27.03.2013 Views

Expertise in nursing practice : caring, clinical judgment - Springer ...

Expertise in nursing practice : caring, clinical judgment - Springer ...

Expertise in nursing practice : caring, clinical judgment - Springer ...

SHOW MORE
SHOW LESS

You also want an ePaper? Increase the reach of your titles

YUMPU automatically turns print PDFs into web optimized ePapers that Google loves.

xvi Introduction<br />

across time. However, the model does not focus or identify particular<br />

traits or talents of the person who generates the skillful performance.<br />

Nurs<strong>in</strong>g, as a <strong>practice</strong>, requires both techne and phronesis as described<br />

by Aristotle. Techne can be captured by procedural and scientific<br />

knowledge, knowledge that can be made formal, explicit, and certa<strong>in</strong><br />

except for the necessary tim<strong>in</strong>g and adjustments made for particular<br />

patients. Phronesis, <strong>in</strong> contrast to techne, is the k<strong>in</strong>d of practical reason<strong>in</strong>g<br />

engaged <strong>in</strong> by an excellent practitioner lodged <strong>in</strong> a community of<br />

practitioners who through experiential learn<strong>in</strong>g and for the sake of good<br />

<strong>practice</strong> cont<strong>in</strong>ually lives out and improves <strong>practice</strong> (Benner, Hooper-<br />

Kyriakidis, & Stannard, 2000; Dunne, 1997; Gadamer, 1975; MacIntyre,<br />

1981; Shulman, 1993). Techne, or the activity of produc<strong>in</strong>g outcomes,<br />

is governed by a means-ends rationality where the maker or producer<br />

governs the th<strong>in</strong>g produced or made by ga<strong>in</strong><strong>in</strong>g mastery over the means<br />

of produc<strong>in</strong>g the outcomes. By contrast, phronesis is lodged <strong>in</strong> a <strong>practice</strong><br />

and so cannot rely solely on a means-ends rationality, because one’s<br />

acts are governed by concern for do<strong>in</strong>g good <strong>in</strong> particular circumstances,<br />

where be<strong>in</strong>g <strong>in</strong> relationship and discern<strong>in</strong>g particular human issues must<br />

guide action.<br />

Technique and narrow rational-technicality alone cannot address <strong>in</strong>terpersonal<br />

and relational responsibilities, discernment, and situated possibilities<br />

required by car<strong>in</strong>g for persons made vulnerable by illness and<br />

<strong>in</strong>jury. Phronesis is required. Means and ends are <strong>in</strong>extricably related <strong>in</strong><br />

car<strong>in</strong>g for the ill. The cl<strong>in</strong>ician and patient bend and respond to the other<br />

so that the horizons and world are opened and reconstituted, allow<strong>in</strong>g<br />

new possibilities to emerge.<br />

As the Dreyfus model suggests, experiential learn<strong>in</strong>g requires the<br />

stance of an engaged learner, rather than a stance of one expert <strong>in</strong> techne<br />

who skillfully applies well-established knowledge <strong>in</strong> prespecified clear circumstances.<br />

Experiential learn<strong>in</strong>g requires openness and responsiveness<br />

by the learner to improve <strong>practice</strong> over time. The learner who develops an<br />

attuned, response-based <strong>practice</strong> learns to recognize whole situations <strong>in</strong><br />

terms of past concrete experiences, as po<strong>in</strong>ted out by the Dreyfus model.<br />

We found that respond<strong>in</strong>g to the situation as an “<strong>in</strong>stance of particular<br />

concerns” is central to the logic of excellent <strong>practice</strong>. As Bourdieu<br />

(1990) po<strong>in</strong>ts out, understand<strong>in</strong>g the nature of the situation is at the<br />

heart of practical reason<strong>in</strong>g, and cl<strong>in</strong>ical reason<strong>in</strong>g is a form of practical<br />

reason<strong>in</strong>g. Cl<strong>in</strong>ical reason<strong>in</strong>g is always reason<strong>in</strong>g across time about<br />

the particular through transitions <strong>in</strong> the patient’s condition or concerns<br />

and/or changes <strong>in</strong> the patient’s condition. For example, a cl<strong>in</strong>ician might

Hooray! Your file is uploaded and ready to be published.

Saved successfully!

Ooh no, something went wrong!