand Rapids:
Zondervan, 1984.
Mao Tse-Tung. Selected Works. New York: International Publishers,
1954.
Payne, Keith B., and Karly I. Payne. A Just Defense. Portland:
Multnomah Press, 1987.
Ramsey, Paul. War and the Christian Conscience. Durham:
Duke University Press, 1961.
Sawyer, Ralph. The Seven Military Classics of Ancient China.
Boulder: Westview Press, 1993.
Sun Tzu. The Art of War. Trans. Samuel B. Griffifth.
London: Oxford University Press, 1963.