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Second Half 2011 Focus on the Horizon - Kantar Retail

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<str<strong>on</strong>g>Sec<strong>on</strong>d</str<strong>on</strong>g> <str<strong>on</strong>g>Half</str<strong>on</strong>g> <str<strong>on</strong>g>2011</str<strong>on</strong>g> <str<strong>on</strong>g>Focus</str<strong>on</strong>g> <strong>on</strong> <strong>the</strong> Horiz<strong>on</strong>


Design<br />

Jennifer Zipp<br />

Lisa Weiderman<br />

© <str<strong>on</strong>g>2011</str<strong>on</strong>g> – <strong>Kantar</strong> <strong>Retail</strong> LLC. All Rights Reserved.<br />

Disclaimer: The analyses and c<strong>on</strong>clusi<strong>on</strong>s presented herein represent <strong>the</strong> opini<strong>on</strong>s of <strong>Kantar</strong> <strong>Retail</strong>. The views expressed in this publicati<strong>on</strong> do<br />

not necessarily reflect <strong>the</strong> views of <strong>the</strong> companies covered by this publicati<strong>on</strong>. This publicati<strong>on</strong> is not endorsed, or o<strong>the</strong>rwise supported, by <strong>the</strong><br />

management of any of <strong>the</strong> companies covered herein.<br />

Copyright Notice: No part of this publicati<strong>on</strong> may be reproduced in any form or by any means without <strong>the</strong> express written permissi<strong>on</strong> of <strong>the</strong><br />

copyright owner.<br />

96 Breakthrough Insights<br />

/ Research Team<br />

Sara Al-Tukhaim<br />

Frank Badillo<br />

Jessica Campbell<br />

Wils<strong>on</strong> Chen<br />

Alida Destrempe<br />

Karolina Fiedler<br />

Ray Gaul<br />

Bryan Gildenberg<br />

Kaina Hamed<br />

Doug Hermans<strong>on</strong><br />

Yi Ting Hu<br />

Rema Iyer<br />

Sim<strong>on</strong> Johnst<strong>on</strong>e<br />

Laura Kennedy<br />

Vadim Khetsuriani<br />

Amy Koo<br />

Jim Le<strong>on</strong>ard<br />

Stephen Mader<br />

David Marcotte<br />

Alexandra Mansfield<br />

Rachel McGuire<br />

Le<strong>on</strong> Nicholas<br />

Ivana Nikolic<br />

Mike Paglia<br />

Himanshu Pal<br />

John Rand<br />

Bryan Roberts<br />

Kate Senzamici<br />

Robin Sherk<br />

Steve Spiwak<br />

Xue Fei Sun<br />

Lynne Vantassel<br />

Mary Brett Whitfield<br />

Lisa Wiltshire<br />

Fan Zhang<br />

Anne Zybowski


In This Issue<br />

Foreword 2<br />

<strong>Retail</strong> Insights<br />

UK Online Grocery: Comparis<strong>on</strong> Shopping Trips 5<br />

Online <strong>Retail</strong> in China: Getting Ahead of <strong>the</strong> Curve 14<br />

Adding Clarity or Clutter? A First Look at Walgreens and CVS’s 20<br />

New Private Brands, “Nice!” and “Nuance”<br />

What Target’s Suppliers Need to Know about Walmart Canada 24<br />

Getting it Right: Anticipating Amaz<strong>on</strong>’s Growth Trajectory 34<br />

Tesco Price Drop: Seismic Shift or Smoke and Mirrors? 39<br />

Safeway’s Strategic In-Store Marketing 44<br />

Bey<strong>on</strong>d <strong>the</strong> Box: Costco’s Digital Dive 49<br />

Shopper Insights<br />

Value Discounters C<strong>on</strong>tinue to Attract More Shoppers 59<br />

Where <strong>the</strong> Men Are/Aren’t 67<br />

Shopping Through <strong>the</strong> Eyes of a Low-Income Shopper 73<br />

Ec<strong>on</strong>omic Insights<br />

The Global Macroec<strong>on</strong>omic Outlook for <strong>Retail</strong>: Danger from Europe to China 80<br />

The Macroec<strong>on</strong>omic Outlook for U.S. <strong>Retail</strong>: Pushed Toward Recessi<strong>on</strong> 88


FOREWORD<br />

Welcome to <strong>Kantar</strong> <strong>Retail</strong>’s semi-annual collecti<strong>on</strong> of<br />

Breakthrough Insights—our recent research pieces that we<br />

feel best reflect <strong>the</strong> key issues in <strong>the</strong> rapidly changing retail<br />

landscape.<br />

Many years ago, my fa<strong>the</strong>r took me deep-sea fishing for <strong>the</strong> first time,<br />

and during <strong>the</strong> voyage I began to feel more than a little queasy. My<br />

Dad looked down at me at <strong>on</strong>e point and saw me closing my eyes,<br />

hoping that <strong>the</strong> swells rocking <strong>the</strong> boat would pass. His simple instructi<strong>on</strong><br />

to me at <strong>the</strong> time is something that has stuck with me ever<br />

since:“The <strong>on</strong>ly way you’ll feel better is if you keep your eyes open and<br />

focused <strong>on</strong> <strong>the</strong> horiz<strong>on</strong>. Your eyes will see <strong>the</strong> movement you feel in<br />

your head, and you’ll stop feeling sick.”<br />

I’ve thought of that advice many times over <strong>the</strong> years, and quite frequently<br />

recently as <strong>the</strong> queasiness has come back with a vengeance<br />

in <strong>the</strong> sec<strong>on</strong>d half of <str<strong>on</strong>g>2011</str<strong>on</strong>g>. Those of us in <strong>the</strong> nor<strong>the</strong>astern United<br />

States have experienced hurricanes, earthquakes, tornadoes, floods,<br />

and a freak late autumn blizzard in this six-m<strong>on</strong>th period, and that’s<br />

even before we think about <strong>the</strong> turbulent global ec<strong>on</strong>omic and retail<br />

landscape! I’ve written many times in <strong>the</strong> last six m<strong>on</strong>ths about <strong>the</strong><br />

need to cope more effectively in uncertain and volatile times, but I have gradually come to realize a simple point<br />

that to some degree c<strong>on</strong>tradicts that characterizati<strong>on</strong> of <strong>the</strong> world today: <strong>on</strong>ly infrequent volatility is uncertain.<br />

What we are faced with today, and what <strong>Kantar</strong> <strong>Retail</strong> believes will be <strong>the</strong> modus operandi for <strong>the</strong> global retail<br />

marketplace in 2012 and bey<strong>on</strong>d, is a sort of perpetual volatility—at which point volatility becomes a known that<br />

needs to be planned for, not an unknown that surprises. Management guru Jim Collins builds <strong>on</strong> this idea in his<br />

writings <strong>on</strong> why formerly great companies fail. Great companies are rarely derailed by <strong>the</strong> unknown, as <strong>the</strong> unknown<br />

tends to relatively evenly impact all companies and <strong>the</strong>ir competitors. Great companies that avoid failure<br />

do so with <strong>on</strong>e simple skill: <strong>the</strong> ability to sift through <strong>the</strong> known to find <strong>the</strong> truly important, and to plan and act in a<br />

way that deals with and capitalizes <strong>on</strong> that “known.”<br />

In pursuit of that <strong>the</strong>me, what you will find in <strong>Kantar</strong> <strong>Retail</strong>’s H2 Breakthrough Insights collecti<strong>on</strong> is a series of<br />

works that define <strong>the</strong> major factors that are shaping <strong>the</strong> retail landscape and what <strong>the</strong> strategies should be that<br />

surround those “great big knowns.” To establish <strong>the</strong> case for this more permanent volatility, our Chief Ec<strong>on</strong>omist<br />

Frank Badillo has c<strong>on</strong>tributed two pieces that highlight its root causes and effects: <strong>the</strong> first <strong>on</strong> <strong>the</strong> uncertainty<br />

associated with many of <strong>the</strong> major retail markets around <strong>the</strong> world and <strong>the</strong> sec<strong>on</strong>d focusing <strong>on</strong> <strong>the</strong> c<strong>on</strong>tinued<br />

troubled outlook for <strong>the</strong> U.S. retail envir<strong>on</strong>ment.<br />

2 Breakthrough Insights<br />

Figure 1: The 5 Shares Map<br />

Share of<br />

Real Growth<br />

Share of<br />

Soluti<strong>on</strong><br />

<strong>Retail</strong>er/<br />

Landscape<br />

Market Evoluti<strong>on</strong><br />

and C<strong>on</strong>diti<strong>on</strong>s<br />

Share of<br />

Wallet<br />

Informati<strong>on</strong><br />

Post-Desktop<br />

Informati<strong>on</strong><br />

Shopper<br />

Post-Recessi<strong>on</strong><br />

Digital Shopper<br />

Share of<br />

Engagement<br />

Share of<br />

Decisi<strong>on</strong><br />

Source: <strong>Kantar</strong> <strong>Retail</strong>


Two framing perspectives provide a lens to view <strong>the</strong> remaining articles. The first is <strong>Kantar</strong> <strong>Retail</strong>’s proprietary “5 Shares”<br />

framework, and <strong>the</strong> sec<strong>on</strong>d is those shares married with <strong>the</strong> fundamental questi<strong>on</strong>s companies will need to grapple with in<br />

order to thrive in this era of perpetual volatility.<br />

Share of Real Growth: Where Will I Grow?<br />

Fans of <strong>Kantar</strong> <strong>Retail</strong>’s analysis will be familiar with our oft-repeated phrase that growth is going to c<strong>on</strong>tinue to come from<br />

less comfortable places. Phil Smiley and Justin Cook profile <strong>on</strong>e of those uncomfortable “knowns”: <strong>on</strong>line retail/e-commerce<br />

in China and how digital commerce today is going to make <strong>the</strong> Chinese retail landscape of tomorrow look foundati<strong>on</strong>ally different<br />

than o<strong>the</strong>r major global markets. We also know that U.S. retailers are increasingly going to be pushed to intensify internati<strong>on</strong>al<br />

expansi<strong>on</strong> as U.S. retail market growth sputters, and Robin Sherk maps out <strong>the</strong> showdown we expect to see as Walmart<br />

and Target square off against <strong>on</strong>e ano<strong>the</strong>r in <strong>the</strong> Canadian market.<br />

“Where will I grow” also is a relevant questi<strong>on</strong> even for U.S.-centric companies. There are unexplored channels, segments,<br />

and niches that though unfamiliar can be sources of real growth. Mary Brett Whitfield previews our findings about arguably<br />

<strong>the</strong> largest under-served shopping populati<strong>on</strong> in <strong>the</strong> United States today—men—by drawing c<strong>on</strong>clusi<strong>on</strong>s from our recently<br />

augmented ShopperScape ® m<strong>on</strong>thly U.S. shopper panel that has been expanded to more precisely analyze male shopping behavior.<br />

For <strong>the</strong> first time, channels such as home improvement, c<strong>on</strong>sumer electr<strong>on</strong>ics, and c<strong>on</strong>venience get a fair shake from<br />

our analysis as <strong>the</strong> male voice is heard more clearly. Gen Xers redefining gender roles at home and marriage-delayed Gen Ys<br />

are resp<strong>on</strong>sible for <strong>the</strong> dramatically increased men’s involvement in shopping and shopping decisi<strong>on</strong>s. <strong>Kantar</strong> <strong>Retail</strong>’s work<br />

here can help our clients develop strategies to capitalize <strong>on</strong> this key known.<br />

Share of Engagement: How Will I Cut Through <strong>the</strong> Clutter and C<strong>on</strong>nect to Shoppers?<br />

The risk of focusing <strong>on</strong> <strong>the</strong> known is in resorting to lazy cliché or not challenging c<strong>on</strong>venti<strong>on</strong>al ideas, and nowhere is this<br />

risk greater in a “known” which needs more dimensi<strong>on</strong>: <strong>the</strong> idea that retailers need to make <strong>the</strong>ir stores “more experiential”<br />

to compete with <strong>on</strong>line competitors. Some retailers do, but in fact, some may compete by making <strong>the</strong>ir stores simpler and<br />

faster to shop instead of more interesting and engaging. <strong>Retail</strong>ers that are enhancing <strong>the</strong>ir store experience need to do so<br />

with a firm eye <strong>on</strong> how that improved experience causes sales increases. As our <strong>Kantar</strong> brethren at TNS are f<strong>on</strong>d of reminding<br />

us, keeping people in <strong>the</strong> store l<strong>on</strong>ger doesn’t necessarily sell more—most retailers that are successful sell and close quickly<br />

and effectively. With that screen in place, Alida Destrempe evaluates Safeway’s attempts to re-invigorate its store experience<br />

and value communicati<strong>on</strong> in a photo-based study.<br />

Share of Decisi<strong>on</strong>: Why Will Shoppers Choose Outlets and Brands?<br />

Price today remains a cornerst<strong>on</strong>e of shopper outlet choice, and <strong>the</strong>re is no c<strong>on</strong>cept more fundamental to <strong>the</strong> relati<strong>on</strong>ship<br />

between retailers, suppliers, and shoppers than price. To a casual reader of <strong>the</strong> newspaper, a short-durati<strong>on</strong> extreme discounting<br />

c<strong>on</strong>cept like Group<strong>on</strong> having a market capitalizati<strong>on</strong> of more than USD10 billi<strong>on</strong> should highlight <strong>on</strong>e simple known:<br />

list price and average selling price are going to become increasingly disassociated from <strong>on</strong>e ano<strong>the</strong>r. The implicati<strong>on</strong>s of this<br />

known are massive and impact virtually every core retail industry process—pricing strategy, promoti<strong>on</strong>, placement, product<br />

availability, branding, and new item strategy. Our price-based analysis this m<strong>on</strong>th takes us to <strong>the</strong> United Kingdom, where<br />

Bryan Roberts highlights <strong>the</strong> offline grocery price battle that has turned into an Orwellian state of permanent total war, and to<br />

<strong>the</strong> United States, where Le<strong>on</strong> Nicholas investigates how low-income shoppers are getting price signals from retailer opening<br />

price point (OPP) assortments and pricing models.<br />

Breakthrough Insights 3


Share of Wallet: How Much Will Shoppers Spend?<br />

Building <strong>on</strong> <strong>the</strong> OPP <strong>the</strong>me, <strong>the</strong> rise of discount formats in various retail markets around <strong>the</strong> world is ano<strong>the</strong>r key known. The<br />

United States in particular is susceptible to this, as it by far <strong>the</strong> largest retail market in <strong>the</strong> world and <strong>on</strong>e with a relatively<br />

large disparity of income (o<strong>the</strong>rwise known as a Gini coefficient). To understand this phenomena in much more detail Dave<br />

Marcotte profiles <strong>the</strong> rise of discounters in <strong>the</strong> United States and shares insights <strong>on</strong> both who is shopping in <strong>the</strong>se stores<br />

and what is driving <strong>the</strong>m <strong>the</strong>re. A few key categories—such as party, occasi<strong>on</strong>s and greeting cards—are resp<strong>on</strong>sible for a<br />

surprisingly high amount of destinati<strong>on</strong> traffic. Understanding this is key to understanding this channel in <strong>the</strong> United States,<br />

Walmart’s c<strong>on</strong>tinued attempts to resp<strong>on</strong>d to it, and to understanding low-income shoppers in general. U.S. shoppers making<br />

less than <strong>the</strong> median household income would be <strong>the</strong> third-largest retail market in <strong>the</strong> world (behind <strong>on</strong>ly <strong>the</strong> wealthy U.S.<br />

shoppers and China) if <strong>the</strong>y were a standal<strong>on</strong>e country.<br />

Share of Soluti<strong>on</strong>: What Will We Sell Shoppers?<br />

Share of wallet’s l<strong>on</strong>g-term cousin is really share of soluti<strong>on</strong>:what can our share of wallet be over time? Brendan Langan<br />

takes this discount phenomen<strong>on</strong> <strong>on</strong> from a different angle and investigates <strong>the</strong> increased competitive intensity as <strong>the</strong> value<br />

channel c<strong>on</strong>tinues to expand into areas traditi<strong>on</strong>ally dominated by drug. In particular, this overlap is now exacerbated by <strong>the</strong><br />

senior leadership at both major U.S. n<strong>on</strong>-food discount operators being veterans of <strong>the</strong> drugstore industry. In this case, <strong>the</strong><br />

major known is that low-income shoppers are increasingly looking to alternative vehicles to stay healthy or cure ailments in an<br />

ec<strong>on</strong>omically challenging envir<strong>on</strong>ment, and <strong>the</strong> value channel will almost certainly play a critical role in this adaptati<strong>on</strong> by <strong>the</strong><br />

bottom tiers of <strong>the</strong> ec<strong>on</strong>omic pyramid.<br />

Ano<strong>the</strong>r retailer seeking to aggressively expand its footprint from a soluti<strong>on</strong> perspective is Amaz<strong>on</strong>.com, and our final article<br />

for this period is Anne Zybowski’s overview of how Amaz<strong>on</strong>.com used its 2010 acquisiti<strong>on</strong> of Quidsi (soap.com, diapers.com,<br />

and yoyo.com) to expand its footprint into c<strong>on</strong>venti<strong>on</strong>al replenishment categories. There is no thinking observer of shopper<br />

behavior who would deny that a massive amount of volume in categories that have predictable replenishment, low shopper<br />

engagement, and high shopper benefit for <strong>the</strong>ir household being in-stock <strong>on</strong> those items (diapers, toilet paper, etc.) increasingly<br />

is going to move to some sort of <strong>on</strong>line-facilitated auto-replenishment model. Today, it remains somewhat surprising<br />

how few retailers, suppliers, or agencies have addressed this fundamental “known” with specific acti<strong>on</strong> steps to compete with<br />

or leverage this inexorable sea change in shopping behavior.<br />

We hope that <strong>the</strong>se articles motivate you to attack <strong>the</strong>se specific issues of course, but more importantly perhaps we hope<br />

that this overview gives you <strong>the</strong> c<strong>on</strong>fidence to act, c<strong>on</strong>vincingly and boldly, in this world of perpetual volatility. Closing your<br />

eyes or pretending that <strong>the</strong> seas aren’t rough is <strong>on</strong>ly going to make you sick. Visi<strong>on</strong> firmly focused <strong>on</strong> <strong>the</strong> horiz<strong>on</strong> of <strong>the</strong> Great<br />

Big Knowns and a dedicati<strong>on</strong> to turning insights around those knowns into acti<strong>on</strong> appear to be <strong>the</strong> core survival skills for <strong>the</strong><br />

bumpy ocean of 2012 and bey<strong>on</strong>d.<br />

Best of luck, and hope to see you somewhere so<strong>on</strong>,<br />

Bryan Gildenberg<br />

Chief Knowledge Officer, <strong>Kantar</strong> <strong>Retail</strong><br />

4 Breakthrough Insights


UK Online Grocery:<br />

Comparis<strong>on</strong> Shopping Trips<br />

By: Bryan Roberts / Originally published: September 19, <str<strong>on</strong>g>2011</str<strong>on</strong>g><br />

While it is relatively easy to complete<br />

comparis<strong>on</strong> shopping trips at bricks &<br />

mortar stores, a comparis<strong>on</strong> of <strong>on</strong>line<br />

grocery retailers (all <strong>the</strong> way from<br />

browsing <strong>on</strong>line to receiving <strong>the</strong> products)<br />

is a slightly more complex, not to menti<strong>on</strong><br />

expensive, affair. To c<strong>on</strong>duct a genuine<br />

comparis<strong>on</strong>, we felt it was necessary to<br />

actually complete a series of shopping<br />

trips with all of <strong>the</strong> major <strong>on</strong>line grocers<br />

in <strong>the</strong> UK. Here we present <strong>the</strong> findings<br />

from our experience shopping all of <strong>the</strong><br />

major <strong>on</strong>line grocers, covering issues<br />

such as <strong>the</strong> <strong>on</strong>line shopping experience,<br />

pricing, delivery, and accuracy.<br />

Tesco App Enables Shoppers to Scan Ads and Add Them to Online Shopping Lists<br />

Survey background<br />

Our survey comprised a series of <strong>on</strong>line shopping<br />

trips c<strong>on</strong>ducted over a two-week period, at Tesco,<br />

Asda, Sainsbury’s, Waitrose, and Ocado. We<br />

selected 15 SKUs (Figure 1) across a variety of<br />

categories that we assumed would be available<br />

through all of <strong>the</strong> retailer’s e-commerce sites. For<br />

<strong>the</strong> sake of price comparability we selected <strong>on</strong>ly<br />

branded items and avoided categories such as fresh<br />

produce where product weights and pack sizes<br />

are significantly variable and/or where branded<br />

penetrati<strong>on</strong> is low.<br />

We registered as a first-time customer at all of <strong>the</strong><br />

sites, so, in effect, <strong>the</strong>se were all first-time shops<br />

with <strong>the</strong> <strong>on</strong>line retailers. During <strong>the</strong> shopping<br />

process, we timed how l<strong>on</strong>g it took to find and<br />

Source: Tesco<br />

Breakthrough Insights 5


Figure 1: Selected 15 SKUS Across Variety of Categories<br />

1 Shower gel Original Source Lime Shower<br />

Gel 250ml<br />

2 Dishwasher tabs Finish All In 1 Regular 28 Pack<br />

3 Kitchen roll Plenty Kitchen Towel White<br />

2 Roll<br />

4 Laundry tabs Ariel Liquitabs Colour 23’s<br />

5 Tea Yorkshire 80 Teabags 250g<br />

6 Water Highland Spring Sparkling<br />

Water 6x500ml<br />

7 Fruit Squash Squash Robins<strong>on</strong>s No Added<br />

Sugar Orange Drink 1l<br />

8 Baked beans Heinz Baked Bean In Tomato<br />

Sauce 415g<br />

9 Brown sauce HP Brown Sauce 425g<br />

10 Cider Str<strong>on</strong>gbow Cider 4x440ml<br />

11 Bread Warburt<strong>on</strong>s Wholemeal Bread<br />

Medium Sliced 400g<br />

12 Cheese Ca<strong>the</strong>dral City Extra Mature<br />

350g<br />

13 Wine Wolf Blass Yellow Label<br />

Chard<strong>on</strong>nay 75cl<br />

14 Sausages Walls Classic 8 Pork Sausages<br />

454g<br />

15 Toothpaste Colgate Max White Toothpaste<br />

100ml<br />

Source:<strong>Kantar</strong> <strong>Retail</strong><br />

select <strong>the</strong> 15 SKUs and kept separate timings of<br />

<strong>the</strong> check-out process. Throughout <strong>the</strong> process,<br />

we were keeping an eye out for features such as<br />

<strong>the</strong> hierarchy of brands/private labels as <strong>the</strong>y<br />

appeared in each category, product suggesti<strong>on</strong>s or<br />

recommendati<strong>on</strong>s, special offers and multi-buys,<br />

any evidence of vendor investment in terms of<br />

“space <strong>on</strong> shelf,” availability of <strong>the</strong> 15 SKUs, and any<br />

hints or reminders that were intended to prompt us<br />

to exploit special offers.<br />

6 Breakthrough Insights<br />

In terms of price comparis<strong>on</strong>s, <strong>the</strong> fact that some<br />

of <strong>the</strong> SKUs were not stocked by some of <strong>the</strong><br />

retailers meant that exact comparis<strong>on</strong>s across all<br />

retailers was not possible. But in order to achieve<br />

comparability, we made <strong>the</strong> assumpti<strong>on</strong> that when<br />

a retailer did not carry a particular item, <strong>the</strong> item<br />

would be included in that retailer’s basket at <strong>the</strong><br />

lowest n<strong>on</strong>-promoti<strong>on</strong>al price offered by <strong>on</strong>e of<br />

<strong>the</strong> o<strong>the</strong>r retailers. While we acknowledge that<br />

this methodology is not strictly watertight, it was<br />

preferable to simply deleting four SKUs from our<br />

15-SKU basket. Throughout, we have ranked <strong>the</strong><br />

retailers <strong>on</strong> <strong>the</strong> various criteria featured, with 5 as<br />

<strong>the</strong> best score, and 1 as <strong>the</strong> worst.<br />

Availability<br />

The 15 SKUs were selected<br />

with <strong>the</strong> assumpti<strong>on</strong> that<br />

as well-known brands and<br />

routine pack sizes, <strong>the</strong>y<br />

would be available through<br />

all of <strong>the</strong> retailers. Alas, this<br />

was not to be, creating <strong>the</strong><br />

Availability scores<br />

Asda 4<br />

Ocado 4<br />

Sainsbury’s 3<br />

Tesco 5<br />

Waitrose 5<br />

aforementi<strong>on</strong>ed complicati<strong>on</strong> in price comparis<strong>on</strong>s.<br />

Waitrose and Tesco offered all 15 products; <strong>the</strong>re<br />

was <strong>on</strong>e SKU missing from <strong>the</strong> Asda shop (Highland<br />

Spring water was available in a 9-pack ra<strong>the</strong>r than<br />

a 6 pack); Ocado did not sell <strong>the</strong> 80-pack Yorkshire<br />

Tea bags; and Sainsbury’s did not offer Finish<br />

dishwash tabs in <strong>the</strong> required pack-size and Wall’s<br />

sausages were simply unavailable in a category<br />

dominated by brand leader Richm<strong>on</strong>d, private label,<br />

and more upscale ‘gourmet’ ranges.


Shopping trip durati<strong>on</strong><br />

The relative navigability of<br />

stores clearly had an impact<br />

<strong>on</strong> <strong>the</strong> length of time each<br />

shopping trip took. We<br />

expect subsequent trips to<br />

be faster as we get <strong>the</strong> hang<br />

of <strong>the</strong> vagaries and quirks<br />

of navigating each site.<br />

That said, <strong>the</strong>re were clear<br />

Shopping trip<br />

durati<strong>on</strong> scores<br />

Asda 3<br />

Ocado 5<br />

Sainsbury’s 5<br />

Tesco 4<br />

Waitrose 2<br />

disparities in shopping trip durati<strong>on</strong>. Sainsbury’s<br />

and Ocado came out <strong>on</strong> top as <strong>the</strong> easiest/fastest<br />

sites to shop, with Tesco and <strong>the</strong>n Asda offering <strong>the</strong><br />

next fastest sites to navigate. Rounding out <strong>the</strong> pack<br />

is Waitrose, a site where we believe <strong>the</strong>re is still<br />

a huge amount of work to be d<strong>on</strong>e to improve <strong>the</strong><br />

shopper experience.<br />

Checkout<br />

The next stage of <strong>the</strong><br />

Checkout scores<br />

shopping process was<br />

Asda 5<br />

checkout and, again, <strong>the</strong>re<br />

Ocado 3<br />

was a marked variati<strong>on</strong> in<br />

Sainsbury’s 2<br />

<strong>the</strong> speed of this process.<br />

Tesco 3<br />

Coming in last was<br />

Waitrose 4<br />

Sainsbury’s, with around five<br />

minutes needed to complete our order. The Tesco<br />

experience was marred by <strong>the</strong> site crashing midway<br />

through checkout, although we were quickly able<br />

to log back in and thankfully retrieve <strong>the</strong> shopping<br />

basket and restart checkout. Asda was <strong>the</strong> clear<br />

winner, offering a rapid and effective checkout<br />

process that took just two minutes.<br />

Delivery time-slots: Proximity<br />

While not necessarily<br />

something that is within<br />

a retailer’s c<strong>on</strong>trol (a<br />

successful service will be<br />

heavily booked up), <strong>the</strong>re<br />

were some real differences<br />

in terms of how quickly<br />

<strong>the</strong> retailers were able<br />

to provide delivery. Asda<br />

was able to offer us a delivery later in <strong>the</strong> day of<br />

our order, while Ocado, Tesco, and Sainsbury’s<br />

were all able to fit our delivery <strong>on</strong> <strong>the</strong> following<br />

day. The biggest lag was for Waitrose, where <strong>the</strong><br />

nearest available timeslot was two days from <strong>the</strong><br />

time of order. A useful feature offered by Asda<br />

allows shoppers to choose a timeslot (indicated<br />

by a van symbol <strong>on</strong> <strong>the</strong> scheduling tool) for when<br />

a van is already scheduled to be in your area—<br />

enabling shoppers to coordinate <strong>the</strong>ir deliveries<br />

with o<strong>the</strong>r shoppers in <strong>the</strong>ir area, minimising<br />

<strong>the</strong> envir<strong>on</strong>mental impact of <strong>the</strong>ir deliveries and<br />

increasing efficiencies for Asda. A similar feature<br />

also is offered by Ocado.<br />

Delivery Timeslots: Durati<strong>on</strong><br />

One of <strong>the</strong> inc<strong>on</strong>veniences<br />

associated with any sort<br />

of home shopping is <strong>the</strong><br />

requirement for some<strong>on</strong>e<br />

to be in at <strong>the</strong> delivery<br />

address to receive <strong>the</strong> order.<br />

Indeed, this is <strong>on</strong>e of <strong>the</strong> key<br />

drivers behind <strong>the</strong> growth<br />

Time-slots:<br />

proximity scores<br />

Asda 5<br />

Ocado 4<br />

Sainsbury’s 4<br />

Tesco 4<br />

Waitrose 3<br />

Time-slots:<br />

durati<strong>on</strong> scores<br />

Asda 4<br />

Ocado 5<br />

Sainsbury’s 5<br />

Tesco 4<br />

Waitrose 4<br />

Breakthrough Insights 7


of <strong>the</strong> “drive-thru” grocery ecommerce model in<br />

markets as diverse as <strong>the</strong> US, Germany, France,<br />

<strong>the</strong> UK, and Spain; such services provide all of <strong>the</strong><br />

c<strong>on</strong>venience of <strong>on</strong>line shopping without <strong>the</strong> burden<br />

of being housebound. In ranking timeslot durati<strong>on</strong>,<br />

higher scores have been awarded for <strong>the</strong> shortest<br />

timeslots, <strong>the</strong> logic being that <strong>the</strong>se shorter slots<br />

are more c<strong>on</strong>venient for time-pressed shoppers.<br />

Sainsbury’s and Ocado triumphed thanks to <strong>the</strong><br />

availabilityof <strong>on</strong>e-hour slots as opposed to <strong>the</strong> two<br />

hours offered by <strong>the</strong> alternative services.<br />

Communicati<strong>on</strong>s<br />

A comm<strong>on</strong> <strong>the</strong>me with<br />

home shopping in general<br />

is <strong>the</strong> need for c<strong>on</strong>firmati<strong>on</strong><br />

and reassurance <strong>on</strong><br />

orders and deliveries. The<br />

supermarkets in questi<strong>on</strong><br />

here varied enormously<br />

in <strong>the</strong> way that <strong>the</strong>y<br />

communicated between <strong>the</strong><br />

time <strong>the</strong> order was placed and <strong>the</strong> time <strong>the</strong> delivery<br />

was received. All of <strong>the</strong> supermarkets issued a<br />

c<strong>on</strong>firmati<strong>on</strong> email up<strong>on</strong> receipt of <strong>the</strong> order. This<br />

is where Waitrose and Asda both stopped: <strong>the</strong> next<br />

time we heard from <strong>the</strong>m was when our groceries<br />

were delivered. Ocado was much more active in<br />

communicating with us: as well as <strong>the</strong> c<strong>on</strong>firmati<strong>on</strong><br />

e-mail, we received a reminder SMS message<br />

<strong>the</strong> day before delivery. On <strong>the</strong> day of delivery, we<br />

received an SMS telling us of changes to <strong>the</strong> order<br />

and ano<strong>the</strong>r SMS <strong>on</strong> <strong>the</strong> day to remind us of <strong>the</strong><br />

delivery time and to assure us that <strong>the</strong>re were no<br />

unavailable items. Both Tesco and Sainsbury’s<br />

8 Breakthrough Insights<br />

Communicati<strong>on</strong><br />

scores<br />

Asda 3<br />

Ocado 5<br />

Sainsbury’s 4<br />

Tesco 4<br />

Waitrose 3<br />

sent a reminder SMS <strong>on</strong> <strong>the</strong> day before delivery.<br />

The clear winner here was Ocado—we were fully<br />

informed throughout <strong>the</strong> process and were left<br />

c<strong>on</strong>fident that our delivery would be timely and<br />

accurate.<br />

Pricing<br />

As referenced above, <strong>the</strong> Pricing scores<br />

fact that not all of <strong>the</strong> Asda 4<br />

retailers stocked all of <strong>the</strong> Ocado 5<br />

SKUs meant that we had to Sainsbury’s 3<br />

improvise slightly in order Tesco 2<br />

to c<strong>on</strong>struct comparable<br />

baskets. We accept that<br />

Waitrose 1<br />

this might not be <strong>the</strong> most scientifically rigorous<br />

piece of analysis, but it was ei<strong>the</strong>r this soluti<strong>on</strong> or<br />

disregarding <strong>the</strong> SKU for all of <strong>the</strong> retailers. The<br />

instances of unavailability are highlighted in red in<br />

<strong>the</strong> Figure 2, while promoti<strong>on</strong>s are highlighted in<br />

green. Where products were replaced by items of a<br />

different value, we have included <strong>the</strong> original price<br />

of <strong>the</strong> item, again for <strong>the</strong> sake of comparability. And<br />

finally, as was <strong>the</strong> case with Tesco, when a retailer<br />

ended up not processing/delivering an item, we<br />

have included that item’s price as though it were<br />

delivered.<br />

Surprisingly, perhaps, <strong>the</strong> clear winner in terms of<br />

basket pricing was Ocado. This is a clear result of<br />

its brand price-matching with Tesco plus a couple of<br />

fortuitous promoti<strong>on</strong>s (<strong>on</strong> wine and dishwash tabs)<br />

that brought its basket in at <strong>the</strong> lowest price by far.<br />

Without <strong>the</strong> promoti<strong>on</strong>s, Ocado would have been<br />

beaten <strong>on</strong> price by Asda—its EDLP strategy coming<br />

through—as well as by Tesco and Sainsbury’s.


