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UNITED STATES ARMY IN WORLD WAR II
The European Theater of Operations
THE ARDENNES:
BATTLE OF THE BULGE
by
Hugh M. Cole
CENTER OF MLITARY HISTORY
UNITED STATES ARMY
WASHINGTON, D. C., 1993

Library of Congress Catalog Card Number: 65-60001
First Printed 1965—CMH Pub 7–8–1
For sale by the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office
Washington, D.C. 20402

UNITED STATES ARMY IN WORLD WAR II
Fred C. Cole
Washington and Lee University
James A. Field, Jr.
Swarthmore College
Earl Pomeroy
University of Oregon
Theodore Ropp
Duke University
Stetson Conn, General Editor
Advisory Committee
(As of 1 July 1964)
Lt. Col. Thomas E. Griess
United States Military Academy
Lt. Gen. August Schomburg
Industrial College of the Armed Forces
Maj. Gen. Hugh M. Exton
U.S. Continental Army Command
Brig. Gen. Ward S. Ryan
U.S. Army War College
Brig. Gen. Elias C. Townsend
U.S. Army Command and General
Staff College
Office of the Chief of Military History
Brig. Gen. Hal C. Pattison, Chief of Military History
Chief Historian
Chief, Histories Division
Chief, Editorial and Graphics Division
Editor in Chief
iii
Stetson Conn
Col. Albert W. Jones
Col. Walter B. McKenzie
Joseph R. Friedman

... to Those Who Served

Foreword
During most of the eleven months between D-day and V–E day in
Europe, the U.S. Army was carrying on highly successful offensive opera-
tions. As a consequence, the American soldier was buoyed with success,
imbued with the idea that his enemy could not strike him a really heavy
counterblow, and sustained by the conviction that the war was nearly won.
Then, unbelievably, and under the goad of Hitler's fanaticism, the German
Army launched its powerful counteroffensive in the Ardennes in December
1944 with the design of knifing through the Allied armies and forcing a
negotiated peace. The mettle of the American soldier was tested in the
fires of adversity and the quality of his response earned for him the right
to stand shoulder to shoulder with his forebears of Valley Forge, Fredericks-
burg, and the Marne.
This is the story of how the Germans planned and executed their
offensive. It is the story of how the high command, American and British,
reacted to defeat the German plan once the reality of a German offensive
was accepted. But most of all it is the story of the American fighting man
and the manner in which he fought a myriad of small defensive battles
until the torrent of the German attack was slowed and diverted, its force
dissipated and finally spent. It is the story of squads, platoons, companies,
and even conglomerate scratch groups that fought with courage, with
fortitude, with sheer obstinacy, often without information or communica-
tions or the knowledge of the whereabouts of friends. In less than a fortnight
the enemy was stopped and the Americans were preparing to resume the
offensive. While Bastogne has become the symbol of this obstinate, gallant,
and successful defense, this work appropriately emphasizes the crucial
significance of early American success in containing the attack by holding
firmly on its northern and southern shoulders and by upsetting the enemy
timetable at St. Vith and a dozen lesser known but important and decisive
battlefields.
The hard fighting that preceded the Battle of the Bulge has been re-
counted in two volumes, The Siegfried Line Campaign, and Dr. Cole's
own earlier work, The Lorraine Campaign. Events after it will be related
in The Last Offensive, now in preparation. Two other volumes in this
subseries, The Supreme Command and Logistical Support of the Armies,
Volume II, are useful supplements to the Ardennes volume.
vii

In re-creating the Ardennes battle, the author has penetrated “the fog
of war” as well as any historian can hope to do. No other volume of this
series treats as thoroughly or as well the teamwork of the combined arms-
infantry and armor, artillery and air, combat engineer and tank destroyer-
or portrays as vividly the starkness of small unit combat. Every thoughtful
student of military history, but most especially the student of small unit
tactics, should find the reading of Dr. Cole’s work a rewarding experience.
Washington, D.C.
15 June 1964
viii
HAL C. PATTISON
Brigadier General, USA
Chief of Military History

The Author
Hugh M. Cole received his Ph.D. from the University of Minnesota in
1937 in the field of European military history. He taught military history at
the University of Chicago until 1942, when he joined the Army as an intelli-
gence officer. After graduating from the Command and General Staff School
he was assigned to the staff of the Third Army during its operations in
Europe. At the close of hostilities he became Deputy Theater Historian,
European Theater of Operations. From 1946 to 1952 Dr. Cole
directed the work of the European Theater Section, Office of the Chief of
Military History, wrote The Lorraine Campaign, a volume that appeared
in this series in 1950, and undertook much of the work that has culminated
in this volume on the Ardennes Campaign. He joined the Operations
Research Office of The Johns Hopkins University in 1952 and has continued
his active interest in military history and his service to the Army both as a
scholar and as colonel in the U.S. Army Reserve.
ix

Preface
This volume deals with the crucial period of the campaign conducted
in the Belgian Ardennes and Luxembourg, generally known as the Battle
of the Bulge. Although the German planning described herein antedates
the opening gun by several weeks, the story of the combat operations begins
on 16 December 1944. By 3 January 1945 the German counteroffensive
was at an end, and on that date the Allies commenced an attack that would
take them across the Rhine and into Germany. The last phase of operations
in the Ardennes, therefore, is properly part and parcel of the final Allied
offensive in Europe, and so the course of battle beginning on 3 January
1945 is described in another and final volume of this subseries.
The problem of the level of treatment is always difficult in the organiza-
tion and writing of the general staff type of history, which is the design of
this volume. In describing a war of movement, the solution usually has
been to concentrate on tactical units smaller than those normally treated
when the war of position obtains. Thus the French General Staff history
of the summer offensive in 1918 abruptly descends from the army corps
to the regiment as the appropriate tactical unit to be traced through this
period of mobile operations. The story of the Ardennes Campaign is even
more difficult to organize because of the disappearance, in the first hours,
of a homogeneous front. Churchill’s dictum that the historian’s task is “to
allot proportion to human events” applies in this instance, although there
are limits to the amount of expansion or contraction permissible. Thus the
reader is introduced on 16 December 1944 to battles fought by companies
and platoons because they are meaningful and because the relative impor-
tance of these actions is as great as operations conducted by regiments or
even divisions later in the story. As the American front congeals and a
larger measure of tactical control is regained, the narrative follows bat-
talions, then regiments, and then divisions. The building blocks, however,
are the battalion and the regiment. In U.S. Army practice during the war
in western Europe, the battalion was in organization and doctrine the basic
unit, with both tactical and administrative functions. The regiment, in
turn, when organized as a regimental combat team was the basic maneuver
element combining the arms and having staying power. Also, the regiment
was the lowest infantry unit to have a name and a history with which
the soldier could, and did, identify himself.
xi

The Ardennes battle normally was “fought,” in the sense of exercising
decisive command and directing operations, by the corps commander. The
span of tactical control in these widely dispersed actions simply was
beyond the physical grasp of higher commanders. These higher commanders
could “influence” the battle only by outlining (in very general terms) the
scheme of maneuver, allocating reserves, and exercising whatever moral
suasion they personally could bring to bear. In other words, “tactics came
before strategy,” as Ludendorff wrote of the March offensive in 1918.
For the early days of the Ardennes Campaign the narrative opens each
successive stage of the account by a look at the enemy side of the hill. This,
in fact, is mandatory if the story is to have cohesion and meaning because
the Germans possessed the initiative and because the American forces were
simply reacting to the enemy maneuvers. The account in later chapters
shifts to the American camp in accordance with the measure to which the
American forces had regained operational freedom.
This volume represents the most exhaustive collection of personal
memoirs by leading participants ever attempted for a general staff history
of a major campaign. The memoirs take two forms: interviews with
American participants shortly after the action described, and written ac-
counts prepared immediately after the end of World War II by the German
officers who took part in the Ardennes Campaign. The use of the combat
interview in the European Theater of Operations was organized by Col.
William A. Ganoe, theater historian, but the specific initiation of an in-
tensive effort to cover the Ardennes story while the battle itself was in
progress must be credited to Col. S. L. A. Marshall. The enlistment of the
German participants in the Ardennes, first as involuntary then as voluntary
historians, was begun by Colonel Marshall and Capt. Kenneth Hechler,
then developed into a fully organized research program by Col. Harold
Potter, who was assisted by a very able group of young officers, notably
Captains Howard Hudson, Frank Mahin, and James Scoggins.
The story of the logistics involved in the American operations is treated
at length and in perceptive fashion by Roland G. Ruppenthal, Logistical
Support of the Armies, in two volumes of this subseries. In the main,
therefore, the present volume confines itself to the logistical problems of
the German armies. Readers interested in following the course of Allied
relationships at high levels of command, and particularly the operations of
Allied intelligence on the eve of the German offensive, are referred to
Forrest C. Pogue’s The Supreme Command, another volume in this series.
Unfortunately the interest of the United States Air Forces in tactical support
of ground operations was on the wane in the period after World War II
and, as a result, a detailed air force history of air-ground co-operation dur-
ing the battle of the Ardennes remains to be written. To introduce in full
the effects of the tactical role played by Allied air power during the ground
operations here described would require a volume twice the size of this
xii

one. I have tried, however, to keep the role of the air constantly before the
reader, even though the specific actor often is anonymous.
As in my previous volume in the European subseries an attempt is
made to include all awards of the Medal of Honor and the Distinguished
Service Cross. The reader will recognize that deeds of valor do not neces-
sarily coincide with the focal point of a particular action, as this is selectively
seen and described by the historian; so it has been necessary to relegate
to the footnotes and cover in very cursory fashion many of these individual
acts of gallantry.
The reader will find no reference to “lessons learned.” This is not
because the history of the Ardennes Campaign is so antique as to lack a
useful application to modern military thought or planning for the future.
On the contrary, the operations in the Ardennes show in real life tactical
forms and formations which (in such things as dispersal, gaps between units,
counterattack doctrine, widths of front, and fluidity of movement) are com-
parable to those taught by current Army doctrine and envisaged for the
future. Nonetheless, the most valuable lessons which might be derived from
the study of this campaign would lead inevitably to a consideration of special
weapons effects and their impact on military operations, which in turn would
result in a restrictive security classification for the volume. I hope, however,
that the Army service schools will find it fruitful to make the extrapolation
that cannot be made here.
The maps consulted by the author were those in use at the end of 1944.
They include the U.S. Army reproductions of the maps prepared by the
British Geographical Section, General Staff, in the 1 : 25,000 series (G.S.,
G.S. 4041), the 1 : 50,000 series (G.S., G.S. 4040), and the 1 : 100,000 series
(G.S., G.S. 4336 and 4416). The most useful German map proved to be
the 1 : 200,000 Strussenkurte von Belgien, a copy of the French Michelin
road map, issued to German troops as early as 1940 and, in an English
version, used by American armored units. Some of the terrain in question
is familiar to me, but this personal knowledge has been augmented by an
extensive use of photographs. Shortly after World War II pilots of the
45th Reconnaissance Squadron, USAF, under the supervision of Maj. John
C. Hatlem, flew photographic missions designated by the author, over
terrain in Luxembourg and Belgium. In addition some special ground
photographs were made. The total collection numbers two hundred and
sixteen photographs and has proved invaluable in writing this story.
References to clock time are on the twenty-four hour system. Fortu-
nately for the reader (and the writer), the Allies converted to British
summer time on 17 September 1944 and the Germans went back to middle
European time on 2 October 1944; as a result both forces used the same
clock time in the Ardennes. Sunrise on 16 December 1944 came at 0829
and sunset occurred at 1635 (using Bastogne, Belgium, as a reference
point). The brevity of daylight is an important tactical feature of this
xiii

history, and the reader should note that dawn and dusk (morning and
evening twilight) each added only thirty-eight minutes to the hours of
light.
A host of participants in the Ardennes battle have answered questions
posed by the author, provided personal papers, and read a part or the whole
of the draft manuscript. Their assistance has been invaluable.
Although this volume took an unconscionably long while to write, my
task was made much easier by the initial efforts of Captains Blair Clark,
Howard Hudson, Robert Merriam, and George Tuttle, who spent several
months at the close of the war in gathering the sources and preparing first
drafts for a history of the Ardennes Campaign. In the Office of the Chief
of Military History, Mrs. Magna Bauer, Charles V. P. von Luttichau, and
Royce L. Thompson worked over a period of years in gathering data and
writing research papers for use in the volume. The reader of the footnotes
will obtain some slight measure of my obligation to these three.
In preparation for publication, Mr. Joseph R. Friedman, Editor in
Chief, OCMH, has given this volume devoted attention, and Mrs. Loretto
C. Stevens of the Editorial Branch has shepherded it through the final steps
of editing. Mr. Billy C. Mossman prepared the maps, Miss Ruth A. Phillips
selected the photographs, and Miss Margaret L. Emerson compiled the
index.
Finally, I am indebted to my secretary, Mrs. Muriel Southwick, without
whose exhortations and reminders this book might never have been com-
pleted.
For any errors of fact or flaws of interpretation that may occur in this
work, the author alone is responsible.
Washington, D.C. HUGH M. COLE
15 June 1964
xiv

Contents
Chapter Page
1
. THE ORIGINS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1
Hitler’s Perspective. September 1944 . . . . . . . . .
How the Plan Was Born . . . . . . . . . . . . .
3
9
II . PLANNING THE COUNTEROFFENSIVE . . . . . . . 19
Details of the Plan . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19
The Big Solution . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27
A Double Envelopment? . . . . . . . . . . . . . 29
III . TROOPS AND TERRAIN ............. 33
The Order of Battle . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 33
The Allies Return to the Attack .......... 36
The Terrain . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 39
IV . PREPARATIONS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 48
Deception and Camouflage . . . . . . . . . . . . 48
The Western Front in Early December . . . . . . . . 51
The Intelligence Failure ............. 56
The German Concentration ............ 63
V . THE SIXTH PANZER ARMY ATTACK . . . . . . . 75
The 99th Division Sector . . . . . . . . . . . . . 77
The Initial Attack. 16 December . . . . . . . . . . 80
The First Attacks in the Monschau-Höfen Sector
Are Repulsed. 16 December . . . . . . . . . . 86
The German Effort Continues. 17-18 December . . . . . 90
Losheimergraben Is Lost . . . . . . . . . . . * 92
The German Attack Toward Rocherath and Krinkelt.
16-17 December . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 95
The 395th Infantry Conforms to the Withdrawal . . . . 101
The 2d Division Gives Up the Wahlerscheid Attack . . . . 103
The 394th Infantry Abandons the Mürringen Position . . 105
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Chapter Page
VI . THE GERMAN NORTHERN SHOULDER IS JAMMED 107
The 2d Division Withdraws . . . . . . . . . . . . 107
The 1st Infantry Division Sends Reinforcements to
Butgenbach . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 112
The Defense of the Twin Villages. 18 December . . . . . 113
The Last Attack at Höfen Fails. 18 December ...... 119
The 2d Division Withdraws to the Elsenborn Line.
19 December . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 120
The Enemy Tries the Western Flank. 19-23 December . . 128
VII . BREAKTHROUGH AT THE SCHNEE EIFEL . . . . . . 136
Introductory Note . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 136
Dispositions of the 106th Infantry Division . . . . . . 137
Enemy Preparations for Another Cannae . . . . . . . 142
TheAttack in theLosheim Gap . . . . . . . . . . . 145
The Attack Hits the 106th Division . . . . . . . . . 151
The 424th Infantry and CCB, 9th Armored . . . . . . . 158
Cannae in the Schnee Eifel . . . . . . . . . . . . 161
The Question of Air Resupply . . . . . . . . . . . 171
VIII . THE FIFTH PANZER ARMY ATTACKS THE 28TH
INFANTRY DIVISION . . . . . . . . . . . . 173
The 110th Infantry Sector. 26-18 December . . . . . . 176
The 212th Infantry Sector. 16-20 December . . . . . . 193
The Fall of Wiltz . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 205
IX . THE ATTACK BY THE GERMAN LEFT WING: 16-20
DECEMBER . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 212
The 109th Infantry Defense on the Sauer and Our
Rivers. 16-20 December . . . . . . . . . . . . 214
Elements of the 9th Armored Division Battle at the
Sauer. 26-20 December . . . . . . . . . . . . 227
X . THE GERMAN SOUTHERN SHOULDER IS JAMMED . . 238
The German Thrust Begins . . . . . . . . . . . . 240
Southern Flank-A Summing Up . . . . . . . . . . 258
XI . THE 1ST SS PANZER DIVISION'S DASH WESTWARD. AND
OPERATION GREIF . . . . . . . . . . . . . 259
Kampfgruppe Peiper on the Move . . . . . . . . . . 260
Operation Greif . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 269
XII . THE FIRST ATTACKS AT ST . VITH . . . . . . . . . 272
The 7th Armored Division Move to St . Vith . . . . . . . 273
The Enemy Strikes at the St . Vith Perimeter . . . . . . 280
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Chapter Page
XIII . VIII CORPS ATTEMPTS TO DELAY THE ENEMY .... 294
CCR, 9th Armored Division. and the Road to Bastogne . . 294
The Advance of the XLVII Panzer Corps . . . . . . . 298
Team Cherry on the Longvilly Road . . . . . . . . . 300
The 101st Airborne Division Moves Into Bastogne . . . . 305
XIV . THE VIII CORPS BARRIER LINES . . . . . . . . . . 310
Middleton’s First Moves . . . . . . . . . . . . . 311
The Gap North of Bastogne . . . . . . . . . . . . 316
Defense Southwest of Bastogne . . . . . . . . . . . 322
Renewed Drive Around Bastogne . . . . . . . . . . 323
XV . THE GERMAN SALIENT EXPANDS TO THE WEST ... 330
The 30th Division Meets Peiper . . . . . . . . . . . 334
The West Flank of the XVIII Airborne Corps. 20 December 352
Action in Front of the XVIII Airborne Corps Right Wing.
20 December . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 354
The Net Closes on Peiper . . . . . . . . . . . . . 359
XVI . ONE THREAT SUBSIDES; ANOTHER EMERGES . . . . 368
The Attempt To Relieve Peiper’s Kampfgruppe ..... 368
The 3d Armored Division Is Checked. 21-23 December . . 377
The Fight at the Baraque de Fraiture Crossroads. 23 December 388
XVII . ST . VITH IS LOST . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 393
The Defenders of St . Vith Pass to the XVIII Airborne Corps 393
The Enemy Closes on the St . Vith Salient . . . . . . . 401
The Final Withdrawal From the St . Vith Sector . . . . . 407
XVIII . THE VII CORPS MOVES TO BLUNT THE SALIENT . . 423
Division of the Battlefield . . . . . . . . . . . . 423
The VII Corps Assembles .............. 427
German Armor Advances on the VII Corps ....... 435
The Main Battle Is Joined. 24 and 25 December . . . . 438
XIX . THE BATTLE OF BASTOGNE . . . . . . . . . . . 445
The Initial Deployment East of Bastogne . . . . . . . 445
Bastogne Is Encircled . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 459
The Enemy Begins a Concentric Attack . . . . . . . . 464
The Battle on Christmas Day . . . . . . . . . . . . 478
XX . THE XII CORPS ATTACKS THE SOUTHERN SHOULDER 482
The End of the Defensive Battle. 22 December . . . . . 482
The XII Corps Moves to Luxembourg . . . . . . . . 485
The XII Corps’ Counterattack . . . . . . . . . . . 489
xvii

Chapter
XXI . THE III CORPS’ COUNTERATTACK TOWARD
BASTOGNE . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 509
Preparations for the Attack . . . . . . . . . . . . 509
The 80th Division Advance . . . . . . . . . . . . 515
The 26th Infantry Division Attack . . . . . . . . . . 520
The 4th Armored Division Attack . . . . . . . . . . 523
The 80th Division Battle in the Woods. 25-26 December . . 532
The 26th Division Fight for a Bridgehead on the Sure.
24-27 December . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 540
The 4th Armored Division Reaches Bastogne . . . . . . 547
XXII . THE BATTLE BEFORE THE MEUSE . . . . . . . .. 556
The Meuse River Line . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 556
The Meuse Seems Within Reach . . . . . . . . .. 562
The Celles Pocket . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. 565
The Fight at Humain . . . . . . . . . . . . .. 570
The Fight at Verdenne . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 574
XXIII . THE BATTLE BETWEEN THE SALM AND THE
OURTHE: 24 DECEMBER–2 JANUARY . . . . 578 .
The Battle at the Manhay Crossroads . . . . . . . .. 583
The Fight in the Aisne Valley . . . . . . . . . .. 593
The 2d SS Panzer Is Halted . . . . . . . . . . . . 595
The 82d Airborne Withdraws From the Salm River Line .. 598
“The Sad Sack Affair” . . . . . . . . . . . . .. 601
The Elsenborn Shoulder . . . . . . . . . . . .. 603
XXIV . THE THIRD ARMY OFFENSIVE . . . . . . . . . .. 606
Widening the Bastogne Corridor . . . . . . . . .. 606
The Opposing Grand Tactics . . . . . . . . . .. 610
The Sibret-Villeroux Actions . . . . . . . . . .. 615
The Two Attacks Collide . . . . . . . . . . . . . 617
The III Corps Joins the Attack . . . . . . . . . .. 627
The Lone Battle of the 26th Division ....... .. 637
The VIII Corps’ Attack Continues ....... . . 643
XXV . EPILOGUE . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 649
The Weather . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 649
The Opposing Troop Strengths . . . . . . . . . . . 650
The Opposing Weapons . . . . . . . . . . . . . 651
The Artillery Arm in the Ardennes . . . . . . . . . 656
The Air Weapon . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 660
Logistics . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 663
The Turning Point in the Ardennes . . . . . . . . . 668
The Place of the Ardennes Offensive in World War II . . 673
Appendix
A . TABLE OF EQUIVALENT RANKS . . . . . . . . . . 677
B . RECIPIENTS OF THE DISTINGUISHED SERVICE CROSS 678
xviii
Page

Page
BIBLIOGRAPHICAL NOTE . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 680
GLOSSARY . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 682
BASIC MILITARY MAP SYMBOLS . . . . . . . . . . . . . 685
INDEX . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 689
Maps
No. Page
I. The Western Front, 15 December 1944 . . . . . . . . . . 52
2. The XVIII Airborne Corps Meets Kampfgruppe Peiper,
20-25 December 1944 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 347
3. The XVIII Airborne Corps West Flank, 20 December 1944 . . . 355
4. Bastogne, 25-26 December 1944 . . . . . . . . . . . . 473
Maps I-X Are in Accompanying Map Envelope
I. The Ardennes Counteroffensive: The German Plan, December 1944
II. The Sixth Panzer Army Attack, 16-19 December 1944
III. The LXVI Corps Attacks the 106th Infantry Division,
16-19 December 1944
IV. The Fifth Panzer Army Attacks the 28th Infantry Division,
16-19 December 1944
V. The Seventh Army Attack, 16-19 December 1944
VI. Bastogne, 19-23 December 1944
VII. The XVIII Airborne Corps Sector, 21-23 December 1944
VIII. Between the Salm and the Meuse, 24-27 December 1944
IX. The Southern Shoulder, 22-26 December 1944
X. Widening the Bastogne Corridor, 24 December 1944-2 January
1945
Illustrations
Page
Adolf Hitler . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2
Generaloberst Alfred Jodl . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
Generalfeldmarschall Gerd von Rundstedt . . . . . . . . . . . 23
Generalfeldmarschall Walter Model . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24
Noville and Stolzemberg . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 41
xix

Page
Lt . Gen . Omar N . Bradley. Air Chief Marshal Sir Arthur W . Tedder.
General Dwight D . Eisenhower. and Field Marshal Sir Bernard L .
Montgomery . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 54
Maj . Gen . Troy H . Middleton . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 55
Panzerkumpfwagens V (Panther) on the Way to the Front . . . . . . 60
Generaloberst der Waffen-SS Josef Dietrich . . . . . . . . . . . 76
Snow Scene Near Krinkelt . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 79
Losheimergraben . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 84
Constructing a Winterized Squad Hut . . . . . . . . . . . . . 88
Camouflaged Pillbox Serving as Command Post . . . . . . . . . 100
Maj . Gen . Leonard T . Gerow . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 103
2d Division Infantrymen on the March . . . . . . . . . . . . . 108
26th Infantry Area Near Butgenbach . . . . . . . . . . . . . 114
Captured German Tank Crewman . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 118
99th Infantry Division Vehicles Moving Through Wirtzfeld . . . . . 121
Gun Position on Elsenborn Ridge . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 124
Wrecked German Tank Showing “Bazooka Pants” . . . . . . . . . 127
American Prisoners . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 169
General der Panzertruppen Hasso von Manteuffel . . . . . . . . 174
General der Panzertruppen Heinrich F . Luettwitz . . . . . . . . . 174
German Troops Passing Abandoned American Equipment . . . . . 183
Clerf . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 189
Ouren. Showing Bridges . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 200
Wiltz . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 210
Ettelbruck . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 224
Cave Refuge for Civilians . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 227
Wallendorf . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 228
Belgian Woman Salvaging Burned Grain . . . . . . . . . . . 233
Breitweiler . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 246
Lt . Gen . Courtney H . Hodges . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 259
Kampfgruppe Peiper . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 262
Massacred American Soldiers Near Malmedy . . . . . . . . . . 263
Traffic Jam in St . Vith Area . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 276
Railroad Yards at Gouvy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 287
Antitank Gunners Guarding a Crossing. Vielsalm . . . . . . . . 288
Brig . Gen . Anthony C . McAuliffe . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 306
Paratroopers of 101st Airborne Near Bastogne . . . . . . . . . . 308
La Roche and the Ourthe River . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 314
Combat Engineer Setting a Charge . . . . . . . . . . . . . 326
Amblève River Bridge at Stavelot . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 338
Maj . Gen . Matthew B . Ridgway and Maj . Gen . James M . Gavin . . . 344
Troops of 325th Glider Infantry Moving Through Fog . . . . . . . 346
Stoumont . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 350
Mined Bridge at Malmédy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 360
xx

Page
German Tank Disguised as an American Tank . . . . . . . . . 362
105-mm. Howitzers M7 in Action Near La Gleize . . . . . . . . . 375
Baraque de Fraiture . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
. . . . 388
St.Vith . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 394
Chérain . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 399
Tanks of the 7th Armored Division Near St . Vith . . . . . . . . 408
Car Bearing General Bradley Fords a Belgian River . . . . . . . . 425
Maj . Gen . J . Lawton Collins, Field Marshal Montgomery. and
General Ridgway . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 426
Hotton . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 430
MP’s Checking Vehicles Near Marche . . . . . . . . . . . . . 432
Captured German 88-mm . Gun . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 439
Bastogne . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 446
Casualties in an Improvised Emergency Ward . . . . . . . . . . 467
SuppIy by Air . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 469
A Bastogne Street After Luftwaffe Bombardment . . . . . . . . . 476
Maj . Gen . Manton S . Eddy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 485
Lt . Gen . George S . Patton. Jr . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 487
5th Infantry Division Troops Moving Toward the Front . . . . . . 49 1
A White Phosphorus Burst . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 496
Scheidgen . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 498
White-Clad 11th Infantry Troops Attack Toward Haller . . . . . . 500
Müllerthal . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 502
Berdorf . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 505
Maj . Gen . John Millikin . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 510
Heiderscheidergrund Bridge . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 519
Watching a Dogfight Between American and Luftwaffe Planes . . . . 527
4th Armored Division Rolling Toward Chaumont . . . . . . . . 528
Esch-sur-Sure . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 547
American Troops in Tintange . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 549
German Prisoners Carrying Wounded . . . . . . . . . .... 550
British Tank Patrolling the Meuse at Namur . . . . . . . . . . 558
Civilian Refugees at Dinant Bridge . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 562
Marche . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 563
2d Armored Division Infantrymen Moving to New Positions . . . . . 573
Prime Mover Towing 8-Inch Howitzer . . . . . . . . . . . . 582
Manhay Crossroads . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 584
Elements of 3d Armored Division Advancing Near Manhay . . . . . 586
Troops of the 84th Infantry Division Digging In ..... .... 588
Destruction of Grandménil . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 597
Supplies Moving Through Bastogne . . . . . . . . . . . . . 608
Massed Half-Tracks . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 618
35th Infantry Division Machine Gunners . . . . . . . . . . . . 624
xxi

Page
Bed Sheets Used as Camouflage . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 631
6th Armored Division Tanks in Snowstorm . . . . . . . . . . . 634
Medics Removing Casualties. Lutrebois . . . . . . . . . . . . 636
Kaundorf . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 639
All illustrations are from Department of Defense files. with the exception of
the photograph on page 76 (General Dietrich) reproduced through the courtesy
of the Central Intelligence Agency. and the one on page 174 (General von
Luettwitz) , taken from captured German records in the National Archives .
xxii

The U.S. Army Center of Military History
The Center of Military History prepares and publishes histories as re-
quired by the U.S. Army. It coordinates Army historical matters, including
historical properties, and supervises the Army museum system. It also
maintains liaison with public and private agencies and individuals to stimu-
late interest and study in the field of military history. The Center is located
at 1099 14th Street, N.W., Washington, D.C. 20005-3402.
xxiii

THE ARDENNES: BATTLE OF THE BULGE

On Saturday, 16 September 1944, the
daily Fuehrer Conference convened in
the Wolf’s Lair, Hitler’s East Prussian
headquarters. No special word had
come in from the battle fronts and the
briefing soon ended, the conference dis-
banding to make way for a session be-
tween Hitler and members of what had
become his household military staff.
Wilhelm Keitel and Alfred Jodl were
in this second conference. So was Heinz
Guderian, who as acting chief of staff
for OKH held direct military responsi-
bility for the conduct of operations on
the Russian front.
Herman Goering was absent. From
this fact stems the limited knowledge
available of the initial appearance of
the idea which would be translated into
historical fact as the Ardennes counter-
offensive or Battle of the Bulge. Goer-
ing and the Luftwaffe were represented
by Werner Kreipe, chief of staff for
OKL. Perhaps Kreipe had been in-
structed by Goering to report fully on
all that Hitler might say; perhaps Kreipe
was a habitual diary-keeper. In any
case he had consistently violated the
Fuehrer ordinance that no notes of the
daily conferences should be retained ex-
cept the official transcript made by
Hitler’s own stenographic staff.
Trenchant, almost cryptic, Kreipe’s
notes outline the scene. Jodl, represent-
ing OKW and thus the headquarters
CHAPTER I
The Origins
responsible for managing the war on the
Western Front, began the briefing. 1 In
a quiet voice and with the usual adroit
use of phrases designed to lessen the
impact of information which the Fuehrer
might find distasteful, Jodl reviewed the
relative strength of the opposing forces.
The Western Allies possessed 96 divi-
sions at or near the front; these were
faced by 55 German divisions. An
estimated 10 Allied divisions were en
route from the United Kingdom to the
battle zone. Allied airborne units still
remained in England (some of these
would make a dramatic appearance the
very next day at Arnhem and Nijme-
gen). Jodl added a few words about
shortages on the German side, shortages
in tanks, heavy weapons, and ammuni-
tion. This was a persistent and unpopu-
lar topic; Jodl must have slid quickly
to the next item–a report on the German
forces withdrawing from southern and
southwestern France.
Suddenly Hitler cut Jodl short. There
ensued a few minutes of strained silence.
Then Hitler spoke, his words recalled
as faithfully as may be by the listening
1 MS # P–069, The Kreipe Diary, 22 July-2
November 1944 (General der Flieger Werner
Kreipe). OKH, OKL, and OKW are the ab-
breviated versions, respectively, of Oberkommando
des Heeres, the High Command of the German
Army, Oberkommando der Luftwaffe, The Luft-
waffe High Command, and Oberkommando der
Wehrmacht, the Armed Forces High Command.

2
ADOLF HITLER
OKL chief of staff. “I have just made
a momentous decision. I shall go over
to the counter-attack, that is to say”–
and he pointed to the map unrolled on
the desk before him—“here, out of the
Ardennes, with the objective–Antwerp.”
While his audience sat in stunned si-
lence, the Fuehrer began to outline his
plan.
Historical hindsight may give the im-
pression that only a leader finally bereft
of sanity could, in mid-September of
1944, believe Germany physically capa-
ble of delivering one more powerful
and telling blow. Politically the Third
Reich stood deserted and friendless.
Fascist Italy and the once powerful Axis
were finished. Japan had politely sug-
gested that Germany should start peace
negotiations with the Soviets. In south-
eastern Europe, as the month of August
THE ARDENNES: BATTLE OF THE BULGE
closed, the Rumanians and Bulgarians
had hastened to switch sides and join
the victorious Russians. Finland had
broken with Germany on 2 September.
Hungary and the ephemeral Croat
“state” continued in dubious battle be-
side Germany, held in place by German
divisions in the line and German garri-
sons in their respective capitals. But the
twenty nominal Hungarian divisions and
an equivalent number of Croatian
brigades were in effect canceled by the
two Rumanian armies which had joined
the Russians.
The defection of Rumanian, Bulgar-
ian, and Finnish forces was far less im-
portant than the terrific losses suffered
by the German armies themselves in
the summer of 1944. On the Eastern
and Western Fronts the combined
German losses during June, July, and
August had totaled at least 1,200,000
dead, wounded, and missing. The rapid
Allied advances in the west had cooped
up an additional 230,000 troops in posi-
tions from which they would emerge
only to surrender. Losses in materiel
were in keeping with those in fighting
manpower.
Room for maneuver had been whit-
tled away at a fantastically rapid rate.
On the Eastern Front the Soviet summer
offensive had carried to the borders of
East Prussia, across the Vistula at a num-
ber of points, and up to the northern
Carpathians. Only a small slice of
Rumania was left to German troops.
By mid-September the German occupa-
tion forces in southern Greece and the
Greek islands (except Crete) already
were withdrawing as the German grasp
on the Balkans weakened.
On the Western Front the Americans
had, in the second week of September,

THE ORIGINS 3
put troops on the soil of the Third
Reich, in the Aachen sector, while the
British had entered Holland. The
German armies in the west faced a
containing Allied front reaching from
the Swiss border to the North Sea. On
14 September the newly appointed
German commander in the west, Gen-
eralfeldmarschall Gerd von Rundstedt,
acknowledged that the “Battle for the
West Wall” had begun.
On the Italian front Generalfeld-
marschall Albert Kesselring’s two armies
retained position astride the Apennines
and, from the Gothic Line, defended
northern Italy. Here, of all the active
fronts, the German forces faced the
enemy on something like equal terms-
except in the air. Nonetheless the Allies
were dangerously close to the southern
entrances to the Po Valley.
In the far north the defection of
Finland had introduced a bizarre opera-
tional situation. In northern Finland
and on the Murmansk front nine Ger-
man divisions held what earlier had
been the left wing of the 700-mile Finno-
German front. Now the Finns no
longer were allies, but neither were
they ready to turn their arms against
Generaloberst Dr. Lothar Rendulic and
his nine German divisions. The Soviets
likewise showed no great interest in
conducting a full-scale campaign in the
subarctic. With Finland out of the war,
however, the German troops had no
worthwhile mission remaining except to
stand guard over the Petsamo nickel
mines. Only a month after Mannerheim
took Finland out of the war, Hitler
would order the evacuation of that
country and of northern Norway.
Political and military reverses so
severe as those sustained- by the Third
Reich in the summer of 1944 necessarily
implied severe economic losses to a state
and a war machine fed and grown strong
on the proceeds of conquest. Rumanian
oil, Finnish and Norwegian nickel, cop-
per, and molybdenum, Swedish high-
grade iron ore, Russian manganese,
French bauxite, Yugoslavian copper,
and Spanish mercury were either lost
to the enemy or denied by the neutrals
who saw the tide of war turning against
a once powerful customer.
Hitler’s Perspective
September 1944
In retrospect, the German position
after the summer reverses of 1944 seemed
indeed hopeless and the only rational
release a quick peace on the best possi-
ble terms. But the contemporary scene
as viewed from Hitler’s headquarters in
September 1944, while hardly roseate,
even to the Fuehrer, was not an un-
relieved picture of despair and gloom.
In the west what had been an Allied
advance of astounding speed had de-
celerated as rapidly, the long Allied
supply lines, reaching clear back to the
English Channel and the Côte d’Azur,
acting as a tether which could be
stretched only so far. The famous West
Wall fortifications (almost dismantled
in the years since 1940) had not yet been
heavily engaged by the attacker, while
to the rear lay the great moat which
historically had separated the German
people from their enemies–the Rhine.
On the Eastern Front the seasonal surge
of battle was beginning to ebb, the
Soviet summer offensive seemed to have
run its course, and despite continuing
battle on the flanks the center had
relapsed into an uneasy calm.

4 THE ARDENNES: BATTLE OF THE BULGE
Even the overwhelming superiority
which the Western Allies possessed in
the air had failed thus far to bring the
Third Reich groveling to its knees as
so many proponents of the air arm had
predicted, In September the British and
Americans could mount a daily bomber
attack of over 5,000 planes, but the
German will to resist and the means of
resistance, so far as then could be meas-
ured, remained quite sufficient for a
continuation of the war.
Great, gaping wounds, where the
Allied bombers had struck, disfigured
most of the larger German cities west
of the Elbe, but German discipline and
a reasonably efficient warning and shelter
system had reduced the daily loss of life
to what the German people themselves
would reckon as “acceptable.” If any-
thing, the lesson of London was being
repeated, the noncombatant will to re-
sist hardening under the continuous
blows from the air and forged still
harder by the Allied announcements of
an unconditional surrender policy.
The material means available to the
armed forces of the Third Reich ap-
peared relatively unaffected by the
ceaseless hammering from the air. It is
true that the German war economy was
not geared to meet a long-drawn war
of attrition. But Reich Minister Albert
Speer and his cohorts had been given
over two years to rationalize, reorganize,
disperse, and expand the German econ-
omy before the intense Allied air
efforts of 1944. So successful was Speer’s
program and so industrious were the
labors of the home front that the race
between Allied destruction and German
construction (or reconstruction) was
being run neck and neck in the third
quarter of 1944, the period, that is, dur-
ing which Hitler instituted the far-reach-
ing military plans eventuating in the
Ardennes counteroffensive.
The ball-bearing and aircraft in-
dustries, major Allied air targets during
the first half of 1944, had taken heavy
punishment but had come back with
amazing speed. By September bearing
production was very nearly what it had
been just before the dubious honor of
nomination as top-priority target for the
Allied bombing effort. The production
of single-engine fighters had risen from
1,016 in February to a high point of
3,031 such aircraft in September. The
Allied strategic attack leveled at the
synthetic oil industry, however, showed
more immediate results, as reflected in
the charts which Speer put before Hitler.
For aviation gasoline, motor gasoline,
and diesel oil, the production curve
dipped sharply downward and lingered
far below monthly consumption figures
despite the radical drop in fuel con-
sumption in the summer of 1944. Am-
munition production likewise had
declined markedly under the air
campaign against the synthetic oil in-
dustry, in this case the synthetic nitrogen
procedures. In September the German
armed forces were firing some 70,000
tons of explosives, while production
amounted to only half that figure.
Shells and casings were still unaffected
except for special items which required
the ferroalloys hitherto procured from
the Soviet Union, France, and the
Balkans.
Although in the later summer of 1944
the Allied air forces turned their bombs
against German armored vehicle pro-
duction (an appetizing target because
of the limited number of final assembly
plants), an average of 1,500 tanks and

THE ORIGINS 5
assault guns were being shipped to the
battle front every thirty days. During
the first ten months of 1944 the Army
Ordnance Directorate accepted 45,917
trucks, but truck losses during the same
period numbered 117,719. The German
automotive industry had pushed the production
of trucks up to an average of
9,000 per month, but in September production
began to drop off, a not too
important recession in view of the looming
motor fuel crisis.
The German railway system had been
under sporadic air attacks for years but
was still viable. Troops could be shuttled
from one fighting front to another
with only very moderate and occasional
delays; raw materials and finished military
goods had little waste time in rail
transport. In mid-August the weekly car
loadings by the Reichsbahn hit a top
figure of 899,091 cars.
In September Hitler had no reason
to doubt, if he bothered to contemplate
the transport needed for a great counteroffensive,
that the rich and flexible German
railroad and canal complex would
prove sufficient to the task ahead and
could successfully resist even a co-ordinated
and systematic air attack-as yet,
of course, untried.
In German war production the third
quarter of 1944 witnessed an interesting
conjuncture, one readily susceptible to
misinterpretation by Hitler and Speer or
by Allied airmen and intelligence. On
the one hand German production was
with e major exceptions of the oil
and aircraft industries, at the peak output
of the war; on the other hand the
Allied air effort against the German
means of war making was approaching
a peak in terms of tons of bombs and
the number of planes which could be
launched against the Third Reich. 2 But
without the means of predicting what
damage the Allied air effort could and
would inflict if extrapolated three or
six months into the future, and certainly
without any advisers willing so to pre-
dict, Hitler might reason that German
production and transport, if wisely
husbanded and rigidly controlled, could
support a major attack before the close
of 1944. Indeed, only a fortnight prior
to the briefing of 16 September Minister
Speer had assured Hitler that German
war stocks could be expected to last
through 1945. Similarly, in the head-
quarters of the Western Allies it was
easy and natural to assume the the
thousands of tons of bombs dropped on
Germany must inevitably have weakened
the vital sections of the German war
economy to a point where collapse was
imminent and likely to come before the
end of 1944.
Hitler’s optimism and miscalculation,
then, resulted in the belief that Germany
had the material means to launch and
maintain a great counteroffensive, a
belief nurtured by many of his trusted
aides. Conversely, the miscalculation of
the Western Allies as to the destruction
2 The results of the numerous joint intelligence
studies undertaken immediately after World War
II on the relation between German production
and the Allied air offensive are well summarized
in the third volume of the official Air Forces
series, Wesley Frank Craven and James Lea Cate,
eds., “The Army Air Forces in World War II,”
vol. III, Europe: ARGUMENT to V-E Day, Jan-
uary 1944 to May 1945 (Chicago: The University of
Chicago Press. 1951). See also MS # P–059. Tank
Losses (Generalmajor Burkhart Mueller-Hille-
brand); K. O. Sauer, Effects of Aerial Warfare
on German Armament Production (T.I. 341, M.I.F.
3); United States Strategic Bombing Survey
(USSBS), Military Analysis Division, The Impact
Of the Allied Air Effort On German Logistics
(Washington, 1947).

