Airman Scholar Sp05-1.indd - United States Air Force Academy
Airman Scholar Sp05-1.indd - United States Air Force Academy
Airman Scholar Sp05-1.indd - United States Air Force Academy
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In this issue…<br />
This publication is devoted to papers written by<br />
cadets at the US <strong>Air</strong> <strong>Force</strong> <strong>Academy</strong> and represents an<br />
excellent cross section of thinking from the 34th Education<br />
Group’s Military Strategic Studies classes. The<br />
<strong><strong>Air</strong>man</strong>-<strong>Scholar</strong> devotes a large percentage of its space<br />
to showcasing USAF <strong>Academy</strong> cadet writing on military<br />
topics. To this end we include the best papers obtainable<br />
from the History, Political Science, Philosophy and Military<br />
Strategic Studies programs. We welcome all departments<br />
focusing on the general theme of Contemporary<br />
Military Thought which guides the <strong><strong>Air</strong>man</strong>-<strong>Scholar</strong>.<br />
In seeking to present current military thought<br />
by cadets at USAFA we are also trying to illuminate<br />
some of the issues with which future USAF leaders are<br />
grappling as they prepare for an uncertain future. As<br />
these future leaders express themselves in recommendations<br />
for solutions or suggest methods of thinking about<br />
solutions, we hope to capture the “nuggets” of truly<br />
useful concepts and thoughts.<br />
For the first time we include a broader specturm<br />
of work which includes Fourth class cadets as well as<br />
upper classmen. We think that you will find these submissions<br />
interesting and useful.<br />
1<br />
The <strong><strong>Air</strong>man</strong>-<strong>Scholar</strong> invites both full-length articles and<br />
short “letters to the editor” comments. Please submit in<br />
accordance with the following guidelines:<br />
1. Full-length articles should be approximately 6,000<br />
words in length, although all submissions will be considered.<br />
2. Articles should be submitted as hard copy with accompanying<br />
3.5 disk (not returned)<br />
3. Articles will be edited to conform with <strong><strong>Air</strong>man</strong>-<strong>Scholar</strong><br />
format; proofs will not be sent to authors prior to publication.<br />
4. Articles are encouraged from all knowledgeable members<br />
of the academic and military communities. Publication<br />
of outstanding papers by USAFA cadets and other<br />
service academy students is a particular goal of <strong><strong>Air</strong>man</strong>-<br />
<strong>Scholar</strong>.<br />
5. Articles must be received by 1 September 2005.<br />
6. Send articles to:<br />
34th Education Group<br />
Attn: <strong><strong>Air</strong>man</strong>-<strong>Scholar</strong><br />
2354 Fairchild Drive, Suite 2A2<br />
USAF <strong>Academy</strong>, CO 80840-6264
AIRMAN SCHOLAR<br />
Published by the 34th Education Group<br />
at the<br />
<strong>United</strong> <strong>States</strong> <strong>Air</strong> <strong>Force</strong> <strong>Academy</strong><br />
Spring 2005<br />
Vol XI, No 1<br />
Commandant of Cadets<br />
Commander 34th Training Wing<br />
Brig Gen Johnny Weida<br />
Commander and Professor of USAFA<br />
34th Education Group<br />
Col Thomas A. Drohan<br />
Editors<br />
Glenn Ferguson<br />
John Farquhar<br />
Brent Talbot<br />
The 34th Education Group’s mission is to oversee curriculum<br />
development and instruction in Military Strategic Studies for<br />
the cadets of the US <strong>Air</strong> <strong>Force</strong> <strong>Academy</strong>. This consists of courses<br />
covering Military Theory and Strategy, Officership, <strong><strong>Air</strong>man</strong>ship,<br />
Aerospace Theory and Doctrine, and Joint and Coalition<br />
Operations. Group personnel conduct research on a variety of<br />
topics, including international security, space-related issues,<br />
military service culture, and educational modeling. Research<br />
activities are coordinated through the 34th Education Group<br />
Research Office.<br />
The opinions expressed in AIRMAN SCHOLAR do not represent<br />
any official policies of the Commandant of Cadets, US <strong>Air</strong><br />
force <strong>Academy</strong>, US <strong>Air</strong> <strong>Force</strong>, or US government. They are presented<br />
to stimulate discussion on military issues and domestic<br />
and international affairs.<br />
AIRMAN SCHOLAR is published twice annually. If you have<br />
comments concerning articles, would like to contribute an article<br />
for publication, or desire to receive AIRMAN SCHOLAR,<br />
please contact us at:<br />
34th Education Group<br />
att: AIRMAN SCHOLAR<br />
2354 Fairchild Drive, Suite 2A2<br />
USAF <strong>Academy</strong> CO 80840-6264<br />
(719) 333-3255 or DSN 333-3255<br />
e-mail: glenn.ferguson@usafa.af.mil<br />
2<br />
TABLE OF CONTENTS<br />
1 From the Editor<br />
By Glenn Ferguson<br />
3 IS MISSILE DEFENSE A GOOD IDEA<br />
by C4C Rob Auflick<br />
7 WHERE OD PRIORITIES LIE, WITH MEN<br />
OR WITH THE MISSION?<br />
By C4C Michelle Bonneau<br />
11 THE ANATOMY OF CLOSE AIR SUPPORT<br />
by C1C Brandon Burns<br />
24 IS DEMOCRATIC IMPERIALISM VIABLE?<br />
ASSESSING THE VALIDITY OF THE BUSH<br />
DOCTRINE.<br />
By C4C Whitney Camp<br />
27 MORALLY BOUND TO NATIONAL<br />
SECURITY<br />
By C3C Brady Cilo<br />
30 MIND OVER MATTER: THE CASE FOR<br />
DECENTRALIZING PSYCHOLOGICAL<br />
OERATIONS (PSYOPS) IN MODERN<br />
WARFARE<br />
By C1C Kristen L. Fagen<br />
43 SPACE ASSETS: THE ACHILLES HEEL IN<br />
NATIONAL DEFENSE<br />
By C1C Alexander K. Goldfein<br />
57 NO COERCION HERE: THE SOVIET<br />
MILITARY EXPEDITION IN<br />
AFGHANISTAN, 1979-1989<br />
By C3C Roland W. Olmstead<br />
65 ETHICS IN WARFARE<br />
By C3C David Schill<br />
69 AIR CONTROL: THE FALLACY OF COER<br />
CIVE AIR STRATEGY IN BRITISH COLO<br />
NIAL ADMINISTRATION, 1919-1924<br />
By C1C Colby Sullins<br />
81 FALLOUT: THE QUESTION OF NEXT GEN<br />
ERATION NUCLEAR WEAPONS<br />
By C1C Damon A. Wagoner<br />
94 THE MYTH OF ISSUE NETWORKS: A<br />
REBUTTAL TO GIBSON AND SNIDER<br />
By C1C William L. Wisehart<br />
98 THE JUST WAR TRADITION AND EAST<br />
ERN MILITARY THEORY: APPLICATIONS<br />
TO IRAQ<br />
By C3C Matthew H. Yan
IS MISSILE DEFENSE A GOOD IDEA?<br />
By C4C Rob Auflick<br />
The Cold War was in full swing. Both the <strong>United</strong><br />
<strong>States</strong> and the Soviet Union were positioning themselves to<br />
be the world’s one and only great superpower. In 1983, one<br />
side thought that they had come up with a weapon which<br />
would give them the upper hand in the military realm of this<br />
ideological conflict. “Obe Ron Kanobi strapped on his cape,<br />
headed up to the podium, and announced his plan to slay the<br />
evil Dark Side, or the Soviet Union with the Strategic Defense<br />
Initiative (SDI), known then as ‘Star Wars’ (Freedman 57).”<br />
“Star Wars” was to be a multi-layered missile defense system<br />
which would protect the <strong>United</strong> <strong>States</strong> in case of an attack<br />
by thousands of Soviet warheads. “Since 1983, the U.S. has<br />
spent more than $55 billion trying to make President Ronald<br />
Reagan’s dreams a reality (Information 22).” This program,<br />
once considered abandoned and a relic of the Cold War, has<br />
found itself once again the center of national security.<br />
While the end of the Cold War signaled a reduction<br />
in the likelihood of global conflict, the threat from foreign<br />
missiles has grown steadily as sophisticated missile technology<br />
becomes available on a wider scale. The proliferation of<br />
weapons of mass destruction and the ballistic and cruise<br />
missiles that could deliver them pose a direct and immediate<br />
threat to the security of U.S. military forces and assets in<br />
overseas theaters of operation, our allies and friends, as well<br />
as our own country. “Since 1980, ballistic missiles have been<br />
used in six regional conflicts (Report 3).“<br />
Basics of Ballistic Missile Defense<br />
All ballistic missiles share a common, fundamental<br />
element. “They follow a ballistic trajectory that includes<br />
three phases. These phases are the boost phase, the midcourse<br />
phase, and the terminal phase (Project 4).” The boost phase<br />
is the portion of a missile’s flight in which it is thrusting to<br />
gain the acceleration needed to reach its target. This phase<br />
usually lasts between three to five minutes. During this phase<br />
the rocket is climbing against the earth’s gravity and either<br />
exiting the earth’s atmosphere, or in the case of shorter range<br />
missiles, only reaching the fringes of outer space.<br />
Once the missile has completed firing its propulsion<br />
system, it begins the longest part of its flight, which is known<br />
as the mid-course phase. During this phase the missile is<br />
coasting, or freefalling towards it target. This phase can last<br />
as long as 20 minutes in the case of intercontinental ballistic<br />
missiles (ICBMs). Most missiles that leave the atmosphere<br />
3<br />
shed their rocket motors by this time in order to increase the<br />
range that the missile’s weapon, known as a warhead, can<br />
travel. For medium and long range missiles this phase occurs<br />
outside the earth’s atmosphere.<br />
The final phase of a missile’s flight is the terminal<br />
phase. During this phase the missile’s warhead re-enters the<br />
earth’s atmosphere at incredible speeds, some at over 2,000<br />
mph. This phase lasts approximately 30 seconds for ICBM<br />
class missiles.<br />
There are advantages and challenges to set up<br />
engagement opportunities against an incoming missile in<br />
each of these phases. “The capability to defend against an<br />
attacking missile in each of these phases is called a layered<br />
defense, and it may be expected to increase the chances that<br />
the missile and its payload will be destroyed (From18).” “By<br />
attacking the missile in all phases of flight, we capitalize on<br />
opportunities that could increase the advantage of the defense<br />
(Project 30).” A capability to intercept a missile in the boost<br />
phase, for example, can destroy a missile regardless of its<br />
range or intended aim-point and provide a global coverage<br />
capability. In addition, the destroyed missile would threaten<br />
the launching nations territory with debris. A midcourse<br />
intercept capability can provide wide coverage of a region<br />
or regions, while a terminal defense reduces the protection<br />
coverage considerably to a localized area. When we then add<br />
shot opportunities in the midcourse and terminal phases of<br />
flight to boost phase opportunities, we increase significantly<br />
the probability that we will be successful. “Improving the<br />
odds of interception becomes critical when ballistic missiles<br />
carry weapons of mass destruction (Project 52).” “When<br />
defending against more lethal payloads, a capability to<br />
intercept a missile near its launch point is always preferable to<br />
attempting to intercept that same missile closer to its target<br />
(Missile 40).”<br />
Figure 1.
History<br />
“Nike-Zeus was one of the first U.S. efforts whose<br />
objective was to develop long range defenses against ballistic<br />
missiles (From 2).” “The logic driving the program called<br />
for an exoatmospheric (60 miles or higher above the earth’s<br />
surface) or very high altitude, long range interceptor carrying<br />
a 400 kiloton nuclear warhead that, when detonated, would<br />
destroy incoming missiles (From 5).”<br />
While rocket science had put the concept within<br />
reach, the tracking radars were still too primitive to cope with<br />
a large number of missiles. The radars could be spoofed by<br />
countermeasures such as chaff and decoys, and were physically<br />
vulnerable. “The tight defense budgets of the 1950s also<br />
acted as a restraint since a widely deployed system would be<br />
costly (Evolution 8).”<br />
Replacing Nike-Zeus program was Project<br />
Defender, what today might be classified as an Advanced<br />
Technology Demonstrator program that explored possible<br />
new technologies that could be incorporated into future<br />
missile defense programs. “One concept that emerged,<br />
called Ballistic Missile Boost Intercept (BAMBI), envisioned<br />
satellite launched, hit-to-kill missiles containing huge wire<br />
mesh arrays that would destroy offensive missiles in the first 5<br />
minutes (the “boost phase”) of flight (Lethbridge 61).” Low<br />
funding and high projected costs, together with new estimates<br />
of Soviet progress on offensive systems and doubts about the<br />
survivability of the BAMBI system, ended this effort in 1968.<br />
Under President Kennedy, Nike-Zeus was canceled<br />
in 1961 and replaced by Nike-X. This program incorporated<br />
three major advances. “These advances were a phased-array,<br />
electronically guided radar, and an upgraded Nike-Zeus<br />
missile renamed Spartan (From 45).” Nike-X, in turn, was<br />
superceded by Sentinel in 1967. “Recognizing that the<br />
U.S. could not stop an all-out attack by Soviet ICBMs, the<br />
Johnson Administration elected to proceed with a “thin”<br />
anti-ballistic umbrella designed to protect major U.S. cities<br />
(Missile 40).” When Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara<br />
announced this plan in September 1967, he made two points<br />
that have become part of the current debate about 21st<br />
century U.S. national missile defense: (1) attempts to deploy<br />
a comprehensive ABM system will only fuel the offensive<br />
missile race, and (2) what is needed is enough of an umbrella<br />
to counter very limited threats such as that posed by the small<br />
Communist Chinese ICBM fleet.<br />
4<br />
The Nixon Administration refocused the Sentinel<br />
system from guarding cities to guarding vital military<br />
locations by employing as many as 12 ABM sites around the<br />
country. “Renamed Safeguard, the system would provide<br />
protection to Minuteman ICBM missile fields, Strategic <strong>Air</strong><br />
Command bases, and the National Command Authority<br />
in Washington, DC (From50).” In August 1969, Senate<br />
approved this plan after the Vice President broke a tie vote.<br />
Furthermore, the new Administration, like its predecessor,<br />
justified the “light ABM” deployment as a means of<br />
preventing the Chinese from ever using their emergent ICBM<br />
force to blackmail the <strong>United</strong> <strong>States</strong>.<br />
“In fact, the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks (SALT)<br />
negotiations became entwined with separate talks on limiting<br />
anti-ballistic missile deployments (From 82).” In 1972<br />
the <strong>United</strong> <strong>States</strong> and the Soviet Union signed the ABM<br />
Treaty which limited both sides to two anti-ballistic missile<br />
interceptor sites. “A 1974 Protocol reduced the two sites to<br />
one each and to 100 interceptors (Missile 13).” The Soviets<br />
elected to defend Moscow with their nuclear tipped Galosh<br />
system, which is an upgraded “Gazelle” system and is still in<br />
place today. Meanwhile, the <strong>United</strong> <strong>States</strong> opted to defend<br />
the Minuteman missile site around Grand Forks, North<br />
Dakota. On October 1, 1975, the Grand Forks<br />
site became operational. “The next day, the House of<br />
Representatives voted to close the system down because the<br />
Soviet program to put multiple independent reentry vehicles<br />
(MIRV) on their missiles meant that Safeguard would be<br />
easily overwhelmed (From 84).” Furthermore, it was finally<br />
recognized that the radars that were part of the system would<br />
be blinded by the electromagnetic pulse from exploding<br />
nuclear warheads on the Safeguard interceptors. The Senate<br />
concurred with the House action in November, and in<br />
February 1976, the system went into “caretaker” status after<br />
only four months of operation. Except for its supporting<br />
radar, Safeguard was closed completely in 1978.<br />
This was how things were until on March 23, 1983,<br />
in five paragraphs near the end of a televised nationwide<br />
address, President Reagan conveyed his vision of how the<br />
U.S. could counter Soviet ICBMs by developing defenses that<br />
would make “nuclear weapons impotent and obsolete (Reagan<br />
1).” Mr. Reagan conceded that some other nations might<br />
regard defensive measures “paired with offensive systems. . .<br />
as fostering an aggressive policy (Reagan 2).” This has been<br />
a concern that remains to this day.
Several <strong>United</strong> <strong>States</strong> Congressmen and Senators<br />
believe that this futuristic “star wars” scheme was nothing<br />
more than another excuse to increase defense spending which<br />
had little impact on the program. The Strategic Defense<br />
Initiative (SDI) was born. In 1985 the Pentagon’s SDI<br />
Organization (SDIO) proposed a multi-layer, space-based<br />
system to defend 3,500 “targets” against Soviet missiles. By<br />
1987 the reality of technological limitations had set in, and<br />
many anti-missile concepts were abandoned as unworkable.<br />
“Nonetheless, with about $4 billion per year being spent<br />
on SDI, the program anticipated a deployment decision in<br />
1993 and initial operational status by 1997 employing both<br />
ground and space-based interceptors (Report 4).” But by<br />
1992 the Warsaw Pact had disintegrated and the Soviet Union<br />
imploded. Under President Bush, the idea of a nationwide<br />
defense against a massive Soviet missile strike was abandoned<br />
in favor of Global Protection Against Limited Strikes or<br />
GPALS. This envisioned an integrated system that would<br />
provide protection against tactical/theater missiles as well as<br />
up to 200 nuclear warheads mounted on land or sea launched<br />
intercontinental ballistic missiles.<br />
But again outside events intervened. In the 1991<br />
Persian Gulf War, America suffered its first combat casualties<br />
caused by ballistic missiles. <strong>Air</strong> <strong>Force</strong> and special operations<br />
missions to find and destroy Iraq’s Scud missiles and their<br />
launchers met with no better success than the World War<br />
II effort, Operation Crossbow, to locate and hit the Nazi<br />
V-2 launch sites. The one apparent bright<br />
spot came from initial reports that the Patriot <strong>Air</strong> Defense<br />
system had achieved notable success in knocking out Scuds<br />
in their terminal ballistic phase, which was later modified<br />
substantially by engineers. Congress responded by enacting<br />
the Missile Defense Act that specified a ground only system of<br />
interceptors to protect U.S. territory to be deployed by 1996.<br />
“The Pentagon, however, said that meeting the 1996 deadline<br />
was not possible, but deployment by 2002 was (Rumsfeld 6).”<br />
When the Clinton Administration came to power<br />
in 1993, SDIO became the Ballistic Missile Defense<br />
Organization (BMDO). “Estimates that Iraq had been<br />
within 6 months of having a nuclear weapon with which<br />
it could have attacked its neighbors or used to blackmail<br />
the <strong>United</strong> <strong>States</strong>, fueled the psychology of missile defense,<br />
particularly deploying defenses in theatres around the world<br />
(Rumsfeld 7).” When the Republicans gained control of both<br />
Houses of Congress in 1995, the stage was set for a major<br />
push not just for developing and deploying theater systems,<br />
but for a National Missile Defense (NMD) system to be<br />
5<br />
deployed by 2003. Technological setbacks caused this date<br />
to slip to 2005, which is also the year in which, according to<br />
a 1999 National Intelligence Estimate, North Korea could<br />
field a missile capable of hitting the U.S. homeland. But in<br />
late 1999, North Korea agreed to stop developing its Taepo<br />
Dong 2 ICBM, which led a number of analysts to add a year<br />
to the Korean “threat development” time line. Concurrently,<br />
in mid-2000, retired <strong>Air</strong> <strong>Force</strong> General Larry Welch, the head<br />
of the National Missile Defense Independent Review Team<br />
created by the Pentagon to evaluate NMD, told the Senate<br />
Armed Services Committee that NMD’s “high risk” made a<br />
2005 deployment “unlikely (Rumsfeld 8).”<br />
Threats and World Impact<br />
To an extent seldom seen since Cold War days, the<br />
growing debate over the need for a NMD system has split<br />
public opinion. Pros and cons are discussed in increasingly<br />
emotional confrontations, which lead not to understanding<br />
but to angry, emotional, rejection of opposing views. What is<br />
there about NMD that produces such friction when the issue<br />
arises? It is because the decision to deploy an NMD system<br />
rests on the most fundamental issues of America’s role in the<br />
world and our relationship not only with our adversaries<br />
but with our closest allies as well. “It is not surprising that<br />
Russia and China are loud critics of NMD, but Germany,<br />
France, Great Britain and other western nations are also<br />
questioning the wisdom of proceeding with a program that<br />
threatens to ignite a new nuclear arms race (Evolution 19).”<br />
It may be possible to shrug off the anticipated arguments<br />
of countries often treated as enemies, but the <strong>United</strong> <strong>States</strong><br />
must give thoughtful consideration and great weight to<br />
the same criticism from its friends.<br />
President Clinton said that a final decision to deploy<br />
NMD must await satisfactory answers to four criteria. First,<br />
there must be a real threat. Secondly, the <strong>United</strong> <strong>States</strong> must<br />
have the technological means to address that threat effectively.<br />
Thirdly, the U.S. response must be affordable. Finally, NMD<br />
deployment must do acceptable damage to the stability of<br />
current and future international security arrangements. The<br />
fourth criteria is clearly the most critical. What good does a<br />
defense system do if it weakens the current strategic nuclear<br />
stability which was built over the last 30 years? Repeated<br />
U.S. threats to break the Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM)<br />
Treaty of 1972, ignore the fact that there is a comprehensive<br />
arms control structure in which the individual treaties are<br />
interdependent. The first Strategic Arms Limitation Treaty<br />
(SALT I) of 1972 was negotiated in tandem with the ABM<br />
Treaty as a complementary measure, in which neither one was
possible without the other. Subsequently SALT II and the<br />
Strategic Arms Reduction Treaties I and II (START I and II)<br />
were erected on the SALT I/ABM foundation.<br />
The existence of this stabilizing arms control structure was<br />
recognized by other nations, most importantly by China, and<br />
thereby inhibited the expansion of other nuclear arsenals,<br />
while contributing to global nuclear non-proliferation efforts.<br />
“To pull out a keystone of arms control by breaking of the<br />
ABM Treaty could weaken nuclear stability worldwide,<br />
particularly because of the sensitivity of Chinese, Indian and<br />
Pakistani nuclear programs (Evolution 33).”<br />
Of equal concern is that NMD will certainly disrupt progress<br />
on future arms control agreements, which are essential to<br />
genuine reductions in still excessive nuclear arsenals. President<br />
Jacques Chirac of France identified this problem when he<br />
declared: “Nuclear disarmament will be more difficult<br />
when powerful countries are developing new technologies<br />
[NMD] to enhance their nuclear capabilities (Evolution 16).<br />
According to Chirac, “The great danger is that other nations,<br />
most notably China and Russia, will seek to enhance their<br />
own nuclear capabilities in response to the deployment of<br />
an American NMD system. In the political effort to justify<br />
deployment of defenses against a highly unlikely threat, the<br />
<strong>United</strong> <strong>States</strong> might undo significant arms control measures<br />
and end up facing much greater real nuclear dangers.<br />
While the end of the Cold War signaled a reduction<br />
in the likelihood of global conflict, the threat from foreign<br />
missiles has grown steadily as sophisticated missile technology<br />
becomes available on a wider scale. The proliferation of<br />
weapons of mass destruction and the ballistic and cruise<br />
missiles that could deliver them, pose a direct and immediate<br />
threat to the security of U.S. military forces and assets in<br />
overseas theaters of operation, our allies and friends, as well as<br />
our own country. We have already witnessed the willingness<br />
of countries to use theater ballistic missiles for military<br />
purposes. Since 1980, ballistic missiles have been used in<br />
six regional conflicts. Strategic ballistic missiles, including<br />
intercontinental (ICBMs) and submarine launched ballistic<br />
missiles (SLBMs) exist in abundance in the world today.<br />
This is why the U.S. is seeking to deploy a<br />
national missile defense system. By such an action the U.S.<br />
will signal to the world that they are willing to pursue illusory<br />
defenses against non-existent threats even though we subject<br />
all nations to continued nuclear competition and increased<br />
risks of a future nuclear war.<br />
6<br />
Works Cited<br />
Ballistic Missile Defense: Evolution and Current Issues. General<br />
Accounting Office Report GAO/NSIAD-93-<br />
229, July 1993.<br />
Ballistic Missile Defense: Information on Directed Energy<br />
Programs for Fiscal Years 1985 Through 1993. General<br />
Accounting Office GAO/NSIAD-93-182, June<br />
1993.<br />
Freedman, Lawrence. U.S. Intelligence and the Soviet Strategic<br />
Threat. Princeton University Press, 1986.<br />
From Nike-Zeus to Safeguard: U.S. Defenses Against ICBMs<br />
1958-1976. Union of Concerned Scientists, 1999.<br />
Lethbridge, Cliff. History of Rocketry Part I-Ancient Times<br />
up to World War II. New York: Bergeman, 1989.<br />
Missile Defense Milestones 1944-1993. Strategic Defense Initiative,<br />
Department of Defense, March 1993.<br />
Project Defender, Congressional Research Service Report 87-<br />
689S, July 1987.<br />
Reagan, Ronald. Peace and Security. March 23, 1983,<br />
Transcript of Television Address to the Nation, U.S.<br />
Department of State, Bureau of Public Affairs, Current<br />
Policy Series No. 472.<br />
Report to Congress: Plan for Deployment of Theater and<br />
National Ballistic Missile Defenses. Department of<br />
Defense, June 1992.<br />
The Rumsfeld Commission Report. The Congressional<br />
Record, July 31, 1998 (pp. S9522-9523).
WHERE DO PRIORITIES LIE, WITH MEN OR WITH<br />
THE MISSION?<br />
By C4C Michelle Bonneau<br />
General George S. Patton Jr. states, “Officers must<br />
be made to care for their men. That is the sole duty of all<br />
officers” (Contrails, 64). Throughout military history, leaders<br />
have asked themselves which is priority: one’s men or<br />
the given mission? As Patton clearly stated, it is the leader’s<br />
responsibility to take care of his/her soldiers, to train them<br />
and then to lead them in the accomplishment of the mission.<br />
This concept of duty is simple enough in writing but there is<br />
one thing that officers and soldiers must accept: when there<br />
is a battle or a war, people will die. Not only that, but during<br />
the time of war, soldiers are tested physically, emotionally, and<br />
mentally. The question is how far is a commander willing<br />
to push his men to accomplish any mission? Or perhaps in<br />
some instances, the better question becomes how many men<br />
is the commander ready to lose for the mission? The answers<br />
are controversial, but taking into account military history<br />
and past battles, successful leaders encouraged their men and<br />
exemplified high morale, but also realized men and resources<br />
often must be sacrificed to accomplish the more important<br />
mission. A vital mission with a clear objective should take<br />
precedence over men’s welfare in battle, but the men take priority<br />
during preparation operations before the mission.<br />
Doolittle Raiders<br />
On 18 April 1942 Lt. Col James H. Doolittle, after a<br />
few months of training, decided that accomplishing his mission<br />
was more important than the lives of the men he risked.<br />
Although this seems a harsh and unjust statement, such a<br />
thought could not be farther from the truth. After the Japanese<br />
destruction of Pearl Harbor in Hawaii, the <strong>United</strong> <strong>States</strong><br />
public and government called for retribution! Doolittle was<br />
selected by General of the <strong>Air</strong> <strong>Force</strong>, Henry H. “Hap” Arnold<br />
as commander of a bombing raid on Japan’s mainland. The<br />
objective of this raid was not to annihilate the enemy so much<br />
as to cause confusion, demoralize the Japanese and boost<br />
American morale. If Japan was driven to task resources for<br />
defensive operations as opposed to strictly offensive as seen<br />
in events such as Pearl Harbor, the <strong>United</strong> <strong>States</strong> would have<br />
more time and breathing room in which to plan future attacks<br />
( Whited ).<br />
After some deliberation, it was agreed that an attack<br />
on Japan would have to be launched from aircraft carriers.<br />
Japan itself was too far away from any Allied held air bases<br />
and the aircraft flown were too large, with no fuel to spare,<br />
to return to the carrier from which they launched. Doolittle<br />
painstakingly selected 24 crews for a force that was planned<br />
7<br />
to consist of 20 North American B-25B Mitchell medium<br />
bombers. After training the crews in takeoff procedures from<br />
the short runway available on top of a carrier ship, Doolittle<br />
briefed the crews on their mission (Chun, 152). Before they<br />
even knew they were going to bomb Japan, Doolittle made<br />
sure that they were properly trained, properly cared for and<br />
had the proper motivation and determination to conduct<br />
such a trip where so many things could go wrong. At this<br />
point, Doolittle’s priority was the well-being of his crews.<br />
Completing the mission was the end goal, but without<br />
trained men the mission was sure to fail.<br />
Trained and ready, the crews and aircraft boarded<br />
the USS Hornet, one of the four American carriers left in the<br />
Pacific, and set across the ocean to the Japanese islands. The<br />
air strike was originally set for the early hours of 20 April<br />
under the cover of night. Doolittle wanted the Hornet 450<br />
miles from Japan when the B-25’s were launched (Chun,<br />
153). At this distance the aircraft would have enough fuel to<br />
make it to Chinese landing sights which were predetermined.<br />
At most, Doolittle would accept a launch site of 550 miles.<br />
However, the aircraft ended up launching on 18 April in<br />
broad daylight from a range of 800 miles from the Japanese<br />
coast (Whited).<br />
The American attack force spotted a Japanese patrol<br />
boat that eventful day, causing the mission and launch to be<br />
undertaken immediately. Although forces sunk the patrol<br />
boat, Doolittle considered the possibility of a radio transmission<br />
getting through to Japanese forces. In order to keep the<br />
element of surprise and the best advantage towards accomplishing<br />
the mission, Doolittle launched his aircraft (Chun,<br />
153-154). He knew that after the mission was accomplished,<br />
his men may not have enough fuel to make it to safe ally territory<br />
in China. He also knew that safely landing the aircraft<br />
with a shortage of fuel would be miraculous feat (Whited).<br />
Months of training and extensive planning went into<br />
the Doolittle raid, only to be modified to the peril of those<br />
involved on split second decisions. But again, Doolittle had<br />
trained his crew--his raiders-- to complete their tasks for the<br />
greater good of the American nation and morale. Turning<br />
back was not an option. Failing to accomplish their mission<br />
was not an option. Sacrificing lives of his men would<br />
be a military casualty, but also a military victory in the wider<br />
scheme of the war. In the end, the mission was the ultimate<br />
priority.<br />
As a side note, only sixteen aircraft were selected<br />
for the Japanese bombing mission as opposed to the originally<br />
planned 20 aircraft force. Fifteen of the sixteen aircraft<br />
launched from the Hornet landed in China in relative safety.<br />
All the crews had to either bail out or crash landed their<br />
aircraft. The Japanese believed that the bombers had come
from Midway since their forces never found the USS Hornet<br />
or Enterprise (Whited). This led them to plan an attack on<br />
the islands where their navy met with considerable resistance,<br />
although the American forces were not always the greater in<br />
number or in arms. The Americans were simply blessed with<br />
capable leaders. These commanders knew the value and worth<br />
of their men would be tested in battle. They knew too that<br />
the mission comes first no matter the sacrifices or odds.<br />
Battle of Leyte Gulf<br />
Admiral Clifton A. F. Sprague defended Leyte Gulf<br />
and the Philippine islands from Japanese invasion. His victory<br />
is one of the most impressive battles against the Japanese<br />
in World War II. Outnumbered and outgunned by Japanese<br />
Vice Admiral Takeo Kurita, Sprague did everything he could<br />
to outmaneuver and outwit his enemy. Taffy 3, a 13 ship task<br />
force, relied on its courageous crews and the sacrifices they<br />
made in order to maintain their objective: keep the Japanese<br />
out of the Philippines and protect<br />
American ground forces ( Wukovits, 141).<br />
Sprague was assigned the command of Carrier Division<br />
25, which included the flagship Fanshaw Bay, an escort<br />
carrier and four destroyer escorts. He was later assigned the<br />
command of Taffy 3 with six escort carriers, three destroyers,<br />
and four destroyer escorts. Due to a previous negativeminded<br />
commander, Sprague’s flagship crew’s morale was<br />
extremely low (Wukovits, 111-112). His first task was to<br />
start building up the ship’s and unit’s morale. The Admiral<br />
knew men and therefore knew that low morale contributes<br />
to bad performance, whereas high morale achieves desired<br />
performance. Bad performance leads to unneeded deaths and<br />
loss of lives which was to be avoided when possible. Although<br />
his crew was still undermanned and overworked, because of<br />
the personal and sincere attention the crew received from<br />
their commander, their morale improved drastically. The<br />
crew also developed a loyalty and trust in Sprague which<br />
became fundamental for Sprague’s tactics in the later battle for<br />
Leyte Gulf (Wukovits, 113).<br />
The Japanese planned a massive attack centering<br />
on the Philippine islands consisting of multiple elements.<br />
Kurita, who didn’t have much faith in the Japanese plan,<br />
moved his fleet down the San Bernardino Strait right into<br />
Sprague’s miniscule force (Wukovits, 132). Vice Admiral William<br />
F. Halsey was to assist Sprague with an impressive fleet<br />
dubbed Task <strong>Force</strong> 34. However, Halsey fell for a Japanese<br />
diversion and ended up chasing Japanese carriers, bringing<br />
vital American forces away from aiding Sprague ( Wukovits,<br />
133-135).<br />
A time had come to face death or failure. Sprague<br />
realized this when he first viewed the Japanese fleet set against<br />
him. Sprague valued his men’s lives and well-being but he<br />
8<br />
also knew where his true loyalty at the time of the battle lay.<br />
He gave his men and ships 15 minutes against what he was<br />
sure would be a Japanese onslaught (Wukovits, 145). However,<br />
instead of retreating and saving the lives of his men and<br />
himself, Sprague chose to hold out and defend Leyte Gulf as<br />
ordered against almost impossible odds. This focus on priorities<br />
and the task at hand was an advantage that Sprague had<br />
over Kurita and it played a vital role in the two-and-a-halfhour,<br />
not 15 minute as<br />
Sprague originally expected, battle that ensued.<br />
Kurita didn’t believe in his commander’s complicated<br />
strategy. The Japanese forces were composed of three main<br />
parts. One would be “bait”, luring Admiral Halsey and the<br />
destructive, speedy American ships away. The other two<br />
would rendezvous at the Philippines simultaneously and take<br />
on whatever American forces were there. Kurita, arriving earlier<br />
than his counterpart commander, was sure that his forces<br />
would be demolished going against the Americans as planned<br />
(Wukovits, 116-117). He had no faith in his mission, which<br />
clouded his judgments. Even when he faced 13 small ships<br />
he should have destroyed easily, Kurita was expecting a large<br />
force and was surprised. As Sprague strategically maneuvered<br />
towards a rain squall away from Kurita’s ships, the enemy<br />
was confused. Kurita could stick to the mission and charge<br />
on to Leyte Gulf and the Philippines, or he could follow and<br />
destroy Sprague, fully expecting Sprague’s forces were superior<br />
compared to his (Wukovits, 146). He sacrificed his mission<br />
and advantage by fighting on Sprague’s terms.<br />
American forces commanded by Sprague put up a<br />
steady, yet somewhat desperate defense. Sprague called for<br />
aerial support to come to his aid, but was still out gunned.<br />
His ships and planes eventually ran out of ammo. Still,<br />
Sprague commanded them to continue harassing Kurita’s<br />
ships, even if simply a diversion. Lt Commander R.S. Rogers’s<br />
account of Sprague’s orders clearly illustrates the emphasis<br />
on defending Leyte Gulf at all costs, even at the high price of<br />
losing all men. As Squadron commander of Fanshaw Bay aircraft,<br />
he radioed in stating that his planes were out of ammo<br />
after three runs on the Japanese. Sprague replied, “Well, look.<br />
You just make dummy runs on the ships because every time<br />
you do, you draw fire away from my ships” (Wukovits, 155).<br />
Considering the alternative, American forces would<br />
lose many more men if one ship was sunk as opposed to aircraft.<br />
And because of the care and attention Sprague devoted<br />
to gaining his men’s trust and promoting courageous actions,<br />
they all knew that following his orders, at their own peril, was<br />
necessary. Strategically, Sprague’s reasoning was correct. Sentimentally,<br />
Sprague seems callous, but he reduced casualties<br />
overall and became victorious. Rogers also knew that men<br />
had to be sacrificed:
Sprague had to give the order to make dummy runs.<br />
It shows you the type of leader he was, he had his priorities<br />
in order and he did what he had to do. There’s<br />
a time you’ve got to do things for the greater good,<br />
like falling on a grenade. This was one of those times<br />
(Wukovits, 155).<br />
American forces had succeeded in knocking out<br />
Japan’s communication system. Therefore, Kurita, at the two<br />
hour mark, was unaware of how his ships vs. the Americans<br />
were faring. Thinking that his forces were losing, he called<br />
off the chase on Sprague and recalled his ships (Wukovits,<br />
175-178). In a battle he should have won, Kurita lost because<br />
he thought to save his men, his resources and didn’t strive to<br />
accomplish his mission. He was outwitted by a leader who<br />
had his priorities straight, which cost him and the Japanese a<br />
vital victory in WWII.<br />
The Red Army<br />
In relatively modern warfare, Russia has been the<br />
only nation to put mission completion far above the wellbeing<br />
and lives of its military soldiers. It is irrefutable that<br />
men are considered an essential resource for any military<br />
force during war, especially the army. Throughout history,<br />
the more men in a nation’s army the more probable that the<br />
nation would win the battle and the war. However, a nation’s<br />
fighting soldiers can amount to such a staggering number that<br />
the men lose their human identity and simply become tools<br />
to be used and disposed of at the government’s or their superior’s<br />
will. The Soviet Army during WWII used its citizens<br />
to amass a great standing army, but also forgot that so many<br />
men require care, coordination, and proper training in order<br />
to be an asset to the military. The prevailing mentality of the<br />
Red Army was to defeat the enemy by overrunning them with<br />
a greater force, despite the probability of substantial casualties<br />
(Sysa). Men were expendable…just achieve the military goal.<br />
Nikolai Lenin, leader of the Bolshevik party that<br />
started a revolution and participated in the civil war that<br />
took place in Russia, realized early-on that the old Imperial<br />
Army under the Tsar’s command had to be immobilized and<br />
destroyed. He set out to create an “army of a new type,” an<br />
army for the people to protect their rights and spread Russian<br />
influence and ideals. The Bolshevik party focused on<br />
mobilizing Red Guards, who were armed worker detachments<br />
(Reese, 7-9). The party also sought out peasants, first<br />
allowing them to volunteer, then instituting a military draft to<br />
increase the size of the Red Army since there were few volunteers.<br />
Eventually, the army would grow to 5 million soldiers<br />
by the end of Russia’s civil war. However, desertion rates<br />
were considerably high. The army and its leaders had a hard<br />
time equipping, arming, housing, feeding, and paying its sol-<br />
9<br />
diers which carried over into the eve of World War II ( Reese,<br />
12-14). With their basic needs unmet and forced against their<br />
will to enter into the army, many felt desertion was their only<br />
way out.<br />
To curb desertion and set a future principle, Russian<br />
leader Leon Trotsky instituted Order Number 65, which<br />
illustrated his “no tolerance” mindset. It also conveyed to<br />
the men that they were expendable and should they choose to<br />
forfeit their duty, they would also forfeit their lives to armed<br />
fellow citizens. The Order stated that any “scoundrel” who<br />
encourages retreat, desertion or not fulfilling an order was<br />
to be shot. Any soldier who left his rifle or sold parts of his<br />
uniform was to be shot. Any soldier who deserts on the front<br />
line was to be shot. Lastly, Trotsky also stated that should any<br />
deserter be harbored, the people are liable to be shot and their<br />
house will be burnt down (Reese, 13). Again, with Order<br />
Number 65, Trotsky aimed to motivate Russian soldiers to<br />
succeed in battle, succeed in their mission and never think<br />
about retreating from their line of duty…or else!<br />
Leading up to World War II, conditions and morale<br />
of the Red Army did not improve much, if at all. Housing<br />
was horrible and in short supply. Barracks sometimes<br />
lacked indoor plumbing and lighting. The buildings were<br />
often cheaply and poorly constructed as well. Food was also a<br />
huge morale depressor. There wasn’t enough, especially when<br />
famine struck during 1923 – 1933, when many men suffered<br />
from malnutrition. On the flip side, it was discovered the<br />
officers were eating well, taking most of the scant food for<br />
themselves (Reese, 65-66). Not only does this show the leaders’<br />
irresponsibly, such actions demonstrate the callousness of<br />
the officers towards their men’s health and their lack of duty.<br />
Malnourished soldiers are a liability to the accomplishment of<br />
any given mission.<br />
In 1939, Stalin could not avoid World War. His<br />
army lacked leadership and properly outfitted and trained<br />
men. Still, he wrote a set of “regulations” to give the military<br />
some scope of an objective and a basis for all missions to be<br />
carried out in the future. One, Stalin indicated that any<br />
enemy who attacks the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics<br />
would be mercilessly crushed by the Red Army. If the enemy<br />
forced Russia into war, the army would proceed to launch an<br />
offensive relying on vast numbers of human resources to gain<br />
the advantage in the ensuing battle ( Reese, 94). With such<br />
guidelines, Stalin left no room to doubt which he held higher<br />
in importance, mission or men.<br />
Like Trotsky before him, Stalin issued Order 227<br />
stating that soldiers should take “not one step backwards”<br />
in battle, else they would be shot by their fellow Russians.<br />
Stalin could always find more men due to the Soviet Union’s<br />
vast territory. The Red Army even started enlisting women
to fight as well. ( Reese, 115) So the choice faced by Russian<br />
soldiers was to kill the Germans or be killed by the<br />
Germans; kill the enemy or be killed by Russians. Order<br />
227 was provided for proper “motivation” to accomplish<br />
their duty and defend their homeland by overwhelming<br />
the enemy.<br />
In sum, Russia’s extreme priorities of completing<br />
the mission at all costs led to many victories in World<br />
War II. However, battles were won at the expense of millions<br />
of lives. The Battle of Berlin cast 300,000 Russian<br />
soldiers, a sum greater than all American losses during the<br />
entire war. Russia by far had the highest fatality and causality<br />
rate out of all nations involved in World War II.<br />
What is more important, men or accomplishing<br />
missions? Although there is no straight answer to this<br />
question, it stands to reason that training men and combat<br />
readiness has one end in site: battle. And in every battle<br />
or war there is a military objective to gain, which makes<br />
training men and seeing to their overall readiness vital to<br />
the success in obtaining the objective. Leaders should<br />
motivate their men, encourage them to excel at their training<br />
and promote military awareness. As witnessed with<br />
Admiral Sprague and Doolittle in World War II, during<br />
the preparation phase, men take initial priority and a commander’s<br />
focus. But it should not be forgotten that every<br />
military decision a commander makes is foreshadowed by<br />
something that is bigger than the lives of his men. A successful<br />
mission is the ultimate goal.<br />
The <strong>United</strong> <strong>States</strong> military forces have striven to<br />
avoid massive amounts of casualties. Russian losses during<br />
WWII were drastic, though the army did succeed in winning<br />
many of its battles. Russian leaders also knew the<br />
importance of mission over men but perhaps at too drastic<br />
a cost. More men may be more advantageous in battle<br />
but as Sprague and Doolittle demonstrated, few highly<br />
motivated and exceptionally well trained men can have<br />
just as devastating an impact on their enemy, succeeding<br />
and sometimes surpassing mission objectives. Either way,<br />
large army or small, multiple resources or minimum force,<br />
the military is always striving to accomplish something,<br />
achieve a goal. Men, technology, and strategies are all just<br />
parts working together to obtain and surpass a given task.<br />
Victory lies in mission completion.<br />
10<br />
htm ><br />
Works Cited<br />
Chun, Clayton K.S. War, Military, Theory, and Strategy.<br />
Boston, New York:<br />
Houghton Mifflin Company, 2002.<br />
Contrails, Volume 49. <strong>United</strong> <strong>States</strong> <strong>Air</strong> <strong>Force</strong> <strong>Academy</strong>,<br />
2003.<br />
Reese, Roger R. The Soviet Military Experience.<br />
New York: Routledge, 2000.<br />
Sysa, Andrey. “Tactics in the Winter War.” Winterwar.com.<br />
2003. Sam<br />
Korhonen. < http://www.winterwar.com/tactics.<br />
Whited, Bert W. “The Bombing of Tokyo.” USS Salt<br />
Lake City.com. Sandy<br />
Thompson. 13 October 2003.<br />
<br />
Wukovits, John F. Devotion to Duty. Annapolis,<br />
Maryland: Naval Institute Press,
“THE ANATOMY OF CLOSE AIR SUPPORT”<br />
BY<br />
C1C BRANDON BURNS<br />
INTRODUCTION<br />
The birth of the airplane had a revolutionary effect<br />
on warfare, adding a much needed third dimension to the<br />
battlefield. During the course of World War I, airpower came<br />
to be employed in various types of missions to include strategic<br />
bombardment, air interdiction, air superiority, and close<br />
air support. Since gaining independence from the U.S. Army,<br />
the Army has made claims that the <strong>Air</strong> <strong>Force</strong> is not committed<br />
to close air support. 1 Despite such attitudes, the <strong>Air</strong> <strong>Force</strong><br />
has sought to provide close air support systems comprised<br />
of trained pilots, well suited aircraft, command and control<br />
(C 2 ) capabilities, and a variety of additional components that<br />
join to form the close air support (CAS) system or “body”<br />
(see “Limitations of the Study” below for further discussion<br />
of the analogy to the human body). From the legendary P-<br />
47 Thunderbolt to the respected A/OA-10 Thunderbolt II,<br />
the U.S. <strong>Air</strong> <strong>Force</strong> has kept its guarantee to provide CAS. 2<br />
However, military aircraft have not been the only systems to<br />
evolve with the times. The introduction of new technologies<br />
has resulted in significant progress in CAS and the U.S. <strong>Air</strong><br />
<strong>Force</strong> has chosen to incorporate technology into all aspects of<br />
the CAS mission. Doctrine, capabilities, and technology are<br />
interrelated, and there is debate about whether the new technology<br />
and the addition of new capabilities will adequately<br />
fulfill the prescribed doctrine for CAS. The complete answer<br />
to this debate requires an understanding of the CAS body.<br />
The latest edition of <strong>Air</strong> <strong>Force</strong> Basic Doctrine states<br />
that:<br />
Close <strong>Air</strong> Support (CAS) consists of air<br />
operations against hostile targets in close proximity<br />
to friendly forces; further, these operations require<br />
detailed integration of each air mission with the fire<br />
and movement of those forces. CAS provides direct<br />
support to help friendly surface forces carry out their<br />
assigned tasks. To be most effective, however, CAS<br />
should be used at decisive points in a battle and<br />
should normally be massed to apply concentrated<br />
combat power and saturate defenses. 3<br />
To fulfill this mission the aircraft requirements for<br />
CAS have changed little since its debut as an <strong>Air</strong> <strong>Force</strong> mission.<br />
A specialized aircraft, the A/OA-10, has been developed<br />
for the CAS mission and is therefore especially well suited for<br />
such tactical employment. The <strong>Air</strong> <strong>Force</strong> plans to introduce<br />
11<br />
the F-35 Joint Strike Fighter (JSF), a multi-role fighter that<br />
will replace the venerable Fairchild Republic A/OA-10 as<br />
the primary CAS weapons platform. Other aircraft, such as<br />
the Rockwell B-1B, have also recently proven their combat<br />
effectiveness while supporting ground operations. With such<br />
aircraft readily available to carry out the CAS mission, it is<br />
arguable that combinations of A/OA-10s, B-1Bs, and other<br />
aircraft may be able to efficiently support CAS operations for<br />
the foreseeable future. Possibly having more attention than<br />
necessary, the <strong>Air</strong> <strong>Force</strong> has concentrated on one component<br />
of the CAS body: weapons platforms. Weapons platforms,<br />
which unarguably need to be upgraded over time, combine to<br />
form just one system, the muscular system, of the CAS body.<br />
True fulfillment of the CAS mission lies in the development<br />
of the entire CAS organization.<br />
Research Question<br />
The U.S <strong>Air</strong> <strong>Force</strong> must concentrate on acquiring<br />
new or upgrading existing tools that can successfully be<br />
employed during CAS operations based on application of the<br />
desired doctrine. CAS is a specialized and unique mission,<br />
and recent U.S. <strong>Air</strong> <strong>Force</strong> trends support future CAS capabilities,<br />
especially for weapons platforms. Based on recent<br />
U.S. combat experiences, adaptations to current U.S. aircraft,<br />
and the transformational approach towards the military as a<br />
whole, the question remains: Given its cultural disposition<br />
to focus on platforms, has the U.S. <strong>Air</strong> <strong>Force</strong> neglected other<br />
systems of the CAS body, while seeking to produce optimum<br />
capabilities for CAS? Recognition of this is crucial to ensure<br />
that the U.S. <strong>Air</strong> <strong>Force</strong> is heading in the right direction to<br />
prepare to meet new and growing challenges involving lowintensity<br />
conflicts which may be expected to impose increased<br />
requirements for CAS.<br />
Limitations of the Study<br />
The purpose for this research is to identify and<br />
support the best approach for <strong>Air</strong> <strong>Force</strong> CAS development<br />
through an analysis of capabilities based on needs and requirements.<br />
This paper seeks to view CAS as a body consisting of<br />
many systems that work together, much like the systems in<br />
the human body. This paper approaches CAS broader than<br />
most CAS analyses; however, the paper will dissect CAS and<br />
examine each system to see how each system is intertwined<br />
with another. After examining all these systems, there will<br />
be a diagnosis of the CAS body and an explanation of where<br />
problems may exist that require treatment. Training is not a<br />
focus of this paper. Although training is mentioned in a discussion<br />
of the CAS systems, training at any level, is not part
of CAS capabilities.<br />
Definitions and Assumptions<br />
Definitions<br />
Before examining the CAS body however, there are<br />
some terms and ideas that must be defined.<br />
Command and control, or C 2 is:<br />
The exercise of authority and direction<br />
by a properly designated commander over<br />
assigned and attached forces in the accomplishment<br />
of the mission. Command and<br />
control functions are performed through<br />
an arrangement of personnel, equipment,<br />
communications, facilities, and procedures<br />
employed by a commander in planning,<br />
directing, coordinating, and controlling<br />
forces and operations in the accomplishment<br />
of the mission. 4<br />
Capabilities – Hardware used in CAS<br />
Hardware – includes assets such as weapons platforms,<br />
munitions, information networks and infrastructure,<br />
command and control infrastructure.<br />
JSTARS – Joint Surveillance Target Attack Radar<br />
System<br />
SAMS – Surface-to-<strong>Air</strong> Missile<br />
IADS – Integrated <strong>Air</strong> Defense<br />
AAA – Anti-<strong>Air</strong>craft Artillery<br />
PGM – Precision Guided Munition<br />
LGB – Laser Guided Bomb<br />
GPS – Global Positioning System<br />
JDAM – Joint Direct Attack Munition<br />
AOC or CAOC – <strong>Air</strong> Operation Center or Combined<br />
<strong>Air</strong> Operation Center<br />
ATO – <strong>Air</strong> Tasking Order<br />
SATCOM – Satellite Communication<br />
CFACC – Combined <strong>Force</strong> <strong>Air</strong> Component Commander<br />
CFLCC – Combined <strong>Force</strong> Land Component Commander<br />
ISR – Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance<br />
Many terms used in this paper will have a biological<br />
connotation. Because this paper is treating CAS as a body,<br />
words such as system: CAS body as related to functions in a<br />
human body. For instance, muscular system, nervous system,<br />
circulatory system, and skeletal system.<br />
Assumptions<br />
In order to propose a convincing diagnosis, the fol-<br />
12<br />
lowing two points will be assumed as being known. First, one<br />
must have a basic understanding of how CAS is executed tactically<br />
because it is essential in developing the mission requirements<br />
for CAS and prescribes a rudimentary depiction of the<br />
environment where CAS operates, thus indirectly identifying<br />
mission essential capabilities. This point will be expanded in<br />
the following sections. This will then enable a link between<br />
CAS as a mission to CAS as a body.<br />
Understanding of basic CAS is incomplete without<br />
knowledge of the overall trend for current operations.<br />
Second, given the current international environment and<br />
associated security issues, the need for the <strong>Air</strong> <strong>Force</strong> to provide<br />
CAS is likely to increase. Most modern combat consists<br />
of relatively small scale ground engagements that require air<br />
support. Because of the countries and organizations that<br />
military force is being used against, enemy air-to-air conflict<br />
is rarely encountered, but surface-to-air threats still exist. The<br />
little air-to-air threat that is present is comprised of obsolete<br />
aircraft and/or ill trained crews. This is a significant consideration<br />
because emphasis must be placed on treatment of a<br />
system that will ensure proper CAS development. If the goal<br />
is to develop a cross-country runner, then a doctor should not<br />
prescribe treatment that is tailored for a boxer. In much the<br />
same way, knowing the combat environment specifies the type<br />
of treatment needed for CAS. If the environment dictated<br />
CAS in an open battlefield against tanks, the treatment would<br />
be different than for urban operations.<br />
Preview of Argument<br />
First, this paper will determine what the systems are<br />
that make up the CAS body. This will be done by describing<br />
the doctrine and tactics of <strong>Air</strong> <strong>Force</strong> CAS. The doctrine<br />
portion will explain what the <strong>Air</strong> <strong>Force</strong> already knows about<br />
CAS and how it should be conducted. Second, tactics will be<br />
examined to describe how the <strong>Air</strong> <strong>Force</strong> conducts CAS operations.<br />
Additionally, this will explain what coordination takes<br />
place and what military assets are used to yield a successful<br />
CAS mission. Once it has been established what assets are<br />
used, these assets and prescribed tactics will be linked to the<br />
body systems for analysis.<br />
Next, the analytical step will have both a description<br />
and analysis of each system. This will take each system, which<br />
has been paired to a function or assets used to perform CAS,<br />
and dissect the system. The dissection is an in-depth examination<br />
to determine the intricate workings and how the <strong>Air</strong><br />
<strong>Force</strong> has attended to or neglected the development of this<br />
system. At the end of each system analysis, this paper will<br />
provide a possible answer for the research question with disregard<br />
to other systems. This preliminary diagnosis, which will
consider multiple possible answers to the research question<br />
from each system analysis, will be scrutinized in the following<br />
section.<br />
The third section will introduce counter arguments<br />
against the preliminary diagnosis. It will evaluate existing<br />
arguments against the preliminary diagnosis and determine<br />
if the premise and support for the counter arguments can be<br />
applied to a physical or metaphysical flaw of the CAS body.<br />
This section will then take the evaluations and support the<br />
diagnosis or establish a new diagnosis.<br />
The forth section and conclusion will study the<br />
current and predicted environment for CAS operations.<br />
Although this paper may have established a diagnosis for<br />
CAS, no evaluation is complete without treatment. To establish<br />
the best possible treatment it must be known what CAS<br />
is being treated for, e.g. CAS operations in European style<br />
battles with tanks, or low intensity conflicts characterized by<br />
urban operations. The conclusion will then establish where<br />
the possible flaw for CAS exists, if any, and the best possible<br />
treatment to ensure the U.S. <strong>Air</strong> <strong>Force</strong> is heading in the right<br />
direction to develop CAS to meet new and growing challenges.<br />
It will also include areas for future research and touch<br />
on developing capabilities that may aid in developing the<br />
CAS body.<br />
LITERATURE REVIEW<br />
What is CAS and How is It Performed?<br />
Literature defining CAS lends itself to a fair amount<br />
of criticism because most students of strategic studies tend to<br />
side one way or another. One side of the argument takes the<br />
<strong>Air</strong> <strong>Force</strong> stance, claiming that CAS is important, that it is an<br />
important <strong>Air</strong> <strong>Force</strong> mission, and that the <strong>Air</strong> <strong>Force</strong> is committed<br />
to it. On the other, there are those who side with the<br />
Army, stating that the <strong>Air</strong> <strong>Force</strong> neglects CAS. Since there<br />
are two sides to this argument, there arises a fundamental difference<br />
in defining CAS. Doctrine is a fairly reliable place<br />
to start, but doctrine has its limitations. <strong>Air</strong> <strong>Force</strong> doctrine<br />
defines what CAS is, but it takes CAS to the extreme side of<br />
this two sided argument, and the same holds true for Army<br />
doctrine. One major flaw that the <strong>Air</strong> <strong>Force</strong> doctrine makes<br />
is the use of the words “close proximity” and “detailed integration”<br />
5 . Although catchy, they have a vague translation,<br />
especially if one considers that the Army and <strong>Air</strong> <strong>Force</strong> may<br />
interpret these differently. What is in close proximity? Is it<br />
the distance between friendly troops and supporting aircraft,<br />
friendly troops to munitions impact, friendly troops and the<br />
enemy, or is it friendly troops and enemy fire? Doctrine provides<br />
a starting point, but because of translation issues it can<br />
13<br />
only establish a loose description of CAS.<br />
A better approach to defining what CAS is, and how<br />
it is really conducted, is to use case studies. Although case<br />
studies are a better approach, they too have misleading flaws.<br />
The case studies on the first Gulf War (Operation Desert<br />
Storm) are extensive. An analysis by Maj Leon Elsarelli<br />
helps to establish a case that there are limitations created by<br />
the environment where CAS operations take place. Elsarelli<br />
makes the claim that the U.S. failed to control the low altitude<br />
environment. This may be true, but he does not identify<br />
why we failed. Knowing why the U.S. failed may change the<br />
conclusion. He went further by stating that the U.S. needs<br />
specialized aircraft with capabilities to withstand attacks. If<br />
one knows why the U.S. failed to control low altitudes, then<br />
a conclusion may be formed such that the U.S. needs more<br />
JSTARS aircraft to observe the area. For this reason, case<br />
studies surrounding CAS can be too general in their description.<br />
Some provide a detailed description of the environment<br />
while others describe the environment only enough to support<br />
their argument, much like Elarelli. Col Edward Mann<br />
has a similar flaw when stating that B-52s lacked significant<br />
strategic objectives, so they became CAS platforms. 6<br />
Most case studies, however, do provide important<br />
information, albeit sometimes indirectly. LtCol Philip<br />
“Goldie” Haun, writing on Operation Allied <strong>Force</strong> in 1999,<br />
identifies the anti-aircraft threats and the U.S. concern for<br />
casualties, then explains what aircraft were used to attack Iraqi<br />
targets in the first Gulf War in 1991. 7 On the basis of Haun’s<br />
comments, it can be inferred that CAS requires a system to<br />
detect threats and relay that information to planning cells and<br />
aircrews. Direct descriptions, however, do exist and Elsarelli<br />
explains that CAS requires aircraft to fly at low altitudes, use<br />
visual identification of targets, and that friendly troops may<br />
be so close that they could be wounded by CAS. 8 Both indirect<br />
and direct descriptions provide significant information<br />
because they identify what CAS is and how it is performed.<br />
The conflicts in the Balkans are another significant<br />
low-intensity conflict. These conflicts for analysis include<br />
Bosnia-Hercegovina (Operation Deliberate <strong>Force</strong>), and Serbia<br />
(Operation Allied <strong>Force</strong>). LtCol Richard Sargent details the<br />
CAS operations during Operation Deliberate <strong>Force</strong>. Like<br />
Haun and Elsarelli, Sargent focuses on the operational environment.<br />
He identifies conditions that inhibit CAS operations,<br />
such as weather, foliage, and terrain. 9 This implies that<br />
CAS is not limited to missions during daytime and optimal<br />
weather. Both Sargent and Elsarelli examine the surface-toair<br />
threats in the environment. Sargent explains that CAS<br />
aircraft, particularly A/OA-10s usually orbit outside of target<br />
areas for on-call CAS. 10 Elsarelli adds that when CAS is called<br />
upon it requires aircraft to fly low over the target areas, put-
ting the aircraft within rage of anti-aircraft weapons. 11 This<br />
creates the need for a rugged design to withstand damage.<br />
Although neither Sargent nor Elsarelli directly state what<br />
aircraft capabilities are most effective, Sargent explains valuable<br />
performance enhancing additions that were used e.g.,<br />
LANTRIN pods. 12<br />
Haun assesses the use of CAS in Operation Allied<br />
<strong>Force</strong>. The environment is analogous to that of Operation<br />
Deliberate <strong>Force</strong>, and much of the same derived capabilities<br />
can be extracted. Haun, however, makes one statement of<br />
particular interest in acknowledging problems with locating<br />
and identifying targets, and limiting collateral damage<br />
while still successfully attacking. 13 This examination provides<br />
important facts from which inferences can be drawn about<br />
capability enhancements and munitions.<br />
The Somalia conflict is centered on the Army’s<br />
delivery of CAS, but Elsarelli identifies through it the special<br />
attention required for urban warfare. Low-intensity conflicts,<br />
characterized by this type of warfare, are points of interest.<br />
Like Haun’s statement concerning visual identification,<br />
Elsarelli uses this environment to highlight visual identification<br />
as a problem due to the use of “technicals”, which are<br />
regular vehicles mounted with weapons. 14 Even with guided<br />
munitions, it can be difficult to decipher between technicals<br />
and ordinary vehicles when using high altitude imagery.<br />
Afghanistan (Operation Enduring Freedom) and<br />
the second Gulf War (Operation Iraqi Freedom) are two of<br />
the most recent military operations, and are requiring more<br />
time to evaluate. To aid in evaluating Operation Enduring<br />
Freedom, however, Maj Anton Eret of the 34 th Education<br />
Group, U.S. <strong>Air</strong> <strong>Force</strong> <strong>Academy</strong>, provides substantial primary<br />
information about the CAS operations. Maj Eret is a B-1B<br />
Weapons System Officer, a U.S. <strong>Air</strong> <strong>Force</strong> Weapons School<br />
graduate, and actively participated in Operation Enduring<br />
Freedom. He has furnished a detailed account of <strong>Air</strong> Tasking<br />
Orders (ATO) and how they were designed to support CAS<br />
operations. 15 He also explains how the physical and combat<br />
environment presented specific problems for smaller aircraft<br />
like the A/OA-10.<br />
CAS platform problems during Operation Enduring<br />
Freedom were open to the use of the strategic bomber force.<br />
Eret describes how the combat environment, mainly due to<br />
altitude restrictions, allowed operations of large aircraft with<br />
large payloads. He also cites new munitions that allowed<br />
pin-point accuracy from higher altitudes. This information,<br />
provided by Eret, will help to evaluate other potential CAS<br />
aircraft characteristics that cannot be extracted in any of the<br />
previous operations.<br />
By extracting the needed capabilities from all of the<br />
case studies, a comparison to CAS body functions can be<br />
14<br />
made. This section relies on <strong>Air</strong> <strong>Force</strong> instruction manuals<br />
and pamphlets because they explain how integration among<br />
systems within the CAS body is supposed to work. Information<br />
from manuals, however, only provides a “perfect world”<br />
operation. No matter how smoothly an operation goes,<br />
there will be some problems. The manuals explain how an<br />
<strong>Air</strong> Operation Center works, but do not address problems<br />
that are encountered during actual operations, thus it is also<br />
important that case studies and reports are also examined to<br />
provide data on issues that have significant problems.<br />
Munitions study has a limited number of sources.<br />
The munitions data to include capabilities, delivery platforms,<br />
and other such information, can be obtained through the<br />
1999 Weapons File and the Federation of American Scientists.<br />
16 These sources provide the basic data, but fail to incorporate<br />
an explanation of the most effective delivery in terms<br />
of munitions combinations, altitudes, speeds, and delivery<br />
volume. Maj Anton Eret is the core source for the munitions<br />
study and a key to this research because of his U.S. <strong>Air</strong> <strong>Force</strong><br />
Weapons School background. His knowledge and practical<br />
experience in current operations provide a cornerstone for the<br />
application of munitions in CAS operations. His comprehension<br />
of the current weapons will provide the needed information<br />
for effective munitions research.<br />
A recent scholarly study conducted by Dr. David<br />
Mets, The Long Search for a Surgical Strike, analyzes the effects<br />
new weapons technology has had on operations such as CAS,<br />
similar to the information from Eret. 17 The limitations of this<br />
munitions analysis stems from the lack of previous research<br />
conducted on effective operation during deployment. Until<br />
recently, little evaluation has been placed on munitions capabilities;<br />
rather the focus has been on the weapons platforms<br />
themselves. Further research will be required as well as an<br />
updated weapons guide.<br />
THESIS BODY<br />
The CAS Anatomy<br />
Close air support is a complex entity. Similar to the<br />
way in which a human body is comprised of a collection of<br />
systems with specialized functions, the CAS body can only<br />
function efficiently and effectively if all of its systems are<br />
integrated together. CAS is supported by systems that can<br />
be likened to the muscular, skeletal, circulatory, and nervous<br />
systems, much like systems in the human body. The skeletal<br />
system for CAS provides the same function as any other<br />
skeleton: structure. In the context of CAS, the structure is<br />
not formed by bones, but by doctrine. Military doctrine,<br />
especially in the <strong>United</strong> <strong>States</strong> <strong>Air</strong> <strong>Force</strong>, is the foundation<br />
that shapes military operations and, therefore, the CAS<br />
operational architecture. Doctrine is limited because it only<br />
provides a general frame upon which other functions build.