Figure 2: Price Comparis<strong>on</strong>s<br />

Product Waitrose Asda Tesco Ocado Sainsbury’s<br />

Original Source Lime Shower Gel 250ml £1.94 £1.94 £1.94 £1.94 £2.00<br />

Finish All In 1 Regular 28 Pack 7.65 5.00 6.00 3.83 5.00<br />

Plenty Kitchen Towel White 2 Roll 1.87 1.86 1.87 1.87 2.00<br />

Ariel Liquitabs Colour 23’S 7.09 6.79 6.79 6.79 7.09<br />

Yorkshire 80 Teabags 250g 2.28 2.28 2.28 2.28 2.28<br />

Highland Spring Sparkling Water 6X500ml 2.39 2.34 1.99 2.34 2.39<br />

Robins<strong>on</strong>s No Added Sugar Orange Drink 1l 1.25 1.10 1.25 1.25 1.25<br />

Heinz Baked Bean In Tomato Sauce 415g 0.69 0.69 0.50 0.69 0.69<br />

HP Brown Sauce 425g 1.99 1.68 1.69 1.50 1.69<br />

Str<strong>on</strong>gbow Cider 4x440ml 3.83 3.50 3.99 4.79 3.99<br />

Warburt<strong>on</strong>s Wholemeal Bread Medium Sliced 400g 0.70 0.70 0.70 0.70 0.70<br />

Ca<strong>the</strong>dral City Extra Mature 350g 4.50 3.98 3.98 3.98 4.48<br />

Wolf Blass Yellow Label Chard<strong>on</strong>nay 75cl 9.99 7.98 9.99 6.66 7.49<br />

Walls Classic 8 Pork Sausages 454g 2.28 2.28 1.14 2.28 2.28<br />

Colgate Max White Toothpaste 100ml 2.00 2.00 2.00 2.00 2.00<br />

Total basket 50.45 44.12 46.11 42.90 45.33<br />

Key: Unavailable; Promoti<strong>on</strong><br />

The most expensive by far was Waitrose, which<br />

comes as a surprise as it also price matches Tesco<br />

<strong>on</strong> 1,000 branded SKUs. This price matching was<br />

claimed by <strong>the</strong> Waitrose website to apply to baked<br />

beans, squash, tea, sausages, bread, shower gel,<br />

and sauce, but it became clear when we shopped<br />

Tesco that Waitrose was 19p more expensive <strong>on</strong><br />

baked beans and 30p more expensive <strong>on</strong> brown<br />

sauce. For sausages, Tesco’s half-price offer meant<br />

that Waitrose was really off <strong>the</strong> mark. It might be<br />

<strong>the</strong> case that we shopped Waitrose at a time when it<br />

was in between Tesco price comparis<strong>on</strong>s (although<br />

it claims to check prices twice per week), but even<br />

so, we are not left with a huge sense of c<strong>on</strong>fidence<br />

in Waitrose’s price matching claims.<br />

Delivery charges<br />

The issue of delivery charges<br />

can be a complex <strong>on</strong>e, as<br />

many of <strong>the</strong> retailers have<br />

a sliding scale of delivery<br />

charges depending <strong>on</strong> size of<br />

shopping basket, day of <strong>the</strong><br />

week, and time of day. We<br />

<strong>the</strong>refore acknowledge that,<br />

Source:<strong>Kantar</strong> <strong>Retail</strong><br />

Deliver charges<br />

scores<br />

Asda 3<br />

Ocado 4<br />

Sainsbury’s 1<br />

Tesco 2<br />

Waitrose 5<br />

if we had spent more m<strong>on</strong>ey, or chosen ano<strong>the</strong>r day/<br />

time, <strong>the</strong>n some of <strong>the</strong>se charges might have been<br />

lower or not have existed at all. It’s clear that <strong>on</strong>line<br />

retailing is more ec<strong>on</strong>omical for larger trolley-style<br />

shops than it is for <strong>the</strong> relatively small basket such<br />

as ours. A larger basket will often avoid delivery<br />

Breakthrough Insights 9


charges, or at least reduce <strong>the</strong>m in terms of cost<br />

per item.<br />

Waitrose’s approach is much simpler (free delivery<br />

for shops of over £50), while <strong>the</strong> o<strong>the</strong>r retailers<br />

have a sliding scale depending <strong>on</strong> order value and<br />

schedule of delivery. Asda charges between £3 and<br />

£5. Ocado deliveries can be free (in <strong>the</strong> graveyard<br />

slot of 10:30–11:30 p.m.) but usual charges vary<br />

from 49p to £4.99. Tesco’s scale ranges from £3.00<br />

to £6.00, while Sainsbury’s has a similar range of<br />

£3.50 to £6.00.<br />

What our shopping experience revealed is that<br />

<strong>the</strong>re are a number of trade-offs available to <strong>on</strong>line<br />

shoppers. The Waitrose delivery is free, but we<br />

are likely to pay a higher price for our groceries.<br />

Similarly, a higher delivery charge will be levied<br />

for those times of day that are c<strong>on</strong>venient for most<br />

shoppers: we must trade off between low cost and<br />

c<strong>on</strong>venience. One trade-off becomes very clear:<br />

for <strong>on</strong>line grocery to be at its most ec<strong>on</strong>omical<br />

from <strong>the</strong> shopper’s perspective, shoppers must<br />

purchase high-value, large-basket orders. Funnily<br />

enough, we suspect that <strong>the</strong> same logic holds from<br />

<strong>the</strong> retailer’s perspective—by baking in delivery<br />

charges based <strong>on</strong> basket size and schedule,<br />

shopper behaviour is being shepherded in <strong>the</strong><br />

directi<strong>on</strong> desired by <strong>the</strong> retailers.<br />

Timeliness<br />

Clearly, a key performance attribute for grocery<br />

e-commerce operators is timeliness, and n<strong>on</strong>e of<br />

<strong>the</strong> providers let us down here. Sainsbury’s was<br />

actually a few minutes early, while Asda, Waitrose,<br />

10 Breakthrough Insights<br />

and Tesco all arrived within<br />

<strong>the</strong>ir allotted time slots.<br />

Ocado dem<strong>on</strong>strated some<br />

typically elegant customer<br />

service: our driver (James in<br />

<strong>the</strong> Odette Oni<strong>on</strong> Van) called<br />

to say that he was in <strong>the</strong><br />

area and asked if we were<br />

willing to accept an early<br />

Timeliness<br />

scores<br />

Asda 5<br />

Ocado 5<br />

Sainsbury’s 5<br />

Tesco 5<br />

Waitrose 5<br />

delivery. We answered in <strong>the</strong> affirmative, and he<br />

arrived 30 minutes ahead of schedule.<br />

Delivery service<br />

The basic distincti<strong>on</strong> here<br />

Service scores<br />

is: will <strong>the</strong> driver offer to<br />

Asda 4<br />

take groceries into <strong>the</strong><br />

Ocado 5<br />

customer’s kitchen, and<br />

Sainsbury’s 5<br />

possibly even offer to help<br />

Tesco 3<br />

unpack? The experience<br />

Waitrose 5<br />

here varied from extremely<br />

good (Waitrose, Ocado,<br />

and Sainsbury’s all delivered <strong>the</strong> bags into <strong>the</strong><br />

kitchen), to <strong>the</strong> moderate (Asda dumped our bags<br />

<strong>on</strong> <strong>the</strong> fr<strong>on</strong>t door mat) to <strong>the</strong> less than ideal (we<br />

had to unpack our own bags from a Tesco crate<br />

<strong>on</strong> <strong>the</strong> fr<strong>on</strong>t step). While we appreciate that <strong>the</strong>re<br />

might be certain legal/insurance/safety c<strong>on</strong>cerns<br />

with delivery staff entering customers’ homes, <strong>the</strong><br />

delivery experience actually can have a significant<br />

effect <strong>on</strong> <strong>the</strong> entire process.<br />

Bags<br />

The UK press has periodically had a field day<br />

over <strong>the</strong> excessive bagging perpetrated by <strong>on</strong>line


grocers. We certainly had a mixed experience. The<br />

sec<strong>on</strong>d-best performer here was Ocado, which<br />

used four bags for 15 items. The delivery, from<br />

<strong>the</strong> main Hatfield fulfilment centre, came in four<br />

colour-coded bags (purple for ambient and red for<br />

fridge) and our excellent Ocado driver was keen to<br />

point out <strong>the</strong> bag recycling service that <strong>the</strong> company<br />

offered.<br />

Asda was <strong>the</strong> worst for bagging—using seven bags<br />

for 14 SKUs. One bag was dedicated to a single<br />

substitute product (“Substituti<strong>on</strong>s are easy to spot—<br />

<strong>the</strong>y’re always delivered in a separate bag and are<br />

clearly marked <strong>on</strong> your delivery note”), although,<br />

as <strong>the</strong>re was no bag colour-coding, this was not<br />

immensely helpful.<br />

Tesco’s bags were colour coded: green for<br />

chilled products; white for ambient, and blue for<br />

substituti<strong>on</strong>s. Some of <strong>the</strong> bagging was faintly<br />

ridiculous, obviously based <strong>on</strong> <strong>the</strong> picking regimen<br />

in <strong>the</strong> Greenford dark store: baked beans and brown<br />

sauce came in <strong>the</strong>ir own bags, while some products<br />

were loose in <strong>the</strong> crate. A total of five bags were<br />

used.<br />

Waitrose did very well here: four bags were used for<br />

15 items. They were colour-coded (blue for fridge<br />

and green for ambient) and <strong>the</strong> driver reminded us<br />

of <strong>the</strong> bag recycling service offered by <strong>the</strong> retailer.<br />

Accuracy<br />

Aside from <strong>the</strong> issue of substituti<strong>on</strong>s (see next<br />

secti<strong>on</strong>), we <strong>on</strong>ly had <strong>on</strong>e example of poor accuracy.<br />

Despite ordering a bottle of wine <strong>on</strong> Tesco.com,<br />

and despite this bottle of wine being featured in<br />

our email c<strong>on</strong>firmati<strong>on</strong><br />

from Tesco, <strong>the</strong> delivery<br />

receipt omitted <strong>the</strong> wine<br />

and, indeed, <strong>the</strong> wine was<br />

nowhere to be found in <strong>the</strong><br />

delivery. For <strong>the</strong> purposes<br />

of <strong>the</strong> pricing comparis<strong>on</strong>,<br />

we have assumed it was<br />

delivered at <strong>the</strong> same<br />

price, but this explains Tesco’s poor standing in <strong>the</strong><br />

accuracy scores. The <strong>on</strong>ly c<strong>on</strong>solati<strong>on</strong> was that we<br />

were not charged for <strong>the</strong> missing item.<br />

Substituti<strong>on</strong>s<br />

Product substituti<strong>on</strong>s have<br />

been ano<strong>the</strong>r c<strong>on</strong>tentious<br />

issue for <strong>on</strong>line grocers,<br />

with assorted inappropriate<br />

and/or comedic substituti<strong>on</strong>s<br />

making <strong>the</strong> press. Ocado<br />

and Sainsbury’s were<br />

<strong>the</strong> <strong>on</strong>ly two retailers to<br />

escape unsca<strong>the</strong>d in this<br />

Accuracy<br />

scores<br />

Asda 5<br />

Ocado 5<br />

Sainsbury’s 5<br />

Tesco 4<br />

Waitrose 5<br />

Substituti<strong>on</strong>s<br />

scores<br />

Asda 4<br />

Ocado 5<br />

Sainsbury’s 5<br />

Tesco 4<br />

Waitrose 3<br />

way, delivering exactly <strong>the</strong> products as ordered.<br />

Waitrose made two substituti<strong>on</strong>s for out of stock<br />

items, replacing Plenty kitchen towels at £1.87 with<br />

Thirst Pockets at £1.22 and <strong>the</strong> 350g Ca<strong>the</strong>dral City<br />

Extra Mature with a Mature 600g pack (charging<br />

<strong>the</strong> lower price of £4.50 ra<strong>the</strong>r than £5.29), slightly<br />

compensating us for <strong>the</strong> wr<strong>on</strong>g flavour of cheese<br />

with extra volume. A nice touch here was that <strong>the</strong><br />

substituti<strong>on</strong>s brought us below <strong>the</strong> free delivery<br />

threshold of £50, but we were still given free<br />

delivery. Asda’s <strong>on</strong>e substituti<strong>on</strong> saw <strong>the</strong>m replace<br />

<strong>the</strong> dishwasher tabs with Finish’s Lem<strong>on</strong> variant<br />

Breakthrough Insights 11


at same price, while Tesco also substituted this<br />

product. The £6.00 28 pack was unavailable, so<br />

(according to <strong>the</strong> delivery receipt) we were given<br />

two 15 packs for £7.76, <strong>the</strong> £1.76 difference being<br />

refunded. One problem here is that we were<br />

actually given two packs of 14.<br />

Shelf-life<br />

The final criteria <strong>the</strong><br />

retailers were judged <strong>on</strong><br />

was shelf-life. Some of <strong>the</strong><br />

retailers (e.g. Waitrose) use<br />

<strong>the</strong> l<strong>on</strong>gest possible shelf<br />

lives as <strong>on</strong>e of <strong>the</strong>ir selling<br />

points, while o<strong>the</strong>rs have<br />

been castigated for using<br />

<strong>on</strong>line shopping as a complex stock rotati<strong>on</strong> system,<br />

foisting near-expired products <strong>on</strong> <strong>the</strong> unsuspecting<br />

public. In this basket, this criteria boils down to <strong>the</strong><br />

sausages, as <strong>the</strong> cheese ordered lasted a couple of<br />

m<strong>on</strong>ths from all of <strong>the</strong> retailers.<br />

Sainsbury’s did not stock <strong>the</strong> sausages, so <strong>the</strong>y<br />

get <strong>the</strong> benefit of <strong>the</strong> doubt here, while Asda was<br />

<strong>the</strong> <strong>on</strong>ly retailer with an issue here. A use-by date<br />

of August 20, with <strong>the</strong> delivery occurring <strong>on</strong> <strong>the</strong><br />

evening of <strong>the</strong> August 18, meant that an enforced<br />

change of menu planning was in order. Only two<br />

days’ shelf life compared poorly to <strong>the</strong> eight from<br />

Tesco, seven from Waitrose and five from Ocado.<br />

We have arbitrarily given Sainsbury’s <strong>the</strong> same<br />

average score as Ocado as <strong>the</strong>y did not stock <strong>the</strong><br />

item in questi<strong>on</strong>.<br />

12 Breakthrough Insights<br />

Shelf-Life<br />

scores<br />

Asda 2<br />

Ocado 3<br />

Sainsbury’s 3<br />

Tesco 5<br />

Waitrose 4<br />

Final scores<br />

Having judged <strong>the</strong> various<br />

services <strong>on</strong> 14 criteria,<br />

Ocado , <strong>the</strong> <strong>on</strong>ly <strong>on</strong>line<strong>on</strong>ly<br />

specialist under<br />

c<strong>on</strong>siderati<strong>on</strong>, emerges as<br />

<strong>the</strong> clear winner. All three<br />

of <strong>the</strong> “Big Three” retailers<br />

scored level points, with<br />

Waitrose pipping <strong>the</strong>m at <strong>the</strong><br />

Final<br />

scores<br />

Asda 52<br />

Ocado 62<br />

Sainsbury’s 52<br />

Tesco 52<br />

Waitrose 54<br />

post in sec<strong>on</strong>d place. Asda was let down by a poor<br />

show in terms of bagging and shelf-life; Ocado’s<br />

<strong>on</strong>ly real weakness was <strong>the</strong> checkout experience;<br />

Tesco was undermined by pricing, delivery charges,<br />

and accuracy; Sainsbury’s fared badly <strong>on</strong> <strong>the</strong> cost<br />

of delivery and availability; and Waitrose has work<br />

to do <strong>on</strong> improving its website and sharpening its<br />

pricing.<br />

The good news for all operators is that not <strong>on</strong>e of<br />

<strong>the</strong>m had an absolute shocker; most were let down<br />

by <strong>on</strong>e or two facets of <strong>the</strong>ir <strong>on</strong>line operati<strong>on</strong>s.<br />

Implicati<strong>on</strong>s for suppliers:<br />

There was not a great deal of evidence throughout<br />

our shopping trips that suppliers are currently able<br />

(or perhaps willing) to secure a more prominent<br />

place “<strong>on</strong> shelf” in <strong>the</strong> <strong>on</strong>line shopping experience.<br />

Indeed, most of <strong>the</strong> sites/categories we shopped<br />

were in alphabetical order or were fr<strong>on</strong>t-loaded<br />

with private brand.


There are clearly some ways of bolstering a<br />

presence in <strong>the</strong>se retailers’ <strong>on</strong>line stores. Securing<br />

space to announce new products or promoti<strong>on</strong>s is<br />

comm<strong>on</strong>place, and we encountered several ‘sticky”<br />

product advertisements that followed us around a<br />

shopping trip, even into different categories.<br />

In terms of <strong>the</strong> alphabetical-order issue, and<br />

this might sounds like something of a fatuous<br />

recommendati<strong>on</strong>, ensuring that brands (or<br />

rebrands) are named with an early letter in <strong>the</strong><br />

alphabet might be a relatively simple way of<br />

ensuring <strong>on</strong>line prominence.<br />

Ano<strong>the</strong>r way of securing prominence will be to<br />

ensure a brand’s participati<strong>on</strong> in <strong>on</strong>line features<br />

such as recipe-based shopping lists and pre-made<br />

shopping lists. At <strong>the</strong> moment, <strong>the</strong>se pre-made<br />

features are extraordinarily skewed toward private<br />

brands.<br />

Sampling is an opportunity with <strong>on</strong>line. Ra<strong>the</strong>r than<br />

relying <strong>on</strong> <strong>the</strong> hit and miss approach of instore<br />

sampling, which is untargeted and dependent <strong>on</strong><br />

traffic flow in <strong>the</strong> store, delivering free product<br />

or product miniatures al<strong>on</strong>gside e-commerce<br />

deliveries enables manufacturers to send samples<br />

directly into shoppers’ homes, often targeted by<br />

shopper group or by geography.<br />

Impulse, c<strong>on</strong>trary to popular belief, can still be<br />

achieved <strong>on</strong>line, such as with Tesco’s “Goes Nicely<br />

With” feature that can lead shoppers into new<br />

categories and new adjacencies. This appears to be<br />

a currently underutilised functi<strong>on</strong> by both retailers<br />

and suppliers.<br />

Online also appears to be a more favourable<br />

arena for multi-brand or multi-category suppliers<br />

to implement cross-brand or cross-category<br />

promoti<strong>on</strong>s. These win favour with retailers through<br />

basket-building but are often difficult/expensive<br />

to achieve instore as space c<strong>on</strong>straints mean that<br />

displaying <strong>the</strong> participating SKUS in close proximity<br />

is often problematic, meaning that shoppers<br />

might have to visit four or five different aisles. By<br />

displaying <strong>the</strong>se promoti<strong>on</strong>s during <strong>the</strong> <strong>on</strong>line<br />

shopping trip or at check-out, shoppers, retailers,<br />

and brands should be able to more readily benefit<br />

from trans-category promoti<strong>on</strong>al programmes.<br />

Breakthrough Insights 13


Online <strong>Retail</strong> in China:<br />

Getting Ahead of <strong>the</strong> Curve<br />

By: Phil Smiley and Justin Cook / Originally published: August 2, <str<strong>on</strong>g>2011</str<strong>on</strong>g><br />

Rapid growth in China’s fledgling modern<br />

retail market will drive companies—both<br />

retailers and manufacturers—to invest<br />

heavily in gaining market share. Online<br />

retailing still represents a fracti<strong>on</strong> of total<br />

retail sales in China. However, <strong>on</strong>line<br />

retailing represents a very large and<br />

fast growing porti<strong>on</strong> of modern retailing<br />

in China. <strong>Kantar</strong> <strong>Retail</strong> predicts that<br />

many executives will learn that investing<br />

heavily in <strong>on</strong>line business platforms will<br />

be a requirement for retailers wishing<br />

to dominate share in China’s rapidly<br />

evolving modern trade. The result will be<br />

a modern trade envir<strong>on</strong>ment <strong>the</strong> likes of<br />

which we’ve never seen before.<br />

When Walmart had just 300 stores in <strong>the</strong> United<br />

States, <strong>the</strong> Internet didn’t exist. Today, Walmart<br />

operates 338 stores in China, a country with more<br />

than 400 milli<strong>on</strong> Internet users and <strong>on</strong>e where <strong>the</strong><br />

<strong>on</strong>line shopping bug is spreading fast.<br />

Online retail is going to play a major role in <strong>the</strong><br />

development of China’s retail market. It will<br />

likely occupy a larger share of transacti<strong>on</strong>s than<br />

14 Breakthrough Insights<br />

in Western markets. Online shopping in China is<br />

already gaining adopti<strong>on</strong> faster than we have seen<br />

in Western markets.<br />

C<strong>on</strong>sequently, <strong>on</strong>line retail will play a disruptive<br />

role in <strong>the</strong> development of modern retailing in<br />

China. Many Chinese cities d<strong>on</strong>’t have a modern<br />

retail store and are unlikely to get <strong>on</strong>e so<strong>on</strong>, but<br />

<strong>the</strong>y do have extensive Internet access. These cities<br />

also have milli<strong>on</strong>s of c<strong>on</strong>sumers with a desire for<br />

c<strong>on</strong>venience and value. Online retail can and will<br />

deliver for <strong>the</strong>se c<strong>on</strong>sumers.


Could it be that offline store networks of <strong>the</strong> size we<br />

see in o<strong>the</strong>r markets, such as <strong>the</strong> US or European<br />

markets, will not materialize in China due to <strong>the</strong><br />

early and fast penetrati<strong>on</strong> of <strong>on</strong>line retail?<br />

Judging by recent events, Walmart China al<strong>on</strong>g with<br />

o<strong>the</strong>r leading local and global retailers may already<br />

be thinking this way. Walmart operates more than<br />

4,300 stores in <strong>the</strong> US and 338 stores in China. But<br />

will Walmart build more than 4,000 stores in China?<br />

It is more likely that Walmart and o<strong>the</strong>r leading<br />

retailers will operate a two-tier strategy. First, <strong>the</strong>y<br />

will develop an <strong>on</strong>line retail network that can reach<br />

all 400 milli<strong>on</strong> modern trade c<strong>on</strong>sumers. <str<strong>on</strong>g>Sec<strong>on</strong>d</str<strong>on</strong>g>,<br />

<strong>the</strong>y will invest in growing and c<strong>on</strong>necting this<br />

network to ‘<strong>on</strong>line-integrated’ brick-and-mortar<br />

stores. They’ll grow both businesses at <strong>the</strong> same<br />

speed. The result is a very different business model<br />

from what is seen in Western markets.<br />

Because <strong>the</strong> business model is different from<br />

models we’ve seen before, it is hard to visualize.<br />

For example, recently, Walmart acquired a stake<br />

of China’s largest “<strong>on</strong>line hypermarket” called<br />

“Yihaodian,” which means “No.1 store.” Yihaodian<br />

is a promising company with a promising <strong>on</strong>line<br />

platform. Yihaodian has grown <strong>on</strong>line sales<br />

from USD 0.64 milli<strong>on</strong> (RMB 4.17 milli<strong>on</strong>) in 2008<br />

to USD 125 milli<strong>on</strong> (RMB 805 milli<strong>on</strong>) in 2010.<br />

They have recently set up an <strong>on</strong>line retail team<br />

in Shanghai to handle <strong>on</strong>line operati<strong>on</strong>s in China.<br />

This move indicates Walmart China’s plans to<br />

focus <strong>on</strong> ecommerce operati<strong>on</strong>s in <strong>the</strong> future. This<br />

ecommerce center joins Walmart’s original center,<br />

located in New York.<br />

O<strong>the</strong>r leading retailers are setting up and expanding<br />

<strong>the</strong>ir <strong>on</strong>line businesses. In additi<strong>on</strong> to Walmart,<br />

Tesco and Carrefour also have announced plans to<br />

expand <strong>the</strong>ir <strong>on</strong>line retail operati<strong>on</strong>s in China.<br />

Taobao, <strong>the</strong> leading <strong>on</strong>line retail site which hosts<br />

B2C and C2C transacti<strong>on</strong>s, has experienced rapid<br />

growth in recent years. Taobao revenues in 2010<br />

were estimated to be USD 60 billi<strong>on</strong>. In fact, if we<br />

classed Taobao as a retailer it would be by far <strong>the</strong><br />

largest retailer in China, dwarfing <strong>the</strong> sales of high<br />

profile retailers such as Walmart, Carrefour, and<br />

Tesco.<br />

China’s Online C<strong>on</strong>sumers<br />

China has a huge base of Internet users, and it<br />

is still growing at an amazing speed. <strong>Retail</strong>ers<br />

in China are finding it easier to reach remote<br />

c<strong>on</strong>sumers via ‘clicks and ship’ retail models<br />

Figure 1: Penetrati<strong>on</strong> of Shopping Online (% HHs) - Pers<strong>on</strong>al<br />

Care<br />

18%<br />

16%<br />

14%<br />

12%<br />

10%<br />

8%<br />

6%<br />

4%<br />

2%<br />

0%<br />

12%<br />

Nati<strong>on</strong>al<br />

Urban<br />

China<br />

16%<br />

4 Key<br />

Cities<br />

10%<br />

11%<br />

13%<br />

8%<br />

A Cities B Cities C Cities D Cities<br />

Source: <strong>Kantar</strong> Worldpanel China: 52 weeks ended<br />

25 March <str<strong>on</strong>g>2011</str<strong>on</strong>g><br />

Breakthrough Insights 15


a<strong>the</strong>r than by building new stores. China’s<br />

Internet-savvy c<strong>on</strong>sumers are willing to accept<br />

new technology and innovati<strong>on</strong> in <strong>the</strong>ir life and<br />

are already accustomed to Internet shopping. In<br />

some categories, such as Baby, it is estimated<br />

that up to 15% of sales are taking place through<br />

<strong>on</strong>line channels. <strong>Kantar</strong> Worldpanel reported that<br />

17% of Nati<strong>on</strong>al Urban Chinese households have<br />

used <strong>the</strong> Internet to purchase grocery products<br />

<strong>on</strong>line with sales growing at 59% year-<strong>on</strong>-year.<br />

Pers<strong>on</strong>al care products are more sought after <strong>on</strong>line<br />

compared with food and household cleaning items<br />

(Figure 1). The proporti<strong>on</strong> of households who shop<br />

<strong>on</strong>line for pers<strong>on</strong>al care items is actually higher in<br />

<strong>the</strong> C cities compared with A cities (13% vs. 10%).<br />

This is because shoppers in <strong>the</strong> lower tier cities<br />

may struggle to find <strong>the</strong> products <strong>the</strong>y want to buy<br />

in traditi<strong>on</strong>al brick and mortar stores, so as an<br />

alternative, seek <strong>the</strong>m out through <strong>on</strong>line stores.<br />

<strong>Kantar</strong> Worldpanel identifies two key motivati<strong>on</strong>s<br />

for purchasing FMCG products <strong>on</strong>line: price and<br />

c<strong>on</strong>venience. The key pers<strong>on</strong>al care categories,<br />

which are more likely to be sought after, are <strong>the</strong><br />

more expensive <strong>on</strong>es, such as cosmetics, facial<br />

skincare, perfume, and hair colorants. Within <strong>the</strong>se<br />

categories, shoppers are opting for more premium<br />

brands, but are actually paying a much lower price<br />

per item. Therefore, shoppers want premium but at<br />

a value price.<br />

C<strong>on</strong>venience also plays a key role, particularly for<br />

categories which are heavy or bulky in <strong>the</strong>ir nature.<br />

For categories such as soft drinks, laundry powder,<br />

and instant coffee, shoppers are purchasing much<br />

16 Breakthrough Insights<br />

bigger pack sizes to take advantage of <strong>the</strong> items<br />

being delivered to <strong>the</strong>ir home. For example, <strong>the</strong><br />

average pack size for soft drinks is 2.3 liters in<br />

traditi<strong>on</strong>al stores but 3.5 liters <strong>on</strong>line.<br />

Making Sense of <strong>the</strong> Online <strong>Retail</strong> Market<br />

The <strong>on</strong>line market can be a c<strong>on</strong>fusing place, littered<br />

with different terminology and jarg<strong>on</strong>. <strong>Kantar</strong> <strong>Retail</strong><br />

analysts break <strong>the</strong> <strong>on</strong>line retail market in China into<br />

four segments, as illustrated in Figure 2.<br />

The first segment is B2C key accounts which would<br />

include internet retailers such as Amaz<strong>on</strong>.cn,<br />

Buy 360, Dang Dang, and <strong>the</strong> <strong>on</strong>line operati<strong>on</strong>s of<br />

retailers such as Tesco, Carrefour, and Walmart. In<br />

this segment products are selected by <strong>the</strong> retailer<br />

who <strong>the</strong>n takes full c<strong>on</strong>trol of assortment, price,<br />

promoti<strong>on</strong>, website design, and <strong>the</strong> user experience.<br />

The sec<strong>on</strong>d segment is what we call <strong>the</strong> <strong>on</strong>line<br />

B2C General Trade. This segment is effectively<br />

<strong>the</strong> small, independent business traders operating<br />

and selling directly to c<strong>on</strong>sumers via <strong>the</strong> Taobao<br />

exchange.<br />

Figure 2: Online <strong>Retail</strong> Market Segmentati<strong>on</strong><br />

B2C<br />

Key Acc<br />

Amaz<strong>on</strong>.cn<br />

Buy 360<br />

Dang Dang<br />

Tesco.com<br />

Carrefour.com<br />

ONLINE RETAIL<br />

B2C<br />

GT<br />

B2C FLAGSHIP C2C<br />

Taobao<br />

Small<br />

Business<br />

Trader<br />

Eg L’Oreal<br />

Flagship Store,<br />

Wyeth Flagship<br />

Store<br />

Taobao<br />

Exchange<br />

Source: <strong>Kantar</strong> <strong>Retail</strong> Analysis


The third segment is B2C Flagship. These are<br />

<strong>on</strong>line stores that are generally operated by<br />

manufacturers and hosted <strong>on</strong> Taobao Mall. In<br />

this case, manufacturers are selling <strong>the</strong>ir brands<br />

directly to <strong>the</strong> c<strong>on</strong>sumer via proprietary <strong>on</strong>line<br />

stores. As such, Taobao is effectively operating<br />

as an <strong>on</strong>line broker between manufacturers and<br />

c<strong>on</strong>sumers.<br />

The fourth segment is <strong>on</strong>line retail from C<strong>on</strong>sumer<br />

to C<strong>on</strong>sumer. This is most prevalent through <strong>the</strong><br />

Taobao exchange where c<strong>on</strong>sumers sell goods and<br />

services to each o<strong>the</strong>r, much in <strong>the</strong> same way that<br />

eBay operates in o<strong>the</strong>r markets.<br />

How Will China’s Online Channel Evolve?<br />

There is no doubt that Taobao leads <strong>the</strong> game<br />

at <strong>the</strong> moment, yet B2C <strong>on</strong>line retailers such as<br />

Amaz<strong>on</strong> and Dang Dang and <strong>the</strong> <strong>on</strong>line operati<strong>on</strong>s<br />

of retailers such as Tesco, Carrefour, and Walmart<br />

are making str<strong>on</strong>g progress in <strong>the</strong> market. <strong>Kantar</strong><br />

<strong>Retail</strong> forecasts that while Taobao will retain its<br />

dominant positi<strong>on</strong>, <strong>on</strong>line retailers such as Amaz<strong>on</strong><br />

and <strong>the</strong> major hypermarket retailers will grow<br />

faster in coming years and wrestle business away<br />

from Taobao.<br />

Taobao, China’s largest <strong>on</strong>line retailer, has already<br />

recognized <strong>the</strong> threat from growing B2C Online<br />

retailers such as Amaz<strong>on</strong> and Dang Dang and has<br />

taken steps to restructure its business model.<br />

Taobao has recently split into three separate<br />

companies to better address its target markets,<br />

according to parent company Alibaba Group. The<br />

restructuring creates Taobao Marketplace, a<br />

C<strong>on</strong>sumer-to-C<strong>on</strong>sumer platform designed for<br />

c<strong>on</strong>sumers and small businesses; Taobao Mall,<br />

a business-to-c<strong>on</strong>sumer marketplace; and eTao,<br />

which will target <strong>the</strong> shopping search market. All<br />

three companies will c<strong>on</strong>tinue under <strong>the</strong> Alibaba<br />

Group.<br />

In an e-mail to Alibaba employees, company CEO<br />

Jack Ma said <strong>the</strong> company is making <strong>the</strong> move<br />

as e-commerce has faced “disruptive changes,”<br />

pointing to social trends and <strong>the</strong> entrance of new<br />

companies in <strong>the</strong> market. He stated that “significant<br />

change has taken place in customer demand … we<br />

need to offer c<strong>on</strong>sumers more sophisticated and<br />

customized services.”<br />

Online Can Change <strong>the</strong> Rules of <strong>the</strong> Game<br />

Traditi<strong>on</strong>al marketing models d<strong>on</strong>’t necessarily<br />

apply in <strong>on</strong>line retail. An example of this is <strong>the</strong><br />

diapers category in China, where Procter & Gamble<br />

dominates <strong>the</strong> offline market with its Pampers<br />

brand. P&G has gained its positi<strong>on</strong> through heavy<br />

marketing expenditure al<strong>on</strong>gside str<strong>on</strong>g in-store<br />

presence and promoti<strong>on</strong>. Yet for certain <strong>on</strong>line<br />

retailers, <strong>the</strong> Mamy Poko brand challenges <strong>the</strong><br />

dominance of Pampers. This is due to two reas<strong>on</strong>s.<br />

First, Mamy Poko’s lower price point appeals to<br />

value-seeking <strong>on</strong>line shoppers. <str<strong>on</strong>g>Sec<strong>on</strong>d</str<strong>on</strong>g>, Mamy<br />

Poko receives <strong>on</strong>line c<strong>on</strong>sumer reviews and ratings<br />

that are equal to or better than Pampers’ ratings<br />

(Figure 3). C<strong>on</strong>sumer recommendati<strong>on</strong>s go a l<strong>on</strong>g<br />

way to helping sell <strong>the</strong> brand.<br />

Breakthrough Insights 17


18 Breakthrough Insights<br />

Figure 3: Diaper Wars <strong>on</strong> Amaz<strong>on</strong><br />

What Are <strong>the</strong> Prospects for Online <strong>Retail</strong> in<br />

China?<br />

Online retail is set to c<strong>on</strong>tinue its exp<strong>on</strong>ential<br />

growth in China with little in <strong>the</strong> way to stop it.<br />

The potential introducti<strong>on</strong> of taxes and <strong>the</strong> lack<br />

of infrastructure in some parts of <strong>the</strong> country<br />

may inhibit <strong>the</strong> speed of growth. However, <strong>the</strong>se<br />

potential changes pale in comparis<strong>on</strong> to some<br />

factors driving growth such as:<br />

High Internet usage and rapidly expanding<br />

broadband network<br />

High mobile ph<strong>on</strong>e penetrati<strong>on</strong>—it is estimated<br />

that 300 milli<strong>on</strong> c<strong>on</strong>sumers go <strong>on</strong>line via <strong>the</strong>ir<br />

ph<strong>on</strong>es in China<br />

Source: Amaz<strong>on</strong>.com<br />

Growing c<strong>on</strong>sumer desire for c<strong>on</strong>venience and<br />

value<br />

Poor access to offline retail stores in rural<br />

areas<br />

Rapidly improving nati<strong>on</strong>al infrastructure<br />

Improving <strong>on</strong>line payment systems<br />

These factors will ensure that <strong>on</strong>line retail will<br />

enjoy a str<strong>on</strong>g and enduring growth trajectory.<br />

Supplier Implicati<strong>on</strong>s<br />

All suppliers need to form a point of view <strong>on</strong> how<br />

<strong>the</strong>ir category fits with China’s <strong>on</strong>line retail market.<br />

This will help frame up <strong>the</strong> potential opportunity of


doing business <strong>on</strong>line. This can be d<strong>on</strong>e in three<br />

steps.<br />

First, suppliers need to c<strong>on</strong>sider which products<br />

are best suited to <strong>the</strong> servicing <strong>the</strong> needs of <strong>on</strong>line<br />

shoppers. Within pers<strong>on</strong>al care, for example,<br />

shoppers are seeking more premium products<br />

at a value price. Also, shoppers will look to take<br />

advantage of <strong>the</strong> c<strong>on</strong>venience of delivery and<br />

purchase larger pack size which is particularly<br />

important for drink and baby categories.<br />

<str<strong>on</strong>g>Sec<strong>on</strong>d</str<strong>on</strong>g>, suppliers need a plan to develop <strong>the</strong>ir<br />

business in this fast-growing and unfamiliar<br />

channel. Without <strong>on</strong>e, <strong>the</strong>y risk getting left behind<br />

or missing <strong>the</strong> opportunity to c<strong>on</strong>vert offline brand<br />

share to <strong>on</strong>line brand share. Developing a plan<br />

means figuring out “where to play” and “how to win”<br />

in <strong>the</strong> <strong>on</strong>line retail market.<br />

Third, companies need to learn before moving<br />

ahead in <strong>on</strong>line brand promoti<strong>on</strong>. In many ways<br />

<strong>on</strong>line brand promoti<strong>on</strong> is unchartered territory.<br />

Most suppliers have mastered <strong>the</strong> art of brand<br />

promoti<strong>on</strong> via key customers using <strong>the</strong> annual joint<br />

business planning process. However, most <strong>on</strong>line<br />

retailers do not even c<strong>on</strong>duct annual planning.<br />

<strong>Kantar</strong> <strong>Retail</strong> Point of View<br />

A Checklist for Suppliers<br />

Prepare a strategy for <strong>on</strong>line retail<br />

Identify which sectors of <strong>on</strong>line retail you want to focus <strong>on</strong><br />

Get to know <strong>the</strong> B2C retailers early<br />

The business is much more sp<strong>on</strong>taneous and fast<br />

moving. As a result, no manufacturer has built an<br />

instituti<strong>on</strong>al understanding of how to drive business<br />

with <strong>on</strong>line retailers. Manufacturers struggle to<br />

build visibility and meet <strong>the</strong> dissimilar needs of<br />

<strong>on</strong>line retailers.<br />

This third activity is critical. Online retailers<br />

operate differently from offline retailers and have<br />

different requirements from suppliers. A good pack<br />

shot and product descripti<strong>on</strong> can be <strong>the</strong> difference<br />

between success and failure. Yet many suppliers<br />

fail to provide adequate support to <strong>on</strong>line retailers.<br />

By <strong>the</strong> same token, some <strong>on</strong>line retailers, such<br />

as Amaz<strong>on</strong>, offer a nati<strong>on</strong>al distributi<strong>on</strong> service<br />

to <strong>the</strong> c<strong>on</strong>sumer (i.e., if <strong>the</strong> product <strong>the</strong>y order in<br />

Shanghai from <strong>the</strong> Shanghai fulfillment center is<br />

not available, Amaz<strong>on</strong> will ship to <strong>the</strong> c<strong>on</strong>sumer<br />

from ano<strong>the</strong>r city such as Beijing). In this case, <strong>the</strong><br />

product may be handled many times in <strong>the</strong> supply<br />

chain and without special packaging to protect it <strong>the</strong><br />

chances of it arriving at <strong>the</strong> c<strong>on</strong>sumer damaged are<br />

greatly increased.<br />

Prepare a learning plan for <strong>on</strong>line retail—understand what drives sales in <strong>on</strong>line retail, understand<br />

shopper needs and drivers<br />

Figure out how to drive demand for your brands in an <strong>on</strong>line retail envir<strong>on</strong>ment<br />

Breakthrough Insights 19


Adding Clarity or Clutter? A First Look<br />

at Walgreens and CVS’s New Private<br />

Brands, “Nice!” and “Nuance”<br />

By: Brendan Langan / C<strong>on</strong>versati<strong>on</strong> originally published: August 2, <str<strong>on</strong>g>2011</str<strong>on</strong>g><br />