6 THE ARDENNES: BATTLE OF THE BULGE
wrought by their bombers contributed
greatly to the pervasive optimism which
would make it difficult, if not impossible,
for Allied commanders and intelligence
agencies to believe or perceive that Ger-
many still retained the material muscle
for a mighty blow.
Assuming that the Third Reich pos-
sessed the material means for a quick
transition from the defensive to the
offensive, could Hitler and his entourage
rely on the morale of the German nation
and its fighting forces in this sixth year of
the war? The five years which had
elapsed since the invasion of Poland had
taken heavy toll of the best physical
specimens of the Reich. The irreplace-
able loss in military manpower (the
dead, missing, those demobilized because
of disability or because of extreme family
hardship) amounted to 3,266,686 men
and 92,811 officers as of 1 September
1944. 3 Even without an accurate measure
of the cumulative losses suffered by the
civilian population, or of the dwellings
destroyed, it is evident that the German
home front was suffering directly and
heavily from enemy action, despite the
fact that the Americans and British were
unable to get together on an air cam-
paign designed to destroy the will of the
German nation. Treason (as the Nazis
saw it) had reared its ugly head in the
abortive Putsch of July 1944, and the
skeins of this plot against the person of
the Fuehrer still were unraveling in the
torture chambers of the Gestapo.
3 German ground force losses are discussed in
more detail in H. M. Cole, The Lorraine Campaign,
United States Army in World War II (Washington,
1950), pp. 29–32. See also OKH, Gen. St. d. H/Organi-
zations Abteilung (hereafter cited as OKH / Org. Abt.)
KTB, 2 December 1944, which gives the revised
personnel situation as of 1 November 1944.
Had the Nazi Reich reached a point in
its career like that which German history
recorded in the collapse of the
German Empire during the last months
of the 1914–1918 struggle? Hitler,
always prompt to parade his personal
experiences as a Frontsoldat in the Great
War and to quote this period of his life
as testimony refuting opinions offered by
his generals, was keenly aware of the
moral disintegration of the German
people and the armies in 1918. Nazi
propaganda had made the “stab in the
back” (the theory that Germany had not
been defeated in 1918 on the battlefield
but had collapsed as a result of treason
and weakness on the home front) an
article of German faith, with the
Fuehrer its leading proponent. Whatever
soul-searching Hitler may have experienced
privately as a result of the
attempt on his life and the precipitate
retreats of his armies, there is no outward
evidence that he saw in these
events any kinship to those of 1918.
He had great faith in the German
people and in their devotion to himself
as Leader, a faith both mystic and cynical.
The noise of street demonstrations
directed against himself or his regime
had not once, during the years of war,
assailed his ears. German troops had won
great victories in the past, why should
they not triumph again? The great defeats
had been, so Hitler’s intuition told
him, the fruit of treason among high
officers or, at the least, the result of insufficient
devotion to National Socialism
in the hearts and minds of the defeated
commanders and the once powerful
General Staff. The assassination attempt,
as seen through Hitler’s own eyes, was
proof positive that the suspicisions which
he had long entertained vis-à-vis the

THE ORIGINS 7
Army General Staff were correct. Now,
he believed, this malignant growth could
be cut away; exposure showed that it
had no deep roots and had not contami-
nated either the fighting troops or the
rank and file of the German people.
Despite the heavy losses suffered by the
Wehrmacht in the past five years, Hitler
was certain that replacements could be
found and new divisions created. His
intuition told him that too many officers
and men had gravitated into headquar-
ters staffs, administrative and security
services. He was enraged by the growing
disparity in the troop lists between
“ration strength” and “combat strength”
and, as a military dictator, expected that
the issuance of threatening orders and
the appointment of the brutal Heinrich
Himmler as chief of the Replacement
Army would eventually reverse this
trend. At the beginning of September
Hitler was impatiently stamping the
ground and waiting for the new battal-
ions to spring forth. The months of July
and August had produced eighteen new
divisions, ten panzer brigades and nearly
a hundred separate infantry battalions.
Now twenty-five new divisions, about a
thousand artillery pieces, and a score of
general headquarters brigades of various
types were demanded for delivery in
October and November.
How had Germany solved the man-
power problem? From a population of
some eighty million, in the Greater
Reich, the Wehrmacht carried a total
of 10,165,303 officers and men on its
rosters at the beginning of September
1944. What part of this total was paper
strength is impossible to say; certainly
the personnel systems in the German
armed forces had not been able to keep
an accurate accounting of the tremen-
dous losses suffered in the summer of
1944. Nonetheless, this was the strength
figuratively paraded before Hitler by his
adjutants. The number of units in the
Wehrmacht order of battle was impres-
sive (despite such wholesale losses as the
twenty-seven divisions engulfed during
the Russian summer offensive against
Army Group Center). The collective
German ground forces at the beginning
of September 1944 numbered 327 divi-
sions and brigades, of which 31 divisions
and 13 brigades were armored. Again it
must be noted that many of these units
no longer in truth had the combat
strength of either division or brigade
(some had only their headquarters staff),
but again, in Hitler’s eyes, this order of
battle represented fighting units capa-
ble of employment. Such contradiction
as came from the generals commanding
the paper-thin formations, some of whom
privately regarded the once formidable
Wehrmacht as a “paper tiger,” would be
brushed angrily aside as evidence of in-
competence, defeatism–or treason.
But the maintenance of this formid-
able array of divisions and brigades re-
flected the very real military potential
of the Greater Reich, not yet fully ex-
ploited even at the end of five years of
what had been called total war. As in
1915 the Germans had found that in a
long conflict the hospitals provided a
constant flow of replacements, and that
this source could be utilized very effec-
tively by the simple expedient of progres-
sively lowering the physical standards
required for front-line duty. In addition,
each year brought a new class to the
colors as German youth matured. This
source could be further exploited by
lowering the age limit at one end of the
conscription spectrum while increasing it

8 THE ARDENNES: BATTLE OF THE BULGE
at the other. In 1944, for example, the
age limit for “volunteers” for the ranks
was dropped to sixteen years and party
pressure applied conducive to volun-
teering. At the same time the older con-
scription classes were combed through
and, in 1944, registration was carried
back to include males born in 1884.
Another and extremely important
manpower acquisition, made for the first
time on any scale in the late summer of
1944, came from the Navy and Air
Force. Neither of these establishments
remained in any position, at this stage
of the war, to justify the relatively large
numbers still carried on their rosters.
While it is true that transferring air
force ground crews to rifle companies
would not change the numerical strength
of the armed forces by jot or tittle, such
practice would produce new infantry or
armored divisions bearing new and, in
most cases, high numbers.
In spite of party propaganda that the
Third Reich was full mobilized behind
the Fuehrer and notwithstanding the
constant and slavish mouthing of the
phrase “total war,” Germany had not,
in five years of struggle, completely uti-
lized its manpower-and equally impor-
tant, womanpower-in prosecuting the
war. 4 Approximately four million public
servants and individuals deferred from
military service for other reasons consti-
tuted a reserve as yet hardly touched.
And, despite claims to the contrary, no
thorough or rational scheme had been
adopted to comb all able-bodied men
out of the factories and from the fields
4 B. H. Klein in his Germany’s Economic Prep-
arations for War (Cambridge: Harvard University
Press, 1959) advances the thesis that, contrary to
Nazi propaganda, the Third Reich never went
over to an all-out industrial and economic effort
until the war was lost.
for service in uniform. In five years only
a million German men and women had
been mobilized for the labor force. In-
deed, it may be concluded that the bulk
of industrial and agrarian replacements
for men drafted into the armed services
was supplied by some seven million
foreign workers and prisoners of war
slaving for the conqueror.
Hitler hoped to lay his hands on those
of his faithful followers who thus far had
escaped the rigors of the soldier life by
enfolding themselves in the uniform of
the party functionary. The task of de-
fining the nonessential and making the
new order palatable was given to Reich
Minister Joseph Goebbels, who on 24
August 1944 announced the new mobili-
zation scheme: schools and theaters to be
closed down, a 60-hour week to be intro-
duced and holidays temporarily abol-
ished, most types of publications to be
suspended (with the notable exception
of “standard political works,’’ Mein
Kampf, for one), small shops of many
types to be closed, the staffs of govern-
mental bureaus to be denuded, and simi-
lar belt tightening. By 1 September this
drastic comb-out was in full swing and
accompanied within the uniformed
forces by measures designed to reduce
the headquarters staffs and shake loose
the “rear area swine,” in the Fuehrer’s
contemptuous phrase. 5
This new flow of manpower would
give Hitler the comforting illusion of
combat strength, an illusion risen from
his indulgence in what may be identified
to the American reader as “the numbers
5 For a detailed description of the Goebbels
comb-out see the manuscript study prepared by
Charles V. P. von Luttichau entitled The Ardennes
Offensive, Germany’s Situation in the Fall of
1944, Part II, The Economic Situation (1953).
OCMH.

THE ORIGINS 9
racket.” Dozens of German officers who
at one time or another had reason to
observe the Fuehrer at work have com-
mented on his obsession with numbers
and his implicit faith in statistics no
matter how murky the sources from
which they came or how misleading
when translated into fact. So Hitler had
insisted on the creation of new forma-
tions with new numbers attached there-
to, rather than bringing back to- full
combat strength those units which had
been bled white in battle. Thus the
German order of battle distended in the
autumn of 1944, bloated by new units
while the strength of the German ground
forces declined. In the same manner
Hitler accepted the monthly production
goals set for the armored vehicle pro-
ducers by Speer’s staff as being identical
with the number of tanks and assault
guns which in fact would reach the front
lines. Bemused by numbers on paper and
surrounded by a staff which had little or
no combat experience and by now was
perfectly housebroken–never introduc-
ing unpleasant questions as to what these
numbers really meant—Hitler still saw
himself as the Feldherr, with the men
and the tanks and the guns required to
wrest the initiative from the encircling
enemy.
How the Plan Was Born
The plan for the Ardennes counter-
offensive was born in the mind and will
of Hitler the Feldherr. Its conception
and growth from ovum are worthy of
study by the historian and the student
of the military art as a prime example
of the role which may be played by the
single man and the single mind in the
conduct of modern war and the direction
of an army numbered in the millions.
Such was the military, political, eco-
nomic, and moral position of the Third
Reich in the autumn of 1944 that a
leader who lacked all of the facts and
who by nature clung to a mystic confi-
dence in his star might rationally con-
clude that defeat could be postponed
and perhaps even avoided by some de-
cisive stroke. To this configuration of
circumstances must be added Hitler’s
implicit faith in his own military genius,
a faith to all appearance unshaken by
defeat and treason, a faith that accepted
the possibility, even the probability, that
the course of conflict might be reversed
by a military stroke of genius.
There was, after all, a prototype in
German history which showed how the
genius and the will of the Feldherr
might wrest victory from certain defeat.
Behind the desk in Hitler’s study hung a
portrait of Frederick the Great. This
man, of all the great military leaders in
world history, was Hitler’s ideal. The
axioms given by Frederick to his generals
were on the tip of Hitler’s tongue, ever
ready to refute the pessimist or general-
ize away a sticky fact. When his generals
protested the inability of soldier flesh
and blood to meet further demands,
Hitler simply referred to the harsh de-
mands made of his grenadiers by Fred-
erick. When the cruelties of the military
punitive code were increased to the
point that even the stomachs of Prussian
officers rebelled, Hitler paraded the
brutal code of Frederick’s army before
them. Even the oath taken by SS officer
candidates was based on the Frederician
oath to the flag.
An omnivorous reader of military his-
tory, Hitler was fond of relating episodes
therefrom as evidence of his catholic

10 THE ARDENNES: BATTLE OF THE BULGE
military knowledge or as footnotes prov-
ing the soundness of a decision. In a very
human way he selected those historical
examples which seemed to support his
own views. Napoleon, before the inva-
sion of Russia, had forbidden any refer-
ence to the ill-fated campaign of Charles
XII of Sweden because “the circum-
stances were altered.” Hitler in turn had
brushed aside the fate of both these
predecessors, in planning his Russian
campaign, because they had lacked tanks
and planes. In 1944, however, Hitler’s
mind turned to his example, Frederick
II, and found encouragement and sup-
port. Frederick, at the commencement
of the Seven Years War, had faced
superior forces converging on his king-
dom from all points of the compass. At
Rossbach and Leuthen he had taken
great risk but had defeated armies twice
the strength of his own. By defeating his
enemies in detail, Frederick had been
able to hang on until the great alliance
formed against Prussia had split as the
result of an unpredictable historical
accident.
Three things seemed crystal clear to
Hitler as explanation for Frederick’s
final victory over his great enemies:
victory on the battlefield, and not defeat,
was the necessary preliminary to success-
ful diplomatic negotiations and a peace
settlement; the enemy coalition had
failed to present a solid front when
single members had suffered defeat;
finally, Prussia had held on until, as
Hitler paraphrased Frederick’s own
words, “one of [the] damned enemies
gets too tired to fight any more.” If
Hitler needed moral support in his de-
cision to prepare for the counteroffensive
at a time when Germany still was reeling
from enemy blows, it is very probable
that he found this in the experience and
ultimate triumph of Frederick called the
Great.
Although the first announcement of
the projected counteroffensive in the
Ardennes was made by Hitler in the
meeting on 16 September, the idea had
been forming for some weeks in the
Fuehrer’s mind. Many of the details in
this development can never be known.
The initial thought processes were
buried with Hitler; his closest associates
soon followed him to the grave, leaving
only the barest information. The gen-
eral outlines of the manner in which
the plan took form can be discerned,
however, of course with a gap here and
there and a necessary slurring over ex-
act dates. 6
The first and very faint glimmerings
of the idea that a counteroffensive must
be launched in the west are found in a
long tirade made by Hitler before Gen-
eraloberst Alfred Jodl and a few other
officers on 31 July 1944. At this moment
Hitler’s eyes are fixed on the Western
Front where the Allies, held fast for
several weeks in the Normandy hedge-
rows, have finally broken through the
containing German forces in the neigh-
borhood of Avranches. Still physically
shaken by the bomb blast which so
nearly had cut short his career, the
Fuehrer raves and rambles, boasts,
threatens, and complains. As he mean-
ders through the “conference,” really a
solo performance, one idea reappears
6 Exact dating for the various phases of the
Ardennes plan, as these evolved in Hitler’s mind,
now is impossible. Magna E. Bauer has attempted
to develop a chronology in MS # R–9, The Idea
for the German Ardennes Offensive, 1944. See
also MSS # P–069 (Kreipe), and A-862 The Prep-
arations for the German Offensive in the
Ardennes, September to 16 December 1944 (Maj.
Percy E. Schramm).

THE ORIGINS 11
again and again: the final decision must
come in the west and if necessary the
other fronts must suffer so that a con-
centrated, major effort can be made
there. No definite plans can be made as
yet, says Hitler, but he himself will
accept the responsibility for planning
and for command; the latter he will
exercise from a headquarters some place
in the Black Forest or the Vosges. To
guarantee secrecy, nobody will be
allowed to inform the Commander in
Chief West or his staff of these far-
reaching plans; the WFSt, that is, Jodl,
must form a small operational staff to
aid the Fuehrer by furnishing any
needed data. 7
Hitler’s arrogation to himself of all
command and decision vis-à-vis some
major and concerted effort in the west
was no more than an embittered re-
statement, with the assassination attempt
in mind, of a fact which had been
stuffed down the throats of the General
Staff and the famous field commanders
since the first gross defeat in Russia and
had been underlined in blood by the
executions following the Putsch of 20
July. The decision to give priority to
the Western Front, if one can take
Hitler at his own word and waive a
possible emotional reaction to the sud-
den Allied plunge through the German
line at the base of the Cotentin penin-
sula, is something new and worthy of
notice.
The strategic and operational prob-
lem posed by a war in which Germany
had to fight an enemy in the east while
at the same time opposing an enemy in
the west was at least as old as the
unification of Germany. The problem of
7 The Wehrmachtfuehrungsstab, or WFSt, was
the Armed Forces Operations Staff.
a war on two fronts had been analyzed
and solutions had been proposed by the
great German military thinkers, among
these Moltke the Elder, Schlieffen, and
Ludendorff, whose written works, so
Hitler boasted, were more familiar to
him than to those of his entourage who
wore the red stripe of the General Staff.
Moltke and Schlieffen, traveling by
the theoretical route, had arrived at the
conclusion that Germany lacked the
strength to conduct successful offensive
operations simultaneously in the east
and west. Ludendorff (Hitler’s quondam
colleague in the comic opera Beer Hall
Putsch) had seen this theory put to the
test and proven in the 1914–1918 war.
Hitler had been forced to learn the
same lesson the hard way in the summer
of 1944.
A fanatical believer in the Clause-
witzian doctrine of the offensive as the
purest and only decisive form of war,
Hitler only had to decide whether his
projected counteroffensive should be
made in the east or the west. In con-
trast to the situation that had existed in
the German High Command of World
War I, there was no sharp cleavage
between “Easterners” and “Westerners”
with the two groups struggling to gain
control of the Army High Command and
so dictate a favored strategy. It is true
that OKH (personified at this moment
by Guderian) had direct responsibility
for the war on the Eastern Front and
quite naturally believed that victory or
defeat would be decided there. On the
other hand, OKW, with its chiefs Keitel
and Jodl close to the seat of power, saw
the Western Front as the paramount
theater of operations. Again, this was a
natural result of the direct responsibility
assigned this headquarters for the con-

12 THE ARDENNES: BATTLE OF THE BULGE
duct of all operations outside of the
Eastern Front. Hitler, however, had
long since ceased to be influenced by
his generals save in very minor matters.
Nor is there any indication that Keitel
or Jodl exercised any influence in turn-
ing the Fuehrer’s attention to the west.
There is no simple or single explana-
tion for Hitler’s choice of the Western
Front as the scene of the great German
counterstroke. The problem was com-
plex; so were Hitler’s mental processes.
Some part of his reasoning breaks
through in his conferences, speeches,
and orders, but much is left to be in-
ferred.
As early as 1939 Hitler had gone on
record as to the absolute necessity of
protecting the Ruhr industrial area, the
heart of the entire war-making machine.
In November 1943, on the heels of
Eastern Front reverses and before the
Western Allies had set foot in strength
across the Channel, Hitler repeated his
fears for the Ruhr, “. . . but now while
the danger in the East remained it was
outweighed by the threat from the West
where enemy success would strike im-
mediately at the heart of the German
war economy . . . .” 8 Even after the
disastrous impact of the 1944 Soviet
summer offensive he clung to the belief
that the Ruhr factories were more im-
portant to Germany than the loss of
territory in the east. He seems to have
felt that the war production in Silesia
was far out of Soviet reach: in any case
Silesia produced less than the Ruhr.
Then too, in the summer and early
autumn of 1944 the Allied air attacks
8 The so-called Hitler Conferences from which
Hitler’s earlier thinking is derived are found in
whole or in fragments in Felix Gilbert, ed.,
Hitler Directs His War (New York: Oxford Uni-
versity Press, 1950).
against the Ruhr had failed to deliver
any succession of knockout blows, nor
was the very real vulnerability of this
area yet apparent.
Politically, if Hitler hoped to lead
from strength and parlay a military
victory into a diplomatic coup, the mono-
lithic USSR was a less susceptible object
than the coalition of powers in the west.
Whereas Nazi propagandists breathed
hatred of the Soviet, the tone toward
England and the United States more
often was that of contempt and derision,
as befitted the “decadent democracies.”
Hitler seems to have partaken of this
view, and in any case he believed that
the Allies might easily split asunder if
one of them was jolted hard enough.
The inability of the western leaders to
hold their people together in the face
of defeat was an oft-expressed and car-
dinal axiom of the German Fuehrer,
despite the example of the United King-
dom to the contrary.
From one point of view the decision
for the west was the result of progressive
elimination as to the other fronts. In
no way could victory in Italy or Finland
change the course of the war. Russia
likewise offered no hope for any de-
cisive victory with the forces which Ger-
many might expect to gather in 1944.
The campaigns in the east had finally
convinced Hitler, or so it would appear,
that the vast distances in the east and
the seemingly inexhaustible flow of
Soviet divisions created a military prob-
lem whose solution lay beyond the capa-
bilities of the Third Reich as long as
the latter was involved in a multifront
war. To put it another way, what Ger-
many now needed was a quick victory
capable of bearing immediate diplo-
matic fruit, Between 22 June 1941 and

THE ORIGINS 13
1 November 1942 the German armies
in the USSR had swept up 5,150,000
prisoners of war (setting aside the Rus-
sians killed or severely wounded) but
still had failed to bore in deep enough
to deliver a paralyzing blow. A quick
and decisive success in the second half
of 1944 against 555 Soviet units of divi-
sion size was out of the question, even
though Hitler would rave about the
“Russian bluff” and deride the estimates
prepared by his Intelligence, Fremde
Heere Ost.
Still other factors were involved in
Hitler’s decision. For one thing the
Allied breakout in Normandy was a
more pressing danger to the Third
Reich than the Soviet advance in the
east. Intuitively, perhaps, Hitler fol-
lowed Schlieffen in viewing an enemy
on the Rhine as more dangerous than
an enemy in East Prussia. If this was
Hitler’s view, then the Allied dash
across France in the weeks following
would give all the verification required.
Whether at this particular time Hitler
saw the German West Wall as the best
available springboard for a counterof-
fensive is uncertain. But it is quite clear
that the possession of a seemingly solid
base for such an operation figured
largely in the ensuing development of
a Western Front attack.
After the announcement of the west
as the crucial front, in the 31 July con-
ference, Hitler seemingly turned his
attention, plus such reserves as were
available, to the east. Perhaps this was
only a passing aberration, perhaps Hitler
had been moved by choler in July and
now was in the grip of indecision. Events
on both fronts, however, were moving
so rapidly that a final decision would
have to be made. The death of Gen-
eralfeldmarschall Guenther von Kluge,
Commander in Chief West, seems to
have triggered the next step toward
irrevocable commitment. Coincident
with the appointment of Model to re-
place the suicide, Hitler met with a few
of his immediate staff on 19 August to
consider the situation in France. During
this conference he instructed Walter
Buhle, chief of the Army Staff at OKW,
and Speer, the minister in charge of
military production and distribution, to
prepare large allotments of men and
materiel for shipment to the Western
Front. At the same time Hitler informed
the conferees that he proposed to take
the initiative at the beginning of Novem-
ber when the Allied air forces would be
unable to fly. By 19 August, it would
appear, Hitler had made up his mind:
an attack would be made, it would be
made on the Western Front, and the
target date would be early November.
The remaining days of August were a
nightmare for the German divisions in
the west and for the German field com-
manders. Shattered into bits and pieces
by the weight of Allied guns and armor,
hunted and hounded along the roads by
the unopposed Allied air forces, cap-
tured and killed in droves, the German
forces in France were thoroughly beaten.
All requests for permission to withdraw
to more defensible positions were re-
jected in peremptory fashion by Hitler’s
headquarters, with the cold rejoinder
“stand and hold” or “fight to the last
man.” In most cases these orders were
read on the run by the retreating divi-
sions.
At the beginning of September Gen-
eralfeldmarschall Walter Model was
“put in the big picture” by the Fuehrer.
Hitler gave as his “intention” for the

14 THE ARDENNES: BATTLE OF THE BULGE
future conduct of operations that the
retreating German armies must hold
forward of the West Wall, thus allowing
time needed to repair these defenses.
In general the holding position indi-
cated by Hitler ran from the Dutch
coast, through northern Belgium, along
the forward edge of the West Wall in
the sector between Aachen and the
Moselle River, then via the western
borders of Alsace and Lorraine to some
indefinite connection with the Swiss
frontier. Here, for the first time on the
Western Front, Hitler relaxed his seem-
ingly pigheaded views on the unyielding
defense and permitted, even enjoined,
a withdrawal. This permission, however,
was given for a very definite purpose:
to permit the reorganization of Ger-
many’s defense at or forward of the
West Wall, the outer limit of Greater
Germany.
Despite the debacle in France, Hitler
professed himself as unworried and even
sanguine. On the first day of September,
Rundstedt was recalled to the position
of Commander in Chief West which he
had been forced to relinquish at the end
of June under Hitler’s snide solicitude
for his “health.” The new commander
was told that the enemy in the west
would shortly be brought to a halt by
logistic failures (in this forecast the
Fuehrer’s intuition served him well) and
that the giant steps being taken toward
Germany were the work of isolated
“armored spearheads” which had out-
run the main Allied forces and now
could be snipped off by local counter-
attacks, whereupon the front would sta-
bilize. Since the U. S. Third Army under
Lt. Gen. George S. Patton, Jr., was
advancing with its right flank open (con-
tact with the U.S. Seventh Army driving
north from the Mediterranean had not
as yet been made), Hitler ordered
Rundstedt to counterattack against this
exposed flank and cut the advanced
American armor by seizing Reims. For
this unenviable task the Fifth Panzer
Army, at the moment little more than
an army headquarters and a few army
troops, would be beefed up and handed
over to the new commander in chief. 9
The thrust to Reims was not intended
as the grand-scale effort to regain the
initiative which by this time was fully
rooted in Hitler’s mind. The Fifth
Panzer Army was to counterattack, that
is, to be committed with limited forces
for the attainment of a limited object.
The scheme visualized for November,
no matter how vague its shape in the
first week of September, was that of a
counteroffensive, or a major commit-
ment of men and materiel designed to
wrest the initiative from the enemy in
pursuance of a major strategic victory.
The counterattack was made, but not
as planned and not toward Reims. The
base for the proposed operation, west of
the Moselle River, was lost to the Amer-
icans before the attack could be
launched. A watered-down variant on
the east side of the Moselle was set in
motion on 18 September, with Luné-
ville as the first objective; it degenerated
into a series of small, piecemeal attacks
of only momentary significance. 10 This,
the single major effort to win time and
space by counterattack and so give
breathing space to the Reich and footing
for a counteroffensive, must be written
9 The background of the abortive Fifth Panzer
Army attack is described in Cole, The Lorraine
Campaign, pp. 190–95.
10 The story of this operation is told in Cole,
The Lorraine Campaign, ch. V, passim.

THE ORIGINS 15
off as a complete failure. Nonetheless,
by the second week of September there
were encouraging evidences all along the
Western Front that the battered German
troops were beginning to get a toehold
here and there, and that the enemy who
had run so fast and so far was not holding
the pace. Except for a handful of bunk-
ers and pillboxes the battle front was
in process of stabilizing forward of the
West Wall. Meanwhile German efforts
to reactivate and rearm these fortifica-
tions were in full swing.
Despite the somber and often despair-
ing reports prepared by Model and his
successor, Rundstedt, during late Au-
gust and early September, Hitler and
his intimate staff in the East Prussian
headquarters continued to give thought
to a decisive attack in the west. About
6 September, Jodl gave the Fuehrer an
evaluation of the situation inherited by
Rundstedt. The task at hand was to
withdraw as many troops from the line
as possible, refit and re-form units. On
the scale required, this work could not
be completed before the first day of
November. Since he was probably lis-
tening to a clearer phrasing of his own
cloudy concept, Hitler agreed, but with
the proviso that the battle front must
be kept as far to the west as possible.
The reason, expressed apparently for
the first time, was that the Allied air
effort had to be kept at a distance from
the Rhine bridges or the consequences
might be disastrous. Did Hitler fear
that fighter-bombers operating from
fields in France or Belgium might leave
the Rhine crossing complex stricken and
incapable of supporting the line of com-
munications to the armies then on the
left bank of the Rhine? Or did he fore-
see that the Rhine bridges would be
systematically hammered in an effort to
strangle the German bid for the initia-
tive when the day for the counteroffen-
sive came?
As a target date, 1 November now
seemed firm. Hitler had tossed it out in
an off-the-cuff gesture; Jodl had evalu-
ated it in terms of the military situation
as seen in the remote Wolf’s Lair; and
in his first report after assuming com-
mand, Rundstedt unwittingly added his
blessing by estimating that the West
Wall defenses would be refurbished and
manned sometime around 20 October.
The Commander in Chief West, be it
noted, was not yet privy to any attack
plans except those for the Fifth Panzer
Army.
Since Hitler was convinced that his
western armies would hold before or at
the West Wall position, and by intuition
or self-hypnosis he held to this convic-
tion, the next step was to amass the
forces needed to issue offensively from
the West Wall base of operations. Dur-
ing July and August eighteen new divi-
sions had been organized, fifteen of
which were sent to the Eastern Front,
one to Norway, and only two to the
Western Front. A further Hitler order
on 2 September commanded the creation
of an “operational reserve” numbering
twenty-five new divisions. This order
lay behind the comb-out program en-
trusted to Goebbels and definitely was
in preparation for a western counter-
offensive. Early in August the Western
Front had been given priority on tanks
coming off the assembly line; this now
was made a permanent proviso and
extended to cover all new artillery and
assault gun production.
Further additions to the contemplated
reserve would have to come from other

16 THE ARDENNES: BATTLE OF THE BULGE
theaters of war. On 4 September OKW
ordered a general movement of artillery
units in the Balkans back to the Western
Front. The southeastern theater now
was bereft of much of its early signifi-
cance and the German forces therein
stood to lose most of their heavy equip-
ment in the event of a Soviet drive into
the Balkans. The northern theater like-
wise was a potential source of reinforce-
ments, particularly following the defec-
tion of Finland in early September and
the collapse of a homogeneous front.
These “side shows” could be levied upon
for the western counteroffensive, and
even the sore-beset German armies in
the east, or so Hitler reasoned, could
contribute armored divisions to the west.
But in the main, the plan still evolving
within the closed confines of the Wolf’s
Lair turned on the withdrawal and re-
habilitation of units which had taken
part in the battle for France. As a first
step the SS panzer divisions in the west
were ordered out of the line (13 Sep-
tember) and turned over to a new army
headquarters, that of the Sixth Panzer
Army.
Having nominated a headquarters to
control the reconstitution of units spe-
cifically named for participation in an
attack to be made in the west, the logical
next step in development of the plan
came in Hitler’s announcement on 16
September: the attack would be de-
livered in the Ardennes and Antwerp
would be the objective.
Why the Ardennes? To answer this
question in a simple and direct manner
is merely to say that the Ardennes would
be the scene of a great winter battle
because the Fuehrer had placed his
finger on a map and made a pronounce-
ment. This simplified version was agreed
to in the months after the war by all
of those major German military figures
in Hitler’s entourage who survived the
last battles and the final Gotterdam-
merung purges. It is possible, however,
that Hitler had discussed the operational
concept of a counteroffensive through the
Ardennes with Jodl–and before the 16
September edict. The relationship be-
tween these two men has bearing on the
entire “prehistory” of the Ardennes
campaign. It is analyzed by the head-
quarters diary-keeper and historian,
Maj. Percy E. Schramm, as follows:
GENERAL JODL
The function of Genobst Jodl in the
Fuehrer’s headquarters consisted of pre-
paring-on the general staff level-the de-
cisions the Fuehrer made in his capacity of
C-in-C of the Wehrmacht. Jodl also was
responsible for their execution. But these
were not his only duties. Whenever the
Fuehrer conceived a new military plan it
was Jodl with whom the idea was discussed

THE ORIGINS 17
and closely examined. It was again Jodl
who obtained the information necessary to
transmute a vague idea into a workable
plan. It was also he who raised objections
and suggestions which had been voiced by
the immediately subordinate commands.
These facts were so little known to the out-
side world that the public scarcely knew
Jodl, and that within the Wehrmacht-
even among those in leading positions-he
was mostly considered only as an executive
tool, by some people even as too willing a
tool. The view was widely held that the
Fuehrer did not accept any opinion other
than his own. It was not recognized that,
although Hitler in the final analysis might
only follow his own trend of thought, he
acquired the inner assurance necessary for
his actions by constantly discussing his in-
tentions within the confines of his inner
circle. For this reason, the Chief of the
Wehrmacht Operations Staff (Jodl) was
an extremely important figure in all stra-
tegic decisions. . . . In his relationship to
the Fuehrer, his functions were not merely
executive, but involved a very complex
process of giving and taking, altering and
retrenching, warning and stimulating. 11
The evidence is clear that Jodl and
a few of his juniors from the Wehrmacht
Operations Staff did examine the
Ardennes concept very closely in the
period from 25 September, when Hitler
gave the first order to start detailed
planning, to 11 October, when Jodl
submitted the initial operations plan.
Other but less certain evidence indicates
that those present in the select confer-
ence on 16 September were taken by
surprise when Hitler made his announce-
ment. Jodl definitely ascribes the selec-
tion of the Ardennes to Hitler and Hitler
alone, but at the time Jodl expressed
this view he was about to be tried before
an international tribunal on the charge
of preparing aggressive war. Even so,
11 MS # B–034, OKW War Diary, 1 April–18
December 1944: The West (Schramm).
the “argument from silence,”—the fact
that there is no evidence of other
thought on the Ardennes as the point
of concentration prior to Hitler’s state-
ment on 16 September—has some valid-
ity.
The most impressive argument for
ascribing sole authorship of the Arden-
nes idea to Hitler is found in the simple
fact that every major military decision
in the German High Command for
months past had been made by the
Fuehrer, and that these Hitler decisions
were made in detail, never in principle
alone.
The major reasons for Hitler’s selec-
tion of the Ardennes were stated by
himself, although never in a single tabu-
lation on a single occasion nor with any
ordering of importance:
The enemy front in the Ardennes sector
was very thinly manned.
A blow here would strike the seam be-
tween the British and Americans and lead
to political as well as military disharmony
between the Allies. Furthermore an en-
trance along this seam would isolate the
British 21 Army Group and allow the en-
circlement and destruction of the British
and Canadians before the American leader-
ship (particularly the political leadership)
could react.
The distance from the jump-off line to a
solid strategic objective (Antwerp) was not
too great and could be covered quickly,
even in bad weather.
The configuration of the Ardennes area
was such that the ground for maneuver was
limited and so would require the use of
relatively few divisions.
The terrain to the east of the break-
through sector selected was very heavily
wooded and offered cover against Allied air
observation and attack during the build-up
for the assault.
An attack to regain the initiative in this
particular area would erase the enemy
ground threat to the Ruhr.

18
Although Hitler never referred di-
rectly to the lightning thrust made in
1940 through the Ardennes as being in
any sense a prototype for the operation
in the same area four and a half years
later, there is indication of a more than
casual connection between the two cam-
paigns in Hitler’s own thinking. For
example, during the 16 September ex-
posé he set the attainment of “another
Dunkirk” as his goal. Then, as detailed
planning began, Hitler turned again
and again to make operational proposals
which had more than chance similarity
to those he had made before the 1940
offensive. When, in September 1939,
Hitler had announced his intention to
attack in the west, the top-ranking offi-
cers of the German armed forces had to
a man shown their disfavor for this
daring concept. Despite this opposition
Hitler had gone ahead and personally
selected the general area for the initial
penetration, although perhaps with con-
siderable stimulation from Generalfeld-
marschall Fritz Erich von Manstein. The
lightning campaign through the Nether-
lands, Belgium, and France had been
the first great victory won by Hitler’s
intuition and the Fuehrerprinzip over
the German General Staff, establishing
a trend which had led almost inevitably
to the virtual dictatorship in military
command exercised by the Fuehrer in
1944. Also, the contempt for Allied gen-
eralship which Hitler continually ex-
THE ARDENNES: BATTLE OF THE BULGE
pressed can be regarded as more than
bombast. He would be prone to believe
that the Western Allies had learned
nothing from the experience of 1940,
that the conservative military tradition
which had deemed the Ardennes as
impossible for armor was still in the
saddle, and that what German arms had
accomplished in 1940 might be their
portion a second time. Two of the fac-
tors which had entered into the plans
for the 1940 offensive still obtained: a
very thin enemy line and the need for
protecting the Ruhr. The German
attack could no longer be supported by
an air force which outweighed the op-
position, but this would be true wher-
ever the attack was delivered. Weather
had favored movement through the
Ardennes defiles in the spring of 1940.
This could hardly be expected in the
month of November, but there is no
indication that Hitler gave any thought
to the relation of weather and terrain
as this might affect ground operations
in the Ardennes. He tended to look at
the sky rather than the ground, as the
Luftwaffe deteriorated, and bad weath-
er-bad flying weather–was his desire.
In sum, Hitler’s selection of the Arden-
nes may have been motivated in large
part by the hope that the clock could
be turned back to the glorious days of
1940. 12
12 General Heinz Guderian, Panzer Leader (New
York: E. P. Dutton & Co., Inc., 1952, app. 3.

CHAPTER II
Planning the Counteroffensive
Details of the Plan
About 25 September Jodl was ordered
to begin a detailed analysis of the Hit-
lerian concept, the only function now
left to the great General Staff. Some
latitude remained to the individual staff
officers and those favored few in the high
echelon of command who retained ac-
cess to the Fuehrer in kneading and
shaping the very general outline handed
down by Hitler into an operations plan.
The outline as it now had taken shape
contained these major points: (a) the
attack should be launched sometime
between 20 and 30 November; (b) it
should be made through the Ardennes
in the Monschau-Echternach sector; (c)
the initial object would be the seizure
of bridgeheads over the Meuse River
between Liege and Namur; (d) there-
after, Antwerp would be the objective; 1
(e) a battle to annihilate the British
1 The precise reasons for the selection of
Antwerp as the German objective are none too
clear. The city represented the main supply base
for British operations and it might be expected
that the British public would react adversely to
an Allied command responsible for the loss of an
area so close to England which could be em-
ployed for V–2 attacks at short range. Later, at
Nuremberg Rundstedt would say that the Meuse
bridgeheads and Liege actually were the ultimate
objectives. The Fifth Panzer Army commander,
General der Panzertruppen Hasso-Eccard von
Manteuffel. gives his story in Seymour Freiden
and William Richardson, eds., The Fatal De-
cisions (New York: William Sloane Associates,
Inc., 1956). Part 6.
and Canadians would ultimately be
fought north of the line Antwerp-Liege-
Bastogne; (f) a minimum of thirty divi-
sions would be available, ten of which
would be armored; (g) support would
be given by an unprecedented concentra-
tion of artillery and rocket projector
units; (h) operational control would be
vested in four armies-two panzer armies
abreast in the lead, two armies com-
posed largely of infantry divisions to
cover the flanks; (i) the Luftwaffe would
be prepared to support the operation;
(j) all planning would aim at securing
tactical surprise and speed; (k) secrecy
would be maintained at all costs and
only a very limited number of individ-
uals would be made privy to the plan.
(Map I)
Theoretically, the chief of OKW,
Keitel, should have been the central
figure as preparations for the Ardennes
counteroffensive unrolled. Actually he
was charged with estimating the fuel
and ammunition required. 2 Jodl and the
Armed Forces Operations Staff would
mastermind the great attack. Rundstedt,
Commander in Chief West, was not
informed of the impending operation;
indeed at this stage he did not even
know that Hitler envisaged a counter-
offensive in the west. So much for the
2 The remaining records of the German High
Command show clearly that Keitel no longer had
a hand in the actual direction of the war or in
strategic planning.