The CAS skeletal system provides abilities and limitations<br />
for other CAS functions, allowing them to strengthen or<br />
weaken, grow or atrophy as required by a given CAS operation.<br />
This is not too difficult to understand when one realizes<br />
that modern U.S. military planning is formulated on the basis<br />
of effects-based operations. Without a solid structure that<br />
provides a construct for other systems to grow upon, the CAS<br />
body would be a conglomeration of unorganized systems ineffectively<br />
attempting to perform complex operations.<br />
While the skeletal structure is essential, it is hopelessly<br />
inadequate to perform functions unless it is combined<br />
with other systems. In the same way, doctrine cannot fight<br />
a war without troops, equipment, training, and orders. The<br />
CAS body’s version of the muscular system can be viewed<br />
as the kinetic means in which operations take place. This<br />
idea is indicative of a muscular system; however, it is hard<br />
to conceptualize in the context of CAS operations. Within<br />
the CAS body, there are only two forms of kinetic activities:<br />
the employment of munitions and the mode or platform<br />
from which they are delivered. In the context of CAS, the<br />
weapons delivery platforms are synonymous to legs and feet,<br />
while the munitions can be thought of as hands. The legs<br />
(weapons platforms) provide a mode of transportation for<br />
the hands (munitions) to actively engage the target. When<br />
power (muscles) is combined with a frame (skeleton), one can<br />
see the importance of having both; all the power in the world<br />
is only dead weight if it is not given a framework for projection.<br />
Likewise, a structure is unable to provide force without<br />
a means of execution.<br />
The CAS mission, unfortunately, is too intricate<br />
to be performed by a mindless creature of massive structure<br />
and power. CAS must be integrated with detailed coordination<br />
in order to perform the mission in close proximity to<br />
friendly forces and in a dynamic environment. The circulatory<br />
(personnel) and nervous (training) systems are the two<br />
mechanisms that allow for such functions to take place.<br />
These systems combine to form the heart and soul of the<br />
CAS mission as part of the nervous system and all of the circulatory<br />
system concentrate on the trained people who work<br />
together to perform a CAS operation. Although training and<br />
personnel issues are not topics of discussion in this paper,<br />
they cannot be disregarded as key features to the efficiency<br />
and effectiveness of the CAS body. It is important to note the<br />
contribution of the circulatory system. In the CAS body, it<br />
allows for the flow of new personnel with innovative ideas and<br />
methods to each part of the body. These ideas can help foster<br />
growth or adaptations of other functions. New outlooks and<br />
methods, dubbed “transformation” in the military realm, is<br />
an important part of the modern U.S. military, but transformational<br />
changes can only be executed by technically skilled<br />
15<br />
operators. 18<br />
These technically skilled operators, found in many<br />
diverse career fields to include the cockpits, <strong>Air</strong> Operations<br />
Centers, High Value Aerial Assets, command and control centers,<br />
and intelligence processing centers, are the neuromuscular<br />
connections that convert information to motion. Included<br />
in the nervous system is also the eyes, ears, brain, and nerves;<br />
each can be associated with a part of the CAS body. When<br />
the nervous system is combined with the other three systems,<br />
CAS becomes a fully integrated, functional, and effective<br />
military operation.<br />
The CAS body does have vulnerabilities and weaknesses<br />
that can be exploited or cause functional problems,<br />
just as human bodies are not immune to diseases, trauma,<br />
and minor injuries. Unlike a human, however, the CAS body<br />
cannot just visit a local doctor; it must be dissected and analyzed<br />
to form a proper diagnosis.<br />
The Muscular System<br />
The <strong>United</strong> <strong>States</strong> <strong>Air</strong> <strong>Force</strong> has spent billons of dollars<br />
to research and develop some of the most sophisticated<br />
aircraft the world has ever seen. The legacy of U.S. CAS platforms<br />
dates back to World War II and the P-47 Thunderbolt.<br />
Its eight 50 caliber machine guns and robust body construction<br />
allowed the P-47 to prevail at lower altitudes and under<br />
fire when other aircraft were more likely to develop malfunctions<br />
due to enemy fire. 19 Continuing with these design characteristics,<br />
the <strong>Air</strong> <strong>Force</strong> adopted the A-1H Skyraider during<br />
the Vietnam War, and the A-10 Thunderbolt II. These aircraft<br />
have design characteristics that allow them to be effective<br />
CAS platforms based on their durability, firepower, and ironically,<br />
their slow speed.<br />
The A-10 has become a trusted sight for many of the<br />
troops serving on the ground due to its firepower. The A-10’s<br />
30mm Gatling gun and uranium depleted rounds can make<br />
quick work of enemy armored units. The cockpit is designed<br />
around the gun barrel and is enclosed by a titanium shell,<br />
providing increased protection for the pilot and avionics. The<br />
uniquely cambered wings allow greater lift when loaded with<br />
a variety of munitions. The wings are not swept and have<br />
eleven pylons that can be loaded with 16,000 lbs of bombs<br />
and missiles including the AGM-85 Maverick, AIM-9 Sidewinder,<br />
and Mk-82, -83, and -84 bombs. 20 The two twin<br />
turbo fan engines are set higher than the wings to increase<br />
protection. The A-10 also has an internal feature that is<br />
unlike most modern aircraft, a non-hydraulic powered control<br />
capability that allows the pilot to fly the aircraft even if all the<br />
hydraulics have failed. 21 Ugly at best, the A-10 is designed to<br />
be the tank of the sky with the sole mission of providing CAS<br />
to those who need it.
Platforms, however, are moving away from A-10<br />
type aircraft and becoming less mission-based. Advances in<br />
technology and new tactics have made mission titles for aircraft<br />
obsolete. Strategic bombers, attack fighters, and fighter/<br />
bomber designations are becoming combined. Desert Storm<br />
in 1991 saw the use of B-52 bombers as CAS platforms. 22<br />
Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF) and Operation Iraqi<br />
Freedom (OIF) employed B-1s, B-52s, F-16s, F-15Es, and<br />
A-10s in support of CAS missions, though each aircraft was<br />
designed for another mission (long range strategic bombing<br />
(B-52), low level nuclear strikes (B-1), short range inexpensive<br />
fighter (F-16), and air superiority tactical fighter (F-15). 23<br />
Each aircraft has been refitted with avionics that allow it to<br />
execute the CAS mission.<br />
The legs of CAS are also being improved. The introduction<br />
of the F/A-22 will exhibit increased survivability<br />
because of its stealth, speed, and avionics. Like the F/A-22,<br />
the F-35, which is slated to be the true CAS platform replacement,<br />
has similar features to the F/A-22. Neither, however,<br />
has the same robust construction, payload, or main gun of<br />
the A-10. When examined with respect to the effectiveness<br />
of replacing the A-10, the <strong>Air</strong> <strong>Force</strong> argues that there<br />
is a dwindling need for aircraft such as the A-10 in modern<br />
CAS operations because technology has created the ability<br />
to achieve precision at a distance – distance that is needed to<br />
keep aircraft out of range from enemy anti-aircraft fire.<br />
The changing operational environment has played<br />
a massive roll in the <strong>Air</strong> <strong>Force</strong>’s CAS evolution. Modern<br />
combat operations take place in areas that are usually<br />
defended by SAMs threats. Less expensive than having an<br />
air force, many countries have IADs that center on the use<br />
of SAMs and AAA. Such systems are much cheaper to buy,<br />
maintain, and train crews for than are aircraft on alert. To<br />
counter this surface-to-air threat, the <strong>Air</strong> <strong>Force</strong> flies at altitudes<br />
at or above 25,000 feet for as many missions as possible<br />
because at 25,000, seventy-five percent of the ground threat is<br />
negated. 24 The A-10 cannot be used effectively at these altitudes<br />
for CAS, but aircraft like the F-15E, F-16, B-52, B-1,<br />
F/A-22, and F-35 can. What makes these aircraft effective at<br />
such altitudes is not dependant on actual design as much as it<br />
is on avionics and munitions capabilities.<br />
Munitions give the CAS body the ability to physically<br />
touch the enemy. All the systems in a human body<br />
cannot help a boxer in a fight if he does not have hands. CAS<br />
is equally vulnerable without munitions. Without these<br />
“hands,” none of the aircraft capabilities would be of any<br />
advantage to CAS. Mets, a premier scholar, has noted that<br />
the U.S. <strong>Air</strong> <strong>Force</strong> spends a considerable amount of money on<br />
research and development of aircraft but little on the development<br />
of weapons. 25 This is a terrible mistake on behalf of the<br />
16<br />
<strong>Air</strong> <strong>Force</strong> because the CAS body needs a variety of munitions.<br />
Light weapons like the small diameter bomb are extremely<br />
important so aircraft can load more weapons without increasing<br />
weight. Furthermore, these weapons must give CAS the<br />
ability to provide a solid fist- punch (2,000 lb bomb on building),<br />
or a finger poke (PGM into a C 2 structure), but this<br />
ability correlates to the munitions rather than the aircraft.<br />
Although the <strong>Air</strong> <strong>Force</strong> has paid less attention to<br />
munitions development, which is not to say that they have<br />
neglected it altogether. Research and development in the field<br />
has been ongoing. LGBs debuted in the early 1970’s and saw<br />
limited operational use in Vietnam. 26 Since then, there have<br />
been multiple munitions advancements to provide airpower<br />
with much needed accuracy. As Mets points out, this new<br />
surge to produce weapons with launch-and-leave capabilities<br />
and pin-point accuracy started with the maturation of the<br />
GPS at the end of the first Gulf War in which the GPS signals<br />
are received by small computers on the weapon. 27 Once<br />
launched, satellite signals continuously up-date the bomb or<br />
missile until impact. The key capability of the aircraft now<br />
becomes its avionics. The aircraft operators have to input the<br />
target coordinates and launch the weapon. Only aircraft with<br />
computers on board that can “talk” to the weapons are able to<br />
exploit PGM capabilities. JDAM, which is the GPS package<br />
on a Mk-80 class bomb body, are becoming the main air-toground<br />
weapons of choice because they provide all weather,<br />
night-day drop capabilities. 28 LGBs are still used, but they are<br />
susceptible to fog, clouds, foliage, or any other medium that<br />
can block a laser beam from the targeteer (whether it be an<br />
aircraft or ground party) to the target.<br />
It would be presumptuous to say that any aircraft can<br />
now become a CAS platform with proper avionics and guided<br />
bombs, but such a trend is becoming more apparent with the<br />
development of new technology. The days of single mission<br />
aircraft are coming to an end, evidenced by the F/A-22 and F-<br />
35. Multipurpose or multi-role, however one wants to define<br />
it, is the catch phrase of modern aircraft design. From 25,000<br />
feet or higher, the <strong>Air</strong> <strong>Force</strong> is becoming capable of providing<br />
CAS without the need to build aircraft for a threat environment<br />
it can fly over.<br />
The Nervous System<br />
The AOC is the processing center and workhorse for<br />
the CFACC, where the ATO is built and executed. The ATO<br />
is the daily physical list of air operations that will be executed<br />
over a period of twelve hours. Within it, aircraft are allocated<br />
to a variety of commanders and assigned everything from<br />
their missions and targets to what they will be armed with.<br />
The AOC has two primary responsibilities, often broken<br />
down into Combat Plans and Combat Operations. The
Combat Plans division “builds” the ATO and Combat Operations<br />
executes it, though other divisions participate in both<br />
responsibilities. 29 Planning and Operations are done with<br />
both aircraft operators and non-rated personnel because the<br />
AOC must incorporate all aspects of modern combat, from<br />
logistics to intelligence, in order to compose the aerial ballet.<br />
Considerations that are dealt with in the AOC range from<br />
munitions inventory, battle damage assessment, saturation of<br />
SATCOM links, to the details of aircraft turning at the correct<br />
times. Thus it is important that each of the involved elements<br />
actively participate in air operations coordination. 30<br />
Joint Publication (JP) 3-56.1, Command and Control<br />
for Joint <strong>Air</strong> Operations, states that the responsibilities of the<br />
CFACC include: “functioning as the supported commander<br />
for…theater airborne reconnaissance and surveillance.” 31<br />
Intelligence plays a critical role in joint air operations because<br />
of the speed, range, and flexibility of air power. Timely, tailored<br />
intelligence is essential to the effective application of<br />
combat air assets. It plays an integral part in the development<br />
and execution the Joint <strong>Air</strong> Operations Plan, shapes key planning<br />
products prepared by the CFACC and the CFACC’s<br />
staff, and is vital to the development of a comprehensive, prioritized<br />
target list and allocation of CAS sorties. <strong>Air</strong>-focused<br />
intelligence is necessary for combat planners and combat<br />
operations to be able to plan and execute the ATO. 32<br />
The majority of information-related operations that<br />
are located in the AOC fall under the heading of ISR. Overall<br />
integration of ISR functions and C 2 of ISR assets is accomplished<br />
by establishing a single focal point for ISR in the<br />
AOC – ISR Division (ISRD). 33 The AOC is the best location<br />
to integrate the war fighter’s ISR capabilities. The ISRD is<br />
functionally associated, yet fully integrated, to embed sensor<br />
experts, platform experts and intelligence experts within the<br />
other divisions of the AOC. The ISRD is an essential aspect<br />
of all AOC operations and is integrated into every part of<br />
the air tasking cycle. ISRD responsibilities are constant,<br />
whether the AOC is engaged in combat operations or in<br />
military operations other than war. 34 The ISRD’s primary<br />
mission is to provide a fused, constantly updated intelligence<br />
picture throughout the AOC. That mission is accomplished<br />
through teams within the ISRD and liaisons to the other<br />
AOC divisions and through the synchronization of ISR assets<br />
and capabilities. 35 The ISRD concept is to centrally manage<br />
intelligence responsibilities. Through this concept, the<br />
ISRD ensures a consistent intelligence picture is maintained<br />
throughout the air tasking cycle. Additionally, ISR personnel<br />
are integrated within the Strategy Division, Combat Plans<br />
Division, and Combat Operations Division to provide dedicated<br />
and tailored ISR support for specified CAOC processes.<br />
It is the AOC’s focal point for integrating ISR throughout the<br />
17<br />
CFACC’s full range of operations. 36<br />
The Chief, ISRD (CISR) is responsible for all ISR<br />
activities required to support CFACC planning and operations.<br />
The CISR controls, coordinates, and directs the ISR<br />
tasking process through the other division chiefs, as directed<br />
by the CAOC Director. 37 The CISR is responsible for synchronizing<br />
ISR with aerospace strategy, planning, and operations,<br />
and achieves this through centralized control via an ISR<br />
Division and decentralized execution by embedded elements<br />
in the other AOC divisions. 38 The CISR integrates numerous<br />
cross-functional disciplines, enabling the core processes<br />
of the other AOC Divisions to continue. Centralized, fused<br />
ISR control forms a single ISR picture in the AOC. Decentralized<br />
ISR execution provides each JAOC division with the<br />
flexibility to tailor the unified ISR perspective to the unique<br />
processes and products of each division. 39 These products and<br />
processes require continual update of the ISR picture, which<br />
is accomplished through feedback from the ISR personnel in<br />
each division to the ISRD. The CISR’s authority to manage<br />
this process creates a single fused ISR picture, ensuring that<br />
each division has ISR tailored to meet specific ATO requirements.<br />
40<br />
The ISRD develops, maintains, and disseminates<br />
information, threat estimates, intelligence updates, and threat<br />
alerts, manages intelligence collection requirements, and<br />
provides targeting and weaponeering support. The division<br />
integrates numerous cross-functional disciplines and provides<br />
direct support to the other AOC divisions’ core processes<br />
through embedded ISR elements. There are five ISRD elements:<br />
Analysis, Correlation, and Fusion (ACF) Team;<br />
Targeting and Battle Damage Assessment (BDA) Team; ISR<br />
Management Team; Processing, Exploitation, and Dissemination<br />
(PED) Team; and Sensitive Compartmented Information<br />
(SCI) Management Team. ISRD Core Team personnel provide<br />
intelligence products and services that support the entire<br />
AOC, joint force, and subordinate units. 41 In addition, ISRD<br />
core personnel provide oversight and management of JFACC<br />
ISR processes to ensure that the appropriate ISR reporting,<br />
planning, tasking, and deconfliction occurs in order to build a<br />
common source threat and targeting picture. As the adversary<br />
does not operate according to the ATO cycle, core personnel<br />
ensure continuity of the threat picture and horizontal integration<br />
of ISR processes across the AOC. 42<br />
It is critical that intelligence personnel understand<br />
CFACC operations to support decision-making as well as<br />
ATO preparation and execution. From conception to execution<br />
the ATO is created in seventy-two hours. Support of<br />
the seventy-two hour cycle requires an understanding of the<br />
missions and tasks to be achieved and supported. 43 Central to<br />
this understanding is a strong operations-intelligence interface
ased on working side-by-side, knowing each other’s requirements,<br />
and having maximum access to operational and intelligence<br />
information. In this regard, key CFACC intelligence<br />
personnel must have access to all plans and programs so that<br />
intelligence planners are aware of the operations’ requirements,<br />
plans, and programs and can formulate collection<br />
planning or any special tasking required. 44 Likewise, operational<br />
planners should have access to all available intelligence<br />
information that might affect CFACC operations. To attain<br />
such information, the CAS body relies on its eyes and ears.<br />
Feeding the brain constant information are the eyes<br />
and ears of the CAS body, comprised of many elements to<br />
include Special Operations troops, <strong>Air</strong> Liaison Officers, Forward<br />
<strong>Air</strong> Controllers, ISR aircraft, and space assets. These<br />
assets give the CAS body the ability to see and hear the<br />
enemy. Human assets (ALOs and FACs) are personnel on the<br />
ground who can provide real time information to those who<br />
need it. In typical CAS operations, ground controllers use a<br />
variety of techniques to communicate target information to<br />
the pilots flying CAS missions. 45<br />
<strong>Air</strong>craft also play an important role in providing the<br />
CAS body with situational awareness. E-8 JSTARS, RC-<br />
135 Rivet Joint, MC-130s and E-3 AWACS all have specific<br />
functions that are relayed both to operators and to the AOC.<br />
Combined, these aircraft also function as a sort of spinal cord.<br />
RC-135s, built on a Boeing 707 airframe, and MC-130s,<br />
built on the C-130 airframe, have the primary function of<br />
electronic surveillance. 46 They monitor electronic activity<br />
in the area of responsibility and report to the AOC. With<br />
proper guidance from the AOC, these aircraft can inform<br />
CAS pilots of electronic signatures that may pose a threat<br />
such as radar waves from a hostile surface to air missile sight<br />
or enemy communications. Similar to the RC-135, the E-3<br />
scans the sky to pick up enemy aircraft and radar signatures<br />
and warn CAS pilots of possible enemy aircraft. 47 Although<br />
important to the CAS body for situational awareness, these<br />
functions do not directly affect the relationship between aircraft<br />
and troop engagements.<br />
The E-8, however, does directly support such activities.<br />
The JSTARS is the AWACS for ground movement.<br />
Designed with the U.S. Army, this aircraft scans the surface<br />
and can detect enemy vehicle movement or engaged friendly<br />
troops. 48 Using low mounted radar on the JSTARS, trained<br />
operators monitor ground activities and provide real-time<br />
information to ground units, the AOC, and air crews overhead.<br />
Should situations arise that require CAS, JSTARS can<br />
vector in CAS aircraft and provide coordinates to pilots for<br />
targets. The target information is loaded into the avionics for<br />
weapons deployment. Such situations are known in the AOC<br />
as XCAS missions, those without a predetermined target.<br />
18<br />
<strong>Air</strong>craft performing such missions loiter at altitude until a call<br />
is received. In this situation, the JSTARS cannot provide a<br />
picture of the battlefield; all it can relay are coordinates and<br />
elevation. Battlefield imagery and predetermined targets are<br />
gathered by space assets.<br />
Space is the final instrument used by the CAS body<br />
to see and hear enemy activities. Satellite imagery, whether<br />
electro-optical, radar, or infrared, provides a capability that<br />
can feed the AOC endlessly. 49 However, spaces assets are not<br />
limited to imagery. Space assets can perform many of the<br />
same missions as aircraft. The difference between the two is<br />
that space can provide a constant theater-wide watch without<br />
nearly as many trained crews.<br />
Information flow is the key to making the CAS body<br />
function effectively and efficiently. In humans, when a brain<br />
lacks the ability to communicate with the body to create muscular<br />
movement, that body is paralyzed. The same holds true<br />
for the CAS body. In a similar manner, information overload<br />
or sporadic information can cause the body to function<br />
improperly; the CAS body has the same vulnerabilities. In<br />
a properly running body information flows from the brain<br />
continuously. Sights, sounds, smells, and tactile stimulants<br />
are gathered and analyzed. If something is threatening in the<br />
environment, say a bright light, the brain will send a signal<br />
to the neuromuscular junctions and the innervations there<br />
will cause the eye lids to close. Some information may cause<br />
a muscular reaction before the information is even sent to the<br />
brain, such as the reflex when one touches a flame. Immediately<br />
the human body reacts with a quick relay of information<br />
from the finger to spinal column and back, the reflex being to<br />
withdraw one finger. Some reflexes can also be overridden by<br />
the brain. If there is some conscious motivation to continue<br />
through the flame and pain, the brain can override the reflex<br />
and keep the reaction from occurring. The caveat to overriding<br />
a reflex response, however, is that one is aware of the<br />
repercussions of one’s actions. Simple reflexes are the standard<br />
reaction when something happens unexpectedly; CAS works<br />
in a similar manner but with some key differences.<br />
The AOC and ATO are designed to analyze an environment<br />
and preplan accordingly. Information from the<br />
environment is supplied from all ISR assets and sent to the<br />
brain. What may take a human a few hours, minutes, or seconds<br />
to analyze will take seventy-two hours for the CAS brain<br />
to analyze. 50 From the brain, the ATO is sent to all commanders<br />
for execution, just as information is sent to the neuromuscular<br />
junctions. From there operators take the information<br />
and transform it into action. Sorties are launched and<br />
attacks are made.
Diagnosis<br />
All the systems I have discussed play a critical role<br />
in making CAS operations work. Information flow is by far<br />
the system needing the most treatment, but it is not independent<br />
in its damaging effect. Areas of the skeletal, muscular,<br />
and nervous systems all aid in causing the nerves to function<br />
improperly, however the nervous system has the largest<br />
responsibility in the breakdown of information flow, particularly<br />
during action/reaction situations.<br />
While the AOC is fairly efficient at seventy-two hour<br />
planning, it lacks the ability to make effective action/reaction<br />
judgments. During ATO planning, CAS can be allocated a<br />
percentage of assets that will be used strictly for their operations.<br />
Those assets are then given to the CFLCC, the Army’s<br />
equivalent to the CFACC. From the there the CFLCC subdivides<br />
his allocated sorties to subordinate commanders. 51 Up<br />
to this point, it may be somewhat confusing as to action/reaction<br />
situations, but a simple example should aid in clarifying.<br />
Suppose the CFLCC is given 30 sorties, which are then subdivided<br />
among his subordinate commanders. The 1 st Division<br />
Commander may be given 10 sorties, the 2 nd given 5 and<br />
the 3 rd given 15. Suppose the 1 st and 2 nd divisions are engaged<br />
in combat and require CAS, while the 3 rd has had no contact<br />
with enemy forces. If the two engaged divisions require<br />
more CAS, they will call the AOC via their ALO and request<br />
additional support. From there, the CFACC coordinates<br />
with the CFLCC commander, who then pulls those 15 sorties<br />
from 3 rd Division. It should be obvious that is not an efficient<br />
way of reacting to a situation. By the time all the coordination<br />
is completed and CAS is reallocated, the ground battle<br />
may be over. Yet this is merely one part of a larger problem.<br />
Suppose the 3 rd Division had light contact and<br />
launched its 15 sorties for CAS, but then determined that no<br />
CAS was necessary. Since those aircraft are already in the air,<br />
coordination may be conducted quickly through the AOC<br />
and those 15 sorties may be redirected to aid the 1 st and 2 nd<br />
Divisions. As soon as those 30 aircraft drop their payload and<br />
return, all 30 sorties assigned to CAS have been spent. What<br />
happens if 3 rd Division is suddenly counter-attacked and<br />
needs CAS? It is ludicrous to think that the <strong>Air</strong> <strong>Force</strong> will<br />
not provide aid to those troops, and this example illustrates<br />
the problem with planning and information flow at the AOC<br />
level.<br />
Part of the treatment that could be prescribed is to<br />
change joint doctrine regarding CAS sortie allocation. Once<br />
the <strong>Air</strong> <strong>Force</strong> allocates CAS sorties to the CFLCC (typically<br />
an Army or Marine officer), CAS is executed just as it was in<br />
World War II, with disregard for the lessons learned at Kasserine<br />
Pass. 52 <strong>Air</strong>power is not effective when controlled in<br />
19<br />
pockets by ground commanders, thus CAS should not be<br />
slotted to individual ground commanders. One solution for<br />
centralized command of CAS involves integration of the U.S.<br />
Marine Corps. Suppose Joint Doctrine establishes a new<br />
position under the Joint <strong>Force</strong> Commander. This position,<br />
commanded by a marine aviator, becomes the CAS Operations<br />
Center (CASOC), and bridges the needs of the Ground<br />
Commander to the capabilities of the <strong>Air</strong> Commander. Sorties<br />
slotted for CAS are not given to the JFLCC, but rather<br />
to the CAS Commander. Units needing assistance call the<br />
CASOC via ALOs and one commander directs and redirects<br />
aircraft as required. Since the CASOC is linked to the AOC,<br />
the AOC can update the CASOC on aircraft that are available<br />
to provide extra support should it be requested. Doctrine can<br />
easily accommodate such a position, but the flow of information<br />
must also be changed. Requests for air support must<br />
be channeled straight to the CASOC and executed without<br />
interference from either the CFACC or CFLCC.<br />
The next problem that is encountered regarding<br />
information flow relates to munitions. More than a few<br />
CAS missions have ended in fratricide, where our forces<br />
have engaged friendly forces. This, unfortunately, is not an<br />
uncommon problem. Training is very important in limiting<br />
such events, but as this paper does not focus on training it<br />
is forced to look deeper for an explanation. After evaluating<br />
the methods used to conduct CAS operations with regard to<br />
ground and cockpit operations, there is evidence that operator<br />
error is to blame for this problem. That is not to say that<br />
these operators are not sufficiently trained. On the contrary,<br />
they are trained to a high level of technical skill. Forward air<br />
controllers and pilots are subject to some of the longest training<br />
in the U.S. military. What is not surprising is that these<br />
operators do make mistakes – mistakes that are fatal. Miscommunicated<br />
coordinates, wrongly programmed munitions,<br />
and unclear friendly positions are all reasons for fratricide<br />
unlinked to training. Rather, they are linked to information<br />
flow.<br />
Broadening Dr. Mets’ thoughts on munitions development,<br />
there is another advancement that could reduce fratricide.<br />
Blue <strong>Force</strong> Tracking is a system that uses GPS through<br />
a small transmitter worn on an individual, vehicle, or friendly<br />
unit. This system provides a constant feed on the location of<br />
friendly forces. Currently Blue <strong>Force</strong> Tracking is not issued<br />
to every soldier on the ground, but further development<br />
may enable each soldier, vehicle, and ground asset to have<br />
this system. Should developments allow this, could there be<br />
way to integrate such information into a JDAM kit or into<br />
the avionics of aircraft? If JSTARS can actively locate each<br />
ground asset via Blue <strong>Force</strong> Tracking, there should be a way to<br />
integrate such information into a failsafe mechanism on the
aircraft. Bomb blast patterns for and each type of ordinance<br />
has a measurable pattern. That information should be stored<br />
into a small data base on board the aircraft. This would allow<br />
pilots to target units, but should a Blue <strong>Force</strong> signal be picked<br />
up within the pattern based on the targeted impact point, the<br />
bomb will not release from the aircraft.<br />
This system would have some limitations. The database<br />
for blast pattern sizes would not be capable of seeing<br />
the impact point in three dimensions. Friendly troops on<br />
higher ridge lines or inside a building may be out of range for<br />
fragments, but two dimensionally they may be within range.<br />
Three dimensions may be overcome, but barriers, walls,<br />
ground units with armor, and other such obstacles will be<br />
difficult to take into account. These situations may provide<br />
adequate cover for friendly units, but a computer will only see<br />
the units, the blast pattern, and the relative distance between<br />
the point of impact.<br />
Smarter weapons and changing doctrine may<br />
improve the information flow between the different systems<br />
of the CAS body. Since CAS’s inception there has been a<br />
continual need for improvement, but (unlike past attempts)<br />
aircraft are not at the focal point of this examination. In a<br />
sense, aircraft are the shoes for the CAS body. It doesn’t really<br />
matter what is on your feet, but some shoes are better suited<br />
for specific activities, just as some aircraft are better suited for<br />
specific CAS operations.<br />
CONCLUSION AND SUMMARY<br />
The development of the CAS body has experienced<br />
growing pains, and there will always be room for improvement.<br />
From a muscular standpoint, there has been a tremendous<br />
advance in aircraft design. In modern aviation<br />
single mission aircraft are not the only aircraft that are able<br />
to provide CAS. Current aircraft such as the F-15E, F-16,<br />
B52, and B-1 have been given another mission thanks in part<br />
to advances in avionics. Future aircraft such as the F/A-22<br />
and F-35 will enable the <strong>Air</strong> <strong>Force</strong> to fulfill all missions with<br />
a single airframe. The largest contributor to the capability<br />
for multi-role missions stems primarily from the advances in<br />
munitions. GPS and laser guided bombs have enabled accuracy<br />
at altitude, altitudes that negate seventy-five percent of<br />
the world’s surface-to-air threat.<br />
As impressive as PGMs may be, fratricide is still a<br />
tragic risk of CAS. No matter how rugged, fast, or maneuverable<br />
the aircraft, or how accurate the munitions may be,<br />
neither can overcome communication issues that may lead<br />
to friendly troops being in the area when a bomb impacts.<br />
The integration of the Blue <strong>Force</strong> Tracking system into the<br />
on-board computers of aircraft and weapons may prove a<br />
failsafe trigger. This concept does have limitations, but such<br />
a system, if developed properly, could drastically reduce CAS<br />
20<br />
fratricide.<br />
In the context of the CAS body, this aforementioned<br />
munitions development is considered improvement of the<br />
muscular system, but it is intertwined with the nervous<br />
system and a flow of information. By computerizing this<br />
failsafe system with Blue <strong>Force</strong> Tracking, the human operator<br />
is removed from having to keep such an intense situational<br />
awareness of troop movements, targets, flying, navigating, and<br />
targeting. Additional tasks, such as monitoring Blue <strong>Force</strong><br />
Tracking information inside the cockpit and on the ground,<br />
without the aid of a failsafe mechanism can lead to task saturation,<br />
and possibly increase fratricide. Weapons systems<br />
that combine information and precision must be the focus of<br />
newer weapons.<br />
Technology has provided a solution that allows<br />
one airframe capable of carrying out air superiority, strategic<br />
attack, interdiction, and CAS missions. The F-35s can fly<br />
high and fast and are extremely maneuverable, allowing these<br />
aircraft to fight their way into an area in order to provide<br />
CAS. Such performance characteristics combined with the<br />
ability to drop PGMs gives the F-35 an edge over the aging<br />
A/OA-10. Just because troops cannot see the F-35 or feel the<br />
heat from its engines like they could the A-10 does diminish<br />
the aircraft’s ability to deploy precision munitions on target<br />
and provide CAS. 53<br />
Precision from high altitudes is where the <strong>Air</strong> <strong>Force</strong><br />
plans to take CAS in the twenty-first century. From a ground<br />
commander’s point of view, “close proximity” is defined as the<br />
distance between the aircraft and the friendly troops on the<br />
ground. <strong>Air</strong> commanders, however, define “close proximity”<br />
as the distance between the munitions impact and the troops.<br />
In spite of this difference in definitions, neither high nor low<br />
altitude has proven to be any more or less risky from a fratricide<br />
point of view.<br />
Developments in structure could aid in timely information<br />
flow from requests to air support reactions. Currently,<br />
the <strong>Air</strong> <strong>Force</strong> has a division of the AOC, the <strong>Air</strong> Support<br />
Operations Center (ASOC), that acts in a similar role to the<br />
proposed CASOC. 54 The difference between the two is that<br />
the current division reports directly to the CFACC, whereas<br />
the CASOC has a CAS Commander, which is equal to that<br />
of the CFACC and CFLCC. The proposed CASOC could<br />
bridge the gap between fundamental doctrinal disputes, like<br />
the definition between “close proximity”, between the <strong>Air</strong><br />
<strong>Force</strong> and the Army. Furthermore, the Marines have a solid<br />
grasp on CAS operations, thus they may provide a better flow<br />
to CAS action/reaction missions.<br />
The drawback to such a change will inevitably bring<br />
conflict between the services as the <strong>Air</strong> <strong>Force</strong> would be unwilling<br />
to release control of its air assets and the Army would be
unwilling to let go of it option to package out its assigned<br />
CAS support to subordinate ground commander. Even more<br />
complicating would be the problems that surround the ATO.<br />
The ATO is critical to synchronizing operations, and should<br />
CAS be placed under control of a new Commander, the ATO<br />
process would be severely damaged unless further development<br />
of such an alteration takes place.<br />
The two diagnoses presented in this paper are examples<br />
of developments that do not focus on aircraft design.<br />
Although is seems plausible that a munitions development<br />
would occur before such a doctrinal change, one must not be<br />
closed-minded when brainstorming avenues to develop the<br />
CAS body. As this paper has also discussed, no one system<br />
can be examined independently because all systems in the<br />
CAS body are intertwined. Each change or advance in one<br />
system can cause a change, either for better or for worse, in<br />
another system.<br />
The limits of this paper must be acknowledged. This<br />
paper has taken systems and analyzed them with respect to<br />
the others in a medical context, yet it has disregarded parts<br />
of the nervous and circulatory systems. As mentioned in<br />
the beginning of this paper, these omitted analyses focus on<br />
training and the flow of new ideas. New ideas keep military<br />
transformation alive. Innovative ideas, tactics and techniques<br />
can only improve CAS. New ideas are constantly appearing<br />
in student works published at the <strong>Air</strong> University. No<br />
matter who the author, each publication has potential to be<br />
expanded upon and developed. For this reason, it is worthy<br />
to take time and educate oneself about the books and papers<br />
produced at the <strong>Air</strong> University.<br />
Within the writings at the <strong>Air</strong> University new ideas<br />
regarding training can be revealed. Training is an extremely<br />
important part of CAS operations. Training does not center<br />
only on pilots and FACs, but encompasses every operator,<br />
rated, and non-rated officer who participates in CAS operation.<br />
Training ideas that could be researched include CAS<br />
training with the Marines. It may be a feasible option to send<br />
our A-10, F-15E, and F-16 crews to a CAS training program<br />
run by the Marine Corps. The <strong>Air</strong> <strong>Force</strong> has implemented<br />
training programs to improve not only CAS but all air operations,<br />
moreover the <strong>Air</strong> <strong>Force</strong> must not forget how vital all<br />
members of the CAS team are and that their training is just as<br />
important as that of the operator’s.<br />
Other areas that are worthy of continued research are<br />
the use of Unmanned Combat Aerial Vehicles (UCAVs), the<br />
use and implications of the Small Diameter Bomb (SDB),<br />
and offensive and defensive couterspace operations. Publications<br />
in Popular Mechanics, Aviation Weekly, and military publications<br />
may facilitate new ideas that could aid in developing<br />
some of the aforementioned topics. One particular publica-<br />
21<br />
tion of interest is LtCol Mike “Wolf” Smith’s thesis from the<br />
<strong>Air</strong> University. In his paper entitled “Ten Propositions of<br />
Spacepower”, the tenth proposition makes the powerful statement<br />
that “weaponizing space is inevitable.” 55 Could weaponizing<br />
space present a new CAS platform?<br />
The debate over CAS may still rage on, but there is<br />
little doubt that the <strong>Air</strong> <strong>Force</strong> lacks a commitment to performing<br />
CAS missions. The <strong>Air</strong> <strong>Force</strong> uses all it assets as<br />
effectively and efficiently as possible to maximize firepower,<br />
maneuverability, and exploitation of the theatre of operations.<br />
Situations dictate priorities, and as future conflicts<br />
become more frequent and low-intensity in nature, CAS may<br />
become an even more critical mission. <strong>Air</strong>power is dependant<br />
upon flexible response and since Kasserine, the <strong>Air</strong> <strong>Force</strong> has<br />
endeavored to commit to CAS operations while maintaining<br />
the integrity of its other responsibilities. The <strong>Air</strong> <strong>Force</strong> must<br />
seek solutions to optimize CAS capabilities that are not solely<br />
dependent on new aircraft or on a particular development in<br />
one system.<br />
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mil/about/glossary.htm; Internet; accessed 18 October<br />
2003.<br />
Joint Publication (JP) 3-56.1. Command and Control for Joint<br />
<strong>Air</strong> Operations. 14 November 1994.<br />
Joint Strike Fighter (JSF). Federation of American Scientists,<br />
2003. [database on-line]; available from http://www<br />
.fas.org/man/dod-101/sys/ac/jsf.htm; Internet;<br />
accessed 22 September 2003.<br />
Joint Surveillance Target Attack Radar System (Joint STARS /<br />
JSTARS). Federation of American Scientists, 2003.<br />
[database on-line]; available from http://www .fas.<br />
org/man/dod-101/sys/ac/a-10.htm; Internet; accessed<br />
23 April 2005.<br />
Kent, John. “The ‘F’ Stands for ‘Future’.” <strong>Air</strong> and Space<br />
Power Journal 17 (Spring 2003): 41-46.<br />
Mann, Edward C., III. Thunder and Lightning: Desert Storm<br />
and the <strong>Air</strong>power Debates. Maxwell AFB, AL: <strong>Air</strong><br />
University Press, 1995.<br />
Mets, David R. “The Long Search for a Surgical Strike: Precision<br />
Munitions in Military Affairs.” The Cadre<br />
Papers, no. 12 (October 2001): 1-79.<br />
“The Republic Thunderbolt,” Jane’s Fighting <strong>Air</strong>craft of World<br />
22<br />
War II, (London: Bracken Books, 1989), 254.<br />
Rife, Shawn P. “Kasserine Pass and the Proper Application of<br />
<strong>Air</strong>power.” Joint <strong>Force</strong>s Quarterly (Autumn/Winter<br />
1998-99): 76-77.<br />
Rivet Joint. Federation of American Scientists, 2003. [database<br />
on-line]; available from http://www .fas.org/<br />
man/dod-101/sys/ac/a-10.htm; Internet; accessed 23<br />
April 2005.<br />
Sargent, Richard L. “Deliberate <strong>Force</strong> Tactics.” In Deliberate<br />
<strong>Force</strong>: A Case Study in Effective <strong>Air</strong> Campainging, ed.<br />
Robert C. Owens, 297-239. Maxwell AFB, AL: <strong>Air</strong><br />
University Press, 2000.<br />
Smith, Mike V. “Ten Propositions of Spacepower.” School<br />
of Advanced <strong>Air</strong>power Studies Thesis, <strong>Air</strong> University,<br />
Maxwell AFB, AL, 2001.<br />
VanHook, Richard. Briefing for Military Strategic Studies<br />
485. “Space Operations.” Fall 2004.<br />
Wills, Steve. Briefing for Military Strategic Studies 400. “Joint<br />
and Coalition Warfare.” 10 Feb 2005.<br />
1999 Weapons File. Eglin AFB, FL: Office of the Armament<br />
Production Group Manager, 1999.<br />
DOCUMENTATION<br />
Dr Titus and Dr Karolick reviewed my structure and made<br />
suggestions for my headers, sub headers and some of<br />
my footnotes.<br />
Maj Eret gave some suggestions about the AOC in respect to<br />
my formulation of the CASOC. These changes will<br />
be incorporated into the next draft. He also gave me<br />
an additional source for CAS and the A-10.<br />
C1C Rebecca Simpson reviewed my paper and made grammatical<br />
corrections.<br />
C1C Joe Mobbley gave me the information and source for the<br />
definition of C 2 .<br />
(Endnotes)<br />
1 B. Franklin Cooling, Case Studies in the Development<br />
of Close <strong>Air</strong> Support (Washington, D.C.: Office of <strong>Air</strong><br />
<strong>Force</strong> History, 1990), 250.<br />
2 Leon E. Elsarelli, “From Desert Storm to 2025:<br />
Close <strong>Air</strong> Support in the 21 st Century,” (Research Paper, <strong>Air</strong>
Command and Staff College, 1998), 2.<br />
3 <strong>Air</strong> <strong>Force</strong> Doctrine Document (AFDD) 1, <strong>Air</strong> <strong>Force</strong><br />
Basic Doctrine, (Maxwell AFB, AL: HQ AFDC: 1997), 49.<br />
4 2003. Joint <strong>Force</strong>s Command Glossary: C2 [on-line].<br />
<strong>United</strong> <strong>States</strong> Joint <strong>Force</strong>s Command; available from http://<br />
www.jfcom.mil/about/glossary.htm#C; Internet; accessed 18<br />
October 2003.<br />
5 Ibid.<br />
6 Edward C. Mann III, Thunder and Lightning:<br />
Desert Storm and the <strong>Air</strong>power Debates (Maxwell AFB, AL: <strong>Air</strong><br />
University Press, 1995), 157.<br />
7 Philip Haun, “<strong>Air</strong> Power Versus a Field Army,” RAF<br />
<strong>Air</strong> Power Review 4(Winter 2004): 71.<br />
8 Elsarelli, “Desert Storm to 2025,”11.<br />
9 Richard L. Sargent. “Deliberate <strong>Force</strong> Tactics,” in<br />
Deliberate <strong>Force</strong>: A Case Study in Effective <strong>Air</strong> Campainging,<br />
ed. Robert C. Owens, (Maxwell AFB, AL: <strong>Air</strong> University<br />
Press, 2000.), 317.<br />
10 Ibid, 318.<br />
11 Elsarelli, “Desert Storm to 2025,” 8.<br />
12 Sargent, “Deliberate <strong>Force</strong>,” 318.<br />
13 Haun, “<strong>Air</strong> Power Versus a Field Army,” 72.<br />
14 Elsarelli, “Desert Storm to 2025,” 24.<br />
15 Anton Eret, interviewed by author, 5 September<br />
2003, USAF <strong>Academy</strong>.<br />
16 1999 Weapons File (Eglin AFB, FL: Office of the<br />
Armament Production Group Manager, 1999), Preface.<br />
17 David R. Mets, “The Long Search for a Surgical<br />
Strike: Precision Munitions in Military Affairs,” The Cadre<br />
Papers, no. 12 (Maxwell AFB, AL: <strong>Air</strong> University Press, 2001):<br />
56.<br />
18 Transformational changes, or the term<br />
“transformation”, as meant by the author, includes the<br />
contemporary, substantial changes in the way the U.S.<br />
military approaches organizing, training, and equipping its<br />
forces. The subject of military transformation is addressed<br />
in greater detail by Colin S. Gray. His entire book is about<br />
Modern Strategy, but his ideas , especially chapter 7, embrace<br />
the idea of transformation. Colin S. Gray, Modern Strategy<br />
(London: Oxford University Press, 1999), 175-206.<br />
19 “The Republic Thunderbolt,” Jane’s Fighting<br />
<strong>Air</strong>craft of World War II (London: Bracken Books, 1989), 254.<br />
20 A-10/OA-10 Thunderbolt II, (Federation of<br />
American Scientists: 2003) [database on-line]; available from<br />
23<br />
http://www .fas.org/man/dod-101/sys/ac/a-10.htm; Internet;<br />
accessed 22 September 2003.<br />
21 Ibid.<br />
22 Mann, Thunder and Lightning, 157<br />
23 Eret interview.<br />
24 Ibid.<br />
25 Mets, “Long Search for Strike,” 35<br />
26 Ibid, 1.<br />
27 Ibid, 42<br />
28 1999 Weapons File, 5-13.<br />
29 Joint Aerospace Command and Control Course<br />
(JAC2C) (Hurlburt Field, FL: USAF C2 Warrior School),<br />
FUN-132, 3.<br />
30 Ibid.<br />
31 Joint Publication (JP) 3-56.1. Command and Control<br />
for Joint <strong>Air</strong> Operations. 14 November 1994.<br />
32 Text for JAC2C, 3.<br />
33 Ibid.<br />
34 Ibid.<br />
35 Ibid.<br />
36 Ibid.<br />
37 Ibid, 1.<br />
38 Ibid, 4.<br />
39 Ibid.<br />
40 Ibid.<br />
41 Ibid, 6.<br />
42 Ibid.<br />
43 Ibid, 1.<br />
44 Ibid.<br />
45 LtCol Steve Wills, Briefing for Military Strategic<br />
Studies 400, “Joint and Coalition Warfare,” 10 Feb 2005.<br />
46 Rivet Joint, (Federation of American Scientists:<br />
2003) [database on-line]; available from http://www .fas.org/<br />
man/dod-101/sys/ac/a-10.htm; Internet; accessed 23 April<br />
2005.<br />
47 E-3 Sentry (AWACS), (Federation of American<br />
Scientists: 2003) [database on-line]; available from http://<br />
www .fas.org/man/dod-101/sys/ac/a-10.htm; Internet;<br />
accessed 23 April 2005.<br />
48 Joint Surveillance Target Attack Radar System (Joint<br />
STARS / JSTARS), (Federation of American Scientists: 2003)<br />
[database on-line]; available from http://www .fas.org/man/<br />
dod-101/sys/ac/a-10.htm; Internet; accessed 23 April 2005.<br />
49 LtCol Richard VanHook, Briefing for Military<br />
Strategic Studies 485, “Space Operations,” Fall 2004.<br />
50 JAC2C, 1.<br />
51 Maj Anton Eret, Briefing for Military Strategic<br />
Studies 368, “Weapons Technology and Employment<br />
Strategies,” Spring 2005.<br />
52 Shawn P. Rife, “Kasserine Pass and the Proper
Application of <strong>Air</strong>power,” Joint <strong>Force</strong>s Quarterly (Autumn/<br />
Winter 1998-99), 76-77.<br />
53 Adam J. Hebert, “The Long Reach of Heavy<br />
Bombers,” <strong>Air</strong> <strong>Force</strong> Magazine, November 3003, 24.<br />
54 Eret interviewed.<br />
55 Mike V. Smith, “Ten Propositions of Spacepower”<br />
(M.A. thesis, School of Advanced <strong>Air</strong>power Studies, <strong>Air</strong> University,<br />
Maxwell AFB, AL, 2001), 98.<br />
24<br />
IS DEMOCRATIC IMPERIALISM VIABLE?<br />
ASSESSING THE VALIDITY OF THE<br />
BUSH DOCTRINE<br />
By C4C Whitney Camp<br />
The Roots of Democratic Imperialism<br />
As the federal convention convened and Federalists<br />
and Anti-Federalists joined in debate and discussion, the<br />
issues of domestic policy in collaboration with expansion<br />
came to the front of the agenda. Recently liberated from the<br />
imperialistic British Empire, most of the founding fathers<br />
assured that “conquest or superiority among powers is not<br />
or ought not ever to be the object of republican systems”<br />
(“A Strategy” 1). Since the late 18 th century, the foreign<br />
and domestic policies of the <strong>United</strong> <strong>States</strong> have changed<br />
significantly and altered their focus based on the global<br />
community’s status. George W. Bush’s National Security<br />
Strategy has been under the microscope of politicians, civilians<br />
and military leaders with the invasion of Afghanistan<br />
and the occupation of Iraq. In his January 2005 State of the<br />
Union address, Bush said, “We are all part of a great venture:<br />
To extend the promise of freedom in our country, to renew<br />
the values that sustain our liberty, and to spread the peace<br />
that freedom brings” (State 4). The expansion of democracy<br />
within the world is significant to the daily lives of Americans<br />
and to the perpetuation and stability of the <strong>United</strong> <strong>States</strong> of<br />
America. In order to assess the validity of the Bush doctrine,<br />
it is essential to analyze the role of a democratic republic in<br />
the world order, explain why opponents believe the Bush<br />
doctrine crosses the line, and finally, clarify the necessity of<br />
<strong>United</strong> <strong>States</strong>’ international intervention as a global power<br />
and economic stronghold.<br />
The Democratic System in Today’s World Order<br />
Classical military theorists to modern political analysts<br />
have continually assessed the place of democracy in the<br />
world order. When does a democracy retain the right to<br />
infringe its own form of government upon another nation?<br />
T.E. Hulme, a British conservative who enlisted in WWI<br />
attacks the pacifist and the passive politician by articulating<br />
that skepticism about war arises for two reasons. The primary<br />
reason is “the fatuous belief that liberty cannot at any rate be<br />
permanent endangered, for Germany herself will inevitably<br />
develop toward democracy” (Hulme 251). Furthermore, as<br />
international institutions such as the <strong>United</strong> Nations and capitalistic<br />
superpowers like that of the <strong>United</strong> <strong>States</strong> begin to see<br />
the necessity of the people’s voice, sovereignty becomes redundant.<br />
In Jihad vs. McWorld, Benjamin Barber says, “Sovereignty<br />
is indeed in a twilight, condemned to a shadow world
y government’s myriad postmodern detractors—ex-Communist<br />
and postindustrialist alike” (Barber 277). Democracy has<br />
taken on a new role in the international society—to bring the<br />
basic human rights and beliefs of the Enlightenment to every<br />
culture and race. Many liberal nations and constituents claim<br />
that democracy, with its basic tenant of the “right to choose”<br />
has no right to infringe upon other nations and peoples.<br />
However, the uniqueness of democracy resides in the fact that<br />
as soon as it is instituted, it can be changed to become the<br />
people’s will. In Hobbe’s social contract theory, he explains that<br />
citizens of a state abandon certain rights for the prosperity<br />
of the state, but as soon as that government infringes on the<br />
inalienable rights of man, the people have the responsibility to<br />
overthrow the government (Lutz 100). The National Security<br />
Strategy offers nations in the Middle East the right to execute<br />
Hobbe’s theory and to choose how they want to be governed.<br />
The Bush doctrine attempts to give every person throughout<br />
the world the right to choose, thereby clarifying the place of<br />
the democratic system in a world of diverse nations. In a 7<br />
March 2005 editorial, Michael Barone affirms: “George W.<br />
Bush gambled that actions can change minds. So far, he’s winning”<br />
(Barone 29).<br />
Opponents to the National Security Strategy<br />
Stanley Kurtz questions, “Could such a venture<br />
in democratic imperialism be harmonized with out liberal<br />
principles?” (Kurtz 1). Many <strong>United</strong> <strong>States</strong> Democrats and<br />
angry foreign nations believe the answer is no. Bush has met<br />
extreme opposition against his foreign policies, which have<br />
thereby affected his domestic policies through legislation<br />
such as the Patriot Act. Seamus Mine in an editorial in The<br />
Week claims: “It is not democracy that is on the march in the<br />
Middle East. It is the U.S. military” (Milne 15). He extends<br />
his analysis by asserting that the 140,000 troops patrolling the<br />
streets of Iraq do not equate to liberty and freedom. However,<br />
Stanley Kurtz uses an analogy to the British Empire’s<br />
occupation of India, recalling that democracy came to India<br />
“very slowly.” Many opponents of the Bush doctrine want<br />
instantaneous satisfaction and expect Bush to deliver freedom,<br />
liberty and immaculate human rights in an immediate turnaround.<br />
“It takes democracy to make democracy” (Kurtz 9).<br />
However, no matter the dissent against Bush, Democrats,<br />
Republicans and nations across the world do agree with<br />
the obligation of the War on Terror. And if the majority of<br />
Americans agree with this specific policy, all citizens have to<br />
do is look towards the sweeping democratic changes taking<br />
place all over the world. As general elections in Iraq took<br />
place with a higher voter turnout than the <strong>United</strong> <strong>States</strong>’<br />
and a presidential Palestinian election was successful, things<br />
are beginning to change in the Middle East. In Febru-<br />
25<br />
ary, thousands of Lebanese took to the streets to protest the<br />
Syrian occupation, demanding democracy. In Egypt, Hosni<br />
Mubarak agreed to allow a second party to the presidential<br />
elections. In Saudi Arabia, the first multi-candidate elections<br />
took place in February. However, in a 5 March 2005<br />
article of the Economist, the writer blatantly says, “The Middle<br />
East is still a dangerous mess. The despots are not becoming<br />
democrats overnight” (Democracy 9). Even if the Middle<br />
East is not perfect yet, Americans must realize that democracy<br />
cannot be linked with immediate satisfaction. Mortimer<br />
Zuckemeran, in an 11 April 2005 US News and World<br />
Report reminds his readers: “Our strategy to push for democratization<br />
is admirable. But let’s recognize that the social and<br />
cultural changes of the Middle East mean it will take time”<br />
(Zuckerman 84).<br />
Opponents of the National Security Strategy are not<br />
merely confined within the borders of the country. The Bush<br />
administration must recognize the true meaning of democracy,<br />
even when it comes at a cost to the Untied <strong>States</strong>. In<br />
Venezuela, Hugo Chavez, the popularly elected president still<br />
holds onto anti-American tendencies. Bush must accept the<br />
dissent and embrace the opponents to his policies, in order<br />
not to lose the pathway to true democratic establishments<br />
(Kurtz 9). The <strong>United</strong> <strong>States</strong> faces the problem of democratizing<br />
cultures that hold different ideals and spiritual values<br />
than what our government is based on. John Stuart Mill in<br />
Representative Government insists that democracies in “uncivilized<br />
countries” must arise first from the formation of democratic<br />
assemblies until full representative government can<br />
be achieved (Kurtz 8). When applied to Iraq, this assembly<br />
is the Iraqi governing council. Whether critics to the Bush<br />
administration lie within or outside the <strong>United</strong> <strong>States</strong>, George<br />
W. Bush must take each opinion carefully and proceed cautiously<br />
as he attempts to provide democracy empirically. The<br />
true line between democratic imperialism and imperialism<br />
will be drawn according to the Bush administration’s reaction<br />
to democratically-induced anti-US sentiments.<br />
The US as a necessary hegemonic power<br />
The article: “A Strategy for Republican Empire?”<br />
emphasizes that Bush’s foreign policy is correct and justified<br />
in order to maintain world order. Hegemonic stability theory<br />
believes that economic prosperity can only be gained through<br />
the presence of a powerful state that is willing to provide<br />
international security (“A Strategy 2). America is now that<br />
hegemonic power. As soon as economic prosperity is gained,<br />
peace will follow. Many others agree with this theory and<br />
America’s homeland security is maintained in the process of<br />
intervening abroad. “Terrorism against American interests<br />
‘over there’…should be regarded just as we regard terrorism
against America ‘over here’” (One 32). Foreign powers must<br />
realize the necessity of a world superpower, both economically<br />
and politically. “The Europeans, with the French and Germans<br />
to the fore, have been gracelessly loth to admit that the<br />
Bush doctrine, however crassly simplistic in expression and<br />
implementation, has moved the scenery—in the right direction”<br />
(Democracy 9).<br />
Bush has caused a sudden democratic stirring in the<br />
Middle East, with the original intent to keep Americans safe<br />
at home. Thucydides believed that countries went to war for<br />
three reasons: fear, honor and interest. The Bush doctrine<br />
is influenced by theses three reasons, though it is primarily<br />
honor and fear. Furthermore, Thucydides also believed that a<br />
state is most secure when it is surrounded by those like itself<br />
(‘A Strategy” 2). In such a global and technological age, it<br />
is no longer the neighbors of a state who can pose harm to<br />
one country; therefore, Bush realizes the necessity of containing<br />
terrorism overseas as well. Not only is Bush preaching<br />
classical military theorists through his actions, but he is also<br />
echoing the doctrine and beliefs of Woodrow Wilson, who<br />
believed in a liberal and free world order (Ajami 31).<br />
Bush boldly declares again and again that American<br />
presence in the Middle East is necessary during the times of<br />
terrorism. The hegemonic stability theory and the current<br />
times of crisis throughout the world dictate the <strong>United</strong> <strong>States</strong><br />
to be the world’s democratic imperialist. For, “peace is maintained<br />
ultimately by the power of the strong” (“A Strategy” 2).<br />
Altering the Bush Doctrine in the face of change<br />
Even if the Bush doctrine has been accepted as successful<br />
to a certain degree by Democrats, Republicans and<br />
foreigners alike, there is always room for alteration. “American<br />
foreign policy thinking also suffered from a reluctance to<br />
abandon, alter or at times even reconsider policies adopted to<br />
meet Cold War needs” (Huntington 309). Now that analysts<br />
have determined the necessity of US power abroad, and met<br />
the opposition head-on, it is time for the Bush administration<br />
to address the challenges of creating new democracies<br />
and allowing them to be sovereign. “For the <strong>United</strong> <strong>States</strong><br />
to be fully secure and prosperous, everyone must be secure<br />
and prosperous” (“A Strategy” 2). Security and prosperity<br />
ultimately stem from rule by the people. As soon as the Bush<br />
administration can achieve democracy in these areas, Americans<br />
will be better off—both domestically and internationally.<br />
Democracy, however, takes time and the formation of a cohesive<br />
political policy requires analysis first and foremost, but<br />
can only be implemented through trial and error. The Bush<br />
administration has taken the first and the hardest steps to creating<br />
a peaceful world through the power of one, but the next<br />
democratically elected administration must maintain the same<br />
26<br />
lofty goals in order to secure the prosperity of the global community.<br />
Therefore, the political motives of Bush and his successors<br />
and the military implementation are inherently linked.<br />
As Clausewitz once said, “War is politics by other means.”<br />
Works Cited<br />
Ajami, Fouad. “A sudden, powerful stirring.” US News and<br />
World Report. 14<br />
Mar. 2005: 30.<br />
“A Strategy for Republican Empire? Understanding the Bush<br />
doctrine.”<br />
Online posting. 22 Oct. 2003. 15 Apr. 2005.<br />
Barber, Benjamin R. Jihad vs. McWorld. New York: Ballantine<br />
Books, 1996.<br />
Barone, Michael. “Minds are changing.” US News and World<br />
Report<br />
7 Mar. 2005: 29.<br />
“Democracy stirs in the Middle East.” The Economist 5 Mar.<br />
2005: 9.<br />
Hulme, T E. “Essays on War.” Conservatism: An Anthology<br />
of Social<br />
and Political Thought From David Hume to the<br />
Present. Comp. Jerry<br />
Z. Muller. Princeton: Princeton UP, 1997. N. pag.<br />
Huntington, Samuel P. The Clash of Civilizations and the<br />
Remaking of World Order. New York:<br />
Touchstone, 1996.<br />
Kurtz, Stanley. Democratic Imperialism: A Blueprint. Stanford<br />
University. 15 Apr. 2005.<br />
Lutz, Donald S. A Preface to American Political Theory.<br />
Lawrence: University P of Kansas, 1992.<br />
Milne, Seamus. “America’s Real Agenda is Power.” The Week<br />
25<br />
Mar. 2005: 15.<br />
“One nation after all.” The Economist 11 Sept. 2004: 32.<br />
State of the Union Address. 2 Feb. 2005. White House. 15<br />
Apr. 2005 .<br />
Zuckerman, Mortimer B. “Good Things Take Time.” Editorial.<br />
US News<br />
and World Report 11 Apr. 2005: 84.