C<strong>on</strong>versati<strong>on</strong>s<br />

Walgreens and CVS have stepped up <strong>the</strong> pace of private brand development over <strong>the</strong> past few m<strong>on</strong>ths, cutting-in hundreds of<br />

new items across <strong>the</strong> store. Recent additi<strong>on</strong>s to <strong>the</strong> shelf have included new ec<strong>on</strong>omy brands (Nice! and Just <strong>the</strong> Basics) as well<br />

as more fully developed proprietary brands (Good & DeLish and Nuance Salma Hayek). For now, it remains to be seen whe<strong>the</strong>r<br />

<strong>the</strong>se brands will add useful choice and clarity to <strong>the</strong> merchandising ladder, or merely add to <strong>the</strong> clutter <strong>on</strong> <strong>the</strong> shelf. Ei<strong>the</strong>r way,<br />

nei<strong>the</strong>r Walgreens nor CVS intend to take <strong>the</strong>ir foot off <strong>the</strong> accelerator anytime so<strong>on</strong>, with aggressive plans to increase private<br />

brand share of sales and shelf space.<br />

Figure 1. Chain Drug Private Label Comparis<strong>on</strong><br />

20 Breakthrough Insights<br />

Walgreens Duane Reade CVS Rite Aid<br />

Fr<strong>on</strong>t Store Sales (billi<strong>on</strong>s) $21,995.6 $979.4 $18,350.4 $8.1<br />

Nati<strong>on</strong>al Brand Sales (billi<strong>on</strong>s) $17,486.5 $866.8 $15,230.8 $6.8<br />

Private Brand Sales (billi<strong>on</strong>s) $4,509.1 $112.6 $3,119.6 $1.3<br />

Private Brand % Fr<strong>on</strong>t Store Sales 20.5% 11.5% 17.0% 16.0%<br />

Est. Private Brand SKUs N/A 2,000 5,100 3,300<br />

Priate Brand % Fr<strong>on</strong>t Store SKUs N/A N/A 26.2% 13.2%<br />

CAGR 2005–2010 CAGR 2005–2009 CAGR 2005–2010 CAGR 2005–2010<br />

Fr<strong>on</strong>t Store Sales 8.2% 4.4% 12.6% 5.0%<br />

Nati<strong>on</strong>al Brand Sales 7.3% 3.3% 11.5% 4.0%<br />

Private Brand Sales 12.4% 14.7% 18.8% 11.6%<br />

Primary Private Brands<br />

Walgreens, W, Good & Delish, Pet<br />

Shoppe, Café W, Deerfield Farms,<br />

Big Roll, Casual Gear, Penway,<br />

Pure American, Big Flatts 1901,<br />

Men’s Z<strong>on</strong>e, Xcel, Details, Bioinfusi<strong>on</strong>,<br />

Studio 35<br />

Duane Reade, DR, DR Delish,<br />

Good & Delish, Apt. 5, Apt. 5 Goes<br />

Green, Pet Shoppe, Prevail<br />

CVS, Gold Emblem, Just <strong>the</strong><br />

Basics, Essence of Beauty, BIG<br />

CHILL, Nuance Salma Hayek,<br />

Absolutely Divinie, Blade, Fuel,<br />

Earth Essentials, Pet Central,<br />

Caliber, 24.7, skineffects, Christophe,<br />

Ellin Lavar, Fruitopia,<br />

Bioluxe<br />

Rite Aid, Simplify, Pantry, HOME,<br />

Renewal, tugaboos, Pure Spring,<br />

PharmaAssure, Thrify, Rx Suncare<br />

Source: <strong>Kantar</strong> <strong>Retail</strong> research and analysis, company reports


Increased <str<strong>on</strong>g>Focus</str<strong>on</strong>g> <strong>on</strong> <strong>the</strong> Bottom of <strong>the</strong> Ladder<br />

Recent efforts to establish a more c<strong>on</strong>sistent opening price point (OPP) value propositi<strong>on</strong> have been apparent<br />

across <strong>the</strong> Big 3 drugstores, beginning with <strong>the</strong> introducti<strong>on</strong> of Rite Aid’s new private brand architecture in 2010,<br />

featuring its new price fighter brand, Simplify. In February <str<strong>on</strong>g>2011</str<strong>on</strong>g>, CVS rolled out approximately 100 new items<br />

under <strong>the</strong> Just <strong>the</strong> Basics name, spanning various categories and departments across <strong>the</strong> store. The range was<br />

positi<strong>on</strong>ed as a functi<strong>on</strong>al, value-priced, opening price point offering, with a “smart simplicity” appeal, priced at<br />

a discount between 40% to 70% vs. <strong>the</strong> nati<strong>on</strong>al brand.<br />

In early August, Walgreens threw its hat into <strong>the</strong> OPP ring, cutting-in a dozen items under <strong>the</strong> Nice! brand in dry<br />

grocery as part of a broader department reset. The new brand replaced tertiary brands and select Deerfield<br />

Farms items. Packaging has been revamped, featuring a stripped-down and cleaner look and feel. In-store<br />

signage and packaging have been designed to positi<strong>on</strong> <strong>the</strong> brand as “smart. quality. everyday.”<br />

Figure 2. Walgreens Introduces Nice! Dry Grocery Brand<br />

Source: <strong>Kantar</strong> <strong>Retail</strong> store visit<br />

Breakthrough Insights 21


Walking Walgreens, Nice! Executi<strong>on</strong> Inc<strong>on</strong>sistent<br />

Although still early, executi<strong>on</strong> has been inc<strong>on</strong>sistent and <strong>the</strong> shelf crowded with Nice! positi<strong>on</strong>ed al<strong>on</strong>gside<br />

o<strong>the</strong>r private brands (W, Café W, Deerfield Farms, Good & Delish, etc.). It may stand out <strong>on</strong> <strong>the</strong> shelf, but its<br />

value propositi<strong>on</strong> is not immediately clear. Fur<strong>the</strong>r, operati<strong>on</strong>al executi<strong>on</strong> and presentati<strong>on</strong> at <strong>the</strong> half dozen<br />

locati<strong>on</strong>s visited were all over <strong>the</strong> place. While this is not that uncomm<strong>on</strong> in <strong>the</strong> early weeks of a launch, <strong>the</strong>se<br />

issues were compounded by this week’s circular that featured a coup<strong>on</strong> for Nice! Macar<strong>on</strong>i & Cheese for 49¢<br />

(with a 3 piece limit) versus <strong>the</strong> $1.29 shelf<br />

price (a 62% discount). With <strong>on</strong>e facing and a<br />

very deep discount, it was not surprising to<br />

see numerous out of stocks <strong>on</strong> <strong>the</strong> first day of<br />

<strong>the</strong> ad. Addti<strong>on</strong>ally, <strong>the</strong> store visited indicated<br />

<strong>the</strong>y would not receive a shipment until Friday,<br />

resulting in a poor first impressi<strong>on</strong> and lost<br />

sales. Several o<strong>the</strong>r stores did not yet have<br />

<strong>the</strong> item in stock and were instead offering a<br />

branded equivalent. When asked about <strong>the</strong> new<br />

brand, most store associates had not heard of it<br />

(despite <strong>the</strong> radio loop) or were not aware that it<br />

was a Walgreens item.<br />

Outside of spotty in-store signage, radio, and<br />

<strong>the</strong> <strong>on</strong>e coup<strong>on</strong> in this week’s ad, Walgreens has<br />

yet to invest in marketing or <strong>on</strong>line resources to<br />

build awareness, which leaves customers and<br />

associates ill-informed. For now, it remains to<br />

be seen whe<strong>the</strong>r Walgreens is adding clarity or<br />

clutter, but in <strong>the</strong> interim, it looks like <strong>the</strong> latter.<br />

That being said, I do not feel this will be <strong>the</strong> case<br />

for l<strong>on</strong>g as <strong>the</strong>y leverage learnings from Duane<br />

Reade and work to significantly rati<strong>on</strong>alize<br />

<strong>the</strong>ir portfolio of private labels while building<br />

standal<strong>on</strong>e brands and accelerating private<br />

label sales growth.<br />

22 Breakthrough Insights<br />

Figure 3. Walgreens Introduces Nice! Dry Grocery Brand, Early<br />

Executi<strong>on</strong> Mixed<br />

Source: <strong>Kantar</strong> <strong>Retail</strong> store visit


CVS Introduces Holistic Beauty<br />

Soluti<strong>on</strong>: Nuance Selma Hayek<br />

On <strong>the</strong> o<strong>the</strong>r end of <strong>the</strong> c<strong>on</strong>tinuum,<br />

CVS has introduced a holistic beauty<br />

soluti<strong>on</strong> and integrated campaign with<br />

<strong>the</strong> launch of its Nuance Salma Hayek<br />

product range.<br />

CVS has invited its shoppers and<br />

beauty bloggers to “Discover Nuance<br />

Salma Hayek,” a unique collecti<strong>on</strong><br />

of products designed for women<br />

who seek high-quality, efficacious<br />

beauty products customized to<br />

address <strong>the</strong>ir pers<strong>on</strong>al needs. The<br />

line includes approximately 100 items<br />

spanning skincare, body care, hair<br />

care, and cosmetics, and features<br />

reas<strong>on</strong>able pricing ranging from $7.99<br />

to $19.99. This line is <strong>on</strong>e of <strong>the</strong> most<br />

comprehensive for CVS to date, and<br />

has been in development for <strong>the</strong> past<br />

three years. The launch has been<br />

supported with a comprehensive<br />

campaign leveraging <strong>on</strong>line, social<br />

media, beauty advocates, in-store<br />

signage, and sampling.<br />

C<strong>on</strong>versati<strong>on</strong>s Is Your Pers<strong>on</strong>al<br />

C<strong>on</strong>necti<strong>on</strong> to <strong>Kantar</strong> <strong>Retail</strong>’s<br />

Experts ... Online<br />

To join <strong>the</strong> C<strong>on</strong>versati<strong>on</strong>, visit<br />

<strong>Kantar</strong> <strong>Retail</strong> iQ and click <strong>on</strong> <strong>the</strong><br />

“C<strong>on</strong>versati<strong>on</strong>s” tab. All <strong>Kantar</strong><br />

<strong>Retail</strong> iQ members have full access to<br />

C<strong>on</strong>versati<strong>on</strong>s.<br />

Figure 4. Introducing Nuance Salma Hayek<br />

Figure 5. CVS Begins Cutting-In Nuance<br />

Source: cvs.com<br />

Source: <strong>Kantar</strong> <strong>Retail</strong> store visits<br />

Breakthrough Insights 23


What Target’s Suppliers Need to<br />

Know about Walmart Canada: The<br />

Overview<br />

By: Robin Sherk / Originally published: September 19, <str<strong>on</strong>g>2011</str<strong>on</strong>g><br />

Although Walmart Canada may be familiar to Target teams, Walmart’s Canadian operati<strong>on</strong>s are distinct from its<br />

U.S. counterpart. Overall, Walmart Canada will be a formidable competitor to Target across grocery, c<strong>on</strong>sumables,<br />

and general merchandise. It has a wide reach in <strong>the</strong> market in terms of stores and audience penetrati<strong>on</strong>, and its<br />

footprint is expanding as a <strong>on</strong>e-stop grocery shop. Moreover, Walmart Canada is investing in insights and leveraging<br />

Wal-Mart Stores, Inc.’s best practices, particularly from <strong>the</strong> U.K. and <strong>the</strong> U.S. Although Walmart Canada presents<br />

challenges for Target, its positi<strong>on</strong>ing also allows Target opportunity to gain tracti<strong>on</strong> in <strong>the</strong> market.<br />

24 24 Breakthrough Breakthrough Insights Insights


Store Locati<strong>on</strong>s and Formats<br />

Walmart entered Canada in<br />

1994 with <strong>the</strong> acquisiti<strong>on</strong> of<br />

122 Woolco locati<strong>on</strong>s from<br />

Woolworth Canada. The<br />

chain comprised <strong>on</strong>ly discount<br />

stores until 2006, when<br />

Walmart Canada began adding<br />

Supercentres. By mid <str<strong>on</strong>g>2011</str<strong>on</strong>g>, <strong>the</strong><br />

retailer had stores (190 discount<br />

stores and 135 Supercentres)<br />

in every province and territory<br />

except <strong>the</strong> far nor<strong>the</strong>rn<br />

territory of Nunavut. Figure 1<br />

illustrates that its overall store<br />

presence is c<strong>on</strong>centrated in<br />

Ontario, though <strong>the</strong>re also is a<br />

significant presence in Quebec,<br />

Alberta, and British Columbia.<br />

Its Supercentres are primarily<br />

in Ontario, Alberta, British<br />

Columbia, and Saskatchewan,<br />

with recent introducti<strong>on</strong>s<br />

in Manitoba and Quebec<br />

as well. Unlike in <strong>the</strong> U.S.,<br />

Walmart does not operate any<br />

supermarket or c<strong>on</strong>venience<br />

formats in Canada.<br />

In terms of format expansi<strong>on</strong>,<br />

Walmart Canada is focused<br />

<strong>on</strong> <strong>the</strong> Supercentre. The<br />

retailer c<strong>on</strong>tinues to c<strong>on</strong>vert<br />

its discount stores into<br />

Supercentres, as Walmart<br />

Canada’s Chief Executive, David<br />

Cheesewright asserted in June<br />

<str<strong>on</strong>g>2011</str<strong>on</strong>g>, “o<strong>the</strong>r than a handful<br />

we think every store can be<br />

c<strong>on</strong>verted to Supercentre.”<br />

As a result, over <strong>the</strong> last five<br />

years, though Walmart Canada<br />

added 36 net new stores in total,<br />

it added over 135 Supercentres<br />

due to c<strong>on</strong>versi<strong>on</strong>s. In short,<br />

Walmart Canada is leveraging its<br />

store base to better serve <strong>on</strong>estop,<br />

stock-up shopping trips.<br />

Figure 1: Walmart Canada’s Store Presence<br />

Walmart Canada’s stores are<br />

smaller than in <strong>the</strong> U.S. In<br />

2010, <strong>the</strong>y averaged 129,000<br />

square feet, with a range of<br />

70,000 to 200,000 square feet.<br />

Comparatively, Walmart US<br />

discount and Supercentres<br />

average 169,000 square feet.<br />

Its Canadian stores accordingly<br />

tend to carry fewer items,<br />

averaging 100,000 SKUs, with<br />

a range from 65,000 to 120,000<br />

SKUs.<br />

325 Stores:<br />

• 190 Discounts<br />

• 135 Supercentres<br />

Note: Walmart has stores in Yuk<strong>on</strong> and <strong>the</strong> Northwest Territories, but it does<br />

not have enough locati<strong>on</strong>s to reach 1% of <strong>the</strong> store base.<br />

Source: Walmart.ca, June <str<strong>on</strong>g>2011</str<strong>on</strong>g>, Company reports<br />

Breakthrough Insights 25


In Canada, Walmart operates<br />

Supercentres across <strong>the</strong><br />

spectrum of urban, suburban,<br />

and rural areas. Though <strong>the</strong><br />

majority of Walmart Canada’s<br />

stores are in areas analogous<br />

to <strong>the</strong> U.S., such as in shopping<br />

plazas and <strong>on</strong> <strong>the</strong> outskirts of<br />

smaller towns, it has an urban<br />

presence across a number<br />

of cities, including Tor<strong>on</strong>to,<br />

Vancouver, Calgary, Winnipeg,<br />

Halifax, Ottawa, and Quebec<br />

City. Walmart, <strong>the</strong>refore, has<br />

a proven ability to serve urban<br />

customers in Canada, a key<br />

difference compared with its<br />

U.S. counterpart.<br />

Store Services<br />

As in <strong>the</strong> U.S., additi<strong>on</strong>al store<br />

services offered by Walmart<br />

Canada include <strong>the</strong> Pharmacy,<br />

PhotoCentre, and McD<strong>on</strong>ald’s.<br />

Many of <strong>the</strong> retailer’s stores<br />

also offer a Portrait Studio,<br />

Tire & Lube Express service<br />

for cars, and Visi<strong>on</strong> Centre.<br />

Services targeted to local needs<br />

and tastes also are prominent,<br />

including hair sal<strong>on</strong>s, wine<br />

shops, Tim Hort<strong>on</strong>’s coffee and<br />

doughnuts, travel services, and<br />

dry cleaners. Figure 2 outlines<br />

26 Breakthrough Insights<br />

Walmart’s services and <strong>the</strong><br />

proporti<strong>on</strong> of stores with each<br />

offering.<br />

A key difference between<br />

Walmart’s U.S. and Canadian<br />

stores is <strong>the</strong> latter’s bank.<br />

Launched last year, it currently<br />

offers <strong>on</strong>ly a credit card that is<br />

mainly promoted in stores; 90%<br />

of new applicati<strong>on</strong>s are taken<br />

through its cashiers. This year,<br />

Walmart Canada is looking to<br />

expand its offering to o<strong>the</strong>r<br />

products such as insurance, but<br />

its first priority is to develop <strong>the</strong><br />

credit card’s penetrati<strong>on</strong> am<strong>on</strong>g<br />

shoppers. The retailer also<br />

offers gift cards and m<strong>on</strong>ey<br />

transfer services.<br />

Walmart US’s efforts to start a<br />

bank have l<strong>on</strong>g been thwarted<br />

by regulatory authorities,<br />

leading it to expand its<br />

M<strong>on</strong>eyCenter services. As<br />

Walmart Canada’s credit card<br />

expands, it also gives <strong>the</strong><br />

retailer a tool to offer shoppers<br />

rewards for <strong>the</strong>ir loyalty.<br />

Currently, Walmart Canada’s<br />

credit card gives Walmart<br />

Rewards that amount to 1.25%<br />

for every purchase at its stores<br />

and 1% wherever else <strong>the</strong> card<br />

is used. As more shoppers<br />

adopt <strong>the</strong> card, <strong>the</strong> retailer<br />

may also gain insights into its<br />

shoppers’ spending behaviors.<br />

Overall, Walmart Canada has<br />

an added tool to c<strong>on</strong>tend with<br />

Target’s practices should Target<br />

bring a 5% REDcard Rewards<br />

program to Canada.<br />

Figure 2: Online <strong>Retail</strong> Market<br />

Segmentati<strong>on</strong><br />

Service<br />

# of<br />

Stores<br />

% of<br />

Walmart<br />

Canada<br />

Stores<br />

Pharmacy 321 99%<br />

PhotoCentre 314 97%<br />

McD<strong>on</strong>alds 305 94%<br />

Portrait Studio 228 71%<br />

Tire & Lube Express<br />

Centre<br />

217 67%<br />

Visi<strong>on</strong> Centre 201 62%<br />

C<strong>on</strong>necti<strong>on</strong> Centre 133 41%<br />

SmartStyle Hair Sal<strong>on</strong> 66 20%<br />

Magic Cuts 55 17%<br />

Lotto (Good to Go!) 35 11%<br />

Marlin Travel 27 8%<br />

Hear at Last 26 8%<br />

Regal nails 24 7%<br />

Medical Clinic 19 6%<br />

Tim Hort<strong>on</strong>s 16 5%<br />

Wine Rack 12 4%<br />

Fun Factory 10 3%<br />

Cadet Cleaners 8 2%<br />

Sussex Insurance 3 1%<br />

Dental Office 2 1%<br />

Bubble Tea 1 0%<br />

Source: Walmart.co, June <str<strong>on</strong>g>2011</str<strong>on</strong>g>


Of <strong>the</strong> differences in services<br />

between Canada and <strong>the</strong> U.S.,<br />

<strong>the</strong> most striking is <strong>the</strong> lack<br />

of a website-to-store pick-up<br />

opti<strong>on</strong> in Canada. In <strong>the</strong> U.S.,<br />

this service, called “Site to<br />

Store,” accounts for 60% of<br />

Walmart.com’s orders. Online<br />

ordering through Walmart.ca<br />

<strong>on</strong>ly began in mid <str<strong>on</strong>g>2011</str<strong>on</strong>g>, and <strong>the</strong><br />

retailer’s website currently offers<br />

a limited selecti<strong>on</strong> of general<br />

merchandise for home delivery<br />

<strong>on</strong>ly. Accordingly, <strong>the</strong> multichannel<br />

experiences advancing<br />

at Walmart US are not (yet)<br />

reflected in <strong>the</strong> Canadian market.<br />

Figure 3: Collage of Walmart’s Fresh, Prepared Food Opti<strong>on</strong>s<br />

Assortment and Private<br />

Labels<br />

Last year, just under half of<br />

Walmart Canada’s sales were in<br />

Grocery and Health & Wellness<br />

(including Baby) categories.<br />

While this is a smaller<br />

proporti<strong>on</strong> than in <strong>the</strong> U.S.,<br />

c<strong>on</strong>sumables’ share of sales<br />

will rise due to Supercentres’<br />

c<strong>on</strong>tinued expansi<strong>on</strong> in Canada.<br />

Walmart Canada’s general<br />

merchandise assortment,<br />

which is analogous to <strong>the</strong> U.S.<br />

in covering apparel, home,<br />

entertainment, and hardlines,<br />

will accordingly comprise a<br />

smaller proporti<strong>on</strong> of Walmart<br />

Canada’s sales over time.<br />

Though Target is increasing<br />

its focus <strong>on</strong> c<strong>on</strong>sumables<br />

(currently at 41% of sales in <strong>the</strong><br />

U.S.), its emphasis remains <strong>on</strong><br />

discreti<strong>on</strong>ary items. Its focus<br />

<strong>on</strong> c<strong>on</strong>sumables in Canada<br />

remains unclear at this time,<br />

but Walmart’s proporti<strong>on</strong><br />

will likely allow it a point of<br />

differentiati<strong>on</strong> compared to<br />

Target’s customary discount<br />

store offerings (even if PFresh<br />

is introduced in Canada).<br />

While maintaining a “house<br />

of brands” propositi<strong>on</strong>,<br />

Walmart Canada leverages<br />

best practices in private<br />

label from both its U.S. and<br />

U.K. operati<strong>on</strong>s. In grocery<br />

and c<strong>on</strong>sumables, Canadian<br />

shoppers can purchase<br />

Walmart US’ biggest private<br />

Source: <strong>Kantar</strong> <strong>Retail</strong> Store Visits<br />

Breakthrough Insights 27


lines, including Great Value,<br />

Equate, Ol’ Roy, and Parent’s<br />

Choice. Walmart Canada’s<br />

private grocery lines generally<br />

maintain opening price point<br />

(OPP) propositi<strong>on</strong>s. It does not<br />

have <strong>the</strong> Marketside, Prima<br />

Della, or World Table offerings<br />

that are available in <strong>the</strong> U.S.<br />

However, <strong>the</strong> retailer does<br />

carry select grocery items from<br />

ASDA’s Extra Special line, and it<br />

is adding a more premium, “Our<br />

Finest” line in frozen (shown in<br />

Figure 3, left-hand side), fresh<br />

prepared foods, and n<strong>on</strong>-edible<br />

grocery. In fresh, prepared<br />

meal opti<strong>on</strong>s, Walmart Canada<br />

also takes a lead from ASDA,<br />

offering opti<strong>on</strong>s appealing to<br />

Canadian tastes (Figure 3,<br />

middle and right photos).<br />

Looking at o<strong>the</strong>r key categories,<br />

its apparel positi<strong>on</strong>ing is<br />

anchored by an expansive<br />

George brand. Launched<br />

as a m<strong>on</strong>obrand in <strong>the</strong> fall<br />

of 2010, it now covers junior<br />

fashi<strong>on</strong>s, mainstream, and<br />

more traditi<strong>on</strong>al clothing<br />

offerings for men, women, and<br />

children. Walmart Canada<br />

works closely with Walmart<br />

US for sourcing and ASDA<br />

28 Breakthrough Insights<br />

for its styles. In June <str<strong>on</strong>g>2011</str<strong>on</strong>g>,<br />

Cheesewright explained that in<br />

preparati<strong>on</strong> for Target’s entry<br />

into Canada <strong>the</strong>y have “stepchanged<br />

<strong>the</strong> fashi<strong>on</strong>ability of<br />

our core ladies [apparel]” as<br />

<strong>the</strong>y “want to be ready for when<br />

Target arrives.” Supported with<br />

mass media advertisements<br />

and a noticeable placement<br />

<strong>on</strong> Walmart.ca’s landing page,<br />

its awareness with shoppers<br />

is rising. Walmart Canada<br />

reports that recogniti<strong>on</strong> of its<br />

George brand is now over 60%<br />

of Canadian c<strong>on</strong>sumers.<br />

The private label Home<br />

category offering also<br />

establishes a unique positi<strong>on</strong>.<br />

Similar to <strong>the</strong> U.S., its range<br />

includes Mainstays, Better<br />

Homes and Gardens, and <strong>the</strong><br />

more stylish Home Trends line.<br />

However, instead of featuring<br />

Canopy, Walmart Canada<br />

emphasizes George brand<br />

home items, ranging from desk<br />

lamps to kitchen mitts. In this<br />

way, <strong>the</strong> home department<br />

leverages <strong>the</strong> equity of its lead<br />

apparel brand while refining its<br />

assortment to match <strong>the</strong> styles<br />

of its audience.<br />

Audience Reach and Shopper<br />

Analytics<br />

In June <str<strong>on</strong>g>2011</str<strong>on</strong>g>, Cheesewright<br />

explained that about 80% of<br />

Canadians shopped its stores<br />

last year. He added that<br />

every<strong>on</strong>e shops at Walmart<br />

Canada, stating, “It’s a bit<br />

of a myth that we <strong>on</strong>ly have<br />

low affluent [lower income]<br />

customers.” Brandz’s 2010<br />

Brand Equity Study adds detail<br />

about <strong>the</strong> Supercentre shopper,<br />

explaining that 65% of primary<br />

household grocery shoppers<br />

report having shopped at a<br />

Walmart Supercentre. Though<br />

below Walmart US’s levels,<br />

Walmart Canada n<strong>on</strong>e<strong>the</strong>less<br />

has wide shopper penetrati<strong>on</strong>.<br />

Regarding target audiences,<br />

Walmart Canada segments its<br />

shoppers similarly to <strong>the</strong> U.S.<br />

In <str<strong>on</strong>g>2011</str<strong>on</strong>g>, <strong>the</strong> retailer reports that<br />

57% of Canadian c<strong>on</strong>sumers<br />

fall into <strong>on</strong>e of its three target<br />

clusters; in <strong>the</strong> U.S. this<br />

proporti<strong>on</strong> is comparable at<br />

59% (Figure 4). Examining<br />

<strong>the</strong>se segments fur<strong>the</strong>r though,<br />

Walmart Canada has more<br />

“Price Sensitive Affluents”<br />

(higher income shoppers that<br />

like receiving deals) and fewer


“Price Value Shoppers” (lower<br />

income shoppers that need <strong>the</strong><br />

deal) relative to <strong>the</strong> U.S. This<br />

difference likely reflects <strong>the</strong><br />

two countries’ varied ec<strong>on</strong>omic<br />

c<strong>on</strong>diti<strong>on</strong>s, as Canada never<br />

experienced <strong>the</strong> severity of<br />

<strong>the</strong> U.S. housing crisis, and<br />

its unemployment rate is<br />

currently lower than in <strong>the</strong><br />

U.S. Canada’s relatively more<br />

affluent audience is noteworthy<br />

because recent <strong>Kantar</strong> <strong>Retail</strong><br />

ShopperScape® data indicates<br />

Figure 4: Shopper Segment<br />

Comparis<strong>on</strong>s—Walmart Canada<br />

Walmart Canada’s Shopper Segments<br />

Lower % of Price Value Shoppers than in Walmart US<br />

Shopper Segment: Proporti<strong>on</strong> of Audience<br />

100%<br />

90%<br />

80%<br />

70%<br />

60%<br />

50%<br />

40%<br />

30%<br />

20%<br />

10%<br />

0%<br />

Walmart US Walmart Canada<br />

O<strong>the</strong>r<br />

Price Value Shoppers<br />

Price Sensitive Affluents<br />

Brand Aspirati<strong>on</strong>als<br />

Source: June <str<strong>on</strong>g>2011</str<strong>on</strong>g>, Company<br />

Presentati<strong>on</strong> and <strong>Kantar</strong> <strong>Retail</strong> Analysis<br />

that higher income Walmart<br />

US shoppers who are shopping<br />

<strong>the</strong> retailer less favor moving<br />

to Target vs.o<strong>the</strong>r retailers. If<br />

this tendency parallels across<br />

markets, <strong>the</strong>n Target Canada<br />

should anticipate greater<br />

head-<strong>on</strong> competiti<strong>on</strong> for its<br />

more affluent, price sensitive<br />

audience.<br />

Looking broadly, Walmart<br />

Canada is advancing its use of<br />

analytics. Over <strong>the</strong> past three<br />

years, Cheesewright has made<br />

it a priority to develop <strong>the</strong><br />

retailer’s insights capabilities,<br />

establishing metrics to<br />

analyze everything from<br />

<strong>the</strong> store experience to <strong>the</strong><br />

company’s image. Wal-Mart<br />

Stores, Inc.’s Executive Vice<br />

President of Global C<strong>on</strong>sumer<br />

Insights, Cindy Davis, also is<br />

working with Walmart Canada<br />

to evaluate its metrics and<br />

develop best practices across<br />

countries.<br />

Marketing Message<br />

Walmart Canada tailors<br />

Wal-Mart Stores, Inc.’s<br />

marketing <strong>the</strong>mes to fit its<br />

audience. A comparis<strong>on</strong> of<br />

recent circular covers (shown<br />

in Figure 5) illustrates how<br />

Walmart Canada’s approach<br />

mixes Walmart US’s light<br />

blue imagery, low price, and<br />

Ad Match asserti<strong>on</strong>s with<br />

stark red and yellow text and<br />

a unique, slanted Rollback<br />

arrow. The Walmart Canada<br />

cover also replaces <strong>the</strong> tagline,<br />

“Save M<strong>on</strong>ey, Live Better”<br />

with <strong>the</strong> functi<strong>on</strong>al subhead of<br />

“Supercentre.” The in-store<br />

messaging (Figure 6) similarly<br />

includes modificati<strong>on</strong>s. For<br />

instance, <strong>the</strong> “Everyday Low<br />

Price” sign shown in Canada<br />

puts a greater emphasis <strong>on</strong> <strong>the</strong><br />

word “Everyday.” There are<br />

also different signs in Canada,<br />

such as “Limited Time Only”<br />

promoti<strong>on</strong>s and shelf tags to<br />

highlight specific price points.<br />

Viewed broadly, Walmart<br />

Canada’s marketing materials<br />

tend to have a relatively stark<br />

presentati<strong>on</strong> around price,<br />

reinforcing <strong>the</strong> noti<strong>on</strong> that its<br />

items are inexpensive.<br />

Moreover, its marketing does<br />

not facilitate <strong>on</strong>line social<br />

communities and engagement<br />

around its brand to <strong>the</strong> same<br />

extent as in <strong>the</strong> U.S. For<br />

instance, in recent years both<br />

Walmart US and Wal-Mart<br />

Breakthrough Insights 29


Figure 5: Circular Cover Comparis<strong>on</strong>: Walmart US versus Walmart Canada<br />

Walmart US Circular Cover Walmart Canada Circular Cover<br />

Figure 6: In-Store Signage: Walmart US versus Walmart Canada<br />

Walmart US, Promoti<strong>on</strong>al<br />

Signage (July <str<strong>on</strong>g>2011</str<strong>on</strong>g>)<br />

30 Breakthrough Insights<br />

Source: Walmart<br />

Walmart Canada, Promoti<strong>on</strong>al<br />

Signage (August <str<strong>on</strong>g>2011</str<strong>on</strong>g>)<br />

Source: <strong>Kantar</strong> <strong>Retail</strong> Store Visit<br />

Stores, Inc.’s Sam’s Club have<br />

held <strong>on</strong>line campaigns to let<br />

Facebook fans vote for which<br />

American communities and<br />

charities will receive grants<br />

for causes related to its “Live<br />

Better” brand message.<br />

Comparatively, Walmart<br />

Canada does not even have<br />

an established social media<br />

presence <strong>on</strong> Facebook outside<br />

of its U.S. counterpart’s<br />

umbrella. In this way, Walmart<br />

Canada’s leverage of social<br />

media is relatively under<br />

developed, allowing Target<br />

Canada a means to develop<br />

a rapport with Canadian<br />

audiences distinct from<br />

Walmart Canada.<br />

Implicati<strong>on</strong>s for Target<br />

Canada<br />

Overall, Walmart Canada will<br />

be a formidable competitor<br />

to Target across grocery,<br />

c<strong>on</strong>sumables, and general<br />

merchandise. It has a wide<br />

reach in <strong>the</strong> market in terms<br />

of stores and audience<br />

penetrati<strong>on</strong>, and its footprint<br />

is expanding as a <strong>on</strong>e-stop<br />

grocery shop. Moreover,<br />

Walmart Canada is investing


in insights and leveraging<br />

Wal-Mart, Stores, Inc.’s best<br />

practices, particularly from<br />

<strong>the</strong> U.K. and <strong>the</strong> U.S. Although<br />

Walmart Canada presents<br />

challenges for Target, its<br />

positi<strong>on</strong>ing also allows Target<br />

opportunity to gain tracti<strong>on</strong> in<br />

<strong>the</strong> market.<br />

Walmart Canada’s Advantages<br />

vs. Target:<br />

Tailored Services,<br />

Assortments—The ethnic<br />

profile of Canadian<br />

audiences is quite different<br />

from <strong>the</strong> U.S., and <strong>the</strong><br />

diversity of both its services<br />

and assortment at Walmart<br />

Canada is increasingly<br />

accommodating its<br />

markets. Accordingly,<br />

suppliers that can offer<br />

advice around what tailored<br />

assortments mean at<br />

Canadian sites will be<br />

valuable as Target looks to<br />

meet <strong>the</strong> needs of its new<br />

guest.<br />

Established Grocery<br />

Presence—Already, nearly<br />

half of Walmart Canada’s<br />

sales come from grocery;<br />

as <strong>the</strong> Supercentre<br />

Walmart Canada vs. Walmart US<br />

Formats<br />

Locati<strong>on</strong>s<br />

Services<br />

Private Label<br />

In-Store<br />

Messaging<br />

Target<br />

Audience<br />

77% are Supercenters, as of 2010.<br />

Store formats:<br />

Walmart US Walmart Canada<br />

58% are Discount stores, as of 2010.<br />

Store formats:<br />

Stores almost exclusively in Rural and Suburban markets Stores present across Rural, Suburban, and Urban markets<br />

Unique services include:<br />

Site to Store<br />

M<strong>on</strong>eyCenter<br />

Unique services include:<br />

Newer lines include… Newer lines include…<br />

Examples: Examples:<br />

140 milli<strong>on</strong> shoppers a week, which is 45% of <strong>the</strong> populati<strong>on</strong>*<br />

Segments:<br />

Price Value Shoppers = 20%<br />

Brand Aspirati<strong>on</strong>als = 26%<br />

Price Sensitive Affluents = 13%<br />

Bank and credit card product with Walmart Rewards<br />

8 milli<strong>on</strong> shoppers a week, which is 24% of <strong>the</strong> populati<strong>on</strong>*<br />

Segments:<br />

Price Value Shoppers = 13%<br />

Brand Aspirati<strong>on</strong>als = 28%<br />

Price Sensitive Affluents = 16%<br />

*populati<strong>on</strong> of <strong>the</strong> country from <strong>the</strong> CIA factbook, <str<strong>on</strong>g>2011</str<strong>on</strong>g> estimates<br />

Breakthrough Insights 31


expands, this proporti<strong>on</strong> is<br />

set to rise. For Target to<br />

assert its positi<strong>on</strong> in this<br />

space, it must c<strong>on</strong>sider<br />

that Canadian’s familiarity<br />

with Target might be<br />

limited to mass media<br />

advertisements that focus<br />

<strong>on</strong> discreti<strong>on</strong>ary goods or<br />

cross-border shopping that<br />

would restrain a grocery<br />

trip. Accordingly, Target’s<br />

messaging in Canada must<br />

acknowledge <strong>the</strong> audience’s<br />

percepti<strong>on</strong> of <strong>the</strong> retailer<br />

and seek to shape it.<br />

Coordinated Distributi<strong>on</strong><br />

Network—In market for<br />

nearly two decades prior<br />

to Target’s entry, Walmart<br />

Canada has had time to<br />

establish a distributi<strong>on</strong><br />

network for both grocery<br />

and general merchandise,<br />

setting Target’s<br />

inexperience (particularly<br />

in grocery) as a relative<br />

disadvantage in serving this<br />

audience.<br />

32 Breakthrough Insights<br />

Walmart Canada’s Relative<br />

Weakness … and Target’s<br />

Opportunties:<br />

Lack of Private Brand<br />

Equity in Apparel, Home—<br />

Though Walmart’s George<br />

brand has widespread<br />

awareness, this does<br />

not ensure <strong>the</strong> brand’s<br />

appeal. Given <strong>the</strong> recent<br />

repositi<strong>on</strong>ing of <strong>the</strong> line<br />

as a m<strong>on</strong>obrand, it hasn’t<br />

had <strong>the</strong> time to establish<br />

a positi<strong>on</strong> with shoppers.<br />

Target’s str<strong>on</strong>g apparel<br />

and home lines have an<br />

opportunity to develop<br />

affinity with Canadian<br />

guests, especially those<br />

guests familiar with <strong>the</strong>ir<br />

U.S. offering. Target<br />

has trumpeted research<br />

indicating that “70% of<br />

Canadians are already<br />

familiar with <strong>the</strong> Target<br />

brand,” so Target has a<br />

foundati<strong>on</strong> <strong>on</strong> which to<br />

build.<br />

Underdeveloped Social,<br />

Online Presence—Walmart<br />

Canada’s <strong>on</strong>line presence<br />

is limited, lacking a distinct<br />

Facebook page from its<br />

U.S. counterparts, for<br />

example. Target Canada<br />

should evaluate developing<br />

a differentiated positi<strong>on</strong><br />

in this space, building<br />

communicati<strong>on</strong> with its<br />

audience to advance its<br />

c<strong>on</strong>tact and loyalty with<br />

guests. Its recent relaunch<br />

of Target.com in<br />

<strong>the</strong> U.S. dem<strong>on</strong>strates its<br />

ability to tailor its <strong>on</strong>line<br />

presence to guests’ needs.<br />

Target may accordingly<br />

want to develop its <strong>on</strong>line<br />

offering in tandem with its<br />

store offering, as Target<br />

has recently suggested that<br />

its .ca services will likely<br />

follow store openings in<br />

2013.<br />

Stark Message of “Cheap”—<br />

In Canada, Walmart’s<br />

messaging starkly<br />

emphasizes its inexpensive<br />

price, distracting from<br />

<strong>the</strong> “live better” side of its<br />

brand promise in <strong>the</strong> box.<br />

Target has an opportunity<br />

to balance its “Expect<br />

More” quality and service<br />

dimensi<strong>on</strong>, as well as its<br />

“Pay Less” asserti<strong>on</strong>, thus<br />

differentiating itself in <strong>the</strong><br />

market.