20 THE ARDENNES: BATTLE OF THE BULGE
“Rundstedt Offensive,” as this appella-
tion was broadcast to the world by the
Allies in December 1944.
The mechanics of German staff work
seem to have deteriorated little during
the years of war despite the disfavor
into which the General Staff, as an insti-
tution, had fallen. Methodically, accord-
ing to doctrine as old as Moltke the
Elder, the young officers with Jodl
studied variants to the scheme proposed
by Hitler. Ultimately the staff settled
on five possible courses of action:
Operation Holland: a single-thrust at-
tack to be launched from the Venlo area,
with Antwerp as the objective.
Operation Liège-Aachen: a two-pronged
attack with the main effort driving from
northern Luxembourg in a northwesterly
direction, subsequently turning due north
to meet the secondary attack which would
be launched from the sector northwest of
Aachen.
Operation Luxembourg: a two-pronged
attack launched simultaneously from cen-
tral Luxembourg and Metz to seize Longwy.
Operation Lorraine: also a double en-
velopment, to be launched from Metz and
Baccarat and to converge on Nancy.
Operation Alsace: an envelopment to be
executed in two thrusts, one originating
east of Epinal and the other east of Mont-
béliard, the juncture to be made in the
Vesoul area.
Of these five possibilities the plan-
ning staff recommended the first two.
Operation Holland was recognized as
risky but, at the same time, the
most promising strategically. Operation
Liège-Aachen was deemed a good ex-
ercise of the forward double envelop-
ment and the possible payoff very large
–the destruction of the enemy in the
Aachen salient. In conversation with
Jodl on 9 October, Hitler plumped for
a two-pronged envelopment, setting in
chain what would become a bitter con-
troversy between his views and those of
his major field commanders. When, two
days later, Jodl produced a draft plan
and operation overlay for Hitler’s in-
spection, the favored solution seems to
have been contained in Operation Liège-
Aachen with emphasis on a main effort
to be made through the Ardennes and
Eifel. As Schramm soberly puts it: “Sys-
tematic re-examination confirmed that
the area selected by the Fuehrer actually
was the most promising on the whole
Western Front.”
The scoffer may feel that such a solu-
tion by junior officers was predestined.
And, although the planning staffs in
1940 had been able to introduce radical
changes into the Hitler scheme of ma-
neuver, perhaps such independent staff
operation no longer was possible, or at
least politic. There was no high-placed
and unbiased professional testimony,
however, to negate this decision by the
colonels and lieutenant colonels who
vetted the Hitler concept. Rundstedt,
despite a deep-burning personal desire
to detach his name from the final offen-
sive and a professional contempt for the
failure to recognize the paucity of means
for the mission assigned him, would
later say of the Ardennes Campaign and
Hitler’s share in its formulation: “The
operational idea as such can almost be
called a stroke of genius.”
Hitler now accepted both of the rec-
ommended solutions and ordered prep-
aration of a new draft synthesizing the
two. This concept of a double envelop-
ment with the two prongs of the attack
originating far apart and casting a wide
net as they moved to a meeting would
be known to the German staffs as the
“Grand Slam” (the American command-

PLANNING THE COUNTEROFFENSIVE 21
ers were not the only military bridge
players) or the “Big Solution.” Although
Jodl and the WFSt often were charged
by subordinate headquarters as having
no realization of the difficulties under
which the outnumbered German troops
were battling, here appears to be one
case in which the planning staff was
thoroughly aware that the means were
not and could not be adequate to the
grandiose object of the Big Solution.
Without the support of the field com-
manders, as yet not involved in the
planning, Jodl dared not, or at least pre-
ferred not, to gainsay the Fuehrer’s pro-
posal. The argument at this point was
on the location of the southern boundary
of the main attack force. Hitler held
for the line Wasserbillig, Arlon, and
the north bank of the Semois River. The
staff proposal was more modest in the
area assigned the attack, the southern
boundary originating near Diekirch,
passing north of Martelange to Neufchâ-
teau, thence turning northwest to Givet.
Ten days after the initial staff pre-
sentation Jodl was back to hand Hitler
the revised outline plan or Aufmarschan-
weisung. The Aufmarschanweisung, in
German practice, was a directive con-
taining the basic parts of the plan, the
guiding principles to be followed in
developing and implementing the plan,
and general instructions as to procedure.
From this, more detailed planning nor-
mally was undertaken by the headquar-
ters assigned to carry out the operation.
Even before Hitler gave the final nod,
the chiefs of staff of the two major field
commands concerned (as yet unaware
that a counteroffensive was in the offing)
were called to the East Prussian head-
quarters. General der Kavellerie Sieg-
fried Westphal, from OB West, and
General der Infanterie Hans Krebs,
chief of Model’s Army Group B staff,
reported at the Wolf’s Lair on the
morning of 22 October. 3 They hardly
could have expected a pleasant recep-
tion: the embattled city of Aachen had
fallen to the Americans, and they had
the unpleasant task of pressing OKW
for a favorable answer to Rundstedt’s
repeated-and unanswered-requests for
more divisions to prevent an Allied
breakthrough to the Ruhr.
Scarcely had salutes been exchanged
when the two generals were asked to
sign a pledge binding them to secrecy
in regard to a mysterious operation
Wacht am Rhein (Watch on the Rhine).
If this plan should leak out they would
be shot! Westphal and Krebs were in
the toils of a security system as care-
fully conceived and executed as the com-
bined vigilance of the armed forces and
the Gestapo could make it. Wacht am
Rhein was a cover name, chosen to give
the impression that the plan was for a
defense at the Rhine. An alternate and
more commonly used formula, the
Abwehrschlacht im Westen (Defensive
Battle in the West) had the same intent
and the added advantage that it had
been used to describe the battles
around Aachen.
Probably the two generals were greatly
heartened—and surprised—when they
were handed a long list of troops sched-
uled to arrive on the Western Front at
the end of November and in early
December. At noon, for the first time,
they reported to Hitler who was holding
3 The German term Oberbefehlshaber West,
which may mean either the Commander in Chief
West or his headquarters, has been rendered as
OB WEST when it refers to the headquarters and
as C-in-C West when it refers to the person.

22 THE ARDENNES: BATTLE OF THE BULGE
his daily conference. When the confer-
ence was finished, Westphal and Krebs
found themselves in a second and much
smaller meeting, with Hitler himself
conducting the briefing on an astound-
ing plan for a counteroffensive to be
undertaken in the Army Group B area.
This attack, said Hitler, was designed
to surround and destroy the British and
American forces north of the line Bas-
togne-Brussels-Antwerp. It would be
carried out in two phases: the first phase
to close the attacking force along the
Meuse River and seize bridgeheads; the
second phase to culminate in the cap-
ture of Antwerp. (Neither here nor
later is there evidence of any detailed
planning as to what should be done once
Antwerp fell.) Army Group B would
have three armies for the attack: the
Fifth and Sixth Panzer Armies would
be in the van; the Seventh Army would
be echeloned to the rear so as to cover
the exposed southern flank of the attack
wedge. Two target dates were fixed, 20
November for the end of all prepara-
tions, 25 November for the beginning
of the offensive. The latter date had
been selected by Dr. Schuster and his
meteorologists in answer to the Fuehrer’s
demand for a period in which at least
ten days of continuous bad weather and
poor visibility might be expected. Such
a stretch of poor flying weather would
ground the superior Allied air forces.
Furthermore, the target date coincided
with the new moon, a help in reducing
the effectiveness of Allied night raids.
Westphal and Krebs then heard that
they could count on 18 infantry and 12
armored or mechanized divisions “for
planning purposes.” This windfall of
reinforcements included 13 infantry
divisions, 2 parachute divisions, and 6
panzer-type divisions from the OKW
strategic reserve. But 3 infantry and 6
panzer divisions would have to be with-
drawn by OB WEST from the already
weakened Western Front and re-formed
before taking their place in the coming
offensive. (This was hardly pleasant
news since OB WEST possessed only 9
panzer divisions in its entire theater of
operations.) Hitler then recapitulated
the additional reinforcements which had
been listed in the morning: 5 motorized
antiaircraft (flak) regiments from the
Luftwaffe, 12 Volks artillery corps, 10
rocket projector (Werfer) brigades, plus
a host of army troops.
It may be that Hitler sensed some
skepticism on the part of the two visi-
tors, and it is probable that he remem-
bered past promises of reinforcements
which had never arrived; whatever the
reason, he added his personal assurance
that these units would be forthcoming.
Further, he gave his pledge that the
Luftwaffe would support the operation
with up to fifteen hundred fighters, of
which a hundred would be the new jet
planes, far superior to anything the
Allies could put in the air. As a clincher,
Generalfeldmarschall Wilhelm Keitel
then gave his word as an officer that
17,000 cubic meters (4,250,000 gallons)
of motor fuel would be available for the
attack, plus a special fifty-trainload am-
munition reserve, all this in excess of
current consumption. The two silent
generals were dismissed with the injunc-
tion that OB WEST must hold its front,
even at the cost of giving ground, with-
out committing a single one of the for-
mations earmarked for Wacht am Rhein,
and told that OB WEST should submit
a draft plan for the first phase of the
attack forthwith.

PLANNING THE COUNTEROFFENSIVE 23
Back at the Ziegenberg headquarters
of OB WEST, Westphal recited the in-
structions he had received, then hastened
on to give Rundstedt his own appraisal
of the plan and the “politics” involved.
The plan to seize Antwerp was far too
ambitious for the forces available: the
time for preparation was far too short.
Since it was apparent that the whole
scheme was inspired by Hitler, OB
WEST probably would have no voice in
determining plans or in directing the
operation unless it could team up with
Jodl who, in Westphal’s opinion, was
FIELD MARSL VON RUNDSTEDT
wary of the Big Solution proposed by
Hitler.
Rundstedt had to act quickly if OB
WEST was to make its views known.
With the penalty for a security failure
so immediate, only the operations officer,
Generalleutnant Bodo Zimmermann, the
chief of Supply and Administration,
Generalleutnant Friedrich John, and one
aide were let in on the secret. The next
step was to call a conference for 27
October (it now was late on the 24th)
at the Army Group B headquarters near
Krefeld. In the three nights and two days
remaining, the little group at OB WEST
would prepare an operations plan; to
this the code name Martin was assigned.
The part played by Rundstedt dur-
ing the prelude to the Ardennes Cam-
paign and in its denoument needs some
explanation. An aloof, nonpolitical of-
ficer of the old Prussian school, Rund-
stedt by reason of age and prestige stood
at the apex of the German officer caste
system. He had survived Hitler’s dis-
favor, incurred during his first tour as
Commander in Chief West, then had
been brought back from semiretirement
to take over his old post at a time when
the German armies in the west were
everywhere in retreat. Rundstedt’s posi-
tion in the autumn of 1944 was exceed-
ingly difficult. He was treated correctly
by Hitler, Keitel, Jodl, and the others in
the OKW, but was regarded as too old
and too lukewarm toward National
Socialism to merit anything more than
the outer forms of respect. Advice from
Rundstedt was consistently pigeonholed
by Jodl or brushed aside by Hitler, ex-
cept in those rare cases when Jodl found
it expedient to quote Rundstedt, the
field commander, in support of a posi-
tion being developed by the WFSt.
The relations between Rundstedt and
his chief subordinate, Model, comman-
der of Army Group B, were correct but

24 THE ARDENNES: BATTLE OF THE BULGE
not cordial. After the suicide of Kluge,
both the supreme ground command in
the west, OB WEST, and that of Army
Group B had been united on Model’s
shoulders. Rundstedt’s return to the
Western Front ostensibly was ordered to
relieve this untenable command situa-
tion. However, Hitler and his advisers
intended to keep the old field marshal
officially in leading strings. Model was
well aware of the limitations imposed on
Rundstedt. He himself was an ardent
Nazi, clever, ambitious, and much
younger than Rundstedt. Thus far Mo-
del had retained a high place in the
Fuehrer’s notoriously fickle favor. The
upshot seems to have been a kind of
truce between Rundstedt and Model in
which the younger field marshal de-
ferred to the elder, but in which the OB
WEST commander kept his place by
handling two-way communications be-
tween his subordinate headquarters,
Army Group B, and his superior head-
quarters, OKW, without overly much
interference or comment. Under such
strained circumstances OB WEST would
more and more assume the properties of
a rubber stamp, this becoming most ap-
parent during the actual operations in
the Ardennes. 4
Whether or not Rundstedt’s views
would get an airing before Hitler, the
same sense of duty which compelled the
aging field marshal to remain in his
anomalous post also forced him to an
official expression of his military opin-
4 The relations between Rundstedt and Model
are described by one of the latter’s staff officers,
Thuisko von Metzch, in an unpublished report
made for the Office of the Chief of Military
History in 1952. Charles V. P. von Luttichau,
Report on the Interview With Mr. Thuisko von
Metzsch [14–19 March 1952] on Operations of
Army Group B and Its Role in the German
Ardennes Offensive, 1944. Copy in OCMH.
FIELD MARSHAL MODEL
ion. Sometime around 21 September
Rundstedt had advised OKW that the
ultimate objective for all strategy in the
west should be a counteroffensive to in-
flict a decisive defeat on the enemy. The
hope of such a strategy seems to have
evaporated in the smoke and dust of the
Aachen battle; by mid-October Rund-
stedt had a single thought, simply to hold
on. It may be that momentarily Rund-
stedt was fired by the plans which his
chief of staff brought back from the
Wolf’s Lair, but the field marshal was
too old and too experienced to expect
miracles. Although Rundstedt had rec-
ognized the merit of Hitler’s opera-
tional plan, from the very first he

PLANNING THE COUNTEROFFENSIVE 25
realized, as he later testified, that “all,
absolutely all conditions for the possible
success of such an offensive were lack-
ing.” 5
The weaknesses of the plan were di-
agnosed by Rundstedt and Westphal as
follows: sufficient force was not available
to attain the distant goal of Antwerp; the
German situation on the Western Front
was so precarious that it was question-
able whether the divisions slated for the
offensive could be kept out of the moil
of battle prior to D-day; the Allies might
launch an offensive of their own, “spoil-
ing” the German attack; the northern
and southern flanks of the offensive
would be dangerously open, the ex-
posure increasing with every mile gained
in the advance; finally, there was a better
than average chance that all the attack
could produce would be a salient or
bulge of the Great War variety, consum-
ing too many German divisions in what
would be ultimately only a holding op-
eration. The solution, as seen by Rund-
stedt and Westphal, was to produce an
operations order which would be less
ambitious as to the terrain to be con-
quered and which would aim at maxi-
mum destruction of Allied forces with
minimum risk.
The OB WEST appraisal of Allied
strength, as set forth in Martin, ac-
corded the Allies a two to one superior-
ity. Although the front was relatively
quiet, the main Allied effort was recog-
nized as being directed against the flanks
of the German line (the Fifteenth Army
in the north and the Nineteenth Army
in the south). But the German long-
5 Rundstedt Testimony, Trial of the Major War
Criminals Before the International Military Tri-
bunal (Nuremberg, 12 August 1946) vol. XXXI,
P. 29.
range estimate of Allied intentions pre-
dicted that the Allies first would attempt
to clear the Schelde estuary, as a pre-
liminary to opening the port of Antwerp,
and follow with a shift to the Venlo-
Aachen sector as a base for operations
against the Ruhr. Recognizing, there-
fore, that the Allied north wing with its
four armies was heavily weighted, Plan
Martin emphasized protection of the
north flank of the attack, adding extra
divisions for this purpose and feeding in
a vital secondary attack by six divisions
debouching from the salient south of
Roermond.
The axis of the advance, as pro-
posed in Martin, would be Butgenbach–
Trois Ponts–Werbomont–Ourthe River-
a Meuse crossing north of the line Huy-
Antwerp. The Fifth and Sixth Panzer
Armies, right and left, would attack on
a narrow front, the main strength of the
two armies driving between Simmerath
and Bleialf on a front of only twenty-five
miles. This was the salient feature of the
Rundstedt plan: a heavy concentration
for breakthrough on a narrow front. The
area selected for the thrust of this sharp,
narrow wedge offered the best tank go-
ing to be found; no rivers need be
crossed by the main attack until the
Ourthe was reached. Flank cover would
be given by the advance of the Fifteenth
Army in the north and the Seventh
Army in the south. The secondary attack
from the Roermond sector, heavy with
armor, would effect a juncture with the
main advance near Liège.
Plan Martin, then, exemplified Rund-
stedt’s desire to design and cut a coat
matching the amount of cloth he ex-
pected to have. He wanted immediate
results, to be won by a quick break-
through on a narrow front, with the

26 THE ARDENNES: BATTLE OF THE BULGE
entire field of battle reduced consider-
ably in size from the maneuver area
envisaged in the original Hitler direc-
tive. The simultaneous secondary thrust
from the Roermond salient was regarded
by Rundstedt as essential to the OB
WEST plan.
At Fichtenhain near Krefeld, in a
group of modern buildings which had
been erected as a nursing home for alco-
holics, Field Marshal Model and a small
fragment of his army group staff also
busied themselves with an answer to the
Hitler directive. Despite his avowed
loyalty to the party and Fuehrer, Model’s
reaction to Krebs’ report had been caus-
tic in the extreme: “This plan hasn’t got
a damned leg to stand on.” 6 Antwerp,
in Model’s opinion, was beyond reach
without more forces than were available.
As Rundstedt had done, Model pro-
ceeded to whittle away at the grandiose
plan which had come from the Wolf’s
Lair. Even more than OB WEST, Model
and his staff feared the Allied threat in
the Aachen sector. Sensitive to this and
anxious to concentrate as much of the
limited means as possible in the main
punch, Model at once rejected the idea
of a two-pronged attack. The Army
Group B plan, called Herbstnebel (au-
tumn fog), assigned the armored forma-
tions which Rundstedt intended to
employ in the secondary thrust from
Roermond to a general reserve in the
Düren area; from there this armor could
be thrown in as the second wave of the
main drive, or, if need be, rushed to
bolster the defenses in the Aachen sector.
The Herbstnebel plan called for a
single powerful thrust on a front about
forty miles wide, the breakthrough to be
6 Interv, Luttichau with Metzsch, 14–19 Mar 52.
achieved between the Hurtgen Forest
and Lützkampen with the Fifth and
Sixth Panzer Armies leading the attack.
On the left wing the Seventh Army
would not make an immediate advance
as in the OB WEST maneuver, but
would follow in the track of the Sixth
Panzer Army as a second wave. In con-
trast to the wedge formation advocated
by OB WEST for the main thrust, in
which forces echeloned to the rear would
develop a kind of snowplow effect roll-
ing back the enemy on the flanks, the
Army Group B maneuver represented a
mechanized and motorized version of the
Napoleonic carré in which the main dis-
position for the rupture of the enemy
position was a square with two forma-
tions abreast in the lead and two
formations following on the same axis.
The weight accorded the main thrust by
the two panzer armies was about the
same in both plans; both would employ
seven armored divisions, but Model pro-
vided thirteen infantry divisions as com-
pared with Rundstedt’s ten.
The two plans finally were presented
on 27 October in a joint conference at
Fichtenhain. On this occasion the gen-
erals nominated to command the par-
ticipating armies (General der Pan-
zertruppen Hasso-Eccard von Man-
teuffel, Generaloberst der Waffen-SS
Josef “Sepp” Dietrich, and General der
Panzertruppen Erich Brandenberger)
joined the OB WEST and Army Group
B commanders and their chiefs of staff.
In an initial briefing by Rundstedt, the
problems of cover and deception were
enumerated with solutions about the
same as those employed in the final op-
eration. Cover would be based on the
idea, Defensive Battle in the West.
Deception would aim at attracting the

PLANNING THE COUNTEROFFENSIVE 27
attention of the enemy to the sector
northwest of Cologne where the assem-
bly of troops and supplies would be made
openly and in daylight, the whole ruse
abetted by an increase in radio traffic.
After a meeting that lasted several
hours, Model agreed to submit a new
army group plan incorporating most of
OB WEST’s Martin study. Actually
Model and Rundstedt found themselves
in accord on only one point, that the
Hitler scheme for seizing Antwerp was
too ambitious and that there was no pur-
pose to plans carrying beyond the Meuse
River. Quite independently, or so it
would appear, the two headquarters had
arrived at the Small Solution, or the en-
velopment of the enemy east of the
Meuse River. The fact that Model was
violently opposed to the Fuehrer’s solu-
tion and thus could expect no support
from OKW may have made him more
amenable to Rundstedt’s exercise of the
command decision. When the revised
Model plan arrived at OB WEST head-
quarters on 28 October, it followed the
general outline of the Martin plan. All
of this work was preparatory to the re-
ceipt of further instructions promised by
Jodl. These arrived at OB WEST head-
quarters by special courier during the
night of 2 November.
The Big Solution
Jodl’s preliminary plan had gone to
Hitler on 21 October. The directive now
handed the C-in-C West had been signed
and dispatched from the Wolf’s Lair on
1 November. Why this delay in issuing
the directive? Jodl and Hitler met sev-
eral times a day. There was no need to
wait for information coming from lower
headquarters. Time, it was obvious to
all, was running out.
There is only one explanation for this
surprising delay and it is supported by
what is known of the working relation-
ship between the Fuehrer and the chief
of his planning staff. Probably one can-
not say that the whole of this extended
period was devoted to argument; that
would have been inadmissible to Hitler
and not in keeping with Jodl’s character.
But it is known that the two men were
in fundamental disagreement on the ob-
jective of the planned counteroffensive.
Jodl’s technique would have been to
postpone the final drafting and dispatch
of the directive while he and Buttlar-
Brandenfels tried to “sell” Hitler, push-
ing a little at a time but withdrawing
when storm warnings appeared.
This conflict of ideas, for it hardly can
be called a personal controversy, saw the
Small Solution opposed to the Big Solu-
tion, or Grand Slam. The point of disa-
greement had risen when Hitler com-
bined into one the two separate plans
favored by the WFSt: the attack from
Venlo to seize Antwerp, and the double
envelopment of Liege by pincers from
northern Luxembourg and from the
Aachen area. Jodl and his aides had in-
tended that the forces available would be
employed in one of the favored plans and
one only. A sweeping enlargement on the
original WFSt concept, such as Hitler
demanded, would require perhaps twice
as many new divisions on the Western
Front as the twenty-one that were to be
provided from the OKW strategic re-
serve.
Jodl seems to have had no hesitation
about setting the two alternatives before
Hitler. First, he could go ahead with the
Big Solution, aiming at the seizure of

28
Antwerp and the encirclement and de-
struction of the Allied forces north of the
line Bastogne-Brussels-Antwerp. This
would require a drastic revision of Ger-
man strategy on all fronts. Combat
divisions would have to be stripped from
the Eastern Front in particular and
given to OB WEST. Replacements and
supplies for other fronts than the west
would have to be reduced to a mere
trickle. Obviously ground would have to
be surrendered elsewhere if the great
attack in the west were to be successful;
therefore local commanders must be al-
lowed to make their own decisions as to
retrograde movement. (Surely Hitler
must have gagged on this item.) This
was not all. Jodl and Buttlar-Brandenfels
recommended extreme measures to
wring the extra divisions which the Big
Solution required out of the German
people. The Third Reich would have to
be turned into a fortress under martial
law, with total mobilization of men,
women, and children-a step which was
not taken in fact until the spring of 1945.
If Hitler would not adopt the extreme
measures needed to implement the Big
Solution with an adequate number of
new divisions, then he should accept the
alternate or Small Solution. In this the
object would be the seizure of Liège and
the envelopment of those enemy forces
east of the Meuse in the sector roughly
demarcated by Givet (on the Meuse) in
the south, and Sittard (twenty miles
northeast of Aachen) in the north.
Hitler ridiculed the Small Solution as
nothing but a half measure which could
produce no real success. At the same time
he was unwilling to adopt the stern meas-
ures necessary to make the Big Solution
a success. Despite all protestations that
the final battle would be won or lost in
THE ARDENNES: BATTLE OF THE BULGE
the west, the Fuehrer could not bring
himself to take troops from the Eastern
Front and stake everything on a quick
decision in the west. Stubbornly, Hitler
adhered to Antwerp as the goal of the
attack and the proposition that it could
be achieved with only those thirty divi-
sions or so which could be raised by
OKW or saved out of the ruck by OB
WEST.
By the end of October it must have
been apparent to Jodl that Hitler could
not be moved, nor could the letter
of instruction to the C-in-C West be
longer delayed. The Fuehrer instruc-
tions signed on 1 November were sent
to Rundstedt with a brief covering letter
dictated by Jodl. Two sentences from
Jodl warned Rundstedt that Hitler had
plumped irrevocably for the Big Solu-
tion: “The venture for the far-flung
objective [Antwerp] is unalterable al-
though, from a strictly technical stand-
point, it appears to be disproportionate
to our available forces. In our present
situation, however, we must not shrink
from staking everything on one card.” 7
Rundstedt’s answer, sent to Jodl on 3
November, followed the German mili-
tary tradition by which a commander
was entitled to state his objection to
orders for the record. The forces avail-
able for Wacht am Rhein, he wrote,
were “extremely weak in comparison to
the enemy and the zone of action”; then
he voiced his “grave doubts whether it
would be possible to hold the ground
won, unless the enemy is completely de-
stroyed.” 8 But these words for the record
ended Rundstedt’s efforts for a more
7 Ltr, Jodl to Westphal, 1 Nov 44, OB WEST,
KTB Anlage 50, vol. I, pp. 30–31.
8 Ltr, Rundstedt to Jodl, 3 Nov 44, OB WEST,
KTB Anlage 50, vol. I, pp. 47–50.

PLANNING THE COUNTEROFFENSIVE 29
reasonable plan; he refused to appeal to
Hitler in person, as Westphal urged, on
the ground that it was futile to expect a
favorable hearing from the Fuehrer.
A Double Envelopment?
Closely linked with the Big Solution
was the question of the form in which
the attack should be delivered. The Hit-
ler concept called for a single thrust on
a wide front; this broad zone of action,
so the argument ran, would make it dif-
ficult for the enemy to concentrate his
forces for a riposte. When the Allies
commenced to react, and only then, a
secondary attack would be launched in
the north from the Venlo area by two
army corps under Army Group H (Stu-
dent). Rundstedt, on the other hand,
hoped to deny the enemy the ability to
mass for a counterthrust by employing a
double envelopment, the two prongs of
the attack moving simultaneously from
their jump-off positions. His reply, on
3 November, to the OKW instructions
was phrased most carefully, but despite
the protestation that the points of dif-
ference between the OKW and OB
WEST plans were “unessential,” Rund-
stedt made clear his opinion that a con-
centric maneuver was a must:
It is a requisite that a powerful [sec-
ondary] attack be launched from the area
Susteren-Geilenkirchen simultaneously with
the [main attack] of Sixth SS Panzer, Fifth
Panzer and Seventh Armies; otherwise the
destruction of the strong [Allied] forces
already concentrated in the Sittard-Liège-
Monschau triangle cannot be achieved. 9
Rundstedt then politely bowed in the
direction of Hitler’s scheme for the
follow-up attack in Holland: “After
9 Ibid.
successful execution [of this operation],
strung forces will be free for deployment
in one of two possible courses of action
depending upon the situation; either in
support of the attack of Army Group
Student, or in a northward thrust via
Maastricht.” 10
Although Model and Army Group B
were not consulted in the preparation
of this answer from Rundstedt to Jodl,
the army group planners made haste to
repudiate any plan for a simultaneous
two-pronged attack. The force making
up the northern arm in Rundstedt’s
scheme, the XII SS Corps, was too weak
to carry through a simultaneous second-
ary attack; nor would Model agree to
further reduction of the main effort as
a step in beefing up the northern thrust.
The OB WEST chief of staff could do
no more than note this disclaimer from
the subordinate headquarters: “The
simultaneous attack of the XII SS Corps
is regarded as essential by Field Mar-
shal von Rundstedt for the purpose of
tying down [the enemy]. Considering
the weakness of our forces, OKW is of
the same opinion as you. We will have to
await a decision.” 11
This came four days later in the
Fuehrer’s operations directive of 10
November. Quite obviously Rundstedt’s
plea for the double envelopment had
gone unheeded. Indeed, Hitler seems to
have taken upon himself the task of bury-
ing this idea, for the copy of the opera-
tions directive prepared for his signature
has a sentence inserted after the main
text was typed: “In this sector [reference
is being made to the Fifteenth Army
which Hitler had assigned the mission
10 Ibid.
11 Ltr, Westphal to Krebs, 6 Nov 44, OB WEST,
KTB Anlage 50, vol. I, pp. 67–70.

30
of holding attacks on the northern flank]
the enemy must not be warned in ad-
vance by secondary attacks.” 12 The
simultaneous attack in the north thus
was forbidden, its place to be taken by
a series of holding attacks at some un-
specified time in the dim and distant
final phases of the projected operation.
It appeared that Rundstedt’s concen-
tric attack had followed the Small Solu-
tion into limbo. Certainly the OB WEST
commander showed no readiness to de-
fend his brain-child after the Hitler
edict. Model, however, stood in a some-
what more favored position vis-à-vis
Jodl and Hitler as befitted a field mar-
shal who was a rabidly loyal Nazi. Cir-
cumstances now were in conspiracy to
make Model the ball carrier for the OB
WEST two-pronged attack, which he
had disavowed, and for the Small Solu-
tion, supposedly dead and buried.
The plans and preparations prelim-
inary to the Ardennes counteroffensive,
it must be recognized, were not produced
in a vacuum. The war in the west, some-
what somnolent during October, had
flared up again in November with the
U.S. Third Army attack in the Metz
sector and the combined offensive which
the U.S. First and Ninth Armies had
launched on 16 November with the in-
tention of breaking through the German
defenses east of Aachen and driving to
the Rhine. 13 The latter operation, desig-
nated by the Germans as the Third
Battle of Aachen but known to Ameri-
12 OKW Operation Directive of 10 Nov 44, OB
WEST, KTB Anlage 50, vol I, pp. 95–104.
13 On the attacks made by the U.S. First and
Third Armies in November 1944 see Charles B.
MacDonald, The Siegfried Line Campaign,
UNITED STATES ARMY IN WORLD WAR II
(Washington, 1963) and Cole, The Lorraine Cam-
paign.
THE ARDENNES: BATTLE OF THE BULGE
cans as the Battle of the Hurtgen Forest,
had been forecast with bitter foreboding
in Model’s headquarters. On the very
first day of the new Aachen offensive,
Model proposed a limited operation
against the northern wing of the U.S.
First Army using troops which had been
earmarked for Wacht am Rhein. The
OB WEST and Army Group B com-
manders now were able to forget their
personal differences and the animosities
engendered between their respective
staffs in pursuit of the common object:
the acceptance by Hitler of some type of
Small Solution in which the means were
appropriate to the end. Rundstedt’s for-
warding letter, sent to Jodl on 18 No-
vember while German losses in the
Aachen battle were skyrocketing, backed
Model to the hilt: “A surprise attack
directed against the weakened enemy,
after the conclusion of his unsuccessful
breakthrough attempts in the greater
Aachen area, offers the greatest chance of
success.” 14 To achieve this, wrote Rund-
stedt, he as the OB WEST commander
must be given an absolutely free hand in
determining when the attack should be
made. He wrote this at a time when it
was evident to all that Hitler intended
to keep every such decision in his own
hands. Was the old Prussian field mar-
shal encouraged to fly in the face of the
Fuehrer directive because the young
Nazi field marshal was at his side? Or
did some sense of obligation to the uni-
form he had worn for fifty-four years
impel Rundstedt to make a last effort to
give the German troops who would take
part in the coming battle the best pos-
sible chance of success?
14 Ltr, Rundstedt to Jodl, 18 Nov 44, OB WEST,
KTB Anlage 50, vol. I, pp. 152–59.

PLANNING THE COUNTEROFFENSIVE 31
By 20 November, divisions earmarked
for Wacht am Rhein were in the line
east of Aachen, and it appeared that still
others would have to be used against
Patton at Metz. On this date Model
again enlisted Rundstedt’s support to
brace Hitler. This time Model specific-
ally asked for an improvised limited
double envelopment to destroy the four-
teen Allied divisions in the Aachen sec-
tor. Model argued that the attack he
proposed would give as much tactical and
psychological success as Wacht am Rhein,
and that the destruction of such a large
number of Allied divisions would be a
necessary prerequisite for success in any
future attack like Wacht am Rhein. Ap-
parently the two Western Front com-
manders were trying to drive a bargain
with the Fuehrer: let us undertake a
limited double envelopment in the
Aachen area which will put us at the
Meuse and eat up the enemy reserves;
thereafter, we will be in a position to
regroup, bring fresh forces (not now
available) forward, and undertake the
drive to Antwerp. But Hitler would not
bargain. The answer, relayed by Jodl on
22 November, was abrupt: “Preparations
for an improvisation will not be made.” 15
The workings of a dictatorship in a
large and complex society are devious
and hard to fathom. Hitler had degraded
and executed German generals in the
cruelest fashion while Rundstedt and the
German Officer Corps stood passively by.
A vocal inflection, a doubting word, had
been enough to break famous field com-
manders. The great General Staff was in
complete disgrace, suffering constant rid-
icule from Hitler in craven silence. In-
15 Msg, Jodl to Rundstedt, 22 Nov 44, OB WEST,
KTB Anlage 50, vol. II, p. 12. (Quotation is from
Hitler.)
structions issued by Hitler for the con-
duct of operations were in such detail
that field commanders of the stature of
Rundstedt and Model lacked the author-
ity to move units as small as divisions.
Whenever a field commander appeared
at the Wolf’s Lair he found the atmos-
phere formal and chilling. The
imputation of cowardice and treason
was commonplace. Despite all this, the
Fuehrer’s personal dictatorship suffered
the limitations and strictures which seem
to be a part of all modern dictatorships.
The armies under his command had
suffered reverses and his personal pres-
tige as war lord had declined. The
generals who had been raised to power
by the Nazi party as Nazis could not be
broken without weakening the dictator-
ship of the party. Finally, the number of
generals with proven ability and public
prestige, at this stage of the war, was
relatively small. Even the Supreme War
Lord would have to listen to men of
prestige who had the courage to risk his
disfavor.
Jodl visited OB WEST headquarters
on 26 November, only to find that Rund-
stedt and Model were determined to
cling to the Small Solution and the con-
cept of concentric attack. Once again
Hitler handed down his edict: “There
will be absolutely no change in the
present intentions.” But Model was tena-
cious. Taking advantage of a conference
which Hitler called in Berlin on 2 De-
cember, Model brought forward his
heavy artillery: Sepp Dietrich, Hitler’s
old crony, and “Little” Manteuffel, the
panzer general with the big reputation,
both supporters of the Small Solution.
Still Hitler refused to budge. One last
attempt to win over the Fuehrer was
made four days later when Rundstedt

32
and Model submitted their final draft of
the operations order for Wacht am
Rhein. The accompanying map showed
a second prong to the attack, this carried
as in the first OB WEST plan by the
XII SS Corps. Again Hitler rejected the
suggestion.
In the final version of the operations
THE ARDENNES: BATTLE OF THE BULGE
order for the counteroffensive, approved
by Hitler on 9 December, the scope and
ultimate objective were exactly as they
had been conceived by Hitler and pre-
sented to the OB WEST and Army
Group B chiefs of staff when these offi-
cers were initiated in the plan on 22
October.

The Order of Battle
During the long-drawn debate over
the extent of the counteroffensive, the
objective, and the attack form to be em-
ployed, the order of battle for Wacht am
Rhein took form. This also led to dif-
ferences of opinion and interpretation.
How should the armies be aligned? What
forces, missions, and zones should be
assigned to each particular army? How
many divisions, armored and infantry,
would be available for use in the attack?
The answers to these and like questions
turned on the “Solution” adopted and
the maneuver employed but will be set
forth independently in an attempt to
bring some order out of the confused
interplay between Hitler, Jodl, Rund-
stedt, and Model.
When the representatives of OB
WEST and Army Group B first heard
of the Defensive Battle in the West, the
Fuehrer had given Model, as the com-
mander directly charged with the opera-
tion, three armies: the Fifth and Sixth
Panzer Armies and the Seventh Army.
Subsequently Hitler added the Fifteenth
Army for a special role, although it
would appear that he did not intend to
take the Fifteenth away from Army
Group Student until after the battle was
joined. At the time Westphal and Krebs
rejoined their respective headquarters
they were in possession of a rather gen-
CHAPTER III
Troops and Terrain
eral plan of maneuver and a list of
divisions numbering 29. Hitler had per-
sonally promised 30 divisions, of which
12 were to be armored. From this point
forward there would be a constant ques-
tion posed in each draft plan: how many
divisions and which divisions? By 1
November, as planning progressed, the
Hitler-Jodl estimate of the divisions
which could be employed rose to 39, of
which 13 would be armored. On the
other hand the estimates fed into the
successive OB WEST planning papers
revolved between 29 and 31 divisions,
with 12 armored divisions as a constant.
It is the one extra panzer unit found in
the OKW order of battle which fur-
nishes the key to the conundrum as to
the number of divisions. This unit, the
21st Panzer Division, belonged to Army
Group G and was committed as a roving
halfback, stiffening those parts of the
line where attacks by the Third and
Seventh U.S. Armies threatened to
penetrate. Rundstedt knew that the
21st simply could not be stripped from
the German south flank, already pre-
cariously thin. His list of “available”
divisions, therefore did not name those
divisions already fully committed in
sectors where the Allied threat loomed
large. Be it noted, then, that the Hitler-
Jodl listing of available divisions did not
contain a single new formation (from
the Eastern Front or Italy for example)

34
but simply reckoned on withdrawing
more divisions from other sectors of the
Western Front and throwing them into
the counteroffensive force.
Fancy footwork in extending the
length of the order of battle at OKW
had a direct correlation with the align-
ment of forces laid down in Hitler’s
letter of instructions on 1 November. In
this the Sixth Panzer Army would be
deployed on the right or north flank of
the attack formation and would make
the main effort. In the center would be
the Fifth Panzer Army; on the left the
Seventh Army. This disposition was
“unalterable.” The decision to let the
Sixth Panzer Army gather the largest
sheaf of laurel leaves, if any, was politi-
cally inspired. Its commander, Sepp
Dietrich, was high in the party and the
panzer divisions assigned for the attack
were SS divisions. Hitler’s letter on 1
November calls Dietrich’s command the
Sixth SS Panzer Army, a Freudian slip
for this army did not officially bear the
title SS and would not for some time to
come. The question at issue, however,
was the location of the Sixth Panzer
Army. Rundstedt wanted the main effort
to be launched in the center and so
wished to reverse the position of the two
panzer armies in the final deployment.
But this was only one of several points
at which the deployment outlined by
OB WEST in the Martin plan (as
finally agreed to by Model) differed
from that given by Hitler’s 1 November
letter of instructions. (See Map I.)
The Hitler-Jodl plan provided for an
attack to be carried by the three armies
of Army Group B advancing abreast.
Plan Martin placed the Seventh Army
to the left and rear of the two assault
armies with its northern corps advancing
THE ARDENNES: BATTLE OF THE BULGE
behind the southern wing of the attack.
Correspondingly, the Hitler-Jodl attack
issued from an attack front sixty-five
miles wide; the Martin attack took off
from a forty-mile-wide base. In the first
case the southern terminus of the pene-
tration would be Grevenmacher; in
Martin this terminus was set at Dasburg.
Where the Hitler-Jodl attack moved
straight through the Belgian Ardennes,
that outlined in Martin skimmed the
northern edge of the Ardennes. Of the
thirteen panzer divisions listed by Hitler
and Jodl, only four would be thrown into
the first wave with six following in the
second wave. The remaining three were
to be held out for later employment in
the holding attacks planned for Army
Group Student. In Martin, contrariwise,
Rundstedt put all of the panzer divisions
he counted as available (twelve in num-
ber) in the first attack wave. As to
reserves, the Hitler-Jodl order of battle
counted four divisions in this category
but provided for their commitment as
the third wave of the attack. Rundstedt,
far more concerned than OKW with the
potential weakness of the southern flank,
would assemble the three divisions of his
reserve along the southern boundary of
the expanding salient.
When, on 10 November, Hitler signed
the operation directive Wacht am Rhein,
it became clear that Rundstedt’s Plan
Martin had been sunk without trace.
This was nowhere more evident than in
the order of battle. The revised Hitler-
Jodl list gave an impressive total of 4
armies (the Fifteenth had been added),
11 army corps, and 38 divisions (15
motorized and mechanized and 23 infan-
try), plus 9 Volks artillery corps and 7
Volks Werfer brigades. By what sleight
of hand had Jodl and the WFSt been able