MORALLY BOUND TO NATIONAL SECURITY<br />
By C3C Brady Cillo<br />
More and more often we see headlines in the news<br />
about powerful people, the nation’s leaders, who have dismissed<br />
ethics from their practices in an effort to get ahead by<br />
any means available. Recently, corporate leaders of Enron,<br />
Martha Stewart, and Sammy Sosa, along with many others,<br />
have allegedly forgone personal ethics by opting to take the<br />
easy route and cheating. While the integrity of these individuals<br />
will always be compromised, their lives will continue to<br />
go on, despite attention from the media. A serious problem<br />
occurs when, rather than a well known celebrity, a military<br />
professional chooses to forgo basic morals and puts national<br />
security into question. One way to circumvent this problem<br />
before it manifests itself lies in the acceptance and commitment<br />
to a moral or ethical code that acts as a stepping-stone<br />
in developing one’s own ideals. True adherence to a moral<br />
code such as the <strong>United</strong> <strong>States</strong> <strong>Air</strong> <strong>Force</strong> <strong>Academy</strong>’s Cadet<br />
Honor Code develops the character, integrity, and honor<br />
necessary of an officer in today’s military and remains essential<br />
to protecting national security. Past examples of national<br />
security breaches help illustrate the breakdown in morals<br />
and further display the need for an effective honor code. An<br />
analysis of today’s Honor Code reinforces the concepts behind<br />
instilling a value system in every person.<br />
On 14 June 2000, a man named George Trofimoff<br />
was arrested by the FBI for supplying the USSR with information<br />
critical to the security of the <strong>United</strong> <strong>States</strong>. The case<br />
was notable because Trofimoff was the nation’s highest ranking<br />
military member ever convicted of espionage. The Army<br />
Reserve Colonel was charged for and admitted to 25 years<br />
of spying for the USSR and Russia, earning over $250,000<br />
during his career (George). Recruited by the KGB in 1969,<br />
Trofimoff allegedly supplied the USSR/Russia with documents<br />
regarding what the US knew about the defense capabilities<br />
of the USSR and Warsaw Pact nations (Ex-colonel).<br />
On 28 September 2001, Trofimoff was given a break, when,<br />
instead of the death penalty for treason, he was sentenced to<br />
life in prison without possibility of parole (George).<br />
John A. Walker Jr. was sitting in a hotel room pondering<br />
the possible reasons he had not received his payment.<br />
After he had placed the paper bag full of 129 stolen classified<br />
US Navy documents at the drop location, he went to find<br />
his payment of $200,000 in another location, but never succeeded.<br />
Suddenly, he received a phone call from the front<br />
desk that he believed to be a ploy to lure him out of the<br />
room. He looked out the window and saw no police cars in<br />
the parking lot, so he left the room. He was immediately<br />
apprehended by two FBI agents, who promptly strip-searched<br />
27<br />
him and effectively ended his spy career. John Walker, a US<br />
Navy warrant officer, had been engaging in espionage for the<br />
USSR for 18 years. He formed a spy ring, composed of his<br />
son, Michael Walker, and his older brother, Arthur James<br />
Walker. Michael was a petty officer on the USS Nimitz, and<br />
was in charge of disposing of classified documents. Arthur,<br />
a retired Navy Lieutenant Commander, worked for a defense<br />
contractor and was in the position to easily smuggle defense<br />
documents to John. With these sources, John would take the<br />
documents and sell them to the KGB in return for large sums<br />
of money. The most disturbing information that John passed<br />
to the Russians was the ‘keylists’ or encryption codes that<br />
could decipher the Navy’s secret transmissions (Earley 1-4).<br />
In an interview with Russian KGB agent, Vitaly Yurchenko,<br />
Yurchenko admitted that “[the USSR] deciphered millions of<br />
[US] messages. If there had been a war, [the USSR] would<br />
have won” (Earley 1). In the end, John and Arthur received<br />
life imprisonment, and Michael earned 25 years in prison,<br />
lessened by his father’s divulgence of information to the FBI<br />
(Earley 4).<br />
These examples bring to light a true American tragedy.<br />
American citizens, and, more importantly, military<br />
members, who are driven by nothing else than greed for<br />
foreign money, have betrayed the greatest free country in the<br />
world. They compromised national security on the basis of<br />
a big pay-day. Besides a collapse of national security, a total<br />
breakdown of morals occurred on the parts of Trofimoff and<br />
Walker. They completely disregarded character, honor, and<br />
integrity, and were left with nothing except lifetime jail sentences,<br />
the loss of others’ trust, and dishonor to their names.<br />
A case can be argued as to whether these men would have<br />
committed the same crimes had they been under some type<br />
of moral code for a period of four years, like cadets at the <strong>Air</strong><br />
<strong>Force</strong> <strong>Academy</strong>.<br />
A recent article by Darryl Goldman of the Military<br />
Review claims that the Department of Defense has a dilemma<br />
of military members not having the same ethics and values<br />
that they once had. He claims that “the young men and<br />
women joining the military today are a diverse aggregation,<br />
generally without the homogeneous values of their grandparents”<br />
(Goldman). He implies that the values once instilled<br />
by a strong family background no longer exist today as they<br />
once did. Goldman also points out that the military has “no<br />
effective mechanism for teaching [its members] the values<br />
traditionally esteemed by our military services” (Goldman).<br />
This seems to be a reality in the operational <strong>Air</strong> <strong>Force</strong>, as<br />
there seems to be no unified approach to achieving this goal.<br />
Instead, the new trend has become isolated human relations<br />
initiatives, such as a program on violence prevention that<br />
divides into smaller subdivisions like workplace violence,
sexual assault, and suicide prevention (Goldman). These<br />
individual topics draw attention away from the underlying<br />
goal of more improved ethics training. It appears as though<br />
a more encompassing, universal code is necessary to promote<br />
the kind of morals and ethics that the military requires. Once<br />
again, the reference to a moral code such as the <strong>Air</strong> <strong>Force</strong><br />
<strong>Academy</strong> Cadet Honor Code conveys its importance and significance<br />
in today’s society.<br />
In order to understand the benefits of the Honor<br />
Code, an analysis of its purpose, components, and future<br />
outlook is necessary. In the beginnings of the newly formed<br />
<strong>United</strong> <strong>States</strong> <strong>Air</strong> <strong>Force</strong> in 1947, a main concern was the<br />
lack of a sufficient supplier of professional, honorable officers<br />
(Charles 178). Many government leaders agreed that a separate<br />
institution such as West Point or Annapolis was necessary<br />
for the <strong>Air</strong> <strong>Force</strong> as well. The bill for this new institution<br />
was signed into law in early 1954, and the rest is history<br />
(179). The <strong>Academy</strong>’s first superintendent, General Hubert<br />
R. Harmon realized the need for some sort of honor structure<br />
that would promote and develop the values necessary of<br />
future <strong>Air</strong> <strong>Force</strong> officers. He also knew that the system must<br />
not only be accepted by cadets, but implemented and maintained<br />
by cadets as well (180). Captain Leonard J. Mahony<br />
of the <strong>Academy</strong>’s first class reflected on the initial process by<br />
saying, “it was clearly transmitted that the code belonged to<br />
us—to accept, change or even reject” (181-2). An almost<br />
unexpected unanimous acceptance of the newly formed code<br />
occurred even without a vote, and established the statement:<br />
“We will not lie, cheat, or steal, nor tolerate those who do”<br />
(182).<br />
The purpose of the newly adopted Code was<br />
summed up beautifully by General Mark Clark, Allied Commander<br />
in WWII, when he said, “A stern code of ethics, a<br />
strong sense of personal morality, ‘obedience to the unenforceable”—these<br />
are qualities a leader must have at the core<br />
of his being…without a firm moral base a man is too unsure<br />
of himself to be an effective leader” (Charles 70). The Honor<br />
Code acts as the code of ethics and the firm moral base to<br />
which Clark refers. It undeniably chips away at the core of<br />
every person’s being, until that person’s foundation has been<br />
replaced with a rock solid base of values that allows him or<br />
her to instinctively make honorable decisions. The honor<br />
system is based on the condition that cadets are willing and<br />
insist on having the Code for themselves, which strengthens<br />
its effectiveness. Exercising the right to modify the Code in<br />
1961, cadets reworded it to its current statement: “We will<br />
not lie, steal, or cheat, nor tolerate among us anyone who<br />
does” (184). These four precepts truly embody the essence of<br />
an honorable leader and provide common values for everyone<br />
under the Code.<br />
28<br />
By definition, the code is meant to guard against the<br />
liar, the cheat, the thief, and the acceptance of their deceitful<br />
acts (Charles 185). Lying constitutes any statement, written<br />
or spoken, that is not entirely true. It includes direct<br />
untruths, but also involves other statements, such as not telling<br />
the whole truth. Suppose an upperclass cadet asks if a<br />
fourthclassman has shined his shoes, implying on the same<br />
day. By responding “yes,” because he shined his shoes the<br />
day before, the fourthclassman conveyed a false image, and<br />
committed an honor violation (186). In the above examples<br />
of national security breaches, both Trofimoff and Walker<br />
lived lives of deceit by masking their true feelings and actions<br />
toward the <strong>United</strong> <strong>States</strong>. These men became immune to the<br />
fact that they were lying to everyone, and this helped them<br />
rationalize their actions. Lying must be eliminated from the<br />
thoughts of a leader, or else he too may become desensitized<br />
by such words and actions.<br />
Stealing deals with the taking of someone else’s<br />
property, thus depriving the true owner of its use (Charles<br />
188). In order to borrow an item, a cadet must have actual<br />
or implied permission, and must leave a note explaining the<br />
case. Stealing can also include destruction of government<br />
property, because in doing so, others are effectively deprived<br />
of the property’s use. When it comes down to it, people must<br />
realize that if it does not belong to them, then they shouldn’t<br />
take it. A big controversy occurs at the <strong>Academy</strong> when cadets<br />
believe that even small things like the condiments of peanut<br />
butter, ketchup, and honey, and utensils are somehow free for<br />
the taking. Actions as seemingly small as this are considered<br />
honor violations (188-90). Obviously, Trofimoff and Walker<br />
were both stealing on a large scale. They used their power to<br />
steal secrets vital to national security, and handed them over<br />
to the enemy for money. A moral breakdown occurred in<br />
both men when they deliberately took what was not theirs. A<br />
true leader understands that stealing is a means used by cowards<br />
who are never worthy of the things they obtain.<br />
Cheating involves having an unfair advantage over<br />
another in an academic or other situation (Charles 191).<br />
Whether during a test in the classroom, down on the intramural<br />
fields, or in the squadron, cheating remains unfair and<br />
immoral. The Dean of the Faculty tries to eliminate many<br />
cases by disallowing take-home tests, employing an alternating<br />
day system, and using the method of academic security.<br />
The Dean understands the importance of academics in class<br />
standing, and realizes that in this area, many people will be<br />
tempted to cheat. Overcoming this temptation forms one<br />
aspect of the foundation a leader acquires while under the<br />
Code. Trofimoff and Walker cheated the system by earning<br />
income not included in their job descriptions. They found<br />
ways to carefully and meticulously take unfair advantages
over others through exploitation of national secrets. A leader<br />
must be strong-willed and confident in his abilities to disallow<br />
himself from cheating.<br />
Toleration is the element of the Code that separates<br />
the <strong>Academy</strong>’s honor code from that of other institutions.<br />
This clause keeps the Code in check because it forces cadets<br />
to be proactive in their pursuit of exposing dishonesty. The<br />
clause, however, is also the one that many people find hard to<br />
enforce for themselves. Many cadets may be confident that<br />
they would never lie, steal, nor cheat, but become hesitant<br />
when they observe others doing those deeds. One must realize<br />
that if a friend would ask to cover for his dishonesty, he<br />
cannot be that much of a friend (Charles 194). The families<br />
of Trofimoff and Walker undoubtedly knew of their relatives’<br />
spy careers, but tolerated their actions and delayed exposing<br />
them because they were family. In Walker’s case, he convinced<br />
his two brothers to join in his criminal activity. Time<br />
and time again, toleration proves to be the hardest decision a<br />
cadet and future leader can make. Tragically, a cadet may be<br />
ostracized by his or her peers because he turned in, or ‘ratted’<br />
on the person who actually committed the violation. A leader<br />
must be firm in his morals, and although one of the toughest<br />
decisions to make is ruining the career of another, the leader<br />
must also never forget that the person brought the violation<br />
on himself.<br />
Many issues with the Honor Code occur because<br />
cadets may view the whole system as something negative that<br />
is ‘always out to get them.’ Although accepting the Code is a<br />
critical choice in one’s life, and should remain of utmost priority,<br />
viewing the precepts by their positive complements may<br />
help some people on the fence make that important choice<br />
more easily. Instead of viewing the concepts of lying, stealing,<br />
cheating, and tolerating as always negative, many people react<br />
better to positive counterparts, by being able to associate these<br />
with the true values of leadership.<br />
The complement of lying becomes honesty. Honesty<br />
should be something every person attains just by living under<br />
the Code. Cadets should not try to find ways to bend the<br />
truth that could be construed as lying, they should just understand<br />
that being honest is part of life. Instead of thinking of<br />
stealing, the quality of respect is easier to measure. Whether<br />
it is respect for other’s property, or respect for them as people,<br />
the concept remains central to the overall spirit of the Honor<br />
Code. Mutual respect ties into attitudes about others, especially<br />
when faced with the decision to lie to them, steal from<br />
them, or cheat in spite of them. The counterpart of cheating<br />
takes the shape of fairness. If one acts fairly in all endeavors,<br />
cheating will never cross the mind. When faced with that terrible<br />
temptation of copying an answer or plagiarizing an essay,<br />
one must remember how fair it would be to take advantage of<br />
29<br />
his peers like that, and act accordingly. Toleration remains the<br />
toughest precept for most cadets, and can be equivocated with<br />
support. As long as cadets support each other and do not let<br />
themselves fall into the pits of dishonesty, they will never have<br />
to make those tough decisions. These alternate perspectives<br />
of the Honor Code precepts help to better convey their true<br />
intentions.<br />
By observing and living the Honor Code on a dayto-day<br />
basis, cadets become accustomed to it and strive to<br />
live up to its standards. Edgar Holt, author of the History<br />
of the <strong>United</strong> <strong>States</strong> <strong>Air</strong> <strong>Force</strong> <strong>Academy</strong>, noted that “one of<br />
the most significant features of the cadet way of life was the<br />
part the Honor Code played in every facet of cadet activities”<br />
(Calkins 15). From the beginning of the cadet career, the<br />
cadet is bombarded with encouragement to live honorably<br />
under the Code. By commissioning date, “observance of the<br />
Code on every occasion would have become so much a part<br />
of the inner being of each man that he would be guided by it<br />
throughout his life” (15). This fortunate side effect of living<br />
under the Code is the key to a secure nation for the future.<br />
Some may argue that men like Trofimoff and Walker<br />
were inherently prone to crime and unethical behavior, and<br />
that living under the Code may not have prevented their<br />
actions. However, if this were true, some manifestation of<br />
their lacking integrity would likely have shown while under<br />
the Code and they would have been weeded out. It may be<br />
true that some men and women cannot be swayed by the<br />
Code, but if so, at least this fact becomes apparent and these<br />
individuals are not placed in positions that could compromise<br />
national security in the first place. These people comprise<br />
a minority, because most people living under the Code will<br />
develop and reinforce the continued morals necessary of <strong>Air</strong><br />
<strong>Force</strong> officers.<br />
In a world of changing technology, ruthless competition,<br />
and getting ahead by any means possible, one thing<br />
must remain absolutely steadfast: a person’s morals. The <strong>Air</strong><br />
<strong>Force</strong> <strong>Academy</strong> cadets do their best to support and enforce<br />
the Honor Code, in hopes to eliminate cases like those of<br />
Trofimoff and Walker. These past and current threats to US<br />
national security from the homeland side all stem from a<br />
breakdown or lack of morals. The Honor Code prevents this<br />
breakdown in morals by daily exposure to the officer values of<br />
respect, honesty, fairness, and support that become so deeply<br />
instilled in the cadet that nothing will be able to budge his<br />
will-power throughout his career. A moral or ethical code like<br />
that of the <strong>Air</strong> <strong>Force</strong> <strong>Academy</strong> is extremely crucial to national<br />
security in the future of our <strong>Air</strong> <strong>Force</strong> and nation.
Bibliography<br />
Calkins, Raymond. The Morality of the <strong>Air</strong> <strong>Force</strong> <strong>Academy</strong><br />
Honor Code. Washington, DC: 1966.<br />
Charles, William. Honor Codes: Can They Develop Integrity<br />
in Future Military Leaders? Fort Leavenworth,<br />
Kansas: 1968.<br />
Earley, Pete. “Family of Spies: The John Walker Jr. Spy Case.”<br />
Crime Library: Criminal Minds and Methods.<br />
. 19 October 2003.<br />
“Ex-colonel of USA Trofimoff’s Arrest.” Timeline: On Behalf<br />
of National Security. .<br />
20 October 2003.<br />
“George Von Trofimoff Biography.” Office of the National<br />
Counterintelligence Executive. . 19 October 2003.<br />
Goldman, Darryl. “The Wrong Road to Character Development?”<br />
Military Review, Jan/Feb 98, Vol. 78, Issue<br />
1. EBSCOHost Searchable Database. 18 Oct 2003.<br />
30<br />
“MIND OVER MATTER: THE CASE FOR DECEN-<br />
TRALIZING PSYCHOLOGICAL OPERATIONS<br />
(PSYOP) IN MODERN WARFARE”<br />
BY<br />
C1C KRISTEN L. FAGEN<br />
INTRODUCTION<br />
Statement of Research Question<br />
“There are but two powers in the world, the sword<br />
and the mind. In the long run the sword is always beaten by<br />
the mind,” stated Napoleon Bonaparte, describing the power<br />
of the mind in battle over the physical aspects of war. 1 Psychological<br />
warfare involves the use of mental persuasion in<br />
manipulating the enemy to give in to military objectives without<br />
the use of weapons or destruction. Psychological operations<br />
(PSYOP) have been utilized in military conflict since the<br />
beginning of warfare. The importance of PSYOP is evident<br />
in the writings of Sun Tzu and documented in the military<br />
theory and doctrine of such historic figures as Clausewitz and<br />
Napoleon. PSYOP have been officially utilized under organized<br />
commands in the U.S. military since World War I and<br />
is likely to play an ever increasing role in military operations<br />
into the future. 2<br />
The organization and use of PSYOP in the U.S.<br />
military has been inconsistent throughout the last century as<br />
a result of the fluctuating requirements for PSYOP in different<br />
conflicts and varying combat situations. This leads to my<br />
thesis question: “Has the U.S. military developed the optimum<br />
organizational potential for the delivery of psychological<br />
operations in an era of expanding contingency operations?”<br />
This question demands an examination of current U.S. military<br />
PSYOP organization and of the roles PSYOP play in<br />
military operations. In addition, the need for better PSYOP<br />
organization and defined PSYOP roles will be analyzed and<br />
our present PSYOP capabilities will be determined. This<br />
paper will evaluate how well the U.S. is prepared to utilize<br />
PSYOP in the future. On the basis of this analysis, recommendations<br />
will be offered on ways to improve the conduct<br />
and organization of PSYOP. Sophisticated and well-organized<br />
PSYOP are critical to a modern U.S. military that is prepared<br />
to fight the wars of the twenty-first century.<br />
Background and Significance of the Problem<br />
PSYOP has the potential to play a vast role as a force<br />
multiplier and a combat reducer in the post-Cold War era. 3<br />
PSYOP allow a military force to mentally counteract and<br />
overcome the enemy with limited manpower, limited physical<br />
fighting, and limited carnage. Serving as a force multiplier,<br />
PSYOP expands force capability without the need for more<br />
personnel. Also, PSYOP reduces the need for combat since<br />
the enemy can be persuaded to surrender without physically
fighting. Sun Tzu stated “that the most noble victory [is]<br />
to subdue the enemy without a fight”. 4 PSYOP seeks to do<br />
this. As an adjunct to conventional warfare, PSYOP are used<br />
to facilitate a country’s war fighting capability by mentally<br />
weakening the enemy forces or civilian population in order to<br />
reach a military goal without the spilling of enemy or friendly<br />
blood. PSYOP virtually persuade an adversary to give up the<br />
fight.<br />
Despite the attractiveness of successful psychological<br />
warfare, the use of organized PSYOP in U.S. military operations<br />
was limited in the twentieth century and is still limited<br />
today, partially due to a lack of PSYOP organization. The<br />
lack of organization can be linked to the inconsistent use of<br />
PSYOP in past U.S. military operations. The U.S. military<br />
limited its use of PSYOP in the twentieth century. This is<br />
evident in the rise and fall of PSYOP use during and after<br />
wars or conflicts. 5 Interest in PSYOP would rise during war<br />
then fall after the conflict was over, making PSYOP a forgotten<br />
form of warfare in the interwar periods. This lack of<br />
interest yielded limited PSYOP organization efforts, and left<br />
the Army the only military service with permanent operational<br />
PSYOP groups. Currently, the only existing active<br />
PSYOP group in the U.S. military is the Army’s 4 th Psychological<br />
Operations Group (<strong>Air</strong>borne) at Fort Bragg, North<br />
Carolina. 6 Their mission is “to deploy anywhere in the world<br />
on short notice, and plan, develop, and conduct Civil Affairs<br />
and Psychological operations in support of Unified Commanders,<br />
coalition forces, or other governmental agencies as<br />
directed by the National Command Authority”. 7 Reserve and<br />
guard units also participate in PSYOP delivery, including the<br />
Pennsylvania <strong>Air</strong> National Guard’s 193 rd Special Operations<br />
Wing and a number of Army Reserve components. 8 The <strong>Air</strong><br />
<strong>Force</strong>’s 39 th Information Operations Squadron at Hurlburt<br />
Field is involved in information warfare training which contributes<br />
to PSYOP strategy, but the squadron does not have<br />
an active, operational PSYOP component that is involved in<br />
the delivery of PSYOP. 9<br />
As the only U.S. military PSYOP forces, the 4 th<br />
PSYOP group and reserve and guard PSYOP units, are tasked<br />
with several PSYOP roles. One of the key roles of PSYOP<br />
is to “ensure a seamless information effort by designing an<br />
organization that can coordinate PSYOP efforts at the strategic,<br />
operational and tactical levels”. 10 This task requires the<br />
coordination of PSYOP among multiple PSYOP units, since<br />
one unit cannot seek to control all combat levels at once. A<br />
defined PSYOP organization is necessary to direct the activities<br />
of multiple PSYOP units at the varying levels of war.<br />
PSYOP can be utilized at all levels of war: strategic, operational,<br />
and tactical, and they can also be utilized in all phases<br />
of war, including operations preceding war, during war, and<br />
31<br />
after war. 11 PSYOP are also applicable to any type of military<br />
operation, including the support of conventional warfare,<br />
special operations, peacetime efforts, major military conflicts,<br />
or small, less intense military contingencies. 12 While PSYOP<br />
may be relevant to several types of military operations, phases,<br />
and levels of war, PSYOP efficacy and use are limited by poor<br />
organization of forces responsible for PSYOP delivery. A<br />
better-organized and better-defined PSYOP force would result<br />
in a more modern and better-prepared U.S. military.<br />
Limitations<br />
The limitations surrounding this study pertain to<br />
PSYOP aspects that do not directly influence the organization<br />
and the roles of PSYOP. PSYOP doctrine will be discussed,<br />
but equipment, technology, and training aspects of PSYOP<br />
will be disregarded, since these categories do not apply to the<br />
organization of PSYOP delivery. Equipment and advanced<br />
technology are critical to successful PSYOP but they are not<br />
critical to the study of PSYOP organization. While equipment<br />
and technology play a large role in the modernization of<br />
PSYOP, description of these elements would only add complex<br />
scientific information to the study. Finally, the importance<br />
of training this study is negligible since training cannot<br />
be a focus until PSYOP organization is determined.<br />
This study will focus on U.S. Army and U.S. <strong>Air</strong><br />
<strong>Force</strong> PSYOP doctrine and organization. The U.S. Navy and<br />
Marine Corps’ use and organization of PSYOP will not be<br />
considered in depth. While the Navy and Marine Corps have<br />
PSYOP capabilities, those services play a very limited PSYOP<br />
role at this time. For the purposes of this study, it is assumed<br />
that the <strong>Air</strong> <strong>Force</strong> and the Army will be the key actors in<br />
military PSYOP in future contingencies. Accordingly, recommendations<br />
for PSYOP organization will center on <strong>Air</strong> <strong>Force</strong><br />
and Army needs.<br />
Relevance to current problems involving PSYOP<br />
organization will determine selection of specific case studies.<br />
Moreover, specific emphasis will be given to the most<br />
recent U.S. military operations, specifically Operation Desert<br />
Storm and Operation Allied <strong>Force</strong>, since they appear to hold<br />
the most significance for the future of PSYOP organization.<br />
While earlier operations involving the role of PSYOP<br />
do pertain to historical PSYOP organization, they are not as<br />
applicable to this study regarding the future of the PSYOP<br />
organization.<br />
Definitions and Assumptions<br />
Several definitions are critical to the analysis and<br />
arguments proposed in the study. The following terms will be<br />
used throughout the study:<br />
Information Operations (IO). According to Joint Publication<br />
3-53, Doctrine for Joint<br />
Psychological Operations, Information Operations are
defined as “actions taken to affect<br />
adversary information and information systems while<br />
defending one’s own information and information<br />
systems”.<br />
32<br />
13 IO includes several types of operations,<br />
including military deception, psychological operations,<br />
electronic warfare, operational security, and<br />
computer network operations. 14<br />
Psychological Operations (PSYOP). According to the Doctrine<br />
for Joint Psychological<br />
Operations, PSYOP are defined as “planned operations<br />
to convey selected information and indicators<br />
to foreign audiences to influence the emotions,<br />
motives, objective reasoning, and ultimately the<br />
behavior of foreign governments, organizations,<br />
groups, and individuals”. 15<br />
Organization. The official parties in control, their strategy,<br />
what specific operations they are in<br />
control of, how they utilize their control, and if they<br />
share or do not share control with other parties.<br />
Delivery. Refers to the act of conducting PSYOP as opposed<br />
to the strategic planning of<br />
PSYOP.<br />
Strategic PSYOP. Utilized by “U.S. government departments<br />
and agencies…to influence<br />
foreign attitudes, perceptions, and behavior in favor<br />
of U.S. goals and objectives…These activities take<br />
place predominantly outside the military arena, but<br />
frequently use DOD assets and receive support from<br />
military PSYOP forces”. 16<br />
Operational PSYOP. “Conducted prior to, during war or<br />
conflict, and at the conclusion of open<br />
hostilities in a defined geographic area to promote the<br />
effectiveness of the area commander’s campaigns and<br />
strategies”. 17<br />
Tactical PSYOP. “Conducted in the area assigned a tactical<br />
commander during conflict and war<br />
to support the tactical mission against opposing<br />
forces”. 18<br />
Iraqi Freedom. Finally, organizational recommendations will<br />
be offered for enhancing PSYOP in the future.<br />
Before the question --“Has the U.S. military developed<br />
the optimum organizational potential in the delivery of<br />
psychological operations in an era of expanding contingency<br />
operations?”-- is fully examined, a review of the pertinent literature<br />
is necessary to determine what information is available<br />
from previous research on the topic of PSYOP.<br />
LITERATURE REVIEW<br />
General History of PSYOP<br />
The use of PSYOP has existed since the beginning of<br />
warfare. Documented as far back as biblical times, PSYOP<br />
have been used to mentally manipulate the enemy to meet<br />
certain military objectives. James Radvanyi mentions several<br />
uses of PSYOP throughout history:<br />
Psychological operations are as old as the history of<br />
mankind; indeed, the Bible records numerous cases,<br />
such as the ‘torch-game’ deception of Gideon against<br />
the Midianites that forced them to retreat…the Athenians’<br />
clever use of psychological warfare against the<br />
Melians in the Peloponnesian War…the Romans’<br />
disinformation and blackmail campaigns that ultimately<br />
forced the Carthaginians to surrender in the<br />
Punic Wars…And, one should never forget that the<br />
success of the Golden Horde of Genghis Khan partly<br />
depended on frightening rumors about the savagery<br />
and the greatly exaggerated numbers of the Khan’s<br />
horsemen army.<br />
Preview of Argument<br />
The argument presented in this study will address<br />
the organizational requirement for a modern and successful<br />
PSYOP force ready to face the demands of expanding contingency<br />
operations. It will be determined if the U.S. military<br />
has achieved the optimum organizational arrangements for<br />
PSYOP delivery, or whether organizational changes are necessary<br />
to more effectively utilize PSYOP in contemporary warfare.<br />
It is this researcher’s contention that such changes are<br />
indeed required. My argument will be supplemented by an<br />
evaluation of PSYOP in several recent or current U.S. operations,<br />
such as Operation Desert Storm, Operation Joint <strong>Force</strong><br />
in Bosnia, Operation Allied <strong>Force</strong> in Kosovo, and Operation<br />
19<br />
Many great warriors of the past wrote of the necessity for psychological<br />
means in warfare. As reported by James Rodgers,<br />
while Sun Tzu never used the term “PSYOP,” he did encourage<br />
his commanders “to know the enemy and know yourself;<br />
in a hundred years you will never be in peril,” and he recommended<br />
“[attacking] the enemy where weak, [defending]<br />
only where strong, and [achieving] deception” in warfare. 20<br />
Deception in warfare pertains to PSYOP and the resulting<br />
mental manipulation of the enemy. Differing from Sun Tzu’s<br />
teachings, U.S. PSYOP forces today rely more on sharing<br />
facts with the enemy rather than on deceiving the enemy, in<br />
order to expose true shortcomings in the enemy’s objectives,<br />
mentality, or leadership. More recent historical figures also<br />
have expressed their faith in the effectiveness of psychological<br />
warfare. Mao Zedong stated that, “The mind of the enemy<br />
and the will of his leaders is a target of far more importance<br />
than the bodies of his troops”. 21 This statement epitomizes<br />
the motive of PSYOP to this day; to wage war against the enemy’s<br />
mind and will rather than seeking the physical destruction<br />
of the enemy’s troops. According to Dr. Frank Goldstein,<br />
“Because soldiers and civilians have not fundamentally
changed in nature or psychology since Sun Tzu wrote these<br />
observations, they remain appropriate today”. 22<br />
History of PSYOP in the <strong>United</strong> <strong>States</strong><br />
Like other civilizations and nations, the <strong>United</strong><br />
<strong>States</strong> has utilized PSYOP in warfare throughout its history.<br />
While psychological warfare was used by Americans as early<br />
as the Battle of Bunker Hill, PSYOP did not become a formal<br />
activity of the U.S. military until World War I. 23 Goldstein<br />
mentions that several countries used both strategic and tactical<br />
PSYOP during WWI, including the use of propaganda<br />
created by specialized PSYOP units. 24 PSYOP officially<br />
became known as “psywar” during World War II and was<br />
employed mainly via public broadcast radio. 25 During the<br />
Korean Conflict and then the Cold War, PSYOP were best<br />
used by the Soviets. Western powers, including the U.S.,<br />
lagged behind in PSYOP potential through the Vietnam War.<br />
As expressed by Goldstein, the “North Vietnamese mastered<br />
the art of using the international media for their PSYOP”. 26<br />
In contrast, “U.S. PSYOP planning was not effectively formalized<br />
or coordinated with operations and troop mobilizations”.<br />
27 Following the Vietnam War, PSYOP was utilized in<br />
other combat operations including conflicts in the Falklands,<br />
Afghanistan, Africa, South and Central America, Grenada,<br />
Panama, and the Persian Gulf. 28<br />
American use of PSYOP has changed drastically over<br />
the years, but one theme has remained – the theme of fluctuating<br />
employment of PYSOP in U.S. military operations.<br />
According to Alfred Paddock, the use of PYSOP in warfare<br />
has fluctuated greatly throughout U.S. history. 29 Radvanyi<br />
agrees that American PSYOP can be considered inconsistent<br />
throughout American history, but he interprets this inconsistency<br />
as mere hesitancy to realize PSYOP’s effectiveness<br />
in war. He claims that, “Throughout its history, the U.S.<br />
approach toward practicing PSYOP can only be characterized<br />
as mild, if not timid”. 30 The episodic and timid nature of<br />
PSYOP has placed inadvertent limitations on the U.S. military’s<br />
use of PSYOP in warfare, for its full operational potential<br />
may still be unknown due to its restricted use in the past.<br />
The Role of PSYOP<br />
The roles PSYOP can play in military operations are<br />
boundless. According to Paddock, “PSYOP can be used to<br />
demoralize, disorient, and confuse hostile groups….Against<br />
such groups, PSYOP are employed as an offensive weapon<br />
to enhance the overall effectiveness of military operations”. 31<br />
Pugmire agrees and adds that “PSYOP are used throughout<br />
[a] campaign to support and achieve the commander’s<br />
objective...[the commander’s] PSYOP assets represent his only<br />
organic means to communicate directly with the enemy forces<br />
or civilians within his theater of operations”. 32 In addition to<br />
33<br />
the offensive and communicative nature of PSYOP, Goldstein<br />
claims that, “The ultimate objective of American PSYOP is<br />
to convince enemy, friendly, and neutral nations and forces to<br />
take action favorable to the U.S. and its allies”. 33 This objective<br />
is met by PSYOP at many different operational levels, in<br />
multiple phases of war, and in several types of war.<br />
As expressed by Pugmire, “Different levels of PSYOP<br />
have emerged that span the entire operational continuum”. 34<br />
These PSYOP levels include Strategic PSYOP, Operational<br />
PSYOP, and Tactical PSYOP. Strategic PSYOP are used to<br />
“influence foreign attitudes, perceptions, and behavior in<br />
favor of U.S. goals and objectives”. 35 Operational PSYOP<br />
are “conducted prior to, during war or conflict, and at the<br />
conclusion of open hostilities…to promote the effectiveness<br />
of the area commander’s campaigns and strategies”. 36 Tactical<br />
PSYOP are “conducted in the area assigned a tactical commander<br />
during conflict and war to support the tactical mission”.<br />
37 Goldstein goes into detail concerning both strategic<br />
and tactical uses of PSYOP. He asserts that “Strategic PSYOP<br />
are usually considered an aspect of public diplomacy and are<br />
normally established and guided by inter-government working<br />
groups created for a particular short-term situation or<br />
regional area of concern”. 38 Goldstein says that differing from<br />
strategic PSYOP, “In tactical or battlefield PSYOP, commanders<br />
use such techniques as loudspeaker broadcasts and leaflet<br />
drops with the intent of generating a force multiplier without<br />
having to increase force size”. 39 He further observes, “Psyopsers<br />
support tactical deception, counterterrorism, counterpropaganda,<br />
and other nontraditional means as the tactical situation<br />
merits”. 40<br />
The “operational continuum” expands with the<br />
multiple phases of war and types of conflict in which PSYOP<br />
may play a role. The three official phases are prior to, during,<br />
and after conflict or war. 41 It should be noted that war is not<br />
a prerequisite for the use of military PSYOP. PSYOP may<br />
be used in peacetime operations or in other types of conflict<br />
including conventional warfare, special operations, major<br />
military conflicts, and smaller, less intense military contingencies.<br />
Paddock emphasizes that “while PSYOP do have a<br />
mission in support of special operations, both in high-intensity<br />
conflicts and in low-intensity operations, they also have<br />
a much broader application in peacetime and crisis, with or<br />
without accompanying military operations, and across the<br />
entire spectrum of conflict”. 42 In another article, Paddock<br />
stresses that “First priority…must go to planning military<br />
PSYOP that will assist the unified commands- the combatant<br />
commands- and the conventional forces assigned to support<br />
them for various contingencies”. 43 Paddock includes a list of<br />
additional PSYOP roles that pertain to peacetime and lowintensity<br />
requirements:
Peacetime and low-intensity requirements…may<br />
include humanitarian assistance, peacekeeping,<br />
disaster relief, counter-drug operations, civic action,<br />
unscheduled studies and assessments oriented to<br />
crisis areas, advisory mobile training teams for the<br />
military forces of friendly nations, staff assistance to<br />
unified commands, counterterrorism, foreign internal<br />
defense, and support for DOD and non-DOD agencies.<br />
44<br />
This list proves that there are virtually no limits to the contributions<br />
PSYOP may make in military operations. Since<br />
there are so many possible PSYOP applications, there is great<br />
potential for a high demand for PSYOP in future contingency<br />
operations.<br />
The Current PSYOP <strong>Force</strong> Structure<br />
Despite the vast roles that PSYOP can play in warfare<br />
and other operations, the current U.S. PSYOP organization<br />
restricts PSYOP potential for future operations. The structure<br />
is limited by the small number of active duty members dedicated<br />
solely to PSYOP. The structure is also limited by the<br />
lack of organization among the U.S. military services. The<br />
different branches of the armed forces have individual PSYOP<br />
capabilities but their PSYOP responsibilities are not well<br />
defined and delineated from those of the other branches. The<br />
Army’s 4 th Psychological Operations Group (POG) at Fort<br />
Bragg is the only active duty group whose efforts are dedicated<br />
entirely to PSYOP. 45 The 4 th POG makes up 26 percent<br />
of all Army PSYOP units, while the remaining 74 percent is<br />
made up of reservists. 46<br />
“The majority of [delivery] expertise [resides] in the<br />
Army Reserve Components (RC),” explains Randall Bowdish,<br />
while the other Armed <strong>Force</strong>s branches have limited numbers<br />
of their own reserve or guard units dedicated to PSYOP. 47<br />
The other services have capabilities of their own to contribute<br />
to PSYOP:<br />
The <strong>Air</strong> <strong>Force</strong>’s radio and TV broadcast capability<br />
resides primarily in four EC-130 Commando Solo<br />
aircraft, assigned to the Pennsylvania <strong>Air</strong> National<br />
Guard…the Navy can produce audiovisual products<br />
from a host of imaging commands…and Marine<br />
Corps PSYOP support consists of shore-based loudspeaker<br />
broadcasting, aerial and artillery leaflet dissemination<br />
and audiovisual equipment. 48<br />
In addition to the aforementioned capabilities of the Marines,<br />
Navy, and <strong>Air</strong> <strong>Force</strong>, “A handful of <strong>Air</strong> <strong>Force</strong> officers with<br />
PSYOP expertise are serving in key positions in the Pentagon,<br />
among the unified commands, and at their Special Operations<br />
School at Hurlburt Field”. 49 Also, according to Paddock,<br />
34<br />
“The Marine Corps has two civil affairs groups with PSYOP<br />
as a secondary mission in its reserves”. 50 Despite the available<br />
capabilities of all four services, the Army and the <strong>Air</strong> <strong>Force</strong><br />
combined have the most capabilities to carry out PSYOP missions,<br />
as was demonstrated in both Operation Desert Storm<br />
and Operation Allied <strong>Force</strong>.<br />
While all four services have some PSYOP capabilities,<br />
their potential for successful PSYOP is retarded due to a continually<br />
“‘top-down’ centrally controlled, deliberate approach”<br />
to PSYOP and an “outdated Cold War strategy of force,”<br />
according to Steven Collins in Parameters, a professional journal<br />
published by the US Army War College. 51 Collins argues<br />
that while centralized control of PSYOP is good for “mid to<br />
high intensity” conflicts like Desert Storm, decentralized control<br />
would be more beneficial in the utilization of PSYOP in<br />
modern peacekeeping operations, since “tactical commanders<br />
need a high degree of local autonomy in order to be responsive”.<br />
52 The “Cold War strategy of force” refers to the focus<br />
on strategic PSYOP, rather than the more recently applicable<br />
tactical PSYOP.<br />
PSYOP Organization in Operation Desert Storm (Case Study)<br />
American PSYOP coalition efforts in Iraq during<br />
Operation Desert Storm were mainly tactical in nature and<br />
involved the combination of both ground and air components.<br />
53 There were four modes of delivery of PSYOP in<br />
Operations Desert Storm including radio transmissions,<br />
loudspeaker broadcasts, leaflet disseminations, and enemy<br />
prisoners of war (EPW) team actions. 54 The USAF and its<br />
EC-130 aircraft were responsible for the radio transmissions<br />
from the air, the 4 th POG was responsible for the loudspeaker<br />
broadcasts from the ground, and the leaflets for leaflet disseminations<br />
were prepared and packed into leaflet bombs by<br />
the Army and dropped out of <strong>Air</strong> <strong>Force</strong> aircraft. 55 The joint<br />
nature of PSYOP in the Gulf War is described in greater detail<br />
by Robert Adolph. Adolph mentions that “the 4 th PSYOP<br />
Group broadcast ‘Voice of the Gulf’ (VOG)…from fixed<br />
stations on the ground in Saudi Arabia and Turkey…and<br />
from specially modified <strong>Air</strong> <strong>Force</strong> EC-130 aircraft from the<br />
Pennsylvania <strong>Air</strong> National Guard, known as Volant Solo”. 56<br />
The Army also assisted the joint PSYOP coalition in leaflet<br />
drops with the Navy’s F/A-18 Hornet aircraft and the Marines<br />
“successfully directed a psychological operation over Faylaka<br />
Island in Kuwait Bay…with aid from a specially configured<br />
Marine helicopter mounted with a 2,700-watt loud speaker<br />
system…which [talked] enemy forces into laying down their<br />
weapons and surrendering en masse”. 57 The joint PSYOP<br />
coalition in Operation Desert Storm proved PSYOP to be<br />
very effective in fighting the war against Saddam’s regime.<br />
The temporary wartime organization of Army units and<br />
<strong>Air</strong> <strong>Force</strong> units, specifically, led to successful PSYOP that
esulted in 73 thousand Iraqis reached via PSYOP messages<br />
and 70 percent of the EPWs claimed that PSYOP messages<br />
had “impacted their surrender”. 58 A more tactical PSYOP<br />
approach proved successful in this operation.<br />
PSYOP Organization in Operation Deliberate <strong>Force</strong> (Case<br />
Study)<br />
Unlike Operation Desert Storm, Operation Deliberate<br />
<strong>Force</strong> was more focused on peacekeeping, thus there<br />
was even more need for “local autonomy” of the military<br />
commanders at a tactical PSYOP level, as noted above by<br />
Collins. 59 Collins claims that based on poor U.S. PSYOP<br />
performance in Bosnia, PSYOP needs to better “support<br />
tactical elements,” especially as the “U.S. military finds itself<br />
more involved in protracted struggles at the lower end of the<br />
spectrum of conflict,” for “low-intensity conflict is basically<br />
a struggle for people’s minds”. 60 Collins argues that three<br />
limitations beset PSYOP in Bosnia: 1) leaders’ inability to<br />
conduct an adequate reconnaissance or local media assessment<br />
before December 1995, 2) a lack of facilities and personnel in<br />
Sarajevo to conduct operations, and 3) a muddled policy with<br />
uncertain enforcement. 61 All of these issues relate to poor<br />
PSYOP organization and a poor definition of roles.<br />
PSYOP Organization in Operation Allied <strong>Force</strong> (OAF) (Case<br />
Study)<br />
PSYOP in OAF proved that a combined Army/<strong>Air</strong><br />
<strong>Force</strong> PSYOP coalition could deliver effective results in the<br />
war in Kosovo. The temporary organization of Army and<br />
<strong>Air</strong> <strong>Force</strong> PSYOP units under a joint command in Kosovo<br />
resulted in over 104.5 million dropped leaflets on Yugoslavia<br />
during OAF, according to Ellis of the 4 th POG at Fort Bragg. 62<br />
Once again, the Army’s 4 th POG and the <strong>Air</strong> <strong>Force</strong>’s EC-130s<br />
of the 193 rd Special Operations Wings, Pennsylvania <strong>Air</strong><br />
National Guard, combined efforts with the 7 th Special Operations<br />
Squadron in dropping leaflets that were intended to<br />
influence the Serbian people to turn against Slobodan Milosevic<br />
and his plans to purge Kosovo of the ethnic Albanians. 63<br />
The 193 rd also “assisted the PSYOP effort with airborne radio<br />
and television broadcasts”. 64 The beneficial results of PSYOP<br />
contributions during OAF determined that “PSYOP will<br />
continue to be a weapon of first choice as a combat and diplomatic<br />
multiplier and a combat reducer for future military<br />
operations”. 65 On the other hand, Robert Wall and David<br />
Fulgham argue that the “PSYOP tools” used in OAF were<br />
“largely ineffective,” for the “‘art’ of massaging the view of<br />
locals was not as successful as it might have been”. 66 This<br />
argument points to a significant difference of opinion on the<br />
success of PSYOP in OAF. Perhaps PSYOP was not used to<br />
its full potential in Kosovo due to its poor organization and<br />
ill-defined roles in the operation. This case study suggests<br />
that coalition organization of PSYOP has the potential to<br />
35<br />
reap positive results in military contingencies, but that it also<br />
requires that enhancement of PSYOP organization be considered<br />
and implemented in the future.<br />
PSYOP in Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF) and Operation<br />
Iraqi Freedom (OIF)<br />
(Case Study)<br />
Interestingly, Osama bin Laden has more successfully<br />
utilized PSYOP via media in the country of Afghanistan than<br />
the U.S. has utilized PSYOP in defeating bin Laden. According<br />
to James Poniewozik and others in “The Battle for Hearts<br />
and Minds,” bin Laden has manipulated the minds of the<br />
Afghani people to see America as the enemy of their Muslim<br />
faith and their country. 67 This is surely successful PSYOP, and<br />
much can be learned from bin Laden’s aggressive approach.<br />
While many pamphlets have been dropped into Afghanistan<br />
and Iraq and intensive broadcasts are being made, the people<br />
are not as receptive to PSYOP suggestions as they were in<br />
Operation Desert Storm or even the operations in the Balkans.<br />
It is essential that PSYOP groups understand the nature<br />
of the “sophisticated adversary” and the deep-seated attitudes<br />
of civilian audiences in countries like Afghanistan and Iraq. A<br />
more culturally informed and tailored tactical response by a<br />
PSYOP group would likely prove more successful.<br />
The Need to Modernize the PSYOP Organization<br />
While Operation Desert Storm, Operation Deliberate<br />
<strong>Force</strong>, and OAF showed combined forces PSYOP can be<br />
reasonably effective, it is evident that PSYOP organization<br />
needs to be modernized and structured in order to fully tap<br />
the potential of PSYOP in current and future military operations.<br />
As expressed by Paddock, there is a “need to modernize<br />
our PSYOP force structure, both in terms of personnel<br />
and equipment…not surprisingly, a considerable shortfall in<br />
PSYOP forces exists”. 68 Adolph agrees, saying that “America’s<br />
only active PSYOP organization is stretched to the limit…<br />
more force structure and fully trained personnel are required<br />
in the active component to accomplish the mission”. 69 The<br />
4 th POG is not capable of handling all PSYOP in the future<br />
as U.S. military contingencies expand. As emphasized by<br />
Adolph, “Even in time of peace, the operational tempo of the<br />
4 th PSYOP Group is one of the most demanding in any of<br />
the services, in that it provides support to all levels of DOD,<br />
and to special operations forces and conventional forces”. 70 In<br />
order to utilize PSYOP to its full potential, a larger, structured<br />
organization is needed. Bowdish calls for “a full-time cadre<br />
of PSYOP personnel,” perhaps a joint PSYOP unit with the<br />
necessary number of people to be prepared for all types of<br />
PSYOP, all over the world, at any given time. 71<br />
Current PSYOP Organizational Recommendations<br />
Several recommendations for future PSYOP organization<br />
already exist. Paddock claims that “three broad areas
must be addressed if the PSYOP community is to emerge<br />
from this period of transition to play a viable role in our<br />
nation’s security”: (1) education of senior civilian and military<br />
officials on the value of the psychological dimension; (2) planning<br />
for the use of military PSYOP in a changing world; and<br />
(3) continued modernization of the PSYOP force structure. 72<br />
Paddock’s PSYOP plan calls for a structured organization that<br />
can conduct psychological operations in a time of increasing<br />
resort to the military instrument of power. He challenges the<br />
military community to question whether full PSYOP organizational<br />
potential has been reached.<br />
Brooks makes some similar PSYOP recommendations.<br />
Brooks believes that in the future “we will be faced<br />
with ‘asymmetric’ multi-echeloned adversaries”. 73 These<br />
adversaries “will be more likely to attack our interests using<br />
information technology rather than traditional military<br />
means” and Brooks claims that PSYOP are necessary to<br />
counter that form of an offensive against the U.S. 74 In order<br />
to best modernize U.S. PSYOP forces, Brooks argues that<br />
PSYOP must select and retain quality people, provide quality<br />
training, focus on core PSYOP capabilities, and ensure a<br />
seamless information effort by designing an organization that<br />
can coordinate PSYOP efforts at the strategic, operational,<br />
and tactical levels. 75 The “seamless integration” requires<br />
that PSYOP forces “foster active and habitual relationships<br />
between agencies, between services, and between the active<br />
and reserve components”. 76 Like Paddock, Brooks is calling for<br />
the design of a PSYOP organization that can successfully span<br />
the “operational continuum” of future PSYOP contingencies.<br />
Another recommendation from both Collins and<br />
Maiers/Rahn is that the “PSYOP Task <strong>Force</strong> is on par with<br />
other Joint Task <strong>Force</strong> (JTF) component commanders and<br />
should be under the direct operational control of the Joint<br />
<strong>Force</strong>s Commander, rather than a sub-entity of the component<br />
commanders. Collins refers to this poor organization of<br />
PSYOP as due to the “lack of rank,” saying that the PSYOP<br />
Task <strong>Force</strong> is “on par with the other Joint Task <strong>Force</strong> component<br />
commanders and should be under the direct operational<br />
control of the Joint <strong>Force</strong>s Commander”. 77 Maiers/Rahn also<br />
suggest that PSYOP is not properly integrated into the overarching<br />
JTF plans and that information operations should<br />
be organized under a “centralized commander to coordinate<br />
activities on the JTF level”. 78 They recommend a joint information<br />
operations task force (JIOTF) that would be “critical<br />
[in] establishing and maintaining the knowledge superiority<br />
needed to execute rapid decisive operations” in an efficient<br />
and well-organized PSYOP community. 79<br />
THESIS BODY<br />
Modern psychological operations are based on a joint<br />
perspective due to the broad spectrum of operations to which<br />
36<br />
PSYOP is applicable and the overall joint nature of warfare<br />
in military contingencies today. According to the Doctrine<br />
for Joint Psychological Operations (JP 3-53), which “addresses<br />
military [PSYOP] planning, and execution in support of<br />
joint, multinational, and interagency efforts across the range<br />
of military operations”, the joint psychological operations<br />
task force (JPOTF) is considered a “subordinate joint command<br />
of a joint force” that has “coordinating authority with<br />
tactical forces for developing, producing, and disseminating<br />
PSYOP products”. 80 The joint nature of PSYOP imposes<br />
complex organizational challenges. Despite the current focus<br />
on the implementation of PSYOP tactics in modern American<br />
warfare, there is still much confusion as to the command<br />
structure and responsibility for PSYOP actions. The military<br />
is recognizing that PSYOP should be more decentralized and<br />
tactical, with responsibility devolving to commanders at the<br />
operational level. Decentralization of PSYOP will allow the<br />
U.S. military to more effectively face an unpredictable security<br />
environment characterized by counterterrorism operations<br />
and other contingencies requiring the measured application<br />
of force. It is also essential that PSYOP become more of<br />
a focus in all branches of the military, so that self-contained<br />
Army, <strong>Air</strong> <strong>Force</strong>, or Navy PSYOP units have the ability to<br />
wage psychological warfare against an enemy at the tactical<br />
level, with the supplies and capabilities specific to the PSYOP<br />
needs at that level.<br />
Currently, the Secretary of Defense delegates PSYOP<br />
product approval and dissemination to combatant commanders,<br />
who in turn may delegate PSYOP product approval to<br />
a joint task force (JTF) commander, but no lower than that<br />
without Secretary of Defense approval. 81 This highly centralized<br />
PSYOP organization inhibits PSYOP from being utilized<br />
at its greatest potential efficiency. In particular, the centralized<br />
approach to PSYOP prevents operational commanders<br />
from having effective authority to use PSYOP in a way that<br />
responds to the unique circumstances that confront them.<br />
According to Collins, the product approval delegation is “satisfactory<br />
in a quickly evolving mid- to high-intensity conflict<br />
like Desert Storm where the focus is the decisive application<br />
of maneuver and firepower, but in a peacekeeping operation,<br />
where tactical commanders need a high degree of local autonomy<br />
in order to be responsive, it creates great difficulties”. 82<br />
Today, the U.S. military faces more and more peacekeeping<br />
and low-intensity conflicts, so the need for PSYOP delegation<br />
to operational commanders and tactical levels is critical. As<br />
suggested by Collins, U.S. joint forces should “loosen PSYOP<br />
policy and doctrine when operating in low-intensity conflicts,<br />
giving tactical commanders the latitude to conduct their own<br />
PSYOP plan, within given constraints […]; theater-level<br />
PSYOP must remain the prerogative of the Joint <strong>Force</strong>s Com-
mander or Geographic Combatant Commander”. 83<br />
In order to improve PSYOP capabilities and utilization<br />
in modern war it is critical that the military stop treating<br />
PSYOP as a purely strategic-level consideration. Rather,<br />
PSYOP should be commanded and executed at a decentralized<br />
level best suited to operations in a certain region or<br />
conflict. Doctrine for Joint Psychological Operations (JP 3-53),<br />
states that “because of the strategic and operational importance<br />
of the PSYOP contribution to the combatant commander’s<br />
strategic concept, centralized planning of PSYOP<br />
should be focused at that level”. 84 While PSYOP should<br />
have a strategic impact, they are most successful when they<br />
are immediate and responsive to specific action in a theater,<br />
which can only occur when component commanders have<br />
access to PSYOP when needed. Currently, in most command<br />
structures joint operational control of PSYOP falls under the<br />
Geographic Combatant Commander and the Joint Task <strong>Force</strong><br />
(JTF) Commander, as depicted in the figure below (See figure<br />
1). 85<br />
Figure 1. Current joint force organization chart from Joint<br />
Pub 3-53, 2003.<br />
Referred to as the Joint Psychological Operations Task <strong>Force</strong><br />
(JPOTF), joint PSYOP are often overlooked until a crisis<br />
occurs and the need for PSYOP arises. Instead of giving the<br />
JTF Commander control over accessions of required PSYOP<br />
personnel in an area of operations, the Combatant Commander<br />
is in charge of attaching PSYOP forces to subordinate<br />
component commanders to enhance PSYOP planning<br />
and capability. 86 Ideally, the transfer of operational control<br />
of the JPOTF from the Combatant Commander to the JTF<br />
Commander would allow PSYOP to be more readily used at<br />
the operational and tactical levels. Rather than just giving<br />
the JTF Commander control over JPOTF exercises, the JTF<br />
Commander could directly oversee PSYOP action in the area<br />
of operations.<br />
37<br />
Figure 2. Recommended joint force organization.<br />
In order to remedy the situation and promote efficiency<br />
in the use of PSYOP, this study finds that the JTF<br />
Commander should be placed directly in control of the<br />
JPOTF, making it an equivalent component to, rather than a<br />
sub-component of, the component commanders (As shown<br />
in figure 2). In support of this recommendation, Capt Mary<br />
Cohen, Chief of Influence Operations of the 7 th Information<br />
Warfare Flight at Osan AFB, Korea, emphasizes that “control<br />
of how PSYOP is planned and implemented needs to rest<br />
with theater/JTF commanders.” 87 This structure change will<br />
not be an easy feat, for it would require the officer in charge<br />
of the JPOTF, currently a staff section within the JTF command,<br />
to become equivalent in rank to the air, land, sea, and<br />
marine component commanders. The issue, as explained by<br />
Collins, is “that the limited rank structure in PSYOP often<br />
leads to the PSYOP Task <strong>Force</strong> being under the command<br />
of a lieutenant colonel, or, at best, a colonel” since there is a<br />
“reluctance to treat a field grade officer on a par with a flag<br />
officer exercising land, air, or sea component command”. 88<br />
Typically a Joint Task <strong>Force</strong> staff section job does not merit<br />
the rank of general. However, the critical nature of PSYOP in<br />
current contingencies raises its importance in war fighting and<br />
there should be a certain sense of urgency in making sure that<br />
proper attention is given to PSYOP by the JTF commander.<br />
It is essential that PSYOP be prepared and practiced<br />
like all other military operations before crises occur. As<br />
expressed by Mark Maiers and Timothy Rahn in “Information<br />
Operations and Millennium Challenge,” information<br />
operations, including PSYOP, “cannot be simply an afterthought<br />
addressed immediately before a conflict […] shaping<br />
and influencing activities must occur continuously throughout<br />
peace, crisis, and combat, [for] it is almost impossible to<br />
change a popular negative view of JTF efforts once shots are<br />
fired”. 89 In the current organization, the JPOTF is not adequately<br />
linked to the component commanders, which leads<br />
to an inefficient use of PSYOP. According to Collins in his<br />
assessment of Army PSYOP in Bosnia, the lack of imbedded<br />
PSYOP troops in the Geographic Combatant Commander’s<br />
area of responsibility led to a lack of “intangible physical and<br />
mental links between the supported [combatant commander]<br />
and the regional PSYOP battalion,” because this relationship<br />
is rarely forged before a crisis occurs. 90 The integration of<br />
PSYOP in theater operations should not be an afterthought.<br />
Instead, PSYOP should be considered essential before conflict<br />
arises and the necessary PSYOP experts and trained personnel<br />
should already have a relationship with other component<br />
forces.<br />
The transfer of command authority from the Com-
atant Commander to the JTF Commander and emphasis on<br />
planning and practicing PSYOP prior to a crisis have already<br />
been successfully implemented at Osan AFB, Korea. Due to<br />
the urgent nature of being prepared in a theater that is always<br />
on the brink of potential war, PSYOP is practiced in six different<br />
exercises per year at Osan AFB. According to an <strong>Air</strong><br />
<strong>Force</strong> PSYOP specialist currently assigned to Osan, “PSYOP<br />
has not become a forgotten form of warfare here, [at Osan],”<br />
for Korea’s JTF PSYOP preparation is an “example of good<br />
organization and ever-present need to conduct PSYOP planning<br />
and targeting”. 91 The PSYOP task force at Osan is<br />
called the Combined Psychological Operations Task <strong>Force</strong><br />
(CPOTF), which “has equal footing with the other components<br />
at targeting and planning meetings and is headed by<br />
an active duty O-6, equivalent rank to the ground, air, navy,<br />
marine and special forces component commanders” of Joint<br />
Task <strong>Force</strong> Korea. 92 The fact that the CPOTF commander<br />
holds a rank equivalent to the other component commanders<br />
signals the emphasis on PSYOP in the Korean AOR. CPOTF<br />
is in charge of all PSYOP tasking and implementation, so the<br />
other components must funnel all PSYOP requests through<br />
the CPOTF. 93<br />
This PSYOP organization has proven to be very<br />
successful in Korea and could be used as a model for a<br />
new perspective on PSYOP organization in other theaters.<br />
The CPOTF at Osan suggests that PYSOP reorganization<br />
- moving the CPOTF from its traditional place under the<br />
component commanders to a position equivalent to that of<br />
the other component commanders - is possible and effective.<br />
Capt Cohen credits the efficiency of this organization to the<br />
fact that control of PSYOP is placed at a theater level where<br />
the “Combined <strong>Force</strong>s Commander (Geographic Combatant<br />
Commander) in theater is the person with ultimate control<br />
over what is said and what effects need to be achieved”. 94<br />
This leadership organization is guarded from “risky off-peninsula<br />
concepts as much as possible,” due to the decentralization<br />
of PSYOP at JTF Korea. 95 Their JTF Commander has<br />
chosen to not adopt the traditional form of PSYOP organization<br />
used in other U.S. military commands. Rather, he has<br />
delegated PSYOP control for all influence operations in Korea<br />
to the CPOTF, and the results have proven effective. Other<br />
commands should follow the example of PSYOP organization<br />
at Osan AFB, Korea, in order to be as well prepared for using<br />
PSYOP in warfare.<br />
Another issue that needs to be addressed in the<br />
PSYOP community is the lack of organizational consistency<br />
across military services. The Army, <strong>Air</strong> <strong>Force</strong>, and Navy all<br />
have their own PSYOP structure, but each service varies in<br />
how it implements PSYOP at the strategic, operational, and<br />
tactical levels. With the evolving joint nature of warfare it is<br />
38<br />
necessary to make sure these PSYOP forces can work together<br />
under the designated Geographic Combatant Commander.<br />
While the different services may have different PSYOP<br />
responsibilities, they should be tactically compatible with each<br />
other and PSYOP practitioners should understand the roles<br />
and capabilities of their sister service counterparts. Knowing<br />
what each service contributes to the broad PSYOP picture<br />
allows for better implementation, and can also help distinguish<br />
what capabilities are missing.<br />
Even in a joint atmosphere, the branches can be<br />
quite different. At Osan AFB, Korea, the <strong>Air</strong> <strong>Force</strong> considers<br />
PSYOP to be a part of Information Operations (IO) while the<br />
Army considers PSYOP an entirely separate entity from IO,<br />
according to Capt Celina Croteau, who was previously the<br />
<strong>Air</strong> <strong>Force</strong> PSYOP Planner in Korea and is now a member of<br />
the 381 st Information Squadron at Elmendorf AFB, Alaska. 96<br />
She adds that the <strong>Air</strong> <strong>Force</strong> tends to look at the “big picture<br />
without focusing on technical details” even to the extent that<br />
<strong>Air</strong> <strong>Force</strong> PSYOP practitioners do not possess a specific <strong>Air</strong><br />
<strong>Force</strong> Specialty Code (AFSC) which, in turn, leads to a lack<br />
of clearly stated training requirements. 97 In relation to her<br />
own experience as the only <strong>Air</strong> <strong>Force</strong> PSYOP planner at Osan<br />
AFB, Capt Croteau said “I could coordinate efforts and plans,<br />
but I would never have been able to actually conduct PSYOP<br />
on my own.” 98<br />
In contrast, the Army PSYOP components in joint<br />
commands are much more self-contained and self-sufficient<br />
in carrying out operations. In Korea the Army had a cell<br />
with the responsibility and capability of carrying out PSYOP<br />
efforts until reservists arrived to back them up. According to<br />
Croteau, the Army is very different in that it is more technically<br />
oriented, focusing on “the hands-on training aspects of<br />
how to conduct PSYOP – how to design the most effective<br />
leaflets and use broadcast media”. 99 Based on the lack of technical<br />
PSYOP training in the <strong>Air</strong> <strong>Force</strong>, Capt Cohen suggests<br />
from her experience that even though <strong>Air</strong> <strong>Force</strong> PYSOP personnel<br />
may believe they are actively participating in PSYOP,<br />
they are more in charge of “research or support [of PSYOP]<br />
than actual planning/implementation [of PSYOP]”. 100<br />
Based on the reports from these individuals’ experiences<br />
in joint PSYOP situations, it is apparent that there<br />
should be some efforts, especially on the <strong>Air</strong> <strong>Force</strong>’s part, to<br />
become more familiar with the tactical side of PSYOP. Following<br />
the example of current Army PSYOP organization,<br />
the <strong>Air</strong> <strong>Force</strong> should strive to become more self-sufficient<br />
and better able to better utilize PSYOP independently, at<br />
least until additional PYSOP forces are available for support.<br />
Organizationally, <strong>Air</strong> <strong>Force</strong> PSYOP units should include<br />
more active duty personnel with a high order of specialized<br />
expertise, including planning, implementation, research, and
support operations. Instead of being in the same situation<br />
as Capt Croteau, whose role was limited only to coordinating<br />
and planning PSYOP at Osan AFB, <strong>Air</strong> <strong>Force</strong> personnel<br />
could potentially participate in active PSYOP implementation<br />
as is the case with Army PSYOP members. In order to create<br />
and sustain this enhanced focus on PSYOP in the <strong>Air</strong> <strong>Force</strong>,<br />
it is proposed that PSYOP become an official AFSC. This<br />
step would promote formal training for the creation of true<br />
PSYOP specialists, rather than relying on personnel drawn<br />
from kindred AFSCs, such as intelligence or public affairs.<br />
In addition to further expanding the <strong>Air</strong> <strong>Force</strong>’s role<br />
in PSYOP implementation, it is further recommended that<br />
the Marine Corps be better equipped to execute PSYOP missions.<br />
Due to their typically close contact with adversary<br />
forces and civilian populations, Marines have the potential to<br />
drastically influence the perception of U.S. military forces in<br />
foreign countries and intimidate enemy troops, persuading<br />
them to not fight against American troops. According to the<br />
Doctrine for Joint Psychological Operations, the Marine Corps<br />
currently does not possess a formal PSYOP organization<br />
structure, although it is recognized as possessing the “capability<br />
to execute […] actions designed to convey specific impressions<br />
to an adversary”. 101 Like the U.S. Army, the Marine<br />
Corps should offer PSYOP-specific training and develop<br />
specialists with linguistic abilities and cultural knowledge of<br />
specific regions. Such specialists could then be attached to<br />
tactical battalions, supporting special operations and conventional<br />
task forces, a practice that has proven successful for the<br />
Army. 102 Army and Marine Corps forces arguably could work<br />
together more readily than any of the other branches combined,<br />
because their support needs are similar. Going a step<br />
further, joint Marine and Army PSYOP groups could be utilized<br />
effectively in several regions in which the U.S. military is<br />
involved today.<br />
While the Navy does have some PSYOP capabilities,<br />
mainly “audiovisual products”, the sea service is more<br />
limited when it comes to the actual tactical employment of<br />
PSYOP. The Navy has the capability to produce PSYOP<br />
documents and posters that can be distributed to other<br />
PSYOP forces for use. It also has the TARBS radio station<br />
that broadcasts messages from ship to land and several aircraft<br />
that support the PSYOP mission. 103 While this is evidence<br />
that the Navy has played a role in joint PSYOP over the years,<br />
its PSYOP capabilities are largely untapped. This potential<br />
could be exploited by creating tactical Naval PSYOP groups,<br />
similar to the existing Army groups, which are able to assist<br />
component commanders in joint situations.<br />
Of all the services, the Army has best exploited<br />
the potential of PSYOP. As the only service with an active<br />
PSYOP unit, the Army has a proven tactical PSYOP capabil-<br />
39<br />
ity. The <strong>Air</strong> <strong>Force</strong>, Navy, and Marine Corps would do well to<br />
embrace the Army PSYOP model. The Army has recognized<br />
a need for PSYOP in our current military endeavors, and the<br />
<strong>Air</strong> <strong>Force</strong> regularly supports those Army units. There is a<br />
great need to tap this joint potential of PSYOP, which would<br />
allow the services to quickly join and unite tactically against<br />
the enemy. The more prepared each individual service is<br />
for PSYOP, the better prepared each will be to support each<br />
other. The coordination of PSYOP at the tactical level, by the<br />
JTF Commander and JPOTF Commander, will allow PSYOP<br />
to be utilized efficiently and appropriately for the current situation.<br />
PSYOP will reach its optimum potential, becoming a<br />
more recognized and more utilized form of warfare.<br />
CONCLUSION<br />
The role of PSYOP in modern warfare is critical<br />
for influencing the enemy or foreign populations. Recent<br />
operations have shown that tactical level PSYOP can greatly<br />
contribute to joint success. The likelihood of continued US<br />
involvement is a variety of contingency operations--from<br />
peacekeeping missions to special operations to major military<br />
conflicts--underscores the need to strengthen US PSYOP<br />
capabilities. The diverse nature of PSYOP makes it an effective<br />
tactic at all levels of warfare – strategic, operational, and<br />
tactical. The effective organization of PSYOP resources can<br />
be expected to enhance the role and effectiveness of PSYOP<br />
in the future warfare. PSYOP will become more capable of<br />
targeting the enemy’s mind because of an emphasis on tactical<br />
operations tailored to a specific area of operations.<br />
The best way to ensure that PSYOP meets its full<br />
potential is to enable commanders to plan, coordinate, and<br />
implement PSYOP at decentralized and more tacticallyfocused<br />
levels. Especially within a Geographic Combatant<br />
Command, it is essential that the JTF Commander be given<br />
authority over PSYOP planning and employment within the<br />
