FM 17-35 ( Armored Cavalry Platoon, Troop and Squadron ) 1960
FM 17-35 ( Armored Cavalry Platoon, Troop and Squadron ) 1960
FM 17-35 ( Armored Cavalry Platoon, Troop and Squadron ) 1960
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b. Once the main body has withdrawn, the security force employs<br />
fire <strong>and</strong> movement in a delaying action until it passes<br />
through friendly forces or disengages from the enemy.<br />
c. In a daylight withdrawal from action, the troop may be<br />
designated as all or part of the reserve for a larger unit. When<br />
employed in this manner, the troop may:<br />
(1) Be employed as a counterattacking force to permit withdrawal<br />
of a unit that is heavily engaged. Such a counterattack<br />
is a limited-objective attack.<br />
(2) Be employed as a security force to occupy a position<br />
from which it can cover by fire the withdrawal of units<br />
in contact with the enemy.<br />
(3) Be the first element to move to the rear when it is not<br />
required to assist other units in disengaging from the<br />
enemy.<br />
d. When the troop is given a security force mission for a larger<br />
force, it organizes for combat <strong>and</strong> conducts its actions in essentially<br />
the same manner as the security force in the mobile defense.<br />
A troop that is in contact with the enemy <strong>and</strong> not required to<br />
provide its own security, disengages from action in a manner<br />
similar to that of a unit conducting a withdrawal in a delaying<br />
action (fig. 48).<br />
229. Night Withdrawal From Action<br />
a. A night withdrawal from action reduces the effectiveness of<br />
enemy air attacks <strong>and</strong> ground fire. It is easier to deceive the<br />
enemy at night; however, control is more difficult <strong>and</strong> movement<br />
slower. In rugged terrain, the speed of withdrawal may be<br />
quite slow if a number of tracked vehicles must be guided from<br />
their positions to the main route of withdrawal.<br />
b. Elements of the troop are left in contact with the enemy<br />
when the situation requires that security be provided for the<br />
other elements of the troop that are withdrawing. Within the<br />
troop the elements left in contact may consist of an armored<br />
cavalry platoon or elements of each of the three platoons. In the<br />
event a provisional element is left in contact, the troop comm<strong>and</strong>er<br />
may designate the executive officer or a platoon leader<br />
to comm<strong>and</strong> this force. Coordination must be achieved within<br />
the force remaining, between this force <strong>and</strong> the withdrawing element<br />
of the troop, <strong>and</strong> with adjacent units. Matters of comm<strong>and</strong><br />
<strong>and</strong> control must be clearly specified.<br />
c. Elements left in contact use whatever deceptive measures<br />
are available to create the impression that a much larger force<br />
156 AGO 4088B