The code model of communication: a powerful - SIL International
The code model of communication: a powerful - SIL International
The code model of communication: a powerful - SIL International
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108 4. Code Model Linguistics: Patch or Abandon?<br />
To translate a theory or worldview into one’s own language is not to make it one’s own. For<br />
that one must go native, discover that one is thinking and working in, not simply translating<br />
out <strong>of</strong>, a language that was previously foreign. That transition is not, however, one that an<br />
individual may make or refrain from making by deliberation and choice, however good his<br />
reasons for wishing to do so. Instead, at some point in the process <strong>of</strong> learning to translate, he<br />
finds that the transition has occurred, that he has slipped into the new language without a<br />
decision having been made. Or else, like many <strong>of</strong> those who first encountered, say, relativity<br />
or quantum mechanics in their middle years, he finds himself fully persuaded <strong>of</strong> the new view<br />
but nevertheless unable to internalize it and be at home in the world it helps to shape. Intellectually<br />
such a man has made his choice, but the conversion required if it is to be effective<br />
eludes him. … for he lacks the constellation <strong>of</strong> mental sets which future members <strong>of</strong> the<br />
community will acquire through education. (Kuhn 1996:204)<br />
Of the process <strong>of</strong> paradigm evaluation and its relationship to the incommensurability<br />
problem, Kuhn writes:<br />
It makes a great deal <strong>of</strong> sense to ask which <strong>of</strong> two actual and competing theories fits the<br />
facts better. … This formulation, however, makes the task <strong>of</strong> choosing between paradigms<br />
look both easier and more familiar than it is. If there were but one set <strong>of</strong> scientific problems,<br />
one world within which to work on them, and one set <strong>of</strong> standards for their solution, paradigm<br />
competition might be settled more or less routinely by some process like counting the number<br />
<strong>of</strong> problems solved by each. But, in fact, these conditions are never met completely. <strong>The</strong><br />
proponents <strong>of</strong> competing paradigms are always at least slightly at cross-purposes. Neither side<br />
will grant all the non-empirical assumptions that the other needs in order to make its case. …<br />
they are bound partly to talk through each other. Though each may hope to convert the other to<br />
his way <strong>of</strong> seeing his science and its problems, neither may hope to prove his case. <strong>The</strong><br />
competition between paradigms is not the sort <strong>of</strong> battle that can be resolved by pro<strong>of</strong>s. (Kuhn<br />
1996:147–148)<br />
4.1.9. <strong>The</strong> conceptual arrangement <strong>of</strong> paradigms<br />
Related to the misconception that by ‘paradigm’ Kuhn intended only “Grand<br />
<strong>The</strong>ories” is a common neglect <strong>of</strong> Kuhn’s suggestion that paradigms are to some extent<br />
both hierarchically ordered and arranged via network-like connections (1996:40–42).<br />
Kuhn’s suggestions in this regard are not explicitly stated in the 1962 edition; instead<br />
they are embedded in the broader discussion <strong>of</strong> rules and the various uses <strong>of</strong> the term<br />
paradigm (1996:41–43). Kuhn’s 1970 Postscript elaborates on the issue somewhat in<br />
discussing the “numerous levels” <strong>of</strong> community structure and the usage <strong>of</strong> terms<br />
(1996:177, 181). He alludes to the concept <strong>of</strong> levels and related (lower level) paradigms<br />
in such comments as the following: “Normally, the members <strong>of</strong> a mature scientific<br />
community work from a single paradigm or from a closely related set. Very rarely do<br />
different scientific communities investigate the same problems. In those exceptional<br />
cases the groups hold several major paradigms in common” (Kuhn 1996:162).<br />
It is significant that Kuhn chose the word ‘constellation’, defining ‘paradigm’ as a<br />
“constellation <strong>of</strong> group commitments” (1996:181). In contrast to the simpler terms “set”<br />
and “body,” which Kuhn could have employed in referring to group commitments, the<br />
term constellation evokes the idea <strong>of</strong> configuration, pattern, and arrangement.<br />
Commitments to the disciplinary matrix are related and arranged; they are not simply a