theater of operations. PSYOP may then be better utilized<br />
in conjunction with other JTF operations. It is also recommended<br />
that the JPOTF hold a position equivalent to the<br />
component commanders under the JTF Commander. This<br />
would elevate PSYOP from a subordinate staff section of the<br />
JTF command to a more substantial organization headed by<br />
a colonel or officer of equivalent rank to that of component<br />
command officers. Coordination and communication would<br />
become greatly facilitated if component commands and the<br />
JPOTF held equal rank.. The current PSYOP organization<br />
at Osan AFB should be used as a model for other commands<br />
because of the successful planning, preparation, and practice<br />
of PSYOP encouraged by JTF Korea. Decentralizing planning<br />
and implementation of PSYOP to the theater JTF commanders<br />
at Osan AFB has created an ideal and very effective<br />
PSYOP organization. Additionally, each U.S. military service
should prepare itself to better utilize PSYOP as the need for<br />
this tactic increases, especially in operations at the lower end<br />
of the spectrum of warfare. Following the model of Army<br />
PSYOP, the <strong>Air</strong> <strong>Force</strong> should create its own PSYOP AFSC.<br />
That would be the first necessary step to produce airmen<br />
capable of planning and implementing PSYOP. Moreover,<br />
the Marine Corps and Navy should also devote more attention<br />
to PSYOP and its potential for contributing to joint<br />
operations.<br />
The efficient organization of PSYOP is crucial<br />
because of PSYOP’s ever increasing role in military operations<br />
today and in all likelihood, the future. In response to<br />
the thesis question: “Has the U.S. military developed the<br />
optimum organizational potential for the delivery of psychological<br />
operations in an era of expanding contingency operations?”<br />
the answer is the U.S. military has yet to achieve its<br />
full PSYOP potential. Overall, current PSYOP organization<br />
is not meeting operational requirements.<br />
As we have seen, a well organized and highly trained<br />
PSYOP force can be expected to increase prospects for future<br />
military success. The recommendations set forth above are<br />
reasonable and should be implemented to better utilize U.S.<br />
PSYOP forces and capabilities. A tactically-based PSYOP<br />
focus will promote the most effective use of PSYOP. In addition,<br />
decisive and purposeful planning and practice of PSYOP<br />
prior to a conflict will promote a higher level of operational<br />
effectiveness when hostilities commence. With the excellent<br />
examples of the Korean JTF model to draw upon, the U.S.<br />
military should take timely action to strengthen its PSYOP<br />
capabilities.<br />
Future research on this topic will be essential in order<br />
to determine the optimum organizational arrangements for<br />
PSYOP. The arguments proposed in this thesis are based<br />
entirely on unclassified research and the author’s limited interaction<br />
with current PSYOP practitioners. As a cadet who<br />
has yet to experience PSYOP on a firsthand basis, this writer<br />
nevertheless does recognize the vast importance of PSYOP<br />
in modern warfare. In addition to considering the PSYOP<br />
structure adopted by JTF Korea, future research on this topic<br />
should include careful examination of other joint PSYOP<br />
offices for possible alternative organizational constructs.<br />
Needless to say, many other key questions concerning PSYOP<br />
cannot be addressed without access to classified information.<br />
In conclusion, a fully capable PSYOP force can<br />
have a lasting impact on adversary behavior. Accordingly, an<br />
effective PSYOP organization will be critical to future military<br />
success. Effective PSYOP can subdue the enemy’s mind in<br />
a manner that promotes military success without physically<br />
striking the enemy. As stated by German Field Marshall Carl<br />
Gustav Baron von Mannerheim, “For a strong adversary the<br />
40<br />
opposition of twenty-four squadrons and twelve guns ought<br />
not to have appeared very serious, but in war the psychological<br />
factors are often decisive. An adversary who feels inferior<br />
is in reality so”. 104<br />
BIBLIOGRAPHY<br />
Adolph, Robert B., Jr. “PSYOP: Gulf War <strong>Force</strong> Multiplier.”<br />
Army 42 (December 1992): 16-22.<br />
Bowish, Randall G. “Information-Age Psychological Operations.”<br />
Military Review 78<br />
(December-February 1999): 29-34.<br />
Brooks, Paul R.M. “A Vision for PSYOP in the Information<br />
Age.” Special Warfare 13 (Winter<br />
2000): 20-24.<br />
Cohen, Mary E, to author, 3 February 2005. Emailed letter<br />
held by author.<br />
Collins, Steven. “Army PSYOP in Bosnia: Capabilities and<br />
Constraints.” Parameters: U.S. Army<br />
War College 29 (Summer 1999).<br />
Croteau, Celina, to author, 5 February 2005. Emailed letter<br />
held by author.<br />
Ellis, J.O. Psychological Operations Support to Operation Allied<br />
<strong>Force</strong>. Fort Bragg, NC: 4 th<br />
POG, 1999.<br />
Goldstein, Frank L. and Daniel W. Jacobowitz. “Psychological<br />
Operations: An Introduction,” in<br />
Psychological Operations: Principles and Case Studies,<br />
ed. Frank L. Goldstein and Benjamin F. Findley, Jr.<br />
Maxwell AFB, AL: <strong>Air</strong> University Press, 1996, 5-24.<br />
____________________________________. “PSYOP in<br />
Desert Shield/Desert Storm,” in<br />
Psychological Operations: Principles and Case Studies,<br />
ed. Frank L. Goldstein and Benjamin F. Findley, Jr.<br />
Maxwell AFB, AL: <strong>Air</strong> University Press, 1996, 341-<br />
355.<br />
Joint Chiefs of Staff. Doctrine for Joint Psychological Operations,<br />
Joint Pub 3-53. Washington,<br />
D.C. 10 July 1996.<br />
Joint Chiefs of Staff. Doctrine for Joint Psychological Opera-
tions, Joint Pub 3-35. Washington,<br />
D.C. 5 September 2003.<br />
Maiers, Mark W. and Timothy L. Rahn. “Information Operations<br />
and Millennium Challege.”<br />
Joint <strong>Force</strong>s Quarterly 35 (Autumn 2004): 83-87.<br />
Paddock, Alfred H., Jr. “No More Tactical Information<br />
Detachments: U.S. Military<br />
Psychological Operations in Transition,” in Psychological<br />
Operations: Principles and Case Studies, ed. Frank<br />
L. Goldstein and Benjamin F. Findley, Jr. Maxwell<br />
AFB, AL: <strong>Air</strong> University Press, 1996, 26-50.<br />
_______________. “U.S. Military Psychological Operations:<br />
Past, Present, and Future,” in<br />
Psychological Operations and Political Warfare in Longterm<br />
Strategic Planning, ed. Janos Radvanyi. New<br />
York: Praeger Publishers, 1990, 19-35.<br />
Poniewozik, James, et al. “The Battle for Hearts and Minds.”<br />
Time Europe 158 (October 2001).<br />
Pugmire, Brian M. “Psychological Operations: Will the Real<br />
Approval Authority Please Stand<br />
Up?” Naval War College Thesis. Newport, RI: Naval<br />
War College, 2002.<br />
Radvanyi, Janos. “Introduction to PSYOP,” in Psychological<br />
Operations and Political Warfare<br />
in Long-term Strategic Planning, ed. Janos Radvanyi.<br />
New York: Praeger Publishers, 1990, 1-7.<br />
Rodgers, James L. “Information Warfare: Nothing New<br />
Under the Sun.” Marine Corps Gazette<br />
81 (April 1997): 23-29.<br />
Wall, Robert and David Fulgham. “Putting the Spin on<br />
Modern War.” Aviation Week and Space<br />
Technology 154 (February 2001).<br />
4 th Psychological Operations Group [on-line]. available from<br />
http://www.psywarriors.com/4thpog.html; Internet;<br />
accessed 12 September 2003.<br />
39 th Information Operations Squadron [on-line]. Hurlburt<br />
Field AFB, FL; available from<br />
http://www.hurlburt.af.mil; Internet; accessed 12<br />
September 2003.<br />
41<br />
(Endnotes)<br />
1 Brian M. Pugmire, “Psychological Operations: Will the Real<br />
Approval Authority Please Stand Up?,” Thesis (Naval War<br />
College, 2002), 1.<br />
2 Alfred H. Paddock, “No More Tactical Information<br />
Detachments: U.S. Military Psychological Operations in<br />
Transition,” in Psychological Operations: Principles and Case<br />
Studies (Maxwell AFB, AL: <strong>Air</strong> University Press 1996), 20.<br />
3 Paul R.M. Brooks, “A Vision for PSYOP in the Information<br />
Age,” Special Warfare 13 (Winter 2000): 21.<br />
4 Frank L. Goldstien and Daniel W. Jacobowitz,<br />
“Psychological Operations,” in Psychological Operations:<br />
Principles and Case Studies (Maxwell AFB, AL: <strong>Air</strong> University<br />
Press, 1996), 11.<br />
5 Paddock, “No More Tactical Information,” 26.<br />
6 Ibid., 35.<br />
7 th 4 Psychological Operations Group [on-line]. available from<br />
http://www.psywarriors.com/4thpog.html; Internet; accessed<br />
12 September 2003.<br />
8 Randall G. Bowdish, “Information-Age Psychological<br />
Operations,” Military Review 78 (December-February 1999):<br />
30.<br />
9 th 39 Information Operations Squadron [on-line]. Hurlburt<br />
Field AFB, FL; available from http://www.hurlburt.af.mil;<br />
Internet; accessed 12 September 2003.<br />
10 Brooks, “A Vision,” 21.<br />
11 Pugmire, “Psychological Operations,” 3.<br />
12 Paddock, “No More Tactical,” 47.<br />
13 Joint Chiefs of Staff, Doctrine for Joint Psychological<br />
Operations, Joint Publication 3-53 (Washington, DC: 10 July<br />
1996): GL-6.<br />
14 Mark W. Maiers and Timothy L. Rahn, “Information<br />
Operations and Millennium Challenge,” Joint <strong>Force</strong>s Quarterly<br />
35 (Autumn 2004): 83.<br />
15 Joint Chiefs of Staff, Doctrine for Joint Psychological<br />
Operations, 1996, ix.<br />
16 Pugmire, “Psychological Operations,” 3.<br />
17 Ibid., 3.<br />
18 Ibid., 3.<br />
19 Janos Radvanyi, “ Introduction to Psyops,” in Psychological<br />
Operations and Political Warfare in Long-term Strategic<br />
Planning (New York: Praeger Publishers, 1990), 1.<br />
20 James L. Rodgers, “Information Warfare: Nothing New
Under the Sun,” Marine Corps Gazette 81 (April 1997): 24.<br />
21 J.O. Ellis, Psychological Operations Support to Operation<br />
Allied <strong>Force</strong> (Fort Bragg: 4th Psychological Group, 14 July<br />
1999), 5.<br />
22 Goldstein, “Psychological Operations,” 15.<br />
23 Ibid., 13. According to Goldstein, during the Battle of<br />
Bunker Hill PSYOP leaflets were used to try and persuade<br />
British soldiers to switch sides. These leaflets were distributed<br />
by colonials and tempted the British soldiers with reports that<br />
food and provisions were better on the Patriot side. Some<br />
leaflets also mentioned the farmland available to British<br />
soldiers who left the fight.<br />
24 Ibid., 13.<br />
25 Ibid., 13.<br />
26 Ibid., 14.<br />
27 Ibid., 14.<br />
28 Ibid., 14.<br />
29 Alfred H. Paddock, “U.S. Military Psychological<br />
Operations: Past, Present, and Future,” in Psychological<br />
Operations and Political Warfare in Long-term Strategic<br />
Planning (New York: Praeger, 1990), 35.<br />
30 Radvanyi, “Introduction to Psyops,” 1.<br />
31 Paddock, “U.S. Military,” 19.<br />
32 Pugmire, “Psychological Operations,” 1.<br />
33 Goldstein, “Psychological Operations,” 5.<br />
34 Pugmire, “Psychological Operations,” 2.<br />
35 Ibid., 3.<br />
36 Ibid., 3.<br />
37 Ibid., 3.<br />
38 Goldstein, “Psychological Operations,” 10.<br />
39 Ibid., 10.<br />
40 Ibid., 10.<br />
41 Pugmire, “Psychological Operation,” 3.<br />
42 Paddock, “U.S. Military,” 29.<br />
43 Paddock, “No More,” 47.<br />
44 Ibid., 47.<br />
45 Ibid., 35.<br />
46 th 4 Psychological Operations Group, 1.<br />
47 Bowdish, “Information Age,” 30.<br />
48 Ibid., 30.<br />
49 Paddock, “No More,” 34.<br />
50 Ibid., 34.<br />
51 Steven Collins, “Army PSYOP in Bosnia: Capabilities and<br />
Constraints,” Parameter, 29 (Summer 99).<br />
52 Ibid.<br />
53 Frank L. Goldstein and Daniel W. Jacobowitz, “PSYOP<br />
in Desert Shield/Desert Storm,” in Psychological Operations:<br />
Principles and Case Studies, ed. Frank L. Goldstein and<br />
Benjamin F. Findley, Jr. (Maxwell AFB: <strong>Air</strong> University Press,<br />
1996), 349.<br />
42<br />
54 Ibid., 349.<br />
55 Ibid., 350-355.<br />
56 Robert B. Adolph, “PSYOP: Gulf War <strong>Force</strong> Multiplier,”<br />
Army 42 (December 1992): 18.<br />
57 Ibid., 19.<br />
58 Goldstein, “PSYOP,” 349.<br />
59 Collins, “Army PSYOP in Bosnia,” 2.<br />
60 Ibid.<br />
61 Ibid.<br />
62 Ellis, Psychological Operatons, 18.<br />
63 Ibid., 2.<br />
64 Ibid., 2.<br />
65 Ibid., 17.<br />
66 Robert Wade and David Fulgham, “Putting the Spin<br />
on Modern War,” Aviation Week and Space Technology 154<br />
(February 2001).<br />
67 James Pniewozik, et al. “The Battle for Hearts and Minds,”<br />
Time Europe 158 (October 2001).<br />
68 Paddock, “U.S. Military,” 26.<br />
69 Adolph, “PSYOP: Gulf War,” 22.<br />
70 Ibid., 21.<br />
71 Bowdish, “Information Age,” 37.<br />
72 Paddock, “No More,” 44.<br />
73 Brooks, “A Vision,” 20.<br />
74 Ibid., 20.<br />
75 Ibid., 21.<br />
76 Ibid., 23.<br />
77 Collins, “Army PSYOP in Bosnia,” 2.<br />
78 Maiers, “Information Operations and Millennium<br />
Challenge,” 87.<br />
79 Ibid.<br />
80 Joint Chiefs of Staff, Doctrine for Joint Psychological<br />
Operations, Joint Publication 3-53 (Washington, DC: 5<br />
September 2003): xi.<br />
81 Ibid., xii.<br />
82 Collins, “Army PSYOP in Bosnia,” 2.<br />
83 Ibid., 9.<br />
84 Joint Chiefs of Staff, Doctrine for Joint Psychological<br />
Operations, 2003, III-1.<br />
85 Ibid., III-4.<br />
86 Ibid., III-2.<br />
87 Mary E. Cohen to the author, 3 February 2005, emailed<br />
letter held by author.<br />
88 Collins, “Army PSYOP in Bosnia,” 2.<br />
89 Mairs, “Information Operations and Millennium<br />
Challenge,” 87.<br />
90 Collins, “Army PSYOP in Bosnia,” 2.<br />
91 Cohen emailm 3 Feb 05.<br />
92 Ibid.
93 Ibid.<br />
94 Ibid.<br />
95 Ibid.<br />
96 Celina Croteau, to author, 5 February 2005, emailed letter<br />
held by author.<br />
97 Ibid.<br />
98 Ibid.<br />
99 Ibid.<br />
100 Cohen email, 3 Feb 05.<br />
101 Joint Chiefs of Staff, Doctrine for Joint Psychological<br />
Operations, 2003, A-5.<br />
102 Ibid., A-2.<br />
103 Ibid., A-4.<br />
104 Joint Chiefs of Staff, Doctrine for Joint Psychological<br />
Operations, 2003, II-1.<br />
43<br />
“SPACE ASSETS: THE ACHILLES HEEL IN<br />
NATIONAL DEFENSE”<br />
BY<br />
C1C ALEXANDER K. GOLDFEIN<br />
INTRODUCTION<br />
Statement of Research Question<br />
In a world of technology and space exploration,<br />
space assets have taken on an unexpected level of value to the<br />
<strong>United</strong> <strong>States</strong> military. So great has their value become that<br />
destruction of these assets could greatly reduce the combat<br />
effectiveness of the <strong>United</strong> <strong>States</strong> armed forces. Space assets<br />
are defined as any satellite or piece of technology in orbit<br />
capable of providing an advantage or important synergies to<br />
war fighters. 1 Growing reliance on space assets highlights a<br />
host of military considerations for protecting these crucial<br />
assets and raises a myriad of applicable questions. Foremost<br />
to the debate is a question which this research paper will<br />
examine: Has the <strong>United</strong> <strong>States</strong> <strong>Air</strong> <strong>Force</strong> developed the optimum<br />
capabilities for defending U.S. military and commercial<br />
space-based systems of strategic importance? Accordingly,<br />
this paper will evaluate space defense capabilities and propose<br />
changes or improvements in order to overcome any possible<br />
gaps present in current U.S. space defenses. Space defense is a<br />
crucial security issue this nation must address if it is to remain<br />
the world’s greatest military power in years to come.<br />
Background and Significance of the Problem<br />
Throughout the last fifty years of airpower history,<br />
space assets providing a myriad of advantages including imagery,<br />
intelligence, and navigation have played a vital role in<br />
successful military operations. Each helps maintain the victor’s<br />
edge in combat, as pointed out in conflicts such as Desert<br />
Storm and Iraqi Freedom, and are critical to the preservation<br />
of our national defense. Additionally, these tools play a fundamental<br />
part in the <strong>United</strong> <strong>States</strong> <strong>Air</strong> <strong>Force</strong> remaining the<br />
world’s greatest air and space force with the most extended<br />
global reach and advanced capabilities of any nation. Clayton<br />
Chun explains that since the Cold War, space assets have<br />
proven their worth as force multipliers in combat. 2 With the<br />
space race still underway, new weapons designed to incorporate<br />
space attack could destroy or otherwise disable our critical<br />
space tools. Accordingly, a key mission of the U.S. <strong>Air</strong><br />
<strong>Force</strong> must be protection of the space assets on which we so<br />
heavily rely. Without our space-based technology, it is feasible<br />
that the U.S. military would be unable to conduct operations<br />
with the precision or effectiveness we have come to expect.
Warfare has reached every battle medium with the<br />
exception of space, and it is simply a matter of time until this<br />
next evolution occurs. The U.S. <strong>Air</strong> <strong>Force</strong> must prepare for<br />
that day and create an effective system of space defense. In<br />
the words of Giulio Douhet, “Victory smiles upon those who<br />
anticipate the changes in the character of war, not upon those<br />
who wait to adapt themselves after the changes occur.” 3 A<br />
forward-looking stance is critical for preparedness against<br />
threats to our space assets and the strategically significant<br />
capabilities they provide.<br />
Limitations<br />
Space research is limited on a number of levels<br />
based primarily on the novelty of the subject. Space warfare<br />
has been hypothesized for a long time, but application is<br />
extremely new. It is also evident now that since discovery and<br />
innovation concerning space are constantly changing at high<br />
speed, the literature is constantly trying to “keep up” with<br />
the most accurate information. In addition, many important<br />
materials on space are classified and thus not accessible to the<br />
general public. Satellites go into space constantly, and technology<br />
is in constant evolution. Furthermore, the topic of<br />
defense of space assets is relatively new to military researchers<br />
and it is not surprising that documents and research on the<br />
topic are fairly limited. Another limitation is the relatively<br />
short time frame during which this research will be conducted<br />
and synthesized.<br />
The last limitation to the paper is the generally<br />
overlooked nature of the topic. Most people do not have<br />
the foresight to see the demand for continued space development<br />
and protection. However, it is this lack of interest that<br />
gives an independent scholar the ability to help shape the way<br />
such developments evolve into military doctrine. Although<br />
limited, the freedom to create is ever present and this research<br />
may potentially make a modest contribution to our understanding<br />
of current gaps in U.S. space defenses.<br />
Definitions<br />
For reasons of clarity, certain military acronyms are<br />
clearly defined. Acronyms important to this paper include<br />
Space Assets, ASAT, RAND, GPS, ICBM, <strong>Force</strong> Multiplier,<br />
ABL, and GBL.<br />
Space Assets: “The indispensable systems of force<br />
enhancement available in the medium of space.” 4<br />
ASAT: An anti-satellite weapon or technology system<br />
used for interference or destruction of space assets.<br />
RAND: The Research and Development Corporation,<br />
a non-profit institution that conducts a large<br />
amount of research on the military application of<br />
space. Some of their past work has concentrated on<br />
space warfare and ASATs.<br />
GPS: The Global Positioning System of the U.S., a<br />
44<br />
network of twenty-four satellites in known orbits for<br />
determining ground positions and navigational directions.<br />
5<br />
ICBM: An inter-continental ballistic missile capable<br />
of long distance flight and attack between continents.<br />
<strong>Force</strong> Multiplier: Any asset that enhances the ability<br />
of another weapon to function. For example, a<br />
Humvee giving security forces troops the ability to<br />
move faster over more terrain instead of walking.<br />
ABL and GBL: The <strong>Air</strong>borne Laser and Groundbased<br />
Laser systems used for offensive action in order<br />
to defend against specific forms of attack.<br />
One major assumption informs the approach of this<br />
study to the subject of space defense: other nations<br />
have, or will acquire, the technology, concepts, and<br />
will to attack <strong>United</strong> <strong>States</strong> assets in space. Such<br />
technology already exists and potential adversaries are<br />
not likely to forsake its use.<br />
Preview of the Argument<br />
To answer the research question, the value of current<br />
space technology as a military force multiplier must be<br />
examined and placed into a hierarchy of <strong>United</strong> <strong>States</strong> security<br />
requirements. Therefore, technical government reports<br />
on the strengths and values of space assets will be critical for<br />
understanding what those assets truly provide to our nation<br />
and our combat forces. To obtain this data, information<br />
must be derived from technical military sources to include<br />
current doctrine, and from officers in the space field who<br />
are concerned with satellite technology. Drawing on their<br />
training and experience in the field, subject matter experts<br />
are expected to provide accurate information or objective<br />
assessments. After assessing the value of this technology, the<br />
research will consider the nature of U.S. dependence on space<br />
assets, current threats to those assets, and current U.S. space<br />
defenses already in place. It will then be determined whether<br />
or not a gap exists between possible threats and available U.S.<br />
space defense capabilities. This distinction provides the basis<br />
for the development of concepts to overcome such vulnerabilities<br />
in the space field. Proposals for improvements will then<br />
be offered. This analysis will be the focus of the paper and<br />
will reflect critical thinking to determine possible solutions<br />
to the research question based on the evidence that has been<br />
assembled. These solutions will be individually evaluated for<br />
risks, benefits, and costs in order to rectify the current lack of<br />
protection. Finally, a proposal or proposals will be offered for<br />
increasing space defenses against the threat of possible attack.<br />
LITERATURE REVIEW<br />
Today space assets have reached unprecedented levels<br />
of use in military operations. Their military value has drastically<br />
increased since their introduction and now has become
an essential element in how the U.S. conducts modern battle.<br />
The first major application of space systems in<br />
armed conflict was the integration of satellites into war fighting<br />
during Operation Desert Storm in 1991. According to<br />
Curtis Peebles, Desert Storm was the first “space war” and its<br />
conduct suggests how space assets will be employed in future<br />
conflicts. 6 Such has been the case in all subsequent U.S. conflicts<br />
to date including recent wars in Iraq and Afghanistan.<br />
Daniel Goure argues that space power “came of age” in the<br />
Gulf War where its military value began to be understood<br />
and space doctrine developed. 7 For example, of all the bombs<br />
dropped in Desert Storm, only 9 percent were precision satellite-guided<br />
weapons, but they accounted for over 42 percent<br />
of targets struck in the theatre. 8 The effect of such enhanced<br />
weapons was critical for missions requiring accuracy and efficiency.<br />
This is the basis for current U.S. battle tactics which<br />
emphasize preserving civilian and military lives and limiting<br />
collateral damage. Targeting based on satellite guidance is<br />
also valuable as it meets many current U.S. <strong>Air</strong> <strong>Force</strong> guidelines<br />
adopted to encourage the fighting of just war. These<br />
include:<br />
-Use of only what munitions are needed to adequately<br />
destroy a target<br />
-Reduce all numbers of sorties to the minimum<br />
required to destroy the target without<br />
repeat missions<br />
-Destroy only what needs to be destroyed without<br />
civilian and other unnecessary<br />
casualties or destruction of public property<br />
-Provide attack and support operations under any<br />
conditions where visibility may be less<br />
than adequate for conventional bombing 9<br />
These guidelines on targeting are easily met by the use of<br />
space technology.<br />
In addition to targeting applications, space assets are<br />
commonly employed for long-range communications and<br />
detection of enemy forces. High-capacity worldwide secure<br />
voice communications were readily available in the Gulf War<br />
due to satellite technology connecting 128 tactical terminals. 10<br />
This is critical to conducting secure, well-planned and coordinated<br />
operations in enemy territory. In terms of surveillance,<br />
satellites in the Gulf War could detect the smoke plume of a<br />
SCUD missile thirty seconds after launch. 11 Although technology<br />
was not available for missile intercept, the value of<br />
early warning for units under attack is beyond measure. The<br />
element of surprise from missile attack can be nearly eliminated<br />
using space technology.<br />
The final components of space assets of great value<br />
to military operations are GPS and mapping capabilities.<br />
45<br />
In early airpower conflicts, such as WWI and WWII, aerial<br />
photography was undertaken with a camera held out of the<br />
side or mounted to the bottom of an airplane, generally while<br />
flying over dangerous territory. Satellites can safely produce<br />
images with resolution superior to that of a still camera used<br />
in flight. To provide good coverage and map accuracy based<br />
on photography, 80 percent overlap must exist and that can<br />
be hard to attain at high rates of speed in the air, as many<br />
frames must be taken to meet this requirement. 12 When<br />
linked with GPS, maps with unprecedented and constantly<br />
improving detail are created and active coordinate systems<br />
implemented in order to provide accurate positioning locations<br />
at any time. Lastly, directions of the utmost precision<br />
can be provided for successful and smooth operations,<br />
when getting to a target or checkpoint becomes an issue. In<br />
summary, the value of space assets for military applications<br />
in peace or war is unmatched by virtually any other force<br />
enhancement system. Satellites and space systems give <strong>Air</strong><br />
<strong>Force</strong> weapons the edge to make them the most advanced and<br />
capable in the world.<br />
When considering the military value of space assets,<br />
it is vital to understand the degree of current reliance on these<br />
force enhancement systems. In Operation Enduring Freedom,<br />
the on-going war in Afghanistan, satellites provide the<br />
ability to conduct effective operations against a tough and<br />
determined enemy many miles from our shores. According<br />
to Daniel Goure, space assets give the U.S. <strong>Air</strong> <strong>Force</strong> the ability<br />
to “strike at global ranges on short notice with devastating<br />
intensity and accuracy.” 13 Our current capabilities would<br />
be severely limited without satellites upon which many of<br />
our weapon systems are dependent. Militarily, to assault an<br />
enemy thousands of miles away, satellites are of the utmost<br />
importance. They are the very cornerstone of U.S. <strong>Air</strong> <strong>Force</strong><br />
operations and reliance on them in the form of precision<br />
bombardment, e-mail transmitted directly into cockpits of<br />
strike aircraft, and delivery of precision weapons are commonplace<br />
features of our modern force. 14 Space assets make these<br />
capabilities possible.<br />
The <strong>Air</strong> <strong>Force</strong> also relies on space assets in order to<br />
provide better security for U.S. forces, especially those in<br />
combat. For example, satellite communication linked with<br />
the airborne Joint Surveillance and Target Attack Radar<br />
System (J-STARS) detected a column of Iraqi units enroute<br />
to engage allied forces in the Gulf War. 15 Benjamin Lambeth<br />
describes how suddenly commanders responded with an air<br />
assault that destroyed the Iraqi forces and prevented a major<br />
attack on our forces in theatre. 16 The military reliance on<br />
satellites to date is directly tied to troop support such as this.<br />
Reorganization of conflict and protection of American soldiers’<br />
lives is a critical value of any military asset. Col Mark
Wells agrees that the value of target-spotting by satellites is<br />
high and led to attacks of unprecedented success against Iraqi<br />
vehicles fleeing Kuwait. 17<br />
The final level of military reliance on space assets<br />
involves their value in providing security for the American<br />
homeland. Peebles makes the point in describing the creation<br />
of early space systems, including the ballistic missile early<br />
warning system (BMEWS), in order to provide the timely<br />
warning of USSR aircraft and missile attacks. 18 Although<br />
only a limited deterrent factor and not capable of stopping<br />
an onslaught, it provided a precious twenty minutes maximum<br />
warning time before an inbound missile would strike<br />
our soil. 19 Given the threat of a massive nuclear war using<br />
inter-continental ballistic missiles (ICBMs), a new concept<br />
was born during the Cold War: missiles and effective missile<br />
defenses were to be developed. The increased build-up under<br />
President Kennedy to fill the perceived “missile gap” against<br />
the Soviets led to even more development of these immensely<br />
destructive weapons which still exist around the world today. 20<br />
Preston agrees that missile warning is critical and incorporates<br />
it into an overarching concept for attaining U.S. space superiority.<br />
21 It became the “Dawn of the Space Age” and missile<br />
warning should be employed to its utmost extent where early<br />
detection is paramount for the continued mission of defending<br />
the <strong>United</strong> <strong>States</strong> against threats from adversarial nations.<br />
In considering the value of satellites to military<br />
forces, it is important not to overlook the multiple civilian<br />
space systems currently aiding the military in capacities far in<br />
excess of the military. It is a consumer world and the commercial<br />
dimension of space today has led to the increased<br />
appearance of civilian entrepreneurs in space. By using civilian<br />
satellites instead of military satellites, the military satellites<br />
will last longer, civilians have increased business, and the military<br />
has more resources to use in their warfighting attempts.<br />
So it is reasonable to assume that civilian satellites are equally<br />
a vulnerability with harmful implications in the event of their<br />
destruction. For example, when the Galaxy 4 communications<br />
satellite failed on 20 May 1998, 80-90 percent of the<br />
40-45 million pagers in use in the <strong>United</strong> <strong>States</strong> instantly lost<br />
service. 22 This did not directly impact the U.S. military, but<br />
could in other cases. Civilian space assets provide services<br />
to include: imagery, communications, and weather information.<br />
23 The most dominant military use, however, remains<br />
communications. In Operations Iraqi Freedom (OIF) alone,<br />
90 percent of all military communications were made through<br />
civilian satellites. 24 This emphasis will always be in place and<br />
the limited assets of civilians are clearly just as valuable and in<br />
need of protection as military satellites.<br />
It is now clear that satellites are both relied on and<br />
valuable to the warfighter. However, who is allowed to attack<br />
46<br />
a satellite? According to Article III of the Outer Space Treaty,<br />
activities in space shall be:<br />
“conducted in accordance with international law,<br />
including the Charter of the <strong>United</strong> Nations, in the interest of<br />
maintaining international peace and security and promoting<br />
international cooperation and understanding.” 25<br />
This makes all laws ordained by the UN Charter applicable<br />
in space. Article 2(4) of the UN Charter then forbids the use<br />
of force against a nation, its people, and its resources. 26 With<br />
that in mind, an attack against a satellite is an attack on that<br />
nation and what it possesses and represents. So, by law, no<br />
one should attack a satellite, but a possible enemy could lead<br />
a massive space attack in the event of a war, making the provisions<br />
of the treaty essentially useless. Due to the vulnerability<br />
and value of space assets, it can be assumed that they can<br />
and will be targeted in a variety of ways through a variety of<br />
means.<br />
There are many methods for attacking US satellites<br />
either from space, land, air, or the sea. The aforementioned<br />
value of these space tools and our growing reliance upon them<br />
serve to make this a dangerous threat to our highly sophisticated<br />
military forces. There are several ways that an attack<br />
potentially could destroy or disable U.S. satellites in orbit. As<br />
described by Preston, these include:<br />
-Kinetic-energy weapons where mass is delivered to<br />
target by a guided or unguided<br />
projectile using velocity as its key destructive power.<br />
-Directed-energy weapons utilizing the propagation<br />
of destructive energy at very high<br />
speeds.<br />
-Conventional high-explosive munitions delivered by<br />
missile, ICBM, or through other<br />
means generally with advanced targeting capabilities.<br />
-Nuclear strike where thermonuclear weapons are<br />
detonated in space to knock out<br />
potentially large numbers of satellites while avoiding<br />
the damages that are caused by<br />
nuclear detonation on Earth. 27<br />
Kinetic-energy weapons are effective in many ways<br />
and one of the most difficult weapons to effectively stop when<br />
deployed at a target. For example, an F-15 based Altair-II<br />
missile capable of orbit, could launch into space, establish a<br />
heading to intercept the satellite, and deploy a hardened projectile<br />
to make the interception. 28 The warhead needs only<br />
a few small boosters to reach the target where the shear mass<br />
of the moving object rips through the target and destroys<br />
it without any form of explosives beyond fuel necessary to<br />
make the journey. Key advantages of such weaponry are
that it avoids the heated issue of arming satellites and can<br />
be deployed from anywhere in the <strong>United</strong> <strong>States</strong>. However,<br />
satellites and ground stations also can both be armed with<br />
this technology. The missile Nike-Zeus, for example, has<br />
been used to intercept reentry vehicles falling out of orbit<br />
from space on thirteen different occasions. 29 The payload was<br />
small, effective, and hit a variety of targets in near Low-Earth<br />
orbits. The on-board targeting technology was almost identical<br />
to that used in the Gulf War to identify and help destroy<br />
ground targets.<br />
An emerging technology capable of attacking satellites<br />
involves the employment of directed-energy weapons to<br />
include laser, light, radio, and other forms of energy that can<br />
interfere with mechanical operation. 30 The first satellites to<br />
contain similar technology of x-ray and gamma-ray carried<br />
equipment for enhanced photographic and detection capabilities.<br />
31 Although not dangerous, this technology’s usefulness<br />
and ease of operation paved the way to continued experimentation<br />
with energy in space. Currently, ABL and GBL<br />
systems can enhance energy into laser form powerful enough<br />
to shoot down enemy missiles and possibly satellites if applied<br />
in that manner. 32 The relatively vulnerable nature of satellites<br />
possibly could make these attacks very effective. If a key<br />
component of a satellite can be damaged or destroyed, even a<br />
minor assault can render the entire system ineffective. Moreover,<br />
simply the employment of radio frequencies or lesser<br />
energy forms can effectively jam a space tool.<br />
Now finally out of testing stages and into U.S. <strong>Air</strong><br />
<strong>Force</strong> operations is the “Counter Communications System”<br />
(CCS). Brought online in late October 2004, the CCS uses<br />
ground-based jamming based on electromagnetic radio frequency<br />
energy to knock out satellite transmissions for a short<br />
period of time in a reversible manner. 33 This technology<br />
offers a way to achieve satellite damage without the pain of<br />
destruction and impending war. A truly simple system based<br />
on off-the-shelf products, even the poorest nations can afford<br />
this technology and be a threat in regards to denying, or at<br />
east interfering with, our space assets.<br />
Finally, conventional and nuclear strike options exist<br />
that can destroy satellites. Standard munitions, when linked<br />
with a launch engine such as an ICBM, can disable a satellite<br />
or destroy it. 34 These could be deployed in the same nature<br />
that current missiles are launched, or in the fashion of kineticenergy<br />
weapons launched from airborne platforms. It should<br />
be noted here that the only weapons prohibited in space by<br />
international law are nuclear weapons. 35 According to the<br />
Limited Test Ban Treaty of 1963, there will be no nuclear<br />
testing in space, underwater, or in the atmosphere. 36 The devastation<br />
would be completely satisfactory for attacking a satellite,<br />
but would involve a large amount of damage for a small<br />
47<br />
goal. Far less mayhem is truly needed and nuclear weapons<br />
operate in a realm the general public undeniably rejects. 37<br />
The electromagnetic pulse (EMP) alone from the detonation<br />
could eliminate a satellite from effective operations, much<br />
less the shockwave from the blast. 38 These weapons can be<br />
deployed from air, space (in smaller size), land and the sea for<br />
use by an ICBM to carry munitions to orbit. This is a good<br />
method to undertake if a space tool needed total destruction,<br />
but other methods exist that do not jeopardize one’s own satellites<br />
in the instance that two space powers were fighting.<br />
Currently, the U.S. military uses virtually no methods<br />
to actively defend against ASAT attacks or any other form<br />
of interference or sabotage of our crucial space assets beyond<br />
the safety afforded by the nature of planetary orbit. 39 The<br />
one primary example of a defensive satellite is the MILSTAR<br />
communications constellation. In a geosynchronous orbit<br />
(extremely high altitude), the MILSTAR system boasts virtually<br />
unjammable UHF transmissions, a small jamming “footprint,”<br />
and low nuclear scintillation (nuclear survivable). 40 In<br />
the past, knowledge of space attack was something considered<br />
unachievable, so few precautions were taken. In general, satellites<br />
are unarmored, crafted for mission execution instead<br />
of defense and armament, and deemed safe in their orbits. 41<br />
This leaves a considerable gap in the defense structure of our<br />
space assets when aligned with the numerous methods of<br />
attack previously established. It must then become the goal of<br />
the <strong>United</strong> <strong>States</strong> military to find methods available, or establish<br />
new techniques to give our space assets the safety they<br />
deserve for the services they render.<br />
While few man-made defenses are in use, there are<br />
several natural aspects of space that give satellites an increased<br />
level of safety. In addition, certain pre-launch measures could<br />
be made to increase the effectiveness and security of satellites.<br />
First, satellites exist in a vast number of orbits, each<br />
with significantly different characteristics, which include lowearth,<br />
sun-synchronous, geostationary, geosynchronous, and<br />
Molniya orbits. 42 These orbits vary in speed and altitude, so<br />
weapons would have to be designed specifically to reach satellites<br />
in each orbital region of space. This is a natural safety<br />
feature of the space environment that has kept our assets safe<br />
to this day and will keep them secure until these conditions<br />
can be reasonably overcome.<br />
There are numerous options for defensive systems<br />
that will protect U.S. space assets from enemy attack. Technology<br />
is so advanced to date that ideas simply need to be<br />
worked out and put into reality. However, some critics think<br />
that there is still no need for weaponization or defenses in<br />
space. Maj Kirk J. Taylor, USA, thinks that “the right time<br />
has not yet arrived” for the arming of space and contends<br />
that space attack and that the belief in imminent attack is
unfounded. 43 Most authors, on the other hand, find the reality<br />
of the U.S. coming under space attack a near-term danger<br />
and one not to be taken lightly. Maj James L. Hyatt, III,<br />
USAF, claims that many systems exist and should be used in<br />
efforts of bolstering defenses.<br />
These conceptualized space defense systems include<br />
simple anti-jam features, increased maneuverability, or more<br />
advanced armor systems that can deflect, block, or intercept<br />
incoming attack. 44 The armor placed on a satellite<br />
could potentially stop certain conventional munitions or be<br />
deployed outward to disrupt kinetic-energy weapons on their<br />
route to destruction while additional position thrusters allow<br />
satellites to “dodge’ incoming threats. All of this can be done<br />
while blocking incoming jamming signals that are attempting<br />
to disorient and incapacitate the satellite. These systems<br />
constitute moderately simple, yet practical means of defense.<br />
However, money will always remain as the major limiting<br />
factor. The average cost to put one pound of cargo into space<br />
is $2,000. 45 This is so even in the heaviest lifting vehicles<br />
available such as the Titan IV-B (only one remaining) which<br />
possesses the ability to ferry 47,800 pounds of cargo to lowearth<br />
orbit. 46 This limitation will always create difficulties in<br />
implementation. In addition, certain technologies, such as<br />
advanced armor, may be ruled out completely when costs and<br />
benefits are analyzed.<br />
Other possible systems counter low-level EMP disruption<br />
by means of electrical fail-safes that can maintain the<br />
satellite’s basic functions in the event of a nuclear blast occurring<br />
outside of destructive distance. 47 Finally, laser or other<br />
interception weapons could be mounted on a limited scale on<br />
satellites to deflect or destroy oncoming munitions. These<br />
solutions are simple enough to be implemented in the near<br />
future in order to effectively protect against current weaponry<br />
intended to knock our satellites out of the sky.<br />
In summary, satellites are crucial tools for the <strong>United</strong><br />
<strong>States</strong> military and give us the capabilities to conduct warfare<br />
in a manner unlike any other nation. In addition, our level<br />
of reliance on space-based systems has increased exponentially<br />
over the years while the ability to destroy those systems<br />
has also become more feasible. The methods of attack that<br />
could harm a satellite must be examined, linked with available<br />
defense systems, and a method created to protect what is so<br />
important to the <strong>United</strong> <strong>States</strong> and its war fighting capabilities.<br />
In this way, the gap between vulnerability and effective<br />
defense can be bridged and our space assets made more<br />
secure.<br />
THESIS BODY<br />
There is a well-established gap in U.S. satellite<br />
defenses that leave our nation highly vulnerable in the event<br />
of a planned space attack. Space assets are a clear strategic<br />
48<br />
tool for the military, an economic tool for the civilian sector,<br />
and platform for scientific research and the betterment of<br />
mankind. If the <strong>United</strong> <strong>States</strong> lost any or all of these critical<br />
assets, a clear disadvantage would be established that other<br />
nations could take advantage of, primarily in the fighting of<br />
wars.<br />
Space attack is a reality. Since even before the Soviet<br />
launch of Sputnik over 47 years ago in October of 1957, the<br />
two great super powers of the time, the <strong>United</strong> <strong>States</strong> and<br />
Soviet Union, were devising methods to employ space for<br />
attack against its enemy and limit their space power. 48 Even<br />
now, this process continues though it hides under many guises<br />
as the world tends to shy away from ripping space away as<br />
a sanctuary for all to enjoy. Satellites are being considered<br />
for many strategic missions of which ballistic missile defense<br />
(BMD) has taken a forefront position, and for good reason.<br />
A weapon in space capable of destroying an inbound missile<br />
is an appealing concept and one strongly advocated by President<br />
Bush, though the U.S. has been primarily concerned<br />
with terrestrially-launched intercept vehicles. A way ASAT<br />
development hides itself is through BMD development where<br />
armed satellites are being conceived to knock out missiles,<br />
while having secondary capabilities of space attack. In fact, it<br />
is then reasonable to say that BMD development could possibly<br />
fuel more ASAT development in a spiral to battlefield<br />
employment. 49<br />
As development continues into the future, it is<br />
important not to forget what exists in space today and has<br />
and still poses a threat to satellites in orbit. As early as 1947,<br />
the U.S. started its first ASAT program designated Bold<br />
Orion which tested the launch of ASAT missiles from B-47<br />
aircraft. 50 Though unsuccessful in eliminating a satellite, this<br />
led to other programs including Project Mudflap from 1963-<br />
1966, Program 437 in 1976, Program 706 designated SAINT<br />
from 1962 on, and other secret programs (satellite interceptor).<br />
51 Of these, the first successful launch was conducted by<br />
Project Mudflap, otherwise known as Program 505. In 1963<br />
under the Kennedy Administration, a variant of the Army<br />
Nike Zeus system, developed as early as SAINT, destroyed<br />
a low-earth satellite target. 52 The U.S. clearly possesses the<br />
most basic capabilities of removing a satellite (at least in a<br />
low-earth orbit) and although these programs were cancelled<br />
in succession, it can be intuitively derived that progress in the<br />
field has never truly ceased completely.<br />
In regard to the Soviet Union, rigorous testing of<br />
ASAT weapons began in 1968 after the concept began being<br />
explored as early as 1963. Though little data is available even<br />
today, it was known that targets launched from Tyuratam<br />
launch station and interceptors from Plsestsk resulted in a<br />
success rate somewhere between 45% and 65% in attacking
satellites as high as 1,000 km exceeding even U.S. capabilities.<br />
53 The launch vehicle was a SL-11 liquid-fueled booster<br />
which deployed an interceptor that then used a co-planar<br />
(same orbital plane) orbit to get close enough to a satellite<br />
to deploy an explosive charge sending shrapnel at the target<br />
satellite. 54 These tests were conducted thoroughly up to<br />
1982, far longer than any documented U.S. ASAT technology<br />
development program. The last of which is documented<br />
as Program 437 which underwent development from 1963-<br />
1975, attempting to develop a nuclear anti-satellite weapon<br />
based on “spare parts.” 55 When considering the possible range<br />
of these interceptors, the only satellite within striking range<br />
is one traveling in the low-earth orbit (LEO) range. These<br />
satellites operate at approximately 400 km though some operate<br />
as high as 1,500 km. However, these would be the only<br />
satellites remotely possible to intercept. A semi-synchronous<br />
orbit, otherwise known as a middle-earth orbit (MEO), operates<br />
at 20,000 km while geosynchronous orbits (GEO) are<br />
positioned 35,900 km from the Earth’s surface. 56 With this<br />
in mind, it is quite unreasonable to assert that all satellites<br />
are in danger. Technology has come a long way since these<br />
programs of the past, but the cost and difficulties involved in<br />
launching to a deep space orbit is not readily wasted on such<br />
ventures. Rockets capable of placing a satellite into a GEO<br />
orbit are extremely limited in themselves and would most<br />
likely be required to accomplish this type of intercept.<br />
As space budgets around the world are stretched thinner<br />
and thinner, the concept that “wasting” launch vehicles<br />
for intercepting satellites has taken hold. In addition, applying<br />
what was previously mentioned, several unique systems,<br />
each capable of reaching different orbital parameters, would<br />
be required to mass a complete space attack. Hundreds of<br />
satellites circle the earth day in and day out. To successfully<br />
eliminate a fair portion of these satellites (one nation’s), these<br />
unique systems would also have to be heavily armed with<br />
what has come to an extremely limited technology. The concept<br />
of a massive space attack is unfounded and not possible<br />
in this day and age. However, the threat still remains against<br />
a single satellite serving a critical mission.<br />
Those satellites existing in LEO space are most often<br />
noted for their applications in remote sensing and communications.<br />
57 Using their low-altitude, they can produce the best<br />
visual imagery and relay information in the shortest period<br />
of time. As space entrepreneurship has developed around the<br />
world, more and more civilian industries also find this the<br />
most suitable realm for business. Launches decrease in price,<br />
drastically making the mission affordable and in conjunction<br />
with their financial goals and limitations. These victims in<br />
the instance of attack have no defense capabilities. In addition,<br />
the military relies heavily on these systems to enhance<br />
49<br />
their own and limit demands on satellites tasked specifically<br />
for military missions. 58 So the ultimate target within reason<br />
of a potential adversary is the lone satellite in a LEO orbit.<br />
This would be done in hope of reducing military strength<br />
while creating a devastating blow to the U.S. government.<br />
Since the Soviet Union posed the only feasible threat<br />
before becoming a “friend” to the <strong>United</strong> <strong>States</strong>, there are<br />
rarely any space adversaries available today. However, the<br />
looming threat continues to exist in which a rogue nation<br />
or terrorist organization acquires dangerous technology for a<br />
deployment escaping the bounds of deterrence. According<br />
to Thomas Schelling, deterrence is the bargaining power that<br />
comes from the physical harm a nation can do to another<br />
nation reflected in threats and assured retaliation. 59 Another<br />
definition reads, “deterrence is the ability to dissuade or discourage<br />
an opponent from taking certain actions based on the<br />
opponent’s fear of the costs or consequences.” 60 This method<br />
of diplomacy (bargaining for a political goal) is effective when<br />
applied face to face such as the U.S. – Soviet standoff that<br />
ensued during the Cold War. When applied to space, attack<br />
has been limited over the years because the opposing nations<br />
so feared retribution in the event of an unprecedented assault<br />
that they never utilized their technology. The ultimate fear<br />
of a deterrent nation is the lone militant commander without<br />
regard for others and no tools susceptible to retaliation in<br />
kind. 61 To better explain this, a rogue nation without satellite<br />
technology has no reason not to attack U.S. space assets.<br />
They have nothing to lose in return and they know the magnitude<br />
of the effects of their actions. Though a simplification<br />
of world affairs, this risk is simply the only one that reasonably<br />
falls into the context of the potential adversary yet to<br />
be faced in the space realm. In the words of the Honorable<br />
Richard E. Horner, Assistant Secretary of the <strong>Air</strong> <strong>Force</strong>, “we<br />
are all too susceptible to oversimplification.” 62 Thinking outside<br />
the box at potential threats is the most important phase<br />
for taking a protective and well-oriented stance.<br />
Though terrorists and small, destructive groups desire<br />
this technology, acquisition is a completely different story.<br />
The technology involved is expensive, limited, and something<br />
that can be considered a national strategic asset. This is noted<br />
in terms of U.S. policy in which space is known for providing<br />
a safe haven for military systems that contribute to strategic<br />
stability. 63 As such technology is strategic, the defense of<br />
these assets and exploitation of an enemy’s asset is a strategic<br />
goal as well. Therefore, satellite intercept technology is not<br />
something that can be sold, exported, or employed by a new<br />
user easily. It is considered crucial for the efforts of negating<br />
military benefits while further establishing personal safety. 64<br />
In these terms, the reference is being drawn to an intercept<br />
weapon which not only requires the launch vehicles, but a
launch site capable of handling a space launch. Only a few<br />
sites even exist capable of such action. For example, all USSR<br />
tests were conducted out of specifically Tyuratam launch facility<br />
though Plesetsk was certainly capable as well. 65 If a rogue<br />
nation were to even acquire such technology, they would have<br />
few options for deployment. In addition, when most technology<br />
finds itself reaching secondary consumers, it is outdated.<br />
These old systems are effective, but not in comparison to<br />
what have been developed in the years following. On top of<br />
all of these barriers, it is also difficult to use these systems.<br />
The technology is something easily appreciated, but hardly<br />
feasible for employment by low-tech forces utilizing terrorist<br />
tactics to exploit their limited forces.<br />
What can be drawn from this analysis is that acquiring<br />
and effectively using ASAT technology that falls into the<br />
categories of kinetic-energy, conventional, or nuclear is nearly<br />
impossible for a nation attempting to quickly enter into space<br />
combat. First, kinetic energy specifically fails as it tends to be<br />
the most expensive and demanding technology. For this to<br />
work, you need either a homing missile or projectile, both of<br />
which require advanced technology and an adequate launch<br />
site. 66 They also demand the most complex targeting systems<br />
as not only do they have to find a satellite, but actually<br />
shoot it down as opposed to simply creating a large explosion.<br />
Therefore, conventional weapons are just as complicated, but<br />
typically lack a small deal of targeting finesse. The U.S. has<br />
spent most of its time in this realm, although research has<br />
been conducted in many fronts. Finally, nuclear weapons detonated<br />
in space have typically been abandoned as it is against<br />
international agreements, promotes nuclear retaliation, and<br />
may cause harm to or interfere with nearby friendly space<br />
assets. 67 The law is unavoidable as it has been established<br />
that nuclear testing will not occur in the atmosphere under<br />
the aforementioned provisions of the 1963 Limited Test<br />
Ban Treaty. 68 Not only do scientists not readily know what<br />
will happen if a nuclear weapon is detonated outside of our<br />
atmosphere, it is generally considered a taboo practice to test<br />
nuclear weapons in modern times knowing the consequences<br />
that can await those who engage in such actions for a hostile<br />
purpose. Deterrence and the latent retributional violence it<br />
entails is still a driving policy force in the world today and its<br />
implications can even be identified on the most irrational terrorist<br />
levels. 69<br />
The remaining ASAT category and the only with<br />
viable enemy options, is the realm of directed-energy weapons.<br />
These can range from high-energy lasers (HEL) to<br />
light interference, or jamming systems specifically designed<br />
to interfere with radio signals. 70 The concept is said to have<br />
been initially developed by the Soviets with their Radio Electronic<br />
Combat (REC) system. The capabilities were intended<br />
50<br />
to include saturating satellite transponder and ground station<br />
receivers to block out normal communications receiver functions.<br />
71 In regard to lasers, no nation is yet known to actually<br />
possess a ground-based laser capable of delivering a strong<br />
enough and tightly focused beam capable of either disrupting<br />
or destroying a satellite. Also, these lasers require absolutely<br />
immense amounts of power on top of lengthy “reload” times<br />
as only a few “shots” may be potentially fired while a satellite<br />
is in view. It is important to remember that this technology<br />
is currently being developed as it coincides with U.S. nuclear<br />
ballistic missile defense goals. 72 Development of a laser capable<br />
of stopping a missile en route to its target will undoubtedly<br />
be capable of destroying a low-earth orbiting space asset<br />
with minor alterations. Since this technology is not even fully<br />
available to U.S. users, it will then also be ruled out as a possibility<br />
for use by terrorist organizations or other groups identified<br />
as the primary threats in the development and employment<br />
of weapons against strategic U.S. space assets.<br />
What remains may not even be considered weapons<br />
at all, but rather a unique design capable of limiting satellite<br />
use if not rendering it useless altogether. 73 What is implied<br />
here is that the use of jamming technology in the form of<br />
radio waves or other wave frequencies can easily degrade satellite<br />
communications making it incapable of reaching and<br />
transmitting data to enemy ground users. Every satellite has<br />
some link to the ground. To use gathered information, satellites<br />
must transmit vast amounts of data to earth through<br />
either direct transmission or transmission via other satellites<br />
to reach specific stations on the surface. 74 The benefits of<br />
this system then are that it can be used from anywhere on the<br />
earth within the satellite’s footprint, anonymously, and with<br />
little fear of immediate tracking. Jamming is intended to<br />
degrade signals and it does it so well that locating a jamming<br />
system is typically very difficult. The next benefit is that it is<br />
an inexpensive means of accomplishing a strategic goal. The<br />
earliest attempts at using this method occurred during the<br />
second Gulf War. Iraqi troops used portable GPS jamming<br />
kits in an effort to block GPS signals making it nearly impossible<br />
to use joint direct attack munitions (JDAMs) based on<br />
targeting through GPS guidance systems. 75 The result was<br />
a failure for the Iraqi soldiers as GPS munitions inevitably<br />
destroyed the jamming equipment, but set the stage for<br />
future development. Another example of this type of weapon<br />
employment recently occurred involving the effective jamming<br />
of a U.S. communications satellite broadcasting TV<br />
programs in Iran. 76 The results were a loss in satellite communication<br />
with ground stations, resulting in signal transmission<br />
failure, and ultimately complete mission degradation.<br />
What makes this situation difficult is that the source took<br />
many engineers a good deal of time to assume that Cuba was
to blame. Tracking the signal is difficult when the possibilities<br />
of location range from parts of eastern North and Latin<br />
America to Cuba. 77<br />
So why then is jamming so appealing? There are<br />
several reasons for this shift in ideologies. First and foremost,<br />
it is affordable. Jamming technology is nothing more than<br />
off-the-shelf parts. This in turn lowers costs and greatly opens<br />
the possibilities for enemy acquisition. Next, it debilitates<br />
capabilities while avoiding outright destruction. Although a<br />
shaky issue that can be viewed in two distinct ways, the results<br />
prove far friendlier than other options. The initial view is<br />
that interference is attack. By ridding capability you are<br />
attacking the underlying structure, integrity, and mission of a<br />
satellite. Even the most minor interference deprives military<br />
action which can be viewed as a threat. On the other hand,<br />
no physical damage is done. This second argument tends<br />
to hold the most influence and is shaping U.S. policy as the<br />
technology propagates and continues to develop. Jamming<br />
is both “benign” and “passive” while it can turn on and off in<br />
the blink of an eye and leaves no trace behind. 78 Therefore, it<br />
is not an attack, but rather a safe posture and position without<br />
any aggression or decisive interference on the part of the<br />
enemy.<br />
When considering this development, it is easy to<br />
use Sputnik as an example of how technologies develop and<br />
U.S. policy is directed in that regard. Some elements of the<br />
<strong>United</strong> <strong>States</strong> government favored allowing the Soviet Union<br />
to launch the first satellite as it created a precedent of safe<br />
and allowable over flight of the opposing nation from space. 79<br />
Since the <strong>United</strong> <strong>States</strong> did not oppose nor deny the ability of<br />
the Soviets to survey their land from space, the international<br />
policy was established that information collection from over<br />
flight is both legal and an addition to common international<br />
law. As small nations have begun to use these simple methods<br />
to acquire jamming systems, the <strong>United</strong> <strong>States</strong> has not openly<br />
complained about the concept, except publicly that this<br />
action has political consequences, since U.S. broadcasting to<br />
Iran is an important diplomatic objective. 80 But why establish<br />
such a precedent when at a disadvantage? By allowing its use,<br />
you may then pursue this technology and better it for yourself<br />
instead of creating international policy against its use. Since<br />
these incidents, the <strong>United</strong> <strong>States</strong> has introduced its Counter<br />
Communications System (CCS). The 76 th Space Control<br />
Squadron recently unveiled the system which boasts the ability<br />
to deny the communications abilities of multiple satellites<br />
simultaneously, making them useless to their benefactor. 81<br />
What this development ultimately points to is the<br />
direction of space attack in the years to come. Due to the<br />
complex nature of ballistic or guided ASAT weapons, the few<br />
rogue enemies in the world today do not have the faculties or<br />
51<br />
capabilities to attain or successfully use such a tool. In addition,<br />
the <strong>United</strong> <strong>States</strong> is more interested in ballistic missile<br />
defense than satellite attack, based primarily on the fear that<br />
retaliation will cause great harm. Since the priorities have<br />
shifted, the less expensive and equally effective jamming technology<br />
will hit the forefront in development. A precedent<br />
has been set and the world will follow the lead as it has been<br />
established as a unique possibility in warfare.<br />
From a legal perspective, this is a truly innovative<br />
and clever method to evade certain policies that are in place<br />
that help establish space as a sanctuary. Attack is defined in<br />
many ways, but one potent definition is “the onset of a corrosive<br />
destructive process.” 82 This specifies the non-repairable<br />
nature of an attack. Since it is not an attack nor causes any<br />
irreversible damage, sanctuary is preserved. In addition, to<br />
retaliate, there is typically the need for a premeditated and<br />
malicious attempt to deny certain military, political, or diplomatic<br />
capabilities. 83 Therefore, there is no pressing fear of<br />
retaliation in regard to jamming a satellite. It may not necessarily<br />
be a wise political move to jam a signal of a supposed<br />
“ally,” but it does not qualify as an attack.<br />
This analysis then must reiterate how critical it is<br />
to protect against ASAT threats and retain space dominance<br />
against potential enemies. As the background suggests, vulnerabilities<br />
exist and few satellites were designed with jamming<br />
avoidance in mind as an active defense system. Antijamming<br />
systems need to be supplemented in order to deter<br />
enemy interference and prepare for an unstable world where<br />
U.S. space assets remain critical military tools and valuable<br />
civilian assets. Bolstering defenses is thus the first step with<br />
an inevitable goal of veritable safety from influence. But what<br />
challenges await in defending against systems designed “to<br />
load enemy receivers with strong signals?” 84 How can satellites<br />
circumvent this influence and retain usable communications<br />
with ground stations?<br />
By establishing international policy allowing for the<br />
unannounced jamming of satellites in orbit, it has clearly been<br />
established that this activity will occur again. To accomplish<br />
the mission of defense, several courses can be pursued, all of<br />
which can be implemented in the mediums of the air, land,<br />
sea, or space. By increasing the frequency of a transmission,<br />
the footprint is lowered and jamming capability reduced. 85<br />
The resultant effect of such technology is secure transmission<br />
capability and increased awareness of a jamming location as<br />
it is identified within the footprint. The Defense Satellite<br />
Communications System (DSCS) utilizes ten satellites each<br />
possessing the capability to transmit over six super high frequency<br />
transponder channels. 86 The system is secure, and<br />
rightly so, as it is designed to send crucial information to<br />
military commanders during conflict. This technology placed
directly on the satellite is an ideal system as it is virtually<br />
untouchable, especially if ground resources to protect the satellites<br />
are removed through hostile action. The most important<br />
consideration for bringing this tool to the fight is again<br />
cost, primarily for the civilian sector of space. Space launch<br />
carries so large a price; extra funds to increase protection are<br />
typically overlooked. The mantra is simply to use what works<br />
as opposed to what is the most resistant. This unfortunately<br />
leaves virtually all companies beyond the <strong>United</strong> <strong>States</strong> government<br />
unable to afford such a venture. Though this may<br />
be a long-term goal, the more likely solution rests in groundbased<br />
technology.<br />
When considering these upgrade options, it is possible<br />
to consider placing them on satellites currently in orbit,<br />
thus taking special care to protect the most essential satellites<br />
in the growing U.S. network. However, cost is still the driving<br />
factor. The proposed Hubble telescope repairs, brought<br />
to the attention of NASA nearly 2 months ago, were estimated<br />
to be nearly $2 billion. 87 This large sum was required<br />
to repair merely one fourteen-year old satellite that has previously<br />
needed attention to maintain its functioning capabilities.<br />
Satellite repair is not easy, nor is it the safest action, as<br />
it requires a manned crew which places astronauts in danger.<br />
This assertion has been proven in the past as the Columbia<br />
shuttle was lost on 1 February 2003, creating a certain level<br />
of fear in what was once considered routine space operations.<br />
88 With ever limited space budgets, there is no current<br />
feasible way to ever be capable of affording missions to repair<br />
every crucial satellite. Though all may not be considered<br />
important, over 700 U.S. satellites alone orbit the earth. Too<br />
many exist, the danger is increasingly high, and the cost is<br />
phenomenal. In addition, manned repair crews must travel<br />
to space in the shuttle, which is only capable of operating in<br />
the low-earth space environment. Any satellites currently in<br />
higher orbits are, therefore, considered unreachable for repair<br />
and augmentation unless completed by theoretical robotic<br />
“astronauts.” Therefore, missions that fall in the category of<br />
launching to augment satellites in orbit are not a possibility<br />
for future protection of U.S. space assets. 89<br />
A British company known as QinetiQ, Europe’s largest<br />
science and technology organization, boasts the ability to<br />
detect satellite signal interference to within ten kilometers in a<br />
matter of seconds. 90 By using two intercept stations, it tracks<br />
the target satellite and an adjacent orbital element to locate<br />
the “beam” and utilize position and velocity analysis to locate<br />
the source of transmission. 91 Not only is this easy, but the<br />
system is itself ready for purchase and implementation. This<br />
alternative is a financial blessing when compared to the other<br />
aforementioned methods. A single set of stations could track<br />
multiple jamming frequencies simultaneously providing safety<br />
52<br />
of transmissions. If this technology can be implemented, it<br />
is the start needed in the process of space protection against<br />
U.S. enemies of today and tomorrow.<br />
The recommendations, then, that best suit meeting<br />
the mission of closing the gap between possible satellite interference<br />
and available defenses is a three-fold process. First,<br />
to ensure security and a limitation of jamming incidents,<br />
ground-based systems must be made operational as soon as<br />
possible. Systems such as QinetiQ can bolster awareness and<br />
prevent lengthy problems such as those encountered in operations<br />
already undertaken such as the jamming conducted<br />
by Cuba. Several redundant systems will provide adequate<br />
security to a large area and provide coordinates of jamming<br />
sites, enabling targeting and destruction of the threat. Next,<br />
new satellites with missions of the utmost security (specifically<br />
communications) shall, to the highest degree available,<br />
be fitted with jam resistant transmitters as they are launched<br />
in the future. This is a long-term enabler, and although more<br />
expensive, will give added protection and satellite independence<br />
of operation that the U.S. desires in completing the<br />
missions it sees fit and retaining the value of its strategic assets<br />
in space. Finally, satellites armed with jamming detection<br />
technology should be launched in order to facilitate the detection<br />
of threats. Space has been identified as a realm capable<br />
of very precise analysis, mapping, and oversight of the earth.<br />
Therefore, pinpointing something from space based on satellite<br />
triangulation, such as that already done by GPS satellites,<br />
is inherently more accurate than a land-based system. This<br />
would add the final ability of receiving increasingly accurate<br />
threat location information for its removal or destruction.<br />
CONCLUSION<br />
The growing reliance of the Unites <strong>States</strong> and other<br />
nations on their strategic satellite systems has identified<br />
these assets as critical for military operations, bolstering the<br />
economy, and providing deterrent measures. Space attack<br />
has been developed for years in the form of kinetic-energy,<br />
directed-energy, conventional munitions, and nuclear munitions<br />
that have ASAT application. Destroying a satellite is a<br />
major blow to the morale and national strength of another<br />
country. This then must be protected against in the instance<br />
that a nation comes into possession of technology capable of<br />
delivering such a blow. However, due to the complex nature<br />
of the space environment, limited finances for ASAT development,<br />
and difficulty in acquisition for terrorist or other rogue<br />
groups, most forms of attack are negligible as a threat.<br />
What remains is the previously tested and implemented<br />
technique of satellite signal jamming. Since all<br />
satellites must communicate their message to be effective,<br />
jamming offers an inexpensive, non-destructive means to<br />
eliminate satellite effectiveness while not taking a war stance
or violating international agreements. This is the method<br />
of choice and the primary threat to be defended against and<br />
prepared for in years to come. Due to the costs of space<br />
launch, the most reasonable and effective method for space<br />
defense involves three phases. The first introduces several<br />
ground-based jamming systems to locate threats in order for<br />
conventional forces to eliminate them or allow politicians to<br />
pressure the adversary to stop, given the knowledge of the<br />
jamming and its location parameters. Next, deploying more<br />
satellites with increased onboard jamming protection will<br />
create the independence in space needed to operate without<br />
fear. Finally, to fully ensure future protection against jamming<br />
technology, space-based jamming-signal locators should<br />
be employed to accurately locate the threat.<br />
Space has proven time and again to be the best means<br />
of locating, mapping, and targeting what is encountered<br />
on the surface of the earth. From this, we develop strategy.<br />
Though many years away, this goal would be adequate to<br />
close the gap currently present between vulnerabilities and<br />
defenses. Space is a strategic realm and extremely important<br />
in supporting military operations which have grown increasingly<br />
reliant on these systems. Space assets are one of the<br />
greatest military enablers ever devised, but if exploited by the<br />
enemy, our “Achilles Heel” in national defense. The damage<br />
would be devastating. Therefore, protective action can and<br />
will be pursued in the years to come in order to retain the<br />
superiority of <strong>United</strong> <strong>States</strong> strategic space assets.<br />
Although these solutions pose a sound method for<br />
solving the problem at hand, additional research should be<br />
pursued to ensure the best execution. The research should be<br />
directed at determining which of the proposed solutions best<br />
meets mission requirements in light of costs and other limiting<br />
factors. In addition, each method must be fully examined<br />
in terms of its practicality and applicability to civilian space<br />
assets. What remains is fully verifying the usefulness of the<br />
defense techniques now that the threat and solutions have<br />
been laid out. The pursuit of space dominance begins here<br />
and additional research must be pursued to ensure taking the<br />
best course of action possible.<br />
BIBLIOGRAPHY<br />
“Attack” [on-line]. Google Dictionary; Internet; available<br />
from http://www.google.com/search<br />
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(Endnotes)<br />
1 Peter L. Hays, ed., et. al., Spacepower for a New<br />
Millennium: Space and U.S. National Security (New York,<br />
NY: McGraw-Hill, 2000), 3.
