Pakistan-India Trade:
Pakistan-India Trade: Pakistan-India Trade:
Non-Trade-Related Stakes of the Pakistan-India Relationship person levels is quite extraordinary. This weighs heavily in the peacebuilding process, despite the perceived roadblocks in rapprochement. This in itself is ample reason for optimism for the future. Existing misperceptions can be expected to reduce considerably once trade and other links gradually open up. Positive changes can perhaps happen sooner than anticipated if politicians on both sides demonstrate the proper leadership to push this process further. Social media growing exponentially in both countries can potentially become the gamechanger, if nurtured wisely. The advantage of having a common culture, language, history, and border—an advantage that seems to be untapped at the moment—cannot be overstated. Linking the local regions on both sides of the border—like Punjab, where there was historical and natural pre-partition trade—can further boost this process. Pakistan needs to work on countering misrepresentative and negative images not only in India, but in the rest of the world—and especially in the post-9/11 era. The Indian media too must avoid the temptation to sensationalize news from Pakistan in a knee-jerk fashion, and it must provide some space for positive news to filter through. The Media RAJ There has been a sudden unleashing of the media in India and Pakistan, both in terms of scale and content. Media companies in the last two decades have gradually gained considerable influence socially, economically, and politically in their respective countries. Their role in the India-Pakistan relationship has been no exception. Two examples demonstrate this point. In 2001, the Agra Summit brought the two sides together. However, the summit abruptly concluded without a joint statement. Some blame this on a meeting President Pervez Musharraf held during the summit with senior Indian journalists, which was broadcast on live television. It highlighted the different positions of India and Pakistan, and particularly regarding Kashmir. In essence, the Indian media both exploited and weakened the government’s position before the Indian public. In such an environment, it was difficult for the Indian government to win the public’s approval for an agreement. | 121 |
Amin Hashwani In 2004, Musharraf made a proposal on Kashmir that sparked controversy in both the Indian and Pakistani media. He suggested that Pakistan not demand a plebiscite on the status of Kashmir, and that India not demand making the Line of Control an international border. Instead, he suggested that Kashmir be broken down into seven regions, and demilitarized through a phased process. Thereafter, Kashmiris would decide their own fate. The Indian Foreign Ministry spokesman criticized Musharraf for not having first discussed his proposal through diplomatic channels. The Indian media highlighted the reaction of prominent statesman Jaswant Singh, who condemned the proposal as “map-making...in disguise” that needed to cease. The Pakistani media accused Musharraf of selling out on Kashmir. Several days later, Pakistan’s Foreign Ministry clarified that Musharraf’s proposal was merely meant to generate debate on the issue. 1 The seCuriTY PrediCaMenT: PaKisTan’s arMY as a douBle-edGed sWord As compared to India, the role of the Pakistan army, which has ruled the country for almost half its history, has historically been more prominent. Although Pakistan has now transitioned into a political democracy, the army still has a strong influence—especially in the areas of defense and foreign policy. The fact that Pakistan, since its inception, has been in a constant state of instability—internally and externally—has not helped matters. Three wars with India, the partition of Bangladesh, support for U.S. interests in the region during the Cold War, a status of front-line state after the Soviet Union’s invasion of Afghanistan (and the consequent hosting of over 3 million refugees for over three decades), a key partner in the “war on terror” after 9/11 and the civil wars with the Tehrik-e-Taliban that resulted, the Baluchistan Liberation Movement— all of this has extracted a heavy social, political, and economic price from the Pakistani people. And it has kept Pakistan in a perpetual state of flux, thereby preventing the evolution and development of any state institutions apart from the military itself. Among other unresolved issues with India, the Kashmir dispute stirs strong feelings. In Pakistan, it is viewed as a people’s issue rather than simply a land dispute. From the very beginning, this dispute has | 122 |
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Amin Hashwani<br />
In 2004, Musharraf made a proposal on Kashmir that sparked controversy<br />
in both the <strong>India</strong>n and <strong>Pakistan</strong>i media. He suggested that <strong>Pakistan</strong><br />
not demand a plebiscite on the status of Kashmir, and that <strong>India</strong> not demand<br />
making the Line of Control an international border. Instead, he suggested<br />
that Kashmir be broken down into seven regions, and demilitarized<br />
through a phased process. Thereafter, Kashmiris would decide their own<br />
fate. The <strong>India</strong>n Foreign Ministry spokesman criticized Musharraf for<br />
not having first discussed his proposal through diplomatic channels. The<br />
<strong>India</strong>n media highlighted the reaction of prominent statesman Jaswant<br />
Singh, who condemned the proposal as “map-making...in disguise” that<br />
needed to cease. The <strong>Pakistan</strong>i media accused Musharraf of selling out<br />
on Kashmir. Several days later, <strong>Pakistan</strong>’s Foreign Ministry clarified that<br />
Musharraf’s proposal was merely meant to generate debate on the issue. 1<br />
The seCuriTY PrediCaMenT: PaKisTan’s arMY as a<br />
douBle-edGed sWord<br />
As compared to <strong>India</strong>, the role of the <strong>Pakistan</strong> army, which has ruled the<br />
country for almost half its history, has historically been more prominent.<br />
Although <strong>Pakistan</strong> has now transitioned into a political democracy, the<br />
army still has a strong influence—especially in the areas of defense and<br />
foreign policy. The fact that <strong>Pakistan</strong>, since its inception, has been in a<br />
constant state of instability—internally and externally—has not helped<br />
matters. Three wars with <strong>India</strong>, the partition of Bangladesh, support for<br />
U.S. interests in the region during the Cold War, a status of front-line<br />
state after the Soviet Union’s invasion of Afghanistan (and the consequent<br />
hosting of over 3 million refugees for over three decades), a key<br />
partner in the “war on terror” after 9/11 and the civil wars with the<br />
Tehrik-e-Taliban that resulted, the Baluchistan Liberation Movement—<br />
all of this has extracted a heavy social, political, and economic price<br />
from the <strong>Pakistan</strong>i people. And it has kept <strong>Pakistan</strong> in a perpetual state<br />
of flux, thereby preventing the evolution and development of any state<br />
institutions apart from the military itself.<br />
Among other unresolved issues with <strong>India</strong>, the Kashmir dispute<br />
stirs strong feelings. In <strong>Pakistan</strong>, it is viewed as a people’s issue rather<br />
than simply a land dispute. From the very beginning, this dispute has<br />
| 122 |