Pakistan-India Trade:

Non-Trade-Related Stakes of the Pakistan-India Relationship
strategically poised the Pakistani army against a much larger rival. The
fact that India is seven times larger economically and demographically,
and boasts a growing defense armory, has increased the sense of insecurity
within the Pakistani establishment.
A common perception that has grown over the years is that perhaps
the Pakistani army wants to keep the dispute with India festering, so that
it can continue to maintain its dominant position within the country.
This view is not only widely believed in India and in think-tanks around
the world, but also in some circles within Pakistan as well. Against this
backdrop, it would be interesting to examine an alternative view.
The Musharraf Era
During President Musharraf’s period of rule, there were genuine moves
made toward peace with India, with substantial progress made to some
extent. This was despite the fact that Musharraf was widely attributed
to be the author of the Kargil conflict. Additionally, a few years into his
presidency, each country mobilized a million troops “eyeball to eyeball”
on the border (the quoted term comes from the Economist) following an
attack on the Indian parliament.
Musharraf co-initiated the Composite Dialogue process with his
Indian counterparts, Prime Minister Atal Bihari Vajpayee and subsequently
Prime Minister Manmohan Singh, in an attempt to discuss
and resolve all outstanding issues, conditionally but unilaterally moving
away from the UN Kashmir resolutions of 1948 and 1949 calling for a
plebiscite under UN auspices (which no political or military government
had ever done before). He also agreed to a broad framework for a solution
on the Kashmir dispute with his Indian counterparts, and ordered
a crackdown on militant activities on Pakistan’s soil. Musharraf clearly
demonstrated a genuine, personal desire to find an equitable and lasting
solution to all outstanding issues with Pakistan’s eastern neighbor.
It is important to note that these peace initiatives were undertaken
by President Musharraf as much in his capacity as chief of army staff
as president. These critical decisions could not have been procedurally
taken without the consent of the top army brass. If the establishment had
deliberately decided to keep the conflict with India brewing for strategic
reasons, then none of the progress achieved during Musharraf’s regime
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