TROOPS AND TERRAIN 35
to raise divisions for the counteroffensive
which the Western Front commanders
could not see? The answer is found in a
combination of self-mesmerism at Hit-
ler’s headquarters and a kind of double
entry order of battle. The assignment of
the Fifteenth Army, fighting in the
Aachen battle, theoretically added six
divisions to the attacking force. The
Fifteenth Army, however, was not to be
employed until the Allies had reacted in
force to the German attack, and in any
case could not be expected to launch a
large-scale attack until the Allied front
east of Aachen had been drastically de-
nuded of troops. Furthermore, the actual
count of divisions in the Fifteenth Army
was deceptive. Two of the divisions (the
49th Infantry and 246th Yolks Grena-
dier) had been merged, the 49th being
deactivated. This merger had been re-
ported to the WFSt but the 49th con-
tinued on the Hitler-Jodl list. Another
organization listed, the 89th Infantry
Division, amounted to the strength of a
single rifle battalion. Both OB WEST
and Army Group B had asked for its
disbandment, but this request was re-
fused at the Fuehrer level.
An error of potentially greater import
existed in the listing of three panzer-type
divisions supposedly to come from other
sectors of the Western Front. Rund-
stedt’s protest against the nomination of
the 21st Panzer Division as “available”
has already been noted. Also tied down
by the Allied attacks on the Army Group
G front was the 17th SS Panzer Grena-
dier Division. In addition, the 10th SS
Panzer Division, involved in the fight
east of Aachen, had a very limited com-
bat capability. But when Model at-
tempted to replace this formation with
a green parachute division, OKW turned
down the relief because the second divi-
sion was ticketed for Wacht am Rhein.
In effect the felony was compounded in-
sofar as the three panzer-type divisions
were concerned. Not only was it very un-
likely that they could be taken out of
sectors where they already were hotly
engaged, but each was so weakened by
constant fighting-the 21st Panzer Divi-
sion and 17th SS Panzer Grenadier Divi-
sion had been in line without a break
since the Allied invasion of Normandy-
that the two together no longer had the
combat value of a single full division.
The chain of events leading to the
issuance of the questionable Hitler-Jodl
order of battle was vicious in its work-
ing-but the sequence was not ended.
Hitler had determined on a military so-
lution in which the means were not ade-
quate to the end desired. His comman-
ders at first had attempted to bring the
objective into some proper relation to
the available means. As a retort to these
efforts, Jodl and the WFSt had sup-
ported the Fuehrer scheme by an inflated
listing of additional available divisions.
The higher field commanders then
bowed to the inevitable, although they
personally were aware that the troop list
attached to the final operation directive
of 10 November was probably phony, or
at least highly suspect. The troop list
thereafter would be duplicated in army
group, army, corps, and division orders
and plans. Commanders and staffs in
lower echelons could have little or no
knowledge of the questionable basis of
the troop list. Each time the list was re-
produced it became more of a solid fact.
When a corps commander was informed
that he would be given one of the divi-
sions whose availability originally had
been questioned by Rundstedt or Model,

36 THE ARDENNES: BATTLE OF THE BULGE
he accepted this as a fact and made. his
plans accordingly. This was true at the
army level-and eventually even at the
headquarters of Army Group B. Con-
stant repetition would turn a hypothesis,
mendacious by origin, into a military
“fact.” There is a lesson here for those
who may be called upon to plan large-
scale military operations in the future.
The Allies Return to the Attack
Rundstedt’s immediate reaction to the
outline Fuehrer plan brought back to the
OB WEST headquarters by his chief of
staff on 24 October had been a caveat:
the entire project for a German counter-
offensive would have to be abandoned if
the Western Allies launched any large-
scale attack. Rundstedt was not simply
being cagey. He was worried by the gen-
eral quiet which had fallen over the
Western Front following the American
penetration of the West Wall outworks
at Aachen. He anticipated that the Allies
would make new attacks in the Aachen
and Metz sectors as soon as their divi-
sions were refitted and resupplied. The
C-in-C West especially feared a thrust
from the Aachen salient to the Ruhr and
had so advised Hitler, asking as was his
wont for reserves. Rundstedt’s request
for nine fresh divisions lay unanswered
in the files of OKW until Westphal
finally brought the news that OB WEST
would not be given the nine divisions
requested but instead would have to take
nine divisions out of the line in the west
and prepare them for use in the great
counteroffensive. To make matters very
much worse, OB WEST would lose two-
thirds of its armored and mechanized
troops during the rehabilitation period.
After the meeting with Model at
Fichtenhain, Rundstedt once again asked
for additional divisions to meet the im-
pending Allied attack and repeated the
warning that an Allied offensive would
cancel the German plans. This time (3
November) he specified the areas where
the attack would be made: it would be a
double thrust, one arm advancing from
the Aachen front in the direction of
Cologne, the other striking from the
Metz sector toward Saarbrücken. Hit-
ler’s reply, telegraphed two days later,
was unsympathetic. Rundstedt must hold
with those divisions he had in the line.
Divisions listed for Wacht am Rhein
could be committed only if they became
involved in a fight while assembling in
their future attack positions, although an
exception could be made in the event
of Allied airborne landings. Otherwise
the commitment of any Wacht am Rhein
formation must have the express permis-
sion of the Fuehrer.
Rundstedt’s prediction of things to
come was made good when the U.S.
Third Army opened a two-corps attack
on 8 November. Within twenty-four
hours Hitler was in touch with OB
WEST, reminding Rundstedt that he
must keep his hands off the Wacht am
Rhein divisions even if this meant giving
ground all along the line. As a reassuring
note OKW expressed the hope that the
Allied attack would burn up divisions
which might otherwise face the German
counteroffensive.
Now the C-in-C West was responsible
for two types of Wacht am Rhein divi-
sions, those in the line which he must
relieve for rest and refitting, and those
which had been organized or rehabili-
tated in the Reserve Army and dis-
patched to Rundstedt’s command. The
weight of armor in the American attack

TROOPS AND TERRAIN 37
east of Metz and the possibility that this
thrust would rupture the German south
wing at the joint between the First and
Nineteenth Armies, impelled Rund-
stedt to cling to those tanks which were
on the Army Group G front. This he did
in flat disobedience of direct orders
from OKW. He went a step further on
21 November and ordered the Panzer
Lehr Division out of its assembly area
and into a counterattack designed to
block the American XV Corps, whose
drive toward the Saverne Gap threat-
ened to separate the First and Nine-
teenth Armies. OKW ultimately agreed
to this use of Panzer Lehr, but then
called off the counterattack on 25 No-
vember. The responsible Western Front
commanders simply stalled the relief of
the Panzer Lehr until it was clear that
the division had suffered too much dam-
age to allow any further hope of success.
The upshot of the Allied offensive in
Lorraine was that two panzer-type divi-
sions scheduled for Wacht am Rhein be-
came irretrievably embroiled in the
losing battle being waged by Army
Group G, while the elite Panzer Lehr
Division limped back to its assembly area
much reduced in strength and with
badly shaken morale. None of the in-
fantry divisions engaged in the battles
east of Metz were scheduled for employ-
ment in the Ardennes, but the redeploy-
ment in the south of two divisions from
the Eifel sector necessitated the prema-
ture commitment of two Volks Grena-
dier divisions from the Replacement
Army as their relief. In addition the
American attack in Lorraine would cost
the Hitler offensive an entire Yolks
artillery corps, two panzer brigades, and
two heavy antitank battalions.
The Third Battle of Aachen, begun
on 16 November, was even more threat-
ening in the eyes of OB WEST than the
Allied drive in Lorraine. Within twenty-
four hours the situation was so desperate
that Model threw in his only tactical
reserve, the XLVIII Panzer Corps. As
the German casualties mounted on the
Army Group B front, Rundstedt began
to bleed his north wing, taking one di-
vision after another from Army Group
Student. By 20 November the prospect
of an Allied breakthrough loomed so
large that the C-in-C West asked OKW
for the four reserve SS panzer divisions
which were being readied to carry the
main Ardennes attack by the Sixth
Panzer Army. His request was denied.
There ensued a tactical merry-go-
round catching up divisions all the way
from the Netherlands to Strasbourg.
Rundstedt would bring in one of the di-
visions which had been kept on ice for
the coming offensive, relieve a battered
division in the line, then in a few days
shuffle the relieving division back to a
reserve position close behind the line–
sometimes with OKW approval, but
more often without. Meanwhile the Ger-
man artillery was working desperately to
take the place of tactical air support–so
marked by its absence. As early as the
third day of the attack the light and
medium howitzers bolstering the Army
Group B positions were dipping into the
special ammunition stocks which had
been reserved by the Fuehrer for the
Ardennes battle and which bore his im-
print, Fuehrer Reserve. At the close of
the first week of fighting in the Aachen
area the German casualties there had
risen to 12,000. Replacements who had
been sent forward to reflesh the divisions
being reorganized for Wacht am Rhein
found themselves filling the gaping ranks

38 THE ARDENNES: BATTLE OF THE BULGE
of formations in the line. By the first
week of December the Aachen battle
had resulted in the direct commitment
or a cessation of training and rehabilita-
tion in the case of five panzer-type and
seven infantry divisions. An additional
six Volks artillery corps had been
tossed into the fray but, made up of
over-age reservists, they probably prof-
ited by this enforced training period.
It is hardly surprising that the impact
of the attacks around Aachen and Metz
should have further shaken Rundstedt’s
and Model’s already wavering belief in
the possibility of any large measure of
success for the Ardennes counteroffen-
sive. Model reacted more strongly than
Rundstedt, the latter fatigued by the
constant tug of war with OKW and more
and more adopting the resignation of
the aged. When Model again took up the
cudgels for the Small Solution, stress-
ing the paucity of forces left for the
counteroffensive, he sounded a prophetic
warning: “Should the attack be stopped
at the Meuse due to the lack of reserves
the only result will be a bulge in the
line and not the destruction of sizable
enemy forces [italics supplied]. . . .
The widely stretched flanks, especially
in the south, will only invite enemy
counteractions.” Hitler answered by as-
suring OB WEST that “the number of
units originally projected will be made
available.” This was on 27 November.
The initial target date for Wacht am
Rhein had come and gone; the Allied
November offensive had been a spoiling
attack in the true sense of the term,
albeit unwittingly so.
The German attack in the west
launched on 10 May 1940, in so many
respects the prototype for the 1944 coun-
teroffensive in the Ardennes, had been
postponed some sixteen times. 1 The
period of planning and preparation had
covered six and a half months. In 1939–
40, however, there was no pressing rea-
son to disturb the quiet of the “phony
war,” nor was the Third Reich seriously
threatened on the ground or in the air.
The summer disasters in 1944, on the
contrary, demanded immediate action to
recoup German losses and stave off an
immediate threat. There is no question
that Hitler’s selection of the target date
for the start of the offensive, 25 Novem-
ber 1944, was made with every intention
that the operation should begin in fact
before the end of November. Further-
more, Rundstedt and Model had ac-
cepted this date without official question,
despite the fact that it would leave them
only one month in which to make ready.
Rundstedt, however, had added a cau-
tionary note by reminding OKW that the
actual attack date would depend upon
the arrival of the panzer divisions in
their forward assembly positions and the
completion of ammunition and fuel
stockpiling in the concentration area.
There is some evidence that the
Fuehrer had chosen November not only
for its promise of poor flying weather
but also because he hoped to win a vic-
tory in the west and release divisions to
the Eastern Front before the beginning
of the annual Soviet winter offensive. If
so, this second desideratum was not con-
sidered of really vital importance as
planning progressed. The operation di-
rective of 10 November in which Hitler
ordered that the concentration period be
ended by the 27th clearly referred to
1 The numerous postponements of the German
1940 offensive in the west were, for the most
part, the result of Hitler’s injunction that the
attack be made in good flying weather.

TROOPS AND TERRAIN 39
the weather and even included provisions
for a stop-order to arrest the concentra-
tion in midflight should the weather
suddenly turn fair. The concentration
for Wacht am Rhein, already in progress
when the U.S. Third Army reopened
large-scale fighting on the Western
Front, continued at a wobbly pace dur-
ing the second and third weeks of No-
vember. Eventually the impossibility of
relieving the attack divisions as sched-
uled and the delays wrought by the
temporary commitment of units like the
Panzer Lehr became so obvious as to
brook no denial-even by Hitler. His
postponement of the attack cannot be
pinpointed, but the word probably came
sometime after 23 November. On that
date Model reported that of the armor
slated for Wacht am Rhein only the four
SS panzer divisions and the 2d Panzer
Division had escaped premature com-
mitment in the battles then raging. In
Model's opinion—mark the date—the
other divisions could not be readied be-
fore 15 December.
The Terrain
The area through which Hitler chose
to launch his counteroffensive was, with
the exception of the Vosges, the most
difficult terrain on the entire line of the
Western Front. It consists of two major
parts, the Eifel and the Ardennes. Al-
though the whole is strewn with the
relics of castles and fortified churches,
there had been little military history en-
acted within this area before 1914. 2 A
2 The older military history of the Ardennes is
narrated on a somewhat antiquarian basis in Revue
Historique de l’Armée, 1955, II Année, Numéro 2.
For the 1940 campaign see L. Menu, Lurnière Sur
Les Ruines, Paris, 1953; also M. Fouillien and J.
straight line between Paris and Berlin
will bisect the Eifel and Ardennes, but
the movement of armies during the cen-
turies normally had followed the easier
roads going around this area: in the
north via Liège-Maubeuge or the Flan-
ders plains, in the south via the Metz
gateway. On occasion the Ardennes and
Eifel had been used by large forces for
movement without fighting, battle being
joined at the natural defense lines of
the Meuse River west of the Ardennes,
or the Rhine River east of the Eifel.
In 1914, as part of the Schlieffen Plan,
three of the Imperial German armies
marched from the Eifel through the
Ardennes. Schlieffen had predicted that
the French would react to the pressure
of the heavy German right wing as it
swung through northern Belgium by
counterattacking into the flank via south-
eastern Belgium. It was an integral part
of the famous plan, therefore, that the
German right wing would be covered by
an extension through southern Belgium
and Luxembourg, and that the Ardennes
massif would be used, if needed, as a
bastion from which the French flanking
attack would be repelled. A portion of
the Second and all of the Third and
Fourth German Armies did advance
through southern Belgium and Luxem-
bourg, the march through the main por-
tion of the Ardennes being covered by
the rapid movement of Richthofen's I
Cavalry Corps. French reaction was slow
and the tiny Belgian Army had been
drawn away to defend Liège and Brus-
sels. As a result the Germans marched
across the main body of the Ardennes
mass without a fight, the ultimate meet-
ing engagements with the French on 22
Bouhon, Mai 1940: La Bataille de Belgique,
Bruxelles, n.d.

40 THE ARDENNES: BATTLE OF THE BULGE
August taking place in the densely
wooded but less rugged segment of the
Ardennes (sometimes called the Forest
of Ardennes) close to the Belgian-French
border in the neighborhood of Neufchâ
teau and Virton.
In 1940 the Ardennes once again was
invaded and crossed by German troops,
the jangle of Richthofen’s squadrons
giving way to the roar and grind of
Kleist’s tanks. This time, at Hitler’s in-
sistence, the German maneuver departed
from the classic concept of Schlieffen,
the weight of the German attack being
thrown south of Liège rather than north,
while a narrow thrust replaced the blud-
geon strokes of a massive wheeling
movement. This main effort toward a
decisive breakthrough was launched
through a narrow corridor marked ap-
proximately by Bastogne in the north
and Arlon in the south; but the bulk of
three German armies debouched from
the Eifel and marched across the Ar-
dennes. As in 1914 the crossing of the
Ardennes massif was little more than a
route march, impeded ever so slightly
by brave but tragic and futile attempts
at resistance by the Belgian Chasseurs
Ardennais. Without detracting from the
courage of these few Belgians it is fair to
say that the Germans did not have to
fight before they reached the Meuse
River, and even there they experienced
little opposition. The German advance
through southern Belgium and Luxem-
bourg in 1914 had demonstrated that a
huge modern force could be concen-
trated via rail in the abrupt, broken
country of the Eifel, and from thence be
moved afoot or ahorse through the worst
of the Ardennes mass.
The events of 1940 proved that mecha-
nized forces could move speedily
through the Ardennes, and more, that
not only was Hitler correct in his insist-
ence on the use of large mechanized
forces in the Ardennes, but that the pro-
fessionals in OKH who had opposed him
were wrong. In 1944, as a result, it was
known that the terrain in the Eifel and
Ardennes was not so bad but what it
could be quickly negotiated by modern
mechanized armies under conditions of
good weather and little or no enemy re-
sistance. What history could not demon-
strate, for the lessons were lacking, was
whether modern, mechanized armies
could attack through the Ardennes and
speedily overcome a combination of
stubborn enemy defense, difficult
ground, and poor weather. Terrain,
then, would play a peculiarly important
role in the development of the 1944
counteroffensive.
Although the Ardennes has given its
name to the campaign under study, this
area should be lumped with that of the
Eifel, the composite of the tablelands to
the east which sheltered the German
concentration during the late autumn of
1944. These two areas are extensions of
the Westerwald, blending almost insensi-
bly into each other and sharing many of
the same characteristics. The Eifel is the
complex of hill ranges–they can hardly
be called mountains–lying between the
Rhine, the Moselle, and the Roer Rivers,
mostly in Germany. Only the two west-
ernmost of the Eifel highlands or ranges
need be mentioned here. East of St. Vith
and just inside the German border is
the Schnee Eifel, a high tree-covered
ridge or hogback. It extends from the
northeast to the southwest, a character-
istic thrust line in the entire area, and in
1944 was crested on much of its length
by the West Wall fortifications. East of

NOVILLE
AND STOLZEMBG. Towns in the Ardennes are small and usually fall into one
of two types: a cluster of houses at a crossroads, such as Noville (above), and a river valley
settlement, such as Stolzemburg on the Our ('below).

42 THE ARDENNES: BATTLE OF THE BULGE
Liège is the Hohes Venn, a long table-
land topped with lakes and marshes. The
Hohes Venn is larger than the Schnee
Eifel. Its northeast-southwest course is
defined by a line through Malmédy and
Monschau on the German face and by a
line through Eupen and Spa on the Bel-
gian. In the northeast the Hohes Venn
is prolonged by the Hürtgen Forest. As
the Schnee Eifel forms a barrier covering
St. Vith on the east, so the Hohes Venn
is a large outer bastion for Liege. Al-
though the Hohes Venn is geologically
a part of the Eifel it is somewhat re-
moved from the other parts of the
complex and represents the gradual and
sometimes indefinable blending of the
Eifel and Ardennes.
The Eifel is thickly covered with
forests and provides good cover from air
observation even in the fall and winter.
The area has no large towns but rather
is marked by numerous small villages,
requiring extensive dispersion for any
large forces billeted here. The road net
is adequate for a large military concen-
tration. The rail net is extensive, having
been engineered and expanded before
1914 for the quick deployment of troops
west of the Rhine. The railroads feed
into the Eifel from Koblenz, Cologne,
and the lesser Rhine bridgeheads be-
tween these two. The main rail line, how-
ever, does not cross the Eifel but follows
the Moselle valley on the southern
fringe of the Eifel. Rail and road sys-
tems throughout the Eifel are marked by
meandering courses and numerous
bridge crossings thrown over rivers and
deep ravines.
The Ardennes, like the Eifel, is not a
single and well-defined bloc. The general
area may be defined as a wedge with the
point between Aachen and Düren. The
northern edge is a diagonal: Aachen,
Liege, Maubeuge, Landrecis. The south-
ern edge (much debated by geologists)
is a more pronounced diagonal running
from Aachen southwest to Arlon. The
base, formed by the Forêt des Ardennes
or French Ardennes, roughly coincides
with the Franco-Belgian frontier and the
Semois River. The Ardennes has three
recognized subdepartments: the High
Ardennes in the south, the Famenne De-
pression in the middle, and the Low
Ardennes in the north. The Low Ar-
dennes tends to be open and rolling, but
includes two plateaus: that of Herve, be-
tween Liège and Aachen, and Condroz,
between the lower Ourthe and the
Meuse in the vicinity of Dinant. This
sector is more readily traversed than is
the High Ardennes, but it is relatively
narrow, maneuver is constricted by
the flanking line of the Meuse River, and
entrance from the east presupposes that
the invader has possession of Aachen and
the roads circling north or south of the
Hohes Venn.
The Famenne Depression is only a
thin sliver of the Ardennes wedge. The
Famenne is free from tree cover except
for the characteristic ,buttes which dot
the depression. Scooped out of the Ar-
dennes massif, this long, narrow depres-
sion originates at the upper Ourthe and
extends westward through Marche and
Rochefort. It reaches the Meuse between
Givet and Dinant, offering a good cross-
ing site which often has been employed
by European armies operating on the
Meuse. But an invader from the German
frontier must traverse much difficult
terrain before debouching into this
“march through” depression.
The High Ardennes is often called
the “True Ardennes.” It is not properly

TROOPS AND TERRAIN 43
mountainous, nor yet a forest; rather it
is a wide plateau or high plain out of
which rise elevations in the form of
ridges or higher plateaus erupting from
the main mass. These elevations gener-
ally are unrelated to one another and
combine with large forests to form iso-
lated and independent compartments in
which tactical domination of one hill
mass seldom provides domination of an-
other. The mass structure extends on a
northeast-southwest axis, forming a
watershed which drains away to the
Meuse in the north and the Moselle in
the southeast. Perhaps a third of the area
is covered with forest, much of which is
coniferous. This timber, however, is
scattered all over the High Ardennes
and presents a patchwork picture rather
than a series of large forested preserves.
The main mass is cut in zigzag patterns
by winding, deeply eroded rivers and
streams, some flowing parallel to the
higher ridges, others crossing so as to
chop the ridges and the welts on the pla-
teau into separate sections. In some
places the watercourses run through nar-
row, almost canyonlike depressions with
steep walls rising from a hundred to
three hundred feet. Even the wider
valleys are narrow when compared with
the western European norm.
The road net in 1944 was far richer
than the population and the economic
activity of the Ardennes would seem to
warrant. This was not the result of mili-
tary planning, as in the case of the Eifel
rail lines, but rather of Belgian and
Luxemburgian recognition of the value
of automobile tourisme just prior to
World War II. All of the main roads had
hard surfaces, generally of macadam. Al-
though the road builders tried to follow
the more level stretches of the ridge
lines or wider valley floors, in many cases
the roads twisted sharply and turned on
steep grades down into a deep ravine
and out again on the opposite side. The
bridges were normally built of stone.
There were ten all-weather roads cross-
ing from the German frontier into Bel-
gium and Luxembourg in the sector be-
tween Monschau and Wasserbillig, but
there was not a single main highway
traversing the Ardennes in a straight
east-west direction.
There are no cities in the Ardennes,
unless the capital of Luxembourg and
Arlon are included in this area. The larg-
est villages had, in 1944, populations of
2,500 to 4,000. The normal settlement in
the Ardennes was the small village with
stone houses and very narrow, winding
streets. These villages often constricted
the through road to single-lane traffic.
Another military feature was the lone
farmstead or inn which gave its name to
the crossroads at which it stood.
The fact that most of the High Ar-
dennes lies inside Belgium leads to some
confusion, since one of the administra-
tive subdivisions of that kingdom is
named “Ardennes” but is not exactly
conterminous with the geographical
area. Luxembourg, into which the Ar-
dennes extends, is divided in two parts,
roughly along a line from Attert on the
west to a point midway between
Vianden and Diekirch on the eastern
boundary. The northern half generally
is considered an extension of the High
Ardennes (although one may find as
many definitions of the south edge of the
Ardennes as there are writers touching
the subject) ; in any case it shares the
same physical properties. The southern
half of Luxembourg, known appropri-
ately as the “Good Land,” is less high,

44 THE ARDENNES: BATTLE OF THE BULGE
has more open space, and its valleys
normally can be traveled. A single
river, the Alzette, bisects this part of
Luxembourg in a north-south course
which takes it through the capital city.
But the eastern approach to the Good
Land erases much of its military attrac-
tiveness. Between Sierck and Wasser-
billig the Moselle River forms the
boundary between Luxembourg and
Germany. In this sector the left or Lux-
embourg bank of the river is especially
difficult even by comparison with the
normal terrain obstacles encountered in
the High Ardennes. Farther north,
where the Sauer River continues the
boundary, the river valley is somewhat
less formidable but is backed up by a
broken, gorge-riven area in the neighbor-
hood of Echternach known as the “Lux-
embourg Switzerland.”
It is natural, with the Ardennes mass
forming a northeast-southwest divide be-
tween the tributaries of the Meuse and
the Moselle and with rugged geological
patterns twisting and turning these tribu-
taries, that the military hydrography of
the Ardennes should be important. The
prolongation of the Ardennes in north-
ern Luxembourg is dissected by four
rivers. On the eastern frontier the Our
River continues the boundary trace be-
gun by the Moselle and the Sauer. In
the interior the Wiltz, the Clerf, and the
Sure divide the country into water-
bound compartments. Their valleys are
long and narrow, so narrow and tortuous
that they cannot be followed by roads.
They are further complicated by “cups”
scoured out of the side walls and by cross
ravines, deep and narrow.
In the Ardennes north of Luxembourg
it is possible to cross from Germany into
Belgium without traversing a major
stream. About twenty miles west of the
frontier, however, comes the first of the
rivers descending from the High Ar-
dennes into the Meuse; these are the
Amblève and the Salm which serve as
flankers for the swamp-encrusted table-
land of the Hohes Venn and must be
crossed in any movement west from St.
Vith, Malmédy, or Spa. Next comes the
longest of these rivers, the Ourthe,
which is the most severe military ob-
stacle east of the Meuse. It originates
west of Bastogne as a small creek, then
meanders north until it meets the Meuse
at Liège. At Ortheuville the Ourthe be-
gins to cut through a narrow and wind-
ing defile with steep, rocky sides fringed
by pine trees. Just north of La Roche
the Ourthe leaves its tortuous canyons
and enters the Famenne Depression.
That part of the course between Ortheu-
ville and La Roche permits no road ad-
jacent to the river bed; all approaches to
the east-west crossing sites are difficult.
Just east of the defile through which
flows the middle Ourthe lies the Plateau
des Tailles, which rises to over 1,800 feet
at the Baraque de Fraiture. Two
rivers are found between the Ourthe
and the Meuse: the Lesse and L’Homme
whose confluence is near Rochefort.
Neither of these rivers is too difficult of
negotiation, but the main westward
crossing for movement toward Dinant
and the Meuse centers at Rochefort.
At the very edge of the Ardennes in the
southwest is the Semois River, which
wends its way westward from Arlon to
the Meuse. The Semois is deeply sunk
through much of its course, flowing be-
tween steep walls which descend directly
to the water’s edge and so deny space
for road or rail on the valley bottom.
Although the rivers of the Eifel, as dis-

TROOPS AND TERRAIN 45
tinct from those of the Ardennes, would
have no tactical significance in the battle
of the Ardennes, they were to be of
very considerable logistic, or what the
Germans style “operational,” impor-
tance. The northernmost, the Ahr, fol-
lows an oblique course northeast until it
enters the Rhine at Sinzig. From the
Schnee Eifel comes the Kyll, bending
southward to meet the Moselle not far
from Trier. Paralleling the Kyll in the
west is the Prüm River. It is the last
stream of any importance before the Ger-
man frontier is reached. Like the Kyll
its sources are in the heights of the
Schnee Eifel. The beautiful Moselle at-
tracts numerous small tributaries rush-
ing down from the Eifel, but only the
Moselle itself deserves attention. Alter-
nating between scenes of towering rocks
and meadow passages, the German
Moselle winds and turns capriciously
from its entrance on German soil, past
Trier and a host of little villages whose
names are known to all lovers of the
vine, until finally it rushes past the
“German Corner” at Koblenz and into
the Rhine. Just as the Moselle vineyards
of renown alternate from one bank to
the other, so the railroad line and the
highway crisscross the river throughout
its middle reaches; but rail and road
come to a focal point only a few kilome-
ters from the Luxembourg frontier at
the old Roman city of Trier.
Throughout this whole area military
routes of movement, regardless of the
weather, are synonymous with the road
system. The roads of the Ardennes pro-
liferate in accordance with the geological
compartments incised in the high pla-
teau by rivers and streams as they recede
downward. The main roads tend to fol-
low a north-south axis, although one,
from Luxembourg to Namur, cuts across
the grain of the main mass in a south-
east-northwest direction. In the north-
east the chief road centers are Monschau,
Malmédy, and St. Vith. The southeast-
ern nodal points are Ettelbruck, Mersch,
and, of course, Luxembourg. To the
northwest Bastogne, Marche, and Roche-
fort are the paramount links in the road
system. Arlon, Neufchâteau, and Libra-
mont, in the southwest, complete this
picture. The Eifel is rimmed by a main
road system which hugs the west bank of
the Rhine between Bonn and Koblenz,
then follows the Moselle River until it
breaks away cross-country via Wittlich
to reach Trier. The circuit is completed
by a road which goes north from Trier
through Bitburg, Prüm, and Euskirchen,
finally bifurcating to reach the Rhine at
Bonn and at Cologne. Inside of this cir-
cuit the chief communications centers
are Mayen, Daun, Kochem, and, at-
tached to the outer ring, Wittlich.
The character of the Eifel-Ardennes
terrain dictates three major bases of op-
erations for an attack from the German
frontier. In the north the Aachen sector
is one such base. The direction of attack
here would be through the Low Ar-
dennes via Eupen, Verviers, Marche, and
Rochefort to the Meuse at Givet. The
next base, to the south, lies between
Monschau and the Losheim Gap. The
westward thrust from this base must go
over and between Malmédy and St. Vith.
The broadest base of operations is in the
south between Prüm and Trier. In this
case the attack must be made against the
grain of the Ardennes mass except for a
penetration from Trier to the French
frontier at Virton or Longwy which may
bypass the more rugged country to the
north by movement through the Good

46 THE ARDENNES: BATTLE OF THE BULGE
Land of southern Luxembourg. This
last route, however, is by far the longest
for any attack aimed at reaching the
Meuse River.
The geography of the Ardennes leads
inevitably to the channelization of large
troop movements east to west, will tend
to force larger units to “pile up” on each
other, and restricts freedom of maneuver
once the direction of attack and order of
battle are fixed. To a marked degree the
military problem posed by the terrain is
that of movement control rather than
maneuver in the classic sense. For the
smaller tactical units, the chopped-up
nature of the ground plus the peculiar
timber formations in which dense wood
lots are interspersed with natural or man-
made clearings, indicates the develop-
ment of a series of small, semi-indepen-
dent engagements once the larger battle
is joined. Movement cross-country is
limited, even in good weather; move-
ment along the narrow valley floors may
be blocked there or in the villages at
points of descent and ascent. The back-
bone of the ridges sometimes offers good
observation in the immediate area for
detecting movement on the roads which
climb the hills and plateaus. Locally,
however, the gunner or fighter pilot will
find many blind spots formed by the
thick tree cover or the deep draws and
ravines; the ability of high-angle fire to
beat reverse slopes, which really are
sheer, steep walls, is limited.
What the German planners saw in
1944 was this: the Ardennes could be
traversed by large forces even when
these were heavily mechanized. An at-
tack from east to west across the massif
would encounter initially the greatest
obstacles of terrain, but these obstacles
would decrease in number as an advance
neared the Meuse. In 1914 and 1940 the
German armies moving across the Ar-
dennes had no reason to anticipate strong
opposition on the ground until the
Meuse had been reached and the tortu-
ous defiles left behind. In 1940 the only
German concern had been that the
French air force would catch the ar-
mored columns at the crossings of the
Sauer and Our Rivers. In both these
earlier campaigns the Germans had
thrown a protective screen clear to the
Meuse within twenty-four hours after
the advance began; the initial objectives
of these screening movements have more
than historic significance: Bastogne, St.
Vith, Arlon, Malmédy, La Roche, and
the bridges over the Ourthe River.
The ground offered the defender
three natural defense positions east of
the Meuse, although none of these con-
stituted an impassable barrier to the at-
tacker: (1) a covering line echeloned
to the southeast between Liège and the
Moselle, this pegged on the Hohes Venn,
the rugged zone around Malmédy and
St. Vith, and the boxed-in course of the
Our and Sauer Rivers; (2) the Ourthe
River line; and (3) an intermediate po-
sition, shorter in length, based on the
plateau at Bastogne and extending along
a chain of ridges to Neufchâteau.
There remains a word to be said about
the climate of the Ardennes and Eifel.
This is mountainous country, with much
rainfall, deep snows in winter, and raw,
harsh winds sweeping across the plateaus.
The heaviest rains come in November
and December. The mists are frequent
and heavy, lasting well into late morning
before they break. Precise predictions by
the military meteorologist, however,
are difficult because the Ardennes lies
directly on the boundary between the

TROOPS AND TERRAIN 47
northwestern and central European climatic
regions and thus is affected by the
conjuncture of weather moving east
from the British Isles and the Atlantic
with that moving westward out of Russia.
At Stavelot freezing weather averages
112 days a year, at Bastogne 145 days.
The structure of the soil will permit
tank movement when the ground is
frozen, but turns readily to a clayey mire
in time of rain. Snowfall often attains a
depth of ten to twelve inches in a 24-hour
period. Snow lingers for a long time in
the Ardennes but-and this is important
in recounting the events of 1944–the
deep snows come late. 3
3 The best of numerous terrain descriptions of
the Ardennes was prepared by the German General
Staff in 1940, especially for the offensive in the west.
It is entitled Mililaergeographischer ueberblick
ueber Belgien und angrenzende Gebiete. See also
the British official publication of 1918: A Manual
of Belgium and the Adjoining Territories (ed.
The Admiralty). The best analysis of German
military thought on the problem presented by
the Ardennes terrain is in a manuscript by Magna
E. Bauer entitled Comparison Between the Plan-
ning for the German Ardennes Offensive in 1944
and for the Campaign in the West in 1940 (1951).
OCMH.

Deception and Camouflage
Hitler’s selection of the Ardennes as
the sector in which the western counter-
offensive would be launched was based
in the main on the obvious advantage of
attacking the Allies where they were
weakest. Even so, although the Western
Allies could not be strong everywhere
along the line from Switzerland to the
North Sea, they did outnumber the
Germans in men, tanks, guns, and planes,
they were possessed of greater facility for
rapid movement of large forces, and
they–not the Germans–had the stra-
tegic initiative. At the first word of
German preparations in the Eifel and
Ardennes the Allies could terminate one
or both of their major offensives and
divert large forces into the threatened
area.
The accepted strategic gambit, prac-
ticed with great success by German com-
manders in the west during World War
I, would be to deliver a series of large-
scale attacks in sectors well removed
from the area from which the main
counteroffensive was to be launched. But
the divisions and the logistic support for
such diversionary attacks did not exist.
The German armies in the west could
not uncover the enemy’s jaw by a blow
in Holland or a kidney punch in Alsace;
instead they had to rely on the adroit
misdirection practiced by the conjuror,
turning Allied eyes away from the Eifel
CHAPTER IV
Preparations
long enough to complete the massive
preparations therein.
The German military profession had
a record of some notable achievements in
the attainment of strategic surprise. The
Ludendorff March offensive in 1918 had
been a brilliant example–indeed a
model–of a great offensive whose prepa-
ration had completely escaped detection.
The meticulous detail employed by
Ludendorff’s planners had achieved such
success that the 1918 plans for the cover
and movement of artillery simply were
copied in the artillery build-up for the
Ardennes. The German offensive in
1940 likewise had been a marked ex-
ample of strategic surprise, despite the
forced landing on Belgian soil of a
German plane carrying two liaison offi-
cers who had been entrusted with the
attack plan. The chief security tenets
adopted in preparation for the 1940 at-
tack had been personally dictated by
Hitler, and the first formal security
order issued by OKW in preparation for
the Ardennes counteroffensive was a re-
statement of the Fuehrer Directive of 11
January 1940. (This time, however, liai-
son officers party to the plan were ex-
pressly forbidden to travel by plane.)
Subsequent security measures would re-
flect or rephrase those which had been
so successful in 1940. 1
Probably the Fuehrer’s personal influ-
1 Bauer, Planning for German Ardennes Offen-
sive in 1944 . . . and 1940, app. 8.

PREPARATIONS 49
ence was felt most directly in limiting
the circle of those privy to the plan
during its conception and initial imple-
mentation. Hitler, the highest authority
in the German armed forces, personally
named the officers who were to be ad-
mitted to the great secret; furthermore,
he possessed the power to exact the
death penalty for violations of security,
a power he could be expected to exer-
cise on the slightest provocation and
without regard to the rank or prestige of
the offender. Even the well-disciplined,
high-ranking officers of the Wehrmacht
seem to have been apprehensive of the
personal risks which each encountered
the moment he was admitted to the plan.
So strict was the limitation of knowledge
that in those headquarters charged with
the command of the counteroffensive,
OB WEST and Army Group B, the only
officers brought into the planning phase
were Rundstedt and Model, plus the
chief of staff, the G–3, the quartermaster
officer, and one aide in each of their
respective staffs. In OB WEST, for ex-
ample, the daily and most secret war
diary contained no reference to the
counteroffensive; instead a separate war
diary was maintained, without benefit of
secretary or stenographer, by the few
officers working on the plan. The ex-
change of information between the re-
sponsible headquarters was carried by
liaison officers whose every movement
was watched by military and Gestapo
security agents. All teletype and tele-
phone lines were monitored the clock
around and the officers in the know were
so informed. Hitler had a mania for
“oaths.” Everyone admitted to the plan
took not one but ofttimes several oaths
to maintain secrecy, signing at least one
statement which accepted the death
penalty for any personal breach of
security. Later, division and corps commanders
would be compelled to take an
oath that during the advance they would
not trespass in the attack zone assigned
neighboring units. The death penalty
attached to this as well. 2
Although the immediate planning
staffs could be drastically limited, it was
obvious that some hundreds of officers
would have to be involved in the actual
handling of troops and supplies during
the concentration period, that is from
about 10 November, when the major re-
shuffling of headquarters and larger
troop units would commence, until the
date selected for the jump-off in the Ar-
dennes. The German system of staff
work, based on the rigid allocation of
authority and unquestioning obedience
to orders, was well designed to cope with
this situation. Furthermore, the Allied
attacks in November were launched on
such a scale and achieved such success as
to give real meaning to the Hitler-in-
spired cover plan, The Defensive Battle
in the West. Until the very last hours
before the counteroffensive the Western
Front German commanders accepted as
gospel the idea that the massing of ma-
tériel and the progressive withdrawal of
divisions from the line was intended to
provide fresh troops for the defense of
the Ruhr and the Palatinate. Indeed the
field commanders were much perplexed
in the last days before the Ardennes
counteroffensive by reason of what they
regarded as the high command’s caprici-
ousness and folly in refusing to throw
its reserves into the defensive battles
2 MS # B–038, 116th Panzer Division, Ardennes
(Generalmajor Siegfried von Waldenburg) .

50 THE ARDENNES: BATTLE OF THE BULGE
then reaching a climax in the Aachen
and Saverne Gap sectors. 3
The cover and deception plan, per-
sonally devised by Hitler, turned on a
half-truth. A part of the strategic con-
centration would be made in the Rheydt-
Jülich-Cologne area east of Aachen.
Here the preparations for the counter-
offensive would be paraded before the
Allies. To the south, at the entry to the
chosen path of attack, the Eifel concen-
tration was to be accomplished under
conditions of greatest secrecy behind the
thin line manned by the weak Seventh
Army. Then, at the last moment, the
troops from the northern concentration
area would slip south to join the main
build-up in the Eifel. The cover plan,
as propagated through the German com-
mands on the Western Front and retailed
to the Allies by neutrals and double-
agents, had this scenario: Germany
feared that the U.S. First and Ninth
Armies would achieve a real break-
through and drive to the Rhine in the
sector between Cologne and Bonn; in
preparation for this untoward event the
Fuehrer was amassing a major counter-
attack force northwest of Cologne; a
secondary and relatively small force of
burned-out divisions was being gathered
in the Eifel to contain the right flank of
the expected Allied penetration. 4
The main actor in this play was the
Sixth Panzer Army. Ostensibly its head-
quarters remained northwest of Cologne.
Four of the armored divisions actually
assigned to this headquarters also as-
sembled in this area. The intensification
of rail and road traffic which began here
3 Cole, The Lorraine Campaign, pp. 510–12.
4 The detailed deception scenario is given by
Maj. Percy Schramm, then historian at OKW
headquarters, in MS # A–862.
about mid-November was only partly
concealed. Much movement was made in
daylight. A program of road repair and
civilian evacuation was begun with little
attempt at camouflage. Radio traffic was
increased commensurate with the troop
concentration. Additional antiaircraft
battalions came into the area and with
them special allotments of ammunition
to produce a thickening of fire which
the Allied air forces could not possibly
fail to notice. To emphasize further still
what was transpiring here in the north, a
ghost army was brought into being on 20
November; this, the Twenty-fifth, sup-
posedly had an order of battle of ten di-
visions including some of the panzer
divisions which in fact belonged to the
Sixth Panzer Army.
In contrast to this northern concentra-
tion, that in the Eifel was the product of
secrecy carried to the limit. The Eifel
terrain was well adapted to concealment.
Thick forest cover cloaked its slopes, its
valleys and plateaus. Small villages,
singly not worthy of aerial investigation
but in sum capable of harboring large
forces, offered excellent dispersal. Cani-
ouflage had become second nature with
the German soldier in the west-indeed
since Normandy the art of camouflage
had become the science of survival, and
the Eifel made this task relatively easy.
Strict traffic regulation confined all rail
movements and road marches to hours
of darkness. Special security detachments
prowled the Eifel, and woe to the com-
mander who allowed a vehicle park to
grow beyond normal size. A radio black-
out was thrown over the concentration
area except for those units actually fac-
ing the enemy in the covering positions.
No artillery registration was permitted
except by guns in the line, and even they

PREPARATIONS 51
were limited to a few rounds per day.
Reconnaissance was confined to a hand-
ful of higher officers; combat patrolling
on the Ardennes front was almost en-
tirely limited to nighttime search for
American patrols.
There were a few potential weaknesses
in the screen thrown around and over
the Eifel. At one time the Allies had
flown night reconnaissance missions
across the Eifel, using flares for photog-
raphy. Even Rundstedt was worried lest
a repetition of these missions disclose the
German secret. Next was the problem
of deserters. A quiet sector, particularly
in an area as rugged as the Ardennes
and Eifel, offered numerous chances for
a malcontent to slip over to the enemy.
The so-called Volksdeutsch (Alsatians,
Transylvanians, and the like) had the
worst record in this regard; these were
combed out of all forward units and
would not rejoin their outfits until the
battle began. Hitler himself required a
special daily report from OB WEST
listing all known deserters for the 24-
hour period. As it turned out the num-
ber of deserters was surprisingly small,
only five on the Western Front during
the first twelve days of December. 5
There remained the problem of
widening and improving miles of road
in the Eifel without attracting undue
enemy attention. Furthermore the road-
blocks and barriers thrown up as part of
the West Wall defenses had to be re-
moved in those sectors where the initial
armored penetration would be made.
Such activity hardly could be concealed.
The answer was to undertake road con-
struction in both the northern and south-
ern areas of concentration, tying this to
the cover plan.
5 OB WEST KTB, 13 Dec 44.
German discipline and experience,
backed and enforced by all the security
paraphernalia of a police state, might be
able to divert enemy attention to the
north and prepare a real strategic sur-
prise in the Eifel. In the long run success
or failure would turn on Allied activity
in the air. Could the preparations for
the counteroffensive be completed be-
fore enemy planes spotted the Eifel con-
centration of troops and vehicles?
The Western Front in Early
December
The Allied attacks in November had
as their objective the decisive defeat of
the enemy west of the Rhine and the
seizure of a foothold on the east bank of
that river. By the end of November,
the U.S. First and Ninth Armies, charged
with the main effort, had made some
gains in the direction of Bonn and
Cologne. The 21 Army Group, in the
north, had crossed the Waal River, the
left arm of the lower Rhine. The U.S.
Third Army had put troops on the Saar
River. Farther to the south the U.S.
Seventh Army had captured Strasbourg
and reached the Rhine. The 1st French
Army, on the extreme south flank, mean-
while had liberated Belfort and en-
trapped sizable German forces in the
Colmar pocket. Although Allied losses
had been high, those inflicted on the
enemy had been even greater, probably
on the order of two or three to one. But
the Allies had failed to achieve their
main strategic goals: they had not de-
cisively defeated the German armies
west of the Rhine, nor had they crossed
the river. (Map I)
On 7 December General Dwight D.
Eisenhower, Air Chief Marshal Sir

MAP I
D. Holmes, Jr.