2 Clayton K. S. Chun, Shooting Down a “Star”:<br />
Program 437, the U.S Nuclear ASAT System and Present-Day<br />
Copycat Killers (Alabama: <strong>Air</strong> University Press, 2000), 8.<br />
3 C. Douglas Sterner, Cast a Giant Shadow (Home of<br />
Heroes) [on-line]; available from http://www.homeofheroes.<br />
com/wings/part2/03_walker.html; accessed 19 November<br />
2003.<br />
4 Benjamin S. Lambeth, “<strong>Air</strong> Power, Space Power,<br />
and Geography,” The Journal of Strategic Studies 22 (June/<br />
September 1999): 74.<br />
5 U.S. <strong>Air</strong> <strong>Force</strong> <strong>Academy</strong> Department of Economic<br />
and Geography, Geospatial Data Systems (Denver, CO: John<br />
Wiley and Sons, 2003), 33.<br />
6 Curtis Peebles, High Frontier: The U.S. <strong>Air</strong> <strong>Force</strong><br />
and the Military Space Program (Washington, D.C.: <strong>Air</strong><br />
<strong>Force</strong> History and Museums Program, 1997), 73.<br />
7 Daniel Goure and Christopher M. Szara, <strong>Air</strong> and<br />
Space Power in the New Millennium (Washington D.C.: The<br />
Center for Strategic and International Studies, 1997), 8.<br />
8 Ibid.<br />
9 Clayton K. S. Chun, Aerospace Power in the<br />
Twenty-First Century: A Basic Primer (Maxwell AFB, AL: <strong>Air</strong><br />
University Press, 2001), 144.<br />
10 Benjamin S. Lambeth, The Transformation of<br />
American <strong>Air</strong> Power (New York: Cornell University Press,<br />
2000), 236.<br />
11 Benjamin S. Lambeth, “The Synergy of <strong>Air</strong> and<br />
Space,” <strong>Air</strong>power Journal 12 (Summer 1998): 7.<br />
12 Mark K. Wells, USAF, ed. <strong>Air</strong> Power: Promise and<br />
Reality (Chicago: Imprint Publications, 2000), 232.<br />
13 Goure, <strong>Air</strong> and Space Power, 106.<br />
14 Lambeth, The Synergy of <strong>Air</strong> and Space, 8-9.<br />
15 Benjamin S. Lambeth, “<strong>Air</strong> Power, Space Power,<br />
and Geography,” 68.<br />
16 Ibid.<br />
17 Wells, <strong>Air</strong>power: Promises and Reality, 301.<br />
18 Peebles, High Frontier, 34.<br />
19 Ibid.<br />
20 Clayton K. S. Chun, Shooting Down a “Star”, 8.<br />
21 Bob Preston, ed., Space Weapons: Earth Wars<br />
(California: RAND Publishers, 2002), 9.<br />
22 Corporation for Atmospheric Research, “U.S.<br />
Pagers Silenced” [on-line], Window to the Universe; available<br />
from http://www.windows.ucar.edu/tour/link=/headline_<br />
universe_e_pagers.html; Internet, accessed 15 Sep 2004.<br />
23 Stephen Lambakis, On the Edge of Earth<br />
(Kentucky: University Press of Kentucky, 2001), 20-23.<br />
24 Maj Burmister, USA, “Space Policy” (Class<br />
Presentation to PS 465 Class on 21 October 2004).<br />
25 Nathan C. Goldman, American Space Law:<br />
55<br />
International and Domestic (Iowa: Iowa State University<br />
Press, 1988), 71.<br />
26 Capt Jason S. Wrachford, USAF, “Space Law”<br />
(Class Presentations to PS 465 Class from 30 September to 10<br />
November 2004).<br />
27 Ibid., 24, 36, 45.<br />
28 Peebles, High Frontier, 65.<br />
29 Chun, Shooting Down a “Star”, 8.<br />
30 Karl P. Mueller, “Totem and Taboo: Depolarizing<br />
the Space Weaponization Debate,” Astropolitics1 (Summer<br />
2003): 5.<br />
31 Peebles, High Frontier, 79.<br />
32 Preston, Space Weapons: Earth Wars, 25.<br />
33 CNN, “U.S. Deploys Satellite Jamming System”<br />
(Washington, D.C.; 1 November 2004), 1.<br />
34 Mueller, “Totem and Taboo,” 7.<br />
35 Ibid.<br />
36 Glenn H. Reynolds and Robert P. Merges, Outer<br />
Space: Problems of Law and Policy (Boulder, CO: Westview<br />
Press, 1997), 52.<br />
37 Goure, <strong>Air</strong> and Space Power, 107.<br />
38 Chun, Shooting Down a “Starr”, 4.<br />
39 Ibid., 35.<br />
40 Maj Richard VanHook, USAF, “Satellite<br />
Communications” (Class Presentation to MSS 485 Class on<br />
12 October 2004).<br />
41 Ibid., 36.<br />
42 Ibid., 35.<br />
43 Maj Kirk J. Taylor, USA, Arming the Skies: The<br />
Right Time has not yet Arrived (Ft. Leavenworth, KS: School<br />
of Advanced Military Studies, 2000), 1.<br />
44 Maj James L. Hyatt, III, USAF, Space Power 2010<br />
(Maxwell AFB, AL: <strong>Air</strong> University Press, 1995), 5.<br />
45 Maj Richard VanHook, USAF, “Satellite<br />
Communications.”<br />
46 Ibid.<br />
47 Chun, Shooting Down a “Star”, 35.<br />
48 Frank G. Koltz, Space, Commerce, and National<br />
Security (New York, NY: Council on Foreign Relations Press,<br />
1998), 1.<br />
49 John H. Gibbons, Anti-Satellite Weapons,<br />
Countermeasures, and Arms Control (Washington D.C.:<br />
Office of Technology Development, 1985), 22.<br />
50 Bhuphendra Jasani, Space Weapons – The Arms<br />
Control Dilemma (Philadelphia, PA: Taylor and Francis,<br />
1984), 11.<br />
51 Ibid, 12-13.<br />
52 Joan Johnson-Freese, The Viability of U.S. Anti-<br />
Satellite (ASAT) Policy: Moving Towards Space Control<br />
(USAFA, CO: USAF Institute for National Security Studies,
2000), 5.<br />
53 Jasani, Space Weapons, 14.<br />
54 Paul B. Stares, Space and National Security<br />
(Washington D.C.: The Brookings Institute, 1987), 85.<br />
55 Clayton K. S. Chun, Shooting Down a “Star”,<br />
xiii.<br />
56 David Darling, “Orbits” [on-line]. The<br />
Encyclopedia of Astrobiology, Astronomy, and Spaceflight;<br />
Internet; available from http://www.daviddarling.info/<br />
encyclopedia/O/orbit.html; Internet, accessed 16 March<br />
2005.<br />
57 Maj Richard VanHook, USAF, “Satellite<br />
Communications.”<br />
58 Maj Burmister, USA, “Space Policy.”<br />
59 Thomas C. Schelling, Arms and Influence (New<br />
York, NY: Yale University Press, 1966), 5.<br />
60 Scott Pace, Assessing options for Anti-Satellite<br />
Arms Control: The Analytical Hierarchy Process (Santa<br />
Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, 1986), 5.<br />
61 Ibid., 95.<br />
62 James H Straubel, et. al. Space Weapons: A<br />
Handbook of Military Astronautics (New York, NY:<br />
Praeger Publishers, 1959, 11.<br />
63 Joseph S. Nye, Jr. and James A. Schear, Seeking<br />
Stability in Space: Anti-Satellite Weapons and the Evolving<br />
Space Regime (Lanham, MD: University Press of America,<br />
1987), 5.<br />
64 H. Guyford Stever and Heinz R. Pagels, The<br />
High Technologies and Reducing the Risk of War (New<br />
York, NY: The New York <strong>Academy</strong> of Sciences, 1986), 49.<br />
65 Jasani, Space Weapons, 14.<br />
66 H. Guyford Stever and Heinz R. Pagels, The<br />
High Technologies, 23.<br />
67 Ibid.<br />
68 Glenn H. Reynolds and Robert P. Merges,<br />
Outer Space, 52.<br />
69 Thomas C. Schelling, Arms and Influence, 5.<br />
70 CMD Joe A. Baker, USN, A U.S. ASAT: Do<br />
We Need It? (Maxwell AFB, AL: <strong>Air</strong> War College, 1989),<br />
17-18.<br />
71 Ibid., 18-19.<br />
72 Johnson-Freese, Joan, The Viability of U.S.<br />
Anti-Satellite (ASAT) Policy, 9.<br />
73 CMD Joe A. Baker, USN, A U.S. ASAT: Do<br />
We Need It?, 18.<br />
74 Maj Richard VanHook, USAF, “Satellite<br />
Communications.”<br />
75 John A. Tirpak, “Securing the Space Arena”<br />
[on-line], <strong>Air</strong> <strong>Force</strong> Magazine Online Internet; available<br />
from http://www.afa.org/magazine/July2004/0704space.<br />
56<br />
asp, accessed 17 March 2005.<br />
76 “Cuba Identified as Likely Jamming Source of U.S.<br />
Satellite Programming to Iran” [on-line], Primedia; Internet;<br />
available from http://broadcastengineering.com/news/<br />
broadcasting_cuba_identified_likely/, accessed 17 March<br />
2005.<br />
77 Ibid.<br />
78 Joseph S. Nye, Jr. and James A. Schear, Seeking<br />
Stability in Space, 6.<br />
79 Glenn H. Reynolds and Robert P. Merges, Outer<br />
Space, 8.<br />
80 “Cuba Identified as Likely Jamming Source of U.S.<br />
Satellite Programming to Iran” [on-line], Primedia.<br />
81 John A. Tirpak, “Securing the Space Arena” [online],<br />
<strong>Air</strong> <strong>Force</strong> Magazine Online.<br />
82 “Attack” [on-line], Google Dictionary, Internet;<br />
available from http://www.google.com/search? hl=en&lr=&<br />
oi=defmore&q=define:attack; Internet, accessed 17 March<br />
2005.<br />
83 Thomas C. Schelling, Arms and Influence, 22.<br />
84 John H. Gibbons, Anti-Satellite Weapons,<br />
Countermeasures, and Arms Control, 9.<br />
85 Maj Richard VanHook, USAF, “Satellite<br />
Communications.”<br />
86 “Defense Satellite Communications System Phase<br />
III,” USAF Fact Sheet February 2000 [on-line]; available<br />
from http://www.losangeles.af.mil/SMC/PA/Fact_Sheets/<br />
dscs_fs.htm; Internet, accessed 17 March 2005.<br />
87 “Congress Balks at Hubble Repairs,” Associated<br />
Press; 2 February 2005 [on-line]; available from http://www.<br />
wired.com /news/space/0,2697,66486,00.html; Internet,<br />
accessed 17 March 2005.<br />
88 Ibid.<br />
89 Maj Richard VanHook, USAF, “Satellite<br />
Communications.”<br />
90 “QinetiQ Counters Satellite Jamming,,” Space<br />
Newsfeed 4 March 2004 [on-line]; available from http://<br />
www.spacenewsfeed.co.uk/2004/7March2004_23.html;<br />
Internet, accessed 17 March 2005.<br />
91 Ibid.
NO COERCION HERE:<br />
THE SOVIET MILITARY EXPEDITION IN<br />
AFHGANISTAN, 1979-1989<br />
By:<br />
C3C Roland W. Olmstead<br />
Introduction<br />
The Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan in 1989<br />
was a result of the pressures that were building towards the<br />
impending collapse of the Soviet Union rather than military<br />
defeat at the hands of the mujahideen and its foreign supporters.<br />
This paper seeks to accomplish four goals: (1) create<br />
a framework for analyzing coercion based on Robert Pape’s<br />
theory of coercion and additional considerations based on<br />
politics and the difficulties inherent in coercing non-state<br />
actors; (2) understand the objectives and strategy of each participant<br />
in the conflict along with the reality on the ground;<br />
(3) consider the course and results of the war from the point<br />
of view of each of the participants through the lens of coercion<br />
as established in the framework; (4) draw conclusions<br />
and ‘lessons learned’ from this war and apply them to the current<br />
US involvement in Afghanistan.<br />
Framework<br />
To understand what coercion is, it must first be<br />
understood what it is not. Coercion is not brute force.<br />
Although the two concepts share the use of force as a means<br />
of conforming an enemy’s behavior to the coercer’s will they<br />
differ in that brute force imposes that conformity, whereas<br />
coercion convinces the enemy to comply. 1 Coercion is also not<br />
deterrence. The difference is the desired end state: deterrence<br />
aims at maintaining the status quo while coercion seeks to<br />
alter the enemy’s behavior. 2<br />
In his book, Bombing to Win: <strong>Air</strong> Power and Coercion<br />
in War, Robert Pape defines coercion, analyzes the three<br />
type of coercive strategies, and offers six propositions concerning<br />
the success or failure of conventional coercion. He<br />
defines coercion as “efforts to change the behavior of a state<br />
by manipulating costs and benefits”. 3 To better understand<br />
these costs and benefits, Pape has created an equation that<br />
relates the resistance of an enemy (R) to the benefits of resistance<br />
(B), the probability of successful resistance (p(B)), the<br />
costs of resistance (C), and the probability of suffering those<br />
costs (p(C)), which mathematically is expressed as R = B*p(B)<br />
- C*p(C). 4 Thus, when the costs of resisting exceed the benefits,<br />
resistance will cease (R becomes negative) and the enemy<br />
will comply with the coercer’s demands.<br />
This breakdown into factors affecting an enemy’s<br />
decision leads to three coercive strategies, each one specifi-<br />
57<br />
cally targeted at one of the variables. The punishment strategy<br />
inflicts maximum death and destruction on the civilian<br />
population. 5 The risk strategy also targets the civilian population<br />
but with scheduled intervals of no hostilities to give the<br />
people the opportunity to consider changing their policy. 6<br />
Finally, the denial strategy targets the enemy’s military strategy<br />
and capabilities, including both fielded forces and logistical<br />
support. 7 Pape argues that the benefits of resisting (B)<br />
cannot be manipulated by a coercer but that the other three<br />
variables can be targeted by the three coercive strategies: punishment<br />
aims at increasing the cost of continued resistance<br />
(C), risk tries to increase the probability of costs (p(C)), and<br />
denial seeks to decrease the probability that resistance will be<br />
successful or beneficial (p(B)). 8 The success of each of these<br />
strategies, punishment, risk, and denial, will be tested in light<br />
of the Soviet-Afghan conflict.<br />
Having defined coercion and its three associated<br />
strategies, Pape puts forward six propositions regarding conventional<br />
coercion. The validity of these conclusions will also<br />
be cross-examined against the author’s findings in regards to<br />
the Soviet decision to withdrawal from Afghanistan, the culmination<br />
of which occurred in 1989. They are:<br />
1. Punishment strategies will rarely succeed<br />
2. Risk strategies will fail<br />
3. Denial strategies work best<br />
4. Surrender of homeland territory is especially<br />
unlikely<br />
5. Surrender terms that incorporate heavy additional<br />
punishment will not be accepted<br />
6. Coercive success almost always takes longer than<br />
the logic of either punishment or denial alone would suggest. 9<br />
Pape’s theory, while concise and scientific, suffers<br />
from two serious shortcomings: the failure to consider political<br />
limitations that restrict coercive efforts and the inherent<br />
difficulties of coercing non-state actors, both of paramount<br />
importance in the case of Afghanistan in the 1980’s. First,<br />
political limitations to prosecuting successful coercion include<br />
the necessity of popular domestic support, the effect on the<br />
economy, the costs in terms of people, money, resources, and<br />
opportunity costs, the reality that limited operations equates<br />
to limited options, and the need to balance commitments. 10<br />
All of these factors may restrict the coercer from choosing<br />
the optimal or the best mix of coercive instruments. Second,<br />
non-state actors (NSAs), as implied by their name, do not<br />
behave like states. They act in their own interest and often<br />
ignore the state government if one exists. 11 Indirect coercion<br />
is often fruitless because the NSAs simply do not care. Thus<br />
coercive measures must be that much more precise when<br />
identifying and targeting a non-state actor’s centers of gravity.
Further difficulties include gathering accurate intelligence,<br />
the lack of viable targets, the traditional adaptation to coercive<br />
efforts by NSAs, and the fact that the leaders of NSAs<br />
often have only nominal control of their organizations. 12 If<br />
the difference between conventional coercion and coercing<br />
NSAs is not properly understood, much effort may be misdirected,<br />
especially if conventional coercive strategies are applied<br />
against a non-state actor, leading to great frustration and<br />
waste and possible defeat.<br />
Having defined what coercion is, and what it is not,<br />
set up the three coercive strategies, put forward six propositions<br />
concerning coercion, and added political and NSA<br />
considerations to Pape’s theory, it is time to examine the facts<br />
surrounding the Soviet invasion, occupation, and withdrawal<br />
from Afghanistan during the decade lasting from 1979-1989.<br />
Facts<br />
The history of Afghanistan has been more cyclical<br />
than linear. Although time has moved on, technology<br />
has progressed, and enemies have changed, the Afghan pattern<br />
has remained the same. The Afghans have fought each<br />
other until a foreign power would invade, at which time they<br />
united against their common enemy and, as soon as the foreigners<br />
had been repelled, immediately returned to fighting<br />
one another. This pattern has repeated itself multiple times<br />
against the Russians and the British and the Soviet intervention<br />
would be no different, nor would its aftermath.<br />
To outsiders, Afghanistan has always been a means<br />
rather than an end in itself. The British originally became<br />
involved in Afghanistan not because they wanted to colonize<br />
it but because it would serve as a buffer to protect the crown<br />
jewel of the British Empire: India. Likewise, the Soviets in<br />
1979 did not want Afghanistan for itself but as a stepping<br />
stone to Iran, which was home to much-coveted warm water<br />
ports and oil. 13 The Soviets were not the only foreigners<br />
who would try to use Afghanistan during the 1980’s. All of<br />
the mujahideen’s supporters offered their help with their own<br />
interests in mind, none of which happened to coincide with<br />
the well being of the Afghan people.<br />
The Soviets had a long history of dealing with the<br />
Afghans but put it to surprisingly poor use. They were also<br />
accustomed to ruling large populations of Central Asian Muslims,<br />
50 million of whom were living under the aegis of the<br />
USSR as of 1990. 14 This led to the second objective pursued<br />
by the Soviets in Afghanistan: suppression of growing Islamic<br />
radicalism, particularly before it could spread to the Islamic<br />
populations directly under Soviet control. 15 A third more<br />
immediate objective prompted the Soviet intervention and<br />
that was the establishment and immediate teetering of a communist-style<br />
government in Afghanistan. The Soviet leadership<br />
felt a strong need to support socialist and communist<br />
58<br />
governments wherever they appeared, especially in a country<br />
in such close proximity to the USSR.<br />
At the outset of the conflict, the Afghans lacked<br />
any kind of national identity or purpose save one: evict the<br />
Soviets. Independence was achieved from British interference<br />
in 1919 and the King Muhammad Zahir Shah ruled<br />
for forty years until he became a constitutional monarch in<br />
1964 and was subsequently overthrown in 1973. 16 Although<br />
Afghanistan tried to remain non-aligned, Soviet influence<br />
began to creep in during the 1960’s. 17 Tribal and religious<br />
loyalties remained strong and often superseded nationalistic<br />
or political allegiance. In 1978, the Afghan communists, with<br />
Soviet support, seized power and began implementing socialist<br />
reforms. 18 Such secular communism was too much for<br />
most Afghans, including both radical and nominal Muslims. 19<br />
Some declared a jihad (literally: struggle) against the Afghan<br />
communists and many army units mutinied. 20 The resistors,<br />
irrespective of their tribal or religious affiliation, collectively<br />
became known to the world as mujahideen, or those who<br />
practice jihad.<br />
By 1979, it was clear that Afghanistan’s experiment<br />
in communism had gone drastically wrong. Three problems<br />
led to eventual Soviet intervention. First was the resistance of<br />
the people to the new government’s socialist-based reforms.<br />
Mir Husain quotes Olivier Roy who said that this reaction<br />
“was expressed in the garb of a defense of Islam, because Islam<br />
was inextricably bound to tradition in the worldview of the<br />
Afghan peasantry.” 21 Second, infighting plagued the Afghan<br />
communist party, known as the People’s Democratic Party of<br />
Afghanistan (PDPA). 22 Nur Muhammad Taraki and Hafizullah<br />
Amin, the prime minister and deputy prime minister,<br />
respectively, ended up in conflict with the eventual murder of<br />
Taraki. 23 Third, the final straw was the falling out between<br />
Amin and the Soviets, specifically after his appeal to the West<br />
for aid. 24 So prompted, the Soviets invaded in December,<br />
murdered Amin, and installed their own puppet: Barbak<br />
Karmal. 25 Thus began an occupation that would last over<br />
nine years (). It would be a time of great suffering for both<br />
the Soviets and the Afghans, with the only real success being<br />
achieved on behalf of the radical Islamists, especially the Taliban<br />
and Al Qaida.<br />
The Soviet invasion provoked an outcry around the<br />
world but it was in the Muslim world that the cry resonated<br />
the deepest. It was as if a match had been struck and lit the<br />
fire of Islamic unity, which previously had only been achieved<br />
during the Arab-Israeli Wars. The Islamists who sent money<br />
and those who went themselves shared the single-minded<br />
vision of the Afghans but with a slight twist: evict the atheists<br />
from dar Al-Islam (the House of Islam). 26 They saw the invasion<br />
through a religious rather than a political lens: that this
was an attack on Islam. 27 Radical Muslims from a myriad of<br />
countries made their way to neighboring Pakistan to support,<br />
train, and fight with the mujahideen. Many of their governments,<br />
under the threat of growing domestic problems such as<br />
severe unemployment, were facing opposition from Islamists<br />
and were glad to see them go, moreover, privately hoped that<br />
they would become martyrs in the Afghan jihad. 28 The Saudis<br />
even subsidized one-way plane tickets to Pakistan. 29 Thus, the<br />
war expanded from an Afghan civil war, to attempted subversion<br />
and colonization by the USSR, to a ‘clash of civilizations’<br />
between Atheism and Islam.<br />
The <strong>United</strong> <strong>States</strong> saw and used Afghanistan strictly<br />
in terms of the Cold War. Prior to Soviet involvement,<br />
the US turned down Afghan requests for aid and generally<br />
ignored the region. After the Soviet withdrawal, the US<br />
would again turn its back on Afghanistan until it was attacked<br />
by the Afghan-based Al Qaida on 11 September 2001. In<br />
the interim period, the primary US objective was to prevent<br />
Soviet expansion into southwest Asia in general and in the<br />
direction of the Persian Gulf, whose oil was considered to<br />
be in the US national interest, in particular. 30 The strategy<br />
chosen to check this Soviet aggression was largely colored by<br />
the US’s recent exit from Vietnam and the strong desire to<br />
avoid getting involved in another ‘dirty war.’ 31 Thus, the massive<br />
amounts of financial aid and weapons (ironically, most<br />
of which were Soviet manufactured 32 ) supplied to the mujahideen<br />
was given with no US oversight. “For as long as these<br />
mujahedin were giving the Soviets a “hard time”, Washington<br />
remained oblivious to, and unconcerned about, their anti-<br />
US posture, penchant for terrorism, involvement in the drug<br />
trade, and even their alienation from the vast majority of the<br />
Afghan population in whose name, and for whose liberation,<br />
these mujahedin were ostensibly fighting.” 33<br />
Following the traditional use of Afghanistan as a<br />
‘means,’ the initial US policy was to only supply enough aid<br />
to make the Soviets bleed but not enough to give the mujahideen<br />
the decisive edge needed to obtain victory. 34 This covert<br />
aid changed when President Ronald Reagan issued National<br />
Security Directive #166, which called for all available means<br />
to be employed to evict the Soviets from Afghanistan. 35 The<br />
two immediate results of this Directive were the establishment<br />
of training camps in Pakistan and Stingers. 36 Approximately<br />
900 man-portable Stinger surface-to-air missiles were supplied<br />
to the mujahideen who put them to use against the Soviet and<br />
Afghan <strong>Air</strong> <strong>Force</strong>s. 37 The Afghans inflicted significant but not<br />
irreproachable casualties, particularly against Soviet helicopters.<br />
The Soviets had pursued a three-pronged strategy in<br />
trying to subdue Afghanistan. First, they set about dividing<br />
and destroying the Afghan leadership. 38 Second, they wanted<br />
59<br />
to erode the mujahideen base of popular support by destroying<br />
the social and economic infrastructure of the country. 39<br />
Third and finally, they tried to isolate the region from the<br />
outside world. 40<br />
The Afghans responded in accordance with their<br />
own great military tradition: let them come and suffer. They<br />
pursued a classical insurgency strategy of raising the cost of<br />
remaining in country to the point that it become unbearable<br />
for the Soviets to pay. The other component of their strategy<br />
is what saved the Afghans a myriad of times throughout history:<br />
great endurance and patience. This time was different<br />
in that it is unlikely that the mujahideen would have survived<br />
without external support.<br />
The effectiveness of the non-Afghan fighters, especially<br />
the so-called ‘Arab Afghans,’ against the Soviets has long<br />
been highly overrated, especially by the Arabs themselves.<br />
This should not diminish their contribution but it was propping<br />
up and keeping the mujahideen alive rather than militarily<br />
defeating the Soviets. Their largest contribution was<br />
monetary not military. They built training camps and Islamic<br />
schools across Pakistan in support of the resistance and to<br />
provide Islamic motivation and education.<br />
As in most wars, the objectives and the strategies<br />
of the parties varied dramatically with the reality on the<br />
ground. The Soviets kept the larger strategic picture in mind<br />
and nearly won, despite incredible tactical deficiencies. The<br />
Afghans margin of success was much slimmer than is usually<br />
portrayed, especially by the Western media. The Islamists,<br />
while contributing little towards defeating the Soviets, made<br />
incredible gains in Afghanistan that would rapidly spread<br />
throughout the Islamic world and beyond. The US strategy,<br />
while beneficial to the mujahideen, had only a minimal<br />
impact in compelling the Soviets to withdraw and had the<br />
unintended consequence of building and funding radical<br />
Islam, which would redirect its wrath from the Soviet Union<br />
to its former patron, the West and the <strong>United</strong> <strong>States</strong> in particular.<br />
Of the three strategies pursued by the Soviets two<br />
were successful. Throughout the war, the Soviets kept the<br />
mujahideen divided and constantly checking their backs<br />
against potential treachery. Afghan unity is an oxymoron<br />
and the Soviets played it to full effect. Secondly, the Soviets<br />
inflicted an incredible amount of punishment on the Afghan<br />
people, with an estimated one million dead in Afghanistan<br />
and “significant numbers of the 3 to 5 million refugees living<br />
in Pakistan [who] were also killed.” 41 Their goal was to<br />
undermine mujahideen’s base of popular support and to show<br />
that they were incapable of protecting the people from Soviet<br />
retribution. In this they were again largely successful. The<br />
problem lies in the third objective, which was not realized.
Although the mujahideen were divided and lost the support of<br />
the Afghan people over the course of the war, they managed<br />
to survive because the Soviets could not effectively isolate<br />
them. The majority of the engagements between communist<br />
and mujahideen forces took place on or near the Afghan<br />
border. Pakistani support in particular was critical to keeping<br />
the Afghan resistance alive and was largely supplemented by<br />
both the Muslim world and the <strong>United</strong> <strong>States</strong>.<br />
What is most often highlighted when recounting the<br />
Soviet-Afghan War is the tactical success of the mujahideen<br />
against the Soviets. The question is often posed: how were a<br />
rag-tag bunch of guerillas able to defeat one of the world’s two<br />
great superpowers? While strategically the mujahideen were<br />
very near defeat, they scored many tactical successes because<br />
of Soviet ineptitude in fighting insurgents. 42 Afghanistan’s<br />
rugged terrain and porous borders provide the ideal environment<br />
for guerilla tactics such as ambushes, hit-and-run<br />
raids, sniping, etc. Likewise, the Limited Contingent of<br />
Soviet <strong>Force</strong>s in Afghanistan (LCSFA) was a conventional<br />
force assigned an unconventional mission. 43 The motorized<br />
rifle companies employed against the mujahideen were not<br />
trained, equipped, or motivated to fight under such conditions.<br />
Morale among the conscripted Soviet solders plummeted,<br />
especially as the war dragged on for a decade. One<br />
of the greatest Soviet failures was the slow pace at which they<br />
adapted their tactics and applied ‘lessons learned.’ 44 There<br />
was no sense of urgency and very limited sharing of experiences.<br />
Thus, the Afghan resistors could frequently re-employ<br />
the same traps and tactics and the Soviets simply absorbed the<br />
punishment. As the war dragged on the Soviets did improve,<br />
introducing a special Counter-Insurgency <strong>Force</strong>, taking<br />
advantage of their total air superiority, and, increasingly, providing<br />
combat support to the Afghan communists. 45 Also,<br />
the Limited Contingent of Soviet <strong>Force</strong>s in Afghanistan was<br />
just that: limited, and it remained so throughout the war. 46<br />
More forces might have provided the mass needed to overcome<br />
the mujahideen but not necessarily. More rapid progression<br />
of counterinsurgency tactics and cutting off outside aid<br />
would have harmed the mujahideen far more than the introduction<br />
of additional Soviet troops.<br />
Despite their incredible tactical shortcomings, the<br />
Soviets nearly won and throughout the conflict they kept the<br />
larger strategic vision firmly in view. The <strong>United</strong> <strong>States</strong> was<br />
not the only one to learn from Vietnam. The Soviet leadership<br />
observed and made sure that Afghanistan did not become<br />
‘their Vietnam,’ despite frequent allegations to the contrary.<br />
They did this by keeping Afghanistan from dominating the<br />
larger strategic picture because, in reality, their intervention<br />
there was not that important to the Soviet national interest<br />
and by imposing and adhering to a strict limitation on the<br />
60<br />
number of troops. They did not allow Afghanistan to become<br />
a ‘black hole’ of men and materiel that Vietnam was to the<br />
<strong>United</strong> <strong>States</strong>. This larger strategic vision, while ultimately<br />
successful in preventing Soviet over commitment in Afghanistan,<br />
also proved exceptionally frustrating for the troops in<br />
theater. Because Afghanistan was intentionally a low priority,<br />
so too was improving tactics, learning proper counterinsurgency,<br />
and providing the necessary troops and equipment that<br />
would be necessary for victory. 47<br />
The Afghans won, as do many insurgents, by not<br />
losing. Although they remained divided and absorbed tremendous<br />
punishment, they were kept alive by outside intervention.<br />
Their military success, and even more so of the ‘Arab<br />
Afghans,’ has been greatly inflated but this does not take away<br />
from their courage, tenacity, and perseverance. The value of<br />
US involvement also tends to be grossly overestimated, especially<br />
the effectiveness of the Stinger surface-to-air missiles.<br />
Even after the implementation of National Security Directive<br />
#166, at no time were the Soviets ‘bled white.’ During the<br />
war the Soviets suffered 13,000 killed in action and many<br />
more in non-combat related accidents and fatalities but at no<br />
time was the punishment inflicted excessive or unbearable.<br />
Even the celebrated Stingers, while quite effectively employed,<br />
did not bring about a change in the Soviet mind. These casualty<br />
figures are actually quite miniscule when considered in<br />
light of the Soviet history of absorbing millions of casualties<br />
during World War II.<br />
The results of this conflict, so often misconstrued,<br />
were nonetheless far reaching. The Soviet withdrawal, completed<br />
in 1989, and the subsequent collapse of the Soviet<br />
Union are frequently linked in the minds of the Afghans and<br />
Arabs. Essentially, they claim that they fought and defeated<br />
a superpower and thereby caused its collapse. However, this<br />
is a fallacy known as post hoc ergo propter hoc, which literally<br />
means ‘after this therefore because of this.’ Because the<br />
collapse of the USSR occurred shortly after the Soviet withdrawal<br />
from Afghanistan, many in the Islamic world, most<br />
prominently Osama bin Laden, attribute the withdrawal as a<br />
major cause of the collapse. The truth is the exact opposite:<br />
the impending collapse of the USSR led to the withdrawal<br />
of Soviet forces from Afghanistan. However fallacious, bin<br />
Laden and many of his colleagues’ conclusion has led to their<br />
belief that a small group of Muslim fighters can defeat and<br />
moreover destroy a superpower. They have turned their attention<br />
to the <strong>United</strong> <strong>States</strong> and attacked her, most dramatically<br />
on 11 September 2001, in hopes that the US would be drawn<br />
into Afghanistan and defeated, repeating the Soviet experience.<br />
Although the Soviet Union collapsed shortly after the<br />
1989 withdrawal, Russia has remained involved in Central
Asia in general and Afghanistan in particular. Two problems<br />
linger from the Soviet-Afghan War and they both revolve<br />
around Islamic radicalism. Immediately after the Soviet<br />
withdrawal, the world turned its back on Afghanistan and<br />
this allowed the radical Taliban to seize power and moreover<br />
to export it, particularly to the newly created Central Asian<br />
republics. Thus, the original Soviet objective of checking<br />
the growth of radical Islam was a dismal failure. Chechnya<br />
illustrates this problem even closer to home; but there is also<br />
another inherited problem of the Soviet-Afghan War: tactical<br />
incompetence when fighting insurgents. The Russian Army<br />
suffers today against Chechnyan rebels from many of the<br />
same deficiencies that the LCSFA had against the Afghans.<br />
Many in the West expected the almost immediate<br />
collapse of the Afghan communist government upon the<br />
withdrawal of the last Soviet forces, similar to collapse of<br />
South Vietnam after the American withdrawal. But such was<br />
not the case. Najibullah remained in power until 1992, when<br />
his government finally collapsed and chaos ensued until order<br />
was restored by the Taliban. This was because the mujahideen,<br />
never united, began fighting each other even before the<br />
Soviet withdrawal was complete. Another factor was that<br />
outside support for the mujahideen rapidly dried up, while<br />
Najbullah continued to receive significant Soviet assistance.<br />
The conflict in Afghanistan between religion and<br />
tribalism was successfully manipulated by outsiders, ensuring<br />
further chaos in the wake of the Soviet withdrawal. The<br />
Pakistani government, fearful of Pashtun desires for autonomy<br />
within their own country, helped create the madrassahs<br />
(Islamic schools) that spawned the Taliban desiring to unite<br />
the people under the banner of Islam rather than tribalism.<br />
The Soviets, in the process of their retreat northwards, reignited<br />
Pashtun and Uzbek nationalism as a counterweight to<br />
radical Islam. These forces have been at work up to the present<br />
day, seen in the rise and subsequent fall of the Taliban.<br />
Fit<br />
Now that a framework has been created for analyzing<br />
coercion and the case study of Afghanistan has been examined<br />
in depth, the question remains, were any of the participants<br />
able to successfully execute a coercive strategy? The answer<br />
in every case, for the Soviets, for the mujahideen, for the<br />
Islamists, and for the <strong>United</strong> <strong>States</strong>, is a resounding ‘no!’<br />
The Soviets were successful at employing both punishment<br />
and risk strategies against the Afghans but they failed<br />
miserably at denial. The Soviets inflicted tremendous pain on<br />
the Afghan population and even undermined their support of<br />
the mujahideen, but it did not matter; this was not critical to<br />
the resistance. They also successfully killed and divided the<br />
Afghan resistance factions; in Pape’s words, the risk strategy of<br />
decapitation. Again, this was important but not crucial to the<br />
61<br />
survival of the mujahideen. Although some could argue that<br />
the Soviets also attempted a denial strategy, in reality it was<br />
brute force. It failed because of the tactical incompetence at<br />
the outset of the conflict and the lethargic pace at which the<br />
LCSFA adapted.<br />
The underlying reasons for the Soviet failure mesh<br />
well with Pape’s propositions regarding conventional coercion.<br />
As predicted, punishment and risk failed and denial, which<br />
has the potential for success, did not occur. Furthermore,<br />
the costs of surrendering were too great for the Afghans to<br />
accept. Pape notes that the surrender of homeland territory is<br />
unlikely. Even more than this, the Afghans were being asked<br />
to accept a completely new culture, ideology, and worldview,<br />
which the Afghan communists tried to impose. The Soviets<br />
recognized that trying to impose such drastic and draconian<br />
changes would be counterproductive and advised the PDPA<br />
accordingly. But the Afghan communists preceded and successfully<br />
stirred up nearly all the Afghans against the communists.<br />
The Soviets, once they directly intervened, were thus<br />
compelled to use brute force against the Afghans as nothing<br />
short of total defeat would be enough to make the Afghans<br />
into communists.<br />
The Afghans also failed to coerce the Soviets to leave<br />
their country. They pursued primarily a punishment strategy,<br />
hoping to make the cost of remaining in Afghanistan<br />
outweigh the benefit by killing as many Soviet soldiers as<br />
possible. Their problem was that the Soviet Armed <strong>Force</strong>s<br />
(SVS) could absorb tremendous losses with no real effect on<br />
capability or their will to continue the war. Casualties paled<br />
in comparison to Soviet losses during World War II or even<br />
American losses in Vietnam. Also, by keeping the LCSFA<br />
truly limited, there was never any real danger that Afghaninflicted<br />
punishment would rise to unacceptable levels.<br />
The mujahideen were never in a strong enough position<br />
to effectively employ a denial strategy. Although they<br />
won many small engagements, the Soviets retained the strategic<br />
initiative throughout the war and could do anything they<br />
wanted, provided they were willing to pay the price. 48 “Significantly,<br />
throughout the lengthy and bitter war in Afghanistan<br />
the resistance was unable to challenge the Soviet hold<br />
over even a single strategically-important asset.” 49<br />
The Islamic supporters of the mujahideen saw their<br />
objective accomplished, namely Soviet withdrawal, but they<br />
contributed very little to that success. Their real contribution<br />
was in propping up the mujahideen, and so they did not exercise<br />
any type of coercion.<br />
Likewise, the US achieved its objective only at a tremendous<br />
cost. The massive aid provided to the mujahideen<br />
also meant that anti-American factions would subsequently<br />
turn against their Western patrons. Not only did the US have
a minimal impact on the Soviet decision to withdraw from<br />
Afghanistan, its attempts spawned disastrous side effects.<br />
Having established that there was no successful coercion<br />
from 1979-1989 in Afghanistan, the question remains,<br />
what caused the Soviet withdrawal? The answer lies beyond<br />
Pape’s theory in the larger political context of the Cold War.<br />
The Afghans won not because of any military success<br />
against the LCSFA, but because of the one thing they<br />
did not do: surrender. In 1985, Mikhail Gorbachev came<br />
to power in the USSR and he immediately began to consider<br />
how to remove the LCSFA. 50 He did this not because<br />
of the punishment that the Afghans were inflicting on the<br />
Soviets, but because he recognized the “long-festering Soviet<br />
weaknesses…[that] later brought the collapse of the Soviet<br />
Communist power and the USSR itself.” 51 Ronald Reagan<br />
was effectively ‘spending the Soviets into the ground’ by<br />
building cold war arms at a rate at which the Soviet economy<br />
could simply not compete. As Gorbachev embarked on his<br />
reformation of communism he encountered growing public<br />
outrage against Soviet troops in Afghanistan. The width and<br />
breadth of the tactical disaster was getting back to the Soviet<br />
people, who could not see the larger strategic picture and how<br />
close the LCSFA was to victory. Having opened Pandora’s<br />
box by allowing criticism of the Soviet system, he was then<br />
unable to contain it in regards to Afghanistan. The impending<br />
economic collapse of the USSR, combined with growing<br />
public pressure, is what finally drove Gorbachev to withdraw<br />
the LCSFA.<br />
Future<br />
The decade of foreign interference in Afghanistan<br />
from 1979-1989 carries many lessons for others who dare<br />
to tread the same ground, especially the <strong>United</strong> State since<br />
it began an armed intervention in Afghanistan in November<br />
2001 following the terrorist attacks of September 11 th . Key<br />
Soviet failures and successes can be avoided and applied by<br />
the <strong>United</strong> <strong>States</strong> in order to accomplish its objectives and<br />
avoid becoming bogged down in a never ending engagement<br />
between US forces and Afghan insurgents.<br />
The <strong>United</strong> <strong>States</strong> must first recognize the will and<br />
motivation of the Afghan people. Over the course of history<br />
they have fiercely opposed attempted occupation by the Russians,<br />
the British, and the Soviets. They will not accept undue<br />
American influence. If forced to fight, they have the stomach<br />
for a long drawn-out war of attrition, in stark contrast to the<br />
American people who are impatient for total victory 52 . The<br />
Afghans have proven over and over again their willingness to<br />
persevere and outlast their enemies. The <strong>United</strong> <strong>States</strong> would<br />
do well to avoid becoming such an enemy.<br />
The second Soviet mistake was the imposition of<br />
an extreme form of government on the Afghan people. The<br />
62<br />
Soviets actually recognized that Taraki and Amin were too<br />
radical and tried to restrain them. 53 Secular communism<br />
proved to be completely unpalatable to the average Afghan. 54<br />
The Soviet efforts were too late and, once they invaded, they<br />
were forced to deal with the consequence: namely, a people<br />
galvanized against the Soviet ideology. The lesson for the<br />
<strong>United</strong> <strong>States</strong> is clear: do not try to impose a foreign system<br />
of government. Any new constitution must be sufficiently<br />
‘Afghan’ and, consequently, Islamic.<br />
The <strong>United</strong> <strong>States</strong> military involvement today in<br />
Afghanistan shares one great similarity with the decade of<br />
Soviet occupation: most of the fighting is between US forces<br />
and insurgents, remnants of both the Taliban and Al Qaida,<br />
and it is occurring on and near the Pakistani border. This<br />
carries two implications, both of which were major Soviet<br />
failures. First, the US forces engaged must learn, refine, and<br />
perfect counterinsurgency tactics. Politically, the US cannot<br />
afford to lose tactical engagements nor suffer casualties anywhere<br />
on the order of the Soviet losses. A system must be<br />
developed to share ‘lessons learned’ and thereby improve<br />
tactics and avoid repeating mistakes. Second, Pakistan must<br />
cease to be a sanctuary for insurgents, who traverse the border<br />
with relative ease. Just as the <strong>United</strong> <strong>States</strong> and sympathetic<br />
Muslim nations supplied the mujahideen via Pakistan, so the<br />
remaining anti-American forces are operating out of Pakistan.<br />
Either the border must be sealed, which geographically is difficult<br />
to impossible, or the fight must be taken to Pakistan,<br />
preferably by Pakistani government forces rather than American<br />
or Western troops, whose presence would likely do more<br />
harm than good. The bottom line is that there will be no<br />
peace or victory in Afghanistan as long as the insurgents have<br />
secure bases to operate out of in Pakistan.<br />
The last lesson for American forces in Afghanistan to<br />
learn from their Soviet predecessors is to clearly grasp the conflict<br />
between ideology, religion and tribalism that so fractures<br />
Afghan society. Afghani, Pakistani and Soviet leaders encouraged<br />
and supported communism, radical Islam and tribalism,<br />
respectively, as a counterweight to the other. The <strong>United</strong><br />
<strong>States</strong>, perhaps unwittingly, has fallen to supporting tribalism<br />
through its alliance with the likes of Uzbek General Dostum<br />
and other ethnically-based groups who opposed the Taliban.<br />
To bring permanent peace and democracy to Afghanistan,<br />
the <strong>United</strong> <strong>States</strong> must find something that supersedes both<br />
ethnic and religious identity. Such a centrifugal force, that is<br />
sufficient to overcome Afghanistan’s many schisms, has yet to<br />
be discovered and applied.<br />
Bibliography<br />
Anonymous, Through Our Enemies’ Eyes: Osama bin Laden,<br />
Radical Islam, and the Future of America, (Washington:
Brassey’s, 2002).<br />
Bodansky, Yossef and Evgeny Nikitenko, “Reflections on<br />
Afghanistan,” Defense & Foreign Affairs’ Strategic<br />
Policy, February 1999.<br />
Bradsher, Henry S., Afghan Communism and Soviet<br />
Intervention, (Oxford: Oxford UP, 1999).<br />
Ewans, Martin, “America and Afghanistan: A Troubled<br />
History,” World and I, 1 March 2002.<br />
Husain, Mir Zohair, Global Islamic Politics, 2d ed., (New<br />
York: Longman, 2003).<br />
McMichael, Scott R., Stumbling Bear: Soviet Military<br />
Performance in Afghanistan, (London: Brassey’s, 1991).<br />
O’Ballance, Edgar, Afghan Wars: Battles in a Hostile Land,<br />
1839 to the Present, rev. ed., (London: Brassey’s, 2002).<br />
Pape, Robert A., Bombing to Win: <strong>Air</strong> Power and Coercion<br />
in War (Ithaca: Cornell UP, 1996).<br />
Phillips, James A., “Consolidating Victory in Afghanistan,”<br />
Heritage Foundation Reports, 20 February 1990.<br />
Rogers, Tom, The Soviet Withdrawal from Afghanistan, Analysis<br />
and Chronology, (Westport: Greenwood, 1992).<br />
Thomas, Troy S. and Stephen D. Kiser, Lords of the Silk<br />
Road: Violent Non-State Actors in Central Asia (US<br />
<strong>Air</strong> <strong>Force</strong> <strong>Academy</strong>: Institute for National Security Studies,<br />
2002).<br />
Acknowledgements<br />
I would like to thank Major Melton for proofreading a draft<br />
of my paper.<br />
I would also like to thank Dr. Talbot for proofreading a draft<br />
of my paper.<br />
Many of the ideas and concepts incorporated into this paper<br />
were discussed and refined during Major Melton’s<br />
MSS 365, T1 class and I would like to thank all those that<br />
took part in those discussions whose ideas were not<br />
directly cited.<br />
(Endnotes)<br />
1 The idea that there is a difference between brute<br />
force and coercion was discussed in Major Melton’s Military<br />
Strategic Studies 365 class, section T1, on 16 January<br />
2004. The example given for brute force was Rome’s total<br />
destruction of Carthage during the Third Punic War.<br />
2 Robert A. Pape, Bombing to Win: <strong>Air</strong> Power and<br />
Coercion in War (Ithaca: Cornell UP, 1996), 4.<br />
3 Ibid.<br />
4 Ibid., 16.<br />
5 Ibid. 21.<br />
63<br />
6 Ibid., 18-19.<br />
7 Ibid., 19.<br />
8 Ibid., 18.<br />
9 Ibid., 20.<br />
10 These factors were covered on 19 February 2004<br />
while discussing the Byman theory of diplomatic coercion in<br />
Maj Melton’s MSS 365 class, section T1.<br />
11 Troy S. Thomas and Stephen D. Kiser, Lords of<br />
the Silk Road: Violent Non-State Actors in Central Asia (US<br />
<strong>Air</strong> <strong>Force</strong> <strong>Academy</strong>: Institute for National Security Studies,<br />
2002), 73.<br />
12 These five challenges to coercing non-state actors<br />
were discussed on 25 February 2004 in Maj Melton’s MSS<br />
365 class, section T1.<br />
13 Yossef Bodansky and Evgeny Nikitenko,<br />
“Reflections on Afghanistan,” Defense & Foreign Affairs’<br />
Strategic Policy, February 1999, 8.<br />
14 James A. Phillips, “Consolidating Victory in<br />
Afghanistan,” Heritage Foundation Reports, 20 February<br />
1990, 1.<br />
15 Bodansky, 8.<br />
16Mir Zohair Husain, Global Islamic Politics, 2d ed.,<br />
(New York: Longman, 2003), 297.<br />
17 Edgar O’Ballance, Afghan Wars: Battles in a Hostile<br />
Land, 1839 to the Present, rev. ed., (London: Brassey’s, 2002),<br />
viii.<br />
18 Husain, 297.<br />
19 Bodansky, 8.<br />
20 Husain, 297.<br />
21 Ibid, 261.<br />
22 O’Ballance, viii.<br />
23 Husain, 262.<br />
24 O’Ballance, viii.
25 Husain, 262.<br />
26 Anonymous, Through Our Enemies’ Eyes: Osama<br />
bin Laden, Radical Islam, and the Future of America,<br />
(Washington: Brassey’s, 2002), 109.<br />
27 Ibid.<br />
28 Ibid., 111.<br />
29 Ibid.<br />
30 Bodansky, 8.<br />
31 Ibid.<br />
32 Martin Ewans, “America and Afghanistan: A<br />
Troubled History,” World and I, 1 March 2002, 20.<br />
33 Bodansky, 8.<br />
34 Ewans, 20.<br />
35 Ibid.<br />
36 Ibid.<br />
37 Ibid.<br />
38 Bodansky, 8.<br />
39 Ibid.<br />
40 Ibid.<br />
41 Pape, 353.<br />
42 Bodansky, 8.<br />
43 Scott R. McMichael, Stumbling Bear: Soviet<br />
Military Performance in Afghanistan, (London: Brassey’s,<br />
1991), xix.<br />
44 Bodansky, 8.<br />
45 McMichael, 52.<br />
46 Ibid.<br />
47 Bodansky, 8.<br />
48 Bodansky, 8.<br />
49 Ibid.<br />
64<br />
50 Tom Rogers, The Soviet Withdrawal from<br />
Afghanistan, Analysis and Chronology, (Westport:<br />
Greenwood, 1992), 3.<br />
51 Henry S. Bradsher, Afghan Communism and Soviet<br />
Intervention, (Oxford: Oxford UP, 1999), xi-xii.<br />
52 The shortness of the American attention span is illustrated<br />
in questions currently being raised such as “why are<br />
Americans still in Iraq one year after the takeover?” whereas<br />
history tends toshow that it takes many years to secure and<br />
rebuild a country.<br />
53 Bodansky, 8.<br />
54 Ibid.
ETHICS IN WARFARE<br />
By C3C David Schill<br />
“For as long as men and women have talked about<br />
war, they have talked about it in terms of right and wrong”<br />
(Walzer 3). From tribal warfare thousands of years ago, to the<br />
stories of King David defeating Goliath and the Philistines,<br />
and to the trench warfare in the recent World Wars, warriors<br />
have fought and killed each other mercilessly. Is this right?<br />
Should the human race be allowed to take the bare essence of<br />
human life away from another? If so, when is this permissible<br />
and what limitations must be placed upon warfare? In order<br />
for warfare to be considered morally right and even allowable,<br />
all actors involved must fight for the correct justifiable purpose,<br />
and they must fight justly and morally.<br />
As in any discussion about ethics or philosophy, it is<br />
necessary to begin with assumptions that lead to the cohesion<br />
of an argument. To begin, morality needs to have a common<br />
definition. Immanuel Kant provides a definition which has<br />
three propositions. First, an action must be done from duty<br />
in order to have any moral worth. The second follows the<br />
first; that this action is not judged by the outcome of the<br />
action, but on the principle of the action itself. Finally, “Duty<br />
is the necessity of an action done out of respect for the law”<br />
(Kant 12-13). Without further definitions of these propositions,<br />
morality is, in essence, doing the right thing because<br />
the action is right in and of itself and because it follows societal<br />
law. This societal law can be determined to be based on<br />
cultural relativism, specifically the cultural attitude founded<br />
on current day Western society. Keep in mind, as James<br />
Rachels states, that cultural relativism “…says that there is<br />
no such thing as a universal truth in ethics, there are only the<br />
various cultural codes” (Rachels 50). Because of the importance<br />
of morality and ethics in warfare to the Western World<br />
in the twenty-first century, this is the best and most natural<br />
viewpoint to take and understand in the discussion.<br />
Now, in order for warfare to exist and occur between<br />
two nations, there must be a conflict or disagreement of some<br />
sort between the two. There must be a purpose for going to<br />
war. For example, the citizens of Great Britain living in the<br />
Americas during the eighteenth century went to war because<br />
of unfair taxation and representation, as well as a desire to<br />
govern themselves. Hitler went to war in order to destroy<br />
inferior races and gain land for the supreme German race.<br />
What is the difference between the two reasons?<br />
Jus ad bellum, the justice of war, requires the judgment<br />
of the reason or purpose for going to war. It questions<br />
the moral worth of aggression, self-defense, and human integrity<br />
in warfare (Walzer 21). Did Hitler have a just purpose<br />
65<br />
of going to war? Obviously to destroy an inferior race and<br />
conquer land is not a just purpose for going to war. Did the<br />
soon to be American citizens have a just purpose for going to<br />
war? Were they pushed to war with extreme and unfair taxation<br />
and lack of representation, and have to defend themselves<br />
against such treatment?<br />
The principles of jus ad bellum can easily answer<br />
these questions and determine which action of warfare was<br />
moral and which was not. John Locke, in the seventeenth<br />
century, developed these widely used principles. To begin, he<br />
states that governments have the responsibility and the duty<br />
to provide national security to their people. Secondly, the<br />
citizens have the responsibility of supporting wars of national<br />
defense and resisting aggression by foreign states. Lastly,<br />
the citizens also have the right to oppose domestic or international<br />
aggression by their own governments. Just as individual<br />
men have no natural right to commit attack on the life,<br />
liberty, health, and possessions of others, governments have<br />
no right to attack its neighbors lives, liberties, and possessions<br />
(Davidson 130-131).<br />
If no government has the right to attack another<br />
government, then the only just and moral action in warfare<br />
is self-defense. In all wars, one nation is the aggressor, while<br />
the other is the victim of this aggression. The nation then,<br />
who pursues this initial attack, is then acting aggressively in<br />
an unjust manner. The victim nation, by defending itself,<br />
and eventually defeating and punishing the aggressor, is acting<br />
justly. The case of World War Two is obvious, in which the<br />
Axis Powers were the unjust aggressors. However, are the<br />
colonists of Great Britain, who desire their own nation, unjust<br />
because they initiated the attack? Or were they acting in selfdefense<br />
to protect their rights and liberties. This answer is<br />
not as clear cut as the first, and can be argued either way. Its<br />
ambiguity provides evidence of jus ad bellum, or the need to<br />
have justice in determining the purpose of warfare. Just ad<br />
bellum also forces the actors to have a justifiable reason for<br />
being in the war.<br />
“It is perfectly possible for a just war to be fought<br />
unjustly and for an unjust war to be fought in strict accordance<br />
with the rules” (Walzer 21). For example, General<br />
Sherman of the Union Army devastated Atlanta and the<br />
Confederate South in his “March to the Sea.” In all considerations,<br />
the Civil War was just, but he used extremely brutal<br />
and unjust tactics to achieve the end. Likewise, what if a<br />
nation is attacked and fights unjustly. For example, the Royal<br />
<strong>Air</strong> <strong>Force</strong> and the <strong>United</strong> <strong>States</strong> Army <strong>Air</strong> <strong>Force</strong> in Operation<br />
Overlord during World War Two performed civilian morale<br />
raids on Germany. Was the action taken against Hamburg<br />
just? What is the difference between Hitler’s unjust war and<br />
the unjust method used by the Allied forces?
