Cubby, Inc. v. CompuServe, Inc., Stratton Oakmont, Inc

A sues B for breach of contract, A is alleging that B violated an obligation that B intended to be
legally enforceable. In promissory estoppel cases, courts simply infer that intention not from
consideration but from a promise that B could have foreseen would induce A's reliance.
Against this background, we inquire whether Barnes' theory of recovery under promissory
estoppel would treat Yahoo as a "publisher or speaker" under the Act.
As we explained above, subsection 230(c)(1) precludes liability when the duty the plaintiff
alleges the defendant violated derives from the defendant's status as a publisher or speaker. In a
promissory estoppel case, as in any other contract case, the duty the defendant allegedly violated
springs from a contract--an enforceable promise--not from any non-contractual conduct or
capacity of the defendant. Barnes does not seek to hold Yahoo liable as a publisher of third-party
content, but rather as the counter-party to a contract, as a promisor who has breached.
How does this analysis differ from our discussion of liability for the tort of negligent
undertaking? After all, even if Yahoo did make a promise, it promised to take down third-party
content from its website, which is quintessential publisher conduct, just as what Yahoo allegedly
undertook to do consisted in publishing activity. The difference is that the various torts we
referred to above each derive liability from behavior that is identical to publishing or speaking:
publishing defamatory material; publishing material that inflicts emotional distress; or indeed
attempting to de-publish hurtful material but doing it badly. To undertake a thing, within the
meaning of the tort, is to do it.
Promising is different because it is not synonymous with the performance of the action
promised. That is, whereas one cannot undertake to do something without simultaneously doing
it, one can, and often does, promise to do something without actually doing it. Contract liability
here would come not from Yahoo's publishing conduct, but from Yahoo's manifest intention to
be legally obligated to do something, which happens to be removal of material from publication.
Contract law treats the outwardly manifested intention to create an expectation on the part of
another as a legally significant event. That event generates a legal duty distinct from the conduct
at hand, be it the conduct of a publisher, of a doctor, or of an overzealous uncle.
Furthermore, a court cannot simply infer a promise from an attempt to de-publish. For, as a
matter of contract law, the promise must "be as clear and well defined as a promise that could
serve as an offer, or that otherwise might be sufficient to give rise to a traditional contract
supported by consideration." Thus a general monitoring policy, or even an attempt to help a
particular person, on the part of an interactive computer service does not suffice for contract
liability. This makes it easy for Yahoo to avoid liability: it need only disclaim any intention to be
bound.
Therefore, we conclude that, insofar as Barnes alleges a breach of contract claim under the
theory of promissory estoppel, subsection 230(c)(1) of the Act does not preclude her cause of
action. We do not reach the question whether Barnes has a viable contract claim or whether
Yahoo has an affirmative defense under subsection 230(c)(2) of the Act.
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