PREPARATIONS 53
Arthur W. Tedder, Field Marshal Sir
Bernard L. Montgomery, and Lt. Gen.
Omar N. Bradley met at Maastricht to
lay plans for future operations. There
was general agreement that the Allies
should launch an all-out offensive on the
Western Front early in 1945 but consid-
erable variance between the views of
Eisenhower and Montgomery as to the
future scheme of maneuver and disposi-
tion of forces. Montgomery held, as he
had since September, for a single strong
thrust across the Rhine north of the
Ruhr and the restriction of all other
operations to containing actions by
limited forces. Eisenhower agreed with
the proposal for a main attack north of
the Ruhr by Montgomery’s 21 Army
Group and was prepared to give
the field marshal the U.S. Ninth Army.
But he was unwilling to abandon his oft-
expressed concept of the one-two punch
with Patton’s Third Army swinging a
secondary blow toward the Frankfurt
Gate. 6
After the Maastricht meeting, Eisen-
hower set plans in motion to continue
pressure on the enemy and chew up as
many German divisions as possible be-
fore the main offensive in the north. To
accomplish this the Supreme Com-
mander gave permission for the Third
Army to mount an offensive along the
Saar front on 19 December and directed
Lt. Gen. Jacob L. Devers, the 6th Army
Group commander, to support the drive
with elements of the Seventh Army. In
the meantime these two armies contin-
ued heavy local attacks, Patton driving
on Saarlautern while Lt. Gen Alexander
6 Forrest C. Pogue, The Supreme Command, United
States Army in World War II (Washington, 1954),
p. 316.
M. Patch’s Seventh Army turned north
into the Saverne Gap.
At the opposite end of the long Allied
line, Montgomery gave orders in early
December for the British Second Army
to “tidy up” the 21 Army Group posi-
tion on the Meuse with an attack calcu-
lated to erase the Heinsberg salient. This
operation was flooded out, however, and
on 16 December advance parties were
moving north as the first step in a major
shift to the left preparatory to the attack
toward Krefeld and the Ruhr, now
tentatively scheduled for the second
week in January. South of 21 Army
Group Lt. Gen. William H. Simpson’s
U.S. Ninth Army liquidated the remain-
ing enemy forces in the Jülich sector and
by 14 December had closed along the
Roer River. Lt. Gen. Courtney H.
Hodges’ First Army, to the right of the
Ninth, also had reached the Roer, after
the bloody Hurtgen battle, but could
not risk a crossing attack while the
Germans held the Urft-Roer dams. A
series of air attacks was launched early
in December to breach the dams and re-
move the threat of enemy-controlled
floods, but with so little success that the
deal passed to the First Army. 7 Bradley
ordered Hodges to seize the Schwam-
menauel and the Urftalsperre, the key
points in the Roer valley system of dams,
and on 13 December the First Army
commander put the V Corps, his center,
into an attack toward the dams. His
northernmost corps, VII Corps, was as-
signed a support role in this attack and
would attain its limited objectives by 16
December.
The mission and deployment of Maj.
Gen. Leonard T. Gerow’s V Corps later
7 See MacDonald, The Siegfried Line Campaign,
pp. 597–98.

54
THE ARDENNES: BATTLE OF THE BULGE
GENERAL BRADLEY, AIR CHIEF MARSHAL TEDDER, GENERAL EISENHOWER, AND
FIE MARSHAL MONERY (left to right), during the Maastricht meeting.
had a direct effect in determining the
initial American reaction to the German
attack. Gerow had four infantry divi-
sions, two armored combat commands,
and a cavalry group at his disposal. A
new division, the 78th, was deployed in
the corps center on a front extending
from Lammersdorf to Monschau. On
the left, the 8th Infantry Division
fronted along the Kyll River line. The
right wing was held by the 99th In-
fantry Division, whose positions reached
from Monschau to the V-VIII Corps
boundary in the Buchholz Forest north-
west of the Losheim Gap. The first
phase of the V Corps attack was to be
carried by the 78th and 2d Infantry
Divisions, the latter coming up from an
assembly area at Camp Elsenborn and
passing through the 99th Division left.
The 8th and 99th would confine their
efforts initially to demonstrations and
line-straightening. The first day of the
attack went as planned, but on 14 De-
cember the enemy stiffened and on the
15th counterattacked; the 78th Division
became involved in a rough battle at
Rollesbroich and Kesternich, while the
2d bogged down in a slow-moving fight
for individual pillboxes in the Monschau
Forest. This was the situation when the
enemy onslaught hit the 99th Division

PREPARATIONS 55
and its VIII Corps neighbors on the
the morning of 16 December.
GENERAL MIDDLETON
Maj. Gen. Troy H. Middleton’s VIII
Corps on First Army’s right flank had no
part in the Allied attacks of early De-
cember. Two of Middleton’s infantry
divisions were weary and casualty-ridden
from the intense fighting of the Novem-
ber push to the Roer. The third was
newly arrived from the United States.
The corps mission, then, was to train,
rest, re-equip, and observe the enemy.
Nonetheless this was no Blighty, a haven
for second-rate troops and bumbling
commanders. The 28th Infantry Division
(Maj. Gen. Norman D. Cota) and the
4th Infantry Division (Maj. Gen. Ray-
mond O. Barton) had distinguished
therhselves in the bloody battles of the
Hurtgen Forest. The veterans of this
fight were well equipped to train and
hearten the replacements for some 9,000
battle casualties the two divisions had
sustained. General Middleton himself
had a fine combat record reaching from
World War I through Sicily, Normandy,
and Brittany. Deliberate and calm but
tenacious, he was regarded by Bradley
and Patton as one of the best tacticians
in the U.S. Army.
As the result of the relief of the 83d
Infantry Division, en route to the VII
Corps, the deployment of the VIII Corps
(as it would meet the German attack)
took final form on the 13th. The 4th
Infantry Division abutted on the Third
Army at the Luxembourg-French fron-
tier and followed the Moselle and Sauer
Rivers, marking the German border, as
far north as Bollendorf. A combat com-
mand of the 9th Armored Division, as yet
inexperienced, had taken over a narrow
sector to the left of the 4th on io De-
cember. The second combat command
of this division, earlier comprising the
corps reserve, was assigned to V Corps
and started its march north on 13 De-
cember. The veteran 28th Infantry Di-
vision held the corps center, fronting on
the Our River. The newly arrived and
green 106th Infantry Division had com-
pleted the relief of the 2d Infantry Di-
vision in the Schnee Eifel sector on 12
December. Here the German West Wall
turned northeastward following the
Schnee Eifel crest. In the Losheim Gap,
at the northern terminus of the Schnee
Eifel, a light task force of the 14th
Cavalry Group maintained a screening
position between the 106th and 99th In-
fantry Divisions. It should be noted that
this was the seam between the VIII and
V Corps.
Although the VIII Corps forward
area possessed many terrain features
favoring the defender, notably the

56 THE ARDENNES: BATTLE OF THE BULGE
Schnee Eifel on the left wing and the
river sequence fronting the corps center
and right, there were numerous points
of entry for an attack moving east to
west. The three infantry divisions under
Middleton’s command were responsible
for a front of about eighty-five miles, a
distance approximately three times that
normally assigned an equivalent defend-
ing force by U.S. service school teaching
and tactical doctrine. On the morning
of 16 December the total assigned
strength of the VIII Corps was 68,822
officers and men. Immediately after the
Battle of the Bulge, the tag “a calculated
risk” would be applied to the attenuated
VIII Corps front as it existed on 16 De-
cember. Middleton was well aware of the
risk-indeed he had made this clear in
discussions with his superiors. Somewhat
after the event General Eisenhower
wrote General of the Army George C.
Marshall (on io January 1945) that in
early November he and Bradley had dis-
cussed the possibility of a German coun-
teroffensive in the Ardennes but had
agreed that such a move would be un-
profitable to the enemy. The line of
reasoning, as set before Marshall, was
this: the “Volkssturm” would be no good
in offensive operations, winter in the Ar-
dennes would render continuous logistic
support impossible, and Allied strength
was so great that the Germans could not
push far enough to reach really vital ob-
jectives. 8
Whatever thought may have been
given to the Ardennes, the Allies were
on the offensive and preparing for yet
greater offensive operations well to the
north and the south of the VIII Corps
8 Ltr, Eisenhower to Marshall, 10 Jan 45, in
SHAEF message file, Plans and Operations, folder
27.
sector. Losses during November had
been high and the reserve of new divi-
sions in the United States was running
low (in the United Kingdom such a re-
serve no longer existed). The old mili-
tary axiom that the line cannot be strong
everywhere applied with full force to
the Allied positions reaching from
Switzerland to the North Sea. Almost
automatically Allied strength would con-
centrate in those areas where the offen-
sive was the order of the day and where
decision might be reached. The Ar-
dennes sector seemed no special risk, it
had been quiet for weeks, it offered-or
so it seemed-no terrain attraction for
the enemy, and there was no recogniz-
able indication that enemy forces oppo-
site the VIII Corps and 99th Infantry
Division outnumbered those deployed
on the friendly side of the line. If there
was a “calculated risk,” therefore, it was
no more precise or specific than that
taken wittingly by any commander who
thins his front to mount an attack while
knowing that he has over-all superiority
and the ability to retain the initiative.
The Intelligence Failure
In the years that have passed since the
close of World War II the Ardennes has
ranked close to Pearl Harbor as an epi-
sode inviting public polemic, personal
vituperation, and ex parte vindication.
Sentences, phrases, and punctuation
marks from American intelligence docu-
ments of pre-Ardennes origin have been
twisted and turned, quoted in and out
of context, “interpreted” and misinter-
preted, in arduous efforts to fix blame
and secure absolution. There no longer
is point to such intensely personal exam-
ination of the failure by American and

PREPARATIONS 57
Allied intelligence to give warning of
the Ardennes counteroffensive prepara-
tions. The failure was general and can-
not be attributed to any person or group
of persons. The intelligence story on the
eve of the Ardennes is not germane in
terms of personal opinions or the men
who held them. What counts are the
views held at the various American head-
quarters and the gist of enemy informa-
tion which reached those headquarters. 9
In mid-September the Western Allies
had felt imminent victory in their hands.
Flushed with their own dazzling suc-
cesses and heartened by news of the
bloody defeats which the Soviet armies
were administering to the Germans on
the Eastern Front, the Allies saw the
Wehrmacht collapsing and the Third
Reich tottering to its knees. The per-
vasive optimism dissipated as the sur-
prisingly revitalized German armies
stood their ground in defense of the West
Wall, but it never completely disap-
peared. When the Allied attack began to
roll again in late November and early
December, some of this earlier optimism
reappeared. A 12th Army Group intelli-
gence summary issued on 12 December
echoes the prevailing tone: “It is now
certain that attrition is steadily sapping
the strength of German forces on the
Western Front and that the crust of de-
fenses is thinner, more brittle and more
vulnerable than it appears on our G–2
maps or to the troops in the line.” This
optimism, particularly when heightened
by reports that the enemy no longer had
fuel for tanks and planes, conditioned all
estimates of the enemy’s plans and capa-
9 Pogue, The Supreme Command, pp. 361–72.
This is the best treatment of the problem of
personal responsibilities for the various Allied in-
telligence estimates.
bilities. It may be phrased this way: the
enemy can still do something but he
can’t do much; he lacks the men, the
planes, the tanks, the fuel, and the am-
munition.
Another aspect of Allied thinking
would contribute to the general miscon-
ception of German capabilities and in-
tentions. The return of Field Marshal
von Rundstedt to command in the west
had been marked with much interest by
Allied intelligence staffs. Accepted in
military circles as one of the best soldiers
in the world, Rundstedt’s reputation,
even among his opponents, rose to new
stature as the result of the stubborn Ger-
man defense in the autumn of 1944.
Here, then, was a commander who
could be expected to act and react ac-
cording to the rational and accepted
canons of the military art. He would
husband his dwindling resources, at an
appropriate time he would counterat-
tack in accordance with available means,
and ultimately he would fall back to the
Rhine for the major defensive battle.
Had Rundstedt actually commanded in
the west, as the Allies believed, this
analysis would have been correct.
(Rundstedt’s effort to delimit the scope
of the Ardennes counteroffensive in or-
der to achieve a reasonable symbiosis
between the means and the end proves
the point.)
But Hitler alone commanded. Intui-
tion, not conventional professional judg-
ment, would determine German action.
Unaware of the true nature of the
German decision-making process in the
west, the Allied commanders and staffs
awaited an enemy reaction which would
be rational and therefore predictable. If
the thought ever occurred to an Allied
intelligence officer that Germany would

58 THE ARDENNES: BATTLE OF THE BULGE
gamble on one last great effort west of
the Rhine, staking everything on a single
throw of the dice, this idea disappeared
in the aura of high professional military
competence which attached to Rund-
stedt. In a way this may have been the
field marshal’s greatest personal contri-
bution to the Ardennes counteroffen-
sive.
It is impossible to determine the ex-
tent to which the Hitler cover plan
deceived the Allies into accepting the
area north of the Ardennes as the focal
point for the anticipated German reac-
tion. Here the Allies were making their
greatest effort and it was natural to as-
sume that the German reserves remain-
ing would be committed to meet this
effort. Even the U.S. Third Army, far to
the south, relaxed its normally parochial
view of the front and predicted that the
Sixth Panzer Army would be employed
in a spoiling attack in the Aachen-
Düren sector. Here, too, lay the direct
route to the Ruhr. It long had been an
article of faith in Allied strategy that
Germany would make its greatest efforts
in defense of what Eisenhower had
called the two hearts of Germany: the
Ruhr, the industrial heart, and Berlin,
the political heart. Furthermore, the
area between the Roer and Rhine
Rivers represented good tank-going for
the Allied armored divisions. Duly im-
pressed with their own armored suc-
cesses, the Allies expected that the
enemy would throw his reserve armor
into battle here in an attempt to prevent
a repetition of the August tank race
across France. Perhaps German decep-
tion did make some confirmatory contri-
bution, but regardless of this Allied eyes
were fixed immovably on the front
north of the Ardennes.
One item would cause Allied intelli-
gence some concern, although it seems
that this concern was more academic
than real. Where was Rundstedt’s ar-
mored counterattack reserve, the Sixth
Panzer Army? Allied situation maps of
early December still carried the head-
quarters of this army in the vicinity of
Cologne, and assigned four or five un-
committed panzer divisions as available
to this command. But the actual location
of the Sixth Panzer Army was a matter
of debate. The 12th Army Group
thought that it might be concentrated
around Bielefeld, northeast of Cologne.
The U.S. First Army placed it rather
indefinitely between the Roer and the
Rhine. The U.S. Third Army plumped
for a location between Düsseldorf and
Cologne. The U.S. Ninth Army appar-
ently did not care to enter this guessing
game. SHAEF intelligence summed up
the matter nicely in the report of io
December: “There is no further news of
Sixth SS Panzer Army beyond vague
rumours.”
There was general agreement that
Rundstedt’s armored reserve would be
thrown against the First and Ninth
Armies in an effort to blunt their drive
in the Roer area, although the severe
German reverses sustained in the south
during the second week of December led
to some thought that divisions might be
stripped from the Sixth Panzer reserve
to shore up the defenses of the Palati-
nate. The two U.S. armies carrying the
attack in the north were agreed that the
Sixth Panzer Army would be committed
after their attack had crossed the Roer
River. The 12th Army Group expected
the same timing and anticipated the
German reaction would come as a co-
ordinated counterattack. There was less

PREPARATIONS 59
Allied interest in the Fifth Panzer Army
than in the Sixth. The former had been
sorely handled in the fight on the Roer
front and the appearance of the Fif-
teenth Army in this sector, identified in
the second week of December, led to the
assumption that the Fifth and its most
badly battered divisions had been with-
drawn for rest and necessary overhaul.
On 12 December the 12th Army Group
reported the Fifth as assembling its
weary divisions between Cologne and
Koblenz.
American intelligence summaries,
periodic reports, and briefing precis, for
the month prior to the 16 December as-
sault, gave only fragmentary and skeletal
information on the enemy opposite the
VIII Corps. German planners had pre-
dicted that the American high com-
manders would accept the theory that the
rugged terrain in this area, particularly
in poor weather, effectively precluded
large-scale mechanized operations. Per-
haps there was some subconscious as-
sumption by American staffs that the
Ardennes was so nearly impassable as to
be ruled out of consideration. But there
were more tangible reasons for the
scant attention accorded this sector. It
had been a quiet sector of the Western
Front since the Allied dash across France
had halted in September. The German
divisions identified here as fairly perma-
nent residents were battle weary, under-
strength, and obviously in need of rest
and refitting. At various times fresh
divisions had appeared opposite the
VIII Corps, but their stay had been
brief. By December it had become axio-
matic, insofar as U.S. intelligence was
concerned, that any new division identi-
fied on the VIII Corps front was no more
than a bird of passage en route to the
north or the south. As a result the
Ardennes assumed a kind of neutral hue
in American eyes. Important happen-
ings, it seemed, transpired north of the
Ardennes and south of the Ardennes, but
never at the division point itself. This
mental set offers a partial explanation
of why the 99th Division in the V Corps
zone identified only three of the twelve
German divisions assembling to its
front, while the VIII Corps identified
only four out of ten divisions before 16
December.
Was there any warning note sounded
for the VIII Corps and its troops in the
line during the days just prior to the
German onslaught? With the advantage
of hindsight, seven items can be dis-
cerned in the corps reports for the period
13–15 December which might have given
the alarm. Two divisions, the 28th and
106th, sent in reports of increased vehic-
ular activity on the nights before the
attack. The 28th discounted its own re-
port by noting that this was the normal
accompaniment of an enemy front-line
relief and that the same thing had hap-
pened when a German unit had pulled
out three weeks before. The 106th was
a green division and unlikely to know
what weight could be attached legiti-
mately to such activity. In fact one
regimental commander rebuked his S–2
for reporting this noise as “enemy move-
ment.” A third incident occurred on 14
December when a woman escapee re-
ported to the 28th Infantry Division
commander that the woods near Bitburg
were jammed with German equipment.
Her answers to questions posed by the
division G–2 apparently were impres-
sive enough to gain the attention of the
VIII Corps G–2 who ordered that she
be taken to the First Army headquarters.

60
The woman arrived there on 16 Decem-
ber.
The four remaining incidents attach
to the capture of German prisoners on
15 December, two each by the 4th and
106th Infantry Divisions. The time of
capture is important: two at 1830, one
at 1930, and one at an unspecified time
thereafter. All four claimed that fresh
troops were arriving in the line, that a
big attack was in the offing, that it might
come on the 16th or 17th but certainly
would be made before Christmas. Two
of the prisoners were deserters; they
THE ARDENNES: BATTLE OF THE BULGE
themselves did not take the reported
attack too seriously since, as they told
their captors, all this had been promised
German troops before. The other two
were wounded. One seems to have made
some impression on the interrogators,
but since he was under the influence of
morphine his captors decided that fur-
ther questioning would be necessary.
Of the seven incidents which in retro-
spect may be considered signposts point-
ing to an impending attack on the VIII
Corps front, only four were reported to
the corps headquarters. Three of the
PANZERKAMPFWAGENS V (PANTHER) EN ROUTE TO THE FRONT

PREPARATIONS 61
four prisoners seemed to be parroting
wild and baseless rumors of a sort which
was fairly common, and these three were
bundled into prisoner of war cages without
further ado. The incidents reported
to the VIII Corps were forwarded to
the First Army and duly noted by that
headquarters on 14 and 15 December.
Only one incident was deemed worthy
of 12th Army Group attention. This,
one of the reports of extraordinary traffic,
was mentioned in the commanding
general’s briefing as confirmation of the
predicted relief of the 326th Infantry
Division. This briefing began at 0915 on
16 December. 10
Perhaps the appearance of these seven
indicators might have been treated in
combination to uncover the German
preparations and allow the VIII Corps
at least a minimum tactical preparation
for the attack. Whether any commander
would have been justified in making
major alterations in his troop disposition
on the basis of this intelligence alone
is highly questionable. One might more
reasonably conclude that the American
acquisition of only this limited and suspect
information was a tribute to the
security measures enacted by the enemy.
What of air intelligence, the source of
Rundstedt’s greatest worry? Bad weather
during the first half of December did
reduce the number of Allied reconnaissance
sorties flown east of the First Army
front but by no means produced the kind
of blackout for which the enemy hoped.
In the month prior to the Ardennes
attack the 67th Tactical Reconnaissance
10 The intelligence sources bearing on the Allied
failure to appreciate the coming German counter-
offensive have been gathered by Royce L. Thomp-
son in a study entitled American Intelligence on
the German Counteroffensive, 2 vols. (1949). MS
in OCMH files.
Group (IX Tactical Air Command),
supporting the First Army, flew 361
missions of which 242 were judged suc-
cessful. From the 10th through the 15th
of December the group flew 71 missions
with varying degrees of success; for ex-
ample, on 14 December planes flown
over Trier by the 30th Photo Reconnais-
sance Squadron reported the weather
clear, but two hours later a second mis-
sion ran into haze and was able to see
very little. Only one day, 13 December,
in the five critical days before the attack
found all U.S. air reconnaissance
grounded. 11
The pilots belonging to the 67th
Group and the 10th Photo Reconnais-
sance Group, the latter attached to the
Third Army’s old partner, the XIX
TAG, actually constructed an imposing
picture of German build-up west of the
Rhine in the month preceding the Ar-
dennes counteroffensive. In the last week
of November the number of enemy
columns on the roads showed a marked
increase. On 30 November U.S. recon-
naissance planes reported a drastic
heightening of rail activity west of the
Rhine and this was confirmed by the
fighter-bombers flying “armed-recce.”
Special indications of forthcoming attack
were numerous: a large number of hos-
pital trains on the west bank of the
Rhine, several groups of flatcars car-
rying Tiger tanks, and fifty searchlights
in one location. Lights representing
large-scale night movements were con-
sistently reported, although the two
available night fighter squadrons were
11 Royce L. Thompson has compiled a complete
collection of excerpts from pertinent Air Force
records bearing on the operations of the U.S.
Army Air Forces during the Ardennes battle:
Tactical Air Phase of the Ardennes Campaign, 2
vols. (1950). MS in OCMH files.

62 THE ARDENNES: BATTLE OF THE BULGE
so badly understrength (averaging no
more than ten P–61’s operational) that
their contribution perforce was limited. 12
The intelligence problem presented
by the U.S. air effort was not that of a
paucity of information but rather one
of interpretation. Both the Allied ground
and air headquarters expected the enemy
to reinforce those sectors to the north
and south of the Ardennes where the
First and Third U.S. Armies were attack-
ing. The main special indicators of
coming attack were identified in transit
areas on the routes to the Roer and the
Saar. The trainloads of Tiger tanks, for
example, were seen on the Euskirchen
rail lines. This line ran northwest to
Düren and the Roer, but a branch line
led south to the Eifel. The reports of
searchlights, turned in on the night of
6–7 December, came from the vicinity
of Kaiserslautern, opposite the Third
Army. Kaiserslautern, however, was only
a few miles by rail from Trier, one of
the chief unloading yards opposite the
VIII Corps. There was considerable
information, then, of the enemy’s grow-
ing strength west of the Rhine. But the
interpretation of his intentions was pre-
cisely what he desired: reinforcement of
the Sixth Panzer Army counterattack
reserve on the Roer front and piecemeal
movement to shore up the divisions
being battered by the Third and Seventh
Armies.
Was there any special attempt at air
reconnaissance over the Eifel? A large
number of missions were flown here in
November, that is, before the final as-
sembly for attack began. During the first
half of December the 67th Group rather
consistently included Eifel targets in its
12 Craven and Cate, eds., Europe: ARGUMENT
to V–E Day, p. 675.
daily mission orders; however, these
missions were given low priority and
often were scratched. In the critical
period (10 through 15 December) the
67th flew only three missions directly
opposite the VIII Corps, on 14 Decem-
ber over Trier. Numerous requests for
air reconnaissance were made during
this time by the VIII Corps divisions,
but even when accepted by higher
ground echelons and forwarded to air
headquarters these missions retained so
low a priority, when contrasted with the
demands from the Roer and Saar fronts,
as to fall at the bottom of the missions
list. In sum, it can be said that the
reconnaissance flown over the Eifel be-
between 16 November and 15 December
gave much information on enemy activ-
ity, but that this was interpreted as
routine troop movement through the
Eifel way-station en route to the north
and the south. Thus, the SHAEF intel-
ligence summary of 10 December gives
air reports of “continuing troop move-
ments towards the Eifel sector” and con-
cludes that “the procession is not yet
ended.”
Could the proper combination of air
and ground intelligence have weakened
the Allied fixation on the Roer and Saar
sectors? Perhaps, but this is extremely
hypothetical. One thing seems clear.
Although the ground headquarters were
charged with the final analysis of photos
and pilot reports secured by the air,
there was little co-operation and liaison
between the air and ground headquar-
ters as to the initial interpretation placed
by the air forces on the data gathered
through aerial reconnaissance. The offi-
cial U.S. Army Air Forces account of
this episode states the case justly: “Per-
haps the chief fault was one of organiza-

PREPARATIONS 63
tion, for there seems to have been a
twilight zone between air and ground
headquarters in which the responsibility
had not been sufficiently pinned
down.” 13
On 15 December the Allied air com-
manders’ conference at SHAEF convened
to review the big picture. Here the
SHAEF G–3 told the assembled airmen
that the Roer dam operations had failed
to provoke a move by the main enemy
armored reserve; as for the VIII Corps
front, “nothing to report.” Then the
A–2 rose to sketch the activities of the
Luftwaffe: it had continued the move-
ment westward, closer to the battlefield,
which had been noted in recent days,
but all this was “defensive” only.
The prelude to the Ardennes counter-
offensive of 16 December can only be
reckoned as a gross failure by Allied
ground and air intelligence. One of the
greatest skills in the practice of the mil-
itary art is the avoidance of the natural
tendency to overrate or underestimate
the enemy. Here, the enemy capability
for reacting other than to direct Allied
pressure had been sadly underestimated.
Americans and British had looked in a
mirror for the enemy and seen there
only the reflection of their own in-
tentions.
The German Concentration
Hitler’s operation directive of 10
November set 27 November as the date
for completion of the huge concentra-
tion preliminary to the Ardennes coun-
teroffensive, with a target date two days
earlier for the’ attack by the divisions in
the initial thrust. But his commanders
13 Ibid., p. 681.
in the west, better versed in logistics,
recognized from the first that the attack
could not be made before the very last
of the month. The Allied attacks in the
Aachen and Metz sectors made further
postponement unavoidable, pinning
German divisions to the front long be-
yond their planned date of relief and
bringing others back into the line when
refitting had only just begun. Inside the
Greater Reich the Replacement Army,
charged with creating and training new
Volks Grenadier divisions for the offen-
sive, proved Hitler’s optimism ill-
founded. The task of building new divi-
sions from air force troops, sailors, and
the products of Goebbel’s raid on the
remaining civilian population was im-
mense, the timing necessarily slow. In
early December, when Hitler’s target
date had come and gone, another factor
intervened to cause delay. The prelim-
inary movement of armored divisions
and vehicular columns had burned up
far more fuel than German quartermas-
ters had reckoned. The attack would
have to be delayed until the diminished
fuel tanks west of the Rhine could be
replenished.
The concentration period, therefore,
would run until 16 December but even
these added days gave all too short a
time for such a formidable array of prep-
arations. The original plans called for
the movement and assembly of 4 armies,
11 corps, 38 divisions, 9 Volks artillery
corps, and 7 Yolks Werfer brigades,
plus service and support troops. By the
beginning of December OKW’s inflated
order of battle had been reduced to
about 30 divisions (the Fifteenth Army
now was deleted from the initial attack
order, although still envisioned as the
subsidiary attack force) , but the logistics

64 THE ARDENNES: BATTLE OF THE BULGE
problem remained of staggering proportions.
The area in which the Army Group B
would concentrate its forces, equipment,
and supplies was delimited on the south
by the Moselle River and had as its base
the Rhine crossings stretching from
Dusseldorf to Koblenz. On the north
there were actually two limits. That
farthest north ran from the Rhine west
on the axis Munchen-Gladbach and
Roermond. South of this line Allied
intelligence officers watched, as they
were intended to watch, the daylight,
only half-disguised, movement of German
troops and supplies. Farther south
a second and true limit defined the main
concentration area. Here the line extended
from Bonn, through Euskirchen,
to the front north of Monschau. The
trick, then, would be to effect a large
and secret concentration south of this
second line while at the same time preparing
to sideslip the forces from the
north into this sector in the last hours
before the attack.
The first problem of organization was
that of rail transport. 14 Troops, tanks,
and guns had to be brought from East
Prussia, Poland, Austria, the Netherlands,
Denmark, and Norway. Fuel and
ammunition had to be hauled across the
exposed Rhine bridges and unloaded
quickly and quietly at the Eifel dumps.
A number of divisions, in particular
those assigned to the Sixth Panzer Army,
would have to be shuttled from the
battle front back across the Rhine to
14 The best study on German rail movements
and explanation of pertinent German sources will
be found in Charles V. P. von Luttichau’s manu-
script, German Rail Communications in the
Ardennes Offensive, 1944–45 (1952). OCMH. See
also the OB WEST KTB and Anlage for the sup-
ply build-up prior to the attack.
training and refitting areas, then be
moved across the Rhine again and into
the concentration zone.
Probably no railway system in the
world was better able to handle this
tremendous task than the Reichsbahn
(the German State Railroads). It had
been modernized on the eve of the war,
was a model of efficient management,
and, through a program of systematic
looting, had more than replaced the
rolling stock lost to air attack. The cars
and the locomotives in large freight
yards, as many American soldiers will
remember, read like a European rail-
road gazetteer. Militarization of the
German railroads was complete. The
German Army had been the first in his-
tory to employ railroads for a great
strategic concentration, and the suc-
cesses of 1870 had led to a tradition in
General Staff thought and training
which looked to the rail system as the
primary means of strategic concentra-
tion. The rail lines along the Rhine and
west of the river had been located in
accordance with military desires, The
Eifel branches had been constructed in
preparation for the First World War,
then had been reinforced for the cam-
paign of 1940. But there was more than
the tradition of the great General Staff
to dictate this reliance on rail: Hitler’s
scheme for a military superhighway
system, the Reichsauto bahnen, had been
cut short by the war; the Allied attacks
against motor fuel production had de-
pleted German stocks, although hardly
to the extent that Allied intelligence
estimated in the autumn of 1944.
The major threat, of course, was the
overwhelming superiority of the Allied
air forces and their ability, no longer
effectively challenged by the Luftwaffe,

PREPARATIONS 65
to look and to strike almost at will. Ger-
man railway preparations, as a result,
had to take count of three dangers:
Allied air reconnaissance over the Eifel
and its rail approaches, bombing attacks
to knock out the Rhine rail bridges, and
rail-cutting attacks stepped up to the
point where repair efforts could no
longer hold the pace. In the short run,
decisions on the form of the air war
reached in the higher Allied councils
during the autumn of 1944 made the
German task much easier; in the long
run, these same decisions contributed to
the final failure of the Ardennes counter-
offensive.
British and American air leaders had
found themselves consistently at logger-
heads on the issue of transportation
versus oil targets. The American view
was that the German rail system con-
stituted too complex a target to be
demolished in any reasonable time,
but that enemy oil production was so
highly concentrated (particularly in the
synthetic oil plants) as to permit a kill-
ing blow in the time and with the effort
available. Before 16 December the
American view held first priority. In-
deed, during the month of October
second place was accorded to attacks-
subsequently judged as “rather incon-
clusive”-against ordnance depots, tank
assembly plants, and motor vehicle pro-
duction. Eventually, at the close of Oc-
tober, the British succeeded in raising
the priority on rail attacks, although this
remained second to those on oil. Novem-
ber was the big month for attacks against
the latter, the Allied strategic air forces
dropping 37,096 tons aimed at German
oil production. In the second half of
the month, however, the rail campaign
stepped up; the Eighth Air Force and
the RAF actually delivered more bombs
against rail than against oil targets. The
Rhine bridges presented a special prob-
lem. In November the SHAEF G–2
asked that the air mount a campaign to
cut these bridges, but on this the Amer-
ican and British air commanders were
in accord. The great Rhine bridges,
heavily guarded by flak, were tough
targets for the bombing techniques then
current and the Allied air forces suc-
ceeded in staving off this demand.
German records, fairly full for the
final quarter of 1944, give this picture
of the effects of Allied air attacks. The
Reichsbahn moved troop strength by
rail equivalent to sixty-six divisions be-
fore the attack. 15 Forces equivalent to
seven divisions were moved by road.
Twenty-seven of the division-size rail
movements were affected in some way
by air attack, in most cases before they
actually entered the build-up zone. De-
lays normally were no longer than one
or two days, although from 10 December
on some divisions were forced to march
an extra fifty to sixty miles on foot. A
number of units lost essential organic
equipment during these attacks, the
deprivation inevitably inhibiting their
later performance. Very noticeable ef-
fects of Allied air efforts came on 10 and
11 December. On the first day a noon
attack over the Koblenz rail yards left
more than a hundred bomb craters.
Nonetheless, the yards were in full
operation twenty-four hours later. The
main double-track line supporting the
Sixth Panzer Army assembly (Cologne-
Euskirchen) was hit so severely as to
stop all rail traffic on 11 December: but
15 Detailed
troop movements have been worked
out in Luttichau, Rail Communications, ch. VII,
passim.

66 THE ARDENNES: BATTLE OF THE BULGE
the line was running again on the 12th.
Two Rhine rail bridges took hits in
November and four were under repair
as the result of attacks during October.
In all cases at least one rail line per
bridge remained operable. An Allied
plane hit one bridge with one bomb
during the first half of December. Supply
shipments generally went unscathed in
the actual concentration area. About
five hundred trains were employed to
effect this build-up, of which air attack
in October and November destroyed
only fifteen carloads.
In sum, the greatest menace to the
German rail concentration came from
attacks by bombers and fighter-bombers
against railroad tracks, stations, and
yards. Hardly a day passed without one
or more breaks somewhere in the system
at and west of the Rhine. During the
first two weeks of December the Allied
air attacks inflicted 125 breaks on the
rails feeding the Western Front, 60 of
which were in the concentration area.
German engineers, still working on
November cuts, repaired 150 breaks of
which 100 were in the concentration
area. There was, then, an uneasy equi-
librium between Allied air attacks and
the German rail repair capability. Be
it remembered, however, that the Allied
air campaign against the Reichsbahn
thus far was dispersed and a matter of
second priority.
If nuclear weapons do not succeed in
entirely removing rail transport from
the logistic systems of future war, the
German handling of the Ardennes build-
up will stand as a military model. As
a part of military history, the story of
this German success, achieved despite
Allied dominance in the air, merits some
attention. One of Hitler’s first concerns,
following the fateful decision to gamble
everything on a single stroke in the west,
was to assure himself that the Rhine
bridges would be secure and that the
Reichsbahn could bear the weight he
intended to impose upon it. Sometime
during September-an exact date is
lacking-the OKH Chief of Trans-
portation, General der Infanterie
Rudolf Gercke, was admitted to the
tiny circle of those entrusted with
the Ardennes plans. His initial task was
to deal with the Rhine River crossing
sites; this was the priority through Sep-
tember and October. First the pillars
and piers supporting the Rhine bridges
were reinforced so that a lucky hit could
not send an entire bridge into the Rhine
waters. Next, a number of ferries were
modified to carry trains and a few high-
way bridges were strengthened for
tracklaying in the event that the regular
railroad bridges failed. Special heavy
spans of military bridging were floated
into waiting positions along the banks.
(At one time plans were made to ex-
pand two mining tunnels which ran
under the Rhine so that troops could be
marched from one side to the other.)
Ruhr industry contributed large stocks
of steel girders and plates; these stocks
were then distributed for quick repair
jobs at the main rail bridges. Early in
October reinforcement was introduced
on a number of bridges to permit the
passage of trains carrying the 70-ton
King Tiger tanks. By early December
eight railway bridges were ready imme-
diately behind the assembly area, plus
an equal number of highway bridges
and twelve Rhine ferries capable of
handling locomotives. An additional
four rail bridges, lower down on the
Rhine, were scheduled for use if needed.