2012 EMEA Events Calendar<br />

Q1<br />

<strong>Kantar</strong> <strong>Retail</strong> Events | Less Opini<strong>on</strong>, More Insight<br />

NEW Digital <strong>Retail</strong>ing Sessi<strong>on</strong>—Amsterdam,<br />

Ne<strong>the</strong>rlands<br />

Jan 26 Geographical Coverage - Europe<br />

Carrefour Middle East Sessi<strong>on</strong>—Dubai, UAE<br />

Feb Geographical Coverage – Middle East<br />

Carrefour Turkey Sessi<strong>on</strong>—Istanbul, Turkey<br />

Feb 22 Geographical Coverage – Turkey<br />

Spanish <strong>Retail</strong>ing Forum—Madrid, Spain<br />

Apr 24 Geographical Coverage – Spain<br />

Tesco Global Sessi<strong>on</strong>—L<strong>on</strong>d<strong>on</strong>, UK<br />

Apr 26 Geographical Coverage - Global<br />

NEW Russian Hypermarket Sessi<strong>on</strong>—Moscow, Russia<br />

May 15 Geographical Coverage – Russia & Ukraine<br />

NEW Russian Discounter Sessi<strong>on</strong>—Moscow, Russia<br />

May 16 Geographical Coverage – Russia &<br />

Ukraine<br />

NEW <strong>Retail</strong>er Financial Models Sessi<strong>on</strong>—<br />

Istanbul, Turkey<br />

Feb 23 Geographical Coverage - Turkey<br />

Carrefour G5 Sessi<strong>on</strong>—Paris, France<br />

Mar 20 Geographical Coverage – G5<br />

(Belgium, France, Greece, Italy and<br />

Spain)<br />

UK <strong>Retail</strong>ing Forum—L<strong>on</strong>d<strong>on</strong>, UK<br />

Mar 28 Geographical Coverage – UK<br />

Breakthrough Insights 33<br />

For more informati<strong>on</strong> - Email CustomerService@<strong>Kantar</strong><strong>Retail</strong>iQ.com or Call +44 (0)207 031 0272<br />

Q2<br />

Walmart Africa Sessi<strong>on</strong>—Johannesburg,<br />

South Africa<br />

May 22 Geographical Coverage – South<br />

Africa<br />

European <strong>Retail</strong>ing Forum—TBD<br />

Jun 14 Geographical Coverage – Europe


Getting it Right: Anticipating<br />

Amaz<strong>on</strong>’s Growth Trajectory<br />

By: Anne Zybowski / Originally published: October 26, <str<strong>on</strong>g>2011</str<strong>on</strong>g><br />

One year ago <strong>on</strong> Nov. 8, 2010, Amaz<strong>on</strong> announced its<br />

plans to acquire Quidsi (parent company of diapers.<br />

com and soap.com am<strong>on</strong>g newer sites), giving it<br />

ano<strong>the</strong>r str<strong>on</strong>g foothold in a specialty e-commerce<br />

business. In <strong>the</strong> Breaking News Insight article we<br />

wrote that day, we identified three moves that were<br />

significant about this acquisiti<strong>on</strong>:<br />

1. Driving penetrati<strong>on</strong> of key categories<br />

2. Targeting mom and <strong>the</strong> replenishment trip<br />

3. E-tailers: moving from <strong>on</strong>line to bricks &<br />

mortar?<br />

A year later, it’s as if Amaz<strong>on</strong> c<strong>on</strong>tinues to work<br />

from our playbook and has made significant<br />

progress against each <strong>on</strong>e of <strong>the</strong>se plays. Let’s take<br />

a look at <strong>the</strong> highlights:<br />

1. Driving Penetrati<strong>on</strong> of Key Categories<br />

Heading into <str<strong>on</strong>g>2011</str<strong>on</strong>g>, Amaz<strong>on</strong> was trying to get its<br />

head around selling CPG—how could shipping<br />

anything less than a club pack make sense?<br />

Amaz<strong>on</strong> started testing “eaches” (individual pack<br />

sizes) vs. club packs to see both <strong>the</strong> impact <strong>on</strong> sales<br />

and profitability. Results exceeded expectati<strong>on</strong>s as<br />

sales took off and handling costs were lower than<br />

34 Breakthrough Insights<br />

expected due to high attachment rates. As of July<br />

<str<strong>on</strong>g>2011</str<strong>on</strong>g>, HBC is <strong>on</strong>e of <strong>the</strong> top categories shopped<br />

<strong>on</strong>line by Amaz<strong>on</strong> shoppers with 43% of m<strong>on</strong>thly<br />

shoppers looking for HBC (vs. 23% across all<br />

primary shoppers) (Figure 1).<br />

While baby supplies is <strong>on</strong>e of <strong>the</strong> lowest-ranked<br />

categories, with <strong>on</strong>ly 11% of Amaz<strong>on</strong>’s m<strong>on</strong>thly<br />

shoppers having shopped for <strong>the</strong> category, stay<br />

tuned for #2.


2. Targeting Mom and <strong>the</strong><br />

Replenishment Trip<br />

While Subscribe & Save was<br />

launched in 2007 with grocery<br />

items, <strong>the</strong> program really took off in<br />

<str<strong>on</strong>g>2011</str<strong>on</strong>g> as more participating vendors<br />

means more eligible products<br />

<strong>on</strong>line, and “Mom” became<br />

<strong>the</strong> gateway to new purchase<br />

behaviors. Mom, coveted by bricks<br />

& mortar retailers like Target and<br />

Babies R Us for <strong>the</strong> basket that<br />

comes with <strong>the</strong> frequent stock-up<br />

trip for diapers, is <strong>the</strong> lynchpin for<br />

<strong>the</strong> <strong>on</strong>line basket as well.<br />

Launched in September 2010, <strong>the</strong><br />

Amaz<strong>on</strong> Mom program (which<br />

offers 30% off diapers and wipes<br />

and gives shoppers an Amaz<strong>on</strong><br />

Prime membership for up to a<br />

year based if m<strong>on</strong>thly spending of<br />

USD25+ is maintained) has had a<br />

significant impact <strong>on</strong> shopping and<br />

purchasing behavior because of<br />

its tremendous value offer. By July<br />

<str<strong>on</strong>g>2011</str<strong>on</strong>g>, 4% of all shoppers and 10.9%<br />

of m<strong>on</strong>thly Amaz<strong>on</strong>.com shoppers<br />

are members of <strong>the</strong> Amaz<strong>on</strong> Mom<br />

program (Figure 2).<br />

Figure 1. Products Amaz<strong>on</strong> Shoppers Shop for Online: CPG Scores High <strong>on</strong> <strong>the</strong> List<br />

All<br />

Primary<br />

Shoppers<br />

M<strong>on</strong>thly<br />

Amaz<strong>on</strong>.com<br />

Shoppers<br />

Sample Size 4061 814<br />

Women’s apparel/shoes 33% 50%<br />

HBC 23% 43%<br />

Hardcover or paperback books 21% 42%<br />

DVD or Blu-ray movies 15% 34%<br />

C<strong>on</strong>sumer electr<strong>on</strong>ics (e.g., digital camera,<br />

televisi<strong>on</strong>, DVD player)<br />

13% 26%<br />

Men’s apparel/shoes 12% 23%<br />

E-books 12% 27%<br />

Grocery N<strong>on</strong>-Food items 11% 20%<br />

Laptop/desktop/netbook computer 11% 22%<br />

Furniture (assembled or ready-toassemble)<br />

9% 17%<br />

Video games 9% 20%<br />

Prescripti<strong>on</strong> drugs 9% 11%<br />

Toys/dolls/games 8% 18%<br />

Infants/toddlers/kids apparel 8% 17%<br />

School/home office supplies 7% 14%<br />

Tablet computer (e.g., iPad, Galaxy Tab,<br />

PlayBook)<br />

6% 15%<br />

Grocery Food items 6% 13%<br />

Home textiles 5% 11%<br />

Building products (e.g., paint, flooring,<br />

cabinets, plumbing supplies, etc.)<br />

5% 8%<br />

Baby supplies (e.g., diapers, wipes, etc.) 5% 11%<br />

Hand tools or power tools 4% 9%<br />

N<strong>on</strong>e of <strong>the</strong>se 35% 9%<br />

Bolding/highlighting indicates a significant difference between column<br />

percentages (96% CL)<br />

Source: <strong>Kantar</strong> <strong>Retail</strong> ShopperScape®, July <str<strong>on</strong>g>2011</str<strong>on</strong>g><br />

Breakthrough Insights 35


And in case you are w<strong>on</strong>dering if membership<br />

changes shopping behavior:<br />

49% of Gen X women who are Amaz<strong>on</strong> program<br />

members shop weekly, as compared with <strong>on</strong>ly<br />

16% of Gen X women females who are NOT<br />

members<br />

Figure 2. M<strong>on</strong>thly Amaz<strong>on</strong> Shoppers Who Are Members of<br />

Amaz<strong>on</strong> Mom/Subscribe & Save<br />

Nei<strong>the</strong>r of <strong>the</strong>se 92.9% 81.9%<br />

Source: <strong>Kantar</strong> <strong>Retail</strong> ShopperScape®, July <str<strong>on</strong>g>2011</str<strong>on</strong>g><br />

36 Breakthrough Insights<br />

All<br />

Shoppers<br />

M<strong>on</strong>thly<br />

Amaz<strong>on</strong><br />

Shoppers<br />

Sample size 4061 815<br />

Amaz<strong>on</strong> Mom 4.0% 10.9%<br />

Amaz<strong>on</strong> Subscribe & Save 4.7% 13.5%<br />

BOTH Amaz<strong>on</strong> Mom Subscribe & Save 1.6% 6.3%<br />

Figure 3: Amaz<strong>on</strong> is Penetrating Trip-driving Categories<br />

All<br />

Shoppers<br />

Baby<br />

food and<br />

supplies Toys*<br />

From <strong>the</strong> perspective of shoppers who purchase<br />

key c<strong>on</strong>sumables categories, <strong>the</strong> highlighted areas<br />

in Figure 3 indicate <strong>the</strong> category purchaser groups<br />

that over-index with Amaz<strong>on</strong> program members.<br />

19% of shoppers who purchased baby<br />

supplies in <strong>the</strong> past four weeks and 15% of<br />

toy purchasers are Amaz<strong>on</strong> Mom members—<br />

str<strong>on</strong>g penetrati<strong>on</strong> in a short time.<br />

Shoppers of pers<strong>on</strong>al care and household<br />

cleaning products over-index with Subscribe &<br />

Save membership at 6% and 5%, respectively.<br />

Given <strong>the</strong> digital nature of Amaz<strong>on</strong> as well as<br />

<strong>the</strong> instant access to movies via Amaz<strong>on</strong> Prime,<br />

it is no surprise that 10% of all shoppers who<br />

purchased video games and 9% of those who<br />

purchased DVDs/movies also are members of<br />

Subscribe & Save.<br />

Purchased Category in <strong>the</strong> Past 4 Weeks<br />

Video<br />

games<br />

DVD / Blu-Ray<br />

Movies<br />

Sweet<br />

snacks<br />

Color<br />

cosmetics<br />

Pers<strong>on</strong>al<br />

care<br />

products<br />

Sample Size 4061 320 322 288 491 2391 971 2268<br />

Amaz<strong>on</strong> Mom 4% 19% 15% 7% 7% 5% 4% 4%<br />

Amaz<strong>on</strong> Subscribe & Save 5% 14% 9% 10% 9% 5% 5% 6%<br />

All<br />

Shoppers<br />

Pet<br />

supplies<br />

Household<br />

cleaning<br />

products<br />

Purchased Category in <strong>the</strong> Past 4 Weeks<br />

Dry /<br />

canned<br />

groceries<br />

Salty<br />

snacks<br />

Household<br />

paper<br />

goods Pet food<br />

N<strong>on</strong> -<br />

prescripti<strong>on</strong><br />

drugs<br />

Sample Size 4061 913 2574 2985 2841 2616 1850 1561<br />

Amaz<strong>on</strong> Mom 4% 4% 4% 4% 4% 4% 3% 3%<br />

Amaz<strong>on</strong> Subscribe & Save 5% 5% 5% 5% 5% 5% 4% 4%<br />

Source: <strong>Kantar</strong> <strong>Retail</strong> ShopperScape®, July <str<strong>on</strong>g>2011</str<strong>on</strong>g>


3. E-tailers: Moving from Online to Bricks &<br />

Mortar?<br />

Far-fetched, right? Amaz<strong>on</strong> is a pure-play, <strong>on</strong>line<strong>on</strong>ly<br />

retailer, but <strong>the</strong>re is something to be said for<br />

physical proximity. Multi-channel is often (lazily)<br />

used to describe a store-based retailer that also<br />

runs an e-commerce business to drive growth, but<br />

<strong>the</strong> same works in reverse. True “multi-channel” is<br />

about leveraging <strong>the</strong> best of each channel to meet<br />

<strong>the</strong> shopper where <strong>the</strong>y want to interact with <strong>the</strong><br />

brand.<br />

Our initial speculati<strong>on</strong> was that Amaz<strong>on</strong>’s initial<br />

physical presence would be a drive-thru locati<strong>on</strong>.<br />

That may yet materialize, but until <strong>the</strong>n Figure 4<br />

shows <strong>the</strong> locker presence that Amaz<strong>on</strong> is testing<br />

in <strong>the</strong> US (via 7-Eleven) and <strong>the</strong> UK (in shopping<br />

centres).<br />

These lockers began testing in September <str<strong>on</strong>g>2011</str<strong>on</strong>g> and<br />

here’s how it works:<br />

Choose a “locker” locati<strong>on</strong> at checkout (vs. a<br />

home address)<br />

Your package is delivered to <strong>on</strong>e of<br />

approximately 40 PO box–style lockers centered<br />

around a m<strong>on</strong>itor resembling an ATM interface<br />

Scan an emailed barcode at <strong>the</strong> locker to get a<br />

pin and locker #<br />

If rumors are true, potential US rollout to<br />

7-Eleven locati<strong>on</strong>s nati<strong>on</strong>wide could be summer<br />

2012<br />

Figure 4. Amaz<strong>on</strong> lockers – coming so<strong>on</strong> to a shopping mall<br />

(UK) or 7-Eleven (US) near you<br />

Source: <strong>Kantar</strong> <strong>Retail</strong> store visits<br />

Breakthrough Insights 37


<strong>Kantar</strong> <strong>Retail</strong> Point of View<br />

Our coverage of Amaz<strong>on</strong> will c<strong>on</strong>tinue<br />

to evolve as this retailer c<strong>on</strong>tinues<br />

to test, learn, implement, and <strong>the</strong>n<br />

iterate again. Remember, as Jeff<br />

Bezos reminds shareholders every<br />

year by attaching <strong>the</strong> 1994 Letter to<br />

Shareholders to <strong>the</strong> annual report—<br />

“It’s still Day 1”.<br />

As we head into 2012, our <strong>on</strong>line<br />

coverage (beginning with <strong>the</strong><br />

December Year-End Forum event) will<br />

increasingly explore <strong>the</strong> implicati<strong>on</strong>s<br />

of Amaz<strong>on</strong>’s growth and changes in<br />

both technology and shopper behavior<br />

<strong>on</strong> bricks and mortar retailers. These<br />

customers are increasingly looking<br />

to <strong>the</strong>ir suppliers to help “stop <strong>the</strong><br />

leakage” to <strong>on</strong>line. Smart suppliers<br />

will recognize that competing against<br />

Amaz<strong>on</strong> as well as o<strong>the</strong>r e-commerce<br />

business models isn’t just about<br />

helping your customers sell <strong>on</strong>line,<br />

but is more importantly about<br />

adapting existing business models,<br />

integrating digital presence with<br />

physical presence, and highlighting<br />

unique and differentiated value<br />

propositi<strong>on</strong>s. Digital represents<br />

a huge opportunity to lead in<br />

partnership with your bricks and<br />

mortar customers.<br />

38 38 Breakthrough Breakthrough Insights Insights<br />

Source: Amaz<strong>on</strong>.com


Tesco Price Drop: Seismic<br />

Shift or Smoke and Mirrors?<br />

By: Bryan Roberts / Originally published: September 28, <str<strong>on</strong>g>2011</str<strong>on</strong>g><br />

Never has a major pricing offensive by a leading<br />

retailer been so badly kept under wraps or so<br />

widely documented. A combinati<strong>on</strong> of ill-advised<br />

comments <strong>on</strong> an unofficial Tesco employee forum<br />

(c<strong>on</strong>cerning managers’ leave being cancelled <strong>on</strong><br />

Sunday 25th September plus inordinate amounts of<br />

point of sale being delivered) and some mischievous<br />

social media activity meant that Tesco’s planned<br />

“reveal” of its Big Price Drop campaign was brought<br />

forward from M<strong>on</strong>day, September 26, to Friday,<br />

September 24 (Figure 1 and 2).<br />

Despite fevered speculati<strong>on</strong> for <strong>the</strong> best part of <strong>the</strong><br />

week that Tesco was poised to unleash a seismic<br />

EDLP-led price war that would destabilise its<br />

competitors and tip <strong>the</strong> playing field back in its<br />

favour, what was actually revealed by beleaguered<br />

Tesco UK CEO Richard Brasher was 3,000 price cuts<br />

across a mix of branded and private label SKUs. The<br />

UK business press, full of talk of a price war, has<br />

since recast <strong>the</strong> move as a price skirmish.<br />

Why was anticipati<strong>on</strong> so fevered and expectati<strong>on</strong>s<br />

so high over Tesco’s move? Simply put, <strong>the</strong> UK<br />

business has been underperforming competitors<br />

in terms of like-for-like sales growth and market<br />

Figure 1. Price Drop Campaign Signage<br />

Source: <strong>Kantar</strong> <strong>Retail</strong> store visits<br />

Breakthrough Insights 39


share performance: Morris<strong>on</strong>s has been making<br />

steady progress with an excellent reputati<strong>on</strong> for<br />

fresh, value and service; Sainsbury’s has retained<br />

a combinati<strong>on</strong> of quality and str<strong>on</strong>g promoti<strong>on</strong>s;<br />

and Waitrose has augmented its undoubted quality<br />

credentials with those of value and affordability<br />

through private label innovati<strong>on</strong> and price-matching<br />

Tesco <strong>on</strong> brands. Asda, which has not been setting<br />

<strong>the</strong> world <strong>on</strong> fire in performance terms ei<strong>the</strong>r, still<br />

trumps every<strong>on</strong>e else <strong>on</strong> price—due to both its<br />

EDLP stance and its 10% Asda Price Guarantee.<br />

While modest in scale if not in influence, Aldi and<br />

Lidl have also been gaining share at a mercurial<br />

rate as British shoppers c<strong>on</strong>tinue <strong>the</strong>ir flight to<br />

value.<br />

The Tesco model is not broken (it is still growing,<br />

it still has a virtually unassailable lead in <strong>the</strong> UK<br />

grocery market, and it makes double <strong>the</strong> operating<br />

margins of every<strong>on</strong>e else), but it is not where it<br />

used to be. It has lost its place at <strong>the</strong> vanguard<br />

of innovati<strong>on</strong> and best practice, it has let <strong>the</strong><br />

pricing lead slip to Asda, and <strong>the</strong> industry is awash<br />

with talk of falling in-store standards and overcentralisati<strong>on</strong>.<br />

All of <strong>the</strong>se have combined to see<br />

a gradual, but steady, erosi<strong>on</strong> in <strong>the</strong> retailer’s<br />

market share and <strong>the</strong> unfamiliar and uncomfortable<br />

experience of like-for-like sales declines (excluding<br />

VAT and petrol).<br />

There have already been some efforts to regain<br />

momentum in <str<strong>on</strong>g>2011</str<strong>on</strong>g>. Tesco has invested in some<br />

potentially successful innovati<strong>on</strong> in private brands it<br />

has c<strong>on</strong>tinued to improve its already world-leading<br />

grocery e-commerce business and, now, it has<br />

sought to re-establish its pricing credentials.<br />

40 Breakthrough Insights<br />

Figure 2. Price Drop Campaign Signage<br />

Source: <strong>Kantar</strong> <strong>Retail</strong> store visits<br />

Its relative stagnati<strong>on</strong> led many to believe that Tesco<br />

was readying itself for a dramatic and potentially<br />

redefining moment of pricing acti<strong>on</strong>. At a time when<br />

c<strong>on</strong>sumer spending is weak (particularly in n<strong>on</strong>food),<br />

<strong>the</strong> major supermarkets c<strong>on</strong>tinue to open new<br />

space at a record rate, leading us to believe that <strong>the</strong><br />

net effect has been a cannibalisati<strong>on</strong> of each o<strong>the</strong>r<br />

and <strong>the</strong>mselves. While like-for-like sales in <strong>the</strong> UK<br />

market have been surprisingly buoyant compared<br />

with o<strong>the</strong>r mature markets such as France,<br />

Germany, and <strong>the</strong> US, <strong>the</strong>re is a sense that <strong>the</strong> UK<br />

might start flattening and perhaps even declining<br />

in general terms as turgid c<strong>on</strong>sumer demand<br />

combines with increasing overcapacity.<br />

The current envir<strong>on</strong>ment was seen as <strong>on</strong>e in which<br />

Tesco could launch a hugely aggressive price<br />

offensive that would be difficult for its competitors<br />

to equal. With industry-leading buying power and<br />

margins, Tesco would be uniquely placed to be able


to unleash a fierce price campaign that would be<br />

unable to be matched by its competitors without<br />

<strong>the</strong>m devastating <strong>the</strong>ir already razor-thin margins.<br />

Instead, what we have seen has been something of<br />

an underwhelming halfway house that has already<br />

been dismissed by Sainsbury’s as “smoke and<br />

mirrors” and by Asda as “spin,” <strong>the</strong> latter hitting<br />

back at Tesco’s Big Price Drop newspaper ads with<br />

its own full-page ads proclaiming that “<strong>on</strong>ly <strong>on</strong>e<br />

supermarket is … always 10% cheaper.”<br />

The three main thrusts of <strong>the</strong> Big Price Drop are:<br />

1. Shoppers want more help with <strong>the</strong> cost of <strong>the</strong>ir<br />

weekly shopping. Tesco <strong>the</strong>refore “reduced<br />

<strong>the</strong> prices of more than 3,000 products that<br />

customers need to buy every day—such as<br />

milk, bread, fruit and vegetables. Future cuts<br />

will also focus <strong>on</strong> products that families need<br />

most.”<br />

2. Shoppers are turning away from expensive<br />

brands to more affordable own label ranges.<br />

Tesco will focus most of <strong>the</strong> investment in <strong>the</strong><br />

Big Price Drop <strong>on</strong> reducing prices <strong>on</strong> more than<br />

1,000 Tesco brand products. Tesco branded<br />

products are already c<strong>on</strong>siderably cheaper<br />

than comparable brands. As a result of this<br />

move <strong>the</strong>y will be even better value, in many<br />

cases more than 50% cheaper than <strong>the</strong> brands.<br />

Buying Tesco brand can significantly reduce <strong>the</strong><br />

rate of inflati<strong>on</strong> that customers are currently<br />

experiencing in <strong>the</strong>ir weekly shop.<br />

3. Shoppers have said that <strong>the</strong>y are weary of<br />

having to shop around for <strong>the</strong> best deals and<br />

prices changing too often. Tesco stated that,<br />

“We are going to simplify promoti<strong>on</strong>s, reducing<br />

<strong>the</strong> number of multi-buys particularly in fresh<br />

foods where customers have said <strong>the</strong>y can drive<br />

waste.”<br />

Having given it a day to let <strong>the</strong> dust settle and to get<br />

out and see <strong>the</strong> Big Price Drop in a variety of Tesco<br />

store c<strong>on</strong>cepts, here’s our take <strong>on</strong> <strong>the</strong> initiative and<br />

some of <strong>the</strong> related issues.<br />

The first asserti<strong>on</strong> that Tesco will be saving<br />

shoppers m<strong>on</strong>ey <strong>on</strong> <strong>the</strong> items <strong>the</strong>y buy every day is<br />

a noble <strong>on</strong>e and <strong>on</strong>e that is hard to argue about, at<br />

least for existing Tesco shoppers who will c<strong>on</strong>tinue<br />

to shop at <strong>the</strong> retailer. There are plenty of examples<br />

where <strong>the</strong> branded price cuts mean that Tesco is<br />

now cheaper than Asda <strong>on</strong> some branded SKUS, but<br />

<strong>the</strong>re also are examples of where—even after <strong>the</strong><br />

cuts—Tesco remains more expensive.<br />

Figure 3. Price Cuts <strong>on</strong> Custard<br />

Source: <strong>Kantar</strong> <strong>Retail</strong> store visits<br />

Breakthrough Insights 41


Around a third of <strong>the</strong> cuts were applied to Tesco<br />

private label, which makes comparability a shade<br />

more problematic, but <strong>the</strong> fact remains that <strong>the</strong><br />

mighty 2p price cut <strong>on</strong> Tesco Value Custard now<br />

means that it costs <strong>the</strong> same as Asda Smart Price<br />

tinned custard (Figure 3). Will a cut in <strong>the</strong> price<br />

of Red Square Vodka from £14.32 to £14.29 get<br />

shoppers deserting Waitrose and Aldi and flocking<br />

into Tesco? Perhaps not.<br />

Ano<strong>the</strong>r criticism is that Price Drops are to be found<br />

in a category such as dried herbs & spices, which<br />

we are not c<strong>on</strong>vinced falls into <strong>the</strong> “need to buy<br />

every day bucket.”<br />

A fur<strong>the</strong>r complicati<strong>on</strong> arises from Tesco’s multiformat<br />

strategy and <strong>the</strong> price differential that it<br />

executes across its different trading platforms.<br />

Across its different formats—such as Express<br />

c<strong>on</strong>venience stores, Tesco superstores, and <strong>the</strong><br />

Tesco.com e-commerce store—Tesco states that<br />

<strong>the</strong> “was” (pre-Price Drop) prices were charged at<br />

“most Tesco stores in GB.” One query we have is<br />

that “most Tesco stores in GB” are Tesco Express<br />

units (<strong>the</strong>re are around 1,300 Express stores<br />

compared to 870 Tesco, Tesco Metro and Tesco<br />

Extra outlets in <strong>the</strong> UK) and our research has<br />

indicated that Tesco Express prices are 4% higher<br />

than in larger Tesco stores or Tesco.com.<br />

So, when we visited a Tesco Express unit, we were<br />

c<strong>on</strong>fr<strong>on</strong>ted with a price tag for Tesco Luxury quilted<br />

toilet tissue of “was £2.08, now £1.92,” while larger<br />

stores were showing ‘was £2.00, now £1.85’: both<br />

price tags assuring us that <strong>the</strong> ‘was’ price was<br />

charged in “most Tesco stores in GB” (Figure 4).<br />

C<strong>on</strong>fusi<strong>on</strong> reigns supreme.<br />

42 Breakthrough Insights<br />

Figure 4. Toilet Tissue Price Drop<br />

Source: <strong>Kantar</strong> <strong>Retail</strong> store visits<br />

Despite Tesco stating that <strong>the</strong> split in Price Drop<br />

was to be 2:1 in favour of branded SKUs, <strong>the</strong><br />

sensati<strong>on</strong> in store (helped by <strong>the</strong> Price Drop POS<br />

which almost exclusively highlights Tesco brand<br />

items) is <strong>on</strong>e of Price Drop being used as a private<br />

brand vehicle ra<strong>the</strong>r than a value mechanism.<br />

This makes sense for a couple of reas<strong>on</strong>s (more<br />

headroom in PL margins for price cuts and it<br />

also muddies <strong>the</strong> waters to thwart Asda’s Price<br />

Guarantee comparis<strong>on</strong>s), but it also has meant that<br />

in some categories, <strong>the</strong> “Price Drop” private brand<br />

is located al<strong>on</strong>gside a branded competitor <strong>on</strong> deal<br />

that is <strong>on</strong>ly pennies more expensive—<strong>on</strong>ce again<br />

creating c<strong>on</strong>fusi<strong>on</strong> and something of a muddled<br />

value propositi<strong>on</strong>.<br />

As with any price initiative, speculati<strong>on</strong> has been<br />

rife that Tesco might well have manipulated<br />

prices in an upward directi<strong>on</strong> ahead of <strong>the</strong> Big<br />

Price drop, or has used <strong>the</strong> campaign in a less<br />

than straightforward way to actually engineer <strong>the</strong>


average selling price in an upward directi<strong>on</strong>. A<br />

4-pint bottle of milk was at £1.43 before <strong>the</strong> Price<br />

Drop, with a 3 for £3 multi-buy also available. The<br />

Price Drop saw <strong>the</strong> price fall from £1.43 to £1.25,<br />

although <strong>the</strong> multi-buy was removed (meaning<br />

that for some shoppers, <strong>the</strong> Price Drop here was<br />

actually a 25% Price Increase). Elsewhere, milk<br />

is 2 for £2 at Asda and 3 for £3 at Sainsbury’s<br />

and Morris<strong>on</strong>s. One of Brasher’s comments at<br />

<strong>the</strong> launch was: “We’re giving customers a more<br />

straightforward shop—reducing <strong>the</strong> number of<br />

promoti<strong>on</strong>s and putting <strong>the</strong> emphasis <strong>on</strong> clear and<br />

reliable savings that every<strong>on</strong>e can benefit from.”<br />

With milk, <strong>the</strong>re are certainly less promoti<strong>on</strong>s,<br />

but we’re not c<strong>on</strong>vinced <strong>on</strong> <strong>the</strong> “clear and reliable<br />

savings” comp<strong>on</strong>ent.<br />

Perhaps <strong>the</strong> most c<strong>on</strong>troversial aspect of <strong>the</strong><br />

initiative—at least to <strong>the</strong> mind of Sainsbury’s,<br />

which described <strong>the</strong> move as “giving with <strong>on</strong>e<br />

hand and taking away with ano<strong>the</strong>r”—has been <strong>the</strong><br />

removal of Double Clubcard points (effectively a 2%<br />

retrospective discount given to shoppers in voucher<br />

format). The 2% has been halved to <strong>the</strong> traditi<strong>on</strong>al<br />

1%, but Tesco has increased <strong>the</strong> “exchange<br />

rates” available to Clubcard holders for trips to<br />

restaurants and <strong>the</strong>me parks. Quite how restaurant<br />

and <strong>the</strong>me park discounts sit with Brasher’s<br />

asserti<strong>on</strong> that “across <strong>the</strong> country people are saying<br />

<strong>the</strong>y need more help with <strong>the</strong> cost of living. With<br />

rising utility bills and soaring petrol prices, families<br />

are having to cut back <strong>on</strong> <strong>the</strong> staples, not just <strong>the</strong><br />

extras” is ano<strong>the</strong>r questi<strong>on</strong> altoge<strong>the</strong>r.<br />

Sainsbury’s proposed £350 milli<strong>on</strong> as a valid<br />

estimate of how much Tesco would be saving by<br />

axing double Clubcard points, suggesting that <strong>the</strong><br />

£500 milli<strong>on</strong> “investment” in <strong>the</strong> Price Drop was<br />

largely a reallocati<strong>on</strong> of marketing spend ra<strong>the</strong>r<br />

than a meaningfully aggressive price reducti<strong>on</strong><br />

programme. In February <str<strong>on</strong>g>2011</str<strong>on</strong>g>, <strong>the</strong> week that<br />

Brasher took <strong>the</strong> reins as UK CEO, Tesco unveiled<br />

a £200 milli<strong>on</strong> price-cutting programme. The<br />

previous October, it unleashed an £800 milli<strong>on</strong> price<br />

reducti<strong>on</strong>/promoti<strong>on</strong>al programme, preceded by a<br />

£280 milli<strong>on</strong> round of price cuts in December 2009<br />

and £250 milli<strong>on</strong> in November 2009. So, taking out<br />

<strong>the</strong> purported £350 milli<strong>on</strong> saving from halving<br />

Clubcard points, <strong>the</strong> resultant £150 milli<strong>on</strong> price<br />

investment appears relatively modest in c<strong>on</strong>trast<br />

to <strong>the</strong> £1.5 billi<strong>on</strong> that preceded it over <strong>the</strong> previous<br />

two years.<br />

The issue with <strong>the</strong> Big Price Drop programme<br />

is that it indicates to us that Tesco c<strong>on</strong>tinues to<br />

preoccupy itself with retaining UK margin ra<strong>the</strong>r<br />

than regaining market share. Its sleight of hand that<br />

sees Clubcard points being halved will generate<br />

substantial annual savings (<strong>the</strong> Double points<br />

scheme was initially launched in Summer 2009)<br />

and will undoubtedly benefit Tesco’s profitability.<br />

While £500 milli<strong>on</strong> is a big number, Tesco’s main<br />

goal is to increase its return <strong>on</strong> capital: a genuinely<br />

destructive price war that eroded gross margin<br />

would not have sat well with this aspirati<strong>on</strong>.<br />

Breakthrough Insights 43


Safeway’s Strategic<br />

In-Store Marketing<br />

By: Alida Destrempe / Photo album originally published: September 11, <str<strong>on</strong>g>2011</str<strong>on</strong>g><br />

Safeway is <strong>on</strong>e of <strong>the</strong> largest food and drug retailers in <strong>the</strong> United States. The retailer’s core market is <strong>the</strong><br />

Western half of <strong>the</strong> US, with approximately 30% of its store base located in California. Historically, Safeway’s<br />

growth has been driven by factors such as sales, cost reducti<strong>on</strong>s, and private brand innovati<strong>on</strong>. Yet since <strong>the</strong><br />

downturn of <strong>the</strong> ec<strong>on</strong>omy, Safeway has suffered from financial distress, losing its value percepti<strong>on</strong> <strong>on</strong> top of<br />

store traffic.<br />

Today, Safeway is in <strong>the</strong> process of changing shoppers’ c<strong>on</strong>cepti<strong>on</strong>s of it being too expensive. The retailer has<br />

developed several new and creative marketing campaigns to separate itself from its competitors in order to<br />

help persuade buying behaviors.<br />

Safeway “Ready in Three”<br />

In 2010, Safeway launched<br />

“Ready in 3 or It’s Free,” a<br />

campaign for its in-store,<br />

prepared meals offering. It<br />

appears that <strong>the</strong> retailer is<br />

attempting to align itself better<br />

to current shopping trends by<br />

offering products for quick,<br />

c<strong>on</strong>venient shopping trips. The<br />

signs and ordering department<br />

44 44 Breakthrough Breakthrough Insights Insights


are located near <strong>the</strong> entrance to enhance c<strong>on</strong>venience.<br />