Walzer asks the question, why is it wrong to begin<br />
a war? He answers it with saying, “War is hell” (Walzer 21).<br />
Large numbers of soldiers and citizens die in conflict. For a<br />
given purpose, whether it is territorial gain or in self-defense,<br />
the outcome has to have certain means used to reach the<br />
desired end. These means can also be what makes war wrong;<br />
these means or military tactics and strategy can be considered<br />
evil. How does one achieve victory over an enemy? The easiest<br />
way is for one country to kill all the citizens and soldiers of<br />
the enemy country.<br />
If logic is followed, it is possible and unarguable to<br />
say that killing is always wrong. It also follows that warfare<br />
between nations involves killing. The obvious conclusion<br />
is developed into the idea that warfare is wrong. If this is<br />
believed strictly word for word, then it must be said that all<br />
warfare is wrong. However, these assumptions are not always<br />
true.<br />
Take for example the case of the thousands of little<br />
children who are living with a terminal disease. One boy<br />
living across the country has the genetic material to save the<br />
lives of all these children. However, they can only be saved if<br />
the one boy gives up all his blood for the others, and dies as a<br />
result. Although many arguments from many philosophical<br />
perspectives can be used to consider the case, it is easy and<br />
understandable to say that the one boy should sacrifice his life<br />
in order to save the others. In other words, it is right to kill<br />
the boy in order to save thousands of other lives.<br />
Therefore, the assumption that killing is always<br />
wrong is changed to killing is sometimes wrong. This brings<br />
up the question: in warfare, when is killing permitted and<br />
when is it not?<br />
Jus in bella, or justice in war, really brings about “…observance<br />
or violation of the customary and positive rules of<br />
engagement” (Walzer 21). These rules of engagement are<br />
fairly complex, and at times they are also extremely clear.<br />
The action of attacking noncombatants and those considered<br />
innocent has moral connections to it. Also, the mere act of<br />
killing another human in warfare has severe consequences<br />
mentally and can play a huge part in the moral world.<br />
In past battles, many individuals and their decisions<br />
can be observed and stacked against morality. For instance,<br />
how moral is Douhet’s theory which centers on national<br />
morale decadence through civilian bombing? The whole<br />
treatment of prisoners of war has its roots in morality. In<br />
addition, think of General Sherman’s tactics during the Civil<br />
War and the used of the atomic bomb against Japan.<br />
During 1864 in the American Civil War, the Northern<br />
morale was at an all time low. Many Northerners were<br />
extremely upset at the duration of the war, and they were<br />
especially upset with their army’s performance and lack of<br />
66<br />
success in the war. “Many Northerners began to feel that<br />
perhaps the only way to end the war lay in a negotiated,<br />
compromised peace” (Doughty and Gruber 436). Because<br />
of this, Lincoln felt quite unsure about the upcoming election<br />
of 1864, for many voters might choose a candidate who<br />
does not support the war or a strong, centralized government.<br />
However, Major General William Tecumseh Sherman, one of<br />
the most trusted Union generals during the war, became the<br />
chief maker of increased morale and increased optimism in<br />
the North.<br />
General Sherman was in Northern Georgia during<br />
the summer of 1864, and his first goal was to destroy the city<br />
of Atlanta. After two months of evasion and preparation,<br />
the battles for Atlanta began. Sherman formed a quasi-siege<br />
on the city, and began lobbing artillery shells against the city,<br />
aimed at anything and everything. Eventually, General Hood,<br />
the Confederate commander, and his troops became overwhelmed.<br />
With supplies dwindling, the city burning, and<br />
after failed attempts to counterattack, Hood withdrew from<br />
Atlanta. Sherman then ordered a complete evacuation of the<br />
civilian population of Atlanta. When the mayor of Atlanta<br />
protested to the inhumanity of this action, Sherman replied,<br />
“My orders are not designed to meet the humanities of the<br />
case but to prepare for the future struggles … War is cruelty,<br />
and you cannot refine it … You might as well appeal against<br />
the thunder storm as against these terrible hardships of war”<br />
(Doughy and Gruber 443). It would take the city of Atlanta<br />
nearly one hundred years to fully restore and fix the aftereffects<br />
of the damage done by Sherman in the summer of<br />
1864. Sherman’s victory did, on the other hand, provide an<br />
enormous boost in Union morale (Doughty and Gruber 441).<br />
After finishing off Atlanta, General Sherman realized<br />
the impact that Southern raids were having on his supplies.<br />
Something had to be done, and in a letter to Ulysses Grant,<br />
he proposed the famous “March to the Sea,” in which he<br />
would seek the Confederate General Hood’s army. He concluded<br />
this letter with the quote, “I can make the march, and<br />
make Georgia howl” (Doughy and Gruber 444). On November<br />
15, the Union army advanced and carved out a sixty-mile<br />
wide path of destruction. One of Sherman’s men wrote home<br />
to his family about the march, and this is what he said. “We<br />
had a gay old campaign … Destroyed all we could not eat,<br />
stole their niggers [sic], burned their cotton and gins, spilled<br />
their sorghum, burned and twisted their R. Roads and raised<br />
Hell generally” (Doughy and Gruber 444). These marches<br />
traveled through Savanna, Georgia, and eventually lead all the<br />
way through the Carolinas in equal and greater destruction.<br />
They ruined Southern morale by not only destroying what<br />
aided the army directly, but also by demolishing anything in<br />
their path. Sherman’s march exemplified the concept of total
war perfectly.<br />
Besides utterly devastating the morale of the South,<br />
it has been argued that this action took the fight out of the<br />
Confederate states and directly lead to the surrender at Appomattox<br />
Court House. This can be considered quite a successful<br />
plan by the Northerners. However, although successful,<br />
the lack of morality is obviously a topic for discussion. Not<br />
only did the march affect thousands of noncombatants, these<br />
noncombatants were the actual target. Up to this point, warfare<br />
had rarely seen attacks on those not involved in the war,<br />
especially to this magnitude. It is even possible to compare<br />
Sherman’s slaughter of the innocents to the slaughter of the<br />
innocents by the Nazis in World War Two.<br />
On the other hand, some might argue, didn’t the<br />
positive outcome of the march, namely victory in war, far<br />
outweigh the negative method in which it was carried out?<br />
The proponents of this approach assume that the greatest<br />
good was to win the way, no matter what means, strategies,<br />
and tactics were used. The contradicting side would say that<br />
this is entirely unjust, that all means leading to the outcome<br />
must indeed be moral and just. Whichever side is taken, this<br />
example proves the necessity of ethics in warfare.<br />
Likewise, the Italian, Giulio Douhet, who continues<br />
to have a far reaching impact on the strategy and development<br />
of airpower, had a similar viewpoint to that of Sherman.<br />
“The linkage between civilian morale and ending a conflict<br />
was the key to Douhet’s theory of airpower” (Chun 28). In<br />
all certainty, Douhet would have supported Sherman’s tactics<br />
in the Civil War. Whereas Sherman would destroy everything<br />
with his army, Douhet would destroy everything with airpower.<br />
Douhet’s main purpose was strategic bombardment.<br />
Besides advocating a war against civilians to break the will to<br />
fight, Douhet also promoted the use of poison gas and incendiary<br />
weapons. When discussing Guilio Douhet, how many<br />
people talk about the ethics of his theories and not just the<br />
theories themselves? Imagine if every war followed Douhet’s<br />
theory of strategic bombardment of civilian populations; warfare<br />
would be entirely different. Primary targets of oil refineries<br />
and military headquarters would be changed to apartment<br />
complexes and shopping malls. This would lead to the complete<br />
lack of ethics in warfare.<br />
One subject that continues to create an enormous<br />
amount of debate is the use of nuclear weapons. The atomic<br />
bomb was created and developed during the end of the<br />
Second World War. During the attacks on Hiroshima and<br />
Nagasaki, the unit charged with delivering the bomb was<br />
Col. Paul Tibbetts’ 509 th Bombardment Group. The airmen<br />
were well aware of their mission and the destructive power of<br />
the atom bomb, and “there was some sentiment among the<br />
airmen that the nuclear weapons ought not to be used” (Mets<br />
67<br />
302). Even those involved in the war itself need to have<br />
vision of the morality of their actions.<br />
Twenty years later, the American forces were in Vietnam<br />
fighting a new type of warfare.<br />
Besides obvious cases of unethical attacks, such as Mei Lai,<br />
there are also cases where ethical decisions and situations are<br />
totally ambiguous. A soldier, upon receiving fire on a routine<br />
walk through a village, immediately turned to the direction of<br />
the attack and replied with a couple rounds from his M-16.<br />
He killed the assailant, and upon further inspection, what he<br />
saw was extremely disturbing. On the ground lay a twelve<br />
year old girl, her blood pooling beneath her as she still held<br />
tight to the smoking rifle.<br />
When is it ever ethical to kill a twelve year old girl?<br />
Never? When she is attempting to take your life? Imagine<br />
the soldier, who one day has to return home to his own<br />
family, and his own daughter, and then will have to realize the<br />
terrible nature of his actions. Was the soldier acting unethically<br />
by returning fire on a child, or was the child unethical<br />
for picking up that rifle? “Public opinion tends to focus<br />
on the concrete reality of war and on the moral meaning of<br />
killing and being killed” (Walzer 64). However, there are<br />
numerous cases where the concrete reality of war and killing<br />
crumbles to obscure ash.<br />
If there is one overlaying moral principle, which<br />
stands above all others, it would be that taking the life of<br />
another human is absolutely immoral. Any domestic action<br />
which results in the deliberate elimination of the life of<br />
another is always punished. Warfare, conversely, allows situations<br />
in which this deliberate elimination of life is permitted.<br />
Because of this, it is absolutely necessary to define these situations,<br />
and they are defined on the basis of ethics.<br />
It is important to note that this paper does not decide<br />
on whether the examples of warfare are or are not just. Many<br />
differing perspectives and theories can be used in order to<br />
accomplish that task. A situation can be considered ethical<br />
or unethical depending on the reasoning of the individual.<br />
This paper does, however, reflect on the importance of having<br />
ethics in warfare, and also emphasizes why individuals in<br />
warfare need to act justly and morally. Walzer sums up the<br />
proposition of ethics in warfare properly when he says, “Until<br />
wars are really fought with pawns, inanimate objects, and not<br />
human beings, warfare cannot be isolated from moral life”<br />
(Walzer 64).
Bibliography<br />
Chun, Clayton K.S. <strong>Air</strong> and Space Power for the Twenty-<br />
First Century. Carlisle Barracks,<br />
Pennsylvania: Houghton Mifflin Custom Publishing,<br />
2002.<br />
Davidson, Donald. “The Development of the Just War Tradition.”<br />
Moral Dimensions of the<br />
Military Profession. Ed. Martha Wagner. Cincinnati,<br />
Ohio: Thomson Learning Custom Publishing,<br />
2001. 125-133.<br />
Doughty, Robert A. and Gruber, Ira D. Warfare in the Western<br />
World. Ed. Martin Lew.<br />
Boston, MA: Houghton Mifflin Custom Publishing,<br />
2001.<br />
Kant, Immanuel. Grounding for the Metaphysics of Morals.<br />
3 rd Ed. Indianapolis, Indiana:<br />
Hackett Publishing Company, Inc., 1993.<br />
Mets, David R. Master of <strong>Air</strong>power: General Carl A. Spaatz.<br />
Novato, CA: Presidio Press, 1988.<br />
Rachels, James. “The Challenge of Cultural Relativism.”<br />
Moral Dimensions of the Military<br />
Profession. Ed. Martha Wagner. Cincinnati, Ohio:<br />
Thomson Learning Custom Publishing, 2001. 49-<br />
54.<br />
Walzer, Michael. Just and Unjust Wars. Basic Books: New<br />
York, 2000.<br />
68<br />
AIR CONTROL:<br />
THE FALLACY OF COERCIVE AIR STRATEGY<br />
IN BRITISH COLONIAL ADMINISTRATION,<br />
1919-1924<br />
C1C COLBY SULLINS<br />
<strong>Air</strong>power is not the silver bullet that will cheaply<br />
and effectively win a war, even a very limited one; early airpower<br />
theorists formulated this idea of airpower as a fast<br />
and efficient panacea and propagated it throughout their<br />
governments, erroneously touting the economy and effectiveness<br />
of the British concept of “air control” used to police her<br />
Middle Eastern colonies after World War I. <strong>Air</strong> control was<br />
not, however, effective in every case, and those cases in which<br />
it was effective were due primarily to causes other than the<br />
effects of the bombs that were dropped. Making strategic<br />
policy decisions based on a flawed and incomplete theory of<br />
airpower coercion is therefore dangerous, and may very well<br />
result in a prolonged escalation of involvement in a conflict<br />
originally planned to be quick and decisive. Thus it is necessary<br />
to determine the true causes for any successes enjoyed by<br />
the Royal <strong>Air</strong> <strong>Force</strong> in its campaigns of air control in order to<br />
obtain a more reliable framework for making good coercive<br />
policy decisions.<br />
PART I<br />
INTRODUCTION TO COERCION<br />
Carl von Clausewitz said, “War is an extension of<br />
politics by other means 1 .” This means that military action<br />
is but one of several tools that states may use to realize their<br />
national strategic policies. The first of these tools is diplomatic,<br />
the second is economic. The former is the most preferable,<br />
discussing a conflict in an open forum in order to seek<br />
a resolution that is mutually beneficial to both parties; the<br />
latter requires a greater level of commitment, so before it can<br />
be undertaken more consideration must be made regarding<br />
the desired outcome. The economic tool uses a carrot-andstick<br />
approach to conflict-resolution in which cooperation<br />
is rewarded with favorable trade relations and opposition<br />
is punished with unfavorable relations or even embargoes.<br />
The third and most intensive policy tool is the military tool.<br />
This involves the use of carefully applied violence to force<br />
an adversary’s cooperation, either through coercion or the<br />
exhaustion of the adversary’s defensive means. Of the three<br />
policy tools, the military tool is the riskiest, most destructive,<br />
and the hardest to resolve in the long-term sense. For these<br />
reasons, it should be used as a last resort—yet it is all too<br />
often one of the first tools used to impose the will of one government<br />
upon another.
The political nature of war is essential to defining<br />
violent conflict; war is not an end unto itself but a means by<br />
which governments might attain some other end. Clausewitz<br />
outlined the nature of war by likening it to a triad comprised<br />
equally of three conflicting elements: the Government, the<br />
People, and the Military, with war itself being the interaction<br />
between the elements 2 . The Government represents control,<br />
restraint; the People represents passion, mania, and loss of<br />
control; the Military represents uncertainty, the fog of war,<br />
the role of fate. These three interact, determining the nature<br />
of the constantly evolving conflict.<br />
The nature of war is fluid, constantly ebbing and flowing<br />
between the three elements with varying degrees of intensity<br />
based on the predominant element in the conflict. The<br />
People element is ruled by emotion, passion, and ideology 3 .<br />
It is the most basic and human of the three elements. Raw<br />
passion blends seamlessly into hatred, hatred into cruelty, and<br />
cruelty into brutality, terrorism, or worse. The People element<br />
constantly tends to bring a conflict closer to the essential<br />
nature of war: absolute, horrific violence 4 . Fortunately,<br />
the other two elements are able to hold the People in check<br />
and keep conflict more limited. The Military element might<br />
also be called Fate 5 . Clausewitz called this the fog of war,<br />
the confusion and uncertainty that guarantees that there can<br />
be no guarantees. This entropy can dash a well thought out<br />
strategy to pieces within days, hours, or even minutes after<br />
a conflict begins. The confusion also serves to mitigate the<br />
violence of human emotion on the battlefield. Fate serves<br />
to limit the violence of the conflict, yet also makes it more<br />
difficult to control forces and predict the outcome of the<br />
conflict. The Government element is directed at control 6 . It<br />
therefore tends to limit conflict, to keep the action at a lesser,<br />
more manageable level. The more limited a conflict, the less<br />
emotion is involved and the easier it is to prevent the conflict<br />
from escalating unnecessarily. This allows the conflict to be<br />
resolved with minimal cost in treasure and life. That is the<br />
principle aim of coercion: accomplish national strategic goals<br />
using the minimum force, resources, and treasure necessary.<br />
There are two predominant theories governing the<br />
application of force to affect strategic policy. The first, suggested<br />
by Clausewitz, is called exhaustion 7 . It might also be<br />
called annihilation, because it demands the absolute destruction<br />
of the adversary’s defensive ability. The adversary, left<br />
defenseless, will have no other recourse than to acquiesce.<br />
Cooperation is thereby achieved and the conflict resolved.<br />
Annihilation strikes at the ability of the adversary to resist.<br />
This traditional method of conflict is very effective but tends<br />
to be costly and time-consuming, and therefore is not very<br />
efficient. The other theory, coercion, is designed to be much<br />
faster and less costly. Coercion is a calculated process of hard-<br />
69<br />
hitting, precise attacks engineered to convince an adversary<br />
that the costs of continuing non-cooperation greatly exceed<br />
any benefits, thereby inducing the adversary to choose the<br />
less-costly option, cooperation. Coercion strikes at the will of<br />
the adversary to resist.<br />
Robert Pape, in his book Bombing to Win: <strong>Air</strong><br />
Power and Coercion in War, outlines three basic strategies to<br />
coerce an adversary. The first, punishment, strikes at the will<br />
of the adversary by placing the adversary’s people in peril 8 .<br />
The society itself is threatened with attack, siege, annihilation—any<br />
means available that might frighten the people<br />
into begging their leaders to end the conflict, thereby inducing<br />
the adversary’s cooperation. The second strategy is called<br />
risk strategy and aims at the will of the adversary by gradually<br />
escalating the level of conflict in increments 9 . First, the threat<br />
of escalation is made. Then, the level of conflict is increased<br />
and the threat of further escalation is made. This goes on<br />
until the adversary can no longer support further escalation<br />
and chooses to acquiesce. The third strategy is called denial.<br />
Denial strikes at the will of the adversary by attacking the<br />
adversary’s military capability 10 . Denial differs from Clausewitzian<br />
annihilation of the adversary’s forces because its aim<br />
is not to completely disarm the adversary. On the contrary,<br />
the more soldiers and materiel the adversary retains at the end<br />
of the conflict, the more effective the denial strategy. Denial<br />
seeks to induce the cooperation of the adversary by demonstrating<br />
that the adversary’s military is no longer capable of<br />
making a viable defense. Denial attacks the adversary’s military<br />
strategy.<br />
Enter the latest medium in which force is brought to<br />
bear on an adversary: the air. Since the First World War, airpower<br />
has offered many advantages over traditional groundbased<br />
operations. <strong>Air</strong> operations are inherently offensive in<br />
nature—they take the fight to the adversary and keep the<br />
war away from the people at home. <strong>Air</strong> operations are by<br />
nature faster than ground operations, and provide the ability<br />
to attack, with surprise, virtually anywhere on the battlefield,<br />
beyond the front lines, and even into the very heart of the<br />
adversary’s capital. <strong>Air</strong>power is extremely flexible, which<br />
means that it may be used in a wide variety of situations to<br />
engage any number of different types of targets. Fewer lives<br />
are put at risk in air operations than in ground operations.<br />
<strong>Air</strong>power is tailor-made to inflict fast, precision damage with<br />
great cost to the adversary at comparatively low cost. All of<br />
this makes airpower extremely attractive in undertaking a<br />
coercive strategy.<br />
If airpower is used as the means of applying force, all<br />
of Pape’s coercive strategies simply become coercive air strategies<br />
11 . A punishment air strategy inflicts maximum force on<br />
the civilian population, pushing their endurance to the break-
ing point. A risk air strategy attacks military and civilian targets<br />
on a very limited scale at first, but incrementally increases<br />
in intensity until the adversary must submit. A denial air<br />
strategy is achieved by three distinct methods: direct support<br />
to ground forces, strategic interdiction, and operational<br />
interdiction 12 . The first of these, direct support, is essentially<br />
close air support and is most effective in conflicts where the<br />
battle lines are static as in World War I or the Korean War.<br />
The second method, strategic interdiction, is meant to slowly<br />
and systematically destroy the critical components of an<br />
adversary’s industrial base and sever the production of war<br />
materiel. The third method is operational interdiction. This<br />
aims to cut off logistical support to the adversary’s operational<br />
forces and is most effective in fluid-front conflicts where the<br />
two combatant forces require a great deal of consumables in<br />
order to fight, such as fuel and ammunition. When using<br />
airpower to achieve coercion, Pape argues that another strategy<br />
is possible that could not be used otherwise: a strategy of<br />
decapitation 13 . This calls for two possible options in targeting.<br />
The most common coincides with a theory proposed by<br />
John Warden in which the primary series of targets should<br />
be designed to separate commanders from their troops in the<br />
field, sowing confusion and rendering an adversary’s military<br />
forces ineffective 14 . The other, less common option calls for<br />
a deliberate attack against the leader of the adversarial state in<br />
the hope that any successor will be more willing to cooperate.<br />
All of the coercive strategies of Robert Pape have one<br />
thing in common: coercion is a military option, and the use<br />
of force in coercion is a forgone conclusion. The success or<br />
failure of coercive policies depends solely on the political wills<br />
and military abilities of the two primary adversaries in the<br />
conflict.<br />
Daniel Byman, with the help of Matthew Waxman<br />
and Eric Larson, argues a somewhat more dynamic theory<br />
of coercion than that of Robert Pape in the book <strong>Air</strong>power<br />
as a Coercive Instrument. Coercion is no longer regarded<br />
as just a simple cost/benefit analysis, but something a little<br />
more complicated. It is not a yes/no proposition, it does not<br />
have a certain start or stop time, there is no real success or<br />
failure and both sides may get all, some, or none of what they<br />
desired initially, and political and economic factors become<br />
real considerations in formulating a coercive strategy 15 .<br />
Coercion, according to Byman, is not simply a manner by<br />
which to employ military force. Coercion is the use of the<br />
threat of force, possibly backed by actual force and combined<br />
with political and economic means, to induce the adversary<br />
to change some behavior. There are two types of coercion.<br />
Compellance coercion seeks to persuade an adversary to cease<br />
a behavior, and deterrence coercion seeks to ensure that an<br />
adversary does not begin an undesirable behavior 16 . Deter-<br />
70<br />
rence, in turn, has two distinct types: general, or long-term,<br />
deterrence aims to prevent an action whether it is planned by<br />
an adversary or not, and immediate deterrence that seeks to<br />
prevent an imminent, planned action 17 .<br />
Byman’s concept of coercion has many factors which<br />
determine how successful coercion will be. The first is escalation<br />
dominance 18 . In a conflict, the party with the ability to<br />
control the escalation of the conflict will win. This ability to<br />
control the level of intensity of a conflict depends on credibility,<br />
pressure, capacity, and will. It is vital an adversary believes<br />
that any threats will be carried out. Pressure must be maintained<br />
so that the adversary does not have the ability to counter<br />
any escalation in intensity. The capacity to follow through<br />
with any escalation, the military ability to make good on any<br />
threatened escalation, is every bit as important to deciding<br />
the level of escalation as the political will to see it through.<br />
Escalation dominance as a factor of coercion resembles Pape’s<br />
theory of a risk strategy; however, escalation according to<br />
Byman does not necessarily mean increasing pressure on civilians.<br />
Rather, coercion is the sum product of several different<br />
factors in which the will of the populace—the populace of the<br />
coercer as well as that of the adversary—is only a small factor,<br />
the domestic factor. The military abilities of the two parties<br />
are also only a factor. Additional factors include, but are<br />
not limited to, coalitions or alliances, non-state actors, economic<br />
factors, over-arching strategic goals, religious or social<br />
mores, international media coverage, even weather, climate,<br />
or season. All of these play a role in the ability of one state to<br />
coerce another. The challenge, then, is to determine to what<br />
extent each of the many variables will affect the adversary’s<br />
decision to continue opposition and manipulate the factors in<br />
order to attain the most favorable position possible. It is also<br />
important to remember that, according to Byman, the coercer<br />
may very well end the conflict in a worse position than that<br />
when the conflict started.<br />
One might sum up the definition of coercion by say<br />
that it is the threat of force, as well as the actual use of force,<br />
used in conjunction with political and economic actions,<br />
meant to induce an adversary into cooperation. It does this<br />
by persuading that adversary to refrain from beginning some<br />
undesired behavior or ending an undesired behavior that is<br />
currently being done by the adversary. <strong>Air</strong>power coercion,<br />
then, might be said to be the use of airpower, by means of<br />
punishment, risk, decapitation, or denial strategies, to coerce<br />
an adversary using weaponry and shock value. It is essential<br />
to take into careful consideration the many variables affecting<br />
the particular strategic situation and attempt to exploit them<br />
to some advantage against the adversary. <strong>Air</strong>power is the most<br />
cost-effective means, in terms of lives, time, and treasure, of<br />
ensuring escalation dominance, the key to coercion.
Why is coercion important, however? Wars are<br />
slow and brutal. Wars require men and materiel, both of<br />
which will be lost. Wars require commitment on the part of<br />
the political leadership and the national will to support the<br />
leadership’s decisions. Most importantly of all, wars require<br />
time. With time, all of the aforementioned components dissipate<br />
away towards nothing—men are lost, there exists only<br />
so much materiel, the national will can easily turn against<br />
the war, and, most importantly to democratic societies, if the<br />
will of the people is lost the political leadership can quickly<br />
change. Time, in war, is the enemy of all. Coercion seeks to<br />
deprive time of its power by making conflict fast and costeffective<br />
in terms of both men and materiel. The sheer speed<br />
of coercion, combined with its economy, ensures that national<br />
will and thus political commitment will last the duration<br />
of the conflict. Coercion strategies, properly undertaken,<br />
thereby increase the odds that a conflict will end in success for<br />
the government that elects to use military force as the means<br />
by which to attain its strategic aims.<br />
PART II<br />
SETTING THE STAGE: BRITAIN AT THE END OF<br />
THE FIRST WORLD WAR<br />
During the First World War, over ten million young men<br />
from around the world lost their lives from the skies over<br />
Great Britain to the mountains of northern Italy, from the<br />
western borders of Russia to the Hellespont, and south into<br />
the deserts of Palestine and Mesopotamia and everything in<br />
between 19 . The prolonged war of attrition consumed the<br />
economies of Europe for four years, leaving a shattered wreck<br />
of the prosperity that had been before the war. In 1918, the<br />
world was further wracked by a plague of influenza that killed<br />
over twenty-one million people in a matter of months 20 . In<br />
Russia, a revolution was underway in the name of a political<br />
ideology called communism, and the class-based strife threatened<br />
to erupt spontaneously throughout Europe. German<br />
soldiers returned home to find their country on the very brink<br />
of civil war, their country’s economy in ruins, and their prospects<br />
for the future grim indeed. France found itself rebuilding<br />
hundreds of miles of utterly blasted countryside while<br />
dealing with an army of hundreds of thousands of former<br />
conscripts flooding a job market that simply was no longer<br />
there. Great Britain also struggled to find itself anew, demobilizing<br />
its vast forces, restructuring its economy, and trying<br />
to find a balance of power between the radically differing<br />
political parties struggling for control.<br />
Great Britain’s situation, however, was somewhat more<br />
delicate even still. After the defeat of the Turks and the dissolution<br />
of the Ottoman Empire, Great Britain found itself with<br />
a mandate to manage colonial holdings that almost doubled<br />
the size of the Empire before the war 21 . The power struggle<br />
71<br />
within Parliament rose ever-higher in pitch and intensity, and<br />
the battle lines between the Labour Party and the conservatives<br />
were drawn along the issue of military spending 22 . Britain<br />
emerged from World War I with almost twice the area to<br />
control as before, but with less than half the military budget<br />
and many fewer troops. The Empire, its money, and its forces<br />
were all spread dangerously thin.<br />
During the war, Great Britain had managed to<br />
develop a separate air arm, the Royal <strong>Air</strong> <strong>Force</strong>. Early on,<br />
the Ministry of Armaments decided that command and control<br />
of air assets could best be obtained by way of a separate<br />
command structure working in close concert with the Army<br />
and the Navy. The first real commander of the air service<br />
was General Jan Smuts, a South African who realized that<br />
airpower had the potential to be much more than simply a<br />
weapon to augment the power of the Army and the Navy.<br />
Working closely with then-Prime Minister David Lloyd<br />
George, the two created an <strong>Air</strong> Ministry and laid the foundation<br />
for the Royal Flying Corps 23 . The second commander<br />
was General Hugh Trenchard. He picked up the reigns where<br />
Smuts left off—creating a functional organizational structure<br />
based on centralized command and decentralized execution<br />
in which air support for the ground forces in France would be<br />
coordinated at higher staff levels and the orders would trickle<br />
down to the individual squadron level to be carried out 24 .<br />
Trenchard left his position in command of the air service in<br />
France in early 1918 and became the Chief of the <strong>Air</strong> Staff.<br />
Trenchard’s successor, General John Salmond, took up control<br />
of the air service in France when the Royal Flying Corps<br />
and the Royal Naval <strong>Air</strong> Service became one entity, the Royal<br />
<strong>Air</strong> <strong>Force</strong>, in April of 1918. Salmond focused on directing<br />
the RAF into an offensive arm, striking back at Germany in<br />
reprisal for attacks on London and focusing heavily on providing<br />
air support for ground offensives 25 . Salmond’s brother,<br />
General Geoffrey Salmond, commanded the air forces in the<br />
Middle East, and played a pivotal role in the development of<br />
the unique concepts of air support that would later be used by<br />
Trenchard to formulate his theory of <strong>Air</strong> Control.<br />
After the war, the Ministry of Armaments was dismantled<br />
and the purging of the defense budget began. At the<br />
end of the war, the RAF consisted of 30,000 officers, 263,410<br />
enlisted members, 23,000 aircraft, 401 aerodromes in Great<br />
Britain and 274 overseas, and a total of 185 operational<br />
squadrons 26 . Prime Minister Lloyd George found himself<br />
dealing with civil war in Ireland, an uneasy and suspicious<br />
relationship with Britain’s former ally France, and greatlyincreased<br />
expanse of colonial territory that was as peaceful<br />
now as it had been during the war, all while trying to reduce<br />
military spending and appease the rumblings of the War<br />
Office, the Admiralty, and the Labour Party. The Royal <strong>Air</strong>
<strong>Force</strong> found itself in a fight for survival.<br />
PART III<br />
GENERAL HUGH TRENCHARD<br />
Fortunately for the Royal <strong>Air</strong> <strong>Force</strong>, Winston<br />
Churchill was named <strong>Air</strong> Minister—a political hot potato at<br />
the time—as the price for also being given the War Office. 27<br />
Churchill asked Trenchard to come back as the Chief of the<br />
<strong>Air</strong> Staff after he had resigned due to a dispute with a former<br />
<strong>Air</strong> Minister. Trenchard agreed, and immediately went about<br />
saving the Royal <strong>Air</strong> <strong>Force</strong> from the Army, the Navy, and the<br />
Parliament.<br />
Trenchard’s solution was twofold: create a peacetime<br />
mission for the RAF that could not be accomplished by the<br />
Army or by the Navy, and establish a strong, well-trained<br />
cadre of officers, pilots, and maintenance personnel while<br />
focusing on research and development into better aircraft<br />
technology. This small, highly-trained core of experienced<br />
personnel could weather the storm of post-war cutbacks in<br />
the greatly reduced Royal <strong>Air</strong> <strong>Force</strong>, but could immediately<br />
train a larger force to use the new and improved weapons systems<br />
once the money was available to fund it all 28 .<br />
General Trenchard is known best to historians for<br />
his role in the formation of the independent RAF, and for his<br />
theories regarding the role of strategic bombing. Trenchard<br />
was himself a devoted believer in the absolute necessity of<br />
close concert between air and ground forces. However, in<br />
1918 and 1919 he found himself in the unique position of<br />
defending the very survival of the air force he had worked so<br />
hard to build. It is not surprising that he began to report to<br />
Parliament that strategic air power could be utilized in some<br />
future conflict as a means of shortening the war and limiting<br />
its costs. However, strategic bombing alone would not have<br />
saved the Royal <strong>Air</strong> <strong>Force</strong> from being delivered piecemeal<br />
back into the eager control of the Army and Navy—after all,<br />
following the First World War, it did not appear to Parliament<br />
that there were any more great wars to fight 29 . France was the<br />
closest thing to an adversary, and it seemed unlikely that there<br />
would be any great conflict for another twenty years. There<br />
was therefore no immediate need for strategic bombers.<br />
However, there was an urgent need to pacify the vast<br />
Empire-Commonwealth. During the war, Great Britain’s<br />
entire attention had been devoted to fighting Germany and<br />
the Ottoman Turks in the many different theaters of the<br />
war. In the meantime, renegades and rebellions rose up and<br />
began challenging Great Britain’s authority around the world.<br />
Estimates made by the Army put the costs of pacifying the<br />
smallest of these rebellions, in Somaliland, at two divisions<br />
of regular troops and an entire railway system constructed to<br />
move them around 30 . Trenchard saw in this an opportunity<br />
72<br />
to forge a real, tangible mission for the Royal <strong>Air</strong> <strong>Force</strong> that<br />
would keep it alive: air control.<br />
The essence of air control was an extremely mobile,<br />
highly flexible force comprised of flying squadrons and levies<br />
of local and colonial troops. The flying squadrons would provide<br />
for their own base defense, and would also be equipped<br />
with an equal number of armoured cars as aircraft 31 . This<br />
would give the squadrons equal hitting power on the ground<br />
and from the air. Combined with battalions of low-cost colonial<br />
conscripts to provide the bulk of the ground forces and<br />
to augment aerodrome defense, each squadron could offer the<br />
fighting power of an entire division at a small fraction of the<br />
cost. Furthermore, the inherent advantages of airpower—<br />
speed, flexibility, offense, and surprise—would be present at<br />
no extra charge. Army divisions would need such air support,<br />
anyway.<br />
It is interesting to note that Trenchard’s plan for <strong>Air</strong><br />
Control at first glance refers only to air power, but after closer<br />
examination is heavily reliant upon ground forces. This is in<br />
contrast to the popularly held belief that Trenchard advocated<br />
an airpower-only approach to conflict 32 . Perhaps one of the<br />
major reasons why the role of ground forces used in Great<br />
Britain’s campaigns of <strong>Air</strong> Control was understated by those<br />
praising the colonial victories was the political significance of<br />
the Royal <strong>Air</strong> <strong>Force</strong>’s successes. Churchill was <strong>Air</strong> Minister,<br />
and in 1921 he left the War Office to become head of the<br />
Colonial Office 33 . Any successes the RAF had in administering<br />
the colonies, especially by itself with minimal help from<br />
the Army, reflected all the brighter upon Winston Churchill.<br />
Regardless, <strong>Air</strong> Control was effective for the sum of<br />
its parts, the aircraft, the armoured car detachments, and the<br />
battalions of local levied troops that provided the anvil for the<br />
hammer of the two more mobile elements. Not long after<br />
Trenchard began building his <strong>Air</strong> Control squadrons, Great<br />
Britain had its first opportunity to try airpower as a means<br />
of defending its colonial power. The Third Afghan War had<br />
begun.<br />
PART IV<br />
AFGHANISTAN<br />
The abdication of the Tsar of Russia in 1917 and the<br />
ensuing revolution inspired the hereditary ruler of Afghanistan,<br />
the Amir Ammanullah, to seize power in 1918 and<br />
renounce all treaty obligations that Afghanistan had made<br />
with Great Britain following the Second Afghan War in<br />
1880 34 . The Amir believed that, after four long years of terrible<br />
and bloody war, Great Britain would not be willing to<br />
put up any real defense. The time was ripe for an invasion of<br />
northern India.<br />
The Amir began his invasion of India with over
50,000 regular troops. The army of Afghanistan was small,<br />
but Ammanullah relied on the might of his irregular forces,<br />
the warrior tribesman that comprised over sixty percent of<br />
Afghanistan’s population, to swell the ranks to match the<br />
combined British and Indian force of 150,000 troops 35 . The<br />
war initially went very well for the Amir. His forces smashed<br />
through British outposts along the border and captured<br />
strong positions in rough terrain that could be held by the<br />
resourceful Afghan troops indefinitely. The Afghans advanced<br />
relentlessly the first week of the war until they finally met the<br />
main British and Indian force 36 . The war bogged down into a<br />
stalemate, the two sides battering each other mercilessly.<br />
Enter the Royal <strong>Air</strong> <strong>Force</strong>. Though there were only<br />
two operational squadrons in India at the time, aircraft from<br />
both joined the conflict. They provided air support for troops<br />
engaged in mountain-fighting, reconnaissance and intelligence<br />
for commanders with no accurate maps of the region,<br />
and even ferried supplies to troops surrounded in isolated<br />
mountaintop defensive positions 37 . The Royal <strong>Air</strong> <strong>Force</strong><br />
even attempted limited strategic bombing. One raid, against<br />
the major Afghan city of Jalalabad, managed to set aflame<br />
the entire military quarter of the city while the garrison was<br />
conducting a parade for visiting tribesmen 38 . The tribesmen,<br />
numbering in the thousands, became uncontrollable in<br />
the ensuing confusion and looted the city. This might have<br />
served to convince the Amir that his tribesmen were not reliable<br />
and their allegiance was beginning to fade, but he probably<br />
already knew that prior to the bombing raid. The other<br />
major raid was conducted against the capital of Afghanistan,<br />
Kabul. British pilots dropped several bombs on the city, with<br />
four of them striking the grounds of the Amir’s Palace, and<br />
one of actually causing damage to the roof 39 . Soon after the<br />
bombing of Kabul, the Amir began negotiating an end to<br />
hostilities.<br />
Within four weeks of the invasion of India, around<br />
the same time as the raids on Kabul and Jalalabad, the British<br />
and Indian forces had regained nearly all of the territory<br />
lost in the first week of the war 40 . The combined force, with<br />
340,000 troops, was poised to invade Afghanistan when<br />
a peace settlement was agreed upon and the war ended.<br />
Afghanistan had achieved independence from the last remaining<br />
vestiges of British control left over from the Second<br />
Afghan War, while Great Britain had gained a little territory<br />
from Afghanistan. At only four weeks long, the Third Afghan<br />
War was the bloodiest and most arduous in Britain’s history of<br />
colonial warfare 41 .<br />
British airpower enthusiasts at the time pointed to<br />
the critical role the two operational RAF squadrons played<br />
in shortening the war. They cited the air support operations<br />
conducted to help the situation on the ground, the vital<br />
73<br />
importance of aerial reconnaissance, and the impact of the<br />
strategic bombing raids in coercing Amir Ammanullah to agree<br />
to a peace settlement 42 .<br />
Coercion strategies achieved by means of strategic<br />
bombing raids? Contemporary theories on strategic bombing<br />
were based upon what Pape would call, at their most discriminative,<br />
strategic interdiction and, by far the most popular,<br />
punishment strategies. In terms of coercive airpower, the<br />
RAF conducted operations in keeping with the great theories<br />
of the age. The bombing raids on Kabul and Jalalabad were<br />
meant to inflict damage on the population, thereby destroying<br />
their will to support the war in a classic punishment<br />
strategy. Strikes were made against the war-production capacity<br />
of Afghanistan, trying to eliminate the munitions factory<br />
in Kabul as part of a limited strategic interdiction strategy.<br />
Finally, the bombs dropped on the Amir’s palace were done as<br />
part of a deliberate, if ineffective, decapitation strategy. The<br />
most effective coercion strategy, however, was the use of British<br />
airpower in the role of direct support to the British ground<br />
forces.<br />
<strong>Air</strong>power played a vital role in the support of the<br />
British ground offensive, and probably made the war much<br />
less costly than it otherwise would have been by providing<br />
close air support and aerial resupply to British and Indian<br />
troops high in the mountains. At the time, there were no useable<br />
maps of the region 43 . The reconnaissance aircraft using<br />
aerial photography to “build” maps doubtless saved thousands<br />
of lives for the British and shortened the war by years. To<br />
credit the end of the war to two attempts at strategic bombing<br />
raids, however, might be stretching things a bit. The<br />
Amir was beginning to lose his hold on the loose confederation<br />
of warrior-tribesmen that represented the bulk of his<br />
force. Their poor discipline was made frighteningly evident<br />
by the looting of Jalalabad. This loss of control over what was<br />
essentially two-thirds of his army was no doubt all the more<br />
worrisome to the Amir as the British forces poised along the<br />
borders of Afghanistan swelled to over 340,000, three times<br />
as many troops as the Amir had even before he began losing<br />
control of his tribesmen.<br />
This is where the absolute importance of what<br />
Byman called “escalation dominance” comes into account.<br />
The British forces were poised along the border between India<br />
and Afghanistan, waiting only for the word from their leaders<br />
to spring into the offensive. The Afghans, however, had no<br />
option by the fourth week of war but to defend their territory<br />
from the inevitable crush of the British forces. Thus, the British<br />
had the power to control the pitch of the conflict more so<br />
than the Afghans. The Afghans failed to see that the British<br />
would be unable to sustain such a massive conflict for more<br />
than a mere few weeks, or the Amir might have opted for a
prolonged guerilla conflict. Instead, he saw only the British<br />
force of 340,000 troops and the will of the British commanders<br />
in India to invade and chose to end the conflict.<br />
It seems that in light of the other factors affecting<br />
the war in its fourth week, it is more than reasonable to<br />
surmise that the real winner of the Third Afghan War, as in<br />
the two Afghan Wars that preceded it, was ground power.<br />
The ground forces were greatly supported by the RAF, but<br />
these only increased the abilities of the ground troops. Furthermore,<br />
the logistical situation in India by the end of<br />
the war was so over-extended that the same two squadrons<br />
were unable to sortie sufficient aircraft to put down a tribal<br />
rebellion that flared up the following year in a region called<br />
Waziristan 44 . In Afghanistan, ground operations and the<br />
political will to initiate a ground invasion were the effective<br />
policy tools, with air power providing some backup.<br />
PART V<br />
SOMALILAND<br />
Since 1884, the British controlled a colony in the<br />
northern part of the Horn of Africa, from which they were<br />
able to control the Gulf of Aden and ensure the safe passage<br />
of shipping into and out of the Red Sea. This colony<br />
was called Somaliland. Prior to British administration, it<br />
had belonged to Egypt and to Abyssinia—Ethiopia—before<br />
that. In 1905, control of Somaliland was transferred from the<br />
Indian Office to the Colonial Office. The same year, a Somali<br />
warlord named Mohammed bin Abdullah Hassan, began<br />
his first war against the British authorities. He spent a year<br />
rampaging through the eastern areas of Somaliland before<br />
he was finally brought under some measure of control. He<br />
struck out again in 1910, this time staging raids and hit-andrun<br />
attacks throughout the colony before disappearing into<br />
Somalia, 45 also located on the Horn of Africa but to the south<br />
of Somaliland. Both territories now make up what is known<br />
simply as Somalia.<br />
By now known as the Mad Mullah by the British<br />
authorities for his many eccentricities and his barbarism to<br />
his victims, Hassan took advantage of the Great War to wage<br />
his own war 46 . Uniting several tribes together, Hassan began<br />
his campaign of pillaging along the eastern tip of the Horn,<br />
bringing the entire area under his control. The British colonial<br />
governor levied and trained extensive forces to combat<br />
the warlord. By the end of the Great War colonial forces<br />
had wrested control away from Hassan once again, and what<br />
remained of his army fled with him once again into Somalia<br />
47 . The majority of the colonial forces were then disbanded,<br />
retaining only the Somali Camel Corps, an elite, fast-moving<br />
battalion of five-hundred men and camels 48 . Then, in 1920,<br />
the Mad Mullah returned and began pillaging in southern<br />
74<br />
Somaliland. Lord Milner, Secretary of the Colonial Office<br />
called upon Winston Churchill—at the time the Secretary of<br />
the War Office—for aid in bringing Hassan to ground once<br />
and for all.<br />
Churchill first posed the question of solving the<br />
Somaliland problem to the Army. The responded with the<br />
suggestion of two divisions of troops, with at least one of<br />
those being of regulars, and a railroad to be constructed in<br />
territory taken by the British to ensure that future uprisings<br />
could be quashed quickly and easily 49 . Almost as an afterthought,<br />
the Army requested a squadron of aircraft from<br />
the Royal <strong>Air</strong> <strong>Force</strong> to support them. Churchill was reluctant<br />
to accept this expensive plan, and turned to the Chief<br />
of his other service, the <strong>Air</strong> Ministry, General Trenchard.<br />
Trenchard’s <strong>Air</strong> Control squadrons were ready, and he suggested<br />
that they be used along with forces already in the<br />
area. One squadron of twelve DH-9 light-bombers, an equal<br />
number of vehicles in an armoured car squadron, a battalion<br />
of King’s African Rifles comprising the light infantry element,<br />
and the 500-man strong Camel Corps were the regular forces<br />
available 50 . A levy of 1,500 troops would be used to supply<br />
base defense and garrison known water-holes. All forces were<br />
in place by January of 1921.<br />
Almost immediately, the war turned against Hassan.<br />
The very mobile forces of the Camel Corps and the squadron’s<br />
armoured cars were more than capable of keeping pace<br />
with Hassan’s raiding forces, while aircraft kept the Mullah<br />
under constant surveillance and ceaseless harassment by aerial<br />
bombardment and machine-gun fire. The hammer-and-anvil<br />
of the aircraft, the mobile ground forces, and the battalion of<br />
African Rifles proved too much for Hassan, who fled to his<br />
fortress at Tale in Somalia 51 . The British forces pursued and<br />
captured the fortress by early February. The Mad Mullah fled<br />
to Abyssinia with a handful of followers, where they were all<br />
killed by local tribesmen later that year. The total cost of the<br />
war was a mere £77,000, touted by airpower advocates as the<br />
cheapest war in colonial history 52 .<br />
Yet, how effective was airpower in coercing Hassan<br />
to flee from his forces and his Somali fortress and escape to<br />
Abyssinia where his eccentric behavior could get him killed?<br />
For over fifteen years, colonial troops—mostly from the elite<br />
Camel Corps—had been battling Hassan’s camel-mounted<br />
army in a campaign based on an aggressive denial strategy.<br />
By destroying Hassan’s forces, the British hoped to remove<br />
his will to continue fighting. By 1920, Hassan’s forces were<br />
a mere shadow of their former strength, and the Mad Mullah<br />
himself was in his fifties—old to be galloping around on<br />
a camel battling the world 53 . The importance of Hassan’s<br />
age—quite old for a Somali warlord—cannot be overemphasized<br />
as a factor affecting his eventual abandonment of his
forces. <strong>Air</strong>power was a shock to the forces of Hassan, and<br />
their constant harassment using small bombs and machinegun<br />
fire no doubt made the going a little rougher on the old<br />
man and his weary troops; against such constant harassment,<br />
Hassan’s hit-and-fade strategy was torn to shreds. However,<br />
more than anything else it was Hassan’s inability to make a<br />
decent camp near water because of the constant harassment<br />
from the Camel Corps, the armoured car detachment, the<br />
King’s African Rifle battalion, and the 1,500 conscripted<br />
troops who were guarding all of the water wells in Somaliland<br />
that compelled him to seek refuge in his fortress, as he had<br />
done in years past 54 . Pape would call this strategy operational<br />
interdiction, keeping Hassan’s forces away from the resources<br />
essential to their war effort. Pape, however, argued that<br />
this was an airpower strategy. <strong>Air</strong> control achieved success<br />
through operational interdiction utilizing ground forces.<br />
Hassan’s numbers were greatly reduced when the<br />
British forces surrounded his fortress, and he was in no condition<br />
to wait out a siege and still survive the inevitable assault<br />
that would follow. Furthermore, at over fifty years of age,<br />
Hassan was beginning to feel the strain of constant fighting<br />
and fleeing. Therefore, I argue that while airpower was effective<br />
in increasing the pressure on Hassan and denying him his<br />
fast-paced hit-and-run strategy, without the mobile ground<br />
forces constantly harassing the Mullah and keeping him from<br />
water there is no way that he could be induced to abandon<br />
his forces. Coercion, if it was achieved at all, was achieved<br />
through ground power interdicting vital water supplies and<br />
providing the threat of further punishment to Hassan and the<br />
meager scraps of his raiders.<br />
PART VI<br />
MESOPOTAMIA<br />
The British took control of Mesopotamia, which<br />
would later be known as Iraq, during the First World War.<br />
The British ground offensive to take the Ottoman Turk territory<br />
began in what is now known as Kuwait. The British<br />
charged northwards and took the port city of Basra, from<br />
which they were able to resupply their offensive as it moved<br />
northwards along the Tigris River 55 . While support operations<br />
were being conducted by special operations forces, comprised<br />
of Arab tribesmen led by British officers, to control the<br />
western part of Mesopotamia, the bulk of the British mechanized<br />
advance moved steadily on towards Baghdad until<br />
the offensive was halted on the outskirts of Al Kut 56 . The<br />
Royal <strong>Air</strong> <strong>Force</strong> came to the aid of the beleaguered ground<br />
forces, allowing them to break through the Turkish lines and<br />
take Baghdad, the principal city of the region. The British<br />
continued advancing northwards and were stopped again in<br />
early 1918 at the city of Kirkuk 57 . A terrible battle ensued,<br />
75<br />
and the majority of British forces, outnumbered and cut-off,<br />
were forced to surrender. In the summer of 1918, the British<br />
launched a new offensive from Baghdad, relying more heavily<br />
on mobile armoured car companies and air support 58 . The<br />
British smashed through the Turkish lines, blew past Kirkuk<br />
and captured Mosul, the northernmost city in Mesopotamia<br />
and the last city before the Turkish border. Turkey sued for<br />
peace and the war came to an end in the Middle East.<br />
Or so it seemed on paper. The British signed a peace<br />
treaty with the Sultan of Turkey, and as far as the Sultan was<br />
concerned all of his territories in Mesopotamia, Transjordan,<br />
Palestine, Syria, and Egypt were lost. There was, however,<br />
no peace for the colonial administration of the Protectorate<br />
of Mesopotamia 59 . Baghdad was a safe city for the British,<br />
heavily defended by whole divisions of Indian troops and<br />
several battalions of British regulars. Additionally, there were<br />
still multiple squadrons of attack and pursuit aircraft in the<br />
region, left over from the Great War. The regions around<br />
Baghdad, however, belonged to no man and immediately<br />
became an area of unrest and rebellion. Renegade raiding<br />
parties belonging to warlord chieftains began attacking other<br />
tribes and British officials. Shiite and Sunni clerics, interested<br />
in their own personal power base, began trying to rouse<br />
public support against the British and against each other. Terrorist<br />
attacks and brutal massacres of small Imperial defense<br />
forces and British administrators became common, forcing<br />
the British into the safety of Baghdad, Mosul, and Basra, leaving<br />
the rest of the country to itself 60 .<br />
To make matters worse, Bolshevik agents from the<br />
Soviet Union infiltrated into Mesopotamia from the former<br />
Russian territory of Northern Persia and began to fund<br />
nationalist rebellions against the British in the east 61 . Agents<br />
of the young Turkish revolutionary, Kemal Ataturk, penetrated<br />
into northern Mesopotamia into a region known as<br />
Kurdistan. Supplying some funding and munitions to the<br />
Kurds, Turkish agents began trying to inflame the Kurdish<br />
chieftains to rise up and fight the British to obtain an<br />
independent Kurdistan 62 . By 1920, there were over 130,000<br />
tribesmen violently under arms around the region 63 . British<br />
forces suddenly found themselves desperately huddled atop<br />
scant high ground with the flood waters of civil war rising up<br />
around their ankles.<br />
The British garrison in Mesopotamia was raised<br />
to 17,000 British regulars and 85,000 Indian troops. The<br />
estimated annual cost of supporting these forces rose to £30<br />
million 64 . Winston Churchill had been placed in charge of<br />
the Colonial Office following the brilliant success of the <strong>Air</strong><br />
Ministry in controlling Somalia, and now called a meeting<br />
of all of the regional governors to decide what could be done<br />
about the Middle East. In regards to Mesopotamia, it was
decided that Amir Feisal would be made King of the wartorn<br />
protectorate. Feisal was brother to Amir Abdullah, King<br />
of neighboring Transjordan. Churchill believed that it was<br />
vitally important that Amir Feisal be chosen by the people<br />
of Mesopotamia, which would be renamed Iraq, in order for<br />
him to truly have sovereignty65 the first time, was <strong>Air</strong> Control truly effective in coercing the<br />
Kurds to abandon their rebellion. Though the armoured car<br />
companies were helpful to the flying squadrons, the rocky<br />
terrain made it difficult for the vehicles to keep pace with the<br />
fast-moving mounted Kurdish warriors. However, the sheer<br />
. In order to achieve support number of planes available to Salmond—eight full squadrons<br />
for Feisal, it was necessary to put down the rebellions. with excellent logistical support, as opposed to one squadron<br />
The many divisions based in Mesopotamia by the in both Somaliland and Afghanistan with hit-or-miss logis-<br />
end of 1921 began going about rounding up the more militics—allowed air power to be supplied with much greater<br />
tant renegades and bringing them to justice. The less militant<br />
leaders and clerics were bribed into cooperation by the British<br />
administration 66 . With several additional squadrons from<br />
the Royal <strong>Air</strong> <strong>Force</strong> providing reconnaissance, air support,<br />
and aerial resupply, the British forces were able to destroy<br />
the larger concentrations of renegade forces. Soon, the initial<br />
furor that had caused so many rebellions abated and the<br />
tribesmen and villagers lost interest. By 1922, the region was<br />
mostly pacified except for parts of Kurdistan, and many village<br />
referendums were held in which Amir Feisal was chosen<br />
for their King 67 . Feisal was a gifted negotiator, and his com-<br />
76<br />
force and effectiveness.<br />
<strong>Air</strong> forces, using machine guns and small-diameter<br />
bombs, were directed against war parties of Kurdish horsemen<br />
moving in the open. The massed airpower was very effective<br />
at inflicting losses 71 . <strong>Air</strong>power, practically by itself, ended<br />
the forays and raids by the Kurdish rebels through coercive<br />
methods. The tribes still maintained several warriors—who<br />
still conducted raids from time to time, and still do to this<br />
day—but the rebellion was ended. Therefore, in subduing<br />
Kurdistan, the hammer-and-anvil denial strategy of <strong>Air</strong> Con-<br />
mand presence demanded the respect and obedience of all the<br />
tribal chieftains he met with68 . Peace finally came to Mesopotamia,<br />
and the process of drafting a constitution and beginning<br />
self-rule began in earnest.<br />
The bulk of the British ground forces in Mesopotamia<br />
returned to India, leaving behind nine battalions of<br />
British and Indian infantry, eight flying squadrons with six<br />
armoured car companies as support, and the local levies of<br />
Iraqi troops69 . These were tasked with dealing with the last<br />
remaining renegade forces in the north. These forces were<br />
predominantly Kurdish tribesmen urged on by the Turks to<br />
fight for an independent Kurdistan, and they were supported<br />
by Turkish advisors and even companies of Turkish troops70 trol was effective as a coercive air strategy.<br />
In regards to pacifying the rest Mesopotamia, however,<br />
once again it was not airpower alone that made it work.<br />
Although the costs of putting down the rebellions dropped<br />
considerably from £30 million in 1922 to £3 million by<br />
1923, it was still the 120,000 troops of the British forces<br />
that managed to quash the more militant leaders and clerics<br />
.<br />
General Geoffrey Salmond, head of the <strong>Air</strong> Service in the<br />
Middle East during the Great War, had administered the air<br />
support operations that had enabled the ground forces to reassert<br />
control in Mesopotamia. He now turned his attention<br />
to applying the hammer-and-anvil of <strong>Air</strong> Control to dealing<br />
with the sporadic fighting in the north.<br />
In this, the mobile ground forces of the armoured<br />
car companies worked in concert with the flying squadrons<br />
to harass and weaken Kurdish war parties and Turkish troop<br />
incursions both of them utilizing denial strategies to destroy<br />
the rebel forces coupled with operational interdiction sorties<br />
to deny the rebels access to food, munitions, and information.<br />
Meanwhile, other armoured car detachments worked<br />
in concert with levies of Iraqi troops to occupy Kurdish territory<br />
and flush out renegades in the guerilla-warfare equivalent<br />
of strategic interdiction, denying the renegades access to<br />
their greatest logistical base. It may be argued that here, for<br />
72 . The more moderate leaders and clerics were bought<br />
by the administration, and their subsequent support further<br />
helped the British cause73 . The single most important factor,<br />
however, in pacifying and controlling Mesopotamia was the<br />
installation of Amir Feisal as King. No longer could the scattered<br />
tribes unite to fight some foreign control apparatus in<br />
the form of the British Colonial Office, but rather united<br />
under their charismatic King and began working to form a<br />
viable self-rule with their own constitution. With King Feisal<br />
governing in the place of a colonial governor, Britain was able<br />
to win the hearts and minds of the majority of the people of<br />
Mesopotamia and the widespread cooperation allowed Britain<br />
to rebuild the country better than it had been under the<br />
Ottoman Turks. It is certainly interesting to note that the<br />
most effective means of coercion, to date, involved very, very<br />
little force and a very, very great amount of diplomacy.<br />
In pacifying the Kurds in the north, and in 1923<br />
putting down a small jihad led by a renegade Iraqi magistrate<br />
named Sheik Mahmud who proclaimed himself King of<br />
Kurdistan74 , the winner was airpower alone. Fast, maneuverable,<br />
and hard-hitting, the eight squadrons of Mesopotamia<br />
under General Salmond were able to smash any organized<br />
rebel forces before they could do any damage. The mobile<br />
squadrons of armoured cars provided the effective ground
ase to mop up after the airpower had finished, cutting off<br />
the renegades from their strategic logistics bases in their own<br />
villages and in Turkey. This effective combination, combined<br />
with waning support from the Turks, persuaded the Kurds to<br />
cease their rebellion and turn instead to conducting sporadic<br />
raids on one another.<br />
PART VII<br />
LESSONS TO BE LEARNED<br />
In controlling the very-different situations in the<br />
three colonies mentioned, there were certain over-arching<br />
measures which proved effective. Among them was the close<br />
coordination between ground forces and air forces. At one<br />
time, ground forces alone might have been able to do the<br />
job, but at the cost of hundreds of millions of pounds and<br />
hundreds of thousands of lives lost. After the Great War, the<br />
British people would never have supported such endeavors,<br />
military action would have ended in failure and political<br />
fiasco, and it is likely the colonies would simply have been<br />
left to fend for themselves. <strong>Air</strong>power allowed the British<br />
commanders the ability to strike hard and fast, with good<br />
reconnaissance and aerial intelligence, with accurate and<br />
timely air support in harsh and mountainous terrain where<br />
artillery could not be used, and even with resupply. The<br />
mobile ground forces of the armoured car detachments and<br />
squadrons worked very well to complement the attacks of the<br />
flying squadrons, creating a hammer-and-anvil that gave the<br />
adversary no rest from denial-based attack and operational<br />
interdiction. This is in keeping with the concepts of coercion:<br />
constant pressure keeps the adversary from developing<br />
new strategies or counterstrategies. Meanwhile, the adversary<br />
has no ability to escalate the situation while friendly air<br />
and ground forces are constantly maneuvering to deny the<br />
adversary even the slightest hope of success. The adversary is<br />
compelled to cease the conflict, though the actual ability to<br />
continue resistance may very well be present.<br />
Measures which were tried but which did not work<br />
were the use of ground forces by themselves, and the use of<br />
airpower by itself. The ground forces, for example in Somaliland,<br />
simply did not have the information or the speed to<br />
bring Hassan’s raids to an end without the use of airpower or<br />
without ensnaring the Empire Commonwealth in a brutal<br />
quagmire of slow attrition warfare. In Somaliland, the Royal<br />
<strong>Air</strong> <strong>Force</strong>’s constant denial and decapitation campaign against<br />
Hassan and his raiding forces wrested away the one advantage<br />
that Hassan had possessed in his earlier conflicts against<br />
ground forces—his mobility and stealth.<br />
However, neither could coercive airpower strategies<br />
alone end any conflicts. In Afghanistan, although strategic<br />
bombing raids were conducted against the armaments factory<br />
77<br />
in Jalalabad—strategic interdiction—and against the palace of<br />
Amir Ammanullah—decapitation—the war did not end until<br />
the 340,000 ground troops of the British forces were about to<br />
invade Afghan territory.<br />
This is critical—all too often airpower is seen as the<br />
more sanitary, cost-effective means of coercing an enemy.<br />
However, such an approach lacks the teeth that give coercion<br />
its real bite—the believable threat of escalation. With<br />
airpower, the limit to the level of escalation that is possible is<br />
using nuclear weapons, and unfortunately that level of escalation<br />
is reached decidedly soon in the coercion process. Trying<br />
to assess a probability of success in nuclear coercion begins to<br />
enter heavily into games theory and brinksmanship—psychology,<br />
sociology, and social calculus, desperately attempting to<br />
see how close the opponent will go towards total annihilation.<br />
Suffice to say, with nuclear weapons coercive air strategies<br />
cease to be, and thus may reasonably be termed a failure of<br />
airpower coercion. Ground forces, however, retain almost<br />
limitless escalation. After all, a young soldier occupying an<br />
adversary’s street corner has the ability to do quite a bit more,<br />
overall, than a pilot flying at twenty-thousand feet.<br />
It can therefore be concluded that coercive air strategies—in<br />
effect, using airpower alone to achieve coercion in<br />
any of the many forms outlined by Pape and Byman—will<br />
not work against a determined adversary, especially one who<br />
has military training and whose people are also well-acclimated<br />
to warfare. Only through the use of coordinated air<br />
and ground forces working in close concert might coercion be<br />
achieved. <strong>Air</strong>power may be used to affect a denial-strategy on<br />
the adversary’s military capabilities while razing the logistical<br />
base of the adversary’s forces through operational interdiction,<br />
while ground forces are poised to finish the job and continually<br />
harass the adversary as the anvil of an aggressive denial<br />
strategy and separate adversarial forces from any strategic<br />
logistical support that might be found in the local populace.<br />
Most importantly of all, while airpower is making a fast denial<br />
strategy possible, overwhelming ground forces must be standing<br />
by to invade in order to provide a believable threat of conflict-escalation.<br />
PART VIII<br />
IN CONCLUSION<br />
The British turned to <strong>Air</strong> Control as a means of putting<br />
down rebellion throughout the Empire-Commonwealth<br />
cheaply and effectively. Though <strong>Air</strong> Control did reduce the<br />
costs of the several frontier wars in which it was utilized, it<br />
did not solve all of Britain’s problems. Each conflict still<br />
demanded a high level of commitment, and even the smallest<br />
of the wars, in Somaliland, demanded over a thousand<br />
ground troops to occupy the area, and over five-thousand
local troops levied before the end of the war. It requires vast<br />
amounts of treasure, national will, and even blood to build<br />
and maintain influence around the world. There is no quick<br />
and easy way of asserting such influence, there are no halfmeasures,<br />
and most importantly, there are simply no surgical<br />
strikes that can paralyze an adversary completely, shocked to<br />
the point where the will to fight no longer exists.<br />
<strong>Air</strong>power can help shorten the duration and cost of a<br />
conflict, in terms of blood and treasure. <strong>Air</strong>power can shock<br />
the adversary into realizing vulnerability, and can weaken the<br />
adversary’s forces for the great decisive blow that can only be<br />
delivered by ground forces. However, what is necessary for<br />
any conflict is a clearly defined end-state that national will<br />
can focus on and the political commitment to stay the course<br />
and see the campaign through. Escalation dominance, the<br />
ability to increase pressure on the adversary at will, is the real<br />
key to any coercive strategy. Escalation dominance, however,<br />
can only be achieved if the national will is present to follow<br />
through with what the adversary has to believe is a real, imminent<br />
threat.<br />
There is a real danger, however, in resolving conflict<br />
by means of threatening even worse conflict: that the lesson<br />
learned by the adversary is to strike in a different manner in<br />
the next conflict, in a manner that will be unanticipated and<br />
have a much greater chance of success. The sad truth of coercion,<br />
and war for that matter, is that there is no way of absolutely<br />
winning. There is only postponement, posturing, and<br />
renewal of hostilities at some later date.<br />
The closest way to ensure successful coercion is<br />
actually not through violence at all but through the hearts<br />
and minds of the people. The British were trying to control<br />
colonies through the use of airpower, yet the flying squadrons—and<br />
their armoured car counterparts—were directed<br />
at their adversary’s military capabilities, the formations of<br />
troops, the raiding parties, very much a denial-based strategy.<br />
Meanwhile, the whole time in every colony the British<br />
authorities were trying to ensure that when the conflict was<br />
over there would still be colonials loyal to Britain. The concept<br />
of <strong>Air</strong> Control relied heavily on the use of local levies of<br />
troops, who cost less than British and Indian troops and were<br />
more numerous in the immediate area. These local levies<br />
could never have been possible if British authorities weren’t<br />
ensuring that the majority of the people agreed that the British<br />
needed their help and were willing to give it. The British<br />
accomplished this by building schools and educating the<br />
people of their colonies, by undertaking construction projects<br />
using local labor and thereby providing a job market, and by<br />
simply bribing local leaders into supporting the British cause.<br />
Of the 130,000 tribesmen under arms in Mesopotamia just<br />
after the First World War, only a small fraction would actually<br />
78<br />
be engaged by the British forces in the protectorate. The vast<br />
majority simply began to agree with British rule. This seeming-impossible<br />
reversal was accomplished by converting the<br />
tribal leaders and clerics to the British cause by way of bribes,<br />
gifts, and assurances that their own personal power-base<br />
would not be threatened as long as the supported the British.<br />
Thus, the vast majority of Mesopotamia was coerced<br />
into cooperating with the British without any military<br />
involvement whatsoever, but through the work of positive<br />
public relations, imaginative and effective diversion of funds,<br />
and projects designed to educate the people and build them<br />
a way of life better than they had known before. Imagine—<br />
influencing an entire population through education, health<br />
care, development of infrastructure, and a sense of pride and<br />
self-determination. Perhaps a lesson in real coercion can be<br />
learned from that.<br />
WORKS CITED<br />
Armitage, Sir Michael. The Royal <strong>Air</strong> <strong>Force</strong>: An Illustrated History.<br />
New York, NY:<br />
Sterling Publishing Co., 1993.<br />
Billings, Molly. The 1918 Spanish Influenza Pandemic. Stanford<br />
University, June 1997.<br />
http://www.stanford.edu/group/virus/uda/<br />
Byman, Daniel L., Matthew C. Waxman, and Eric Larson.<br />
<strong>Air</strong> Power as a Coercive<br />
Instrument. Santa Monica, CA: Rand, 1999.<br />
Clausewitz, Carl von. On War. New York, NY: Random<br />
House, Inc., 1993.<br />
Pape, Robert A. Bombing to Win: <strong>Air</strong> Power and Coercion in<br />
War. Ithaca, NY:<br />
Cornell University Press, 1996.<br />
Scovill, Elmer B. The Royal <strong>Air</strong> <strong>Force</strong>, the Middle East, and<br />
Disarmament, 1919-1934.<br />
Ann Arbor, MI: Michigan State University Press,<br />
1973.<br />
Smith, Malcom. British <strong>Air</strong> Strategy Between the Wars. New<br />
York, NY: Oxford<br />
University Press, 1984.<br />
St. George Saunders, Hilary. Per Ardua: The Rise of British <strong>Air</strong><br />
Power 1911-1939. New<br />
York, NY: Oxford University Press, 1945.