PREPARATIONS 67
The Allied decision to forgo any inten-
sive attacks against the Rhine crossings
gave this segment of the German rail
system relative immunity during the
build-up. The actual trackage and the
freight yards, particularly those west of
the Rhine, had no such immunity and
would come under increasing attack in
late November just when the concentra-
tion was swinging into full stride. Almost
completely bereft of any friendly air
cover, how did the Germans keep their
rail transport functioning? Recall that
the Wehrmacht had been forced to per-
fect the art of camouflage, that the tra-
ditionally severe German discipline
functioned nowhere better than in the
rigorous control of troop movement, and
that the Reichsbahn was an integral
member of the body military.
The first measure adopted to protect
military trains from Allied observation
and attack aimed at the utmost use of
darkness and bad flying weather. All
rail movement west of the line Bremen-
Kassel-Ulm, a distance of 150–200 miles
from the fighting front, was confined to
those times when air reconnaissance
would be stymied. A few exceptions,
for purposes of deception, were per-
mitted in the Aachen area. Control was
decentralized and even the smaller rail
stations were tied in to the main Ger-
man weather service so as to wring the
most mileage out of any local change in
the weather. Supply trains were organ-
ized east of the Rhine and there allo-
cated a particular line and army. Every
effort was made to load down the branch
lines, particularly when it became ap-
parent that the Allies tended to con-
centrate on the main lines.
Train movement was very carefully
controlled. The thick forests of the Eifel,
plus an unusual number of rail tunnels
near the chief supply dumps, gave con-
siderable chance of concealment. Wher-
ever possible the run was made to the
unloading point and back to the west
bank of the Rhine in one night. On
double-tracked lines the movement was
restricted to one-way traffic, then re-
versed. A host of small stations were
given extra siding so that trains could be
stationed serially all along the line and
unloaded simultaneously. This system
also permitted quick distribution to the
many small, concealed dumps. Earlier
it had been discovered that engine crews
often were killed by Allied strafing
while the locomotive remained intact.
Special light armor plate therefore was
introduced on all cabs. Also, it had been
noticed that fighter-bomber pilots
tended to work on a train at relatively
high altitudes when subjected to anti-
aircraft fire. All trains, then, would
carry a section of light flak. So success-
ful were these measures that a number
of divisions actually detrained at rail-
heads only eight to twenty miles behind
the front.
There were four main double-track
lines running into the Eifel. From 4
September to io December all were
under the control of the Seventh Army,
but on 10 December the two panzer
armies moved in to take command of
their own sectors. In the north, two
lines, Cologne-Duren and Bonn-Euskir-
chen, handled the bulk of Sixth Panzer
Army traffic. The Ahr River line, fed
mainly by the Remagen bridge, sup-
ported the Fifth Panzer Army. The
Moselle line, following the old Napole-
onic “cannon road,” handled the Sev-
enth Army trains plus some traffic for
the Fifth. Although less rich in rail than

68 THE ARDENNES: BATTLE OF THE BULGE
areas to the north and south, the Eifel
possessed a substantial, crisscross net of
feeder lines. There was one main lateral
line quite close to the front, that via
Euskirchen-Kall-Ehrang-Trier. Until 16
December the main troop detraining
points were Schleiden, Stadtkyll, Prum,
Niederweiss, the west station at Trier,
and Konz. In addition there were four
chief areas for unloading supplies:
Rheinbach, Mechernich, Muesch (near
Ahrdorf) , and Kall.
The amount of ammunition and POL
required to support the attack imposed
a severe load not only upon the dwin-
dling German war economy but on the
Eifel rail system as well. Hitler had
allocated one hundred trains of ammuni-
tion to nourish the counteroffensive, this
coming from the special Fuehrer Re-
serve. Over and above this special re-
serve, Generalmajor Alfred Toppe, the
O berquartermeister, figured on scraping
together four units of what in German
practice was considered a basic load. Of
these units, one was allocated for the
artillery barrage preparatory to the
attack, one half would be used in break-
ing through the enemy main line of
resistance, and one and a half would be
fired to keep the offensive rolling. Toppe
had planned to have two basic loads of
ammunition in the hands of troops when
the attack commenced and did deliver
the loads as scheduled. However, he had
not counted on the Allied attacks, fur-
nishing only enough extra ammunition
for the normal day-to-day battle in the
west. By the second week of December
the two basic loads had been whittled
down to one and a half. Even so, on the
last day reported–13 December–Army
Group B had 15,099 tons of ammunition
in its dumps. The heavy concentration
of antiaircraft artillery scheduled to sup-
port the attack was better off than the
ground gunners: the III Flak Corps, with
66 heavy and 74 medium and light
batteries, had 7 basic loads of ammuni-
tion. In net, the Army Group B logisti-
cians estimated the attack would average
a daily ammunition consumption of
about 1,200 tons. Needless to say this
figure was based on a fast-moving ex-
ploitation once the breakthrough was
accomplished.
Motor fuel, a notorious logistic prob-
lem in German armies at this stage of
the war, was the greatest headache in
the Western Front headquarters, partic-
ularly in the last days before the attack.
The journals of OB WEST are jammed
during this period with messages
attempting to trace promised trainloads
of POL. By 16 December, however, the
quartermaster and rail systems had com-
bined to put the promised 4,680,000
gallons in the hands of OB WEST,
although perhaps half of this was in
dumps back at .the Rhine.
During the period 9 September–15
December the Seventh Army, or main,
concentration area received 1,502 troop
trains and approximately 500 supply
trains, most of which were earmarked
for the counteroffensive. The Eifel rail
net in this time unloaded 144,735 tons
of supplies. At some point the Eifel rail
system would be saturated; this point
was reached on 17 December when OB
WEST was forced to detrain its incom-
ing reserve divisions on the west bank
of the Rhine, a factor of some signifi-
cance in the ensuing history of the Ar-
dennes battle.
With the Allies hammering at the
Roer, pushing along the Saar, and con-
verging on the Saverne Gap, the Arden-

PREPARATIONS 69
nes target date–25 November-passed
into discard. On that day Hitler re-
viewed the situation with his household
military staff. The enemy offensive, said
he, had fulfilled the major prerequisites
for a successful German attack. The
Allies had taken heavy losses and had
been forced to deploy their reserves
close behind the attack front or feed
them into the line. Now, more than ever,
the Fuehrer was convinced of the Big
Solution’s feasibility. From somewhere
in lower echelons the idea had been
broached that the Meuse crossing sites
should be seized on the first day. This
brought hearty concurrence. Advance
battalions should try for the Meuse
bridges in the early morning (Hitler
probably referred here to the end of the
first 24-hour period). Again Hitler
stressed the need for penetrations on
narrow fronts, but once the break-
through was accomplished he foresaw
considerable maneuver as the two panzer
armies hit the Meuse. To ensure flexi-
bility in the choice of bridgeheads, he
extended the Sixth Panzer Army zone
(on the right) to include the crossings
at Huy, while the Fifth Panzer Army
southern boundary moved down to
Givet. It may be that in this same brief-
ing the Fuehrer set a new D-day. In any
case Jodl visited Rundstedt on 26 No-
vember and delivered the news that
Null Tag (D-day) would be 10 Decem-
ber. This date finally was scrapped be-
cause the fuel dumps were not full and
a number of the assault divisions were
s oute to the c oncentration zone.
on the 11th Hitler approved further
postponement until 0530 on 15 Decem-
ber, then on 12 December altered the
attack Order to read the 16th, with the
usual proviso that if good flying weather
intervened the whole operation would
stop dead in its tracks. 16
The rail movement of the initial
attack divisions had nearly ended by 11
December, although the transport of the
second phase formations, belonging to
the OKW reserve, still had a few days
to go. 17 The Seventh Army, quondam
caretaker on the Ardennes front, had
most of its divisions in the line but in
the nights just before the attack would
have to shift some of these southward
into the final assembly area designated
for the Seventh on the attack left wing.
The Fifth Panzer Army, slated to make
the attack in the center, had begun its
concentration in the Remagen-Mayen
area of the Eifel as early as 26 November,
but some of its armor was coming from
as far north as Munchen-Gladbach–one
attack division, the 116th Panzer, would
not complete detraining until 16 Decem-
ber. The Sixth Panzer Army, which in
Hitler’s mind and in OKW plans rep-
resented the main effort and whose
four SS panzer divisions were expected
to pace the entire counteroffensive, by
6 December had closed its armor in a
zone stretching from west of Cologne
to southwest of Bonn. The question
remained whether the Sixth infantry
divisions, some of which were in the
Roer battle line, could be pried loose
and moved south in time for H-hour.
The Fifteenth Army, once intended to
cover the north flank of the Sixth Panzer
16 The several postponements of the German D-
day are described in ETHINT–20, Hitler’s Conduct
of the War (Rittmeister Dr. Wilhelm
Scheidt) .
17 The timing at the end of the German concentration
is given unit by unit in Luttichau’s
German Rail Communications and in his study
entitled The Ardennes Offensive, Progressive
Build-up and Operations, 11–19 December 1944.
MS in OCMH files.

70 THE ARDENNES: BATTLE OF THE BULGE
Army advance, had its hands full on the
Roer front. Here there was no immedi-
ate assembly problem, although the
army would have to plug the gaps left
as divisions pulled out for the Ardennes.
Ultimately, however, the Fifteenth
might be reinforced from the OKW re-
serve and join the attack. If the Fif-
teenth Army is excluded the German
attack front extended for 143 kilometers
(89 miles). The main armored con-
centration, however, would take place
on a frontage of 97 kilometers (61
miles) .
The timetable for final assembly in
attack positions required three days, or
better, three nights, since nearly all
movement would be confined to hours
of darkness. To prevent premature dis-
closure by some unit wandering into
the assembly area, all formations except
those already deployed on the original
Seventh Army front or immediately
behind it were banned from crossing
the Army Group B base line, twelve
miles behind the front, until the final
assembly was ordered by Hitler. Once
across the base line every movement had
to follow rigid timing. For further con-
trol the infantry and armored divisions
were each assigned two sectors for as-
sembly. Infantry Area I was marked by
a restraining line six miles from the
front; Area 11 extended forward to
points about two and a half to three
miles from the front. Armor Area I
actually was east of the base line which
served as the forward restraining line;
Area 11 was defined by a line six to ten
miles from the front. The armored
divisions, of course, would be strung out
over greater distances than given here
but their assault echelons would be
fitted inside the two armored areas.
Timing was defined by coded days
from the alphabet. Since O-Tag or D-
day was in fact 16 December the calen-
dar dates can be given for what in the
plan was merely an undated sequence
of events. On K-Tag (12 December)
troops were alerted for movement. As
yet they had no knowledge of the offen-
sive; they would receive this information
the night before the attack jumped off.
By L-Tag (13 December) all units were
supposed to have their forward detach-
ments up to the base line; most of them
did. During the night of 13 December
the clockwork march to the final attack
positions began. Those infantry divi-
sions not already in place moved to the
forward restraining line of their Area I.
This also was the night for the guns and
howitzers belonging to army and VAK
batteries to move. Using horses from
the neighboring infantry artillery regi-
ments, and liberally employing straw to
muffle the wheels (just as had been done
in 1918), the batteries were dragged
into positions about five miles to the
rear of the ultimate firing emplacements.
The rocket projectors, easier to camou-
flage, were hidden immediately behind
their firing positions.
On the night of the 14th the infantry
divisions not already in place marched
quietly into Area II. Motorized artillery
went to assigned firing positions while
low-flying German planes zoomed nois-
ily over the American listening posts,
or it was dragged forward by horses. The
rocket projector crews dug their pieces
into the pits from which the prepara-
tion for the attack would be fired. The
tracked elements of the panzer division
assault groups churned into Armor Area
II over roads which only two days earlier
had been iced completely and along

PREPARATIONS 71
which treacherous stretches remained.
Wheeled units moved up to the Area I
restraining line. This armored move-
ment in the dark of night was difficult
indeed, but to avoid entanglement each
panzer division had been given a road
of its own and in no cases did the dis-
tance traveled during the two nights
total more than fifty miles; for most it
was less. On the night of 15 December
all formations marched to the line of
departure or to forward combat posi-
tions. It would appear that nearly all
units were in place an hour or two be-
fore H-hour, 0530 on the morning of
16 December.
Although the troops knew nothing of
their mission until the night of the 15th,
save what they could surmise, the com-
manders had been given the picture in
time to do some individual planning.
By the end of the first week in Decem-
ber all corps and division commanders
knew what was expected of them. Most
of the division staffs seem to have been
briefed on 10 December. Hitler re-
ceived the commanders entrusted with
the attack in two groups on the nights
of 11 and 12 December. Most of the
visitors seem to have been more im-
pressed by the Fuehrer’s obvious phys-
ical deterioration and the grim mien of
the SS guards than by Hitler’s rambling
recital of his deeds for Germany which
constituted this last “briefing.” 18
The forces assembled. for the counter-
offensive were the product of an almost
psychotic drive by Hitler to put every
last man, gun, and tank that could be
stripped from some part of the declining
German war establishment into the
attack. Thirteen infantry and seven
18 For the Hitler speeches of 11 and 12 December
1944 see Gilbert, Hitler Directs His War, p. 157.
armored divisions were ready for the
initial assault. Five divisions from the
OKW reserve were on alert or actually
en route to form the second wave, plus
one armored and one mechanized brigade
at reinforced strength. Approximately
five additional divisions were
listed in the OKW reserve, but their
availability was highly dubious. Some
1,900 artillery pieces-including rocket
projectors-were ready to support the
attack. 19 The seven armored divisions in
the initial echelon had about 970 tanks
and armored assault guns. The armored
and mechanized elements of the immediate
OKW reserve had another 450 to
swell the armored attack. 20 If and when
the Fifteenth Army joined in, the total
force could be counted as twenty-nine
infantry and twelve armored divisions.
These divisions and heavy weapons
might or might not suffice for the task
at hand, but the total represented the
best that the Wehrmacht could do. Of
the armored complement on the Western
Front–2,567 tanks and assault guns
–Army Group B and OKW reserve had
been given 2,168. About a third of this
latter total would have to be left for
the time being with the Fifteenth Army
to shore up the right-wing defenses in
the Roer sector. Some four hundred
19 On the German artillery preparations see
MSS # B–311, Group B Artillery, Ardennes
(General der Artillerie Karl Thoholte); B–347,
Sixth SS Panzer Army Artillery (Generalleutnant
Waffen-SS Walter Staudinger); B–759, Sixth Panzer
Army, 15 December 1944–21 January 1945
(Staudinger) .
20 The very difficult task of evaluating and
reconciling the various tank strengths given in
individual (and fragmentary) German documents
has been ably done in Charles V. P. von Luttichau’s
manuscript, Armor in the Ardennes Offensive
(1952). MH. Cf., MS # P–059 (Mueller-Hillebrand)
and the OB WEST KTB for 16 December
1944

72
tanks and assault guns were all that
remained to German divisions on the
rest of the long Western Front. The
hard-pressed armies on the Eastern
Front likewise had been denied the
armored materiel to replace their heavy
autumn losses. At the beginning of December
the Eastern Front total in operational
tanks and assault guns was roughly
1,500. 21 Despite Hitler’s personal
emphasis on the power of the artillery
arm and the very substantial number of
tubes allocated for the offensive, the
greatest portion of OB WEST artillery
had to be left for corsetting where armor
and infantry had been pulled out, and,
because of the scarcity of prime movers,
a large number of batteries scheduled
for the attack never got forward at all.
The artillery flak and rocket projector
support for the entire Western Front
actually numbered 7,822 pieces on 16
December.
As proof that the Western Front’s
armored strength in December 1944
equaled that of the halcyon days at the
beginning of the war, Hitler’s personal
staff compiled a special report which
showed that 2,594 tanks had taken part
in the victorious 1940 campaign in the
west. Nobody, it would appear, cared to
look at comparative figures of air
strengths in previous campaigns. In the
Polish campaign some 50 German divisions
had been given direct support by
1,800 first-line aircraft. The Balkan
campaign had seen 1,000 aircraft supporting
17 divisions. The victorious advance
into the Soviet Union had brought
123 divisions into the line, with 2,500
first-line attack planes in the air. 22 Now,
21 See Luttichau’s Armor in the Ardennes Of-
fensive, Table II.
22 These figures have been gleaned from various
THE ARDENNES: BATTLE OF THE BULGE
for the 25 divisions certain to be com-
mitted in the Ardennes, Goering could
promise only a thousand planes. By this
time Hitler was chary of Luftwaffe prom-
ises and watered down this figure to 800-
goo planes when he presented it to OB
WEST. Hitler’s estimate would be met
-but only for one day and that when
the ground battle already had been
decided.
In December 1944, Germany was
fighting a “poor man’s war” on the
ground as in the air. 23 This must be
remembered when assessing the actual
military potential of the divisions ar-
rayed for the western offensive. Motor
transport was in sorry shape; the best-
equipped divisions had about 80 percent
of their vehicular tables of equipment,
but many had only half the amount spec-
ified in the tables. One of the best mech-
anized divisions had sixty different types
of automotive transport. Spare parts, a
necessity in rough terrain and poor
weather, hardly existed. There was only
a handful of prime movers and heavy
tank retrievers. Signal equipment was
antiquated, worn-out, and sparse; the
same held for engineer tools and ve-
hicles. Antitank guns were scarce, the
heavy losses in this weapon sustained in
the summer and autumn disasters having
never been made good. The German
infantryman would have to defend him-
self against the enemy tank with bravery
and the bazooka, or so the field service
regulations read.
German military poverty was nowhere
more apparent than in the stocks of
ammunition and POL which had been
secondary sources and are estimates only. Joint
Intelligence Survey, Some Weaknesses in German
Strategy and Organization (1946).
23 MS # P–031b.

PREPARATIONS 73
laboriously amassed to support the
attack. The Sixth Panzer Army artillery
commander, for example, had pleaded
for twelve to fifteen units of artillery
ammunition for the first ten days of
operations. 24 On 16 December there were
only one and a half units with the Army
Group B guns and only two additional
units in prospect. Although OB WEST
appears to have estimated a daily POL
consumption of 260,000 gallons per day
for the Ardennes force, a number of the
higher German quartermasters predicted
that Army Group B would burn
four times that amount on each day of
the operation. 25 The armored divisions
had in their vehicles and trains enough
fuel for perhaps go to 100 miles of normal
cruising, but battle in the Ardennes
could hardly be considered normal travel.
Though it is a commonplace that
commanders and supply officers at the
tactical level always want more shells
and gasoline than they probably can use,
there is no question but that the Ardennes
counteroffensive began on a logistical
shoestring.
On 15 December the intelligence
staff at Rundstedt’s headquarters took
one last look at the opposite side of the
In the days just previous there
seems to have been a growing uneasiness
that the Allies had recognized the impending
attack and begun redeployment
to meet it. Probably this was no more
than a nervous reaction to the continued
24 The general problem of artillery and ammu-
nition is discussed by General Thoholte, the artil-
lery representative of Army Group B, in MS #B–311
(Thoholte).
25 A contemporary memorandum on the supply
and POL status written by a Colonel Poleck is
found in Schramm’s Merkbuch under the date of
3 January 1945
26 The Germar Intelligence Estimate for 15 Dec-
ember 1944 is given in OB WEST KTB.
postponement of D-day, for on the 15th
the picture was rosy. The U.S. 4th, 28th,
106th, and 99th Infantry Divisions and
their respective boundaries remained un-
altered. The enemy “lack of interest”
in this sector was “underlined” by the
paucity of aerial reconnaissance. The
only new American division to arrive on
the Western Front, the 75th, had been
identified the day before in the Roer
sector. For several days it had been
recognized that the U.S. 12th Army
Group lacked “large operational re-
serves.’’ Agents working in France had
reported on 7 December that the 82d
and 101st Airborne Divisions were as-
sembled at Mourmelon preparing for
another airborne operation. These two
divisions appeared to be the only U.S.
forces uncommitted. The “rubber duck”
operation on the VIII Corps front in
which Special Troops from the 12th
Army Group simulated an additional
division had been reflected for some days
on German situation maps by a question
mark. On the 15th, however, OB WEST
was satisfied that no new division existed
and the question mark disappeared.
The 4th and 28th Infantry Divisions
were known to be exhausted and it was
doubted that they were up to strength.
There appeared to be relatively little
armor opposite the three assault armies,
probably no more than 370 tanks at the
maximum. Although restrictions on
patrolling had limited any recent infor-
mation on exact tactical locations, there
existed a complete file carefully built
up since September. New arrivals on the
Ardennes front had tended to occupy
the same positions as their predecessors,
and on this habit the Germans counted.
The three communications intelligence
companies operating under Army Group

74 THE ARDENNES: BATTLE OF THE BULGE
B were pleased to report that American
carelessness in the use of radio and commercial
telephone nets was up to par,
and that no reinforcements were en
route to the Ardennes. 27
Across the line intelligence staffs were
equally placid-although with less reason.
The 12th Army Group G–2 situation
map of 15 December showed no
changes. For the sector from the Moselle
to Monschau only five German divisions
appeared, with a sixth apparently withdrawing
from the Eifel. The Sixth Panzer
Army symbol still crowded the dot
on the map representing Cologne. All
panzer divisions, except the 9th SS and
the 12th SS, which bore question marks,
27 MS # P–038, German Radio Intelligence (1950).
remained in locations north of the
Eifel. 28
In the German camp there was one
last hitch. On 15 December Model asked
Rundstedt to postpone the attack, but
the latter ruled that O-Tag would be
as scheduled and so informed Fuehrer
headquarters. At 1530 an officer named
Waizenegger telephoned from OKW to
give Hitler’s confirmation of Rundstedt’s
decision; the liaison officers waiting with
Rundstedt’s staff departed for their com-
mands at once, bearing the attack orders.
And at midnight on the 15th the officer
keeping the OB WEST War Diary made
the last entry of that date: “Tomorrow
brings the beginning of a new chapter
in the Campaign In the West.”
28 This situation map may be found in Thomp-
son’s American Intelligence on the German
Counteroffensive.

CHAPTER V
The Sixth Panzer Army Attack
On the night of 15 December German
company commanders gave their men
the watchword which had come from
the Fuehrer himself: “Forward to and
over the Meuse!” The objective was
Antwerp. Hitler’s concept of the Big
Solution had prevailed; the enemy was
not to be beaten east of the Meuse but
encircled by a turning movement be-
yond that river. The main effort would
be made by Dietrich’s Sixth Panzer
Army on the north wing, with orders to
cross the Meuse on both sides of Liége,
wheel north, and strike for the Albert
Canal, fanning out the while to form a
front extending from Maastricht to
Antwerp. Meanwhile the infantry divi-
sions to the rear of the armored columns
would form the north shoulder of the
initial advance and a subsequent block-
ing position east of the Meuse along the
Vesdre River. Eventually, or so Hitler
intended, the Fifteenth Army would
advance to take a station protecting the
Sixth Panzer Army right and rear.
Manteuffel’s Fifth Panzer Army, ini-
tially acting as the center, had the mis-
sion of crossing the Meuse to the south
of the Sixth, but because the river
angled away to the southwest might be
expected to cross a few hours later than
its armored partner on the right. Once
across the Meuse, Manteuffel had the
mission of preventing an Allied counter-
attack against Dietrich’s left and rear by
holding the line An twerp-Brussels-
Namur-Dinant. The left wing of the
counteroffensive, composed of infantry
and mechanized divisions belonging to
Brandenberger’s Seventh Army, had
orders to push to the Meuse, unwinding
a cordon of infantry and artillery facing
south and southwest, thereafter anchor-
ing the southern German flank on the
angle formed by the Semois and the
Meuse. Also, the Fuehrer had expressed
the wish that the first segment of the
Seventh Army cordon be pushed as far
south as Luxembourg City if possible.
What course operations were to take
once Antwerp was captured is none too
clear. 1 Indeed no detailed plans existed
for this phase. There are numerous indi-
cations that the field commanders did
not view the Big Solution too seriously
but fixed their eyes on the seizure of the
Meuse bridgeheads rather than on the
capture of Antwerp. Probably Hitler
had good reason for the final admoni-
tion, on 15 December, that the attack was
not to begin the northward wheel until
the Meuse was crossed.
Dietrich’s Sixth Panzer Army, selected
to make the main effort, had a distinct
political complexion. Its armored divi-
sions all belonged to the Waffen SS, its
1 Jodl, while a prisoner at Nuremberg, said that
once the Antwerp line was reached the subse-
quent German operations would aim at “neutral-
izing” the Allied armies to the east.

76 THE ARDENNES: BATTLE OF THE BULGE
commander was an old party member,
and when regular Wehrmacht officers
were assigned to help in the attack prep-
arations they were transferred to the SS
rolls. Hitler’s early plans speak of the
Sixth SS Panzer Army, although on 16
December the army still did not bear
the SS appellation in any official way, and
it is clear that the Sixth was accorded
the responsibility and honor of the main
effort simply because Hitler felt he could
depend on the SS.
GENERAL DIETRICH
Josef “Sepp” Dietrich had the appro-
priate political qualifications to ensure
Hitler’s trust but, on his military record,
hardly those meriting command of the
main striking force in the great counter-
offensive. By profession a butcher,
Dietrich had learned something of the
soldier’s trade in World War I, rising to
the rank of sergeant, a rank which at-
tached to him perpetually in the minds
of the aristocratic members of the Ger-
man General Staff. He had accompanied
Hitler on the march to the Feldherrn-
halle in 1923 and by 1940 had risen to
command the Adolf Hitler Division,
raised from Hitler’s bodyguard regi-
ment, in the western campaign. After
gaining considerable reputation in
Russia, Dietrich was brought to the west
in 1944 and there commanded a corps
in the great tank battles at Caen. He
managed to hang onto his reputation
during the subsequent retreats and
finally was selected personally by Hitler
to command the Sixth Panzer Army. Un-
couth, despised by most of the higher
officer class, and with no great intelli-
gence, Dietrich had a deserved reputa-
tion for bravery and was known as a
tenacious and driving division and corps
commander. Whether he could com-
mand an army remained to be proven.
The attack front assigned the Sixth
Panzer Army, Monschau to Krewinkel,
was narrower than that of its southern
partner because terrain in this sector
was poor at the breakthrough points and
would not offer cross-country tank going
until the Hohes Venn was passed. The
initial assault wave consisted of one ar-
mored and one infantry corps. On the
south flank the I SS Panzer Corps
(Generalleutnant der Waffen-SS Her-
mann Priess) had two armored divisions,
the 1st SS Panzer and the 12th SS Pan-
zer, plus three infantry divisions, the 3d
Parachute, the 12th Volks Grenadier,
and the 277th Volks Grenadier. On the
north flank the LXVII Corps (General
der Infanterie Otto Hitzfeld) had only
two infantry divisions, the 326th and
246th Volks Grenadier, The doctrinal
question as to whether tanks or infantry
should take the lead, still moot in Ger-

THE SIXTH PANZER ARMY 77
man military thinking after all the years
of war, had been raised when Dietrich
proposed to make the initial break-
through with his two tank divisions. He
was overruled by Model, however, and
the three infantry divisions were given
the mission of punching a hole on either
side of Udenbreth. Thereafter the in-
fantry was to swing aside, moving north-
west to block the three roads which led
south from Verviers and onto the route
the armor would be taking in its dash
for Liége. Hitzfeld’s corps had a less
ambitious program: to attack on either
side of Monschau, get across the Mut-
zenich-Elsenborn road, then turn north
and west to establish a hard flank on the
line Simmerath-Eupen-Limburg. All
five of the Sixth Panzer Army infantry
divisions ultimately would wind up, or
so the plan read, forming a shoulder on
an east-west line from Rötgen (north of
Monschau) to Liége. Under this flank
cover the armored divisions of the I SS
Panzer Corps would roll west, followed
by the second armored wave, the II SS
Panzer Corps (General der Waffen-SS
Willi Bittrich) composed of the 2d and
9th SS Panzer Divisions.
Dietrich’s staff had selected five roads
to carry the westward advance, the armor
being assigned priority rights on the four
southernmost. Actually it was expected
that the 1st SS and 12th SS Panzer Divi-
sions would use only one road each.
(These two routes ran through the 99th
Infantry Division sector.) Although the
planning principle as regards the ar-
mored divisions was to hold the reins
loose and let them run as far and as fast
as they could, the Sixth Panzer did have
a timetable: one day for penetration and
breakout, one day to get the armor over
the Hohes Venn, the Meuse to be
reached by the evening of the third day,
and crossings to be secured by
the fourth. 2
This army was relatively well
equipped and trained. Most of its ar-
mor had been out of combat for some
time and the horde of replacements had
some degree of training in night move-
ment and fighting. The 1st and 2d SS
had not been loaded with Luftwaffe and
over-age replacements as had the other
divisions. The artillery complement of
the Sixth Panzer Army was very heavy,
albeit limited in mobility by the paucity
of self-propelled battalions. The four
armored divisions had about 500 tanks
and armored assault guns, including go
Tigers (Mark VI). Lacking were two
things which would markedly affect the
operations of the Sixth Panzer Army
once battle was joined. There were few
trained engineer companies and these
had little power equipment. The infan-
try lacked their full complement of as-
sault guns, a weapon on which the
German rifle platoon had learned to lean
in the assault; only the 3d Parachute was
fully armed with this critical infantry
weapon. 3
The 99th Division Sector
The southern portion of the V Corps
front was occupied by the 99th Infantry
Division (Maj. Gen. Walter E. Lauer) ,
2 MS # A–924, Operations of Sixth Panzer Army,
1944–45 (SS Generalmajor Fritz Kraemer).
Kraemer was chief of staff of Sixth Panzer Army.
3 MSS # B–311 (Thoholte) and P–109a, Ardennes
Follow Up–3d SS Panzer Grenadier Regiment
(Oberstleutant Waffen-SS Guenther Wisliceny) ; see
also ETHINT–21, Sixth Panzer Army in the Ar-
dennes Offensive (Generalmajor (Waffen-SS) Fritz
Kraemer) and ETHINT–61, Tank Maintenance,
Ardennes (General der Panzertruppen Horst
Stumpff).

78 THE ARDENNES: BATTLE OF THE BULGE
which had arrived on the Continent in
November 1944 and been placed in this
defensive sector to acquire experience?
The 99th Division front (left to right)
extended from Monschau and Hofen to
the railroad just north of Lanzerath, a
distance of about nineteen miles. To the
east lay the Germans in the West Wall
pillbox line. The frontage assigned an
untried division at first thought seems
excessive, but the V Corps commander
wished to free as much of his striking
power as possible for use in the sched-
uled attack to seize the Roer dams;
furthermore the nature of the terrain
appeared little likely to attract a major
German attack. (Map II)
In the extreme northern portion of
the sector, around Hofen, the ground
was studded with open hills, to the east
of which lay a section of the Monschau
Forest. Only a short distance to the
south of Hofen the lines of the 99th
entered this forest, continuing to run
through a long timber belt until the
boundary between the V and VIII Corps
was reached at the Losheim Gap. The
4 The records of the 99th Division, for the
battle described in this chapter, are quite com-
plete and detailed. Basic documents are: 99th
Div AAR and C–3 Jnl; AAR’s and Unit Jnls of
the 393d. 394th. and 395th Inf Regis; 741st Tank
Bn AAR; AAR’s of 639th and 413th AAA Bns;
254th Engr Combat Bn AAR and Jnl; 801st
Tank Destroyer Bn AAR; 371st FA Bn AAR;
and 799th Ord Co AAR. This operation was the
subject of studies by participants while in Classes
Nos. 1 and 2, Advanced Infantry Officers Course,
Fort Benning, Ga. (see especially those by Majors
Ben W. Legare, J. B. Kemp, and T. J. Gendron
and Capt. Wesley J. Simmons). The then com-
mander of the 99th Division has written the official
division history; see Major General Walter E.
Lauer, Battle Babies: The Story of the 99th In-
fantry Division in World War II (Baton Rouge:
Military Press of Louisiana, Inc., 1951) . American
combat interviews are another useful source.
thick woods in the sector were tangled
with rocky gorges, little streams, and
sharp hills. The division supply lines
began as fairly substantial all-weather
roads, then dwindled, as they ap-
proached the forward positions, to
muddy ruts following the firebreaks and
logging trails. Except for the open area
in the neighborhood of Hofen, visibility
was limited and fields of fire restricted.
Any clearing operation in the deep
woods would only give away the Ameri-
can positions. Although terrain seemed
equally difficult for defense or offense,
this balance would exist only so long as
the defender could retain control over
his units in the woods and provide some
sort of cordon to check infiltration. The
nature of the ground and the length of
the front made such a cordon impossible;
the 99th could maintain no more than a
series of strongpoints, with unoccupied
and undefended gaps between.
Three roads were of primary impor-
tance in and east of the division area.
In the north a main paved road led from
Hofen through the Monschau Forest,
then divided as it emerged on the east-
ern edge (this fork beyond the forest
would have some tactical importance) . A
second road ran laterally behind the
division center and right wing, leaving
the Hofen road at the tiny village of
Wahlerscheid, continuing south through
the twin hamlets of Rocherath and Krin-
kelt, then intersecting a main east-west
road at Bullingen. This paved highway
entered the division zone from the east
at Losheimergraben and ran west to
Malmedy by way of Bullingen and But-
genbach. As a result, despite the poverty
of roads inside the forest belt where the
forward positions of the 99th Division
lay, the division sector could be entered

THE SIXTH PANZER ARMY 79
from the east along roads tapping either
flank.
From 8 December on the 99th Divi-
sion had been preparing for its first
commitment in a large-scale operation,
repairing roads; laying additional tele-
phone wire, and shifting its guns for the
V Corps attack toward the Roer dams.
In addition a new supply road was con-
structed from the Krinkelt area to the
sector held by the 395th Infantry. The
2d Infantry Division was to pass through
the 99th, then the latter would attack to
cover the southern flank of the 2d Divi-
sion advance. As scheduled, the 2d Divi-
sion passed through the 99th Division on
13 December, beginning its attack on a
narrow front toward Dreiborn, located
SNOW SCENE NEAR KRINKELT
on the northern fork of the Hofen road
beyond the Monschau Forest.
The dispositions of the 99th Division
were these: On the north flank-the 3d
Battalion, 395th Infantry, occupied the
Höfen area, with the 38th Cavalry
Squadron on the left and the 99th
Reconnaissance Troop on the right. The
ground here was open and rolling, the
3d Battalion well dug in and possessed
of good fields of fire. Next in line to the
south, the 2d Division was making its
attack on a thrust line running north-
eastward, its supply route following the
section of the Hofen road which ran
through the forest to the fork. The re-
maining two battalions of the 395th re-
sumed the 99th Division front, succeeded

80 THE ARDENNES: BATTLE OF THE BULGE
to the south, in turn, by the 393d Infan-
try and the 394th. Conforming to the
wooded contour, the elements of the 99th
Division south of the 2d Division attack-
ing column occupied a slight salient
bellying out from the flanks.
Two battalions of the 99th Division
(the 1st and 2d of the 395th) took part
in the attack begun on 13 December,
although other elements of the division
put on demonstrations to create some
diversion to their immediate front. The
2d Battalion, 395th, on the right of the
2d Division jumped off in deep snow and
bitter cold in an attack intended to swing
north, wedge through the West Wall
bunker line, and seize Harperscheid on
the southern fork of the road beyond the
forest. The advance on the 13th went
well; then, as the attack hit the German
bunkers and enemy guns and mortars
ranged in, the pace began to slow. By
16 December, however, several impor-
tant positions were in American hands
and it seemed that a breakthrough was
in the making despite bad weather, poor
visibility, and difficult terrain.
The German troops manning the
West Wall positions in front of the 2d
and 99th Divisions had been identified
prior to the 13 December attack as
coming from the 277th Volks Grenadier
Division and the 294th Regiment of the
18th Volks Grenadier Division. An addi-
tional unit was identified on the second
day of the offensive when prisoners were
taken who carried the pay books of the
326th Volks Grenadier Division. Al-
though this was the only indication of
any German reinforcement, American
commanders and intelligence officers
anticipated that a counterattack shortly
would be made against the shoulders of
the 2d Division corridor held by the
99th, but that this would be limited in
nature and probably no more than regi-
mental in strength. The immediate and
natural reaction, therefore, to the Ger-
man attack launched against the 99th
Division on the morning of the fourth
day of the V Corps offensive (16 Decem-
ber) was that this was no more than the
anticipated riposte.
The Initial Attack, 16 December
To the south of the 393d Infantry, the
394th (Col. Don Riley) held a defensive
sector marking the right flank terminus
for both the 99th Division and V Corps.
The 6,500-yard front ran along the In-
ternational Highway from a point west
of Neuhof, in enemy hands, south to
Losheimergraben. Nearly the entire line
lay inside the forest belt. On the right a
two-mile gap existed between the regi-
ment and the forward locations of the
14th Cavalry Group. To patrol this gap
the regimental I and R Platoon held an
outpost on the high ground slightly
northwest of Lanzerath and overlooking
the road from that village. Thence
hourly jeep patrols worked across the gap
to meet patrols dispatched by the cavalry
on the other side of the corps boundary.
Acutely aware of the sensitive nature of
this southern flank, General Lauer had
stationed his division reserve (3d Bat-
talion of the 394th) near the Ruchholz
railroad station in echelon behind the
right of the two battalions in the line.
The fateful position of the 394th
would bring against it the main effort of
the I SS Panzer Corps and, indeed, that
of the Sixth Panzer Army. Two roads ran
obliquely through the regimental area.
One, a main road, intersected the north-
south International Highway (and the

THE SIXTH PANZER ARMY 81
forward line held by the 394th) at
Losheimergraben and continued north-
westward through Bullingen and But-
genbach to Malmédy. The other, a
secondary road but generally passable in
winter, branched from the International
Highway north of Lanzerath, and curved
west through Buchholz, Honsfeld, Schop-
pen, and Faymonville, roughly parallel-
ing the main road to the north.
Of the five westward roads assigned
the I SS Panzer Corps the two above were
most important. The main road to Bul-
lingen and Malmedy would be called
“C” on the German maps; the secondary
road would be named “D.” These two
roads had been selected as routes for the
main armored columns, first for the
panzer elements of the I SS Panzer
Corps, then to carry the tank groups of
the II SS Panzer Corps composing the
second wave of the Sixth Panzer Army’s
attack. But since the commitment of ar-
mored spearheads during the battle to
break through the American main line
of resistance had been ruled out, the
initial German attempt to effect a pene-
tration would turn on the efforts of the
three infantry divisions loaned the I
SS Panzer Corps for this purpose only.
The 277th Volks Grenadier Division,
aligned opposite the American 393d In-
fantry, had a mission which would turn
its attack north of the axis selected for
the armored advance. Nonetheless, suc-
cess or failure by the 277th would deter-
mine the extent to which the tank routes
might be menaced by American inter-
vention from the north. The twin towns,
Rocherath-Krinkelt, for example, com-
manded the road which cut across–and
thus could be used to block–the
Bullingen road, route C.
The two infantry divisions composing
the I SS Panzer Corps center and south
wing were directly charged with open-
ing the chief armored routes. The 12th
Volks Grenadier Division, regarded by
the Sixth Army staff as the best of the
infantry divisions, had as its axis of at-
tack the Bullingen road (route C) ; its
immediate objective was the crossroads
point of departure for the westward
highway at Losheimergraben and the
opening beyond the thick Gerolstein
Forest section of the woods belt. The ul-
timate objective for the 12th Division
attack was the attainment of a line at
Nidrum and Weywertz, eight airline
miles beyond the American front, at
which point the division was to face
north as part of the infantry cordon cov-
ering the Sixth Panzer Army flank. The
3d Parachute Division, forming the left
wing in the initial disposition for the at-
tack, had a zone of advance roughly fol-
lowing the southern shoulder of the
Honsfeld or D route. The area selected
for the breakthrough attempt comprised
the north half of the U.S. 14th Cavalry
Group sector and took in most of the gap
between the cavalry and the 99th Divi-
sion. In the first hours of the advance,
then, the 3d Parachute Division would
be striking against the 14th Cavalry
Group in the Krewinkel-Berterath area.
But the final objective of the 3d Para-
chute attack was ten miles to the north-
west, the line Schoppen-Eibertingen on
route D. The 3d Parachute axis thus
extended through the right of the 99th
Division.
The decision as to exactly when the
two panzer divisions would be com-
mitted in exploitation of the penetra-
tions achieved by the infantry was a
matter to be decided by the commanders
of the Sixth Panzer Army and Army

82 THE ARDENNES: BATTLE OF THE BULGE
Group B as the attack developed. Ar-
mored infantry kampfgruppen from the
12th SS Panzer Division and 1st SS
Panzer Division were assembled close be-
hind the infantry divisions, in part as
reinforcements for the breakthrough
forces, in part because none of the Volks
Grenadier units were used to close co-
operation with armor.
Considerable reshuffling had been
needed in the nights prior to 16 Decem-
ber to bring the I SS Panzer Corps
toward its line of departure and to feed
the infantry into the West Wall positions
formerly occupied by the 277th Division.
All this was completed by 0400 on the
morning set for the attack (except for
the reconnaissance battalion which failed
to arrive in the 3d Parachute Division
lines), and the bulk of the two artillery
corps and two Volks Werfer brigades
furnishing the artillery reinforcement
was in position. None of the three army
assault gun battalions, one for each at-
tacking division, had yet appeared. The
German artillery, from the 75-mm. in-
fantry accompanying howitzers up to the
210-mm. heavy battalions, were deployed
in three groupments, by weight and
range, charged respectively with direct
support of the attacking infantry, coun-
terbattery, and long-distance fire for
destruction.
The first thunderclap of the massed
German guns and Werfers at 0530 on 16
December was heard by outposts of the
394th Infantry as “outgoing mail,” fire
from friendly guns, but in a matter of
minutes the entire regimental area was
aware that something most unusual had
occurred. Intelligence reports had lo-
cated only two horse-drawn artillery
pieces opposite one of the American line
battalions; after a bombardment of an
hour and five minutes the battalion
executive officer reported, “They sure
worked those horses to death.” But until
the German infantry were actually
sighted moving through the trees, the
American reaction to the searchlights
and exploding shells was that the enemy
simply was feinting in answer to the 2d
and 99th attack up north. In common
with the rest of the 99th the line troops
of the 394th had profited by the earlier
quiet on this front to improve their posi-
tions by log roofing; so casualties during
the early morning barrage were few.
The German infantry delayed in fol-
lowing up the artillery preparation,
which ended about 0700. On this part of
the forest front the enemy line of de-
parture was inside the woods. The prob-
lem, then, was to get the attack rolling
through the undergrowth, American
barbed wire, and mine fields immedi-
ately to the German front. The groping
nature of the attack was enhanced by
the heavy mist hanging low in the forest.
The 2d Battalion, on the north flank,
was more directly exposed since a road
led into the woods position from Neuhof.
At this point, close to the regimental
boundary, the battle was carried by a
fusilier company attached to the 990th
Regiment of the 277th Volks Grenadier
Division. The fusiliers succeeded in
reaching the 2d Battalion lines about
0800 but were driven off by small arms
fire and artillery.
In midafternoon the 12th SS Panzer
Division, waiting for the infantry to
open the road to the International High-
way, apparently loaned a few tanks to
carry the fusiliers into the attack. 5 Be-
5 The action. in this sector has been covered
by General Priess in MS # A–877, Commitment
of the I SS Panzer Corps During the Ardennes