Prepared Meals Marketing<br />

Quality produce, a scratch bakery,<br />

a deli with an ordering department,<br />

cheese bar, and seafood are comm<strong>on</strong>ly<br />

found around Safeway’s perimeter.<br />

Many stores feature prepared meals,<br />

but Safeway has used its prepared<br />

foods as an additi<strong>on</strong> to its catering<br />

services. The “quick additi<strong>on</strong>s to<br />

any party” tag line places fur<strong>the</strong>r<br />

emphasis <strong>on</strong> pre-packed and pre-cut<br />

party platters from its Signature Café<br />

label. The retailer also has cleverly<br />

positi<strong>on</strong>ed its marketing in an area<br />

of <strong>the</strong> store that has high traffic and<br />

volume.<br />

Safeway Pantry Essentials<br />

Safeway is currently transiti<strong>on</strong>ing some<br />

Value Red private label products into<br />

a new label called Pantry Essentials.<br />

The new label is slowly being revealed<br />

as items from <strong>the</strong> retailer’s Value Red,<br />

low-price brand are absorbed into<br />

<strong>the</strong> brand. It appears that Safeway is<br />

re-assorting its current private brand<br />

structure to create a solid mid-tier<br />

brand. Safeway has created in-store<br />

marketing, such as shelf talkers, to<br />

help introduce <strong>the</strong> new brand through<br />

<strong>the</strong> transiti<strong>on</strong>.<br />

Breakthrough Breakthrough Insights Insights 45 45


Safeway Kitchens<br />

At <strong>the</strong> beginning of <str<strong>on</strong>g>2011</str<strong>on</strong>g>, Safeway<br />

launched Safeway Kitchens, an additi<strong>on</strong><br />

to its line of private labels. The label<br />

features bread and bakery products,<br />

which are marketed through a crossmerchandising<br />

tactic. Safeway not <strong>on</strong>ly<br />

advertises <strong>the</strong> new product through<br />

shelf talkers, but places <strong>the</strong> marketing<br />

signs with o<strong>the</strong>r Safeway brands that<br />

pair well with <strong>the</strong> new bakery line.<br />

Cupcakes & Wine<br />

It appears that Safeway has built a<br />

str<strong>on</strong>g supplier relati<strong>on</strong>ship through its<br />

“Cupcakes and Wine” marketing campaign<br />

in <strong>the</strong> bakery department. The retailer<br />

created its own specialty, gourmet<br />

cupcakes that would pair well with <strong>the</strong><br />

nati<strong>on</strong>al brand wine. The campaign<br />

includes signage as well as supplier<br />

funded merchandising displays around <strong>the</strong><br />

bakery/wine department. Safeway has an<br />

extensive wine collecti<strong>on</strong>, where suppliers<br />

are challenged in getting a message out<br />

to catch <strong>the</strong> shopper. With a category<br />

that creates so much “white noise,” this<br />

marketing campaign is a smart way to<br />

show product attributes, as well as catch<br />

<strong>the</strong> attenti<strong>on</strong> of shoppers.<br />

46 46 Breakthrough Breakthrough Insights Insights


Health & Wellness Interrupters<br />

Safeway has incorporated large<br />

interrupters that assist in delineating<br />

products within <strong>the</strong> dairy case. Safeway<br />

categorizes its products by “proactive<br />

health,””organic/natural,” “light,” all<br />

messages that promote wellness. For<br />

a retailer that has a str<strong>on</strong>g health and<br />

wellness initiative, <strong>the</strong>se marketing<br />

signs are practical and can assist<br />

shoppers in making healthy shopping<br />

decisi<strong>on</strong>s. This illustrates Safeway’s<br />

ability to take c<strong>on</strong>venti<strong>on</strong>al marketing<br />

and align it to in-store initiatives.<br />

Safeway New Items<br />

Safeway recently added in-aisle<br />

displays to its mix of merchandising in<br />

order to better market newer products.<br />

It is essential for retailers to provide<br />

different forms of marketing when<br />

incorporating new merchandise to its<br />

existing product mix and call attenti<strong>on</strong><br />

to shoppers. Whe<strong>the</strong>r that product<br />

will be successful is dependent up<strong>on</strong><br />

how shoppers resp<strong>on</strong>d, so it is a smart<br />

marketing tool for shoppers to easily<br />

recognize new items.<br />

Breakthrough Breakthrough Insights Insights 47 47


Safeway’s Promise Campaign<br />

In 2009, Safeway revamped its pricing<br />

strategy and developed <strong>the</strong> “Promise<br />

Campaign,” which offered low prices<br />

<strong>on</strong> “thousands of products.” The<br />

retailer invested heavily in advertising<br />

<strong>the</strong> new, low-price positi<strong>on</strong>, yet still<br />

struggles with how that percepti<strong>on</strong><br />

ended up playing out. Today, <strong>the</strong> yellow<br />

“everyday low price” signs remain a<br />

prominent marketing scheme within<br />

stores. Signs call out specific products<br />

and point to where <strong>the</strong>y are in <strong>the</strong><br />

aisle. Safeway does a fairly good job at<br />

promoting lower prices at a store level.<br />

The main issue is <strong>the</strong> price shoppers<br />

actually see <strong>on</strong> <strong>the</strong> shelf, and whe<strong>the</strong>r<br />

<strong>the</strong>y recognize Safeway as having a<br />

lower price within <strong>the</strong> market.<br />

Enhanced Media Gallery: <strong>Retail</strong> Photos,<br />

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Bringing our insights to life<br />

Explore new stores and formats and global innovative merchandising trends without<br />

having to leave your desk with our interactive Media Gallery! The enhanced Media Gallery<br />

seamlessly integrates dynamic photos and albums throughout <strong>the</strong> <strong>Kantar</strong> <strong>Retail</strong> iQ<br />

website. Improved functi<strong>on</strong>ality allows user to better explore our photos and albums,<br />

as well as easily download, save to myiQ or email photos and albums. Learn from our<br />

expert’s as <strong>the</strong>y analyze, compare and c<strong>on</strong>trast various retail competitors with our photo<br />

albums. Gain insights into new and seas<strong>on</strong>al trends and best practices in merchandising<br />

and marketing by browsing through our rich photo library.<br />

48 48 Breakthrough Breakthrough Insights Insights


Bey<strong>on</strong>d <strong>the</strong> Box: Costco’s<br />

Digital Dive<br />

By: Sara Al-Tukhaim / Originally published: August 9, <str<strong>on</strong>g>2011</str<strong>on</strong>g><br />

L<strong>on</strong>g-praised (and often prodded) as a c<strong>on</strong>sistent and disciplined retailer, Costco<br />

seldom departs from its proven and successful model. While <strong>the</strong> “if it ain’t broke,<br />

d<strong>on</strong>’t fix it” mentality has served <strong>the</strong>m well through <strong>the</strong> years, <strong>the</strong> combinati<strong>on</strong> of an<br />

aging member base al<strong>on</strong>g with <strong>the</strong> emergence and adopti<strong>on</strong> of new technologies has<br />

prompted Costco to leverage more innovative member appeals to stay c<strong>on</strong>nected in<br />

a digital world. As this article reveals, Costco’s recent initiatives in <strong>the</strong> digital realm<br />

point to key shifts in strategy moving forward.<br />

Breakthrough Insights 49


Ranging from <strong>the</strong> mundane (e.g., creati<strong>on</strong> of<br />

a Facebook page) to <strong>the</strong> more innovative (e.g.,<br />

testing of sharing-enabled Web videos), Costco has<br />

significantly, albeit quietly, ramped up its memberfacing<br />

digital initiatives during <strong>the</strong> last two years<br />

(Figure 1). Costco’s efforts signify an important<br />

departure from its c<strong>on</strong>servative adherence to <strong>the</strong><br />

no-frills club model and open up <strong>the</strong> possibility of<br />

extending member value through digital means in<br />

and bey<strong>on</strong>d <strong>the</strong> club.<br />

In seeking to maximize visibility with members<br />

across <strong>the</strong>ir paths to purchase, Costco’s digital<br />

initiatives span three key touchpoints:<br />

In <strong>the</strong> Club: <strong>Kantar</strong> <strong>Retail</strong> has noted increased<br />

mobile coding both <strong>on</strong> products and <strong>on</strong> various<br />

promoti<strong>on</strong>al vehicles, like <strong>the</strong> Multi-Vendor<br />

Figure 1. Costco’s Digital Initiative Timeline<br />

• Text message offers<br />

introduced (Sept)<br />

• Mobile site<br />

launched<br />

(Nov)<br />

FALL 2010<br />

50 Breakthrough Insights<br />

WINTER 2010<br />

• Facebook page<br />

formalized<br />

Mailer (MVM) and The Costco C<strong>on</strong>necti<strong>on</strong>.<br />

On <strong>the</strong> Go: Bey<strong>on</strong>d <strong>the</strong> club, Costco has<br />

introduced text message offers, launched<br />

its mobile site, and is developing an app with<br />

several features in c<strong>on</strong>siderati<strong>on</strong>.<br />

Across <strong>the</strong> Network: Costco has taken<br />

important steps to improve member<br />

transparency and access to <strong>the</strong> retailer at home<br />

and via emerging digital touchpoints, including<br />

increased m<strong>on</strong>itoring of and resp<strong>on</strong>siveness to<br />

social networking platforms.<br />

In <strong>the</strong> Club<br />

Mobile codes provide members with a platform to<br />

assess product value, <strong>the</strong>reby influencing purchase<br />

decisi<strong>on</strong>s <strong>on</strong> <strong>the</strong> spot and appealing to Costco’s<br />

upper-income, tech-savvy shopper.<br />

• Social<br />

media<br />

feedback reported in<br />

C<strong>on</strong>necti<strong>on</strong> (Apr)<br />

• Sharing-enabled<br />

Web video testing<br />

SPRING <str<strong>on</strong>g>2011</str<strong>on</strong>g><br />

SUMMER<br />

<str<strong>on</strong>g>2011</str<strong>on</strong>g>/EARLY<br />

2012<br />

• Mobile app to launch<br />

prior to year end<br />

(Aug) or<br />

early FY<br />

2012 at<br />

<strong>the</strong> latest<br />

Source: <strong>Kantar</strong> <strong>Retail</strong> research and analysis; Company reports and collateral


A. Mobile Coding <strong>on</strong> Products and Fixtures<br />

Costco’s use of mobile codes spans departments,<br />

from produce to electr<strong>on</strong>ics and seas<strong>on</strong>al. More<br />

recently, mobile coding has been found <strong>on</strong> product<br />

packaging for computerware, charcoal briquets<br />

(Figure 2), and even watermel<strong>on</strong>s, all of which<br />

extend and enhance <strong>the</strong> member experience.<br />

Mobile codes are not <strong>on</strong>ly appearing <strong>on</strong> products,<br />

but also directly above or beneath a product <strong>on</strong><br />

<strong>the</strong> store fixtures <strong>the</strong>mselves. As Figure 3 shows,<br />

this particular code provides members with <strong>the</strong><br />

opportunity to instantly compare products and<br />

reviews.<br />

B. Mobile Coding in Promoti<strong>on</strong>s<br />

Mobile codes also are increasingly prevalent in<br />

coup<strong>on</strong>s and o<strong>the</strong>r promoti<strong>on</strong>al material regularly<br />

distributed to Costco’s members.<br />

Figure 2. Using Mobile Codes to Enhance <strong>the</strong> Member<br />

Experience: A Case Study<br />

Case Study: code Links to “Costco Grilling Center”<br />

Source: <strong>Kantar</strong> <strong>Retail</strong> research and analysis; Costco multivendor<br />

mailer (March <str<strong>on</strong>g>2011</str<strong>on</strong>g>)<br />

Figure 3. Displaying Mobile Code Messaging <strong>on</strong> <strong>the</strong> Steel<br />

Source: <strong>Kantar</strong> <strong>Retail</strong> club visit (April <str<strong>on</strong>g>2011</str<strong>on</strong>g>)<br />

MVMs: Between January and May <str<strong>on</strong>g>2011</str<strong>on</strong>g> al<strong>on</strong>e,<br />

two of four Costco MVMs featured an ad with<br />

a mobile code, compared to n<strong>on</strong>e that were<br />

available <strong>the</strong> previous year—a small but key<br />

indicati<strong>on</strong> that this is a streng<strong>the</strong>ning trend.<br />

The C<strong>on</strong>necti<strong>on</strong>: Most recently, Costco also<br />

began featuring mobile codes in its C<strong>on</strong>necti<strong>on</strong><br />

magazine, leveraging a 2D barcode (in at least<br />

two separate locati<strong>on</strong>s) that links members<br />

directly to <strong>the</strong> issue’s <strong>on</strong>line editi<strong>on</strong>.<br />

As Figure 4 shows, <strong>the</strong> use of mobile codes in<br />

Costco’s promoti<strong>on</strong>al material provides a broader<br />

platform for vendors to dem<strong>on</strong>strate <strong>the</strong> value-add<br />

that is so vital to selling to club.<br />

On <strong>the</strong> Go<br />

In resp<strong>on</strong>se to a notable increase in mobile device<br />

traffic to its site, Costco has significantly ramped up<br />

its mobile strategy to become and stay relevant to<br />

its tech-savvy member base.<br />

A. Introducti<strong>on</strong> of Text Message Offers<br />

To increase <strong>on</strong>line and in-club traffic and improve<br />

Breakthrough Insights 51


Figure 4. Using Mobile Codes to Dem<strong>on</strong>strate Value<br />

Source: Costco Multi-Vendor Mailers (February and March <str<strong>on</strong>g>2011</str<strong>on</strong>g>)<br />

TAKEAWAY: In <strong>the</strong> Club<br />

The use of mobile coding <strong>on</strong> products and fixtures<br />

and within promoti<strong>on</strong>s provides Costco vendors with<br />

cost-effective means to extend <strong>the</strong> club offer and<br />

dem<strong>on</strong>strate unique added value.<br />

Mobile coding <strong>on</strong> products offers members a<br />

real-time resp<strong>on</strong>se to lingering questi<strong>on</strong>s that<br />

may o<strong>the</strong>rwise inhibit purchase—questi<strong>on</strong>s<br />

that may be addressed in <strong>the</strong> form of a<br />

soluti<strong>on</strong>, pricing transparency, and/or extended<br />

dem<strong>on</strong>strati<strong>on</strong> of unique value.<br />

Mobile codes in promoti<strong>on</strong>s provide a quick,<br />

relatively cost-efficient way for vendors to<br />

dem<strong>on</strong>strate product value and maximize<br />

member appeal where space for messaging<br />

and promoti<strong>on</strong>al signage is o<strong>the</strong>rwise tight, as<br />

<strong>the</strong>se examples illustrate.<br />

When combined with broader social media and/or<br />

club-specific initiatives, mobile codes pose unique<br />

opportunities to innovate in club and deepen your<br />

alignment with Costco bey<strong>on</strong>d <strong>the</strong> product itself.<br />

52 Breakthrough Insights<br />

overall ticket values, Costco began delivering text<br />

message offers in September 2010 to members who<br />

opt in to <strong>the</strong>m (Figure 5). Distributed at a maximum<br />

of eight messages per m<strong>on</strong>th, <strong>the</strong> offers share <strong>the</strong><br />

following features:<br />

New and Featured Items: These offers appeal<br />

to members with a promise that <strong>the</strong>y “will be<br />

<strong>the</strong> first to learn about new + featured items @<br />

Costco.”<br />

Calls to Acti<strong>on</strong>: Texts heavily promote MVMs,<br />

seas<strong>on</strong>al items, <strong>on</strong>line exclusives, Costco<br />

services, and Kirkland Signature products.<br />

Club Openings and Happenings: Alerts for new<br />

club openings, closures, and local road shows<br />

or demos are provided.<br />

For Costco, <strong>the</strong> introducti<strong>on</strong> of text message offers<br />

extends an essential comp<strong>on</strong>ent of its model—its<br />

reliance <strong>on</strong> member-driven word of mouth.<br />

Figure 5. Examples of Costco’s Text Message Offers<br />

Source: <strong>Kantar</strong> <strong>Retail</strong> analysis of Costco text message offers;<br />

Costco.com


B. Mobile Site Launch<br />

In resp<strong>on</strong>se to a 1400% increase in mobile-device<br />

traffic to its PC site, Costco launched its mobile<br />

site in November 2010 (Figure 6). The site currently<br />

enables users to:<br />

Shop costco.com “<strong>on</strong> <strong>the</strong> go”<br />

Access <strong>on</strong>line product descripti<strong>on</strong>s, shipping<br />

informati<strong>on</strong>, and reviews<br />

Identify <strong>the</strong> nearest club warehouses<br />

Check <strong>the</strong> status of <strong>the</strong>ir current order(s)<br />

Learn what is new at <strong>the</strong> clubs<br />

Browse The Costco C<strong>on</strong>necti<strong>on</strong><br />

Costco’s launch of its mobile site aligned with its<br />

introducti<strong>on</strong> of text message to promote <strong>on</strong>-<strong>the</strong>-go<br />

holiday shopping. Currently, Costco is promoting its<br />

mobile site through its website and Facebook pages.<br />

Figure 6. Costco.com Mobile Web Features<br />

C. Smart Ph<strong>on</strong>e App in Development<br />

A natural progressi<strong>on</strong> for any retailer in today’s<br />

digital world, Costco has indicated that it will<br />

launch a smart ph<strong>on</strong>e applicati<strong>on</strong> (app) at some<br />

point in fiscal <str<strong>on</strong>g>2011</str<strong>on</strong>g> (ending August 28). Costco is<br />

c<strong>on</strong>sidering several features for <strong>the</strong> app (Figure 7)<br />

and has probed member preferences for <strong>the</strong> types<br />

of informati<strong>on</strong> that would be most valuable to <strong>the</strong>m.<br />

The development of a Costco app is eventful<br />

but not surprising given its members’ growing<br />

technological savviness. Nearly <strong>on</strong>e third (30%) of<br />

Costco members own a smart ph<strong>on</strong>e, compared<br />

with 25% of all shoppers (according to <strong>Kantar</strong><br />

<strong>Retail</strong>’s ShopperScape® survey of members<br />

shopping m<strong>on</strong>thly at <strong>the</strong> retailer in 2010)—and this<br />

figure is <strong>on</strong> <strong>the</strong> rise.<br />

Source: Costco.com (May and August <str<strong>on</strong>g>2011</str<strong>on</strong>g>)<br />

Breakthrough Insights 53


Figure 7. Smart Ph<strong>on</strong>e App for Costco: Features in<br />

TAKEAWAY: In <strong>the</strong> Club<br />

54 Breakthrough Insights<br />

Note: Features are grouped according to categories established by <strong>Kantar</strong> <strong>Retail</strong><br />

Note: Features are grouped according to categories established by <strong>Kantar</strong> <strong>Retail</strong><br />

Source: <strong>Kantar</strong> <strong>Retail</strong> research and analysis; Costco C<strong>on</strong>necti<strong>on</strong> (October 2010)<br />

Costco’s efforts to go mobile pose opportunities for suppliers to co-promote, tie-in to social media, and c<strong>on</strong>duct more<br />

sophisticated member data analysis.<br />

In “mobilizing” word of mouth through text message offers, Costco not <strong>on</strong>ly fur<strong>the</strong>r promotes <strong>the</strong> value of its<br />

membership but also empowers <strong>the</strong> members to pass <strong>on</strong> (forward) <strong>the</strong> word (text) at <strong>the</strong> click of a butt<strong>on</strong>. For<br />

vendors, Costco’s text offers also help validate participati<strong>on</strong> in MVMs and seas<strong>on</strong>al promoti<strong>on</strong>s.<br />

With plans to launch apps for BlackBerry, Android, and iPh<strong>on</strong>e, despite <strong>the</strong> lack of Apple products in its<br />

clubs, Costco’s app will serve as a key vehicle for communicating with and appealing to members, in additi<strong>on</strong> to<br />

enhancing <strong>on</strong>line traffic and sales.<br />

Suppliers seeking to partner with Costco should leverage <strong>the</strong>se mobile opportunities to engage Costco’s member<br />

base at this increasingly significant touchpoint al<strong>on</strong>g <strong>the</strong> path to purchase.


Across <strong>the</strong> Network<br />

Over <strong>the</strong> last several m<strong>on</strong>ths, Costco has taken<br />

important steps to provide members with greater<br />

transparency and access to <strong>the</strong> typically hands-off<br />

retailer, while increasing oversight and m<strong>on</strong>itoring<br />

of its <strong>on</strong>line and social media presence.<br />

A. Formalizati<strong>on</strong> of Social Media Platforms<br />

Despite being late to <strong>the</strong> game, Costco entered <strong>the</strong><br />

social media realm with <strong>the</strong> launch of its Facebook<br />

page toward <strong>the</strong> end of 2010. Costco’s presence <strong>on</strong><br />

Facebook, its <strong>on</strong>ly formal social media platform<br />

to date, provides important insight into <strong>the</strong> roles it<br />

seeks to play with its member in <strong>the</strong> digital realm.<br />

Facilitator: Facebook as a member-to-member<br />

and vendor-to-member platform<br />

Moderator: Facebook as a platform for<br />

empowering “<strong>the</strong> collective voice of a porti<strong>on</strong> of<br />

<strong>the</strong> member community”<br />

Promoter: Facebook as a platform for<br />

promoting seas<strong>on</strong>al offers, regularly distributed<br />

MVMs, and mobile site access and awareness<br />

Researcher: Facebook as a platform for<br />

understanding member and visitor interests<br />

(e.g., via live polls)<br />

As Figure 8 highlights, many of <strong>the</strong> features of<br />

Costco’s Facebook page are focused <strong>on</strong> creating<br />

a dialogue with and am<strong>on</strong>g members while also<br />

appealing to prospective members.<br />

Through <str<strong>on</strong>g>2011</str<strong>on</strong>g>, Costco has c<strong>on</strong>tinued to probe social<br />

media and technology usage am<strong>on</strong>g its members,<br />

Figure 8. Formalizati<strong>on</strong> of Costco’s Facebook Page<br />

Source: Costco’s official Facebook page (May <str<strong>on</strong>g>2011</str<strong>on</strong>g>)<br />

indicating it is carefully m<strong>on</strong>itoring how its<br />

members relate to Costco bey<strong>on</strong>d <strong>the</strong> club. Specific<br />

areas of focus have included members’ social<br />

network usage and adopti<strong>on</strong> of technologies such<br />

as smartph<strong>on</strong>es and tablets. Most recently, Costco<br />

has been testing <strong>the</strong> use of sharing-enabled web<br />

videos as an <strong>on</strong>line promoti<strong>on</strong>al vehicle—revealing<br />

a willingness to innovate bey<strong>on</strong>d <strong>the</strong> traditi<strong>on</strong>al<br />

adherence to its model.<br />

B. Incorporati<strong>on</strong> of Social Media Feedback<br />

Not <strong>on</strong>ly is Costco m<strong>on</strong>itoring its <strong>on</strong>line presence,<br />

it is actively incorporating social media feedback<br />

and commentary through key promoti<strong>on</strong>al vehicles,<br />

such as The Costco C<strong>on</strong>necti<strong>on</strong>. In a first for <strong>the</strong><br />

C<strong>on</strong>necti<strong>on</strong>, Costco began regularly featuring<br />

Breakthrough Insights 55


“Off-<strong>the</strong>-Network” member comments starting<br />

with its April <str<strong>on</strong>g>2011</str<strong>on</strong>g> issue. As Figure 9 shows, <strong>the</strong>se<br />

comments originate from member Twitter feeds<br />

and blogs, proving to readers that even when <strong>the</strong>y<br />

are not in club, Costco “gets” <strong>the</strong>m.<br />

Figure 9. A First for <strong>the</strong> C<strong>on</strong>necti<strong>on</strong>: “Off-<strong>the</strong>-Network”<br />

56 56 Breakthrough Breakthrough Insights Insights<br />

Source: Costco C<strong>on</strong>necti<strong>on</strong> (April <str<strong>on</strong>g>2011</str<strong>on</strong>g>)<br />

<strong>Kantar</strong> <strong>Retail</strong> Point of View<br />

TAKEAWAY: Across <strong>the</strong> Network<br />

Nurturing relati<strong>on</strong>ships with members is essential to<br />

<strong>the</strong> success of a limited assortment, renewal-driven<br />

retailer such as Costco; this goal has no doubt driven<br />

its growing attenti<strong>on</strong> to social media.<br />

In formalizing and m<strong>on</strong>itoring its digital<br />

presence, Costco is doing what is so vital to its<br />

model: Affirming itself as a retailer who “gets”<br />

its members—accordingly, it will prioritize those<br />

vendors who equally “get” <strong>the</strong>m and who can<br />

translate this understanding <strong>on</strong>line.<br />

Costco is looking to <strong>the</strong> social network to<br />

empower its members: <str<strong>on</strong>g>Focus</str<strong>on</strong>g>ed <strong>on</strong> extending its<br />

reach, Costco is leveraging <strong>the</strong> digital network<br />

to empower current members, attract new<br />

members and promote soluti<strong>on</strong>s—It will expect<br />

similar behavior of its suppliers.<br />

Costco is clearly keeping a close eye <strong>on</strong> member<br />

adopti<strong>on</strong> of social networks, despite a past reluctance<br />

to jump <strong>on</strong> <strong>the</strong> digital bandwag<strong>on</strong>. This will pose<br />

unique opportunities for suppliers with <strong>the</strong> foresight<br />

to extend and deepen Costco’s dialogue with members<br />

bey<strong>on</strong>d <strong>the</strong> box.<br />

Costco’s recent digital initiatives reveal much more than a growing digital sophisticati<strong>on</strong>; <strong>the</strong>y signify a notable<br />

transiti<strong>on</strong> from its usual hands-off approach to member outreach toward <strong>the</strong> more dynamic and formalized facilitati<strong>on</strong><br />

of member interacti<strong>on</strong>. Given <strong>the</strong> time it has taken Costco to get here, <strong>the</strong> questi<strong>on</strong> remains: Why now?<br />

Despite its success, Costco is c<strong>on</strong>tending with a more intense battle for members’ share of wallet today than in<br />

<strong>the</strong> past. A number of marketplace dynamics are in flux:<br />

More intense competitive landscape: Ec<strong>on</strong>omic uncertainty has aggravated <strong>the</strong> competitive pressure<br />

that Costco faces, especially <strong>on</strong>line, where much of its <strong>on</strong>line-<strong>on</strong>ly assortment tends to be discreti<strong>on</strong>ary.<br />

This is most apparent in Costco members’ increasing propensity to also shop <strong>on</strong> Amaz<strong>on</strong>. According to<br />

ShopperScape®, <strong>the</strong> percentage of Costco members who regularly shop Amaz<strong>on</strong> jumped from 38.4% in<br />

2009 to 47.5% in 2010. With competitive pricing and comparable products to Costco, <strong>the</strong> threat of Amaz<strong>on</strong><br />

has intensified <strong>the</strong> need for its vendors to dem<strong>on</strong>strate unique club product, value, and experience.


More fiscally c<strong>on</strong>scious, tech-savvy shoppers: As members have become more fiscally c<strong>on</strong>scious, <strong>the</strong>y<br />

have not <strong>on</strong>ly shifted <strong>the</strong>ir spending toward less discreti<strong>on</strong>ary, smaller ticket items, but <strong>the</strong>y also are much<br />

more adept at using social media and mobile technology to enable <strong>the</strong>m to compare across retailers to<br />

obtain <strong>the</strong> best prices.<br />

More digitally engaged members: Member behavior is undergoing a key shift, forcing Costco to rec<strong>on</strong>sider<br />

how it attracts, engages, and retains members. Between 2010 and <str<strong>on</strong>g>2011</str<strong>on</strong>g> al<strong>on</strong>e, <strong>the</strong> percentage of club<br />

members who purchased a product <strong>on</strong>line jumped from 64% to 71%; those who spent time <strong>on</strong> social<br />

networks increased from 45% to 52%; those who researched a product <strong>on</strong>line prior to in-store purchase<br />

grew from 48% to 54%; and those who accessed a retailer site <strong>on</strong> <strong>the</strong>ir mobile device increased from 8% to<br />

14% (Source: ShopperScape®).<br />

To resp<strong>on</strong>d to <strong>the</strong>se and o<strong>the</strong>r marketplace shifts, it is clear that Costco needs to ramp up its digital strategy.<br />

Though <strong>on</strong>line represents a higher percentage of total sales vs. its club competitors, Costco’s <strong>on</strong>line sales growth<br />

also has historically lagged its club competitors (Figure 10). With an aggressive goal to reach USD 5 billi<strong>on</strong> in<br />

<strong>on</strong>line sales in <strong>the</strong> next five to 10 years (compared with <strong>the</strong> USD 1.8 billi<strong>on</strong> it produced in 2010), Costco will have to<br />

increase its pace of growth.<br />

57 Breakthrough Insights<br />

Figure 10. Costco’s Online Sales<br />

0.3%<br />

0.1%<br />

0.0%<br />

Online Sales as % of Total Sales<br />

Costco Sam's Club BJ's<br />

1.9%<br />

1.1%<br />

0.1%<br />

3.5%<br />

2.5%<br />

0.8%<br />

4.7%<br />

3.5%<br />

1.2%<br />

81 24<br />

2001 2006 <str<strong>on</strong>g>2011</str<strong>on</strong>g> E 2016 E 2001 2006 <str<strong>on</strong>g>2011</str<strong>on</strong>g> E 2016 E<br />

0<br />

Online Sales (USD, Milli<strong>on</strong>s)<br />

costco.com samsclub.com bjs.com<br />

Online<br />

Sales<br />

CAGR<br />

(USD, ‘01-’06 ‘06-’11E ‘11-’16E<br />

Milli<strong>on</strong>s)<br />

Costco 60.9% 19.8% 12.2%<br />

Sam’s 79.4% 24.2% 11.1%<br />

BJ’s N/A 52.1% 17.2%<br />

874<br />

446<br />

11<br />

2,160<br />

1,316<br />

3,836<br />

2,230<br />

Note: US sales <strong>on</strong>ly; Costco excludes Business Centers and<br />

Home; BJ’s excludes ProFoods; Sam’s Club excludes Mas<br />

Source: <strong>Kantar</strong> <strong>Retail</strong> research, analysis, and estimates<br />

90<br />

198<br />

Breakthrough Breakthrough Insights Insights 57 57


Given <strong>the</strong> word of mouth power that Costco’s members boast, this poses several implicati<strong>on</strong>s for its suppliers<br />

(Figures 11).<br />

This also poses several opportunities for Costco’s vendor partners to deepen member engagement, broaden<br />

member touchpoints, and nurture member loyalty (Figure 12).<br />

58 58 Breakthrough Breakthrough Insights Insights<br />

Figure 11. Digital-Related Implicati<strong>on</strong>s for Partnering with Costco<br />

Takeaway Implicati<strong>on</strong>(s)<br />

In <strong>the</strong> Club<br />

On <strong>the</strong> Go<br />

Across <strong>the</strong><br />

Network<br />

• Costco’s growing mobile integrati<strong>on</strong> enables <strong>the</strong> retailer to c<strong>on</strong>nect with members <strong>on</strong> a deeper level<br />

than product packaging and messaging al<strong>on</strong>e.<br />

• For a retailer whose model is based <strong>on</strong> successful member recruitment and retenti<strong>on</strong>, each<br />

opportunity to deepen its c<strong>on</strong>necti<strong>on</strong> with members is key.<br />

• For vendors, <strong>the</strong>re are several upsides to Costco’s growing use of mobile codes: It is cost-effective,<br />

easy to incorporate and, perhaps most importantly, places power in <strong>the</strong> supplier to facilitate member<br />

interacti<strong>on</strong>.<br />

• Through <strong>the</strong> introducti<strong>on</strong> of text message offers, launch of a mobile site and development of a smart<br />

ph<strong>on</strong>e app, Costco has acknowledged <strong>the</strong> need to get and stay relevant to members bey<strong>on</strong>d club<br />

walls.<br />

• Increasing member touchpoints while <strong>the</strong>y <strong>on</strong> <strong>the</strong> go provides quick and cost-effective opportunities<br />

to improve overall engagement and drive <strong>on</strong>line/in-club traffic.<br />

• For vendors, c<strong>on</strong>sider <strong>the</strong> opportunities for cross-collaborati<strong>on</strong> that Costco’s push toward digital<br />

poses.<br />

• Costco’s efforts to c<strong>on</strong>nect with members bey<strong>on</strong>d <strong>the</strong> club, such as through its Facebook page, are<br />

largely focused <strong>on</strong> creating a c<strong>on</strong>versati<strong>on</strong> with members while also appealing to prospective<br />

members.<br />

• As it c<strong>on</strong>tinues to m<strong>on</strong>itor and probe its members’ <strong>on</strong>line behaviors, vendors who understand and<br />

incorporate <strong>the</strong>se insights will serve a particular asset to <strong>the</strong> retailer.<br />

Figure 12. Digital-Related C<strong>on</strong>siderati<strong>on</strong>s for Partnering with Costco<br />

Takeaway C<strong>on</strong>siderati<strong>on</strong>(s)<br />

In <strong>the</strong> Club<br />

On <strong>the</strong> Go<br />

Across <strong>the</strong><br />

Network<br />

Source: <strong>Kantar</strong> <strong>Retail</strong> research and analysis<br />

• Create Calls to Acti<strong>on</strong>: Deepen digital engagement via mobile coding and/or social media initiatives <strong>on</strong><br />

product packaging, pallet displays or <strong>the</strong> product itself<br />

• Promote Broader Soluti<strong>on</strong>s: Rec<strong>on</strong>sider <strong>the</strong> broader, seas<strong>on</strong>al and/or more customized member<br />

soluti<strong>on</strong>s your product(s) offer and <strong>the</strong> multi-channel opportunities for promoting <strong>the</strong>m<br />

• Extend <strong>the</strong> Experience: Leverage digital to extend <strong>the</strong> in-club experience bey<strong>on</strong>d <strong>the</strong> box (e.g., use a<br />

mobile code <strong>on</strong> your pallet to direct members to a related <strong>on</strong>line initiative offered exclusively to Costco<br />

members)<br />

• Drive Traffic Online: Support Costco’s <strong>on</strong>line sales goal by driving traffic to its PC or mobile site (or<br />

partner with Costco to establish a page <strong>on</strong> its site, to which members are directed to via a text offer or<br />

mobile scan)<br />

• Enable “Word of Mouth”: Design in-club and/or <strong>on</strong>line events, initiatives and offers with <strong>the</strong> goal of<br />

sparking word of mouth, both <strong>on</strong> and off <strong>the</strong> network<br />

• M<strong>on</strong>itor Progress: Measure and dem<strong>on</strong>strate to Costco <strong>the</strong> ROI of your digital-related club efforts as<br />

<strong>the</strong>y relate to member recruitment and retenti<strong>on</strong><br />

Source: <strong>Kantar</strong> <strong>Retail</strong> research and analysis


Value Discounters C<strong>on</strong>tinue<br />

to Attract More Shoppers<br />

By: David Marcotte / Originally published: August 23, <str<strong>on</strong>g>2011</str<strong>on</strong>g><br />

Value discounters c<strong>on</strong>tinue to attract more shoppers, an extensi<strong>on</strong> of<br />

a trend that has been several years in <strong>the</strong> making. Overall, <strong>the</strong> <strong>on</strong>ly<br />

loser to date in regards to shopping penetrati<strong>on</strong> is Big Lots. With<br />

its focus <strong>on</strong> close-outs and deal merchandise, it suffers from direct<br />

competiti<strong>on</strong> from all <strong>the</strong> o<strong>the</strong>r channels that have adopted more aggressive<br />

price positi<strong>on</strong>s to appeal to recessi<strong>on</strong>-weary, value-oriented<br />

shoppers. Growth for all o<strong>the</strong>rs c<strong>on</strong>tinues to be str<strong>on</strong>g, and<br />

ShopperScape® data indicates shoppers now think of <strong>the</strong> channel as<br />

a primary and sec<strong>on</strong>dary locati<strong>on</strong> for purchasing a range of items.<br />

Breakthrough Breakthrough Insights Insights 59 59


The questi<strong>on</strong> for this group<br />

of retailers has always<br />

been success outside of <strong>the</strong><br />

recessi<strong>on</strong>. Nearly two years<br />

into <strong>the</strong> recovery after <strong>the</strong><br />

Great Recesssi<strong>on</strong> (albeit a very<br />

modest recovery), it is clear<br />

<strong>the</strong> changes made by <strong>the</strong> value<br />

discounters to stay in fr<strong>on</strong>t of<br />

c<strong>on</strong>sumer needs have worked<br />

well, and leading players have<br />

kept and grown <strong>the</strong> market<br />

share gained in hard times. The<br />

questi<strong>on</strong> that now rises is if <strong>the</strong>y<br />

will c<strong>on</strong>tinue to be successful if<br />

<strong>the</strong> ec<strong>on</strong>omy shifts to recessi<strong>on</strong><br />

again. An excellent indicator<br />

may be that many low-income<br />

shoppers now see this channel<br />

as “<strong>the</strong> best shopping opti<strong>on</strong><br />

given my pers<strong>on</strong>al ec<strong>on</strong>omic<br />

situati<strong>on</strong>.” Given <strong>the</strong> current<br />

ec<strong>on</strong>omic envir<strong>on</strong>ment, all<br />

indicati<strong>on</strong>s are that low-income<br />

shoppers will c<strong>on</strong>tinue to<br />

be significant comp<strong>on</strong>ent of<br />

shoppers overall, which is a<br />

key factor that supports <strong>Kantar</strong><br />

<strong>Retail</strong>’s str<strong>on</strong>g five-year growth<br />

forecast for <strong>the</strong> channel.<br />

Dollar General’s strategy of<br />

moving into a more predictable<br />

c<strong>on</strong>venience and groceryrich<br />

store format appears to<br />

60 Breakthrough Insights<br />

be paying off, but at <strong>the</strong> cost<br />

of general merchandise and<br />

“treasure hunting”’ sales.<br />

Dollar Tree is having equal<br />

success but far more so with<br />

<strong>the</strong> last two types of trips than<br />

grocery trips. Family Dollar is<br />

somewhere in between, with<br />

shoppers using <strong>the</strong>m for all<br />

trip types somewhat evenly.<br />

What seems not to be working<br />

for Dollar General and Family<br />

Dollar is <strong>the</strong>ir investment in<br />

store space and product quality<br />

for apparel and OTC, both which<br />

show poor scores and even<br />

willingness to experiment and<br />

try. All of <strong>the</strong>m are doing well<br />

with office and school supplies.<br />

The back-to-school period has<br />

become a major promoti<strong>on</strong><br />

and display event for each,<br />

with Dollar Tree moving to<br />

permanent aisle positi<strong>on</strong>s for<br />

<strong>the</strong>se products.<br />

Growing shopper base<br />

The value discount channel<br />

c<strong>on</strong>tinues to show str<strong>on</strong>g<br />

shopper base growth, with<br />

Dollar General and Dollar Tree<br />

sustaining growth through <str<strong>on</strong>g>2011</str<strong>on</strong>g><br />