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS<br />
Special thanks go to Major Robert Melton, Jr.,<br />
USAF, for all of his help in writing this. Before he read it,<br />
it was long. After he read it, it was long and was actually<br />
worth taking a look at. Thank you so much, sir, for getting<br />
me back on track! Thanks to my boys in the MSS Class of<br />
’04. We’re so ready. Thanks to the website that provided the<br />
excellent story of the First Afghan War and to Major Melton<br />
for vaguely remembering something about it, and to the old<br />
British pilot that killed the Mad Mullah’s camel, thanks for<br />
reminder that some days it’s chickens and some days it’s feathers!<br />
Thanks to my fiancée Stephanie—no one has ever helped<br />
me more.<br />
Ditat Deus<br />
(Endnotes)<br />
1 Clausewitz 90-99. Excellent, excellent book. Clausewitz is<br />
usually considered a must-read by the military-types (at least<br />
the Cliff’s Notes), but the social theorist and the political<br />
scientist should definitely read it as well; not only is there<br />
much to learn from it, but reading a work is the only way to<br />
be free of misquotations!<br />
2 Clausewitz 101. The terminology is actually People,<br />
Commander, Government. The Commander interacts with<br />
fate, resulting in my explanation which, though a slight<br />
misquote, cuts right to the chase!<br />
3 ibid<br />
4 Clausewitz 85. The writings on this subject are frightening<br />
to contemplate. Absolute war.<br />
5 Clausewitz Chapter One. This is much more effective<br />
documentation. You are charged with reading the entire<br />
chapter and becoming wiser not only concerning the nature<br />
of war but of humanity.<br />
6 ibid<br />
7 ibid<br />
8 Pape 20. The strategist may be confused and perhaps even<br />
bored by this Joministic approach. The political scientist<br />
may not have thought much into the psychological and<br />
circumstantial maelstrom that defines the nature of conflicts<br />
and may see Pape’s arguments as a road to panacea. This<br />
is not the case! Perhaps large-n surveys and application of<br />
chi-squared modeling may help in other aspects of political<br />
science, but in the conduct of military operations, a silverbullet<br />
approach will not be of any value and might actually<br />
be harmful if attempted without proper safety precautions.<br />
To paraphrase Sun-Tzu, we must look at the characteristics<br />
of each individual situation, for they are always different but<br />
often similar.<br />
79<br />
9 ibid<br />
10 ibid<br />
11 Pape 55-58. Pape’s coercive air strategies have some<br />
merit to them, I think. However, readers who wish to learn<br />
about them should be sure to prepare themselves by reading<br />
Clausewitz, Sun Tzu, Cohen, and any history book worth its<br />
salt about any conflict.<br />
12 ibid<br />
13 ibid<br />
14 ibid<br />
15 Byman Read this book. It is short, it is sweet, it is potent,<br />
and it is free online at RAND’s website.<br />
16 ibid<br />
17 ibid<br />
18 ibid<br />
19 Scoville 5-7. A most excellent read. Scovill’s book, written<br />
in 1973 shows striking similarities between the British<br />
experiences in the Muslim world and the experiences the<br />
<strong>United</strong> Status is having now. It is actually quite eery.<br />
20 Billings. I don’t understand why a virus that became the<br />
worst pandemic in recorded history by killing 20-40 million<br />
people in one year does not get more attention. Everybody<br />
knows about “Black Death.” Who’s heard of Spanish<br />
Influenza? I think it’s an injustice.<br />
21 Scoville, Chapter 2.<br />
22 ibid<br />
23 Scovill, Chapter 5<br />
24 ibid<br />
25 ibid<br />
26 ibid<br />
27 ibid. It is amazing to think that Churchill went from the<br />
Admiralty to the War Office and the <strong>Air</strong> Ministry to the<br />
Colonial Office.<br />
28 ibid<br />
29 ibid. Scovill is an outstanding source on the “interwar”<br />
period of RAF. He is an even better source on the concept of<br />
<strong>Air</strong> Control in the Middle East.<br />
30 Scovill,Chapter 6.<br />
31 ibid<br />
32 ibid<br />
33 ibid<br />
34 ibid. It’s necessary to tell a story of the First Afghan War to<br />
show how brutal the fighting was between the British and the<br />
Afghans since the mid-1800s: The British had been warring<br />
against Afghanistan for almost a hundred years by the time<br />
of the Third Afghan War. The First Afghan War was a terrible<br />
debacle. The British Army had found itself embroiled<br />
in a conflict in some of the most unforgiving terrain in the<br />
world against an entire culture of warriors. They fought using<br />
Napoleonic tactics against a mounted force of guerillas and
hardy mountain troops, and though they initially met with<br />
success against the scattered tribes, they soon found themselves<br />
outnumbered by a unified Afghanistan. In the retreat<br />
from Kabul in the January of 1842, a force of over four thousand<br />
soldiers and more than ten-thousand women, children,<br />
and support personnel left the city to join the British garrison<br />
at the city of Jalalabad. Jalalabad was ninety miles from<br />
Kabul, over high, snow-covered mountain passes and rough<br />
terrain. The column was under constant attack by tribesmen<br />
and guerillas. Of the 16,000 souls that left Kabul in the British<br />
retreat, only one made it to Jalalabad, severely wounded<br />
and half-dead from hunger and thirst.<br />
35 Armitage, 33. I liked this book and found it to be an<br />
excellent companion to Scovill’s work. It has nice pictures!<br />
36 Scovill, Chapter 6<br />
37 ibid<br />
38 ibid<br />
39 ibid<br />
40 ibid<br />
41 ibid<br />
42 Armitage, 33<br />
43 Scovill, Chapter 3<br />
44 Armitage, 33; Scovill, Chapter 5. The fight for Waziristan<br />
took years, more than a decade, to quell. The reason that the<br />
British public supported such an extended military action was<br />
that, first off, they for the most part knew nothing about the<br />
conflict and, secondly, the war was relatively “inexpensive.”<br />
45 Armitage 35, Scovill Chapter 6. Excellent story!<br />
46 ibid<br />
47 ibid<br />
48 ibid<br />
49 Scovill, Chapter 6<br />
50 ibid<br />
51 ibid. The following story is from a British pursuit pilot’s<br />
attack. The British were trying to perform decapitation<br />
strategies without precision munitions! On one of the raids<br />
against Hassan, a British pilot dropped a bomb which landed<br />
quite fortunately. Hassan was well-known to ride a white<br />
camel with a long black banner carried high on the wind, a<br />
mark of his eccentric fascination with himself. The young<br />
pilot saw the white camel with the black banner and aimed<br />
his bombs at Hassan, sure that there was no possible way he<br />
could even come close to hitting him. To his surprise, when<br />
he looked back the camel had disappeared, blown to bits, and<br />
Hassan was struggling to get to his feet. At over fifty years of<br />
age, this had to be quite a blow to Hassan. The black banner<br />
was not to be seen flying again behind any camels.<br />
52 ibid<br />
80<br />
53 ibid<br />
54 Scovill, Chapter 6<br />
55 Scovill, Chapter 3<br />
56 Scovill, Chapter 3<br />
57 ibid<br />
58 ibid<br />
59 ibid<br />
60 Scovill, Chapter 3<br />
61 Scovill, Chapter 6<br />
62 ibid<br />
63 ibid<br />
64 Armitage, 37<br />
65 Scovill, Chapter 6. Scovill had an absolutely brilliant idea.<br />
I wonder if we could try it or not in Iraq?<br />
66 ibid<br />
67 ibid<br />
68 ibid<br />
69 ibid<br />
70 Armitage, 35-51<br />
71 Scovill, Chapter 6—probably the best chapter in the entire<br />
book!<br />
72 ibid<br />
73ibid 74 Armitage, 37
FALLOUT:<br />
THE QUESTION OF NEXT GENERATION<br />
NUCLEAR WEAPONS<br />
By C1C Damon A. Wagoner<br />
INTRODUCTION<br />
Statement of the Research Question<br />
As the <strong>United</strong> <strong>States</strong> enters the twenty-first century,<br />
the question of how best to provide for the common defense<br />
remains a primary concern for both the government and the<br />
military. With ever-increasing threats of terrorism and the<br />
proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, the U.S. needs<br />
to take a close look at its own inventory of weapons and evaluate<br />
their usefulness in the coming years. The purpose of the<br />
following research is to evaluate whether or not the <strong>United</strong><br />
<strong>States</strong> should develop a new generation of nuclear weapons<br />
given the potential threats to its national security. The specific<br />
question that the research seeks to answer is this: Should<br />
the <strong>United</strong> <strong>States</strong> design, build, and test low-yield earth-penetrating<br />
nuclear weapons?<br />
Background and Significance of the Problem<br />
Since the development of the atomic bomb in the<br />
1940s, politicians and military leaders have wrestled over<br />
the employment of nuclear weapons in the name of defense<br />
and national security. During the Cold War, the testing and<br />
stockpiling of nuclear weapons led to an incredible arms race<br />
between the <strong>United</strong> <strong>States</strong> and the Soviet Union. The primary<br />
purpose of these weapons was clear: the complete annihilation<br />
of the other nation should it be deemed necessary.<br />
However, the collapse of the Soviet Union left each nation<br />
with a multitude of weapons that no longer could be used<br />
for the mission for which they were created. Limited by the<br />
Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty and the Comprehensive Nuclear<br />
Test Ban Treaty which prohibit the research and development<br />
of precision nuclear weapons, American’s atomic program<br />
came to a grinding halt. 1 Today, however, new threats have<br />
presented themselves in the form of rogue states and non-state<br />
actors such as terrorists. Both groups have started to develop<br />
nuclear capabilities, either through their own research or<br />
through the purchase of such weapons.<br />
Unlike the Soviet Union in the Cold War, these<br />
new nuclear actors are undeterred by the <strong>United</strong> <strong>States</strong>’ large<br />
nuclear arsenal, which currently exceeds 10,000 weapons. 2<br />
The idea of mutually assured destruction is no longer feasible,<br />
since none of the new actors have the ability to completely<br />
destroy all of America’s strategic points as did the Soviet<br />
Union. However, some of these actors, such as North Korea,<br />
have the ability to strike American allies such as Japan and<br />
81<br />
South Korea. As American troops are stationed in both of<br />
these areas, the <strong>United</strong> <strong>States</strong> has a vested interest in deterring<br />
North Korea from launching nuclear warheads. Nuclear<br />
retaliation is the only real military threat the U.S. possesses to<br />
discourage North Korea from an atomic strike. It is unlikely<br />
that the U.S. would retaliate with a nuclear attack, because<br />
the weapons that comprise our current nuclear inventory are<br />
too large and would create too much collateral damage. For<br />
this reason, President Bush and members of his administration<br />
are calling for a study of the need to update our nuclear<br />
arsenal. The purpose of the investigation is to analyze<br />
whether or not our current nuclear capabilities adequately<br />
address the threats facing the U.S. In 2002, after declining<br />
further participation in the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty and<br />
opting to construct a missile defense system, President Bush<br />
requested Congress to approve the research and development<br />
of nuclear weapons in general. Congress approved the President’s<br />
proposal in May of 2003. 3<br />
The research and development of new nuclear<br />
weapons is a significant decision that will greatly affect the<br />
military’s operations. Most research is currently directed at<br />
the development of low-yield nuclear weapons. Often called<br />
“mini-nukes,” these weapons are meant to penetrate into the<br />
earth to destroy underground facilities while theoretically<br />
minimizing collateral damage. As a result of the ongoing<br />
research, the potential use of such weapons becomes much<br />
more likely. That, in turn, could have dramatic effects on<br />
current military doctrine.<br />
Limitations of the Study<br />
This study will evaluate the research, development,<br />
and employment of a new generation of nuclear weapons<br />
from a military point of view. The study is limited to examining<br />
how these weapons could affect military operations, and<br />
whether or not a different approach could be used to achieve<br />
the same objectives. It is important to realize there are very<br />
significant domestic political and international issues associated<br />
with the development of new nuclear weapons. Nonproliferation<br />
is a major component of international politics.<br />
The idea of developing a new nuclear program will provoke<br />
strong opposition from both American political spokesmen<br />
and foreign governments. Congressional resistance to a<br />
nuclear program has already been voiced by Senators Dianne<br />
Feinstein and Edward Kennedy, as they have attempted to<br />
halt funding for nuclear weapons research, arguing that it<br />
could result in a new arms race. 4 Such opposition will be<br />
crucial to consider before the Bush administration produces a<br />
new generation of weapons. Although the politics of nuclear<br />
weapons development is not the focus of this study, it is<br />
important that the reader be aware of the political dimension
of this issue.<br />
This study will focus on the effectiveness of nuclear<br />
weapons as a deterrent or usable military instrument. Therefore,<br />
domestic and international political considerations will<br />
not be considered. An additional limitation includes the<br />
availability of information. The highly sensitive nature of<br />
nuclear weapons means much of the relevant information<br />
about this subject is classified. While this should not significantly<br />
affect the findings of the present study, it is still worth<br />
acknowledging the limits of research and analysis based on<br />
unclassified information.<br />
Definitions and Assumptions<br />
To fully understand the significance of developing<br />
a new nuclear arsenal, it is important to define and describe<br />
weapons in the U.S. nuclear arsenal and what they are capable<br />
of doing.<br />
Nuclear Weapons: Nuclear weapons are based on the<br />
physics of atomic fission and fusion. The first nuclear weapons<br />
developed by the U.S. were fission bombs. Both types<br />
of bombs require some form of a radioactive material such as<br />
plutonium or uranium. Due to radiation, the bombs are very<br />
dangerous environmentally as radioactive dust can travel hundreds<br />
of miles away from the blast area.<br />
Nuclear Fission Bombs: “Nuclear fission is the process<br />
that occurs when a neutron strikes the nucleus of an atom<br />
of one of the heavy radioactive elements. The atom splits<br />
apart and two or more lighter elements are formed and one<br />
or more neutrons are ejected along with beta particles and<br />
gamma rays.” 5 The continued splitting of atoms within a fission<br />
bomb causes a chain reaction that results in an enormous<br />
release of heat and energy. These types of weapons require the<br />
use of a fissile material which is usually either highly enriched<br />
uranium (HEU) or plutonium.<br />
Nuclear Fusion Bombs: The second type of weapon<br />
is a hydrogen or thermonuclear device. This weapon works<br />
on the basis of nuclear fusion. Whereas a fission device is a<br />
chain reaction of breaking atoms, fusion devices work on the<br />
combination of atoms. Fusion devices are much more complex<br />
but have a higher destructive yield. For a fusion reaction<br />
to occur, it is necessary to first create a fission reaction. 6 This<br />
heats the hydrogen core to approximately twenty million<br />
degrees, and forces the hydrogen atoms to fuse together into<br />
helium creating an incredibly large explosion. 7 Nuclear detonations<br />
are measured according to the equivalent amount of<br />
TNT it would take to create the same explosion. For fission<br />
weapons, this is generally in the kiloton (KT) range. Fusion<br />
weapons are much larger and are measured in the megaton<br />
(MT) range. For example, the largest thermonuclear weapon<br />
ever detonated was by the Soviet Union was about 50 megatons.<br />
8 Therefore, it would take about 50 million tons of<br />
82<br />
TNT to create an explosion of the same size.<br />
Radioactive fallout: Fallout is the name given to<br />
radioactive material that is dispersed after the detonation of<br />
a nuclear device. Radiation is caused by excess energy within<br />
an atom due to an imbalance of protons and neutrons. 9 The<br />
excess energy within the atoms is released through alpha and<br />
beta particles and gamma rays, which constitute the dangerous<br />
material in a radioactive element. Alpha and beta particles<br />
are relatively simple to repel, requiring at most a thin<br />
sheet of metal. Gamma rays are highly dangerous and are<br />
very difficult to stop. Thick blocks of lead or concrete are<br />
required to repel gamma rays. They easily penetrate the skin<br />
causing severe damage to both the exterior and interior of the<br />
body. Radioactive fallout is an inevitable side-effect of any<br />
nuclear weapon. Factors affecting fallout include the weapon<br />
size, the fissile material used, the altitude at which the weapon<br />
detonated, and the prevailing winds after detonation. Fallout<br />
can have lasting consequences long after the weapon explodes,<br />
making the surrounding area uninhabitable for decades.<br />
Final definitions for consideration in this study<br />
include the terms “proliferation”, “rogue state”, “non-state<br />
actor” and “collateral damage”.<br />
Nuclear proliferation: Proliferation is the dispersion<br />
of nuclear weapons capabilities throughout the world. Counter<br />
or nonproliferation is a main goal of the U.S. government<br />
as a means of underwriting its national security. The spread<br />
of nuclear weapons makes it more likely that America will be<br />
the victims of a nuclear attack.<br />
Rogue <strong>States</strong>: For the purposes of this study, a rogue<br />
state will be defined as a nation led by a corrupt regime that<br />
poses a potential threat to both the U.S. and its allies based<br />
on its actions. North Korea, Iran, and Syria are examples<br />
of rogue states because their continued hostile actions are<br />
inconsistent with international efforts towards peace. The<br />
Non-Proliferation Treaty, designed to control the diffusion<br />
of nuclear weapons capabilities, is one example of current<br />
international attempts at peace. In January of this year, North<br />
Korea rejected the treaty.<br />
Non-state Actor: In general, a non-state actor is a<br />
self-governing body that is not an internationally recognized<br />
nation. No physical boundary encircles non-state actors<br />
because they do not posses a physical piece of geography. The<br />
Kurds are an example of a non-state actor. Though they claim<br />
to be a legitimate and self-governing nation, they are not<br />
internationally recognized as a sovereign state and there is no<br />
geographic entity known as “Kurdistan.” For the purposes of<br />
this study, the term “non-state actors” will be used to denote<br />
terrorist groups.<br />
Collateral Damage: Collateral damage is defined as<br />
the unintended destruction of people and/or property. Inno-
cent civilians and noncombatants that are injured or killed in<br />
an attack on a legitimate target are the main types of collateral<br />
damage that the U.S. wishes to avoid. The reduction of collateral<br />
damage is a major concern regardless of the type of<br />
weapon being used.<br />
Preview of the Argument<br />
It is clear that the <strong>United</strong> <strong>States</strong> does not have a<br />
weapons arsenal commensurate with security requirements of<br />
the twenty-first century. Both the conventional and nuclear<br />
arsenals of the <strong>United</strong> <strong>States</strong> require serious modernization.<br />
Current capabilities are ill-suited to destroy a growing number<br />
of hardened underground facilities that effectively neutralize<br />
U.S. strategic bombing. U.S. adversaries can easily store<br />
weapons of mass destruction in these bunkers, and there are<br />
currently no weapon systems that can damage or destroy these<br />
facilities. The U.S. must adapt to this changing security environment,<br />
or it can seriously negate non-proliferation attempts<br />
around the globe. These facilities make it very difficult to<br />
track and stop the spread of weapons of mass destruction.<br />
Within the Departments of Defense and Energy, the<br />
most popular concept to counter this emerging threat is the<br />
low-yield earth-penetrating nuclear weapon. The major argument<br />
of this paper is that employment of this specific weapon<br />
will create far too many negative consequences, and that the<br />
U.S. should consider developing non-nuclear alternatives.<br />
Today, the <strong>United</strong> <strong>States</strong> is fighting non-state actors and must<br />
be careful not to cause large amounts of collateral damage in<br />
the process. This specific nuclear weapon does not prevent or<br />
reduce collateral damage. On the contrary, this weapon will<br />
only create additional problems for the military. Most importantly,<br />
there is a strong possibility that this weapon cannot<br />
achieve its stated objective of destroying hardened underground<br />
facilities.<br />
LITERATURE REVIEW<br />
The terrorist attack on the <strong>United</strong> <strong>States</strong> in September<br />
of 2001 caused the government and the military<br />
to quickly evaluate America’s nuclear stockpile and policy<br />
regarding the use of atomic weapons. The majority of experts<br />
before September 11 were concerned with nonproliferation<br />
and the elimination of nuclear arsenals worldwide. Post<br />
9/11 experts are very critical of America’s nuclear arsenal and<br />
have raised the question of whether or not it is still an effective<br />
deterrent against attacks on U.S. soil. Some experts are<br />
vehemently against the development of new atomic weapons,<br />
while others are in favor of new research. Still others argue<br />
that prolonging the life of the current weapons is the best<br />
course of action. At this point, the U.S. still has not taken a<br />
clear direction. President Bush has only called for research<br />
83<br />
into the feasibility of small-yield nuclear weapons. Full-scale<br />
development and production has not started, and many<br />
experts contend that nuclear testing, if restarted at all, is still a<br />
long way off.<br />
The issue of re-evaluating America’s nuclear arsenal<br />
has evoked very strong opinions. Joseph Cirincione, director<br />
of the Non-Proliferation Project at the Carnegie Endowment<br />
for International Peace in Washington, expressed his concerns<br />
over the manufacture of new nuclear weapons in an interview<br />
with the National Journal. 10 Cirincione argues that conventional<br />
weapons would be more effective in destroying underground<br />
facilities if they were employed by “repeated precision<br />
strikes” that “bore deeper and deeper until you reach your<br />
target.” 11 This idea does seem to provide a seemingly acceptable<br />
alternative to using nuclear weapons.<br />
Cirincione believes that the most effective way to<br />
destroy underground facilities would be “repeated strikes”<br />
with conventional weapons. If the enemy realizes that we<br />
know the whereabouts of his facility, and if it takes several<br />
strikes to destroy that facility, the enemy might have time<br />
to escape and possibly salvage important equipment. Cirincione’s<br />
argument does allow for a non-nuclear solution, but<br />
it requires more time, resources, and money, as it will take a<br />
number of missions and a number of conventional weapons<br />
to destroy the facility. An earth-penetrating nuclear weapon<br />
(EPW) could theoretically destroy the facility in one pass.<br />
According to Cirincione, the EPWs are only effective to a<br />
depth of fifty yards or less, thus requiring the use of a highyield<br />
weapon which defeats the necessity of decreased collateral<br />
damage. A test conducted in Alaska confirmed Cirincione’s<br />
conjecture as an earth penetrating bomb dropped from<br />
40,000 feet went only 20 feet into the ground. 12 A key aspect<br />
of this test, is that it was a bomb being dropped, which means<br />
it was dependent upon gravity alone. A propulsion device<br />
could propel the warhead even deeper into the earth.<br />
Robert W. Nelson, in an article for the Journal of the<br />
Federation of American Scientists, agrees with Cirincione about<br />
the futility of the “mini-nukes.” 13 Citing the same example<br />
of how these weapons fail to bury themselves deep enough<br />
into the ground, Nelson argues that “mini-nukes” would only<br />
cause a fallout disaster for the local population. Nelson states<br />
that even a .15 KT weapon failing to penetrate deep into the<br />
soil would create a large radioactive crater, throwing contaminated<br />
dirt around the area. 14 The amount of contamination<br />
is dependent on the size of the bomb. Contamination could<br />
be limited to a few square miles. Prevailing winds after the<br />
blast are unpredictable and could spread the radiation over<br />
several hundred square miles. If there is no possibility of the<br />
mini-nukes penetrating any farther into the dirt, then Nelson<br />
offers a very compelling argument. However, he does make a
large assumption. His fear of a large radioactive crater is only<br />
legitimate if the underground facility is around a population<br />
center. If the underground facilities are in an isolated area,<br />
then the risk of fallout, though still critical to consider, would<br />
be minimized. However, as will be discussed later, there is<br />
little reason to believe that U.S. enemies would place these<br />
facilities in a rural area, because it would only reduce inhibitions<br />
about using these weapons.<br />
Henry Kelly and Ivan Oelrich agree with Nelso and<br />
Cirincione about the problems associated with the mininukes.<br />
15 They introduce a different argument in their article,<br />
stating that “you can’t attack bunkers if you don’t know where<br />
they are – unless you contemplate nuclear carpet bombing.” 16<br />
Failure of American intelligence seems to be a large assumption<br />
in this argument. The idea of nuclear carpet bombing is<br />
an unreasonable proposition, and no where else in the literature<br />
is that even remotely suggested as an alternative. Obviously<br />
carpet bombing with nuclear weapons would create hazards<br />
not only to the local population, but to American troops<br />
in the theater, and also to neighboring countries where winds<br />
could spread the fallout. These authors fail to give enough<br />
credit to the armed forces’ ability to pinpoint important<br />
targets. Current <strong>Air</strong> <strong>Force</strong> doctrine places high importance<br />
on precision bombing. Technology such as smart bombs,<br />
GPS-guided munitions, and infrared targeting are essential<br />
tools for hitting the right target and minimizing risks to noncombatants.<br />
Operation Enduring Freedom in Afghanistan<br />
serves as a prime example of how the U.S. military can hit a<br />
target with notable accuracy. <strong>Air</strong> <strong>Force</strong> bombers successfully<br />
destroyed a vast amount of al Queda’s network of caves with<br />
remarkable precision.<br />
John Swomley argues that success with conventional<br />
precision bombing in Iraq still had negative consequences<br />
because the ordnance “sent high-speed shrapnel flying as far as<br />
a mile, causing many civilian casualties.” 17 Swomley actually<br />
makes a valid point since the results of a nuclear blast, even<br />
small-yield, are likely to be much more severe. But Swomley’s<br />
argument is applicable only for congested areas. As was the<br />
case in the previous arguments, Swomley fails to address the<br />
issue of a rural area. If there will be high civilian casualties,<br />
then the arguments against mini-nukes are very valid. None<br />
of the above arguments, however, mention the use of nuclear<br />
weapons in largely uninhabited regions where the risk of collateral<br />
damage is very low or non-existent. Unless a clear and<br />
immediate threat exists to America’s national security, the use<br />
of nuclear weapons in an urban area is difficult to justify. In<br />
a rural environment it becomes much easier to justify, but<br />
those who oppose a new nuclear research program fail to consider<br />
this possibility. Again, one must consider, though, the<br />
strong possibility that hardened underground facilities will be<br />
84<br />
located mainly in urban areas.<br />
In a report for the Congressional Research Service,<br />
national defense specialist Jonathan Medalia evaluates the<br />
positive aspects of EPWs. 18 According to Medalia’s report,<br />
the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) estimates that over<br />
1,400 underground facilities exist throughout the world. 19<br />
Unfortunately, this report does not discuss whether or not<br />
they are located in urban or rural areas. Nevertheless, Medalia<br />
is very balanced in his report, and admits that it is possible<br />
to disable underground facilities with conventional weapons.<br />
But he also notes that to actually destroy the facilities, it will<br />
be necessary to create a shock wave that can only be achieved<br />
by a nuclear blast. 20 The disabling of an underground facility<br />
means that the personnel inside the bunker would be<br />
killed, but the facility itself could continue to function if new<br />
personnel were introduced. Destruction of a facility means<br />
that it has been damaged beyond repair and is no longer<br />
usable. This is an interesting point, because there may be a<br />
case where disabling the facility is all the military needs to do.<br />
This could be particularly effective in areas of high civilian<br />
populations. Disabling facilities in crowded environments<br />
and destroying facilities in rural areas would serve as a balance<br />
between nuclear and conventional forces.<br />
A strong argument for developing mini-nukes comes<br />
from the fact that underground facilities were created in order<br />
to negate the threat of U.S. conventional weapons. Such<br />
facilities are used to house enemy weapons caches and also<br />
serve as laboratories for research on nuclear, chemical, or biological<br />
weapons. In an interview with the National Journal,<br />
C. Paul Robinson, the director of Sandia National Laboratories,<br />
expressed his belief that “nations have gone to school on<br />
our conventional military capabilities,” which is why they are<br />
“moving their high-value targets out of our reach by locating<br />
them in deeply buried tunnels and inside mountains.” 21 If<br />
our enemies are finding ways to neutralize our conventional<br />
threat then it is understandable why nuclear alternatives are<br />
being considered. This does not mean, however, that nuclear<br />
weapons are the only alternative. Medalia’s report to Congress<br />
concurs with Robinson’s findings: “Adversaries learned from<br />
the Persian Gulf War and elsewhere that U.S. conventional<br />
forces can readily destroy unprotected assets. In response,<br />
they have buried key facilities. The U.S. needs EPWs to<br />
respond to their moves.” 22<br />
Both Robinson and Medalia see the importance of<br />
designing weapons that can penetrate the earth and strike<br />
underground facilities. Though mini-nukes currently seem to<br />
be the most popular way in which to accomplish this mission,<br />
neither of these men are completely sure that nuclear weapons<br />
are the only way in which to proceed. Robinson says, “I<br />
would argue that the <strong>United</strong> <strong>States</strong> must respond by main
taining a robust deterrent against whatever is hidden in those<br />
underground facilities.” 23 Notice that Robinson does not<br />
say that the U.S. needs only a conventional or only a nuclear<br />
deterrent. He realizes that it will likely take a variety of different<br />
weapons to form a robust deterrent. The U.S. cannot<br />
put all of its effort and reliance on a single system and hope<br />
to succeed. Medalia believes that “nonnuclear earth penetrators<br />
could also be improved.” 24 As noted above, he further<br />
believes that conventional weapons have the ability to damage<br />
underground facilities but not completely destroy them.<br />
Whether nuclear or conventional warheads are used, both<br />
men argue that it is necessary to better develop the earth-penetrating<br />
cone. If the missiles or bombs can penetrate deeper<br />
into the ground, there is a much higher chance of success for<br />
either disabling or completely destroying the facilities. This<br />
will also decrease the possibility of collateral damage, since the<br />
explosions will occur deep within the soil.<br />
Until a new program is decided upon, America’s current<br />
nuclear stockpile needs to remain ready for deployment.<br />
Colonel Rick Patenaude, the chief of Deterrence and Strike<br />
for <strong>Air</strong> <strong>Force</strong> Space Command (AFSPC) at Peterson <strong>Air</strong> <strong>Force</strong><br />
Base, is in charge of keeping the U.S. nuclear missile program<br />
at an operational level while considering possible future<br />
upgrades. 25 Kelly and Oelrich disagree with Patenaude’s<br />
attempt to develop a replacement nuclear program. They use<br />
a review by the National <strong>Academy</strong> of Science to support their<br />
contentions that the U.S. can remain confident in its existing<br />
nuclear arsenal due to the routine and complex maintenance<br />
on the intricate parts of the warheads. 26 It is true that the<br />
<strong>Air</strong> <strong>Force</strong> puts a great deal of effort into maintaining the current<br />
U.S. nuclear arsenal, but there is a point at which a new<br />
program must be developed. The current system has outlived<br />
its usefulness with the end of the Cold War and has little to<br />
no applicability in today’s world. In an interview with the<br />
Colorado Springs Gazette, Colonel Patenaude observed that<br />
the U.S. needs to build a new generation of ICBMs because<br />
the Cold War is over. 27 Colonel Patenaude appears to realize<br />
that a transformed security environment requires changes in<br />
how the military provides for the national security. Though<br />
he cannot foresee the precise future of the U.S. nuclear program,<br />
he does understand that an upgrade will be required to<br />
replace the outdated Minuteman III program. John Bolton,<br />
the Undersecretary of State for Arms Control and International<br />
Security, was quoted in Medalia’s report to Congress,<br />
“‘I think the nuclear arsenal is central to our ongoing security<br />
needs…where deterrence failed…we would certainly want an<br />
arsenal that was capable of being used and being used with<br />
effectiveness.’” 28 Mr. Bolton’s quote supports Colonel Patenaude’s<br />
judgment that it is necessary to begin conceptualizing a<br />
new nuclear agenda.<br />
85<br />
A key element of any research and development<br />
program involves vigorous testing of the findings. Unfortunately,<br />
there is still a taboo on nuclear testing in the <strong>United</strong><br />
<strong>States</strong> and in the international community. There are three<br />
main nuclear laboratories in the U.S. including Los Alamos<br />
National Laboratory in New Mexico, Lawrence Livermore<br />
National Laboratory (LLNL) in California, and Nevada<br />
Test Site (NTS) outside of Las Vegas. Testing today consists<br />
mainly of high explosives and non-fissile materials. At LLNL,<br />
depleted uranium-238 (D38) is used for testing because it<br />
lacks the ability to sustain a nuclear chain reaction. President<br />
George H. W. Bush put an end to nuclear tests at NTS<br />
in 1992. 29 The current Bush administration, however, has<br />
expressed interest in beginning nuclear tests, since it would<br />
assist in evaluating new nuclear programs while examining<br />
the functionality of our current arsenal. A key component<br />
of testing is the loss of expertise in the field. The declining<br />
number of nuclear physicists responsible for America’s current<br />
weapons is leaving very little expertise in the field.<br />
Although Congress has approved President Bush’s<br />
proposal to reduce the preparation time required to begin<br />
nuclear testing at NTS, many believe that the U.S. is still a<br />
long way off from reinstituting tests. 30 In his interview, Robinson<br />
said, “I can categorically state that no one is proposing<br />
returning to nuclear testing.” 31 This interview occurred<br />
in August of 2003, and since that time, President Bush has<br />
worked with Congress to gradually introduce the idea of<br />
nuclear testing. This contradicts what former Secretary of<br />
State Colin Powell said that same month: “The President has<br />
no intention of resuming nuclear tests, and there is no need<br />
for us to do so.” 32<br />
This leads to some confusion as former Secretary<br />
Powell is assuring the American people that there is no reason<br />
for testing to resume, while President Bush is lobbying Congress<br />
for quicker preparation time for testing. Kelly and<br />
Oelrich believe that the constant upkeep and inspections of<br />
the U.S. nuclear arsenal has removed any reason for our current<br />
weapons to be tested. 33 Senator Jon Kyl, chairman of<br />
the Subcomittee on Technology, Terrorism, and Homeland<br />
Security, disagrees and believes we should resume nuclear<br />
tests: “ ‘We’ve had a self-imposed moratorium on testing.<br />
Has it stopped other countries [North Korea and Iran]? No.<br />
It shows a failed strategy.’ ” 34 Senator Kyl’s comments show<br />
a possible reason for ending the tests in the 1990s. The<br />
U.S. ended testing on its own, without requests or international<br />
pressures. A possible reason, according to Senator<br />
Kyl, was to set an example for the rest of the world. It seems<br />
that he believes the U.S. hoped that ending its own nuclear<br />
tests would convince other nations to follow suit. Most the<br />
nations throughout the world did exactly that. Other nations
such as Pakistan, India, North Korea, and Iran did not, and<br />
now they pose legitimate threats to our national security.<br />
The creation of a new nuclear program for the<br />
<strong>United</strong> <strong>States</strong> is a hotly debated topic among experts in the<br />
government, military, and civilian world. Several civilians,<br />
along with a number of Democratic members of Congress<br />
including Senators Feinstein and Kennedy, believe that the<br />
current nuclear program adequately provides for our national<br />
security. They see a revived testing and development program<br />
as an unnecessary expenditure. Much of the civilian opposition<br />
comes from a belief that the mini-nukes are not militarily<br />
feasible. Opponents make strong arguments that new weapons<br />
will not succeed in minimizing collateral damage. Using<br />
the evidence provided by tests of EPWs, they claim that a<br />
nuke detonated in a shallow part of the ground will spread<br />
radioactive dust killing thousands of innocent people. Those<br />
in favor of a new nuclear program realize that the current<br />
system is outdated and will not work to deter rogue states<br />
and non-state actors. Medalia and Robinson have good arguments<br />
for strengthening all “bunker-busting” casings for all<br />
types of warheads. This will allow the military to remain flexible<br />
and have both nuclear and conventional weapons at its<br />
disposal. Unfortunately, there seems to be only two extremes.<br />
Either we keep our current nuclear capabilities or we go completely<br />
to mini-nukes. Colonel Patenaude appears to have the<br />
best outlook, as he is trying to gather a number of ideas in<br />
order to determine the best way to upgrade the U.S. nuclear<br />
arsenal.<br />
THESIS BODY<br />
Background Information<br />
What first began as a scientific discovery has now<br />
become the source of the most powerful weapons on earth.<br />
In the early 1940s, few realized the intensity of the energy<br />
released through the splitting of atoms. It was this energy<br />
that helped bring the Second World War to an end. Though<br />
there are considerable political concerns about the use of<br />
nuclear weapons, the fact remains that they are still the most<br />
lethal component in the <strong>United</strong> <strong>States</strong> arsenal, and they are<br />
highly sought by rogue nations and terrorist organizations.<br />
The U.S. has consistently sought to halt the proliferation<br />
of nuclear weapons throughout the world, but the ability to<br />
detonate an atomic bomb has become an indication of a technologically<br />
advanced culture. The inherent problem that the<br />
U.S. now faces is how to maintain a credible defense posture<br />
with nuclear weapons while still attempting to keep other<br />
nations from developing their own nuclear programs.<br />
Before undertaking a discussion about the future<br />
of the U.S. nuclear armament, it is essential to look at how<br />
U.S. nuclear policy has developed over the past sixty years.<br />
86<br />
The U.S. nuclear weapons program began when intelligence<br />
reports raised concerns over the possibility of Nazi Germany<br />
developing an atomic weapon. President Franklin Roosevelt<br />
authorized the creation of the Manhattan Project which was<br />
the U.S. program responsible for the research and development<br />
of a nuclear weapon. In early 1943, J. Robert Oppenheimer,<br />
the civilian director of the program, and Major General<br />
Leslie R. Groves, the military commander, founded Los<br />
Alamos National Laboratory in New Mexico. 35 The sole purpose<br />
of this laboratory was to create and test a nuclear weapon<br />
for use against U.S. adversaries in World War II.<br />
The world’s first nuclear weapon was detonated at<br />
Trinity Test Site in New Mexico on the morning of 16 July,<br />
1945. 36 This area of theoretical physics had now become an<br />
astonishing reality. None who witnessed the explosion were<br />
quite prepared for what they saw and felt. One scientist at<br />
the base camp, ten miles away from the explosion said, “ ‘The<br />
thing that got me was not the flash but the blinding heat of a<br />
bright day on your face in the cold desert morning.’ ” 37 This<br />
successful test proved the incredible power contained in a fissile<br />
weapon, and convinced President Harry Truman that a<br />
nuclear weapon could be employed effectively in the Pacific<br />
Theatre.<br />
Now that a nuclear weapon had become a reality,<br />
President Truman faced a daunting moral and political decision<br />
– whether or not the U.S. should use an atomic bomb in<br />
order to achieve a military victory. A weapon of this magnitude<br />
would indiscriminately kill tens of thousands of Japanese<br />
citizens within a matter of seconds. Thousands more would<br />
suffer the effects of radiation exposure in the following weeks.<br />
There were several contributing factors to President Truman’s<br />
decision. An invasion of the Japanese home islands would be<br />
costly both in American and Japanese lives, and in time. The<br />
Soviets were now turning their attention towards the Pacific<br />
Theatre, and President Truman did not want them to enter<br />
the war against Japan. The Japanese had made it clear that<br />
they would not surrender unconditionally. Finally, there was<br />
a moral question about slaughtering innocent Japanese civilians.<br />
The U.S. gave the Japanese one final chance at surrender<br />
when it issued the Potsdam Declaration which called<br />
for “…Japan to proclaim now the unconditional surrender of<br />
all Japanese armed forces…,” or it would face “prompt and<br />
utter destruction.” 38 Japan did not accept the conditions of<br />
the declaration, and elected to continue fighting. Then Secretary<br />
of War Henry L. Stimson recommended to President<br />
Truman that they use the atomic bomb in the hopes of forcing<br />
Japan to surrender. Stimson later recalled:<br />
My chief purpose was to end the war in victory<br />
with the least possible cost in the lives
of the men in the armies which I had helped<br />
to raise. In the light of the alternatives<br />
which, on a fair estimate, were open to us<br />
I believe that no man, in our position and<br />
subject to our responsibilities, holding in<br />
his hands a weapon of such possibilities for<br />
accomplishing this purpose and saving those<br />
lives, could have failed to use it and afterwards<br />
looked his countrymen in the face. 39<br />
Following the advice of his Secretary of War and military<br />
advisors, President Truman gave the order to employ the use<br />
of a nuclear weapon against Japan.<br />
On 6 August 1945, the Enola Gay B-29 Superfortress<br />
dropped the atomic bomb nicknamed “Little Boy” on<br />
the city of Hiroshima. “Little Boy” was a uranium-fueled<br />
device that was considered to be so reliable that it was never<br />
tested prior to its use in Japan. 40 Three days later, a second<br />
bomb was dropped on the city of Nagasaki. This bomb was<br />
an exact replica of the uranium device tested at Trinity. The<br />
use of these weapons in Japan was the first and only time in<br />
world history that atomic bombs have been employed in a<br />
combat situation. Though the necessity for their use is still<br />
a highly controversial topic even today, the fact remains that<br />
it did force Japan to accept an unconditional surrender and<br />
promptly end World War II.<br />
Though nuclear weapons can be credited with ending<br />
one great struggle, they can almost certainly be cited for<br />
the creation of the ensuing confrontation -- the Cold War.<br />
During the years after World War II and until the collapse<br />
of the Soviet Union, the true mark of a world power was the<br />
possession of a nuclear arsenal. Of course, the only way to<br />
increase the number and effectiveness of such weapons was by<br />
means of an intense schedule of testing. Between 1957 and<br />
1992, Nevada Test Site alone conducted 825 underground<br />
nuclear tests. 41 This does not even take into account the<br />
number of tests that occurred in the atmosphere and at the<br />
various test facilities in the South Pacific. Testing became<br />
even more intense with the creation of thermonuclear or<br />
fusion devices which had yields in the megaton range. In late<br />
1961, the Soviet Union detonated a 50-megaton thermonuclear<br />
device, which still remains the largest atomic weapon<br />
ever tested. 42 The high tempo of testing by both the U.S. and<br />
the U.S.S.R. during the early years of the Cold War encouraged<br />
the accumulation of a vast number of nuclear weapons.<br />
The unfortunate result was that each nation had the power<br />
to destroy the world several times over. Since the end of the<br />
Cold War, both nations have had to face the reality of finding<br />
ways to reduce the number of nuclear weapons in attempts to<br />
promote non-proliferation.<br />
87<br />
The nuclear posture of the U.S. throughout much<br />
of the Cold War was based on the idea of Mutually Assured<br />
Destruction (MAD). Since both nations had a strong nuclear<br />
capability, an attack by one country would almost insure the<br />
destruction of both countries. Deterrence was the main goal<br />
of a strong nuclear arsenal. Due to the U.S. nuclear triad<br />
of bombers, ballistic submarines and intercontinental ballistic<br />
missiles, it was impossible for the Soviet Union to be<br />
prepared for all possible strikes. The same held true for the<br />
Soviet Union’s offensive capabilities against the U.S. The fear<br />
of retaliation was the single-most important aspect of each<br />
nation’s nuclear strategy during the Cold War.<br />
Though maintenance of a strong and determined<br />
image was important during the Cold War, there were several<br />
attempts during these years to begin reducing the frequency<br />
of tests. This legislation was important because it has helped<br />
shape the current U.S. nuclear strategy. In October of 1963,<br />
the U.S. passed the Partial Test Ban Treaty which terminated<br />
nuclear tests aboveground, underwater, and in outer<br />
space. 43 In the following years, a number of other treaties<br />
were passed to further reduce the impacts of testing on the<br />
environment, and to help aid the reduction of each nation’s<br />
nuclear arsenals. Today, the U.S. is still faced with the difficult<br />
stance of attempting to reduce nuclear proliferation<br />
while still maintaining a legitimate nuclear presence in order<br />
to deter potential adversaries. In 1993, Congress passed the<br />
Spratt-Furse ban on the research and development of a new<br />
small-scale nuclear weapon with a yield of five kilotons or less;<br />
this legislation placed additional restrictions to the nuclear<br />
testing moratorium enacted by President George H. W. Bush<br />
that same year. 44 This ban was repealed in 2003 as President<br />
George W. Bush called for an investigation into the practicality<br />
of a new low-yield earth penetrating nuclear weapon to<br />
defeat hardened underground facilities.<br />
Presentation of the Argument<br />
During the Cold War, the strategy of deterrence<br />
worked in the sense that a nuclear war never occurred<br />
between the U.S. and the Soviet Union. Deterrence worked<br />
because each nation apparently was unwilling to accept the<br />
destruction of major cities and the deaths of tens of thousands<br />
of innocent civilians. Yet today the strategy of deterrence<br />
seems archaic with little prospect for influencing international<br />
behavior. Most nations are aware that the U.S. would be<br />
hesitant if not completely unwilling to use a nuclear weapon<br />
against an adversary simply because of the political turmoil<br />
that would ensue. The Cold War presented the U.S. with a<br />
single major enemy that happened to be a sovereign nation.<br />
The ongoing campaigns in the Middle East, suggest today’s<br />
enemies are much harder to identify. Therefore, it is under-
standable why the <strong>United</strong> <strong>States</strong> is now rethinking its nuclear<br />
posture. Weapons with yields in the high kiloton and megaton<br />
range simply no longer serve a valid purpose in today’s<br />
security environment.<br />
In order to modernize the U.S. nuclear inventory, the<br />
Bush administration tasked the Departments of Defense and<br />
Energy to evaluate the effectiveness of low-yield nuclear weapons.<br />
With the repeal of the Spratt-Furse ban in 2003, these<br />
departments quickly began researching potential replacements<br />
to the nation’s traditional nuclear force. The most popular<br />
concept is the Robust Nuclear Earth Penetrator (RNEP)<br />
bomb, and the administration plans on spending $484.7 million<br />
in research and development over the next four years. 45<br />
The idea of a RNEP was born out of the emerging threat of<br />
hardened underground facilities and the weapons of mass<br />
destruction that were potentially stored inside. Theoretically,<br />
a RNEP would burrow into the ground and detonate in close<br />
proximity to the shelter. The shock of a nuclear explosion<br />
would destroy the facility, while the resultant intense heat and<br />
radiation would destroy the chemical and biological weapons<br />
stored inside. 46 The relatively low yield of the weapon (5 kilotons<br />
or less) would hypothetically allow the surrounding soil<br />
to absorb the radioactive fallout and prevent a hazard to the<br />
local population. The RNEP concept is very simple, and in<br />
theory, appears to be a suitable replacement to the high-yield<br />
weapons in the current inventory. However, these weapons<br />
have several drawbacks and are not suitable for employment<br />
in any situation. The U.S. should cease the research of these<br />
devices and consider non-nuclear alternatives to defeat hardened<br />
underground facilities.<br />
The physics of a nuclear earth-penetrator is the first<br />
area of concern when considering its reliability. There are two<br />
components of an earth-penetrating weapon: the warhead and<br />
the weapon casing. The entire unit must travel fast enough<br />
to penetrate deep into the ground. However, the unit cannot<br />
travel too fast, or the weapon casing may become deformed<br />
and potentially damage the warhead. Given the relatively<br />
fragile nature of nuclear weapons, it is essential that the warhead<br />
remain intact or the weapon could fail to detonate.<br />
The U.S. <strong>Air</strong> <strong>Force</strong> conducted a test in 2003 to<br />
examine the penetration capabilities of current systems. A<br />
B-2 Stealth Bomber dropped an unarmed B61-11 earth<br />
penetrating bomb from an altitude of 40,000 feet and it was<br />
able to penetrate the earth only to a depth of twenty feet<br />
deep. 47 This test only proved what many physicists already<br />
had hypothesized about penetrating the earth’s soil. Earthpenetrators<br />
get their energy from gravity. They are simply<br />
dropped from an aircraft at a high altitude and depend upon<br />
the acceleration of gravity to give them a high enough rate of<br />
speed to burry into the ground. Upon impact, most gravity-<br />
88<br />
dependent bombs have speeds around 450 meters per second.<br />
This can be doubled by adding rocket propulsion and would<br />
increase the penetrating depths of the weapon by 75 percent<br />
in hard rock and almost 1,000 percent in soft soil. 48 Though<br />
a simple increase in speed seems to be the logical answer,<br />
the strength of the bomb casing represents another important<br />
consideration. It is simple enough to add a propulsion<br />
device to the back of a bomb, but that creates a risk of hitting<br />
the surface at such a high rate of speed that the weapon is<br />
destroyed almost immediately. Robert W. Nelson of Princeton<br />
University has studied the strengths of various materials<br />
that can be used for earth-penetrating weapons. According<br />
to his research, he found that twenty meters of penetration<br />
may be a theoretical maximum. 49 Thus, there is a strict balance<br />
between speed and strength for these weapons. If twenty<br />
meters is in fact the maximum depth of penetration, these<br />
weapons are entirely infeasible.<br />
The threat of nuclear fallout, which will be discussed<br />
later, is simply too great if a nuclear device were to be detonated<br />
at a depth of twenty meters. Moreover, underground<br />
facilities could be located several hundred feet underground.<br />
If a nuclear weapon, even at a low-yield, is detonated at<br />
twenty meters or less, there is a strong possibility that the<br />
facility will not even receive damage. The shock of the blast<br />
would simply reverberate off of the ground into the atmosphere.<br />
The only answer to this problem would be to increase<br />
the yield of the weapon in order to ensure the destruction<br />
of the facility. But this would only defeat the purpose of a<br />
low-yield RNEP, and is effectively the same idea as detonating<br />
a nuclear weapon on the surface. The physics of this type<br />
of weapon is a major limiting factor in its usefulness. An<br />
increase in speed allows a deeper penetration, but there are no<br />
existing materials strong enough to withstand such an increase<br />
in velocity. A small-yield detonation will likely not achieve<br />
the objective of destroying an underground facility if it can<br />
only bury twenty meters into the soil, and larger yields would<br />
only cause a great deal of radioactive fallout.<br />
The high risk of radioactive fallout is quite possibly<br />
the strongest argument against the military use of nuclear<br />
earth-penetrators. Proponents of these weapons hypothesize<br />
that the depth and the low-yield of the nuclear explosion<br />
would allow the radiation to be absorbed by the surrounding<br />
soil. As discussed above, the depth of the explosion will be<br />
relatively shallow. In order to completely contain the radiation<br />
from a one-kiloton weapon, an explosion would need<br />
to be at least ninety meters underground. 50 Both scientific<br />
studies and actual tests make clear that this depth is currently<br />
unobtainable by an airdropped bomb or missile. Instead of<br />
absorbing the shock and fallout, the surrounding soil would<br />
most likely be thrown into the atmosphere creating an envi-
onmental hazard and risking the lives of those in the surrounding<br />
area.<br />
The exact amount of fallout is difficult to predict, but<br />
the existence of fallout after the use of a RNEP is almost certain.<br />
Regardless of how deep the bomb is able to penetrate,<br />
it is going to leave a trail of open space in the soil through<br />
which fallout can escape. 51 Once radioactive fallout escapes<br />
into the atmosphere, there is little that can be done to protect<br />
local populations. The situation would deteriorate even<br />
further if winds began spreading the fallout over a wide area.<br />
The following circumstances give an idea of the problems<br />
associated with radioactive fallout:<br />
Consider a one-kiloton bunker buster bomb<br />
set off at relatively shallow depth – less than<br />
10 meters – in wind conditions averaging<br />
10 kilometers an hour. Although the numbers<br />
will vary slightly depending on detonation<br />
depth, geology and weapon details, the<br />
basic results will be similar. If it takes six<br />
hours for people in the vicinity to evacuate,<br />
then calculations show that nearly everyone<br />
downwind of the blast within approximately<br />
five kilometers would still be killed by<br />
fallout, and half the inhabitants eight kilometers<br />
away would die. Only if the nearest<br />
population center is 10 or more kilometers<br />
downwind will the fallout lead to few if any<br />
rapid fatalities. 52<br />
America’s enemies are well aware of U.S. policies on<br />
collateral damage. The American military does everything<br />
within its power to ensure there are no unnecessary casualties<br />
to noncombatants. Military commanders will always have<br />
a legal advisor to evaluate potential targets and ensure that<br />
operations abide by international laws and treaties. Technology<br />
is used to limit the accidental deaths of innocent civilians.<br />
Based on the above situation, the use of a RNEP defies the<br />
very principles of war that the U.S. military seeks to embrace.<br />
The military cannot choose when and where it will recognize<br />
the protections afforded to noncombatants. If a nuclear<br />
option creates too much of a danger to surrounding populations,<br />
then the military must find a way to employ conventional<br />
munitions. U.S. enemies are well aware of its stance on<br />
collateral damage. It is therefore logical to surmise that these<br />
enemies will place underground facilities in highly populated<br />
areas. A nuclear weapon, regardless of yield, would not be a<br />
viable option in these situations.<br />
Aside from the concern for collateral damage, radioactive<br />
fallout from a RNEP could cause further complications<br />
for military operations. The U.S. <strong>Air</strong> <strong>Force</strong>, in particular, is<br />
89<br />
concerned with Bomb Damage Assessment (BDA). This is<br />
and has been a critical part of airpower doctrine since World<br />
War II. The <strong>Air</strong> <strong>Force</strong> must know the effectiveness of its<br />
strikes against an enemy target so that it can make appropriate<br />
plans for future attacks. Since the RNEP is an airdropped<br />
weapon, it is likely that the <strong>Air</strong> <strong>Force</strong> will be the primary<br />
branch to use these weapons. BDA will be extremely difficult<br />
if RNEPs are utilized against an enemy target. Surveillance<br />
from space-based satellites will be of little use because they<br />
will not be able to see deep enough into the ground to assess<br />
the damage to enemy facilities. Fallout will make it extremely<br />