THE SIXTH PANZER ARMY 83
hind a smoke screen the tanks rolled out
of Neuhof. An American sergeant
spotted this move and with a sound-
powered telephone brought friendly ar-
tillery into play. High explosive stopped
the tanks in their tracks. A few infantry-
men got through to the forest positions
occupied by the 2d Battalion. There an
unknown BAR man atop a log hut
“raised hell with the Krauts” and the at-
tack petered out. The 2d Battalion, dur-
ing this day, never was really pressed. The
chief enemy thrusts had gone to the
north, where the right flank of the 393d
Infantry was hit hard by the 277th Divi-
sion, and to the south, against the center
and refused right flank of the 394th. No
word of events elsewhere on the 394th
front reached the 2d Battalion command
post, but the appearance of German in-
fantry in the woods along the northern
regimental boundary gave a clue to the
penetration developing there, and the
left company of the 2d Battalion was
pulled back somewhat as flank protec-
tion,
The initial enemy action along the
394th Infantry center and south flank
was intended to punch holes through
which the panzer columns might de-
bouch onto the Bullingen and Honsfeld
roads. The prominent terrain feature,
in the first hours of the fight, was a
Offensive, 16 December 1944–25 January 1945
(General der Waffen–SS Hermann Priess. Cf. MS
# P–109d, Ardennes Follow Up (Oberst der
Schutzpolizei F. W. Bock), and MS # B–577, I
SS Panzer Corps, 15 October–16 December 1944
(Oberst der Waffen-SS Rudolf Lehman). These
are fragments extant of III / SSPz Gr Regt 25, KTB
Nr. 2. For the story of the 277th Volks Grenadier
Division, see MS # B–273, 277th Volks Grenadier
Division, November 1944–January 1945 (General-
major Wilhelm Viebig), and MS # B–465, 3d
Panzer Grenadier Division, 16–28 December 1944
(Generalmajor Walter Denkert) .
branch railroad line which crossed the
frontier just north of Losheim and then
twined back and forth, over and under
the Bullingen-Malmédy highway west-
ward. During the autumn retreat the
Germans themselves had destroyed the
bridge which carried the Bullingen road
over the railroad tracks north of Los-
heim. To the west the highway overpass
on the Lanzerath-Losheimergraben sec.
tion of the International Highway had
also been demolished. The crossroads
at Losheimergraben would have to be
taken if the German tanks were to have
quick and easy access to the Bullingen
road, but the approach to Losheimer-
graben, whether from Losheim or Lan-
zerath, was denied to all but infantry
until such time as the railroad track
could be captured and the highway over-
passes restored.
The line of track also indicated the
axis for the advance of the left wing of
the 12th Volks Grenadier Division and,
across the lines, marked a general bound-
ary between the 1st and 3d Battalions of
the 394th Infantry. When the barrage
lifted, about 0700, the assault regiments
of the 12th Division already were mov-
ing toward the American positions. The
48th Grenadier Regiment, in the north,
headed through the woods for the
Losheimergraben crossroads. Fallen
trees, barbed wire, and mines,
compounded with an almost complete
ignorance of the forest trails, slowed
this advance. The attack on the left,
by the 27th Fuesilier Regiment, had
easier going, with much open country
and a series of draws leading directly
to the track and the American positions.
The 3d Battalion (Maj. Norman A.
Moore), to the south and west of the 1st
Battalion position at Losheimergraben,

84 THE ARDENNES: BATTLE OF THE BULGE
first encountered the enemy. About 0745
L Company, at the Buchholz station, had
taken advantage of the lull in the shell-
ing and was just lining up for breakfast
when figures were seen approaching
through the fog, marching along the
track in a column of two’s. First thought
to be friendly troops, the Germans were
almost at the station before recognition
brought on a fusilade of American bul-
lets. The enemy scattered for the box-
cars outside the station or sought shelter
in ditches along the right of way and a
close-quarters fire fight began. A 3-inch
tank destroyer systematically worked
over the cars, while the American mor-
tar crews raked the area beside the track.
LOSHEIMERGRABEN
A few Germans reached the roundhouse
near the station, but Sgt. Savino Trava-
lini, leader of the antitank platoon, went
forward with a bazooka, fired in enough
rounds to flush the fusiliers, then cut
them down with his rifle as they broke
into the open. (Sergeant Travalini was
awarded a battlefield commission as sec-
ond lieutenant.) K Company, ordered up
to reinforce the outnumbered defenders
at the station, arrived in time to take a
hand in the affray. By noon the Germans
had been repelled, leaving behind about
seventy-five dead; L Company had suf-
fered twenty-five or thirty casualties.
As a result of the stubborn stand at
the station, some of the assault platoons

THE SIXTH PANZER ARMY 85
of the 27th Fuesilier Regiment circled
back to the northeast and onto the left
of the 1st Battalion (Lt. Col. Robert H.
Douglas). Here one of the battalion
antitank guns stopped the lead German
tank and the supporting fusiliers were
driven back by 81-mm. mortar fire thick-
ened by an artillery barrage. The major
threat in the Losheimergraben sector
came shortly after noon when the 48th
Grenadier Regiment finally completed
its tortuous approach through the woods,
mines, and wire, and struck between B
and C Companies. B Company lost some
sixty men and was forced back about 400
yards; then, with the help of the attached
heavy machine gun platoon, it stiffened
and held. During the fight Sgt. Eddie
Dolenc moved his machine gun forward
to a shell hole which gave a better field of
fire. When last seen Sergeant Dolenc still
was firing, a heap of gray-coated bodies
lying in front of the shell hole. 6 The C
Company outposts were driven in, but
two platoons held their original positions
throughout the day. Company A beat off
the German infantry assault when this
struck its forward platoon; then the
battalion mortar platoon, raising its
tubes to an 89-degree angle, rained shells
on the assault group, leaving some eighty
grenadiers dead or wounded.
The early morning attack against the
right flank of the 394th had given alarm-
ing indication that the very tenuous con-
nection with the 14th Cavalry Group
had been severed and that the southern
flank of the 99th Division was exposed
to some depth. The only connecting link,
the 30-man I and R Platoon of the 394th,
northwest of Lanzerath, had lost physical
contact early in the day both with the
6 Sergeant Dolenc was listed as MIA; he was
awarded the DSC.
cavalry and with its own regiment. Radio
communication with the isolated platoon
continued for some time, and at 1140
word was relayed to the 99th Division
command post that the cavalry was pull-
ing out of Lanzerath–confirmation, if
such were needed, of the German break-
through on the right of the 99th.
Belatedly, the 106th Infantry Division
reported at 1315 that it could no longer
maintain contact at the interdivision
boundary. Less than an hour later the
radio connection with the I and R Pla-
toon failed. By this time observers had
seen strong German forces pouring west
through the Lanzerath area. (These
were from the 3d Parachute Division.)
General Lauer’s plans for using the 3d
Battalion, 394th Infantry, as a counter-
attack force were no longer feasible. The
3d Battalion, itself under attack, could
not be committed elsewhere as a unit and
reverted to its parent regiment. Not long
after the final report from the I and R
Platoon, the 3d Battalion was faced to
the southwest in positions along the
railroad.
A check made after dark showed a dis-
couraging situation in the 394th sector.
It was true that the 2d Battalion, in the
north, had not been much affected by
the day's events-but German troops
were moving deeper on the left and right
of the battalion. In the Losheimergraben
area the 1st Battalion had re-formed in
a thin and precarious line; the crossroads
still were denied the enemy. But B
Company had only twenty men available
for combat, while the enemy settled
down in the deserted American foxholes
only a matter of yards away. Four pla-
toons had been taken from the 3d Battal-
ion to reinforce the 1st, leaving the
former with no more than a hundred

86 THE ARDENNES: BATTLE OF THE BULGE
men along the railroad line. Farther to
the west, however, about 125 men of the
3d Battalion who had been on leave at
the rest center in Honsfeld formed a
provisional unit extending somewhat the
precarious 394th flank position.
Some help was on the way. General
Lauer had asked the 2d Division for a
rifle battalion to man a position which
the 99th had prepared before the attack
as a division backstop between Mür-
ringen and Hünningen. At 1600 Colonel
Riley was told that the 394th would be
reinforced by the 1st Battalion, 23d In-
fantry, of the 2d Division. During the
night this fresh rifle battalion, and a
company each of tanks and tank destroy-
ers, under the command of Lt. Col.
John M. Hightower, moved from Elsen-
born to take up positions south and
southeast of Hünningen. Before sunrise,
17 December, these reinforcements were
in place.
During the night of 16–17 December
the entire infantry reserve in the 99th
Division zone had been committed in the
line or close behind it, this backup con-
sisting of the local reserves of the 99th
and the entire 23d Infantry, which had
been left at Elsenborn while its sister
regiments took part in the 2d Division
attack to break out in the Wahlerscheid
sector. The 3d Battalion of the 23d had
set up a defensive position on a ridge
northeast of Rocherath, prepared to sup-
port the 393d Infantry. The 2d Battalion
had assembled in the late afternoon of
the 16th approximately a mile and a
quarter north of Rocherath. The 1st
Battalion would be at Hünningen.
Troops of the 2d Division had continued
the attack on 16 December, but during
the afternoon Maj. Gen. Walter M.
Robertson made plans for a withdrawal,
if necessary, from the Wahlerscheid
sector.
As early as 1100 word of the German
attacks on the V Corps front had pro-
duced results at the command post of the
northern neighbor, the VII Corps. The
26th Infantry of the uncommitted 1st
Infantry Division, then placed on a 6-
hour alert, finally entrucked at midnight
and started the move south to Camp
Elsenborn. The transfer of this regi-
mental combat team to the V Corps
would have a most important effect on
the ensuing American defense.
The First Attacks in the Monschau-
Höfen Sector Are Repulsed
16 December
The village of Höfen, the anchor point
for the northern flank of the 99th Divi-
sion, had considerable importance in
the attack plans of the German Sixth
Panzer Army. Located on high ground,
Höfen overlooked the road center at
Monschau, just to the north, and thus
barred entry to the road to Eupen–at
the moment the headquarters of the V
Corps.
For some reason Field Marshal Model
wished to save the German town of
Monschau from destruction and had for-
bidden the use of artillery there. 7 The
plan handed General Hitzfeld for the
employment of his LXVII Corps (Corps
Monschau) called for an attack to the
north and south of Monschau that was
intended to put two divisions astride the
Monschau-Eupen road in position to
check any American reinforcements at-
tempting a move to the south. The right
division of the Corps Monschau, the
7 Among his staff it was rumored that Model
wished to save the historic latticed houses here.

THE SIXTH PANZER ARMY 87
326th Volks Grenadier Division, had
been ordered to put all three regiments
in the initial attack: one to swing north
of Monschau and seize the village of
Mützenich on the Eupen road; one to
crack the American line south of Mon-
schau, then drive northwest to the high
ground on the road just beyond
Mützenich; the third to join the 246th
Volks Grenadier Division drive through
Höfen and Kalterherberg, the latter
astride the main road from Monschau
south to Butgenbach. If all went accord-
ing to plan, the 326th and 246th would
continue northwestward along the
Eupen road until they reached the
Vesdre River at the outskirts of Eupen. 8
The force available to Hitzfeld on the
morning of 16 December for use in the
Monschau–Höfen sector was consider-
ably weaker than the 2-division attack
planned by the Sixth Panzer Army. In
the two nights before the attack the
326th Volks Grenadier Division had
moved into the West Wall fortifications
facing Monschau and Höfen. The
American attack against the 277th Volks
Grenadier Division at Kesternich, how-
ever, siphoned off one battalion to rein-
force the latter division; in addition one
battalion failed to arrive in line by the
morning of 16 December. Worse, the
246th Volks Grenadier Division, sup-
posed to come south from the Jülich sec-
tor, had been held there by American
attacks. Hitzfeld was thus left with only
8 The account of the operations conducted by
this corps is none too precise: MS # B–092, 326th
Volks Grenadier Division, 16 December 1944–25
January 1945 (Generalmajor Erwin Kaschner),
and MS # A–937, The Ardennes Offensive, De-
cember 1944 (General der Infanterie Otto Hitz-
feld). The AAR’s prepared by the 395th Infantry
and the 38th and 102d Cavalry Reconnaissance
Squadrons are quite complete.
a few indifferent fortress troops on the
south flank of the 326th Division. The
total assault strength in the Höfen-
Monschau area, as a result, was between
three and four battalions. Nonetheless,
Hitzfeld and the 326th commander,
Generalmajor Erwin Kaschner, could
count on a heavy weight of artillery fire
to give momentum to the attack. Two
artillery corps (possibly totaling ten bat-
talions) were in position to give fire
either north or south of the no-fire zone
at Monschau, plus one or two Volks
Werfer brigades–a considerable group-
ment for the support of a division attack
at this stage of the war.
The American strength in the Höfen-
Monschau sector consisted of one rifle
battalion and a reconnaissance squadron:
the 3d Battalion, 395th Infantry, under
Lt. Col. McClernand Butler, in Höfen-
and the 38th Cavalry Reconnaissance
Squadron (Lt. Col. Robert E. O’Brien)
outposting Monschau and deployed to
the north along the railroad track be-
tween Mützenich and Konzen station.
The infantry at Höfen lay in a foxhole
line along a thousand-yard front on the
eastern side of the village, backed up by
dug-out support positions on which the
battalion had labored for some six weeks.
Two nights prior to the German offen-
sive, Company A of the 612th Tank De-
stroyer Battalion towed its 3-inch guns
into the Höfen sector for the purpose of
getting good firing positions against the
village of Rohren, northeast of Höfen,
which lay in the path of the 2d Infantry
Division attack. The appearance of the
guns, sited well forward and swathed in
sheets for protective coloration in the
falling snow, gave a lift to the infantry,
who as yet had to fight their first battle.
To the west the 105-mm. howitzers of

88
THE ARDENNES: BATTLE OF THE BULGE
CONSTRING A WINTERIZED SQUAD HUT NEAR THE FRONT LINES
the 196th Field Artillery Battalion were
emplaced to give the battalion direct
support.
The 38th Cavalry Squadron was
aligned from Monschau north to Konzen
station, holding a continuous position
with fifty dismounted machine guns dug
in behind mines, barbed wire, and trip
flares covering the approaches from the
east. The right flank of the squadron,
outposting Monschau, was at some dis-
advantage because of the deep, rocky
draws leading into and past the town.
But to the north the terrain was less cut
up and offered good fields of fire for the
American weapons posted on the slopes
west of the railroad track. In addition to
the assault gun troop in Mützenick, the
squadron was reinforced by a platoon of
self-propelled tank destroyers from the
893d Tank Destroyer Battalion, which
was stationed behind the left flank to
cover a secondary road which entered
the American position, and the 62d Ar-
mored Field Artillery Battalion. On the
whole the defense in the Monschau-
Höfen area was well set when the battal-
ions of the 326th Volks Grenadier Divi-
sion moved forward to their attack
positions on the morning of 16 Decem-
ber.
The German guns and Werfers

THE SIXTH PANZER ARMY 89
opened a very heavy barrage at 0525,
rolling over the forward lines, then back
to the west along the Eupen road, shell-
ing the American artillery positions and
cutting telephone wires. Neither the in-
fantry nor cavalry (gone well to ground)
suffered much from this fire, heavy
though it was; but many buildings were
set afire in Höfen and some were beaten
to the ground. Monschau, as directed by
Model, escaped this artillery pounding.
In twenty minutes or so the German fire
died away and off to the east the glow of
searchlights rose as artificial moonlight.
About 0600 the German grenadiers came
walking out of the haze in front of the 3d
Battalion. The wire to the American
guns was out and during the initial on-
slaught even radio failed to reach the
gunners. The riflemen and tank destroy-
er gunners, however, had the German
infantry in their sights, without cover
and at a murderously easy range.
The result was fantastic. Yet the
grenadiers who lived long enough came
right up to the firing line–in three
verified instances the bodies of Germans
shot at close range toppled into the fox-
holes from which the bullets came. A
few got through and into the village.
Assault companies of the 1st Battalion,
751st Regiment, and the 1st Battalion,
753d Regiment, had made this attack.
But the support companies of the two
battalions were blocked out by an in-
tense concentration of well-aimed 81 -
mm. mortar fire from the American
heavy weapons company, this curtain
strengthened within an hour by the sup-
porting howitzer battalion. By 0745 the
attack was finished, and in another hour
some thirty or forty Germans who had
reached the nearest houses were rounded
up. Reports of the German dead
“counted” in front of Höfen vary from
seventy-five to two hundred. The casual-
ties suffered by the 3d Battalion in this
first action were extraordinarily light:
four killed, seven wounded, and four
missing.
At Monschau the 1st Battalion of the
752d Regiment carried the attack, ap-
parently aimed at cutting between the
Monschau and Höfen defenses. As the
German shellfire lessened, about 0600,
the cavalry outposts heard troops moving
along the Rohren road which entered
Monschau from the southeast. The
grenadiers were allowed to approach the
barbed wire at the roadblock, then illu-
minating mortar shell was fired over the
Germans and the cavalry opened up with
every weapon at hand–the light tanks
doing heavy damage with 37-mm. canis-
ter. Beaten back in this first assault, the
German battalion tried again at day-
light, this time attempting to filter into
town along a draw a little farther to the
north. This move was checked quickly.
No further attack was essayed at Mon-
schau and a half-hearted attempt at
Höfen, toward noon, was handily re-
pelled. As it was, the 326th Volks
Grenadier Division lost one-fifth of the
troops put into these attacks.
To the south of Höfen and Monschau
in the 2d Division and 395th Infantry
zones, 16 December passed with the
initiative still in American hands. The
German attacks delivered north and
south of the corridor through which the
Americans were pushing had no immedi-
ate repercussion, not even in the 395th
Infantry sector. The Sixth Panzer Army
drive to make a penetration between
Hollerath and Krewinkel with the 1st
SS Panzer Corps, therefore, had no con-
tact with the Monschau Corps in the

90 THE ARDENNES: BATTLE OF THE BULGE
north, nor was such contact intended in
the early stages of the move west. The
German command would pay scant at-
tention to the small American salient
projecting between the LXVII Corps
and the 1st SS Panzer Corps, counting on
the hard-pressed 272d Volks Grenadier
Division to hold in the Wahlerscheid-
Simmerath sector so long as needed.
The German Effort Continues
17–18 December
Although hard hit and in serious
trouble at the end of the first day, par-
ticularly on the right flank as General
Lauer saw it, the inexperienced 99th
Division had acquitted itself in a manner
calculated to win the reluctant admira-
tion of the enemy. German losses had
been high. Where the American lines
had been penetrated, in the 393d and
394th sectors, the defenders simply had
been overwhelmed by superior numbers
of the enemy who had been able to work
close in through the dense woods. Most
important of all, the stanch defense of
Losheimergraben had denied the wait-
ing tank columns of the I SS Panzer
Corps direct and easy entrance to the
main Bullingen-Malmédy road.
The initial German failure to wedge
an opening for armor through the 99th,
for failure it must be reckoned, was very
nearly balanced by the clear break-
through achieved in the 14th Cavalry
Group sector. The 3d Parachute Divi-
sion, carrying the left wing of the I SS
Panzer Corps forward, had followed the
retreating cavalry through Manderfeld,
swung north, and by dusk had troops in
Lanzerath—only two kilometers from
the 3d Battalion, 394th, position at Buch-
holz.
The 12th SS Panzer Division could not
yet reach the Bullingen road. The 1st
SS Panzer Division stood ready and wait-
ing to exploit the opening made by the
3d Parachute Division by an advance via
Lanzerath onto the Honsfeld road. Dur-
ing the early evening the advance kampf-
gruppe of the 1st SS Panzer Division, a
task force built around the 1st SS Panz-
er Regiment (Obersturmbannfuehrer
Joachim Peiper) , rolled northwest to
Lanzerath. At midnight–an exception-
ally dark night–German tanks and in-
fantry struck suddenly at Buchholz. The
two platoons of Company K, left there
when the 3d Battalion stripped its lines
to reinforce the Losheimergraben de-
fenders, were engulfed. One man, the
company radio operator, escaped. Hid-
den in the cellar of the old battalion
command post near the railroad station,
he reported the German search on the
Boor above, then the presence of tanks
outside the building with swastikas
painted on their sides. His almost hourly
reports, relayed through the 1st Battal-
ion, kept the division headquarters in-
formed of the German movements.
About 0500 on 17 December the main
German column began its march
through Buchholz. Still at his post, the
radio operator counted thirty tanks,
twenty-eight half-tracks filled with Ger-
man infantry, and long columns of foot
troops marching by the roadside. All of
the armored task force of the 1st SS
Panzer Division and a considerable part
of the 3d Parachute Division were mov-
ing toward Honsfeld.
Honsfeld, well in the rear area of the
99th, was occupied by a variety of troops.
The provisional unit raised at the divi-
sion rest camp seems to have been de-
ployed around the town. Two platoons

THE SIXTH PANZER ARMY 91
of the 801st Tank Destroyer Battalion
had been sent in by General Lauer to
hold the road, and during the night a
few towed guns from the 612th Tank
Destroyer Battalion were added to the
defenses. Honsfeld was in the V Corps
antiaircraft defense belt and two battal-
ions of 90-mm. antiaircraft guns had
been sited thereabout. In addition,
Troop A, 32d Cavalry Reconnaissance
Squadron, had arrived in Honsfeld late in
the evening.
The stream of American traffic mov-
ing into the village during the night
probably explains the ease with which
the Honsfeld garrison was routed. The
leading German tanks simply joined
this traffic, and, calmly led by a man
signaling with a flashlight, rolled down
the village streets. With German troops
pouring in from all sides the Americans
offered no concrete resistance. Though
some made a fight of it, most engaged in
a wild scramble to get out of town. Some
of the tank destroyers were overrun by
infantry attack through the dark. Guns
and vehicles, jammed on the exit roads,
were abandoned; but many of the
Americans, minus their equipment,
escaped.
The predawn seizure of Honsfeld
opened D route to the spearhead column
of the 1st SS Panzer Division. Reconnais-
sance, however, showed that the next
section of this route, between Honsfeld
and Schoppen, was in very poor condi-
tion. Since the 12th SS Panzer Division
had not yet reached C route, the
main Büllingen-Malmédy road, Peiper’s
kampfgruppe now turned north in the
direction of Büllingen with the intention
of continuing the westward drive on
pavement.
At 0100 on 17 December the 254th
Engineer Battalion had been attached to
the 99th Division and ordered to Bül-
lingen, there to prepare positions cover-
ing the entrances from the south and
southeast. Twice during the dark hours
the engineers beat back German infan-
try attacks; then, a little after 0700,
enemy tanks hove into sight. Falling back
to the shelter of the buildings, the 254th
did what it could to fend off the tanks.
Here, in the town, a reconnaissance pla-
toon of the 644th Tank Destroyer
Battalion had just arrived with orders
to establish contact with the enemy
column, but only one section managed
to evade the panzers. The rest of the
platoon were killed or captured. Upon
receipt of orders from the division, the
engineers, who had clung stubbornly to
houses in the west edge, withdrew and
dug in on higher ground 1,000 yards to
the northwest so as to block the road to
Butgenbach. There the two companies
of the 254th still intact were joined by
men hastily assembled from the 99th Di-
vision headquarters, the antiaircraft
artillery units in the vicinity, and four
guns from the 612th Tank Destroyer
Battalion.
To the surprise of the Americans
gathered along this last thin line the
Germans did not pursue the attack. By
1030 a long line of tanks and vehicles
were seen streaming through Büllingen,
but they were moving toward the south-
west! Later, the 99th Division com-
mander would comment that “the enemy
had the key to success within his hands,
but did not know it.” And so it must
have seemed to the Americans on 17 De-
cember when a sharp northward thrust
from Büllingen would have met little
opposition and probably would have
entrapped both the 99th and 2d Divi-

92 THE ARDENNES: BATTLE OF THE BULGE
sions. In fact, Peiper’s column had simply
made a detour north through Büllingen
and, having avoided a bad stretch of
road, now circled back to its prescribed
route.
American ground observers, on the
17th, attributed the change in direction
to intervention by friendly fighter-
bombers, whose attack, so it appeared,
“diverted” the German column to the
southwest. Two squadrons of the 366th
Fighter Group, called into the area to aid
the 99th Division, made two attacks dur-
ing the morning. The 389th Squadron
struck one section of the German col-
umn, which promptly scattered into
nearby woods, and claimed a kill of
thirty tanks and motor vehicles. It is
doubtful that the Germans were crip-
pled to any such extent-certainly the
move west was little delayed-but the
American troops must have been greatly
heartened. The 390th Squadron, direct-
ed onto the column now estimated to be
two hundred vehicles or more, was in-
tercepted by a squadron of ME-log’s
which dropped out of the clouds over
Büllingen. The Americans accounted
for seven German aircraft, but had to
jettison most of their bombs.
Losheimergraben Is Lost
The lack of highway bridges over the
railroad south of Losheimergraben had
turned the first day’s battle for the
Losheimergraben crossroads into an in-
fantry fight in the surrounding woods.
Both sides had sustained heavy losses.
The 48th Grenadier Regiment had
pushed the 1st Battalion of the 394th
back, but had failed to break through
to the tiny collection of customs build-
ings and houses at the crossroads. By
daylight on 17 December the Americans
held a fairly continuous but thinly
manned front with the 1st Battalion
around Losheimergraben, part of the 3d
Battalion west of the village, and the 1st
Battalion of the 23d Infantry holding the
exposed right-flank position in Hünnin-
gen.
The 12th Volks Grenadier Division,
under pressure from higher head-
quarters to take Losheimergraben, con-
tinued the attack with both its forward
regiments, now considerably weakened.
While the 27th Fuesilier Regiment
moved to flank Losheimergraben on the
west, the 48th Grenadier Regiment
continued its costly frontal attack. The
flanking attack was successful: at least
a battalion of the 27th drove through
a gap between the 1st and 3d Bat-
talions. By 1100 the German infantry
were able to bring the Losheim-Büllin-
gen road under small arms fire and the
noose was tightening on the Losheimer-
graben defenders. The frontal attack,
at the latter point, was resumed before
dawn by enemy patrols trying to find a
way around the American firing line
in the woods.
In a foxhole line 200 yards southeast
of Losheimergraben, 1st Lt. Dewey
Plankers had organized about fifty men.
This small force-men from Companies
B and C, jeep drivers, and the crew of a
defunct antiaircraft gun-beat back all
of the German patrols. But the game was
nearly up. The enemy Pioneers finally
threw a bridge over the railroad at the
demolished overpass on the Losheim
road, and about 1100 three panzers, sup-
ported by a rifle company, appeared in
the woods in front of Plankers’ position.
Lacking ammunition and weapons
(twenty of the tiny force were armed

THE SIXTH PANZER ARMY 93
only with pistols), Plankers ordered his
men back to the customs buildings at the
crossroads and radioed for help. Car-
bines, rifles, and ammunition, loaded on
the only available jeep (the chaplain’s),
were delivered under fire to the Ameri-
can “blockhouses.” The German tankers,
unwilling to chance bazooka fire at close
range, held aloof from the hamlet and
waited for the German gunners and
some ME-log’s to finish the job. The
garrison held on in the basements until
the tanks finally moved in at dusk. Lieu-
tenant Plankers had been informed in
the course of the afternoon that neigh-
boring troops were under orders to with-
draw. He took the men he had left, now
only about twenty, and broke through
the Germans, rejoining what was left
of the 394th Infantry at Mürringen late
in the evening.
Even before the German penetration
at the Losheimergraben angle, the 394th
stood in danger of being cut off and
destroyed piecemeal by the enemy infil-
trating from the east and south. As part
of a withdrawal plan put in effect during
the afternoon for the entire division,
General Lauer ordered the 394th to
withdraw to a second defensive position
at Mürringen, about four kilometers in
the rear of the regiment’s eastern front.
The 2d Battalion, holding the north
flank, was under pressure from both
right and left. At dawn of 17 December,
the enemy had attacked along the
Neuhof road with tanks in the van.
Company E, directly in the path, used its
bazookas with such good effect that three
panzers were crippled. Excellent artil-
lery support and fine shooting by the
battalion mortars helped discourage any
further frontal assault. Infiltration on
the flanks, however, had placed the 2d
Battalion in serious plight when, at 1400,
the order came to withdraw west and tie
in with the 3d Battalion. Leaving a small
covering force behind, the 2d Battalion
started on foot through the woods,
carrying its heavy weapons over the
rugged and snow-covered trails. The
Germans also were moving through the
forest, and the battalion was unable to
turn toward the 3d as ordered. With-
drawing deeper into the forest the bat-
talion bivouacked in the sector known
as the Honsfelder Wald. The covering
force, however, made its way to Mür-
ringen, where it was set to defend the
regimental command post.
The 1st Battalion, in the Losheimer-
graben sector, had been so splintered by
incessant German attack that its with-
drawal was a piecemeal affair. Isolated
groups fought or dodged their way west.
Two hundred and sixty officers and men
made it. 9 Two platoons from Company K
which had been attached to the 1st Bat-
talion did not receive word of the with-
drawal and held on under heavy shelling
until ammunition was nearly spent. It
took these men twenty-four hours to
wade back through the snow to the regi-
mental lines. What was left of the 3d
Battalion also fell back toward Mürrin-
gen, harassed by groups of the enemy en
route and uncertain as to what would be
found at Murringen.
The survivors of the 394th Infantry
now assembling at Mürringen were
given a brief breathing spell while the
enemy concentrated on the 1st Battalion,
23d Infantry, defending the Hünningen
positions 1,500 meters to the south. The
12th Volks Grenadier Division attack
finally had broken through the American
9 The 1st Battalion of the 394th was accorded
a Presidential Citation for its role in this battle.

94 THE ARDENNES: BATTLE OF THE BULGE
line but now was definitely behind sched-
ule. The 48th Regiment, having been
much reduced in strength in the fight
around Losheimergraben, re-formed on
the high ground between the forest edge
and Murringen. The north flank of the
regiment lay exposed to counterattack,
for the 277th Volks Grenadier Division
on the right had been checked in its at-
tempt to take the twin villages, Krinkelt-
Rocherath. The fight now devolved on
the 27th Regiment, which was ordered
to take Hunningen before an attempt to
roll up the American south flank.
Colonel Hightower’s 1st Battalion was
in a difficult and exposed position at
Hunningen. His main strength, de-
ployed to counter German pressure from
the Buchholz-Honsfeld area, faced south
and southeast, but the German columns
taking the Honsfeld-Büllingen detour
were moving toward the northwest and
thus behind the Hunningen defenders.
Whether any part of this latter enemy
force would turn against the rear of the
1st Battalion was the question.
Through the morning the 1st Battal-
ion watched through breaks in the fog as
tanks and vehicles rolled toward Büllin-
gen. Visibility, poor as it was, made ar-
tillery adjustment on the road difficult
and ineffective. Shortly after noon about
120 men who had been cut off from the
2d and 254th Engineer Battalions
arrived at Hightower’s command post
and were dispatched to form a roadblock
against a possible attack from Büllingen.
Somewhat earlier twelve Mark IV
tanks had appeared south of Hunningen
-perhaps by design, perhaps by acci-
dent. Assembled at the woods edge some
800 yards from the American foxhole
line, the panzers may have been seeking
haven from the American fighter-
bombers then working over the road. In
any case they were shooting-gallery
targets. One of the towed 3-inch guns
which the 801st Tank Destroyer Battal-
ion had withdrawn during the early
morning debacle at Honsfeld knocked
out four of the panzers in six shots. The
rest withdrew in haste.
At 1600 the enemy made his first defi-
nite assault, preceded by six minutes of
furious shelling. When the artillery
ceased, German infantry were seen
coming forward through a neck of woods
pointing toward the southeastern edge
of Hunningen. A forward observer with
Company B, facing the woods, climbed
into the church steeple and brought
down shellfire which kept pace with the
attackers until they were within a hun-
dred yards of the American foxholes. A
number of the enemy did break through,
but the assault evaporated when nearly
fifty were killed by four men manning
automatic weapons from a platoon com-
mand post just in the rear of the firing
line. The commander of the 27th
Regiment sent forward seven “distinct
attacking waves” in the course of the
afternoon and early evening. In one as-
sault the Germans captured two heavy
machine guns and turned them on Com-
pany A, but a light machine gun section
wiped out the German crews. At no
time, despite numerous penetrations in
the 1st Battalion line, was the enemy
able to get Hunningen into his hands. 10
Late in the afternoon an indistinct
radio message was picked up by the 1st
Battalion, 23d Infantry. It appeared that
the battalion now was attached to the
9th Infantry (2d Division) , to the north,
and that orders were to pull out of Hün-
10 Colonel Hightower was awarded the DSC for
his conduct of the defense.

THE SIXTH PANZER ARMY 95
ningen. Up to this point, the 394th
Infantry was still in Mürringen, gather-
ing its companies and platoons as they
straggled in. Furthermore the 1st Bat-
talion was in a fire fight with an enemy
only a few score yards distant in the
darkness. Colonel Hightower, therefore,
tried by radio to apprise the 9th Infantry
of his predicament and the importance of
holding until the 394th could reorganize.
At 2330 Colonel Hirschfelder, the 9th
Infantry commander, reached High-
tower by radio, told him that
Hightower’s battalion and the 394th
Infantry were almost surrounded and
that, if the battalion expected to with-
draw, it must move at once. Colonel
Hightower again explained his situation,
said that in his opinion he could not pull
out unless and until the 394th withdrew,
but that he would discuss the situation
with the commander of the 394th.
Hirschfelder agreed and told Hightower
to use his own judgment.
At Mürringen Colonel Riley’s 394th
had not been hard pressed although the
German artillery had shown no favori-
tism and hammered Mürringen and
Hünningen equally. The groups filter-
ing back to Mürringen, however, gener-
ally had very little ammunition left,
even though many detachments came
back with all their heavy weapons. If the
394th was to make a stand at Mürringen
it would have to be resupplied. At first
Colonel Riley hoped to get ammunition
by air, for it appeared that the German
drive in the Krinkelt area to the north
shortly would cut the last remaining
supply road. This was a vain hope for
aerial supply missions in December were
far too chancy. The alternative solution
was for the 394th to withdraw north to
Krinkelt, using the one route still open.
The German Attack Toward Rocherath
and Krinkelt, 16–17 December
The 393d Infantry (Lt. Col. Jean D.
Scott) had taken no part in the V Corps
offensive of 13 December except to put
on a “demonstration” in front of the
West Wall positions. The regiment,
minus its 2d Battalion (attached to the
395th Infantry), was deployed along the
German frontier, a line generally
defined by the eastern edge of the long
forest belt in which the bulk of the 99th
Division was stationed and the Inter-
national Highway. The width of the
front, held by the 3d Battalion on the
left and the 1st Battalion on the right,
was about 5,500 yards. Outposts on the
regimental left lay only a few score yards
from the West Wall bunkers, but the
right was more than half a mile from
the German lines. About four miles by
trail behind the 393d, the twin villages
of Rocherath and Krinkelt lay astride
the main north-south road through the
division area. In front of the 393d, across
the frontier, were entrances to the two
forest roads which ran through the
regimental sector, one in the north at
Hollerath, the second in the south at
Udenbreth. Both villages were in enemy
hands. At the western edge of the
woods the roads converged, funneling
along a single track into Rocherath-
Krinkelt. The twin villages, therefore,
had a tactical importance of the first or-
der. Through them passed the main line
of communications in the 2d Division
corridor, and from them ran the supply
route to the 393d Infantry and the 395th.
In the West Wall bunkers facing the
393d lay the 277th Volks Grenadier Di-
vision (Col. Hans Viebig). Recon-
structed in Hungary from the remnants

96 THE ARDENNES: BATTLE OF THE BULGE
of an infantry division of the same num-
ber which had escaped from the Falaise
pocket, the 277th arrived in the west
during early November. In the days be-
fore the counteroffensive the division
screened the entire front behind which
the I SS Panzer Corps was assembling,
but on the evening of 15 December,
while two new infantry divisions moved
into the line, the 277th assembled on the
north flank of the corps zone between
Hollerath and Udenbreth. One rein-
forced battalion, on the far southern
flank of the original sector, was unable
to reach the division line of departure
in time to join the attack.
The I SS Panzer Corps commander
had decided to put the weight of his
armored thrust to the south and thus
avoid entanglement with the American
force which, it was thought, could be
gathered quickly on the Elsenborn ridge
in the northern sector of the zone of ad-
vance. But the Elsenborn area had to be
neutralized, if for no other reason than
to erase the American artillery group-
ment located there. The 277th Volks
Grenadier Division had the task of
making the penetration on the right
wing of the corps and driving obliquely
northwest to take the Elsenborn ridge.
As finally prescribed by the corps com-
mander, the phases of the attack planned
for the 277th were these: to break
through the American line and open the
forest roads to Rocherath and Krinkelt;
capture these twin villages; seize the
Elsenborn area and block any American
advance from Verviers. The division
commander had received this mission
with qualms, pointing out that the
wooded and broken terrain favored the
Americans and that without sufficient
rifle strength for a quick breakthrough,
success in the attack could only be won
by very strong artillery support. But his
orders stood. On the night of 15–16
December the 989th Regiment as-
sembled near Hollerath, its objective
Rocherath. To the south the 990th
occupied the West Wall pillboxes near
Udenbreth, poised for an attack to seize
Krinkelt.
The artillery, Werfer, and mortar fire
crashing into the American positions on
the morning of 16 December gave
the attacking German infantry the start
the 277th commander had requested.
The concentration thoroughly wrecked
the American telephone lines which had
been carefully strung from battalion to
company command posts; in some cases
radio communication failed at the same
time. This preparatory bombardment
continued until 0700.
The north wing of the 393d, held by
the 3d Battalion (Lt. Col. Jack G. Allen),
lay in the woods close to the German
pillboxes from which the assault wave
of the 989th, guided by searchlights
beamed on the American positions,
moved in on the Americans before they
had recovered from the shelling. In the
first rush all of Company K, save one
platoon, were killed or captured. By
0855, when telephone lines were re-
stored and the first word of the 3d Bat-
talion’s plight reached the regimental
command post, the enemy had advanced
nearly three-quarters of a mile beyond
the American lines along the forest road
from Hollerath. Colonel Allen stripped
the reserve platoons from the balance of
the 3d Battalion line in a futile attempt
to block the onrush, but by 0930 the
Germans had reached the battalion
command post, around which Allen
ordered Companies I and L to gather.