(Figure 1). Family Dollar had<br />

<strong>the</strong> str<strong>on</strong>gest growth from 2009<br />

to 2010, but is tailing off in <str<strong>on</strong>g>2011</str<strong>on</strong>g><br />

in c<strong>on</strong>trast to competiti<strong>on</strong>. Big<br />

Lots, which took a hit during<br />

<strong>the</strong> recessi<strong>on</strong> when it had to<br />

compete with major retailers’<br />

major markdowns, c<strong>on</strong>tinues to<br />

weaken with shoppers.<br />

Figure 1. Past Four-Week Shopper Trends: Value Discount/Dollar Stores<br />

PPT Change<br />

May-09 May-10 May-11 2009-11 2010-11<br />

SMALL-FORMAT DISCOUNT (NET) 47% 49% 50% 3.1 0.8<br />

Dollar General 19% 21% 22% 3.0 1.5<br />

Family Dollar 13% 16% 17% 3.7 0.7<br />

Dollar Tree 21% 23% 25% 4.0 1.6<br />

99 cent <strong>on</strong>ly 5% 4% 5% 0.3 0.9<br />

Big Lots 13% 11% 11% -2.1 -0.9<br />

Tuesday Morning 2% 2% 2% 0.2 0.0<br />

Source: <strong>Kantar</strong> <strong>Retail</strong> ShopperScape®, May 2009, May 2010, and May <str<strong>on</strong>g>2011</str<strong>on</strong>g>


Planned general merchandise<br />

impulse trips no l<strong>on</strong>ger<br />

as important<br />

Overall, shoppers making<br />

planned trips to retailers in<br />

<strong>the</strong> channel has dropped with<br />

<strong>the</strong> slight excepti<strong>on</strong> of grocery<br />

trips (Figure 2). Though<br />

down from 2008, planned<br />

general merchandise trips<br />

have recovered slightly from<br />

2010, but treasure hunting<br />

has dropped c<strong>on</strong>siderably,<br />

reflecting Dollar General<br />

and Family Dollar’s move to<br />

predictable value and stock-up<br />

grocery opti<strong>on</strong>s.<br />

Dollar Tree’s evoluti<strong>on</strong><br />

drives planed general<br />

merchandise trips<br />

The pattern of trips shoppers<br />

make to Dollar Tree shows<br />

<strong>the</strong> trade-offs of going with<br />

a richer mix of products in<br />

standard store formats results<br />

in greatly improved grocery<br />

scores overall but with a<br />

discernable hit to <strong>the</strong> bargainhunting<br />

trips that in <strong>the</strong> past<br />

have been so profitable (Figure<br />

3). Dollar General c<strong>on</strong>tinues to<br />

push its general merchandise<br />

offer with marketing and via<br />

Figure 2. Reas<strong>on</strong>s for Last Value Discount/Dollar Store Trip*<br />

(am<strong>on</strong>g shoppers who shopped a value discount/dollar store in past 4 weeks)<br />

35%<br />

31%<br />

25%<br />

19%<br />

16%<br />

17%<br />

Planned general Impulse trip; no Planned grocery<br />

merchandise trip particular<br />

purchase in mind<br />

fill-in trip<br />

2008 <str<strong>on</strong>g>2011</str<strong>on</strong>g><br />

15% 16%<br />

25%<br />

15%<br />

Planned grocery Planned bargain-<br />

stock-up trip hunting/treasure<br />

hunt trip<br />

16%<br />

12%<br />

Some o<strong>the</strong>r<br />

reas<strong>on</strong><br />

*Multiple answers allowed<br />

Source: <strong>Kantar</strong> <strong>Retail</strong> ShopperScape®, May 2009, May 2010, and May <str<strong>on</strong>g>2011</str<strong>on</strong>g><br />

Figure 3. Reas<strong>on</strong>s for Last Value Discount/Dollar Store Trip*<br />

31%<br />

28%<br />

32%<br />

35%<br />

19%<br />

Planned general<br />

merchandise trip<br />

19%<br />

15%<br />

16%<br />

21%<br />

30%<br />

Impulse trip; no<br />

Particular<br />

purchase in<br />

mind<br />

17%<br />

26%<br />

19%<br />

13%<br />

Planned<br />

grocery<br />

fill-in trip<br />

7%<br />

16%<br />

19%<br />

15%<br />

14%<br />

Planned<br />

grocery<br />

stock-up<br />

trip<br />

All Shoppers Dollar General Family Dollar Dollar Tree Big Lots<br />

9%<br />

15%<br />

9%<br />

17%<br />

14%<br />

Planned<br />

bargainhunting/<br />

treasure<br />

hunt trip<br />

24%<br />

*Multiple resp<strong>on</strong>ses allowed<br />

Source: <strong>Kantar</strong> <strong>Retail</strong> ShopperScape®, May <str<strong>on</strong>g>2011</str<strong>on</strong>g><br />

Breakthrough Insights 61


store placement; <strong>the</strong> retailer<br />

especially focuses <strong>on</strong> general<br />

merchandise soluti<strong>on</strong> areas<br />

such as school supplies and<br />

hobbies.<br />

Younger shoppers using <strong>the</strong><br />

channel for grocery shopping<br />

Using <strong>the</strong> channel for general<br />

merchandise shopping is<br />

under-indexed in shopper<br />

groups younger than 45, while<br />

shoppers 18- to 24-years-<br />

62 Breakthrough Insights<br />

old over-index significantly<br />

in impulse and grocery trips<br />

(Figure 4), ano<strong>the</strong>r sign that<br />

younger generati<strong>on</strong> shoppers<br />

are changing <strong>the</strong>ir selecti<strong>on</strong><br />

criteria for grocery shopping<br />

in general. Though bargain<br />

hunting trips are less prevalent<br />

overall, <strong>the</strong>y still register as<br />

part of <strong>the</strong> shopping expectati<strong>on</strong><br />

in <strong>the</strong> channel.<br />

Figure 4. Reas<strong>on</strong>s for Last Value Discount/Dollar Store Trip*, By Age<br />

(Shoppers who shopped a value discount/dollar store in past m<strong>on</strong>th)<br />

Shopping behavior patterns<br />

by income do not lead to <strong>the</strong><br />

expected relati<strong>on</strong>ship between<br />

wealth and shopping<br />

this channel<br />

The expectati<strong>on</strong> that lowerincome<br />

shoppers are <strong>the</strong><br />

core of <strong>the</strong> discount channel<br />

weakens when higher-income<br />

shoppers are clearly shopping<br />

<strong>the</strong> channel for planned general<br />

merchandise trips and impulse<br />

shopping (Figure 5). Though<br />

higher income shoppers shy<br />

away from food trips, <strong>the</strong>y<br />

Over/Under-Index vs. All past four-week value discount shoppers (index +/- 10% shaded)<br />

Over-index by >10% Under-Index by >10%<br />

Past 4-<br />

Baby<br />

Week<br />

Gen Y Gen X Boomers Seniors<br />

Value<br />

(born (born (born (born<br />

Discount<br />

1982 to 1965 to 1946 to before<br />

Shoppers 18-24 25-34 35-44 45-54 55-64 65+ 2002) 1981) 1964) 1946)<br />

Planned general merchandise<br />

trip<br />

31% 25 95 85 97 119 125 58 91 108 125<br />

Impulse trip; no particular<br />

purchase in mind<br />

19% 132 88 92 97 121 90 100 95 109 90<br />

Planned grocery fill-in trip 17% 128 120 111 99 102 64 122 113 101 64<br />

Planned grocery stock-up trip 16% 132 91 116 118 91 73 102 111 104 73<br />

Planned bargainhunting/treasure<br />

hunt trip<br />

15% 69 102 90 112 100 102 98 90 107 102<br />

Some o<strong>the</strong>r reas<strong>on</strong> 16% 121 120 112 84 78 104 123 112 82 104<br />

*Multiple resp<strong>on</strong>ses allowed<br />

Source: <strong>Kantar</strong> <strong>Retail</strong> ShopperScape®, May <str<strong>on</strong>g>2011</str<strong>on</strong>g>


clearly are looking to <strong>the</strong><br />

treasure hunt as part of <strong>the</strong>ir<br />

experience.<br />

Category purchasing reflects<br />

changes in merchandising in<br />

past year<br />

Greeting cards c<strong>on</strong>tinue to<br />

build a display space in value<br />

discount while <strong>the</strong> reference to<br />

household cleaners as being a<br />

“best buy” at value discounters<br />

in various c<strong>on</strong>sumer magazines<br />

has shifted that product to more<br />

endcaps and displays (Figure<br />

6). Seas<strong>on</strong>al goods have been<br />

a stable in all companies in this<br />

channel as has party supplies.<br />

One of <strong>the</strong> surprises that<br />

emerge is <strong>the</strong> rise of school/<br />

office supplies, again ano<strong>the</strong>r<br />

Figure 6. Category Purchasing at Value Discounters<br />

(am<strong>on</strong>g past 4-week value discount shoppers)<br />

Figure 5. Reas<strong>on</strong>s for Last Value Discount/Dollar Store Trip*, By Household Income<br />

(Shoppers who shopped a value discount/dollar store in past m<strong>on</strong>th)<br />

Over/Under-Index vs. All past four-week value discount shoppers (index +/- 10% shaded)<br />

Buy<br />

Category at<br />

Dollar Store<br />

D<strong>on</strong>'t Buy<br />

Category at<br />

Dollar Store<br />

Greeting cards or gift wrap/bags 77% 23%<br />

Household cleaning products 73% 27%<br />

Seas<strong>on</strong>al 72% 28%<br />

Snack foods 69% 31%<br />

Household paper products 67% 33%<br />

Candy/gum 67% 33%<br />

Party supplies 63% 37%<br />

School/home office supplies 62% 38%<br />

Small housewares 50% 50%<br />

Boxed or canned food items 49% 51%<br />

Beauty or skin care products 47% 53%<br />

Home textiles 45% 55%<br />

Soft drinks or o<strong>the</strong>r n<strong>on</strong>-alcoholic beverages 43% 57%<br />

Toys/dolls/games 38% 62%<br />

OTC drugs 35% 65%<br />

Pet food and supplies 29% 71%<br />

Adult basic apparel 24% 76%<br />

Adult casual apparel 19% 81%<br />

Baby supplies 17% 83%<br />

Kids clothing 16% 84%<br />

Infants and toddlers clothing 15% 85%<br />

Beer and wine 8% 90%<br />

Source: <strong>Kantar</strong> <strong>Retail</strong> ShopperScape®, May <str<strong>on</strong>g>2011</str<strong>on</strong>g><br />

Over-index by >10% Under-Index by >10%<br />

Past 4-Week<br />

Value Discount<br />

$25K - $50K - $75K -<br />

Shoppers


merchandising shift, especially<br />

for <strong>the</strong> back-to-school seas<strong>on</strong>.<br />

And given <strong>the</strong> investment in<br />

space in many of <strong>the</strong>se stores,<br />

<strong>the</strong> expectati<strong>on</strong> would be that<br />

clothing, pet, and OTC would do<br />

better overall.<br />

<str<strong>on</strong>g>Sec<strong>on</strong>d</str<strong>on</strong>g>ary store preferences<br />

are where <strong>the</strong> new strengths<br />

in value discount show best<br />

Bey<strong>on</strong>d greeting cards, value<br />

discounters are more likely to<br />

be a sec<strong>on</strong>dary store of choice<br />

than <strong>the</strong> primary store where<br />

shoppers purchase <strong>the</strong> category<br />

(Figure 7).<br />

The low scores against clothing,<br />

especially <strong>the</strong> high percentages<br />

of channel shoppers who d<strong>on</strong>’t<br />

buy <strong>the</strong> category <strong>the</strong>re at all is<br />

problematic for Dollar General<br />

and Family Dollar given that both<br />

retailers have doubled <strong>the</strong> space<br />

devoted to that category in many<br />

stores.<br />

Dollar Tree, with its greater<br />

coverage of stores in all<br />

neighborhoods, shows greater<br />

primary scores for basics (Figure<br />

8). About half of all Dollar Tree<br />

shoppers use <strong>the</strong> store as <strong>the</strong>ir<br />

primary store for greeting cards<br />

and party supplies.<br />

64 Breakthrough Insights<br />

Figure 7. Category Purchasing at Value Discounters<br />

(am<strong>on</strong>g past 4-week value discount shoppers)<br />

Use Dollar Store as<br />

Primary <str<strong>on</strong>g>Sec<strong>on</strong>d</str<strong>on</strong>g>ary<br />

D<strong>on</strong>'t Buy<br />

Category at<br />

Store Store Dollar Store<br />

Greeting cards or gift wrap/bags 45% 32% 23%<br />

Seas<strong>on</strong>al 34% 38% 28%<br />

Party supplies 33% 31% 37%<br />

Household cleaning products 28% 45% 27%<br />

Household paper products 24% 43% 33%<br />

Candy/gum 22% 45% 33%<br />

Snack foods 20% 48% 31%<br />

School/home office supplies 19% 43% 38%<br />

Small housewares 13% 38% 50%<br />

Beauty or skin care products 12% 35% 53%<br />

Home textiles 12% 33% 55%<br />

Soft drinks or o<strong>the</strong>r n<strong>on</strong>-alcoholic beverages 10% 33% 57%<br />

OTC drugs 10% 25% 65%<br />

Boxed or canned food items 9% 40% 51%<br />

Toys/dolls/games 8% 30% 62%<br />

Pet food and supplies 8% 21% 71%<br />

Adult basic apparel 5% 19% 76%<br />

Baby supplies 5% 13% 83%<br />

Kids clothing 4% 12% 84%<br />

Infants and toddlers clothing 3% 12% 85%<br />

Adult casual apparel 3% 16% 81%<br />

Beer and wine 2% 6% 90%<br />

Deciding factors for shopping<br />

<strong>the</strong> value channel have<br />

less to do with item pricing<br />

<strong>the</strong>n pers<strong>on</strong>al assessment of<br />

ec<strong>on</strong>omic c<strong>on</strong>diti<strong>on</strong>s<br />

Item and basket pricing are not<br />

as important as factors that<br />

drive shoppers to <strong>the</strong> channel<br />

as would be suspected, with<br />

lower-income shoppers <strong>on</strong>ly<br />

slightly more c<strong>on</strong>cerned than<br />

average and that c<strong>on</strong>cern<br />

dropping off as income levels<br />

rise (Figure 9).<br />

Source: <strong>Kantar</strong> <strong>Retail</strong> ShopperScape®, May <str<strong>on</strong>g>2011</str<strong>on</strong>g><br />

“Best shopping opti<strong>on</strong> given<br />

pers<strong>on</strong>al ec<strong>on</strong>omic situati<strong>on</strong>,”<br />

shows as <strong>the</strong> highest driver for<br />

those with household income<br />

less than $25k, closely followed<br />

by “limited assortment reduces<br />

buying temptati<strong>on</strong>s,” which<br />

appears to indicate those with<br />

a self-assessed lack of income<br />

shopping in <strong>the</strong>se stores, but<br />

not with <strong>the</strong> same feeling about<br />

low prices. Easy to shop also<br />

shows as important am<strong>on</strong>g<br />

lower-income shoppers,


Figure 8. Use Dollar Stores as Primary Store for Product/Category, By <strong>Retail</strong>er<br />

All<br />

Shoppers Dollar General<br />

Last Trip was to ...<br />

Family<br />

Dollar<br />

Dollar<br />

Tree Big Lots<br />

(a) (b) (c) (d)<br />

Greeting cards or gift wrap/bags 45% 42% bD 35% 56% ABD 32%<br />

Seas<strong>on</strong>al 34% 29% 30% 38% Abd 31%<br />

Party supplies 33% 23% 24% 45% ABD 24%<br />

Household cleaning products 28% 35% CD 34% CD 22% 18%<br />

Household paper products 24% 30% CD 27% CD 20% 17%<br />

Candy/gum 22% 25% D 22% d 21% d 15%<br />

Snack foods 20% 23% C 22% 18% 17%<br />

School/home office supplies 19% 20% D 16% 21% D 12%<br />

Small housewares 13% 13% 14% 12% 11%<br />

Beauty or skin care products 12% 14% CD 15% CD 9% 7%<br />

Home textiles 12% 12% 14% 11% 8%<br />

Soft drinks or o<strong>the</strong>r n<strong>on</strong>-alcoholic beverages 10% 12% CD 11% cD 8% 5%<br />

OTC drugs 10% 14% CD 11% C 7% 7%<br />

Boxed or canned food items 9% 10% C 8% 6% 7%<br />

Toys/dolls/games 8% 9% 6% 10% b 6%<br />

Pet food and supplies 8% 13% CD 12% CD 2% 4%<br />

Adult basic apparel 5% 10% CD 6% C 2% 3%<br />

Baby supplies 5% 6% C 5% C 2% 3%<br />

Kids clothing 4% 5% C 6% C 1% 3% C<br />

Infants and toddlers clothing 3% 4% Cd 5% Cd 1% 1%<br />

Adult casual apparel 3% 4% C 5% C 1% 3% c<br />

Beer and wine 2% 2% 3% c 1% 2%<br />

Superscript letters indicates significant difference from number in column corresp<strong>on</strong>ding to letter; upper case = 95% CL,<br />

lower case = 90% CL<br />

Figure 9. Importance Factors—When Shopping a Dollar Store<br />

(% of shoppers rating factor “Very Important”)<br />

Source: ShopperScape®, May <str<strong>on</strong>g>2011</str<strong>on</strong>g><br />

Importance Factors -- When Shopping a Dollar Store<br />

(% of shoppers rating factor "Very Important")<br />

Over-index by >10% Under-Index by >10%<br />

$25K - $50K - $75K -<br />

Total 18-24 25-34 35-44 45-54 55-64 65+


which may be a factor of store<br />

placement in lower-income<br />

areas al<strong>on</strong>g with changes in<br />

merchandising to appeal to a<br />

more c<strong>on</strong>venience-oriented<br />

shopper by most of <strong>the</strong> chains<br />

in this channel.<br />

Am<strong>on</strong>g all shoppers, item<br />

and basket pricing top <strong>the</strong><br />

list of drivers, followed by<br />

c<strong>on</strong>venience and speed of<br />

shopping (Figure 10). “Best<br />

shopping opti<strong>on</strong> for my pers<strong>on</strong>al<br />

ec<strong>on</strong>omic situati<strong>on</strong>” drops as an<br />

overall driver but still shows as<br />

somewhat or very important for<br />

80% of <strong>the</strong> resp<strong>on</strong>dents.<br />

Shopper c<strong>on</strong>cerns and drivers<br />

show little variati<strong>on</strong><br />

based <strong>on</strong> retailer<br />

Dollar Tree is dominated by<br />

item pricing versus o<strong>the</strong>r<br />

banners which is expected<br />

given its fixed price missi<strong>on</strong><br />

(Figure 11). Aside from that,<br />

scoring is reas<strong>on</strong>ably close<br />

across <strong>the</strong> banners with Big<br />

Lots scoring in all save ‘Thrill of<br />

<strong>the</strong> Hunt.’<br />

66 Breakthrough Insights<br />

Item pricing (individual items cost less)<br />

Basket Figure pricing 10. Importance (less expensive Factors for overall When basket) Shopping a Dollar 57% Store<br />

C<strong>on</strong>venient locati<strong>on</strong><br />

Quick in-and-out<br />

Best shopping opti<strong>on</strong> given pers<strong>on</strong>al ec<strong>on</strong>omic …<br />

Easy to shop<br />

Friendly neighborhood atmosphere<br />

Wide variety of nati<strong>on</strong>al brands<br />

"Thrill of <strong>the</strong> hunt"<br />

Limited assortment reducestemptati<strong>on</strong>s<br />

24%<br />

24%<br />

18%<br />

36%<br />

30%<br />

45%<br />

38%<br />

52%<br />

66%<br />

36%<br />

40%<br />

46%<br />

46%<br />

41%<br />

47%<br />

Very important Somewhat important Not at all important<br />

43%<br />

34%<br />

37%<br />

28%<br />

40%<br />

41%<br />

23%<br />

30%<br />

20%<br />

11%<br />

13%<br />

18%<br />

6%<br />

9%<br />

Source: ShopperScape®, May <str<strong>on</strong>g>2011</str<strong>on</strong>g><br />

Figure 11. Importance Factors When Shopping a Dollar Store, By <strong>Retail</strong>er<br />

(% of shoppers rating factor “Very Important”)<br />

Last Trip was to ...<br />

All Dollar Family Dollar<br />

Shoppers General Dollar Tree Big Lots<br />

(a) (b) (c) (d)<br />

Item pricing (individual items cost less at $store<br />

than elsewhere)<br />

66% 65% D 64% D 73% ABD 53%<br />

Basket pricing ($store is less expensive for<br />

overall basket)<br />

57% 57% D 55% d 60% D 45%<br />

C<strong>on</strong>venient locati<strong>on</strong> 52% 61% bCD 55% D 49% D 38%<br />

Quick in-and-out 45% 55% BCD 48% cD 41% d 33%<br />

Best shopping opti<strong>on</strong> given pers<strong>on</strong>al ec<strong>on</strong>omic<br />

situati<strong>on</strong><br />

38% 41% D 41% D 37% 30%<br />

Easy to shop 36% 43% CD 39% cD 33% D 23%<br />

Friendly neighborhood atmosphere 30% 36% CD 36% CD 26% 23%<br />

Wide variety of nati<strong>on</strong>al brands 24% 30% CD 27% C 20% 20%<br />

"Thrill of <strong>the</strong> hunt" 24% 20% 23% 24% 25%<br />

Limited assortment reduces buying temptati<strong>on</strong>s 18% 22% C 19% 16% 19%<br />

Superscript letters indicates significant difference from number in column corresp<strong>on</strong>ding to<br />

letter; upper case = 95% CL, lower case = 90% CL<br />

Source: ShopperScape®, May <str<strong>on</strong>g>2011</str<strong>on</strong>g>


Where <strong>the</strong> Men Are/Aren’t<br />

By: Mary Brett Whitfield / Originally published August 31, <str<strong>on</strong>g>2011</str<strong>on</strong>g><br />

Findings from <strong>Kantar</strong> <strong>Retail</strong> ShopperScape’s ®<br />

new male shopper database reveal male heads of<br />

household and <strong>the</strong> “average” primary household<br />

shopper have different store sets in terms of channels<br />

and retailers shopped. Walmart tops <strong>the</strong> list of<br />

retailers shopped by a wide margin for both primary<br />

household shoppers and male shoppers; Amaz<strong>on</strong>.com<br />

ranks #2. The respective “male” and “all-shopper”<br />

lists <strong>the</strong>n begin to deviate with a shuffling of retailer<br />

positi<strong>on</strong>s, and some additi<strong>on</strong>s and omissi<strong>on</strong>s. The<br />

male Top 10 retailer list includes Best Buy, eBay.com,<br />

and Kroger. But Kohl’s, JC Penney, and Dollar Tree,<br />

which make <strong>the</strong> all-shopper Top 10, miss <strong>the</strong> cut <strong>on</strong><br />

<strong>the</strong> male list. There are some noticeable differences<br />

too when looking at retailers shopped by males of<br />

different generati<strong>on</strong>s—findings which could impact<br />

retailer and supplier merchandise and marketing<br />

decisi<strong>on</strong>s.<br />

Like all shoppers in general, <strong>the</strong> top two retailers where<br />

male shoppers are most likely to be found are: Walmart,<br />

with 62% of male shoppers being past-m<strong>on</strong>th shoppers;<br />

and Amaz<strong>on</strong>.com, with 43% of male shoppers as pastm<strong>on</strong>th<br />

shoppers.<br />

Breakthrough Insights 67


Many Stereotypes Hold When Looking for Male<br />

Shoppers<br />

Am<strong>on</strong>g <strong>the</strong> Top 10 most-shopped retail channels,<br />

channels that disproporti<strong>on</strong>ately draw male heads<br />

of household shoppers vs. all primary household<br />

shoppers include (Figure 1):<br />

Home improvement retailers (attracting 62% of<br />

male shoppers in <strong>the</strong> past m<strong>on</strong>th vs. 52% of all<br />

primary household shoppers, a +10 percentage<br />

point swing)<br />

Electr<strong>on</strong>ics retailers (+9 ppts)<br />

C<strong>on</strong>venience stores (+6 ppts)<br />

<strong>Retail</strong> channels where disproporti<strong>on</strong>ately fewer<br />

male shoppers vs. all primary household shoppers<br />

are found include:<br />

Apparel specialty stores (-17 ppts)<br />

Value discount/dollar stores (-10 ppts)<br />

Department stores (-6 ppts)<br />

68 Breakthrough Insights<br />

Like all shoppers in general, <strong>the</strong> top two retailers<br />

where male shoppers are most likely to be found<br />

are: Walmart, with 62% of male shoppers being<br />

past-m<strong>on</strong>th shoppers; and Amaz<strong>on</strong>.com, with 43% of<br />

male shoppers as past-m<strong>on</strong>th shoppers (Figure 2).<br />

The Top 10 retailers shopped by male shoppers<br />

include some retailers that do not make <strong>the</strong> Top<br />

10 am<strong>on</strong>g all primary household shoppers: Best<br />

Buy, eBay.com, and Kroger. <strong>Retail</strong>ers <strong>on</strong> <strong>the</strong> allshopper<br />

Top 10 list that miss <strong>the</strong> cut <strong>on</strong> <strong>the</strong> male<br />

list include: Kohl’s, JC Penney, and Dollar Tree.<br />

Am<strong>on</strong>g <strong>the</strong> Top 25 retailers shopped by male<br />

heads of household, men over-index most<br />

at The Home Depot, Lowe’s, Best Buy, Office<br />

Depot, and liquor stores. O<strong>the</strong>r retailers where<br />

more male than female shoppers are found<br />

include Sears, warehouse clubs Sam’s Club<br />

and Costco, eBay.com, Safeway, and Staples.<br />

Male shoppers under-index relative to all<br />

primary household shoppers most at Kohl’s,<br />

Dollar Tree, and Macy’s.<br />

Figure 1. Top 10 Most-Shopped <strong>Retail</strong> Channels<br />

Male Heads of Household Age 18+ vs. All Primary Household Shoppers<br />

(Shopped retail channel during past 4 weeks)<br />

Male Heads of Household All Primary Household Shoppers<br />

1 Supermarkets 88% 1 Supermarkets 88%<br />

2 Mass channel 78% 2 Mass channel 83%<br />

3 Home improvement/hardware retailers 62% 3 Drug stores 63%<br />

4 Drug stores 57% 4 Department stores 55%<br />

5 Department stores 49% 5 Home improvement/hardware retailers 52%<br />

6 Electr<strong>on</strong>ics/computer retailers 45% 6 Value discount/dollar stores 50%<br />

7 C<strong>on</strong>venience stores 43% 7 Apparel specialty stores 42%<br />

8 Amaz<strong>on</strong>.com 43% 8 Amaz<strong>on</strong>.com 42%<br />

9 Warehouse clubs 40% 9 C<strong>on</strong>venience stores 37%<br />

10 Value discount/dollar stores 39% 10 Warehouse clubs 36%<br />

NOTE: Shading indicates retail channels where shoppers over-index vs. o<strong>the</strong>r shopper type by more than 10%<br />

Source: <strong>Kantar</strong> <strong>Retail</strong> ShopperScape®, March—June <str<strong>on</strong>g>2011</str<strong>on</strong>g>


Figure 2. Top 25 <strong>Retail</strong>ers Shopped by Male Heads of Household Age 18+, Compared with All Primary Household Shoppers<br />

Shopped <strong>Retail</strong>er during<br />

Past 4 Weeks<br />

All Primary<br />

Index vs. All<br />

Primary<br />

Male Heads of Household Household<br />

Household Shoppers<br />

Shoppers<br />

1 Walmart 62% 65% 95<br />

2 Amaz<strong>on</strong>.com 43% 42% 102<br />

3 The Home Depot 38% 30% 126<br />

4 Lowe's 34% 28% 121<br />

5 Walgreens 34% 37% 90<br />

6 Target 32% 39% 83<br />

7 CVS/pharmacy 29% 31% 92<br />

8 Best Buy 26% 19% 135<br />

9 eBay.com 24% 21% 114<br />

10 Kroger (all supermarket banners) 23% 23% 102<br />

11 JCPenney 22% 27% 83<br />

12 Kohl's 21% 27% 77<br />

13 Netflix 20% 19% 106<br />

14 Dollar General 20% 22% 91<br />

15 Sam's Club 20% 17% 115<br />

16 Costco 19% 17% 111<br />

17 Liquor/wine stores 19% 15% 129<br />

18 Staples 18% 16% 111<br />

19 Barnes & Noble 17% 18% 93<br />

20 Sears 16% 14% 118<br />

21* Dollar Tree 16% 24% 64<br />

22* Safeway (all aupermarket banners) 15% 14% 112<br />

23 Macy's 15% 19% 77<br />

24* SuperValu (all smkt banners, excl SAL) 15% 13% 111<br />

25* Office Depot 14% 11% 126<br />

NOTE: Yellow shading indicates retailers where male shoppers over-index by 20%+ vs. all shoppers (index of 120+); gray<br />

shading indicates retailers where <strong>the</strong>y under-index by 20%+ (index ≤ 80)<br />

*<strong>Retail</strong>er makes Male Shoppers’ Top 25 <strong>Retail</strong>er list, but not All Primary Household Shoppers’ Top 25<br />

Source: <strong>Kantar</strong> <strong>Retail</strong> ShopperScape®, March—June <str<strong>on</strong>g>2011</str<strong>on</strong>g><br />

Breakthrough Insights 69


Figure 3. Top 25 <strong>Retail</strong>ers Shopped by Male Heads of Household Age 18+—By Generati<strong>on</strong><br />

(Shopped retailer during past 4 weeks)<br />

Male Heads of<br />

Household Gen Y Gen X Baby Boomers Seniors<br />

a b<br />

c<br />

d<br />

1<br />

2<br />

Walmart<br />

Amaz<strong>on</strong>.com<br />

62%<br />

43%<br />

65%<br />

56%<br />

63% 61% 59%<br />

CD<br />

50% CD<br />

39% D<br />

3 The Home Depot 38% 30% 37%<br />

31%<br />

a<br />

41% Ab<br />

39% A<br />

4 Lowe's 34% 23% 33% A<br />

36% A<br />

37% Ab<br />

5<br />

6<br />

Walgreens<br />

Target<br />

34%<br />

32%<br />

31%<br />

41%<br />

32% 35% 34%<br />

CD<br />

41% CD<br />

28% d<br />

7 CVS/pharmacy 29% 33%<br />

24%<br />

c<br />

8 Best Buy 26% 40%<br />

29% 28% 30%<br />

BCD<br />

30% CD<br />

24% D<br />

9 eBay.com 24% 40%<br />

17%<br />

BCD<br />

29% CD<br />

22% D<br />

10 Kroger (all supermarket banners) 23% 21% 24% 25%<br />

14%<br />

d<br />

11 JCPenney 22% 25%<br />

21%<br />

d<br />

24% D<br />

22% 19%<br />

12<br />

13<br />

Kohl's<br />

Netflix<br />

21%<br />

20%<br />

24%<br />

34%<br />

22% 21% 19%<br />

BCD<br />

25% CD<br />

17% D<br />

14 Dollar General 20% 25%<br />

12%<br />

bCD<br />

15 Sam's Club 20% 17%<br />

20%<br />

19%<br />

20%<br />

19%<br />

17%<br />

23% AbC<br />

16 Costco 19% 22% c<br />

19% 17% 21% C<br />

17 Liquor/wine stores 19% 24% CD<br />

19% 18% 18%<br />

18<br />

19<br />

Staples<br />

Barnes & Noble<br />

18%<br />

17%<br />

20%<br />

30%<br />

17% 18% 20%<br />

BCD<br />

22% CD<br />

14% d<br />

20 Sears 16% 20%<br />

11%<br />

D<br />

17% D<br />

16% D<br />

21 Dollar Tree 16% 21%<br />

12%<br />

CD<br />

17% Cd<br />

14% 14%<br />

22<br />

23<br />

Safeway (all aupermarket banners)<br />

Macy's<br />

15%<br />

15%<br />

19%<br />

27%<br />

15% 15% 16%<br />

BCD<br />

18% CD<br />

12% 11%<br />

24<br />

25<br />

SuperValu (all smkt banners, excl SAL)<br />

Office Depot<br />

15%<br />

14%<br />

14%<br />

18%<br />

16% 15% 13%<br />

C<br />

15% 13% 14%<br />

Note: Letters represent significant difference with corresp<strong>on</strong>ding column; lower case at 95% c<strong>on</strong>fidence level, upper case at 90%<br />

c<strong>on</strong>fidence level<br />

Source: <strong>Kantar</strong> <strong>Retail</strong> ShopperScape®, March—June <str<strong>on</strong>g>2011</str<strong>on</strong>g><br />

Young Males Adopting New Shopping Routines<br />

Generally speaking, ShopperScape ® finds a higher<br />

percentage of young males (especially Gen Y)<br />

shopping across <strong>the</strong> board (at most retailers) vs.<br />

<strong>the</strong>ir older counterparts (Figure 3). Likely reas<strong>on</strong>s:<br />

Higher percentage of young single males who<br />

d<strong>on</strong>’t have a female partner with which to share<br />

shopping duties<br />

Busy lifestyles of older males in family<br />

lifestages limit shopping around<br />

70 Breakthrough Insights<br />

Shopping as a social activity for young males<br />

Looking at <strong>the</strong> male Top 25 retailer list, key<br />

differences am<strong>on</strong>g generati<strong>on</strong>s emerge:<br />

Compared with older shoppers, a significantly<br />

higher percentage of younger male heads of<br />

household—specifically Gen Y and Gen X (who<br />

today are 18–46 years old)—shop <strong>the</strong> following<br />

formats/retailers:


- Online/n<strong>on</strong>-store shopping opti<strong>on</strong>s, e.g.,<br />

Amaz<strong>on</strong>.com, eBay.com, Netflix<br />

- Best Buy<br />

- “Fashi<strong>on</strong>” retailers Target and Macy’s<br />

- Value discounters Dollar General and<br />

Dollar Tree—a finding which seems at<br />

odds with c<strong>on</strong>venti<strong>on</strong>al wisdom that <strong>the</strong><br />

format draws typically female shoppers,<br />

and in particular older <strong>on</strong>es with fixed/<br />

c<strong>on</strong>strained incomes<br />

More male shoppers in older generati<strong>on</strong>al<br />

cohorts tend to shop <strong>the</strong> following formats/<br />

retailers:<br />

- Home improvement centers—The Home<br />

Depot and Lowe’s draw significantly more<br />

Baby Boomer and Senior males than Gen Y<br />

males, largely because older shoppers are<br />

more likely to be married home-owners<br />

with maintenance resp<strong>on</strong>sibilities and l<strong>on</strong>g<br />

“h<strong>on</strong>ey-do” lists<br />

- Club retailer Sam’s Club—likely because<br />

older shoppers tend to be more affluent<br />

shoppers, a core characteristic of <strong>the</strong> club<br />

shopper base<br />

Top <strong>Retail</strong>er Lists Differ By Generati<strong>on</strong><br />

A different set of retailers pop as <strong>the</strong> Top 25<br />

shopped by males of different generati<strong>on</strong>s (Figure<br />

4). Key findings:<br />

The Gen Y male heads of household Top 25 list<br />

differs <strong>the</strong> most from <strong>the</strong> “all-male” list. Five<br />

retailers make <strong>the</strong> Gen Y list that are absent<br />

from <strong>the</strong> all-male list: GameStop, Apple,<br />

7-Eleven, Family Dollar, and Kmart. Apple<br />

and GameStop’s presence suggests that Gen Y<br />

males prefer gadgets more than groceries since<br />

those falling off <strong>the</strong> list include several food<br />

retailers: Safeway, Supervalu, and Sam’s Club.<br />

A mix of small-box retailers appear <strong>on</strong> <strong>the</strong> lists<br />

of older male shoppers: Ace Hardware and<br />

Family Dollar make <strong>the</strong> male Baby Boomer<br />

list; Ace Hardware, Rite Aid, and Trader Joe’s<br />

make <strong>the</strong> senior males list. This finding<br />

helps to prove <strong>the</strong> <strong>Kantar</strong> <strong>Retail</strong> hypo<strong>the</strong>sis<br />

that older shoppers find <strong>the</strong> quick and easy<br />

shopping c<strong>on</strong>venience of small-box formats<br />

appealing. Falling off <strong>the</strong> senior males list:<br />

Macy’s, Netflix, and Barnes & Noble, suggesting<br />

that maintenance of health and home takes<br />

precedence over fashi<strong>on</strong> and fun for older<br />

shoppers.<br />

Breakthrough Insights 71


Figure 4. Top 25 <strong>Retail</strong>ers Shopped Differs by Generati<strong>on</strong>, Male Heads of Household Age 18+<br />