dangerous if not completely impossible for military personnel<br />
to examine the facility. The area will likely be closed off to<br />
any type of military operations due to the danger to our own<br />
forces. The RNEP was designed to give the military additional<br />
options in dealing with hard-to-reach targets, but the<br />
negative repercussions are numerous and have the potential to<br />
actually hinder operations.<br />
Though not the primary focus of this research, some<br />
attention must be given to the matter of politics, albeit only<br />
as it applies to military operations. The U.S. has taken a firm<br />
stance in preventing the proliferation of nuclear weapons<br />
throughout the globe. The U.S. military plays a crucial role<br />
in this area of international relations. Regional combatant<br />
commanders are often the primary ambassadors to other<br />
countries on military matters. Nuclear weapons are a threat<br />
to the national security of the <strong>United</strong> <strong>States</strong>, and therefore<br />
their proliferation is a key concern of the Department of<br />
Defense. Thus it seems ironic that while the DoD is attempting<br />
to stop the spread of nuclear weapons abroad, it is pushing<br />
the development of a new generation of nuclear weapons<br />
at home. These actions severely diminish the political credibility<br />
of the U.S. in the international arena. The U.S. wants<br />
to retain, and indeed expand its own nuclear arsenal, while<br />
proclaiming to other nations the importance of nuclear nonproliferation.<br />
53 In the end, this hypocrisy may only serve to<br />
place more stress on the American military. Other nations<br />
will likely view the U.S. development of RNEPs as a threat<br />
which, in turn, could cause some heretofore “nuclear free”<br />
nations to begin development of their own nuclear arsenals.<br />
If RNEPs are not the answer to destroying underground<br />
storage facilities, the question then becomes how<br />
can the U.S. combat this emerging threat? Advocates of the<br />
RNEP state that there are no conventional alternatives and<br />
that the only way to get an explosion big enough to destroy<br />
an underground facility is to use a nuclear device. But critics<br />
counter, “… if a bomb can be delivered close to its target<br />
bunker, the explosive power of a nuclear warhead may be<br />
superfluous; a conventional warhead will usually do.” 54 The<br />
key issue, therefore, is how to get any weapon close enough to
the target so that it can inflict enough damage. The RNEP<br />
is the convenient option for the military right now. It does<br />
not need to get very close in order to inflict damage simply<br />
because the nuclear explosion will likely be large enough to<br />
cause damage to the facility from a relatively large distance.<br />
The consequences of using the RNEP far outweigh<br />
the benefits. There are ways to destroy or incapacitate these<br />
facilities without using the RNEP. One concept is the Deep<br />
Digger, which would bore into the ground and then deliver<br />
the warhead once it was in close proximity to the target. 55<br />
Though this would take longer than the simple detonation<br />
of a RNEP, it would not produce the negative effects and<br />
resultant controversy that look to come with using a nuclear<br />
weapon. Another idea is to hit the access points to the facility.<br />
Of course, the obvious problem is finding these points,<br />
but it is also difficult to find underground facilities in the first<br />
place. Conventional bombs or ground forces could seal off or<br />
destroy the access points to the facility, thereby neutralizing<br />
their effectiveness. A final option would be kinetic-energy<br />
space weapons. Sometimes called “Rods from God”, the basic<br />
principle of these weapons is based upon high rates of speed.<br />
After entering the atmosphere from an orbiting space platform,<br />
these weapons, in theory, can hit a target with remarkable<br />
precision and devastation. It would be interesting to<br />
investigate the feasibility of using these weapons on hardened<br />
underground facilities.<br />
With so many viable conventional options, it is<br />
unclear as to why the U.S. continues to make the RNEP such<br />
a high priority. C. Paul Robinson, the aforementioned director<br />
of Sandia National Laboratory, has stated, “Our primary<br />
focus is still to accomplish this [destruction of hardened<br />
underground facilities] with conventional weapons, and we<br />
work hard on that problem. Nuclear weapons remain a blunt<br />
instrument of last resort.” 56 If this is truly the case, why does<br />
it appear that the RNEP is the only weapon the DoD and<br />
DoE are researching? It is no secret that the current U.S.<br />
nuclear inventory is out-dated. However, this is not an excuse<br />
for developing a system that will turn out to be as equally<br />
useless. More time, effort, and funding should be dedicated<br />
to the research of non-nuclear options. The U.S. nuclear<br />
arsenal needs to be modernized, but that does not necessarily<br />
mean that it needs to be modernized with additional nuclear<br />
weapons. Perhaps a strong conventional force can offset the<br />
reliance on nuclear weapons. The consequences of using a<br />
nuclear weapon, whether it be a RNEP, or a traditional highyield<br />
weapon, are simply too great. For now, if it still provides<br />
a welcome measure of deterrence, the current nuclear arsenal<br />
should be retained. But with a nod to the “iron law of unintended<br />
consequences,” there is no need to exacerbate political<br />
and military problems by developing a new generation of<br />
90<br />
nuclear weapons.<br />
CONCLUSION<br />
Summary of Findings<br />
Military history is filled with examples of how one<br />
side must adapt to the changes created by an adversary. It is<br />
this adaptation that creates new doctrine, new procedures,<br />
and new technology. The U.S. is currently faced with a<br />
change in the nature of its adversaries. The U.S. has long<br />
depended upon its ability to fly over enemy territory and<br />
destroy high-value targets using various methods of airpower.<br />
Now new enemies have devised new technologies for negating<br />
U.S. airpower. Placing high-value assets underground<br />
has effectively neutralized the U.S. ability to reach important<br />
enemy targets. The U.S. must adapt to this new situation.<br />
Conventional “bunker buster” bombs have been highly effective<br />
against exposed targets in Iraq and Afghanistan. However,<br />
these weapons are of little use against deeply buried<br />
targets. Believing it necessary to update the U.S. nuclear<br />
posture and to have the capability to strike at hardened facilities<br />
underground, the Bush administration has called for the<br />
research into a robust nuclear earth-penetrating bomb.<br />
The Cold War is over, and the idea of nuclear deterrence<br />
no longer appears to be a credible threat to a new generation<br />
of U.S. enemies. The threat of nuclear retaliation certainly<br />
did not hinder attacks on New York City and the Pentagon<br />
in 2001. Nor has nuclear deterrence restrained North<br />
Korean dictator Kim Jong Il from testing ballistic missiles and<br />
developing weapons grade fissile material. America’s nuclear<br />
posture is no longer a credible threat to its adversaries. The<br />
world is very much aware that there are almost no circumstances<br />
in which the U.S. would be willing to kill thousands<br />
of innocent people by using a nuclear device. Therefore, it<br />
is essential that the <strong>United</strong> <strong>States</strong> develop a new posture to<br />
thwart an attack by its enemies.<br />
The RNEP has become the favored weapon for modernizing<br />
the U.S. nuclear inventory and for serving as a deterrent<br />
to underground facilities. Proponents argue that it will<br />
bury deep into the soil and that the surrounding earth will<br />
absorb the fallout so as not to endanger local populations. By<br />
all indications, this simply is not true. There are several problems<br />
with the RNEP that make it a poor choice for a future<br />
U.S. weapon.<br />
First, the basic physics of this weapon suggest that<br />
it will not do in practice what it is expected to do in theory.<br />
There are no materials strong enough to withstand the forces<br />
of speeds necessary to penetrate deeply into the earth. The<br />
bomb casing will likely disintegrate on contact with the<br />
ground and render the warhead useless. Studies have shown<br />
that the limit of penetration is around twenty meters, which
is not nearly deep enough for the earth to absorb the fallout.<br />
Furthermore, there is a strong possibility that if the facility<br />
were buried deep enough, the shock of the bomb would never<br />
even reach the target. This would make the bomb completely<br />
ineffective. Development of this weapon becomes pointless if<br />
it cannot achieve its stated objectives.<br />
Second, the risk of radioactive fallout associated with<br />
the RNEP is too great. Regardless of how deep the weapon is<br />
able to penetrate, there will be a trail that the fallout can trace<br />
back into the atmosphere. The U.S. military prides itself<br />
on its ability to hit targets with precision and accuracy with<br />
little collateral damage. The RNEP would create a dramatic<br />
end to this selective targeting. Even if the RNEP successfully<br />
destroyed an enemy bunker, the negative impacts of the bomb<br />
would overshadow its accomplishments. These targets are not<br />
worth the deaths of thousands of innocent civilians. Though<br />
the short term effects of radiation exposure would be easy to<br />
track, it would be almost impossible to determine precisely<br />
the long term consequences on the local population if an<br />
RNEP was detonated in theatre. The threat not only affects<br />
civilians, but also personnel in the U.S. military. Soldiers<br />
could very well be in the path of the prevailing winds after<br />
detonation and therefore be exposed to lethal doses of radiation.<br />
The high costs of the RNEP with respect to fallout far<br />
outweigh the potential benefits.<br />
Third, the research and development of the RNEP<br />
can actually hinder military operations throughout the world.<br />
The DoD plays an essential role in combating nuclear proliferation.<br />
For the U.S. to pursue development of new nuclear<br />
weapons while attempting to halt the spread of nuclear<br />
weapons elsewhere is nothing short of hypocrisy. The U.S.<br />
strives to be an example to other nations. Accordingly, U.S.<br />
attempts to increase its own arsenal will only encourage other<br />
nations to do the same. This creates increased security risks<br />
for DoD personnel stationed abroad, and can hinder military<br />
diplomacy between U.S. regional commanders and our allies.<br />
Finally, the U.S. has not put enough effort into<br />
studying conventional alternatives to the RNEP. There are<br />
many theories about how best to strike underground facilities,<br />
but the DoD and DoE seem to be focused solely on<br />
the RNEP. Conventional weapons will never have the same<br />
explosive yield as nuclear devices, but a nuclear explosion may<br />
not be necessary. The funding allotted by Congress for the<br />
RNEP over the next four years could be better spent on developing<br />
conventional means of destroying hardened shelters.<br />
The research in this area may very well lead to the realization<br />
that a strong conventional force is the answer to the question<br />
of the current nuclear arsenal.<br />
Direction for Future Research<br />
91<br />
This research was narrowly focused on the military<br />
use of a robust nuclear earth-penetrator. There are several<br />
related matters that could be examined in greater detail. The<br />
question of using a nuclear weapon in combat is fraught with<br />
political controversy. Many nations have a problem with the<br />
U.S. simply considering the use of these weapons. What type<br />
of response can the U.S. expect from the international community<br />
if it did indeed use the RNEP? RNEP employment<br />
could easily lead to a global arms race, and if the U.S. used<br />
these devices, other nations would likely be more willing to<br />
use nuclear weapons as well. The political turmoil could be<br />
expected to have domestic consequences as well. Any Administration<br />
that actively pursued development of RNEPs could<br />
expect to face a great deal of opposition from the American<br />
public.<br />
Additional research would also be useful regarding<br />
the feasibility of the conventional options mentioned earlier.<br />
For example, what sort of studies are being conducted<br />
on the Deep Digger? This weapon system may not have<br />
the same destructive force as the RNEP, but if it can place a<br />
conventional weapon closer to the target, a lesser amount of<br />
force may suffice. Finally, the concept of kinetic-energy space<br />
weapons, while still in its infancy, is quickly gaining support.<br />
The politics of space weaponization alone could develop into<br />
a broad study, but specifically, would space-based weapons<br />
have the capability to destroy an underground target? If so,<br />
how would these weapons compare to other conventional<br />
systems? Regardless of what type of weapon is used, we ultimately<br />
will depend on the quality of our intelligence. In that<br />
respect, it would be useful to have studies that can help us<br />
develop methods for identifying underground facilities and,<br />
in particular, the key access points to such facilities.<br />
The questions proposed above go beyond the scope<br />
of this paper. But it seems clear that answers to these questions<br />
will only serve to broaden our understanding of what<br />
has been discussed here.<br />
Notes<br />
1. Robert W. Nelson, “Low-Yield Earth-Penetrating<br />
Nuclear Weapons,” Journal of the Federation of American Scientists<br />
54, (2001): 1-8.<br />
2. Ben Friedman. 2002. <strong>United</strong> <strong>States</strong> Nuclear Arsenal<br />
[on-line]. Washington, D.C.: Center for Defense Information;<br />
available from http://www.cdi.org/issues/nukef&f/<br />
database/nukearsenals.cfm#<strong>United</strong>%20<strong>States</strong>; Internet;<br />
accessed 30 October 2003.<br />
3. John Swomley, “World Domination via Nuclear
Weapons,” The Humanist 63, (2003): 35.<br />
4. Colorado Springs Gazette, 27 September 2003.<br />
5. Wayne LeBaron, America’s Nuclear Legacy ( New<br />
York: Nova Science Publishers, 1998), 7.<br />
6. Ibid, 10.<br />
7. Ibid.<br />
8. Ibid, 11.<br />
9. Ibid, 6.<br />
10. James Kitfield, “The Pros and Cons of New<br />
Nuclear Weapons,” National Journal 35 (2003): 2566.<br />
11. Ibid.<br />
12. Robert W. Nelson, “Low-Yield Earth-Penetrating<br />
Nuclear Weapons,” Journal of the Federation of American Scientists<br />
54, no. 1 (2001): 1-8.<br />
13. Ibid.<br />
14. Ibid.<br />
15. Henry Kelly and Ivan Oelrich. 2003. Will New<br />
Nuclear Weapons Make us More Secure? [on-line]. Washington,<br />
D.C.: Federation of American Scientists; available from<br />
http://www.fas.org/ssp/docs/030916-newnukes; Internet;<br />
accessed 30 October 2003.<br />
16. Ibid.<br />
17. Swomley, “World Domination”, 35.<br />
18. Jonathan Medalia. 2003. Nuclear Earth Penetrator<br />
Weapons [on-line]. Washington, D.C.: Federation of<br />
American Scientists; available from http://www.fas.org/spp/<br />
starwars/crs/RS20834.pdf; Internet; accessed 30 October<br />
2003.<br />
19. Ibid.<br />
20. Ibid.<br />
21. Kitfield, “The Pros and Cons”, 2566.<br />
92<br />
22. Medalia, Penetrator Weapons.<br />
23. Kitfield, “The Pros and Cons”, 2566.<br />
24. Medalia, Penetrator Weapons.<br />
25. Andrew Koch. 2003. US Considers Major<br />
Changes to Strategic Weapons [on-line]. Alexandria, VA:<br />
Jane’s Defence Weekly; available from http://ebird.dtic.<br />
mil/Sept2003/s20030915217115.html; Internet; accessed 10<br />
October 2003.<br />
26. Kelly, More Secure.<br />
27. Colorado Springs Gazette, 27 September 2003.<br />
28. Medalia, Penetrator Weapons.<br />
29. Julain Coman. 2003. Pentagon Wants ‘Mini-<br />
Nukes’ to Fight Terrorists [on-line]. Washington, D.C.:<br />
London Sunday Telegraph; available from http://ebird.afis.<br />
osd.mil/ebfiles/s20031027228041.html; Internet; accessed 30<br />
October 2003.<br />
30. Ibid.<br />
31. Kitfield, “The Pros and Cons”, 2566.<br />
32. Zhu Iizhen. 2003. US Plots to Develop Small<br />
Nukes [on-line]. Beijing, China: People’s Daily; available<br />
from http://english.peopledaily.com.cn/200308/13/<br />
eng20030813_122264.shtml; Internet; accessed 30 October<br />
2003.<br />
33. Kelly, More Secure.<br />
34. Coman, Fight Terrorists.<br />
35. Richard Rhodes, The Making of the Atomic<br />
Bomb (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1986), 451.<br />
36. Ibid, 667.<br />
37. Ibid, 673.<br />
38. Ibid, 692.<br />
39. Ibid, 696.<br />
40. Kevin O’Neill, “Building the Bomb,” in Atomic
Audit, ed. Stephen I. Schwartz<br />
(Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution Press, 1998), 58.<br />
41. Ibid, 83.<br />
42. Ibid, 78.<br />
43. Ibid, 83.<br />
44. Michael Levi, “Nuclear Bunker Buster Bombs,”<br />
Scientific American 291 (Aug 2004): 74.<br />
45. Ibid, 66.<br />
46. Ibid.<br />
47. Nelson, 2.<br />
48. Levi, 67.<br />
49. Ibid.<br />
50. Ibid.<br />
51. Ibid.<br />
52. Ibid.<br />
53. John Deutch, “A Nuclear Posture for Today,”<br />
Foreign Affairs 84 (Jan/Feb 2005): 51.<br />
54. Levi, 68.<br />
55. Ibid.<br />
56. Kitfield, “The Pros and Cons”, 2566.<br />
Bibliography<br />
Alexander, Brian, and Alistair Millar, ed. Tactical Nuclear<br />
Weapons. Washington, D.C.:<br />
Brasseys, Inc., 2003.<br />
Colorado Springs Gazette, 27 September 2003<br />
Coman, Julian. 2003. Pentagon Wants ‘Mini-Nukes’ to Fight<br />
Terrorists [on-line]. Washington,<br />
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http://ebird.afis.osd.mil/ebfiles/s20031027228041.<br />
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84 (Jan/Feb 2005): 49-61.<br />
Freedman, Lawrence. The Evolution of Nuclear Strategy. New<br />
York: St. Martin’s Press, 1981.<br />
Gray, Colin S. Modern Strategy. Oxford: University Press,<br />
1999.<br />
Kellerhals, Merle D. 2003. Congress Agrees to Let Pentagon<br />
Study Low-Yield Nuclear<br />
Weapons [on-line]. Washington, D.C.: U.S. Department<br />
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texts/03052300.htm; Internet; accessed 30<br />
October 2003.<br />
Kelly, Henry and Ivan Oelrich. 2003. Will New Nuclear<br />
Weapons Make us More Secure? [online].<br />
Washington, D.C.: Federation of American<br />
Scientists; available from<br />
http://www.fas.org/ssp/docs/030916-newnukes;<br />
Internet; accessed 30 October 2003.<br />
Kitfield, James. “The Pros and Cons of New Nuclear Weapons.”<br />
National Journal 35 (2003):<br />
2566.<br />
Koch, Andrew. 2003. US Considers Major Changes to Strategic<br />
Weapons [on-line].<br />
Alexandria, VA: Jane’s Defence Weekly; available<br />
from<br />
http://ebird.dtic.mil/Sept2003/s20030915217115.<br />
html; Internet; accessed 10 October<br />
2003.<br />
Levi, Michael. “Nuclear Bunker Buster Bombs.” Scientific<br />
American 291 (Aug 2004): 66-74.<br />
Iizhen, Zhu. 2003. US Plots to Develop Small Nukes [online].<br />
Beijing, China: People’s Daily;<br />
available from http://english.peopledaily.com.<br />
cn/200308/13/eng20030813_122264.shtml;<br />
Internet; accessed 30 October 2003.<br />
LeBaron, Wayne. America’s Nuclear Legacy. New York: Nova
Science Publishers, 1998.<br />
Medalia, Jonathan. 2003. Nuclear Earth Penetrator Weapons<br />
[on-line]. Washington, D.C.:<br />
Federation of American Scientists; available from<br />
http://www.fas.org/spp/starwars/crs/RS20834.pdf;<br />
Internet; accessed 30 October 2003.<br />
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Nuclear Weapons [on-line].<br />
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Las Vegas: University of Nevada Press: 1986.<br />
94<br />
THE MYTH OF ISSUE NETWORKS:<br />
A REBUTTAL TO GIBSON AND SNIDER.<br />
BY<br />
William L. Wisehart<br />
In the article, Civil-Military Relations and the<br />
Potential to Influence: A Look a the National Security Decision-Making<br />
Process by Christopher Gibson and Don Snider,<br />
the issue of a crisis in civil-military relations is argued away<br />
as being a natural phenomena related to a “changing of the<br />
guard”. Gibson and Snider present a thorough argument supporting<br />
the “non-crisis” party. This argument supports the<br />
theory that it is natural for the civilian and military sectors to<br />
experience tension due to a highly experienced and educated<br />
military elite teamed up with inexperienced and relatively<br />
under-educated civilian elite. They argued that as time progressed,<br />
military and civilian counterparts would eventually<br />
establish a relationship of mutual respect and trust, thus arguing<br />
away the assertion that there was a growing linear gap<br />
between the military and civilian sectors. While this argument<br />
is well researched and fundamentally sound, its Achilles<br />
heel lies in the idealism and lack of true historical evidence<br />
to back it up. Drawing heavily upon the works of Richard<br />
Kohn as well as two well known case studies, McNamara and<br />
the Vietnam crisis as well as the resignation of CSAF General<br />
Ronald R. Fogleman, I intend to show that in truth, an environment<br />
of mutual respect and trust between military and<br />
civilian elite may never come to fruition.<br />
With the advent of the Clinton Administration, the<br />
issue of civil-military relations had escalated to an unprecedented<br />
height. It seemed that the gap between the military<br />
and civilian sectors was expanding at an alarming rate. Many<br />
scholars began questioning whether or not there was a civilmilitary<br />
relation crisis looming on the horizon. Indeed,<br />
during the Clinton administration America would witness the<br />
controversial retirement of six four star flag officers. 1<br />
A myriad of academic speculation ensued, all trying<br />
to decipher the cause of such an erosion of civil-military relations<br />
in American society. Two parties emerged throughout<br />
all this speculation, the crisis party and the non-crisis party. I<br />
have already covered the basic premise of the non-crisis party<br />
in describing Gibson and Snider’s basic arguments. Before<br />
continuing I will cover some of the basic arguments of the<br />
crisis party.<br />
The crisis party has many well known academics<br />
within its ranks, perhaps the most prominent being Richard<br />
Kohn, one of the leading experts on civil military relations.<br />
The crisis argument asserts that there is a growing gap in civil<br />
military relations and that unchecked, it is very likely that we
may have a fundamental breakdown between the civilian and<br />
military elite within our country. Kohn attributes the growth<br />
in the crisis or “gap” to several issues, most notably the growth<br />
in partisanship within the military, the emergence of a powerful<br />
JCS chairmen, and the ghost of Vietnam and the McNamara<br />
years. 2 All of these issues combined with other lesser<br />
topics have combined to create a seemingly unbridgeable gap<br />
in civil-military relations.<br />
With the rise of the Clinton Administration would<br />
come a drastic change in office. Republicans had dominated<br />
the White House for twelve years, and with this dominance<br />
a relatively stable foundation in civil-military relations had<br />
existed. This stable foundation would end as Clinton naturally<br />
replaced many positions. What ensued was a disruptive<br />
“changing of the guard”. Now the military elite had<br />
to work hand-in-hand with a new, relatively inexperienced<br />
staff. While the military remained solidly educated in political<br />
and military topics, the civilian sector of especially the<br />
Department of Defense was fresh and inexperienced with its<br />
particular nuances. Ensuing tension resulted as inexperienced<br />
and relatively under-educated civilians went head to head<br />
with experienced and adept military elite that were used to a<br />
large degree of control. It was not that the civilian sector was<br />
undereducated in the traditional sense, but more accurately in<br />
regards to national security policy and studies. What it truly<br />
boils down to is a lack of experience on the part of the civilian<br />
sector. They had not been dealing with the day-to-day<br />
national security issues like their military counterparts had for<br />
years before. In this sense alone where they considered undereducated<br />
when compared to the military elite. This then is<br />
the premise of the Gibson/Snider argument; that initially<br />
tension was expected between a “new order” and older established<br />
military elite.<br />
Gibson and Snider rely heavily upon an issue network<br />
framework to come to this hypothesis. This framework<br />
asserts that over time, an environment of trust and mutual<br />
respect between civilian and military counterparts would blossom.<br />
3 Gibson and Snider assert that initially, there was a clash<br />
between civilian and military counterparts. This clash was a<br />
result of first and foremost a lack of experience and education<br />
on the part of civilian political leaders. Gibson and Snider<br />
focus primarily on the educational levels of civilian elite and<br />
its relation to the military elite as well as the amount of military<br />
experience of the civilian elite then in power 4 .<br />
Their findings indicate that for the civilian sector,<br />
the educational level of the civilian elite as compared to the<br />
military elite was inferior. 5 In addition they also find that<br />
the level of personal military experience of the civilian elite<br />
had decreased over the last four decades. 6 Conversely, they<br />
assert that the level of political experience in the military elite<br />
95<br />
had risen over the same period of time. 7 From these findings<br />
Gibson and Snider assert that there was bound to be an initial<br />
clash between the military and civilian sector in the government.<br />
8 They conclude however that despite this initial clash,<br />
overall tensions would eventually disappear as time progressed<br />
and both parties gained experience in dealing with the other.<br />
They assert that over time, civilian and military counterparts<br />
would begin to trust each other.<br />
While this argument appears sound and is certainly<br />
logical, I find that it assumes far too much in its conclusion.<br />
My primary issue is with Gibson and Snider’s assertion that<br />
over time, military and civilian counterparts will grow to<br />
overlook educational and experience gaps between the two<br />
parties. Ideally this would absolutely be the case, but Gibson<br />
and Snider are in many ways far too detached from the reality<br />
of civil-military relations in making that assertion. They are<br />
conveniently discounting the effect the McNamara crisis continues<br />
to have on the memory of the military. They far too<br />
quickly choose to gloss over such monumental events as the<br />
resignation of General Fogleman and the indication that provides<br />
on the true nature of civil-military relations in current<br />
society. By investigating both the McNamara Age and the<br />
resignation of General Fogleman, I will prove that the conclusion<br />
Gibson and Snider assert will in many cases never come<br />
to fruition.<br />
Robert McNamara’s rise to power occurred during<br />
the Kennedy and Johnson administrations at the height of<br />
such controversies as mutually assured destruction and the<br />
Cuban missile crisis. Over the ensuing years, McNamara<br />
would strive to regain control over the military establishment.<br />
The true conflict with McNamara and the Service Chiefs<br />
would arise during the Johnson administration and the Vietnam<br />
conflict. During this time McNamara would prove that<br />
the pendulum had swung too far in the direction of civilian<br />
control over the military. Much to the great disdain of the<br />
military, McNamara and Johnson had gone as far as personally<br />
selecting the targets to be struck by the military. Perhaps<br />
McNamara’s intentions were good as he would assert time and<br />
time again that he was merely trying to prevent the escalation<br />
of the Vietnam Conflict into a potential World War III.<br />
During the McNamara reign, constant tension<br />
between the JCS existed. McNamara was always going<br />
against JCS recommendations to escalate specifically air<br />
strikes against North Vietnamese targets. In one particular<br />
case, McNamara directly opposed the JCS recommendation<br />
to attack North Vietnamese surface to air missile sites, recommending<br />
instead that the MiG airfields needed to be targeted<br />
first. 9 In another instance, McNamara removed six of fourteen<br />
targets recommended by the JCS in the Rolling Thunder<br />
campaign, completely undermining their advisory role on the
issue. 10 Such tactical scrutiny by the Secretary of Defense was<br />
utterly absurd, yet situations like this plagued the Vietnam<br />
Conflict on a regular basis.<br />
McNamara extended his campaign to further civilian<br />
control of the military in other non-war fighting realms of the<br />
military. Financial issues also became a heated area of contention<br />
between the JCS and the Secretary of Defense. With<br />
the advent of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the control of financial<br />
issues shifted from individual services to that of the JCS.<br />
With the rise of McNamara, the control of lower-level military<br />
policy was again shifted from the JCS to the Secretary of<br />
Defense. 11 This of course only added to the growing tensions<br />
between the military and civilian elite of that time.<br />
The tension between McNamara and the JCS<br />
would grow to a heightened state with Senate hearings in the<br />
summer of 1967 that would pit McNamara against the JCS.<br />
All five Chiefs of Staff as well as numerous other high ranking<br />
officers would testify against the McNamara strategy in<br />
Vietnam and the “meddling by the civilians in Washington. 12 ”<br />
After the Stennis hearings, the subcommittee issued a unanimous<br />
declaration that McNamara was micromanaging the<br />
war and that “careful controls and restrictive ground rules had<br />
resulted in the application of our air power in a manner which<br />
was of limited effectiveness.” 13 In the end it was reported that<br />
the JCS had nearly revolted after the testimony of McNamara<br />
and although it was partially untrue, even McNamara admits<br />
and partially understates, “strong differences of judgment did<br />
divide us [,] and the frictions they caused created stress, which<br />
took its toll.” 14<br />
McNamara’s aggressive policy of asserting civilian<br />
control over the military would be highly criticized. Many<br />
scholars like James M. Roherty, author of Decisions of Robert<br />
S. McNamara attack McNamara’s failure to “engage in consensual<br />
policy-making.” 15 Roherty asserts that McNamara<br />
represented a threat to the “integrity of the new military<br />
professionalism that had developed during the 1950’s.” 16<br />
Roherty “emphasized the importance and McNamara’s neglect<br />
of this importance of military judgment to force structure<br />
planning.” 17<br />
In the end McNamara would completely lose face<br />
with both the military and the Johnson administration. The<br />
tension between civil-military relations was catastrophic to an<br />
almost immeasurable degree. While it could easily be attributed<br />
as one of the major factors in our eventual defeat in Vietnam,<br />
its larger impact on the future of civil-military relations<br />
draws the most importance in this argument. It shows that<br />
Gibson and Snider’s thesis that eventually tensions between<br />
military and civilian authorities will decrease over time is<br />
flawed. It proves that in many cases, issues between civilian<br />
and military officials may not be resolved, often times con-<br />
96<br />
tributing to a catastrophic failure in American foreign policy<br />
and operations.<br />
In my second case study, I will examine the events<br />
and repercussions surrounding General Fogelman’s early<br />
retirement from his position as Chief of Staff of the <strong>Air</strong> <strong>Force</strong>.<br />
This is intended to provide a contemporary example of the<br />
lack of resolution that can result form civil-military tension.<br />
Throughout General Fogleman’s tenure as CSAF, he admits to<br />
openly clashing with his civilian counterparts, both Secretary<br />
of Defense Cohen and Secretary of the <strong>Air</strong> <strong>Force</strong> Widnall. It<br />
is imperative to note that many of the controversies occurred<br />
at a later date in the Clinton administration, which provide a<br />
direct rebuttal to Gibson and Snider’s argument that over an<br />
extended period of time civil-military tension would decrease<br />
if not disappear between civilian and military counterparts.<br />
Some of the major controversies surrounding General<br />
Fogleman’s early retirement were his disagreement with the<br />
Secretary of the <strong>Air</strong> <strong>Force</strong>’s decision in the Kelly Flinn fiasco.<br />
In this particular case, the year was 1997, well into the Clinton<br />
administration. Secretary Widnall was contemplating<br />
issuing 1 st Lt. Flinn an honorable discharge for the offense of<br />
adultery 18 . General Fogleman disagreed with this and felt it<br />
was in direct opposition to his assertion that a dishonorable<br />
discharge be issued.<br />
Another major controversy during General Fogleman’s<br />
tenure as CSAF was the blocking by Secretary Cohen<br />
of Brigadier General Schwalier’s promotion to Major General.<br />
In this particular instance, General Fogleman had conducted<br />
an extensive investigation into the Khobar Towers bombing<br />
and concluded that Brigadier General Schwalier had done<br />
everything and more to provide for the security of his base.<br />
This did not suit the Clinton Administration and in the<br />
end Secretary Cohen blocked Brigadier General Schwalier’s<br />
promotion to Major General. General Fogleman was disgusted<br />
with the “Washington scene, the pressure from the<br />
Hill—from people who were uninformed.” He was unwilling<br />
to stand by and watch as the DoD “treated this man [BGen<br />
Schwalier] and the <strong>Air</strong> <strong>Force</strong>” poorly 19 .<br />
As a result of these two main incidents, General<br />
Fogleman realized that he had “simply lost respect and confidence<br />
in the leadership that I was supposed to be following.” 20<br />
General Fogleman goes on to state that<br />
“As chief of staff of the <strong>United</strong> <strong>States</strong> <strong>Air</strong><br />
<strong>Force</strong>, charged with providing military<br />
advice to the civilian leadership that the<br />
civilian leadership did not value for whatever<br />
reason, I had become ineffective as a spokesman.”<br />
21<br />
This kind of “loss of confidence” is a primary example of<br />
how civil-military relations eventually worsened instead of
improved over time. After three years of service General<br />
Fogleman decided that early retirement was a much better<br />
alternative to continued service in such a stifling atmosphere.<br />
In this particular case study one can see the opposite<br />
of Gibson and Snider’s thesis at work. Instead of civil-military<br />
relations improving over a period of time, they naturally<br />
degraded to the point that General Fogleman felt compelled<br />
to retire. This is a direct and strong rebuttal to Gibson and<br />
Snider’s argument that over time relations between civil<br />
and military counterparts improve. Here we have a mature<br />
administration in direct conflict with a mature military leader.<br />
The facts simply speak for themselves. How is<br />
that General Fogleman, after completing three quarters of<br />
his assignment cannot resolve a conflict with an administration<br />
that had been in place for well over four years? Simply<br />
put, what we have is a complete failure in the hypothesis of<br />
Snider and Gibson’s non-crisis theory. If we followed Gibson<br />
and Snider’s argument, General Fogleman and his civilian<br />
counterparts should have been able to resolve these situations.<br />
There should have been some form of mutual respect and<br />
trust gained over the years between Fogleman and the DoD<br />
that should have prevented both of these occurrences. Instead,<br />
there is a severe lack of respect and trust on both sides of the<br />
spectrum to the unprecedented point that an early retirement<br />
on the part of General Fogleman was the only resolution.<br />
What Gibson and Snider fail to estimate correctly<br />
is the impact Vietnam and the McNamara years had on the<br />
minds of the military member. They fail to fully appreciate<br />
the fact that in the minds of leaders like General Fogleman, a<br />
repeat of the McNamara years was the last thing they wanted.<br />
General Fogleman himself is quoted as stating that the McNamara<br />
situation had a direct impact on his decision. He states<br />
that he saw a similar situation brewing in what he refers to as<br />
the “tank” and did not want to be a part of such a notorious<br />
reconstruction of events. That was in many ways a primary<br />
motivator for his early retirement from his position. Rather<br />
than make the same mistakes as the service chiefs made<br />
during Vietnam, he wanted to end the situation at the cost of<br />
his own early retirement. 22<br />
Both the McNamara and Fogleman case study prove<br />
that while Gibson and Snider’s arguments are ideally sound,<br />
they have no historical evidence to support their premise. In<br />
addition, these case studies represent two strong refutations<br />
against their argument. They show that the stark reality of<br />
civil-military relations in the Washington political arena can<br />
be far from the sometimes “rosy” picture Gibson and Snider<br />
paint. The fact that in both cases very senior political and<br />
military members with several years of experience under their<br />
belts failed to resolve severe conflicts of civil-military policy<br />
shows that the crux of the non-crisis theory presented by<br />
97<br />
Gibson and Snider can neither explain away the friction in<br />
civil-military relations or predict the outcome of future tensions.<br />
Perhaps if Gibson and Snider had presented significant<br />
historical cases in the argument of their thesis, they may have<br />
had more validity in their non-crisis theory, nonetheless, their<br />
conclusion is fundamentally flawed without it.<br />
Bibliography<br />
Gibson, Christopher P. and Snider, Don M. Civil Military<br />
Relations and the Potential to Influence: A Look at the National<br />
Security Decision Making Process. (Armed <strong>Force</strong>s and Society,<br />
Winter 1999).<br />
Kohn, Richard, The Erosion of Civilian Control of the Military<br />
in the <strong>United</strong> <strong>States</strong> Today. (Chapel Hills, University of North<br />
Carolina at Chapel Hill Press, 2002).<br />
Kohn, Richard, ed., The Early Retirement of General Ronald R.<br />
Fogleman, Chief of Staff, <strong>United</strong> <strong>States</strong> <strong>Air</strong> <strong>Force</strong>. (Aerospace<br />
Power Journal, Spring 2001).<br />
McMaster, H. R. Dereliction of Duty (New York: HarperCollins<br />
Publishing, 1997).<br />
McNamara, Robert S.. In Retrospect: The Tragedy and Lessons<br />
of Vietnam. (New York: Times Books, 1995).<br />
Murdock, Clark A. Defense Policy Formation: A Comparative<br />
Analysis of the McNamara Era. (Albany: State University of<br />
New York Press, 1974)<br />
Palmer, Gregory. The McNamara Strategy and the Vietnam<br />
War: Program Budgeting in the Pentagon, 1960-1968. (Westport:<br />
Greenwood Press, 1978).<br />
Whitehead, YuLin G., LtCol. Civil-Military Relations during<br />
Coalition Operations in the Balkans. (National Defense University,<br />
2001)<br />
(Endnotes)<br />
1 Richard H. Kohn, The Erosion of Civilian Control of the<br />
Military in the <strong>United</strong> <strong>States</strong> Today.<br />
2 Richard H. Kohn. Out of Control: The Crisis in Civil-<br />
Military Relations. The National Interest (No 35., Spring<br />
1994), 3-17.<br />
3 Christopher P. Gibson and Don M. Snider, Civil Military<br />
Relations and the Potential to Influence: A Look at the National<br />
Security Decision Making Process. (Armed <strong>Force</strong>s and Society,
Winter 1999), 212.<br />
4 Gibson and Snider, 203-205.<br />
5 Ibid.<br />
6 Gibson and Snider, Table 5, 207.<br />
7 Ibid.<br />
8 Gibson and Snider, 212.<br />
9 H.R. McMaster, Dereliction of Duty. (New York:<br />
HarperCollins Publishers, 1997). 285.<br />
10 McMaster, 286.<br />
11 Gregory Palmer, The McNamara Strategy and the Vietnam<br />
War: Program Budgeting in the Pentagon, 1960-1968.<br />
(Westport: Greenwood Press, 1978), 47.<br />
12 Robert S. McNamara, In Retrospect. (New York: Times<br />
Books, 1995), 286.<br />
13 McNamara, 290-291.<br />
14 McNamara, 291.<br />
15 Clark A. Murdock. Defense Policy Formation: A<br />
Comparative Analysis of the McNamara Era. (Albany: State<br />
University of New York Press, 1974), 157.<br />
16 Ibid.<br />
17 Ibid.<br />
18 Kohn, The Early Retirement of General Ronald R. Fogleman,<br />
Chief of Staff of the <strong>Air</strong> <strong>Force</strong>, 2.<br />
19 Kohn, 2.<br />
20 LtCol YuLin G. Whitehead. Civil-Military Relations<br />
during Coalition Operations in the Balkans. (National Defense<br />
University, 2001).<br />
21 Ibid.<br />
22 Kohn, 2.<br />
98<br />
THE JUST WAR TRADITION AND EASTERN<br />
MILITARY THEORY: APPLICATIONS TO IRAQ<br />
By C3C Matthew H. Yan<br />
The just war tradition, which has been recently manifested<br />
in the preemptive strike by President George W. Bush would<br />
have been seen as appropriate by the eastern military theorist<br />
Sun Tzu but not Mao Zedong. The just war theory<br />
describes the set of conditions that must be met for a war to<br />
be described by modern standards as just. According to the<br />
theory, a just war is a war that has been, “declared by a legitimate<br />
authority, initiated for a just cause, and waged using<br />
the correct means [with] no wrong intentions” (Fotion 107).<br />
Although the theories on just war have evolved over time they<br />
have continued to describe two main concepts. First, the<br />
purpose of war and the extent in which war is to be executed.<br />
Secondly, advances in the destructiveness of weapons have<br />
caused political leaders, like President Bush, to reconsider the<br />
just war theory. It has been adapted to take into consideration<br />
terrorist factions and nations that have the potential to<br />
irresponsibly produce and use weapons of mass destruction.<br />
It is important to understand that the moral standard created<br />
to distinguish what is just and not just derived from society,<br />
and different societies have different ideas on what action is<br />
justified. Although the just war tradition has been born out<br />
of predominantly Christian societies, eastern military theorists<br />
such as Sun Tzu and Mao Zedong have had similar thoughts<br />
on why war is necessary. However, there are still distinct differences<br />
between both Just War Tradition and eastern societies<br />
in regards to how war should be carried out and also their<br />
influences.<br />
Why War is Necessary?<br />
Sun Tzu, perhaps the most influential eastern military<br />
theorist, felt there were several reasons to go to war,<br />
however, “committing army to battle should be undertaken<br />
with the greatest gravity” (Sawyer 154). Based on Sun Tzu’s<br />
thoughts, a prince would be justified if he engaged, “in<br />
attacking a dark and rustic country, in civilizing barbarians,<br />
in punishing the willfully blind, or in dealing summarily with<br />
a state going to ruin [because] such chastisements were in<br />
accord with the Will of Heaven” (Sun Tzu 32). His theories<br />
on warfare emphasized caution when interacting with foreign<br />
nations or kingdoms. Sun Tzu encouraged kings to employ<br />
espionage to its greatest effect. Spies served to provide the<br />
king with information on both his enemies and his allies,<br />
because Sun Tzu wrote, “never rely on the goodwill of others<br />
or on fortuitous circumstances” (Sun 155). Instead he said,<br />
“guarantee through knowledge, active study, and defensive
preparation that the enemy cannot mount a surprise attack or<br />
gain a victory through simple coercion” (Sun 155). The decision<br />
to declare war would be easier for kings with abundant<br />
knowledge about their opponents. Though Sun Tzu describes<br />
how victory is preferably attained without armed force, he<br />
also states, “the government should resort to armed combat<br />
[when] an enemy threatens the state with military action or<br />
refuses to acquiesce without being forced into submission<br />
through warfare” (Sun 154). Applying Sun Tzu’s theory, a<br />
nation is justified in resorting to armed combat if the opposing<br />
nation fails to comply with peace terms. In a modern<br />
sense, this would include disarmament agreements as well<br />
as agreements to discontinue weapons of mass destruction<br />
research. (Sun 154)<br />
Mao Zedong, a modern eastern military theorist,<br />
captured many of Sun Tzu’s beliefs in his writings on military<br />
theory. The primary difference between Mao and Sun<br />
Tzu’s military theories is Mao’s belief that the only just wars<br />
are revolutionary wars. Considering the communist context<br />
of Mao’s writings, he would have agreed that the only wars<br />
worth fighting are wars that contribute to the abolition of<br />
social classes. Before a discussion on Mao’s beliefs on why<br />
wars should be fought, it is important to present his definition<br />
of war must be presented. Mao describes war as the, “highest<br />
form of struggle, existing ever since the emergence of private<br />
property and social classes, for settling contradictions between<br />
classes, between nations, between states, or between political<br />
groups at given stages of their development” (Mao 177).<br />
Although there can be different types of struggles between<br />
factions, Mao states, “there are only two kinds of wars in history,<br />
just and unjust” (Mao 179). He believed that the sole<br />
purpose of just wars, or revolutionary wars, was to end war.<br />
In destroying the class system, Mao and other communists<br />
believed that all other struggles would be eliminated, and<br />
world peace can be achieved. Much of Mao’s military theory<br />
described tactical theory, like Sun Tzu’s theories, but elaborated<br />
on how to defeat the enemy through guerilla warfare.<br />
Essentially many of Mao’s theories on war’s purpose revolve<br />
around his communist beliefs making a comparison with Sun<br />
Tzu and the just war theory difficult. (Mao 179)<br />
Unlike eastern military theorists, just war tradition<br />
theorists have beliefs that are more general on why war is<br />
necessary. The just war theory does not only justify going to<br />
war but also the effects of war. According to just war theorists,<br />
“the harm of war can only be justified if it prevents an<br />
even greater harm of the same sort, because it is rare that any<br />
positive goals will exceed it in value” (Fotion 113). The just<br />
war theory specifies not only when a war is necessary, but also<br />
when ‘first strikes’ are appropriate. First strike theories were<br />
refined during the Cold War when nuclear attacks seemed<br />
99<br />
most imminent, but they are still applicable today as the<br />
threats of large scale nuclear, biological, and chemical warfare<br />
still exist. Military theorists Fotion and Elfstrom have<br />
distinguished circumstances justifying first strikes where, “it<br />
is extremely likely that war is imminent anyway; they will<br />
suffer great risks of destruction if they wait for the first blow;<br />
there are no other means available to avert the crisis; and<br />
their antagonist has no just cause for war” (Fotion 114). In<br />
a modern sense, Sun Tzu’s theory on when armed combat is<br />
necessary is in conjunction with the just war theory on first<br />
strikes and also with George W. Bush’s decision to strike Iraq<br />
first. George W. Bush, in his address to the <strong>United</strong> Nation<br />
General Assembly, stated,<br />
“We know that Saddam Hussein pursued weapons of<br />
mass murder even when inspectors<br />
were in his country. Are we to assume that he<br />
stopped when they left? The history, the<br />
logic, and the facts lead to one conclusion: Saddam<br />
Hussein’s regime is a grave and<br />
gather danger. To suggest otherwise is to hope<br />
against the evidence. To assume this regime’s good<br />
faith is to bet the lives of millions and the peace of<br />
the world in a reckless gamble. And this is a risk we<br />
must not take…The first time we may be completely<br />
certain he has nuclear weapons is when, God forbid,<br />
he uses one.” (Flippin 209).<br />
President Bush, in his speech, questions the assumption that<br />
Iraq has stopped pursuing weapons of mass destruction. Sun<br />
Tzu’s ideas coincide with this because he wrote, “never rely on<br />
the goodwill of others” (Sun 155). Furthermore, Bush identifies<br />
Iraq as a great threat because no one can confirm their<br />
disarmament. Following Iraqi leaders’ refusal to completely<br />
disarm, Sun Tzu would have probably advised military action<br />
because it revealed Iraq’s refusal to comply without the use of<br />
force. Sun Tzu mentions that a ‘wise leader’ should attack if<br />
a state is threatened by military action or possible danger to<br />
its citizens, which as stated by President Bush in his speech<br />
was the situation that the <strong>United</strong> <strong>States</strong> faced. The just war<br />
theory, like Sun Tzu’s theory, justifies an attack if a state risks<br />
great danger when it does not attack.<br />
The just war theory also takes into consideration<br />
foreigners’ circumstances because, “no nation can remain<br />
completely indifferent to the welfare of the citizens of other<br />
nations” (Fotion 115). A clear example can be drawn from<br />
the Jewish extermination in Europe during World War II.<br />
The international community neglected to identify the injustice<br />
happening to foreign peoples, thus permitting a terrible<br />
genocide. The just war theory considers the fact, “sometimes<br />
nations will have the obligation to initiate war on behalf of<br />
[endangered] citizens from other nations… [because] their
lives and well-being must matter to all” (Fotion 115). Neither<br />
Sun Tzu nor Mao’s military theories consider foreign nations’<br />
dispositions. Mao would probably have disapproved of most<br />
wars justified by the just war theory they are not of the revolutionary<br />
kind. Especially as communism seems to be dying<br />
throughout the world, it is rare to see war based on a working<br />
class fighting an upper-class to abolish the class system.<br />
Although Sun Tzu stressed military action in certain dangerous<br />
situations, he also, “stressed the vital necessity to avoid all<br />
engagements not based on extensive, detailed analyses of the<br />
situation” (Sawyer 154). Sun Tzu might perceive President<br />
Bush’s Iraqi engagement as precarious because the presence<br />
of weapons of mass destruction was likely, but still uncertain.<br />
Sun Tzu, if alive today, might disagreed with the just<br />
war theory and President Bush. He may have advised further<br />
analysis and research to determine whether or not there were<br />
weapons of mass destruction in Iraq. This hypothetical advice<br />
would be in accordance with his ideas on combat as a last<br />
measure and on the importance of reliable intelligence. However,<br />
weapons of mass destruction did not exist during Sun<br />
Tzu’s lifespan, and it is impossible to determine whether his<br />
theory would have changed with the consideration of these<br />
weapons.<br />
The Extent of War<br />
Sun Tzu is elaborate on how war should be carried<br />
out, but states, “the best policy is to take a state intact”<br />
(Sun 77). This would imply that Sun Tzu would disagree<br />
with the annihilation of a population through warfare. Sun<br />
Tzu also feels that one should not use all resources for the<br />
purpose of war because, “when your weapons are dulled and<br />
ardour damped, your strength exhausted and treasure spent,<br />
neighboring rulers will take advantage of your distress to act”<br />
(Sun 73). He would agree that nations involved in total wars,<br />
such as World War I, make themselves vulnerable to invasion,<br />
because these nations have practically exhausted all of their<br />
resources, including resources used for defense. Sun Tzu also<br />
emphasized war’s duration when he writes, “we have heard<br />
of blundering swiftness in war, we have not yet seen a clever<br />
operation that was prolonged” (Sun 73). The aforementioned<br />
war elements discussed by Sun Tzu revolve around his desire<br />
for efficiency in carrying out war.<br />
Although Mao’s theories on war’s permissible extent<br />
are very similar to that of Sun Tzu, Mao exchanges efficiency<br />
for effectiveness. Mao adjusted Sun Tzu’s theories to aide<br />
the effectiveness of guerilla warfare. He emphasized strategic<br />
defense and prioritized the survival of the guerilla faction.<br />
This sometimes means that retreat is acceptable, because it<br />
allows a force to, “conserve its strength and wait for an opportune<br />
moment for beating the enemy” (Mao 210). Unlike Sun<br />
100<br />
Tzu, Mao did not believe that speed or heavy damage were<br />
factors in warfare as long as victory was achieved. However,<br />
Sun Tzu’s theory on preventing maximum resource expenditure<br />
was found applicable for Mao in guerilla warfare, especially<br />
as resources were very limited. (Mao 210)<br />
Unlike the ideas of eastern military theorists such as<br />
Sun Tzu and Mao Zedong, the just war theory is ambiguous<br />
about a nation’s execution of war. According to military theorist<br />
Paul Ramsey, a just war, “must be a limited war,” and if in<br />
response to an attack it must be a war, “that mounts destructive<br />
power to match the increased power of attack, so long<br />
as this can be limited directly to the objective of defeating<br />
attack” (Ramsey 136). According to the just war theory, a war<br />
should be executed by proportionate means with noncombatant<br />
immunity and limited objectives. (Payne 45) Proportionate<br />
means in warfare characterizes when, “the weaponry<br />
or degree of force used [in war is] limited to what is necessary<br />
to secure a just peace” (Payne 42). A victory in a just war is<br />
achieved when peace is created, therefore the just war theory<br />
considers anything that causes war to continue after peace as<br />
extraneous.<br />
Influences on Military Theory<br />
The influences on Sun Tzu are heavily debated<br />
because it is uncertain when and where he originated. However,<br />
it is suspected that Sun Tzu lived between a period when,<br />
“rulers indulged in military adventures to satisfy a whim, to<br />
revenge a slight or an insult, or to collect booty,” and when,<br />
“war was no longer a regulated pastime, but the ultimate<br />
instrument of statecraft” (Tzu 9). This entire time span is<br />
considered one of China’s most chaotic historical periods,<br />
especially as war seemed unusually common. Warlords often<br />
skipped non-violent policy and immediately sought combat<br />
to resolve conflict. Sun Tzu most likely composed his theories<br />
to aide his king in a time when strategic warfare was still fairly<br />
new. (Sun 25)<br />
Mao Zedong’s major influences were Chinese military<br />
literature, especially Sun Tzu’s book, Art of War, where<br />
most of his military strategies were derived. Also, Mao’s communist<br />
training affected his ideas on military theory. As Mao<br />
was forced to employ forces of significantly smaller size than<br />
his enemy, he adapted military principles to fight a guerilla<br />
war. Military experience also influenced Mao when, “the Red<br />
Army failed to break up several of the enemy’s campaigns of<br />
encirclement and annihilation” (Mao 204).<br />
The just war tradition is by far the most evolved<br />
theory. Being of Christian origin, Saint Augustine constructed<br />
the just war tradition when he developed the Jus Ad<br />
Bellum or justified war theory. (Ramsey 16) St. Augustine<br />
gave justification to Christian warfare because Jesus instructed
man to, “Love each other as I have loved you” (Bible, John<br />
15.12). However, Saint Augustine also found it important<br />
that Christians were told, “Everyone must submit to himself<br />
to the governing authorities, for there is no authority except<br />
that which God has established” (Bible, Romans 13.1). Eventually,<br />
Saint Augustine concluded that,<br />
“Human government has been established by God<br />
and given the responsibility to exercise<br />
necessary force for keeping order, rewarding good,<br />
and punishing evil. God has not only condoned war<br />
in the past, he has also participated in it and promises<br />
to do so in the future. Since we know God is perfect,<br />
holy, and good, we cannot say that all wars are<br />
inherently evil. There must be a distinction between<br />
murder, which Scripture clearly condemns, and some<br />
forms of punishment—such as war, self-defense, and<br />
capital punishment.” (Payne 45).<br />
After separating war from inherent evil, the just war theory<br />
next considered when waging war was acceptable. Saint<br />
Augustine writes, “That law therefore, which for the protection<br />
of citizens orders foreign force to be repulsed by the<br />
same force, can be obeyed without a wrong desire” (Ramsey<br />
36). Retaliation for the sole purpose of protecting citizens<br />
of the state eventually evolved into the modern idea of just<br />
war. Modern military theorists have extended the just war<br />
concept to justify pre-emptive strikes because, “no proportionate<br />
reason can be assigned for permitting the extinction of<br />
the human race” (Ramsey 76). The extinction of the human<br />
race is a reference to the possible effect of weapons of mass<br />
destruction if they are allowed to be employed.<br />
Conclusion<br />
Coincidentally, the ideas of eastern military theorists<br />
such as Sun Tzu are not much different from those of the just<br />
war tradition. However, there are some notable differences<br />
in the two theories. The just war theory essentially considers<br />
modern circumstances, while Sun Tzu’s theories do not.<br />
The just war theory takes into consideration weapons of mass<br />
destruction, the welfare of foreign citizens, and terrorism as a<br />
threat to global communities, and Sun Tzu’s theories do not.<br />
It does not seem that time or geography caused a difference<br />
between Sun Tzu’s theories and the just war theory. However,<br />
Mao’s ideas on military theory seem to be radically different<br />
from the just war tradition mainly because of his communist<br />
views. In general, Sun Tzu would have agreed with President<br />
101<br />
George W. Bush’s method and reason used to strike first at<br />
Iraq. Both Sun Tzu and President Bush agree that an enemy<br />
nation’s goodwill should not be trusted, and that the only<br />
resolution to deal with a nation that refuses to cease its threat<br />
is in fact—military intervention.<br />
Works Cited<br />
Flippin, Royce, ed. The Best American Political Writing 2003.<br />
New York: Thunder Mouth’s<br />
Press, 2003.<br />
Fotion, Nicholas, and Gerard Elfstrom. Military Ethics.<br />
Boston: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1986.<br />
Holy Bible: New International Version. Grand Rapids:<br />
Zondervan, 1984.<br />
Mao Tse-Tung. Selected Works. New York: International Publishers,<br />
1954.<br />
Payne, Keith B., and Karly I. Payne. A Just Defense. Portland:<br />
Multnomah Press, 1987.<br />
Ramsey, Paul. War and the Christian Conscience. Durham:<br />
Duke University Press, 1961.<br />
Sawyer, Ralph. The Seven Military Classics of Ancient China.<br />
Boulder: Westview Press, 1993.<br />
Sun Tzu. The Art of War. Trans. Samuel B. Griffifth.<br />
London: Oxford University Press, 1963.