(Shopped retailer during past 4 weeks)<br />

Males Head of Household Gen Y Males<br />

Gen X Males<br />

Baby Boomer Males<br />

Senior Males<br />

Top 25<br />

Top 25<br />

Top 25<br />

Top 25<br />

Top 25<br />

1 Walmart 62% Walmart 65% Walmart 63% Walmart 61% Walmart 59%<br />

2 Amaz<strong>on</strong>.com 43% Amaz<strong>on</strong>.com 56% Amaz<strong>on</strong>.com 50% The Home Depot 41% The Home Depot 39%<br />

3 The Home Depot 38% Target 41% Target 41% Amaz<strong>on</strong>.com 39% Lowe's 37%<br />

4 Lowe's 34% Best Buy 40% The Home Depot 37% Lowe's 36% Walgreens 34%<br />

5 Walgreens 34% eBay.com 40% Lowe's 33% Walgreens 35% Amaz<strong>on</strong>.com 31%<br />

6 Target 32% Netflix 34% Walgreens 32% Target 28% CVS/pharmacy 30%<br />

7 CVS/pharmacy 29% CVS/pharmacy 33% Best Buy 30% CVS/pharmacy 28% Target 24%<br />

8 Best Buy 26% Walgreens 31% eBay.com 29% Kroger (all<br />

supermarket<br />

banners)<br />

25% Sam's Club 23%<br />

9 eBay.com 24% GameStop 31% CVS/pharmacy 29% Best Buy 24% Costco 21%<br />

10 Kroger (all<br />

23% The Home Depot 30% Netflix 25% JCPenney 22% Kroger (all<br />

21%<br />

supermarket<br />

supermarket<br />

banners)<br />

banners)<br />

11 JCPenney 22% Barnes & Noble 30% JCPenney 24% eBay.com 22% Staples 20%<br />

12 Kohl's 21% Macy's 27% Kroger (all<br />

supermarket<br />

banners)<br />

24% Kohl's 21% JCPenney 19%<br />

13 Netflix 20% 7-Eleven 26% Barnes & Noble 22% Dollar General 20% Kohl's 19%<br />

14 Dollar General 20% Dollar General 25% Kohl's 22% Sam's Club 19% Liquor/wine stores 18%<br />

15 Sam's Club 20% JCPenney 25% Dollar General 20% Staples 18% Best Buy 17%<br />

16 Costco 19% Kohl's 24% Costco 19% Liquor/wine stores 18% Dollar General 17%<br />

17 Liquor/wine stores 19% Liquor/wine stores 24% Sam's Club 19% Netflix 17% Ace Hardware 16%<br />

18 Staples 18% Lowe's 23% Liquor/wine stores 19% Costco 17% Safeway (all<br />

aupermarket<br />

banners)<br />

16%<br />

19 Barnes & Noble 17% Costco 22% Macy's 18% Sears 16% Rite Aid 14%<br />

20 Sears 16% Kroger (all<br />

supermarket<br />

banners)<br />

21% Dollar Tree 17% Ace Hardware 15% Dollar Tree 14%<br />

21 Dollar Tree 16% Dollar Tree 21% Sears 17% Safeway (all<br />

aupermarket<br />

banners)<br />

15% eBay.com 14%<br />

22 Safeway (all 15% Family Dollar 20% Staples 17% Supervalu (all smkt 15% Office Depot 14%<br />

aupermarket<br />

banners)<br />

banners, excl SAL)<br />

23 Macy's 15% Kmart/Big Kmart 20% Supervalu (all smkt<br />

banners, excl SAL)<br />

16% Family Dollar 15% Trader Joe's 13%<br />

24 Supervalu (all smkt 15% Staples 20% Office Depot 15% Dollar Tree 14% Supervalu (all smkt 13%<br />

banners, excl SAL)<br />

banners, excl SAL)<br />

25 Office Depot 14% Apple 20% 7-Eleven 15% Barnes & Noble 14% Sears 12%<br />

72 Breakthrough Insights<br />

Shading represents retailer new to <strong>the</strong> Top 25 list vs. all-male heads of household list<br />

Source: <strong>Kantar</strong> <strong>Retail</strong> ShopperScape®, March—June <str<strong>on</strong>g>2011</str<strong>on</strong>g><br />

T<br />

s<br />

r<br />

e


Shopping Through <strong>the</strong><br />

Eyes of a Low-Income Shopper<br />

Cross-<strong>Retail</strong>er Opening Price Points<br />

By: Le<strong>on</strong> Nicholas / Originally published: September 30, <str<strong>on</strong>g>2011</str<strong>on</strong>g><br />

he stock-up trip is not dead, but <strong>on</strong> a weekly basis fewer shoppers make <strong>the</strong>m. Instead<br />

hoppers opt <strong>Kantar</strong> for more, <strong>Retail</strong> smaller recently trips. c<strong>on</strong>ducted Most a pre-trip study to planning still happens offline. But<br />

etailers and discover suppliers how must selected prepare retailers for are next-generati<strong>on</strong> meeting <strong>the</strong> shoppers who prepare differ-<br />

needs of low-income shoppers seeking <strong>the</strong> best<br />

ntly for grocery shopping trips.<br />

price to meet <strong>the</strong>ir cross-category needs. With<br />

shoppers increasingly stretching budgets to<br />

purchase everyday needs, retailers are asserting<br />

<strong>the</strong>ir value messaging and emphasizing low<br />

prices. At <strong>the</strong> same time, a lower-income shopper’s<br />

ability to take advantage of such asserti<strong>on</strong>s<br />

is limited, as retailer strategies such as multipacks<br />

with low price/volume ratios or bundled<br />

soluti<strong>on</strong>s are not helpful to shoppers who can’t<br />

pay <strong>the</strong> often higher price points. For this shopper,<br />

<strong>the</strong> requirement to satisfy cross-category<br />

needs is fulfilled through <strong>the</strong> achievement of<br />

<strong>the</strong> lowest possible price point, often sacrificing<br />

volume purchase savings.<br />

Toward this end, <strong>Kantar</strong> <strong>Retail</strong> selected 20 categories<br />

across <strong>the</strong> edible grocery, n<strong>on</strong>-edible<br />

grocery, and HBA segments at six retailers located<br />

within a five-mile radius of each o<strong>the</strong>r in <strong>the</strong><br />

Nor<strong>the</strong>ast U.S. For each retailer, we assessed<br />

<strong>the</strong> lowest price point available to <strong>the</strong> shopper in<br />

that category (excluding trial sizes) so that she<br />

could minimally meet her purchase requirement.<br />

This article will assess how each retailer enables<br />

<strong>the</strong> shopper to meet basket requirements at <strong>the</strong><br />

opening price point (OPP) level.<br />

Breakthrough Insights 73<br />

73 Breakthrough Insights


Total Basket Findings<br />

Am<strong>on</strong>g <strong>the</strong> six retailers, <strong>the</strong> study results indicated<br />

that Walmart had <strong>the</strong> least expensive total basket,<br />

driven by lower OPPs in its edible grocery and HBA<br />

baskets. Walgreens had <strong>the</strong> most expensive total<br />

basket, driven by sharply higher edible grocery<br />

basket OPPs (see Figures 1.1 and 1.2).<br />

Of note, Walgreens’ higher total basket was driven<br />

in part by <strong>the</strong> type of promoti<strong>on</strong>s it ran, requiring<br />

in some cases that <strong>the</strong> shopper buy more than <strong>on</strong>e<br />

item in order to achieve <strong>the</strong> lower price point per<br />

74 Breakthrough Insights<br />

Figure 1.1 Total Basket Table<br />

Figure 1.2 Total Basket Chart<br />

item, something that a low-income shopper may not<br />

be able to afford.<br />

Stop & Shop offered <strong>the</strong> next cheapest overall basket<br />

at <strong>on</strong>ly 2% more expensive than Walmart’s. With <strong>the</strong><br />

lowest basket in n<strong>on</strong>-edible grocery, Stop & Shop<br />

achieved its pricing positi<strong>on</strong> through featured price<br />

cuts totaling USD 7.52 across segments; had <strong>the</strong>se<br />

cuts not been in place, Stop & Shop would have been<br />

nearly <strong>on</strong>e-third more expensive than Walmart<br />

overall, and Family Dollar would have been <strong>the</strong> next<br />

cheapest relative to Walmart.<br />

Edible N<strong>on</strong>-Edible HBA Total<br />

Index to<br />

Walmart<br />

Walmart $ 8.74 $ 12.59 $ 4.55 $ 25.88 -<br />

Stop & Shop $ 10.14 $ 11.13 $ 5.21 $ 26.48 102<br />

Family Dollar $ 12.45 $ 12.25 $ 5.00 $ 29.70 115<br />

Aldi $ 8.97 $ 12.64 $ 10.55 $ 32.16 124<br />

Target $ 11.42 $ 16.39 $ 7.36 $ 35.17 136<br />

Walgreens $ 20.81 $ 17.16 $ 6.18 $ 44.15 171<br />

$50<br />

$40<br />

$30<br />

$20<br />

$10<br />

$-<br />

Edible N<strong>on</strong>-Edible HBA<br />

Walmart Stop &<br />

Shop<br />

Family<br />

Dollar<br />

Source: <strong>Kantar</strong> <strong>Retail</strong> Store Visits<br />

Aldi Target Walgreens<br />

Source: <strong>Kantar</strong> <strong>Retail</strong> Store Visits


Importantly, <strong>the</strong> opening price points were largely<br />

achieved through everyday pricing. Only selected<br />

Walgreens and Stop & Shop OPPs were reached<br />

through price cuts.<br />

Finally, we saw no clear pattern of achievement<br />

of lower OPPs through private labels or nati<strong>on</strong>al<br />

brands, o<strong>the</strong>r than in <strong>the</strong> case of Aldi, whose<br />

business model is built up<strong>on</strong> private brands.<br />

Figure 2.1 Edible Grocery Basket<br />

Edible<br />

Grocery Eggs<br />

Walmart 0.82<br />

Aldi 0.69<br />

Stop & Shop 1.59<br />

Target 1.19<br />

Family Dollar 1.90<br />

Walgreens 2.39<br />

Pasta<br />

Sauce<br />

$ $ 0.98 0.48<br />

$ $ 1.19 0.49<br />

$ $ 1.00 0.75<br />

$ $ 1.12 0.64<br />

$ $ 1.00 0.65<br />

$ $ 3.29 1.69<br />

Canned Canned<br />

Vegetables Ketchup Tuna Bread Cereal<br />

$ $ 1.00 $ 0.60 $ 0.98 1.00<br />

$ $ 1.19 $ 0.55 $ 0.79 1.39<br />

$ $ 1.00 $ 0.80 $ 1.00 1.00<br />

$ $ 1.17 $ 0.59 $ 1.14 2.34<br />

$ $ 1.00 $ 0.75 $ 1.30 2.00<br />

$ $ 3.79 $ 1.19 $ 1.49 2.99<br />

Figure 2.2 Edible Grocery Brand Compositi<strong>on</strong><br />

Walgreens<br />

Family Dollar<br />

Walmart*<br />

Stop & Shop<br />

Target<br />

Aldi<br />

Edible Grocery Segment Findings<br />

Walmart provided <strong>the</strong> least expensive edible<br />

grocery basket, beating Aldi by approximately<br />

3% (see Figure 2.1). The retailer was able to<br />

provide a reas<strong>on</strong>able split between private<br />

labels and nati<strong>on</strong>al brands for its entry level<br />

assortment within edible grocery (see Figure<br />

2.2).<br />

Nati<strong>on</strong>al Brands Private Labels<br />

Dry<br />

Pasta<br />

½<br />

Gall<strong>on</strong><br />

Milk Total<br />

$ $ 1.00 $ 1.88 $ 8.74 -<br />

$ $ 0.89 $ 1.79 $ 8.97 103<br />

$ $ 1.00 $ 2.00 $ 10.14 116<br />

$ $ 1.09 $ 2.14 $ 11.42 131<br />

$ $ 1.00 $ 2.85 $ 12.45 142<br />

$ $ 1.69 $ 2.29 $ 20.81 238<br />

0% 20% 40% 60% 80% 100%<br />

*Walmart offered <strong>the</strong> same size and price for an item that<br />

was available both as a private label and a nati<strong>on</strong>al brand<br />

within edible grocery.<br />

Source: <strong>Kantar</strong> <strong>Retail</strong> Store Visits<br />

Index to<br />

Walmart<br />

Source: <strong>Kantar</strong> <strong>Retail</strong> Store Visits<br />

Breakthrough Insights 75


After Aldi, we saw a very steep price gap<br />

between Walmart and Stop & Shop (16%),<br />

followed by Target at 31%. Both Stop & Shop<br />

and Target achieved <strong>the</strong>ir OPPs largely through<br />

private brands.<br />

Due to its limited assortment of edible grocery<br />

items, Walgreens delivered <strong>the</strong> most expensive<br />

OPPs in <strong>the</strong> segment. With OPPs comprising<br />

nati<strong>on</strong>al brands, Walgreens’ edible grocery<br />

OPPs registered a 238 index to Walmart.<br />

N<strong>on</strong>-Edible Grocery Segment Findings<br />

Stop & Shop had <strong>the</strong> least expensive n<strong>on</strong>-edible<br />

basket, driven by temporary price cuts of USD<br />

76 Breakthrough Insights<br />

Figure 3.1 N<strong>on</strong>-Edible Grocery<br />

Figure 3.2 N<strong>on</strong>-Edible Grocery Brand Compositi<strong>on</strong><br />

5.08 (see Figure 3.1). The retailer offered an<br />

even split of nati<strong>on</strong>al brands and private labels<br />

for its n<strong>on</strong>-edible grocery basket (see Figure<br />

3.2).<br />

Leveraging private label, Family Dollar was <strong>the</strong><br />

sec<strong>on</strong>d least expensive for n<strong>on</strong>-edible grocery,<br />

at roughly 10% more expensive than Stop &<br />

Shop.<br />

Though it offered <strong>the</strong> lowest total basket,<br />

Walmart’s n<strong>on</strong>-edible OPPs were 13% more<br />

expensive than Stop & Shop, followed closely by<br />

Aldi at a 114 index to Stop & Shop.<br />

Liquid Blue<br />

Index to<br />

N<strong>on</strong>-Edible Toilet Paper Dishwashing Laundry Window<br />

Stop &<br />

Grocery Paper Towel Soap Soap Cleaner Diapers Total Shop<br />

Stop & Shop $ 0.85 $ 1.00 $ 1.29 $ 2.50 $ 1.50 $ 3.99 $ 11.13 -<br />

Family Dollar $ 1.00 $ 1.00 $ 1.00 $ 1.75 $ 1.00 $ 6.50 $ 12.25 110<br />

Walmart $ 0.86 $ 1.94 $ 0.87 $ 1.98 $ 0.97 $ 5.97 $ 12.59 113<br />

Aldi $ 1.29 $ 0.69 $ 1.79 $ 2.39 $ 0.99 $ 5.49 $ 12.64 114<br />

Target $ 2.99 $ 0.99 $ 1.24 $ 2.34 $ 2.34 $ 6.49 $ 16.39 147<br />

Walgreens $ 0.89 $ 0.99 $ 1.00 $ 3.29 $ 2.00 $ 8.99 $ 17.16 154<br />

Target<br />

Walgreens<br />

Stop & Shop<br />

Walmart<br />

Family Dollar<br />

Aldi<br />

Nati<strong>on</strong>al Brands Private Labels<br />

Source: <strong>Kantar</strong> <strong>Retail</strong> Store Visits<br />

0% 20% 40% 60% 80% 100%<br />

Source: <strong>Kantar</strong> <strong>Retail</strong> Store Visits


Both Target’s (147 index to Stop & Shop) and<br />

Walgreens’ (154 index to Stop & Shop) n<strong>on</strong>edible<br />

OPP baskets were significantly more<br />

expensive. In <strong>the</strong> case of Walgreens, <strong>the</strong> index<br />

was achieved despite USD 3.99 in temporary<br />

price cuts.<br />

HBA Segment Findings<br />

Walmart had <strong>the</strong> least expensive HBA segment<br />

basket (see Figure 4.1). All items in <strong>the</strong> HBA<br />

basket were priced under USD 1, and three of <strong>the</strong><br />

four SKUs were nati<strong>on</strong>al brands (see Figure 4.2).<br />

Figure 4.1 HBA<br />

Figure 4.2 HBA Brand Compositi<strong>on</strong><br />

Family Dollar had <strong>the</strong> sec<strong>on</strong>d least expensive<br />

basket in this segment, registering at 10% more<br />

expensive than Walmart.<br />

Stop & Shop followed Family Dollar closely at a<br />

115 index to Walmart, including a total of USD<br />

1.99 in temporary price cuts.<br />

Compared to <strong>the</strong> o<strong>the</strong>r segments within <strong>the</strong><br />

study, Walgreens managed a narrower price<br />

gap in HBA with <strong>on</strong>ly a 136 category basket<br />

index to Walmart.<br />

Bar<br />

Disposable Index to<br />

HBA Soap Toothpaste Shampoo Aspirin Razor Total Walmart<br />

Walmart $ 0.97 $ 0.85 $ 0.78 $ 0.98 $ 0.97 $ 4.55 -<br />

Family Dollar $ 1.00 $ 1.00 $ 1.00 $ 1.00 $ 1.00 $ 5.00 110<br />

Stop & Shop $ 1.23 $ 0.99 $ 0.99 $ 1.00 $ 1.00 $ 5.21 115<br />

Walgreens $ 0.89 $ 1.00 $ 1.00 $ 1.29 $ 2.00 $ 6.18 136<br />

Target $ 2.19 $ 0.94 $ 0.97 $ 0.97 $ 2.29 $ 7.36 162<br />

Aldi $ 1.49 $ 2.49 $ 1.59 $ 1.99 $ 2.99 $ 10.55 232<br />

Walmart<br />

Walgreens<br />

Stop & Shop<br />

Target<br />

Family Dollar<br />

Aldi<br />

Nati<strong>on</strong>al Brands Private Labels<br />

Source: <strong>Kantar</strong> <strong>Retail</strong> Store Visits<br />

0% 20% 40% 60% 80% 100%<br />

Source: <strong>Kantar</strong> <strong>Retail</strong> Store Visits<br />

Breakthrough Insights 77


Could <strong>the</strong> Savvy Shopper Save More?<br />

Although Walmart delivered <strong>the</strong> least expensive<br />

total basket available in <strong>on</strong>e locati<strong>on</strong>, a shopper<br />

could save more m<strong>on</strong>ey through cross-shopping <strong>the</strong><br />

different retailers. If a shopper were to purchase<br />

all of her OPP edible grocery and HBA items at<br />

Walmart and all of her OPP n<strong>on</strong>-edible items at<br />

Stop & Shop, <strong>the</strong>n she could save 6% relative to a<br />

Walmart-<strong>on</strong>ly basket. Without l<strong>on</strong>gitudinal data,<br />

though, it isn’t clear if <strong>the</strong> segment-level savings<br />

would be c<strong>on</strong>sistent over time.<br />

<strong>Kantar</strong> <strong>Retail</strong> Point of View<br />

Taken fur<strong>the</strong>r, if a shopper were to cross-shop <strong>the</strong><br />

six different retailers to get <strong>the</strong> least expensive<br />

item in each of <strong>the</strong> twenty product categories, <strong>the</strong>n<br />

<strong>the</strong> savings would be 19% relative to buying all of<br />

Walmart’s OPPs. However, each week <strong>the</strong> shopper<br />

would have to shop each retailer separately in<br />

order to record <strong>the</strong> lowest price points per category<br />

and <strong>the</strong>n re-visit each store to buy <strong>the</strong> cheapest<br />

respective OPPs.<br />

Over time, technology may enable more efficient grocery cross-shopping, balancing trade-offs of distance and price<br />

savings across baskets with customized criteria. For now, though, our study made clear that Walmart is <strong>the</strong> least<br />

expensive <strong>on</strong>e-stop shop for a cash-strapped shopper. Importantly, Walmart achieved this distincti<strong>on</strong> without <strong>the</strong><br />

use of any rollbacks. This lends credence to Walmart U.S. President Bill Sim<strong>on</strong>’s claim of providing an “every day low<br />

price <strong>on</strong> <strong>the</strong> entire basket.” Shoppers could spend less by shopping around, but without <strong>the</strong> knowledge of price points<br />

in advance, <strong>the</strong> time spent ga<strong>the</strong>ring this data al<strong>on</strong>e would be prohibitive.<br />

Clearly, Walmart’s recent efforts to bolster its value positi<strong>on</strong>ing through smaller sizes and an increasing number of<br />

value-positi<strong>on</strong>ed SKUs is paying off. While it may have featured larger sizes with a favorable price/volume ratio in <strong>the</strong><br />

past, it can now lay claim to saving <strong>the</strong> shopper m<strong>on</strong>ey <strong>on</strong> an absolute basis in a single stop.<br />

Though Aldi came close to matching Walmart’s OPPs in edible grocery, and Family Dollar was <strong>the</strong> sec<strong>on</strong>d least<br />

expensive in both n<strong>on</strong>-edible grocery and HBA, nei<strong>the</strong>r retailer was able to lay claim to a low OPP positi<strong>on</strong> overall.<br />

The study’s findings, with respect to <strong>the</strong>se retailers, were unexpected given <strong>the</strong>ir extreme value positi<strong>on</strong>ing. Perhaps<br />

<strong>the</strong> positi<strong>on</strong>ing assumes larger pack sizes at competitive retailers, an advantage that Walmart seems to have<br />

overcome.<br />

Stop & Shop’s positi<strong>on</strong>ing as a close runner-up to Walmart (<strong>on</strong> an overall basis) was perhaps surprising. Achieved<br />

through price reducti<strong>on</strong>s, <strong>the</strong> retailer’s near parity with Walmart dem<strong>on</strong>strates <strong>the</strong> effectiveness of leveraging price<br />

cuts at <strong>the</strong> OPP level to meet <strong>the</strong> needs of <strong>the</strong> shopper <strong>on</strong> <strong>the</strong> lower rungs of <strong>the</strong> socioec<strong>on</strong>omic ladder.<br />

For suppliers, it will be critical to align with retailers’ efforts to provide low entry-level price points to draw in <strong>the</strong><br />

price-c<strong>on</strong>scious shopper. Whe<strong>the</strong>r through small pack sizes, temporary price cuts, or private labels, retailers are<br />

keen to compete at this level. Savvy suppliers will partner in <strong>the</strong>se efforts, making up margin losses elsewhere <strong>on</strong><br />

78 Breakthrough Insights<br />

<strong>the</strong> category pricing ladder.


2012 Americas Events Calendar<br />

<strong>Kantar</strong> <strong>Retail</strong> Events | Less Opini<strong>on</strong>, More Insight<br />

Q1<br />

Chain Drug SuperSessi<strong>on</strong>—Orlando, FL<br />

Jan 31 Sessi<strong>on</strong>s TBD<br />

Feb 1 General Sessi<strong>on</strong><br />

Feb 1 CVS Workshop<br />

Feb 1 Walgreens Workshop<br />

Feb 2 Sessi<strong>on</strong>s TBD<br />

NEW HEB Workshop—San Ant<strong>on</strong>io, TX<br />

Q2<br />

Feb 28 NEW HEB Workshop<br />

Walmart SuperSessi<strong>on</strong>—Rogers, AR<br />

Apr 3 Sessi<strong>on</strong>s TBD<br />

Apr 4 Sessi<strong>on</strong>s TBD<br />

Apr 5 Sessi<strong>on</strong>s TBD<br />

Shopper Forum—Chicago, IL<br />

Apr 25 General Sessi<strong>on</strong><br />

Costco Workshop Series—Seattle/Bellevue<br />

May 8 Sessi<strong>on</strong>s TBD<br />

May 9 Partnering with Costco<br />

Value Discounters Workshop Series—Charlotte, NC<br />

May 15 Sessi<strong>on</strong>s TBD<br />

May 16 Sessi<strong>on</strong>s TBD<br />

Latin American <strong>Retail</strong>ing Workshop—Miami, FL<br />

Mar 6 Latin American <strong>Retail</strong>ing Workshop<br />

Kroger SuperSessi<strong>on</strong>—Cincinnati, OH<br />

Mar 20 Sessi<strong>on</strong>s TBD<br />

Mar 21 Kroger Workshop<br />

Mar 22 Sessi<strong>on</strong>s TBD<br />

NEW Lowe’s Workshop Series—Charlotte, NC<br />

May 17 NEW Lowe’s Workshop<br />

Mid-Year Forum East—East Coast<br />

June 5 Sessi<strong>on</strong>s TBD<br />

June 6 General Sessi<strong>on</strong><br />

June 7 Sessi<strong>on</strong>s TBD<br />

Mid-Year Forum West—West Coast<br />

June 12 Sessi<strong>on</strong>s TBD<br />

June 13 General Sessi<strong>on</strong><br />

June 14 Sessi<strong>on</strong>s TBD<br />

Breakthrough Insights 79<br />

For more informati<strong>on</strong> - Email CustomerService@<strong>Kantar</strong><strong>Retail</strong>iQ.com or Call 1.617.588.4100


The Global Macroec<strong>on</strong>omic<br />

Outlook for <strong>Retail</strong>: Danger from<br />

Europe to China<br />

By: Frank Badillo / Originally published: September 15, <str<strong>on</strong>g>2011</str<strong>on</strong>g><br />

With macroec<strong>on</strong>omic trends weak in <strong>the</strong> United<br />

States, still weaker in Europe, and precarious<br />

in China, <strong>the</strong> global outlook for retailing am<strong>on</strong>g<br />

countries will be especially uneven over <strong>the</strong> coming<br />

year and <strong>the</strong> years bey<strong>on</strong>d.<br />

Europe is most at risk of recessi<strong>on</strong> re-emerging<br />

before <strong>the</strong> end of <strong>the</strong> year as <strong>the</strong> euro z<strong>on</strong>e’s slowmoti<strong>on</strong><br />

financial crisis takes a growing toll.<br />

At best, <strong>the</strong> United States will see a sharp slowdown<br />

with a high risk of recessi<strong>on</strong>, depending <strong>on</strong> potential<br />

government acti<strong>on</strong>—both fiscal and m<strong>on</strong>etary.<br />

The wild card will be <strong>the</strong> emerging markets led by<br />

China. If China’s inflati<strong>on</strong>-fighting steps slow its<br />

ec<strong>on</strong>omy too much, <strong>the</strong>n recessi<strong>on</strong>ary c<strong>on</strong>diti<strong>on</strong>s<br />

could worsen in developed markets and pull<br />

emerging markets into a sharp slowdown if not a<br />

downturn.<br />

The short-term unevenness in global trends is<br />

evident across a scorecard of macroec<strong>on</strong>omic<br />

indicators for <strong>the</strong> largest ec<strong>on</strong>omies, as well as in<br />

terms of key trends in GDP and c<strong>on</strong>sumer prices.<br />

80 Breakthrough Insights<br />

The impact <strong>on</strong> <strong>the</strong> l<strong>on</strong>g-term outlook am<strong>on</strong>g<br />

countries is evident in an index and mapping of<br />

Global <strong>Retail</strong> Opportunity as measured by <strong>Kantar</strong><br />

<strong>Retail</strong>. These measures show <strong>the</strong> euro z<strong>on</strong>e<br />

countries losing ground, primarily to emerging<br />

markets such as Brazil as well as to select<br />

developed markets such as Canada and Australia.<br />

Russia also appears to be losing ground amid<br />

recent c<strong>on</strong>diti<strong>on</strong>s.


Implicati<strong>on</strong>s<br />

Suppliers and retailers operating internati<strong>on</strong>ally<br />

should anticipate all <strong>the</strong>ir markets being affected by<br />

<strong>the</strong> developing slowdown or recessi<strong>on</strong>.<br />

China and emerging markets cannot be counted<br />

<strong>on</strong> for sustained str<strong>on</strong>g growth. Teams in those<br />

markets should prepare for a potential hard<br />

ec<strong>on</strong>omic landing.<br />

Price pressures are diverging am<strong>on</strong>g countries as<br />

much or more than growth prospects. Suppliers<br />

and retailers should expect pricing power to<br />

weaken starting first in Europe and ultimately<br />

weaken with a lag in China and emerging markets<br />

as those markets slow.<br />

Am<strong>on</strong>g <strong>the</strong> l<strong>on</strong>g-term implicati<strong>on</strong>s of current<br />

trends is that <strong>the</strong> disparity will widen between<br />

slower-growing markets—particularly <strong>the</strong> euro<br />

z<strong>on</strong>e countries—and <strong>the</strong> faster-growing emerging<br />

markets. But <strong>the</strong> extent of <strong>the</strong> disparity depends<br />

<strong>on</strong> how countries perform relative to <strong>on</strong>e ano<strong>the</strong>r.<br />

The disparity will be minimized if emerging markets<br />

suffer a hard ec<strong>on</strong>omic landing.<br />

Scorecard by Largest Ec<strong>on</strong>omies<br />

A scorecard of indicators across <strong>the</strong> world’s<br />

largest ec<strong>on</strong>omies shows <strong>the</strong> particularly weak<br />

envir<strong>on</strong>ment in Europe as well as Japan (Figure 1).<br />

The broad GDP measures as well as <strong>the</strong> more<br />

focused c<strong>on</strong>sumer spending measures have<br />

deteriorated most in Japan and <strong>the</strong> European Uni<strong>on</strong>,<br />

including <strong>the</strong> euro z<strong>on</strong>e countries. Amid softening<br />

demand, inflati<strong>on</strong>ary pressures are easing fastest<br />

in <strong>the</strong>se countries—especially in terms of core<br />

prices excluding food and fuel.<br />

In c<strong>on</strong>trast, GDP and spending measures in <strong>the</strong><br />

United States have held up better compared<br />

with Europe. And in China, GDP, spending, and<br />

investment measures have c<strong>on</strong>tinued to improve at<br />

a str<strong>on</strong>g pace through <strong>the</strong> sec<strong>on</strong>d quarter.<br />

The flashing warning sign in China is evident in<br />

<strong>the</strong> price inflati<strong>on</strong> measures, which suggest an<br />

overheating ec<strong>on</strong>omy. Ano<strong>the</strong>r sign is <strong>the</strong> recent<br />

drop in c<strong>on</strong>sumer c<strong>on</strong>fidence, which is somewhat<br />

surprisingly akin to <strong>the</strong> recent steep dropoff in<br />

c<strong>on</strong>fidence in Europe and <strong>the</strong> United States. In<br />

Japan, <strong>the</strong> post-tsunami dropoff in c<strong>on</strong>fidence has<br />

started to bottom out in recent m<strong>on</strong>ths.<br />

First <str<strong>on</strong>g>Half</str<strong>on</strong>g> GDP by Quarter<br />

GDP growth for <strong>the</strong> first half of <str<strong>on</strong>g>2011</str<strong>on</strong>g> highlights <strong>the</strong><br />

particular risks in Europe and China (Figure 2). This<br />

inflati<strong>on</strong>-adjusted growth measure is quarter-toquarter<br />

growth at an annualized rate, which is <strong>the</strong><br />

way GDP growth is comm<strong>on</strong>ly reported in <strong>the</strong> United<br />

States.<br />

In Europe, this growth measure plummeted from<br />

a pace of about 3% in <strong>the</strong> first quarter of <str<strong>on</strong>g>2011</str<strong>on</strong>g> to<br />

less than 1.0% for both <strong>the</strong> euro z<strong>on</strong>e as well as<br />

<strong>the</strong> broader European Uni<strong>on</strong>. In <strong>the</strong> euro z<strong>on</strong>e,<br />

<strong>the</strong> momentum toward flat or falling growth in <strong>the</strong><br />

sec<strong>on</strong>d half of <strong>the</strong> year is str<strong>on</strong>g, given <strong>the</strong> <strong>on</strong>going<br />

debt crisis that has spread from Greece.<br />

The same measure calculated for China,<br />

meanwhile, accelerated slightly despite <strong>the</strong><br />

Breakthrough Insights 81


Figure 1. Selected Indicators by Country<br />

█ = IMPROVING█ = MIXED █ = DETERIORATING<br />

European Uni<strong>on</strong> *<br />

82 Breakthrough Insights<br />

Period Y-to-Y<br />

Growth<br />

Q-to-Q or<br />

M-to-M<br />

GDP (Inflati<strong>on</strong>-Adjusted), Annualized Growth Rate Q2 '11 1.7% 0.9%<br />

Residential & Business Investment (Inflati<strong>on</strong>-Adjusted) Q2 '11 1.9% 1.4%<br />

C<strong>on</strong>sumer Spending (Inflati<strong>on</strong>-Adjusted) Q2 '11 0.3% -0.4%<br />

C<strong>on</strong>sumer C<strong>on</strong>fidence (Points) Aug-11 -5.6 -4.4<br />

CPI Headline Index, Not Seas<strong>on</strong>ally Adjusted (NSA) Jul-11 2.9% -0.4%<br />

CPI Core Index, excluding food and fuel (NSA) Jul-11 1.5% -0.7%<br />

Euro Z<strong>on</strong>e *<br />

Period Y-to-Y<br />

Growth<br />

Q-to-Q or<br />

M-to-M<br />

GDP (Inflati<strong>on</strong>-Adjusted), Annualized Growth Rate Q2 '11 1.6% 0.6%<br />

Residential & Business Investment (Inflati<strong>on</strong>-Adjusted) Q2 '11 1.7% 0.6%<br />

C<strong>on</strong>sumer Spending (Inflati<strong>on</strong>-Adjusted) Q2 '11 0.5% -0.9%<br />

C<strong>on</strong>sumer C<strong>on</strong>fidence (Points) Aug-11 -5.1 -5.3<br />

CPI Headline Index, Not Seas<strong>on</strong>ally Adjusted (NSA) Jul-11 2.5% -0.6%<br />

CPI Core Index, excluding food and fuel (NSA) Jul-11 1.2% -1.0%<br />

United States<br />

Period Y-to-Y<br />

Growth<br />

Q-to-Q or<br />

M-to-M<br />

GDP (Inflati<strong>on</strong>-Adjusted), Annualized Growth Rate Q2 '11 1.5% 1.0%<br />

Residential & Business Investment (Inflati<strong>on</strong>-Adjusted) Q2 '11 2.2% 5.3%<br />

C<strong>on</strong>sumer Spending (Inflati<strong>on</strong>-Adjusted) Q2 '11 2.2% 0.4%<br />

C<strong>on</strong>sumer C<strong>on</strong>fidence (Points) Aug-11 -8.7 -14.7<br />

CPI (Headline Index) Jul-11 3.6% 0.5%<br />

CPI (Core Index, excluding food and fuel) Jul-11 1.8% 0.2%<br />

Japan<br />

Period Y-to-Y<br />

Growth<br />

Q-to-Q or<br />

M-to-M<br />

GDP (Inflati<strong>on</strong>-Adjusted), Annualized Growth Rate Q2 '11 -0.9% -1.3%<br />

Residential & Business Investment (Inflati<strong>on</strong>-Adjusted) Q2 '11 -0.8% 1.9%<br />

C<strong>on</strong>sumer Spending (Inflati<strong>on</strong>-Adjusted) Q2 '11 -0.6% -0.3%<br />

C<strong>on</strong>sumer C<strong>on</strong>fidence (Points) Aug-11 -4.9 0.0<br />

CPI (Headline Index) Jul-11 0.8% 0.1%<br />

CPI (Core Index, excluding food and fuel) Jul-11 0.3% 0.0%<br />

China<br />

Period Y-to-Y<br />

Growth<br />

Q-to-Q or<br />

M-to-M<br />

GDP (Inflati<strong>on</strong>-Adjusted), Annualized Growth Rate Q2 '11 9.5% 9.1%<br />

Residential & Business Investment (Inflati<strong>on</strong>-Adjusted), NSA Aug-11 25.6% -0.7%<br />

C<strong>on</strong>sumer Spending (Inflati<strong>on</strong>-Adjusted), NSA Q2 '11 10.5% 1.5%<br />

C<strong>on</strong>sumer C<strong>on</strong>fidence (Points) Jul-11 -2.8 -3.1<br />

CPI (Headline Index), NSA Aug-11 6.2% 0.3%<br />

CPI excluding food prices, NSA Aug-11 3.0% 0.2%<br />

Sources: EuroStat, Japan Nati<strong>on</strong>al Statistics Center, Nati<strong>on</strong>al Bureau of Statistics of China, U.S.<br />

Department of Commerce, C<strong>on</strong>ference Board<br />

Y-to-Y = Year-to-Year change; Q-to-Q = change from prior quarter; M-to-M = change from prior m<strong>on</strong>th<br />

All data is seas<strong>on</strong>ally adjusted unless indicated by “NSA” or Not Seas<strong>on</strong>ally Adjusted.<br />

*European Uni<strong>on</strong> countries<br />

(€ marks euro z<strong>on</strong>e countries)<br />

Austria €<br />

Belgium €<br />

Bulgaria<br />

Cyprus €<br />

Czech Republic<br />

Denmark<br />

Est<strong>on</strong>ia €<br />

Finland €<br />

France €<br />

Germany*<br />

Greece €<br />

Hungary<br />

Ireland €<br />

Italy €<br />

Latvia<br />

Lithuania<br />

Luxembourg €<br />

Malta €<br />

Ne<strong>the</strong>rlands €<br />

Poland<br />

Portugal €<br />

Romania<br />

Slovakia €<br />

Slovenia €<br />

Spain €<br />

Sweden<br />

United Kingdom


government’s attempts to slow down ec<strong>on</strong>omic<br />

growth in order to temper inflati<strong>on</strong>ary pressures.<br />

This is not a good sign for China’s outlook. It<br />

suggests <strong>the</strong> country’s risk of a hard ec<strong>on</strong>omic<br />

landing remains very high.<br />

The trends for <strong>the</strong> United States and Japan are not<br />

positive, but <strong>the</strong>y are not as ominous as <strong>the</strong> trends<br />

in Europe and China. In Japan, <strong>the</strong> c<strong>on</strong>tinued fallout<br />

from <strong>the</strong> March natural disasters was not as severe<br />

in <strong>the</strong> sec<strong>on</strong>d quarter as <strong>the</strong> initial first quarter<br />

impact.<br />

Trends in Year-to-Year GDP Growth<br />

GDP growth calculated <strong>on</strong> a year-to-year basis<br />

tends to show a less dramatic trend than quarterto-quarter<br />

growth, which can be more volatile<br />

Figure 2. Inflati<strong>on</strong>-Adjusted GDP by Largest Ec<strong>on</strong>omies<br />

(Qtr-to-Qtr Growth, Seas<strong>on</strong>ally Adjusted Annual Rate)<br />

2.9%<br />

Q1-<str<strong>on</strong>g>2011</str<strong>on</strong>g> Q2-<str<strong>on</strong>g>2011</str<strong>on</strong>g><br />

European<br />

Uni<strong>on</strong>*<br />

3.1%<br />

0.9% 0.6%<br />

1.0%<br />

0.4%<br />

Euro Z<strong>on</strong>e** United<br />

States<br />

-1.3%<br />

9.1%<br />

8.7%<br />

-3.6%<br />

Japan China<br />

*European Uni<strong>on</strong> includes 27 countries<br />

**Euro z<strong>on</strong>e includes 17 countries<br />

Source: EuroStat, China Nati<strong>on</strong>al Bureau of Statistics and<br />

<strong>Kantar</strong> <strong>Retail</strong><br />

Figure 3. Inflati<strong>on</strong>-Adjusted GDP by Major Ec<strong>on</strong>omies<br />

(Year-to-Year Growth, Seas<strong>on</strong>ally-Adjusted)<br />

15%<br />

10%<br />

5%<br />

0%<br />

-5%<br />

European Uni<strong>on</strong>*<br />

China<br />

United<br />

States<br />

2007.1 2008.1 2009.1 2010.1 <str<strong>on</strong>g>2011</str<strong>on</strong>g>.1<br />

Japan<br />

-10%<br />

*European Uni<strong>on</strong> includes 27 countries<br />

Source: EuroStat, China Nati<strong>on</strong>al Bureau of Statistics and<br />

<strong>Kantar</strong> <strong>Retail</strong><br />

and is most affected by revisi<strong>on</strong>s (Figure 3). This<br />

doesn’t change <strong>the</strong> negative outlook, given <strong>the</strong><br />

importance of falling c<strong>on</strong>fidence. But it suggests<br />

that <strong>the</strong> starting point for <strong>the</strong> outlook may not be as<br />

weak as painted by o<strong>the</strong>r indicators.<br />

Europe’s growth trend, by this measure, appears<br />

much less negative than suggested by <strong>the</strong> quarterto-quarter<br />

growth trend.<br />

The slowing trend in <strong>the</strong> United States, <strong>on</strong> <strong>the</strong> o<strong>the</strong>r<br />

hand, appears somewhat more pr<strong>on</strong>ounced—at<br />

least from str<strong>on</strong>g 2010 growth—compared with<br />

Europe.<br />

China’s str<strong>on</strong>g year-to-year growth remains<br />

steady by this measure, although relatively modest<br />

compared with <strong>the</strong> very str<strong>on</strong>g growth of 2007 or<br />

early 2010.<br />

Breakthrough Insights 83


The comparis<strong>on</strong>s to 2007 also are notable for<br />

Europe and <strong>the</strong> United States. Both had rebounded<br />

to pre-recessi<strong>on</strong> growth rates in 2010.<br />

C<strong>on</strong>sumer Price Trends<br />

The escalating price pressures that have weighed<br />

<strong>on</strong> <strong>the</strong> outlook globally are clearly persisting at<br />

<strong>the</strong>ir worst in China (Figure 4).<br />

Although China’s c<strong>on</strong>sumer price inflati<strong>on</strong> rate<br />

subsided a bit in August, <strong>the</strong>re is still not enough<br />

evidence to say that China finally has its inflati<strong>on</strong><br />

problem under c<strong>on</strong>trol—particularly given str<strong>on</strong>g<br />

GDP and c<strong>on</strong>sumer spending growth in <strong>the</strong><br />

sec<strong>on</strong>d quarter. The high inflati<strong>on</strong> rates remain<br />

a significant threat for both China and <strong>the</strong> global<br />

ec<strong>on</strong>omy.<br />

Figure 4. C<strong>on</strong>sumer Price Inflati<strong>on</strong> by Major Ec<strong>on</strong>omies<br />

(Year-to-Year Percent Change)<br />

7%<br />

6%<br />

5%<br />

4%<br />

3%<br />

2%<br />

1%<br />

0%<br />

Jan-10 Jan-11<br />

-1%<br />

-2%<br />

84 Breakthrough Insights<br />

China<br />

European<br />

Uni<strong>on</strong>*<br />

Japan<br />

United<br />

States<br />

*European Uni<strong>on</strong> includes 27 countries<br />

Source: EuroStat, Japan Nati<strong>on</strong>al Statistics Center, Nati<strong>on</strong>al<br />

Bureau of Statistics of China, U.S. Department of Labor, and<br />

<strong>Kantar</strong> <strong>Retail</strong><br />

In c<strong>on</strong>trast, <strong>the</strong> price pressures in Europe peaked<br />

in April and have since been subsiding, partly in<br />

resp<strong>on</strong>se to weakening c<strong>on</strong>sumer demand. This<br />

should give European central bankers a much freer<br />

hand to lower interest rates to stimulate ec<strong>on</strong>omic<br />

growth.<br />

The uptick in Japan’s price pressures are focused<br />

in food, fuel, and services, which likely reflects<br />

growing scarcity in <strong>the</strong> wake of <strong>the</strong> March disasters.<br />

The United States also saw inflati<strong>on</strong> pressures<br />

peak through <strong>the</strong> summer because of food and fuel<br />

prices for <strong>the</strong> most part. Those inflati<strong>on</strong> pressures<br />

should subside into <strong>the</strong> sec<strong>on</strong>d half of <strong>the</strong> year,<br />

particularly in terms of fuel prices that have come<br />

down from <strong>the</strong>ir mid-May peak. This will give <strong>the</strong><br />

Federal Reserve greater freedom to use m<strong>on</strong>etary<br />

policy to stimulate a slowing U.S. ec<strong>on</strong>omy.<br />

Global <strong>Retail</strong> Opportunity Index<br />

The recent and emerging growth trends are having<br />

a significant impact <strong>on</strong> <strong>the</strong> relative attractiveness<br />

of retail markets in <strong>the</strong> l<strong>on</strong>g term. This is evident<br />

in a ranking of <strong>the</strong> markets based <strong>on</strong> a Global<br />

<strong>Retail</strong> Opportunity Index developed by <strong>Kantar</strong> <strong>Retail</strong><br />

(Figure 5). Based <strong>on</strong> this index:<br />

Most euro z<strong>on</strong>e countries (i.e., Ireland, Austria,<br />

Ne<strong>the</strong>rlands, Spain, Belgium, Italy, Portugal,<br />

and Greece) have sagged toward <strong>the</strong> bottom of<br />

<strong>the</strong> rankings.<br />

Russia’s outlook also has been hit hard in this<br />

envir<strong>on</strong>ment, dropping it to 10 th in <strong>the</strong> ranking<br />

from third. Russia’s households appear to be<br />

particularly hurt by inflati<strong>on</strong> pressures amid


Figure 5. Global <strong>Retail</strong> Opportunity Ranking 1<br />

Rank<br />

Prior-Year<br />

Rank Country Regi<strong>on</strong> Index<br />

1 1 China Asia-Pacific 85.5<br />

2 4 Brazil Latin America 69.1<br />

3 2 United States North America 60.6<br />

4 5 Malaysia Asia-Pacific 50.9<br />

5 7 Australia Asia-Pacific 50.4<br />

6 9 Canada North America 46.3<br />

7 6 Vietnam Asia-Pacific 45.9<br />

8 11 Sweden Western Europe 45.7<br />

9 8 India Asia-Pacific 45.4<br />

10 3 Russia Central & Eastern Europe 44.1<br />

11 12 United Kingdom Western Europe 44.1<br />

12 10 France Western Europe 41.1<br />

13 14 South Korea Asia-Pacific 38.9<br />

14 18 Philippines Asia-Pacific 38.3<br />

15 13 Argentina Latin America 37.9<br />

16 19 Switzerland Western Europe 37.8<br />

17 16 South Africa Africa 37.1<br />

18 20 Germany Western Europe 37.0<br />

19 15 Ind<strong>on</strong>esia Asia-Pacific 35.8<br />

20 22 Taiwan Asia-Pacific 35.6<br />

21 17 Japan Asia-Pacific 33.6<br />

22 30 Mexico Latin America 33.5<br />

23 24 Thailand Asia-Pacific 33.2<br />

24 23 Turkey Central & Eastern Europe 32.9<br />

25 28 Poland Central & Eastern Europe 32.3<br />

26 26 Ireland Western Europe 32.2<br />

27 21 Austria Western Europe 32.0<br />

28 27 Ne<strong>the</strong>rlands Western Europe 31.2<br />

29 25 Spain Western Europe 30.5<br />

30 29 Belgium Western Europe 30.0<br />

31 31 Italy Western Europe 22.0<br />

32 32 Portugal Western Europe 16.3<br />

33 34 Nigeria Africa 15.0<br />

34 33 Greece Western Europe 10.9<br />

1 The rankings are based <strong>on</strong> a weighted index of three measures:<br />

(1) forecasted real growth rates of spending <strong>on</strong> retail-related<br />

categories through 2016, (2) measures of market risks, and (3)<br />

size of <strong>the</strong> retail market. The weighting is skewed in favor of<br />

growth (55%) instead of risk (25%) with market size given <strong>the</strong><br />

least weight (20%)<br />

* Euro z<strong>on</strong>e countries in blue<br />

uneven growth in <strong>the</strong> oil industry that’s key to<br />

<strong>the</strong> country’s outlook.<br />

N<strong>on</strong>-euro z<strong>on</strong>e countries such as Sweden and<br />

Switzerland have tended to edge higher in <strong>the</strong><br />

rankings.<br />

Brazil is am<strong>on</strong>g <strong>the</strong> emerging markets that<br />

have c<strong>on</strong>tinued to climb in <strong>the</strong> rankings<br />

amid developed market woes—although <strong>the</strong><br />

movement am<strong>on</strong>g emerging markets overall is<br />

quite mixed depending <strong>on</strong> specific situati<strong>on</strong>s.<br />

Some have held steady while o<strong>the</strong>rs have<br />

slipped in <strong>the</strong> rankings.<br />

Australia and Canada are am<strong>on</strong>g <strong>the</strong> developed<br />

markets where sustained growth has allowed<br />

<strong>the</strong>m to edge higher in <strong>the</strong> rankings.<br />

Global <strong>Retail</strong> Opportunity Map<br />

A mapping of <strong>the</strong> opportunity index teases out<br />

<strong>the</strong> impact that <strong>the</strong> index’s three dimensi<strong>on</strong>s—<br />

inflati<strong>on</strong>-adjusted growth, market risk, and market<br />

size—each have <strong>on</strong> <strong>the</strong> relative opportunity am<strong>on</strong>g<br />

countries (Figure 6). In this c<strong>on</strong>text, four countries<br />

exhibit an attractive combinati<strong>on</strong> of lower-thanaverage<br />

risk and higher-than-average growth:<br />

Australia, Canada, Sweden, and <strong>the</strong> United States.<br />

Countries are mapped from low- to high-growth<br />

al<strong>on</strong>g <strong>the</strong> horiz<strong>on</strong>tal axis (using inflati<strong>on</strong>-adjusted<br />

2010–2016F compound annual growth rates for<br />

c<strong>on</strong>sumer spending <strong>on</strong> retail-related categories)<br />

and from high- to low-risk al<strong>on</strong>g <strong>the</strong> vertical axis.<br />

(See <strong>the</strong> sidebar for more background about <strong>the</strong><br />

risk measures and o<strong>the</strong>r data issues). The size<br />

of a country’s circle <strong>on</strong> <strong>the</strong> map is indicative of its<br />

relative market size in 2016. O<strong>the</strong>r observati<strong>on</strong>s<br />

based <strong>on</strong> <strong>the</strong> opportunity map include:<br />

It’s all relative. Although <strong>the</strong> United State’s<br />

l<strong>on</strong>g-term growth prospects have deteriorated,<br />

it retains its relative attractiveness am<strong>on</strong>g most<br />

o<strong>the</strong>r countries—which are being hurt as much,<br />

Breakthrough Insights 85


86 Breakthrough Insights<br />

Figure 6. Global <strong>Retail</strong> Opportunity Map<br />

High Risk Low Risk<br />

-75<br />

Germany*<br />

Portugal*<br />

Greece*<br />

Italy*<br />

Low Growth<br />

Ne<strong>the</strong>rlands*<br />

Japan<br />

Spain*<br />

Austria*<br />

Belgium*<br />

Ireland*<br />

Nigeria<br />

Switzerland<br />

U.K.<br />

France*<br />

Taiwan<br />

South<br />

Korea<br />

Turkey<br />

Poland<br />

Mexico<br />

-95<br />

Sweden<br />

Canada<br />

United<br />

States<br />

Ind<strong>on</strong>esia<br />

Argentina<br />

Russia<br />

Australia<br />

Malaysia<br />

Thailand<br />

South Africa<br />

*Euro z<strong>on</strong>e members<br />

*Euro z<strong>on</strong>e members<br />

Explanatory note: The relative size of each country’s retail market is represented by <strong>the</strong> size of its bubble. The mapping<br />

horiz<strong>on</strong>tally represents <strong>the</strong> country’s forecasted growth al<strong>on</strong>g a c<strong>on</strong>tinuum of low-to-high growth. The mapping<br />

vertically represents <strong>the</strong> country’s risk level al<strong>on</strong>g a c<strong>on</strong>tinuum of low-to-high risk. Where each axis line crosses <strong>the</strong><br />

c<strong>on</strong>tinuum represents average growth or risk. So countries mapped <strong>on</strong> <strong>the</strong> right half represent higher-than-average<br />

growth. And countries mapped <strong>on</strong> <strong>the</strong> top represent lower-than-average risk. The best opportunities are in <strong>the</strong> top right<br />

quadrant, which represents low-risk/high-growth opportunities<br />

Source: <strong>Kantar</strong> <strong>Retail</strong><br />

India<br />

Philippines<br />

Low Risk/High Growth<br />

“Best” Quadrant<br />

Western Europe<br />

Central & Eastern Europe<br />

North America<br />

Latin America<br />

Asia -Pacific<br />

Africa<br />

Vietnam<br />

Brazil<br />

China<br />

High Growth


if not more, by <strong>the</strong> current global ec<strong>on</strong>omic<br />

envir<strong>on</strong>ment.<br />

PIIGS. Last year, this outlook included Italy<br />

in a group with euro z<strong>on</strong>e countries that were<br />

more troubled at <strong>the</strong> time—Portugal, Ireland,<br />

Greece, and Spain. That proved to be prescient,<br />

given Italy’s more recent debt troubles. These<br />

countries tend to be clustered <strong>on</strong> <strong>the</strong> map,<br />

straddling <strong>the</strong> two left low-growth quadrants.<br />

Risky growers. Notable am<strong>on</strong>g <strong>the</strong> risky<br />

growers in <strong>the</strong> bottom right quadrant is <strong>the</strong><br />

rightward movement by Brazil and Mexico<br />

toward a more attractive positi<strong>on</strong> and <strong>the</strong><br />

leftward movement by Russia toward a less<br />

attractive positi<strong>on</strong>. China retains its place as<br />

<strong>the</strong> str<strong>on</strong>gest growth market.<br />

Safe laggards. Notable am<strong>on</strong>g <strong>the</strong> safe<br />

laggards in <strong>the</strong> upper left quadrant is <strong>the</strong><br />

rightward movement by Germany toward a<br />

more attractive positi<strong>on</strong>. This largely reflects<br />

Germany’s ability to sustain relatively better<br />

growth than its neighbors amid <strong>the</strong> euro debt<br />

crisis. And in this envir<strong>on</strong>ment, Sweden has<br />

edged out of this quadrant into <strong>the</strong> best growth<br />

opportunity space to <strong>the</strong> right.<br />

About <strong>the</strong> Global <strong>Retail</strong> Opportunity Measures<br />

Market size. C<strong>on</strong>sumer spending data reported by each country are used to define market size. <strong>Retail</strong><br />

sales measures are not used because <strong>the</strong>y can vary significantly in terms of what is included. For<br />

example, <strong>the</strong> figures for some countries are inflated by what o<strong>the</strong>r countries classify as wholesale sales.<br />

And some countries do not try to estimate sales of smaller retailers or informal retailers.<br />

C<strong>on</strong>sumer spending data have a number of advantages. They are a comp<strong>on</strong>ent of each country’s<br />

nati<strong>on</strong>al accounts, which tend to be measured uniformly across countries. <str<strong>on</strong>g>Focus</str<strong>on</strong>g>ing <strong>on</strong> spending <strong>on</strong><br />

goods—and excluding c<strong>on</strong>sumer spending <strong>on</strong> services—is a good proxy of retail sales. Spending <strong>on</strong><br />

automobiles also is excluded. The c<strong>on</strong>sumer spending data also are better at including sales in informal<br />

markets.<br />

Market risk. The market risk measure leverages data from <strong>the</strong> World Ec<strong>on</strong>omic Forum’s Global<br />

Competitiveness Report, <str<strong>on</strong>g>2011</str<strong>on</strong>g>–2012. Data that measure differences am<strong>on</strong>g countries in terms of five<br />

factors are used and weighted in <strong>the</strong> following way: 50% infrastructure and instituti<strong>on</strong>s, 30% higher<br />

educati<strong>on</strong>/training and business sophisticati<strong>on</strong>, and 20% technological readiness.<br />

Breakthrough Insights 87


The Macroec<strong>on</strong>omic Outlook for U.S. <strong>Retail</strong><br />

Pushed Toward Recessi<strong>on</strong><br />

By: Frank Badillo / Originally published: September 29, <str<strong>on</strong>g>2011</str<strong>on</strong>g><br />

88 88 Breakthrough Insights<br />

A bumper sticker slogan may be as good<br />

a way as any of explaining why <strong>the</strong> ec<strong>on</strong>omic<br />

recovery is in danger of lapsing into<br />

ano<strong>the</strong>r recessi<strong>on</strong>: “Humpty Dumpty was<br />

pushed!”


What looked like an ec<strong>on</strong>omic and retail recovery<br />

in decent shape—although not necessarily eggshaped—at<br />

<strong>the</strong> start of <str<strong>on</strong>g>2011</str<strong>on</strong>g> is in danger of falling<br />

into recessi<strong>on</strong> by <strong>the</strong> end of <str<strong>on</strong>g>2011</str<strong>on</strong>g> because of<br />

<strong>the</strong> accumulating impact of a series of mostly<br />

unexpected shocks or market disrupti<strong>on</strong>s. In<br />

particular, <strong>the</strong>se include:<br />

Fuel price spikes/Middle East revolts. The first<br />

big blow to c<strong>on</strong>sumer c<strong>on</strong>fidence this year was<br />

<strong>the</strong> spike in fuel prices. Prices surged from<br />

March to <strong>the</strong>ir May peak—as oil markets were<br />

disrupted as revolts spread from Tunisia to<br />

Egypt and Libya—and remained elevated as <strong>the</strong><br />

Libya c<strong>on</strong>flict dragged <strong>on</strong>. This fuel price spike<br />

caused inflati<strong>on</strong>ary pressures to shift from bad<br />

to worse, particularly in emerging markets<br />

such as China.<br />

Japan’s disasters. The earthquake and<br />

tsunami-induced nuclear disaster in Japan<br />

in March quickly added to global inflati<strong>on</strong><br />

pressures as shortages occurred in key<br />

industries, particularly autos and electr<strong>on</strong>ics.<br />

The disrupti<strong>on</strong>s to <strong>the</strong> U.S. auto industry caused<br />

temporary job losses that c<strong>on</strong>tributed to <strong>the</strong><br />

slowdown in U.S. job growth that emerged in<br />

May and June.<br />

Europe’s “slow-moti<strong>on</strong>” financial crisis. The<br />

European crisis slowly is becoming <strong>on</strong>e of <strong>the</strong><br />

most significant threats to <strong>the</strong> global outlook.<br />

The crisis has deteriorated m<strong>on</strong>th-by-m<strong>on</strong>th<br />

since <strong>the</strong> April request by Portugal for a bailout.<br />

The euro z<strong>on</strong>e’s move to bolster its bailout<br />

programs has failed to quiet c<strong>on</strong>cerns, which<br />

have instead mounted with new fears regarding<br />

Italy and renewed fears over Greece. Now,<br />

<strong>the</strong> crisis is evolving bey<strong>on</strong>d a sovereign debt<br />

crisis into a full-blown financial crisis. This is<br />

evident in growing c<strong>on</strong>cerns about European<br />

banks, which are being shunned in <strong>the</strong> markets<br />

because of <strong>the</strong>ir exposure to euro-country debt.<br />

U.S. debt debate. The big falloff in U.S.<br />

c<strong>on</strong>sumer c<strong>on</strong>fidence in August and September<br />

that weighs heavy <strong>on</strong> <strong>the</strong> outlook is partly<br />

attributable to <strong>the</strong> acrim<strong>on</strong>ious debate in<br />

C<strong>on</strong>gress over <strong>the</strong> U.S. debt ceiling and<br />

deficit reducti<strong>on</strong>. The c<strong>on</strong>fidence falloff also<br />

is attributable, however, to <strong>the</strong> August and<br />

September stock market selloffs, which<br />

occurred in resp<strong>on</strong>se to broader c<strong>on</strong>cerns<br />

about government debt and growth globally.<br />

And those global c<strong>on</strong>cerns are being driven<br />

relatively more—and increasingly more—by<br />

c<strong>on</strong>cerns about a euro financial crisis.<br />

Are China and Emerging Markets Next?<br />

Next in <strong>the</strong> string of events in <str<strong>on</strong>g>2011</str<strong>on</strong>g> that may fur<strong>the</strong>r<br />

aggravate <strong>the</strong> U.S. retail outlook is <strong>the</strong> risk of a<br />

hard landing in key emerging markets, particularly<br />

China. The September stock market selloffs in<br />

<strong>the</strong>se countries have been particularly big—larger<br />

than <strong>the</strong> falloff in developed markets. The wealth<br />

losses in <strong>the</strong>se emerging markets could be <strong>the</strong> kind<br />

of shock that aggravates <strong>the</strong> steps <strong>the</strong>se countries<br />

are taking to slow <strong>the</strong>ir ec<strong>on</strong>omy as a way to<br />

dampen inflati<strong>on</strong> pressures.<br />

The risk of a hard ec<strong>on</strong>omic landing in China is<br />

particularly worrisome, given its key supply- and<br />

demand-side role in U.S. and global markets. A<br />

Breakthrough Insights 89


hard landing in China also would present risks to<br />

<strong>the</strong> global financial markets, given growing c<strong>on</strong>cern<br />

that growth in China is being driven by a U.S.-style<br />

real estate bubble fed by easy access to credit in<br />

recent years.<br />

C<strong>on</strong>fidence Is Paramount Above All Else<br />

Amid <strong>the</strong> series of disrupti<strong>on</strong>s, <strong>the</strong> falloff in<br />

c<strong>on</strong>fidence am<strong>on</strong>g c<strong>on</strong>sumers and businesses<br />

remains <strong>the</strong> best window <strong>on</strong> <strong>the</strong> retail outlook—and<br />

<strong>the</strong> view has not improved based <strong>on</strong> <strong>the</strong> latest data.<br />

The c<strong>on</strong>sumer c<strong>on</strong>fidence and sentiment numbers<br />

through September stayed near <strong>the</strong> lows <strong>the</strong>y fell<br />

to after <strong>the</strong> initial stock market selloff in August<br />

(Figure 1). These measures paint an increasingly<br />

ominous outlook with each blow <strong>the</strong> ec<strong>on</strong>omy has<br />

taken, starting with <strong>the</strong> March spike in fuel prices.<br />

At <strong>the</strong> same time, it will be important to see how <strong>the</strong><br />

c<strong>on</strong>tinued letup in c<strong>on</strong>fidence am<strong>on</strong>g c<strong>on</strong>sumers<br />

affects <strong>the</strong>ir spending intenti<strong>on</strong>s as tracked by<br />

<strong>Kantar</strong> <strong>Retail</strong>. The letup in spending intenti<strong>on</strong>s<br />

through September has been significantly less<br />

severe than <strong>the</strong> o<strong>the</strong>r c<strong>on</strong>fidence measures. If that<br />

remains <strong>the</strong> case, <strong>the</strong>n it suggests that household<br />

spending likely will weaken in <strong>the</strong> m<strong>on</strong>ths ahead but<br />

not necessarily fall off suddenly and dramatically.<br />

But it still may be not be enough to avoid a<br />

recessi<strong>on</strong> in <strong>the</strong> m<strong>on</strong>ths ahead.<br />

Private Sector Follows School Job Cuts<br />

A corresp<strong>on</strong>ding falloff in business c<strong>on</strong>fidence—<br />

which may be accelerating in <strong>the</strong> wake of <strong>the</strong> recent<br />

stock market selloffs—appears to be evident in<br />

<strong>the</strong> path of job growth amid <strong>the</strong> year’s market<br />

90 Breakthrough Insights<br />

Figure 1. Measures of C<strong>on</strong>fidence<br />

100<br />

90<br />

80<br />

70<br />

60<br />

50<br />

40<br />

30<br />

20<br />

Spending<br />

Intenti<strong>on</strong>s***<br />

C<strong>on</strong>sumer<br />

Sentiment**<br />

C<strong>on</strong>sumer<br />

C<strong>on</strong>fidence*<br />

Jan-08 Jan-09 Jan-10 Jan-11<br />

*C<strong>on</strong>fidence is through September as reported by <strong>the</strong><br />

C<strong>on</strong>ference Board<br />

**Sentiment is through September as reported by Reuters/<br />

University of Michigan<br />

***Shopping Intenti<strong>on</strong>s from <strong>Kantar</strong> <strong>Retail</strong> ShopperScape® is<br />

through September; represents sum of % of shoppers planning<br />

to spend about <strong>the</strong> same or more in <strong>the</strong> coming m<strong>on</strong>th<br />

Source: C<strong>on</strong>ference Board, Reuters/University of Michigan and<br />

<strong>Kantar</strong> <strong>Retail</strong><br />

disrupti<strong>on</strong>s. After starting to rebound str<strong>on</strong>gly<br />

through April, private sector job growth has slowed<br />

dramatically in most m<strong>on</strong>ths through September<br />

(Figure 2). September job growth appeared to<br />

improve, but is weaker when workers returning<br />

from a Veriz<strong>on</strong> labor strike is discounted.<br />

This downshift in hiring highlights <strong>the</strong> growing risk<br />

in this increasingly uncertain envir<strong>on</strong>ment that<br />

private employers will hold back <strong>on</strong> investment<br />

and hiring that <strong>the</strong>y o<strong>the</strong>rwise would have moved<br />

forward with.


While <strong>the</strong> private sector job weakness may be<br />

building, what’s more clear from <strong>the</strong> data is that<br />

<strong>the</strong> job market weakness since May has been led<br />

by a pickup in job cuts by government. The data<br />

fur<strong>the</strong>r show that <strong>the</strong> bulk of <strong>the</strong> government job<br />

cuts in recent m<strong>on</strong>ths have been local school jobs.<br />

In o<strong>the</strong>r words, also adding to <strong>the</strong> string of market<br />

disrupti<strong>on</strong>s of <str<strong>on</strong>g>2011</str<strong>on</strong>g> has been <strong>the</strong> impact of <strong>the</strong> past<br />

recessi<strong>on</strong> <strong>on</strong> local school districts. With property<br />

taxes collected <strong>on</strong> a lagging basis, school districts<br />

are <strong>on</strong>ly now feeling <strong>the</strong> full impact of <strong>the</strong> recessi<strong>on</strong><br />

and declining home values <strong>on</strong> <strong>the</strong>ir revenues—<br />

forcing <strong>the</strong> recent job cuts.<br />

Impact of Bernanke and Obama Plans<br />

In <strong>the</strong> short term, <strong>the</strong> recessi<strong>on</strong> risk posed by <strong>the</strong><br />

year’s market disrupti<strong>on</strong>s will not be eliminated by<br />

<strong>the</strong> plans laid out by Fed Chairman Ben Bernanke<br />

Figure 2. Job Growth: Private Sector vs. Government<br />

M<strong>on</strong>th-to-M<strong>on</strong>th Change in Jobs in Thousands<br />

300<br />

250<br />

200<br />

150<br />

100<br />

50<br />

0<br />

-50<br />

-100<br />

Total jobs (n<strong>on</strong>farm)<br />

Private-sector jobs<br />

Government<br />

Jan-11 Mar-11 May-11 Jul-11 Sep-11<br />

Source: U.S. Department of Labor and <strong>Kantar</strong> <strong>Retail</strong><br />

or President Barack Obama. Bernanke’s plan is<br />

<strong>the</strong> <strong>on</strong>ly <strong>on</strong>e that has a chance of having an impact<br />

in <strong>the</strong> next few m<strong>on</strong>ths—when it can make a<br />

difference in averting a recessi<strong>on</strong>. However, <strong>the</strong><br />

immediate impact of <strong>the</strong> Bernanke plan has been<br />

negative because of <strong>the</strong> way it has raised c<strong>on</strong>cern<br />

am<strong>on</strong>g investors about “significant downside risks<br />

to <strong>the</strong> ec<strong>on</strong>omic outlook.”<br />

The stimulus plans likely will have most of <strong>the</strong>ir<br />

impact in 2012, when <strong>the</strong>y might soften <strong>the</strong> landing<br />

of an ec<strong>on</strong>omic slowdown or downturn. In <strong>the</strong> very<br />

near term, <strong>the</strong> Bernanke and Obama plans will be<br />

hard-pressed to turn around negative c<strong>on</strong>sumer<br />

and business sentiment that appears to be leading<br />

<strong>the</strong> ec<strong>on</strong>omy toward recessi<strong>on</strong>.<br />

Stimulus to Home Buying and Refinancing?<br />

Bernanke’s plan could prove to be a powerful<br />

stimulus that would benefit retailers, particularly<br />

homegoods retailers. The 30-year fixed mortgage<br />

rate is likely to fall below 4% in <strong>the</strong> final weeks<br />

of <strong>the</strong> year, which will give households a bigger<br />

incentive to refinance mortgages and purchase<br />

homes. Refinancing would free up income to spend<br />

in <strong>the</strong> household budget and home buying would<br />

trigger follow-<strong>on</strong> purchases of homegoods.<br />

The success of Bernanke’s plan, however, depends<br />

<strong>on</strong> whe<strong>the</strong>r enough households can get loans. Many<br />

of <strong>the</strong> households that most need refinancing are<br />

“underwater” in terms of <strong>the</strong> value of <strong>the</strong>ir home.<br />

Meanwhile, banks would have to loosen <strong>the</strong>ir<br />

stricter credit standards and show more inclinati<strong>on</strong><br />

to lend m<strong>on</strong>ey. Unless households and banks are<br />

Breakthrough Insights 91


able to find some comm<strong>on</strong> ground, <strong>the</strong> Bernanke<br />

plan is likely to produce mixed results.<br />

The data suggests <strong>the</strong> Fed may have been prodded<br />

to fix a mortgage market fur<strong>the</strong>r crippled by <strong>the</strong><br />

recent collapse in c<strong>on</strong>fidence. Mortgage rates<br />

had fallen toward 4% before <strong>the</strong> Fed plan was<br />

announced and refinancing applicati<strong>on</strong>s had fallen<br />

instead of rising as would be expected (Figure 3).<br />

This suggests <strong>the</strong> falloff in c<strong>on</strong>fidence may be<br />

keeping households from making big decisi<strong>on</strong>s such<br />

as refinancing even when <strong>the</strong>y work in <strong>the</strong>ir favor.<br />

The Fed acti<strong>on</strong> should make <strong>the</strong> incentives clear<br />

and help jolt households—and firms—out of <strong>the</strong><br />

inertia that has set in amid declining c<strong>on</strong>fidence.<br />

Figure 3. Mortgage Rate & Refinancing Applicati<strong>on</strong>s<br />

Weekly Rate and Index<br />

5.4<br />

5.2<br />

5.0<br />

4.8<br />

4.6<br />

4.4<br />

4.2<br />

4.0<br />

3.8<br />

Applicati<strong>on</strong>s for<br />

Refinancing<br />

(right scale)<br />

2010 <str<strong>on</strong>g>2011</str<strong>on</strong>g><br />

Source: Mortgage Bankers Associati<strong>on</strong>, Federal Reserve<br />

Board, and <strong>Kantar</strong> <strong>Retail</strong><br />

92 Breakthrough Insights<br />

30-Year Fixed<br />

Mortgage Rate<br />

(left scale)<br />

6,000<br />

5,000<br />

4,000<br />

3,000<br />

2,000<br />

1,000<br />

0<br />

Implicati<strong>on</strong>s<br />

<strong>Retail</strong>ers and <strong>the</strong>ir suppliers should prepare<br />

for a recessi<strong>on</strong>-like envir<strong>on</strong>ment, with<br />

discreti<strong>on</strong>ary categories and channels—<br />

particularly apparel and homegoods—most at<br />

risk of flat or falling unit volume emerging by<br />

<strong>the</strong> holidays.<br />

Homegoods should benefit more than o<strong>the</strong>r<br />

retail categories and channels as <strong>the</strong> Fed’s<br />

stimulus plan begins to have a growing impact<br />

into 2012.<br />

Do not expect government stimulus to avert<br />

a significant slowdown or downturn in <strong>the</strong><br />

m<strong>on</strong>ths ahead. Government acti<strong>on</strong> at best will<br />

help minimize negative c<strong>on</strong>diti<strong>on</strong>s in <strong>the</strong> short<br />

term. In <strong>the</strong> l<strong>on</strong>g term, government acti<strong>on</strong> may<br />

help create an envir<strong>on</strong>ment that accelerates a<br />

recovery.<br />

China and emerging markets cannot be counted<br />

<strong>on</strong> for sustained str<strong>on</strong>g growth. Teams in those<br />

markets should prepare for a potential hard<br />

ec<strong>on</strong>omic landing.<br />

The impact of a U.S. downturn will remain<br />

uneven am<strong>on</strong>g states and metro markets with<br />

those especially dependent <strong>on</strong> government<br />

jobs most susceptible. States with companies<br />

that sell heavy equipment and durable goods to<br />

emerging markets are at additi<strong>on</strong>al risk if those<br />

global markets sustain a hard landing.


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/ C<strong>on</strong>tacts<br />

Leadership Team<br />

Wayne Levings<br />

Chief Executive Officer<br />

Mayer Danzig<br />

Chief Digital Officer<br />

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Chief Knowledge Officer<br />

Steve Pattins<strong>on</strong><br />

Chief Executive Officer - Market Insights<br />

Bryan Roberts<br />

Director, EMEA <strong>Retail</strong> Insights<br />

Phil Smiley<br />

Chief Executive Officer - Asia Pacific<br />

Global Sales and Services<br />

Scott Butterfield, Chief Customer Officer<br />

Scott.Butterfield@<strong>Kantar</strong><strong>Retail</strong>.com<br />

Michael Pickford, Director, Strategic Global Accounts<br />

Michael.Pickford@<strong>Kantar</strong><strong>Retail</strong>.com<br />

Media<br />

Ka<strong>the</strong>rine Clarke, Vice President<br />

Ka<strong>the</strong>rine.Clarke@<strong>Kantar</strong><strong>Retail</strong>.com


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