THE SIXTH PANZER ARMY 97
At this point the 81-mm. mortar crews
laid down such a successful defensive
barrage (firing over 1,200 rounds in the
course of the fight) that the attackers
swerved from this area of danger and
continued to the west. By nightfall the
forward companies of the 989th were at
the Jansbach creek, halfway through the
forest, but had been slowed down by
troops switched from the left wing of the
3d Battalion and had lost many prisoners
to the Americans. The 3d Battalion
radio had functioned badly during the
fight and contact with the 370th Field
Artillery Battalion, supporting the 3d,
was not established till the close of day.
Despite the penetration between the 3d
and 1st Battalions and the large number
of enemy now to the rear and across the
battalion supply road, Colonel Allen re-
ported that the 3d could hold on during
the night. His supply road had been cut
in midafternoon, but Company I of the
394th had fought its way in with a supply
of ammunition.
On the south the 1st Battalion (Maj.
Matthew L. Legler) likewise had been
outnumbered and hard hit. Here the
990th Regiment had assembled in Uden-
breth during the dark hours and, when
the barrage fire lifted at 0700, began
an advance toward the 1st Battalion. The
German assault companies, however,
failed to get across the half mile of open
ground before dawn and were checked
short of the woods by mortar and ma-
chine gun fire, The commander of the
277th Volks Grenadier Division at once
decided to throw in his reserve, the 991st
Regiment, to spring the 990th loose.
Sheer weight of numbers now carried
the German attack across the open space
and into the woods–but with high cas-
ualties amongst the riflemen and the
officers and noncoms herding the assault
waves forward. By 0830 the Germans
had nearly surrounded Company C, on
the 1st Battalion right. An hour later,
the 991st Regiment, attacking southwest
from Ramscheid, knocked out the light
machine guns and mortars in the Com-
pany B sector (on the left) with bazooka
fire and captured or killed all but one
platoon. Company A (Capt. Joseph
Jameson) , which had been in reserve,
counterattacked in support of what was
left of Company B and by noon had dug
in on a line only 300 yards behind the
original line. Here Company A held
for the rest of the day against repeated
enemy attacks and constant artillery
fire with what the regimental after
action report characterized as “heroic
action on the part of all men.” In this
fight friendly artillery played an impor-
tant role. The surviving Company B
platoon had retained an observation
post overlooking the treeless draw along
which reinforcements moved from Uden-
breth and despite the German fire a
telephone wire was run forward to this
command post. The American gunners
quickly made this avenue suicidal;
through the afternoon cries from the
wounded Germans lying in the draw
floated back to the American line.
Company C on the 1st Battalion right
had slowly succumbed to the weight of
numbers; by 1015 two of its platoons
had been engulfed. There was little that
the regiment could do in response to
Major Legler’s plea for assistance, but
at 1030 the mine-laying platoon from
the regimental antitank company ar-
rived to give a hand. This small detach-
ment (26 riflemen plus 13 runners and
cooks), led by Lt. Harry Parker, made
a bayonet charge to reach the remaining

98 THE ARDENNES: BATTLE OF THE BULGE
Company C platoon and set up a new
line of defense on the battalion right
flank. A gap still remained between the
battalion and the 394th Infantry farther
south.
By the end of the day the 393d Infan-
try had restored a front facing the
enemy. 11 But the new line could hardly
be called solid, the rifle strength remain-
ing was too slim for that. The 1st Battal-
ion had lost over half of its effective
strength; the 3d Battalion had its right
bent back for several hundred yards and
had lost nearly three hundred men. The
enemy wandered almost at will through
the woods, firing into foxholes, shooting
off flares, and calling out in English to
trap the unwary. But even with the
German strength apparent on all sides,
the American situation seemed to be
improving. Reinforcements, requested
by General Lauer, had arrived from the
2d Division during the late afternoon,
the supply roads might be restored to
traffic when daylight came again, and
the losses inflicted on the attacker were
obvious and heartening.
The breakthrough on the south flank
of the 99th Division, during 17 Decem-
ber, was paralleled that day by a strong
German armored thrust into the division
center. The 393d, whose left battalion
had been driven back into the deep
woods during the first day’s attack, was
under orders to counterattack and re-
store its original line. The 3d Battalion
was close to being surrounded, and in
11 Pfc. R. D. Smith and Pfc. Angelo Cestoni
were awarded the DSC for bravery in the fight by
the 393d Infantry. It should be added that the
forward observers of the 370th Field Artillery
Battalion, which was supporting the infantrymen
of the 393d, also distinguished themselves and
order to recover its eastern position at
the wood line it would have to reopen
the battalion supply road. At 0800
Colonel Allen’s tired and weakened
battalion attacked to the west and drove
the enemy off the road, but when the
eastward counterattack started it
collided with a battalion of German
infantry. For half an hour Germans and
Americans fought for a hundred-yard-
wide strip of the woods. Then, about
1000, the German armor took a hand.
The failure by the 277th Volks Gren-
adier Division to clear the woods and
reach Krinkelt-Rocherath on 16 Decem-
ber had led to some change of plan.
The right flank, roughly opposite the
3d Battalion sector, was reinforced by
switching the 990th Regiment to the
north to follow the 989th Regiment.
More important, the 12th SS Panzer
Division (which now had come up on
the left of the 277th) parceled out some
of its tanks to give weight to the infantry
attack by the right wing of the 277th
Volks Grenadier Division.
The first tank entered the forest road
from Hollerath, rolled to within ma-
chine gun range of the Americans,
stopped, then for twenty minutes me-
thodically spewed bullet fire. Attempts
to get a hit by artillery fire were futile,
although the American shelling momen-
tarily dispersed the accompanying infan-
try and permitted a bazooka team to
wreck one track. But even when crippled
the single tank succeeded in immobiliz-
ing the American infantry. Four more
enemy tanks appeared. One was knocked
out by a bazooka round, but the rest
worked forward along the network of
two, 1st Lt. G. W. Jackman and 2d Lt. W. D.
Markin, received the DSC, Lieutenant Markin
posthumously.

THE SIXTH PANZER ARMY 99
firebreaks and trails. 12 The combination
of tanks and numerous infantry now
threatened to erase the entire 3d Battal-
ion position. Ammunition had run low
and the 3d Battalion casualties could not
be evacuated.
About 1030 Colonel Scott ordered the
3d Battalion, 393d Infantry, as well as
its southern neighbor (the 1st), to re-
move to new positions about one and
a half miles east of Rocherath. This
would be done by withdrawing the 3d
Battalion through the 3d Battalion, 23d
Infantry (the reinforcements sent by
Robertson), which had dug in some
thousand yards to its rear. All the vehi-
cles available to the forward troops
were filled with wounded. Fifteen
wounded men, most too badly hurt to
be moved, were left behind, together
with the 3d Battalion surgeon, Capt.
Frederick J. McIntyre, and some enlisted
aid men. By noon the entire battalion
had pulled out (disengaging without
much difficulty) ; it passed through the
3d Battalion, 23d Infantry, and two
hours later was on the new position.
Allen’s battalion had fought almost con-
tinuously since the early morning of the
16th; then at full strength, it now was
reduced to 475 men and all but two
machine guns were gone.
The 1st Battalion of the 393d Infantry
had not been hard pressed during the
morning of 17 December because the
German forces in its area had been con-
tent to move through the gap on the
right, between the 393d and 394th.
Ordered to withdraw about 1100, the
battalion was in position alongside
12 The action at this point devolved on Sgt.
Vernon McGarity and his squad. For outstanding
heroism McGarity was awarded the Medal of
Honor.
the 3d Battalion, 23d Infantry, by 1400,
the two now forming a narrow front
east of the twin villages.
The 3d Battalion, 23d Infantry (Lt.
Col. Paul V. Tuttle, Jr.) , had been
rushed to the western edge of the woods
on the afternoon of the 16th for use as
a counterattack force. The hard-hitting
German attack against the 3d Battalion,
393d, on the following morning so drastically
changed the situation that Colonel
Tuttle’s orders were altered to:
“hold at all costs.” His battalion was
none too well prepared for such defense,
having arrived with no mines and very
little ammunition. Trucks bringing ammunition
forward found the road between
Büllingen and Krinkelt barred by
the enemy and never reached the battalion.
Shortly after the troops from the 393d
passed through the battalion, Company
I, on the open left flank, heard the clanking
of tank treads. A few minutes later
German tanks with marching infantry
clustered around them struck the left
platoon of Company I, rolling forward
till their machine guns enfiladed the
foxholes in which the American infantry
crouched. Company I held until its ammunition
was nearly gone, then tried
to withdraw to a nearby firebreak but
went to pieces under fire raking it from
all directions. 13 Company K, in line to the
south, next was hit. The company started
an orderly withdrawal, except for the
left platoon which had lost its leader
and never got the order to pull back.
This platoon stayed in its foxholes until
the tanks had ground past, then rose to
13 The gallant attempt by Pfc. Richard E. Cowan
singlehandedly to cover the Company I retreat
was recognized by the award of the Medal of
Honor.

100
THE ARDENNES: BATTLE OF THE BULGE
CAMOUFLAGED PILLBOX IN THE FOREST serves as a regimental command post.
engage the German infantry. The pla-
toon was wiped out.
A medium tank platoon from the
741st Tank Battalion, loaned by Robert-
son, had arrived in the 3d Battalion area
during the night. Lt. Victor L. Miller,
the platoon leader, took two tanks to
cover a forest crossroads near the Com-
pany K position. In a duel at close quar-
ters the American tanks destroyed two
panzers, but in turn were knocked out
and Lieutenant Miller was killed.
Parts of Company K held stubbornly
together, fighting from tree to tree, with-
drawing slowly westward. For courage in
this fight, Pfc. Jose M. Lopez, machine
gunner, was awarded the Medal of
Honor. This rear guard action, for the
company was covering what was left of
the battalion, went on until twilight.
Then, as the survivors started to cross
an open field, they were bracketed by
artillery and Werfer fire and scattered.
(Later the battalion would be given the
Distinguished Unit Citation.) Company
L, on the inner flank, had been given
time for an orderly retreat; eighty or
ninety men reached Krinkelt.
The 3d Battalion of the 393d had
barely started to dig in behind the 3d
Battalion, 23d Infantry, when the first
stragglers came back with word of the

THE SIXTH PANZER ARMY 101
German assault. Colonel Allen moved
his spent battalion to a hastily organized
position 500 yards to the northwest and
prepared to make another stand. The
main force of the German attack, however,
had angled away while rolling over
the flank of the forward battalion. About
this time the 3d Battalion, 393d, met a
patrol from the 1st Battalion, 9th Infantry,
which had been rushed to the
Rocherath area to cover the 2d Division
withdrawal south from Wahlerscheid,
and the two battalions joined forces.
The retreat of the 3d Battalion, 23d
Infantry, left its right-flank neighbor,
the 1st Battalion, 393d Infantry, completely
isolated. 14 Telephone lines long
since had been destroyed, and radio
communication had failed. In late afternoon
Major Legler decided to withdraw
but hearing that the 2d Battalion of the
394th was to tie in on his right reversed
his decision. About dark, however, the
Germans struck in force and the rifle
companies pulled back closer together.
Because the battalion supply road was
already in German hands, Legler and
his men struck out across country on the
morning of the 18th, taking a few vehicles
and those of the wounded who could
be moved. The main body reached
Wirzfeld but the rear guard became
separated, finally joining other Americans
in the fight raging around Krinkelt.
The 1st Battalion by this time numbered
around two hundred men.
The 395th Infantry Conforms
to the Withdrawal
The 395th Infantry, which had sup-
14 Lt. Col. Paul V. Tuttle, Jr., for his able
handling of the withdrawal by the 3d Battalion,
was awarded the DSC.
ported the 2d Infantry Division attack
in the Wahlerscheid sector, was little
affected on the 16th and the morning
of the 17th by the German power drive
against the rest of the 99th Division. In-
formation reaching the 395th command
post was sparse and contradictory; both
the 2d Division and the 395th still as-
sumed that the battle raging to the south
was an answer to the American threat
at Wahlerscheid, where the 2d Division
had made a sizable dent in the West
Wall by evening of 16 December. 15
All this time a chain reaction was mov-
ing slowly from the menaced southern
flank of the 99th northward. It reached
the 395th before noon on 17 December
with word that the 324th Engineer Bat-
talion, stationed between that regiment
and the 393d, was moving back to the
west. Actually the engineers had not yet
withdrawn but had moved to make con-
tact with and cover the exposed flank
of the 395th, this apparently on General
Lauer’s orders while the 395th was tak-
ing orders from Robertson. The with-
drawal of the 2d Infantry Division to
the Rocherath area resulted in the attach-
ment of the 395th (reinforced by the
2d Battalion of the 393d) to General
Robertson’s division. Now the battalions
were ordered to blow up all of the pill-
boxes taken in the advance. Finally, at
1600, Col. Alexander J. Mackenzie re-
ceived a retirement order given by Gen-
eral Lauer or General Robertson, which
one is uncertain. The plan was this. The
two battalions of the 395th and the at-
tached battalion from the 393d would
fall back toward the regimental com-
mand post at Rocherath. From this
15 For details of the Wahlerscheid attacks, see
MacDonald, The Siegfried Line Campaign, pp.
606–10.

102 THE ARDENNES: BATTLE OF THE BULGE
point the regiment would deploy to
cover the road leading out of Rocherath
to the north and northeast, the road
which the 2d Infantry Division was
using in its march south from the
Wahlerscheid battlefield.
The 1st Battalion reached Rocherath
and on General Robertson’s orders en-
trenched on both sides of the road north
of the village. Heavy weapons were drag-
ged through the deep mud and were
placed to cover the road. The other two
battalions dug in along a perimeter
which faced east from Rocherath and
the Wahlerscheid road. So emplaced, the
395th waited for the enemy to come
pouring through the woods onto the 2d
Division route of withdrawal.
On the opposite side of the 2d Divi-
sion corridor, in the Höfen area, the
enemy made no serious move on 17
December to repeat the disastrous attack
of the previous day. The immediate ob-
jective of the 326th Volks Grenadier
Division remained the high ground
northwest of Monschau near Mützenich.
General Kaschner apparently decided on
17 December to make his bid for a break-
through directly in this sector and to
abandon momentarily the attempt to
force a penetration between Monschau
and Höfen.
About 0400 on 17 December the 38th
Cavalry Squadron outposts north of
Monschau heard enemy troops moving
along the draw running west from Men-
zerath. Quick and accurate response by
American batteries ended this move.
Three hours later the German batteries
opened up, shelling the thin line of
troopers deployed along the railroad cut
north of Monschau. When the guns and
Werfers ceased, a wave of German in-
fantry headed for the railroad tracks.
They were checked by machine gun fire,
but more Germans appeared, extending
the assault front from the north edge of
Monschau to the hill beyond Mützenich.
American fire power–artillery, tank de-
stroyers, tank guns, and the numerous
machine guns—stopped the first attack.
But by 0900 the enemy had succeeded
in gathering a battalion on the north
flank, poised against the Troop B front
3,400 yards along the railroad line east
of Mützenich Hill. In short rushes the
enemy filtered into the Troop B area.
Even the Luftwaffe took a hand; at least
two squadrons made strafing runs over
the cavalry positions. Although some
Germans broke through the thin cavalry
line, a sharp shelling administered by
the 62d Field Artillery Battalion stopped
the main support troops short of the rail-
road. More Germans could be seen as-
sembling in Imgenbroich, but friendly
aircraft were on the way to help the
cavalry. Gunners from the 62d marked
the village with red smoke and the
fighter-bombers went in bombing and
strafing. This ended the daylight phase
of the fray. Company A of the 47th In-
fantry, which regiment was en route to
the sector from Eupen, had appeared in
time to help hunt down the Germans
who had got through the cavalry line.
Despite prisoner reports that the 326th
would throw in a regimental attack
during the afternoon, quiet reigned.
The 47th Infantry arrived at Mützenich
and bivouacked astride the Eupen road
-the immediate threat was ended. The
38th Squadron could report a count of
two hundred German dead in front of
its lines. The 326th Volks Grenadier
Division was finding its position at the
pivot of the Sixth Panzer Army offensive
a costly one.

THE SIXTH PANZER ARMY 103
The 2d Division Gives Up the
Wahlerscheid Attack
On the night of 16–17 December the
enemy counterattacked at Wahlerscheid.
Actually the number of enemy troops
available for use against the 2d Division
was very small, too few for any telling
maneuver out of the West Wall position.
The bulk of the 272d Yolks Grenadier
Division, holding the sector, had been
thrown in to stop the American 78th
Division farther north. The 326th
Yolks Grenadier Division was already
engaged in a costly attempt to penetrate
the American lines at Monschau and
Höfen. As a result the defense at the
Wahlerscheid road junction had been
conducted on a catch-as-catch-can basis
by troops farmed out for brief periods
prior to commitment in the counter-
offensive. On 15 December, for example,
elements of the 990th Regiment (277th
Yolks Grenadier Division) were relieved
by a reinforced battalion of the 751st
Regiment (326th Volks Grenadier Divi-
sion), which, during the night of 15–16
December, was in the process of being
relieved by the Replacement Battalion
of the 326th. By coincidence the 2d Di-
vision attack on the night prior to the
16th engaged and detained troops which
both the 277th and 326th expected to use
elsewhere on the first day of the counter-
offensive.
On the afternoon of 16 December Maj.
Gen. Leonard T. Gerow, commanding
the V Corps, concluded from the frag-
mentary reports coming out of the main
battle area that the 2d Infantry Division
might soon find itself in a difficult sit-
uation. He asked the First Army com-
mander, General Hodges, for permission
to call off the attack at Wahlerscheid and
GENERAL GEROW
move the 2d Division to the natural de-
fensive line offered by the ridge run-
ning north and south of Elsenborn. This
was refused. Late in the evening the
deputy corps commander (Maj. Gen.
Clarence R. Huebner) cautioned Gen-
eral Robertson to keep the unengaged
troops of his division in hand for a quick
change of plan, despite the order to con-
tinue the attack. 16 By this time the three
battalions of the 9th Infantry and two
of the 38th were committed. On the
16 The 2d Division attack and subsequent fight-
ing withdrawal are very well covered in combat
interviews. In this chapter the following after
action reports and journals have been used: 2d
Div; 9th, 23d, and 38th Infantry Regiments; the
2d Div Hq Commandant. The 644th Tank De-
stroyer Bn. Army Ground Forces Report No. 559
(26 January 1945) is useful. The published ma-
terials, History of the Fifteenth Field Artillery
Battalion in the European Theater of Operations
and D plus 106 to V-E: The Story of the 2d
Division (n.d.n.p.), are of little value.

104 THE ARDENNES: BATTLE OF THE BULGE
morning of the counteroffensive’s second
day, with the American position in the
99th Division and VIII Corps sector rap-
idly deteriorating, Gerow renewed his
request. The First Army commander
was unwilling to give orders for a with-
drawal but authorized the V Corps com-
mander to act as he saw fit. Gerow
phoned Robertson; it was now about
0730.
For the first time the 2d Division com-
mander learned that the enemy had
broken through the 99th and that his
own division was in danger of being
cut off. Gerow’s order was to set up a
defensive position on the Elsenborn
ridge—but first the 2d Division had to
withdraw from the exposed Wahler-
scheid sector. The immediate task con-
fronting Robertson was that of
gathering what troops he could to de-
fend the single road back through
Krinkelt-Rocherath to Wirtzfeld, while
at the same time holding open the one-
track road between Wirtzfeld and El-
senborn. 17 Two-thirds of his reserve, the
23d Infantry, would be attached to the
99th Division. The rifle strength of the
two regiments around Wahlerscheid had
been reduced by nearly 1,200 men. The
1st Battalion of the 9th Infantry, for
example, had begun the Wahlerscheid
attack on 13 December with 35 officers
and 678 men; on the morning of 17
December the active roster was 22 officers
and 387 men. All of the original com-
pany commanders and most of the pla-
toon leaders were casualties. Fortunately,
the tank and tank destroyer strength at-
17 The 2d Division engineers had worked 011
this secondary road until it offered a fairly passable
single track.
tached to support the 2d Division attack
had been held in reserve well to the
south in order to prevent a jam on
the single communicating road during
the infantry phase of the operation and
so constituted a readily available reserve.
But the appearance of German armor
early on 17 December would force some
piecemeal distribution to meet this
threat.
Even before the withdrawal order
reached the 2d Division command post
at Wirtzfeld on the morning of the 17th,
German tanks had been spotted moving
on Büllingen the main division supply
point. General Robertson ordered the
headquarters commandant to prepare a
defense at the division command post
(a few hundred yards north of Büllin-
gen) and sent his only free rifle battal-
ion, the 2d of the 23d Infantry, south
from the Rocherath area. After the rap-
ture of Büllingen the German column
turned away to the southwest, but a re-
connaissance party composed of a tank
platoon and a few riflemen in half-tracks
continued in the direction of Wirtzfeld.
They had been anticipated by only a few
minutes with the arrival of a self-pro-
pelled gun platoon from C Company of
the 644th Tank Destroyer Battalion.
When the Germans reached the ridge
south of Wirtzfeld they were momen-
tarily profiled against the sky line.
Two of the American tank destroyers
and a 57-mm. gun accounted for three
of the panzers and a half-track. For the
time being the threat to the southern
terminus of the 2d Division line of with-
drawal was ended. The 2d Battalion, 23d
Infantry, and additional tank destroyers
from the 644th soon arrived and de-
ployed in the deep snow south of Wirtz-
feld on the slope facing Büllingen there

THE SIXTH PANZER ARMY 105
to watch the 1st SS Panzer Regiment as
it filed southwest.
The 394th Infantry Abandons the
Mürringen Position
East of German-held Büllingen the
American troops in Mürringen faced en-
circlement, occupying as they did a pre-
carious and jutting angle between the
defense forming on the evening of 17
December around the twin villages and
the southern shoulder bracing at But-
genbach. The sole road remaining for
withdrawal to the Elsenborn assembly
area ran back through Krinkelt, the
southernmost of the twin villages, whose
tenure by friendly troops was none too
certain on the night of the 17th. The
chances for a successful withdrawal from
Mürringen were dwindling by the hour.
The 37 1st Field Artillery Battalion,
which had been firing in support of the
394th from battery positions close by,
was out of ammunition. Colonel
Riley, the regimental commander, re-
ported this to General Lauer at 0115
on the 18th, adding that he recom-
mended “withdrawal.” The division
commander at once sent a radio message
back: “Withdraw arty. Your order. Your
time.” Apparently Lauer expected that
the 394th Infantry and Hightower’s bat-
talion from the 23d Infantry would send
off the guns and then consolidate with
the Krinkelt defenders. About this time
Hightower arrived at Riley’s command
post and told him of his conversation
with Colonel Hirschfelder. Hightower
had just talked with one of his ambu-
lance drivers who had come back from
Wirtzfeld via the road through Krinkelt
and said he could guide the vehicles out.
Colonel Riley now decided to evade the
closing jaws of the German trap by mov-
ing out through Krinkelt and retiring,
if possible, to Elsenborn. The ambulance
driver would join the head of the column
and Hightower’s trucks would fall in be-
hind the vehicles of the 394th.
Shortly after midnight the remnants
of the 394th Infantry at Mürringen
formed in two columns, one composed
of foot troops, the other made up of the
remaining vehicles. Colonel Riley
started the motor column, which in-
cluded Hightower’s vehicles, along the
road toward Krinkelt at 0215, a road
beaten by hostile shellfire. Near Krin-
kelt, whence came the sound of heavy
firing, the column halted while scouts
moved toward the houses at the edge of
the village. Here German tanks were
seen, and so orders were passed along to
abandon the vehicles and move west on
foot to Elsenborn. The infantry column
started a quarter of an hour after the
vehicles, marching quietly toward Krin-
kelt along a tree-covered draw, carrying
only helmets, overcoats, rifles, and am-
munition. Debouching onto the road
south of Krinkelt, the infantry found it
lined with deserted trucks and jeeps.
After some indecision the infantry
manned a few of the empty vehicles-
by this time it had been ascertained that
the 2d Infantry Division had at least
partial control of Krinkelt–and edged
their way through the village and out
the Wirtzfeld road. Most of the men
from Mürringen reached Elsenborn
during the 18th. The 371st Field Ar-
tillery Battalion, which had displaced
closer to Krinkelt during the night,
failed to get its heavy equipment out of
the snow when a second move was
ordered at daylight, and all but five
howitzers were abandoned.

106 THE ARDENNES: BATTLE OF THE BULGE
There remains to account for the
394th’s 2d Battalion, which had been
cut off from the regiment while in the
Honsfelder Wald, and the 1st Battalion
of the 23d, attached to the 394th and
holding Hünningen, the southernmost
position left to the 2d and 99th Divi-
sions. In the Honsfelder Wald the 2d
Battalion of the 394th met the 1st Bat-
talion of the 393d; both were out of com-
munication with their parent regiments
and neither knew the location of neigh-
boring units. Jointly deciding to with-
draw further to the west, the two units
began their march at daylight on the
18th. Diverted by the sound of intense
firing in the direction of Krinkelt, they
marched toward Mürringen.
Almost in the shadow of the houses
the force got a hostile reception: the
Germans had moved in on the heels of
the 394th. At this critical juncture radio
contact was made with a friendly unit,
probably the 2d Division, and in answer
to the plea for help American shells be-
gan exploding in the village. Between
the confusion and the morning fog, the
Americans were able to break away,
turning this time toward Wirtzfeld. They
carried as many of their wounded as
they could, but some of the wounded had
to be left behind in the care of two aid
men. En route to Wirtzfeld the group
suddenly was brought under fire by the
2d Division artillery, a number of casu-
alties resulting. At this point the men
nearly panicked, but order was restored
while a squad leader raced ahead to a
friendly outpost and stopped the shell-
ing. Most of the weary, hungry troops
reached Elsenborn during the early
hours of 19 December. Cap. Robert
McGee, S–3 of the 2d Battalion, 394th,
had brought out about 570 officers and
men. The 1st Battalion, 393d, which had
been badly hurt in the first two days of
the fight, was less fortunate. Fewer than
300 of its officers and men were left.
The 1st Battalion, 23d Infantry, at
HUnningen, it will be recalled, had re-
ceived radio orders late on the 17th
which put it under the command of the
9th Infantry. Colonel Hightower’s bat-
talion was closely engaged, for the Ger-
mans had filtered through at a number
of points, and when the order came to
withdraw from the village the battalion
had to fight its way free. Company B,
most exposed, was under assault even as
the withdrawal began. A platoon leader
was wounded in front of the foxhole
line; two aid men tried to reach him and
were killed. A third reached the side of
the fallen officer, then both were killed.
The 3d Platoon, whose radio was gone,
had no word as to the time when the
battalion was pulling back. Runners who
tried to reach the platoon were killed or
captured, and this part of Company B
was lost. Most of the badly depleted 1st
Battalion withdrew in accordance with
an earlier plan along a secondary road
via Mürringen which had been scouted
by the battalion medical officer, the ve-
hicles following the 394th and the men
on foot marching cross-country to Wirtz-
feld.

CHAPTER VI
The German Northern Shoulder
Is Jammed
The 2d Division Withdraws
General Robertson’s plan for moving
his 2d Division south was to “skin the
cat,” pulling the most advanced bat-
talions in the Wahlerscheid sector back
through the others. In addition to the
main supply road, a part of the division
could use the secondary route running
more or less parallel to the Wahler-
scheid road until the two met at a fork
about a mile north of Rocherath. (See
Map 11.) The 395th Infantry was in the
woods east of the northernmost section
of the 2d Division withdrawal route and
would provide cover for the first stage
of the tricky move parallel to and close
behind the rapidly deteriorating front.
Then too the enemy at the Wahlerscheid
road junction seemed hardly strong or
aggressive enough to make even a day-
light disengagement difficult.
The danger zone would be the twin
villages. Roads from the east led into
Rocherath and Krinkelt. And, to the
east, as information from the 99th Divi-
sion rifle battalions warned, the Ger-
mans had made a deep penetration and
were liable at any moment to come
bursting out of the forest. Rocherath and
Krinkelt had to be held if the 2d Divi-
sion was to reach the Elsenborn position
intact and with its heavy weapons and
vehicles. The 99th Division had long
since thrown its last reserve into the
battle; therefore the 2d Division (with
the attached 395th) alone had to provide
for the defense of this endangered sec-
tor of the corridor south.
The 2d Division commander assigned
responsibility to his officers as follows. 1
Col. Chester J. Hirschfelder, command-
ing the 9th Infantry, was charged with
the actual withdrawal from Wahler-
scheid. The assistant division com-
mander, Col. John H. Stokes, Jr., took
over the defense of Rocherath. Col.
Philip D. Ginder, assigned to the divi-
sion as a spare regimental commander,
was given the task of establishing a
blocking position southeast of Wirtzfeld
-the village at which the 2d Division
would have to turn toward Elsenborn.
General Robertson himself would spend
the crucial hours of the 17th working up
and down the Rocherath road, gathering
additional troops where he could, inter-
vening to change the disposition of
battalions and even companies as the
complexion of the battle altered.
The men turning south were con-
cerned with a fight for their lives. Some
units of the division would be able to
1 General Robertson, however, maintained per-
sonal control of the battle and was in the thick
of the fight. He received the DSC.

108 THE ARDENNES: BATTLE OF THE BULGE
occupy their assigned positions and en-
trench before the enemy struck. Others
would have to attack in order to take
their designated place in the new line of
resistance. Meanwhile the rumor that
American prisoners were being butch-
ered in cold blood by SS troops was
spreading like wildfire through the 2d
Division, a partial explanation of the
bitter fight finally made at the twin
villages.
Robertson’s order, “withdraw at
once,” reached the 9th Infantry a little
after 1000. By 1100 the 2d Battalion had
assembled and started south, with the 3d
and 1st Battalions forming in that order
to complete the column. The withdrawal
from the front lines, shielded by a heavy
barrage laid on the West Wall positions,
was accomplished readily but of course
took much time. The 1st Battalion,
2D DIISION INFRYMEN ON THE MARCH
bringing up the rear of the 9th Infantry
column, did not set out until 1415.
Before the five battalions at Wahler-
scheid commenced to disengage, General
Robertson marched his only reserve, the
3d Battalion of the 38th Infantry, south
through Rocherath and Krinkelt. At this
time in the morning the imminent Ger-
man threat was in the area north of
Büllingen. For this reason Robertson
placed the 3d Battalion (–) at the south-
ern edge of Krinkelt, where, by 1130, it
was entrenched. One rifle company, plus
the antitank and service companies, took
positions around Rocherath guarding the
roads entering the village from the north
and east.
The redeployment of the 2d Division
had a double aim: securing a firm hold
on Wirtzfeld, essential to the control of
the road net in the final phase of the

THE GERMAN NORTHERN SHOULDER IS JAMMED 109
move to Elsenborn, and defending Krin-
kelt and Rocherath until such time as
both the 2d and 99th Divisions could be
withdrawn to the Elsenborn ridge. The
9th Infantry, leading the move, was to
concentrate the bulk of its troops around
Wirtzfeld; the 38th, to build up a de-
fensive line at Krinkelt-Rocherath as its
battalions arrived. Before dark the 2d
Battalion of the 9th Infantry had tra-
versed the seven and a half miles of con-
gested and shell-torn road, deploying
south of Wirtzfeld in line with the 2d
Battalion of the 23d Infantry. The 3d
Battalion, next in the 9th Infantry col-
umn, arrived after dark and dug in be-
tween the two battalions already south
of Wirtzfeld. En route the 2d Division
commander had detached Company K
and sent it posthaste to the line forming
northeast of Rocherath and to the rear
of the fragmented 3d Battalion, 393d.
Through the afternoon the prospect of a
large-scale German armored attack from
Büllingen had loomed large in the cal-
culations of both General Robertson and
General Lauer. Fortunately the attack
failed to come.
In the late afternoon two rifle bat-
talions were on their way to Krinkelt and
Rocherath: the 1st Battalion of the 9th
Infantry (Lt. Col. William D. McKin-
ley) cleared the Wahlerscheid area at
1415; the 1st Battalion of the 38th Infan-
try (Lt. Col. Frank T. Mildren) started
on its way at 1530. The road south was
now under German shellfire, going was
slow, and only a short span of daylight
remained. The danger involved in the
movement across the front multiplied
with each hour, for the 99th Division
center, east of the twin villages, was
collapsing.
On the road General Robertson met
Colonel McKinley and told him that he
had just come from the command post
of the 395th Infantry where he had
learned that the Germans had broken
through the 393d. Robertson had split
the preceding battalion of the 9th Infan-
try to send a rifle company and part of
the headquarters company to bar the
main road from the forest into Roche-
rath. Now he ordered McKinley to rush
his battalion to Rocherath and hold the
woods road “until ordered to with-
draw.” At dusk the 1st Battalion was in
position, deployed on a slight rise over-
looking a shallow depression from which
a gradual ascent led into the forest.
A thick fog lay close to the snow-cov-
ered ground. Around was a scene of wild
confusion, stragglers with and without
arms hurrying along the road and across
the fields, the sound and flash of gun-
fire coming from the woods to the east.
Company K, now attached to the 1st Bat-
talion, already was north of the road,
backed up by three guns from the 644th
Tank Destroyer Battalion. Company C
closed beside K; Company B dug in
at the road; Company A lay to the south.
The battalion had not picked up its
mines during the disengagement, but
was able to get a few from the tank
destroyers for use at the road. There
were fifteen extra bazookas on the am-
munition vehicles, and these were
handed to riflemen earlier trained by
McKinley as bazooka men. Forward ob-
servers from the 15th Field Artillery
Battalion hurriedly set up their com-
munications. In the woods, less than a
thousand yards away, firing continued
as darkness closed over the American po-
sition.
Friendly infantry and tanks were
known to be coming west. About 1930

110 THE ARDENNES: BATTLE OF THE BULGE
three tanks and a platoon or so of in-
fantry came through Company B. They
had passed on toward Rocherath before
anyone realized that this was the first
of the enemy. Half an hour later more
tanks came clanking along the road, the
dark shapes of infantrymen following.
This time Company B took no chances.
The first two German tanks struck the
American mines. Then two more tried
to swing off the road, only to be knocked
out by bazooka fire. By this time the Ger-
mans were milling about, apparently
completely surprised, while the 15th
Field Artillery Battalion added to the
confusion by beating the road close to
the 1st Battalion foxholes. It took the
enemy an hour or so to reorganize. Then
five or six German tanks attacked in
line, rolling to within a couple of hun-
dred yards of the foxhole line where
they halted and fired for nearly half an
hour. Next the accompanying infantry
rushed in, but were cut down by the
heavy machine guns on the final pro-
tective line. Finally the enemy tankers
and riflemen got together in an assault
that broke through.
The 1st Battalion refused to panic and
set to work with bazookas against the
flanks of the blinded tanks. One of the
panzers was crippled, but the crew com-
partment proved impervious to bazooka
rounds (perhaps this was a Tiger). So
Cpl. Charles Roberts (Company D) and
Sgt. Otis Bone (Company B) drained
some gasoline from an abandoned ve-
hicle, doused the tank, and lit the whole
with thermite grenades. When German
tanks moved into the Company A area,
American artillery responded to the ur-
gent call for help and within three min-
utes dropped in a concentration that
stopped the assault. Meanwhile the
American gunners, firing from new em-
placements near Camp Elsenborn, had
effectively checked further troop moves
on the road from the forest, seven bat-
talions finally joining in the shoot. By
midnight all was quiet in front of the
1st Battalion except for the distant crash
of friendly artillery-around the fox-
holes the silence was “frightening.”
Stubborn determination, mines, ma-
chine guns, and bazookas had checked
this first series of assaults, but the battal-
ion commander would credit the gun-
ners at Elsenborn with saving his
battalion. 2
It will be recalled that the 1st Bat-
talion of the 38th Infantry had started
south shortly after the departure of the
last troops of the 9th Infantry. The ac-
tual withdrawal was screened by the 2d
Battalion of the 38th, the final covering
force of the 2d Division, and was aided
by fire and smoke laid down by the 37th
Field Artillery Battalion, 81-mm. and 4.
2-inch mortars. On the road the regi-
mental executive officer met Colonel
Mildren and explained the 1st Battalion
mission: to go into the line forming at
the twin villages on the left of the 3d
Battalion, 38th Infantry, east and north-
east of Krinkelt. Mildren learned in
addition that the battalion probably
would have to fight its way to the as-
signed position a jarring note that
pleased none this close to nightfall.
About a thousand yards north of
2 For ease of description this engagement has
been treated as a fight by the 1st Battalion; notice,
however, that the 1st deployed alongside Com-
pany K. Pfc. William A. Soderman, of Company
K, stopped three enemy tanks with bazooka rounds
during the night of battle but was badly wounded
by machine gun fire from the last tank he at-
tacked. Soderman was awarded the Medal of
Honor.

THE GERMAN NORTHERN SHOULDER IS JAMMED 111
Rocherath the battalion column came to hold won more Germans appeared as the
a crossroads which had been picked as a night went on. The fight for Krinkelt
profitable target for the enemy artillery surged back and forth, building to buildand
Werfers. Company A at the head of ing, hedgerow to hedgerow. Men on both
the column passed safely, but the rest sides were captured and recaptured as the
came into a gantlet of the most severe tide of battle turned. A German attempt
shelling the veteran battalion ever had to seize the heavy-walled church on the
encountered. Company C, third in the northern edge of the village was beaten
serial, suffered most and became badly off by the reconnaissance company of the
disorganized. German tanks were near 644th Tank Destroyer Battalion, which
the crossroads and might have cut into had lost a platoon at Büllingen during
the American infantry had not T/4 the morning. The communications offi-
Truman Kimbro placed mines across the cer of the 1st Battalion, 38th Infantry, 1st
eastern entry. Kimbro was killed, after Lt. Jesse Morrow, knocked out a tank
having been hit innumerable times. He with only a rifle grenade. (Morrow later
was awarded the Medal of Honor post- was awarded the DSC.) The situation in
humously.
Krinkelt was further confused by re-
The leading company, now alone, treating troops from the 99th Division,
entered Rocherath at dusk but found no intermixed as they were with the infilguides
and marched on through the next trating enemy. One German, using a capvillage
until met by bullet fire. Twice tured American to give the password, got
the company doubled back on its trail past two outposts, but a sentry finally
until finally found by the battalion ex- killed both men. At midnight a column
ecutive and directed to the proper po- of 99th Infantry vehicles started pouring
sition. Company B arriving about 2130, through the town and continued the rest
moved in on the left of Company A but of the night.
was still on the surface (not having had At Rocherath, the Germans who had
time to intrench) when German tanks so boldly entered the village earlier in
and infantry struck from the northeast at the evening destroyed three American
Krinkelt. Company A, well dug in and tanks as these inched their way out of
with all its weapons emplaced, let the the village to help Company K of the
tanks roll past and then took on the in- 38th Infantry. Here too the fight was
fantry. Its neighbor, Company B, ex- bitter and confused. At one time a
posed and without its supporting battalion commander of the 38th was
weapons, was riddled, only one platoon reported to have men from sixteen
managing to escape. The Company B different companies fighting under his
survivors, joined by what was left of command. By midnight, however, the
Company C, fell back to the regimental enemy tanks behind the American lines
command post in Rocherath and joined had been accounted for and the German
the antitank company in the street fight infantrymen captured or killed.
raging there.
When the wild night of fighting drew
Back at Krinkelt three German tanks to a close, the Americans still were in
with infantry clinging to their decks got control of the two villages and the near
into the eastern streets; with this foot- sector of the Wahlerscheid withdrawal

112 THE ARDENNES: BATTLE OF THE BULGE
route. The rear guard 2d Battalion of the
38th had made a highly successful with-
drawal and was assembled a half mile
north of Rocherath. The 395th Infantry
had moved back as ordered and, thus
far in good shape, held the left flank of
the 2d Division northeast of Rocherath
astride the two approaches to the
fork above the village. (It had left
the 324th Engineer Battalion isolated
on Rath Hill, however, and when the
engineers started west on the morning of
the 18th they came under fire from both
the 395th and the enemy.) Straggler
lines were operating around the twin
villages and a start was being made at
regrouping the strays and tying to-
gether the bits and pieces of the Ameri-
can line. Wirtzfeld, the one good escape
hatch to Elsenborn, was ready for a de-
fense in force. The 2d Division artillery
and its reinforcing battalions had dis-
placed to the Elsenborn ridge in positions
within range of the entire front. General
Robertson's 2d Division and attached
troops had carried through a highly com-
plex maneuver in the face of the enemy,
disengaging in a fortified zone, withdraw-
ing across a crumbling front, then wheel-
ing from column to secure and organize
a defensive line in the dark and under
attack. Having completed this mission,
the 2d Division was under orders to hold
in place while the remnants of the 99th
Division right wing passed through to
Elsenborn; then it was to break away and
re-form for the defense of the Elsenborn
ridge.
The appearance of the 2d Infantry
Division at the twin villages probably
came as a complete surprise to the Ger-
man command. German intelligence had
failed completely as regards the location
of this division and believed that it was
in reserve at Elsenborn. Peculiarly
enough, the fact that the 2d was attack-
ing through the 99th positions never was
reported to the Sixth Panzer Army head-
quarters. Dietrich expected, therefore, to
break through the 99th and meet the 2d
somewhere to the rear or possibly to
the right rear of the 99th. This may
explain the German failure to attempt
an end run and drive for Elsenborn.
The 1st Infantry Division Sends
Reinforcements to Butgenbach
The advance guard of the 1st SS Pan-
zer Division had reached Büllingen on
the early morning of 17 December, by
its presence threatening the open right
flank and the rear of the 99th Division.
Although the German armored column
veered southwest, under the eyes of the
astonished Americans, the presence of
the enemy this deep within the bare
south flank was a cause of grave concern
to General Lauer and later to General
Robertson. Through the morning only
a handful of engineers and headquarters
personnel, backed up with single tank
destroyer and antiaircraft pieces, stood
in the way of a German dash north across
the American rear. But the 1st SS Pan-
zer, intent on objectives far to the west,
failed to make this play. 3 A platoon
of Mark IV tanks did scout the Butgen-
bach road but withdrew when three were
destroyed by the few guns of Company
3 The history of the fight against the 1st SS
Panzer during the first few days of the advance
was the subject of a special report, based on
personal interviews in January 1945, by Capt.
Franklin Ferriss (in OCMH). Coverage on the
German side is good, notably MSS # A–924
(Kraemer), A–877 (Priess), and B–733, 12th
Volks Grenadier Division, 1–29 December 1944
(Generalleutnant Gerhard Engel) .

THE GERMAN NORTHERN SHOULDER IS JAMMED 113
B, 6 12th Tank Destroyer Battalion,
which Capt. John J. Kennedy had
implaced near Dom Butgenbach.
Reinforcements from the 1st Infantry
Division, as promised by the VII Corps,
arrived at Camp Elsenborn about 0900,
reported to the 99th Division, and were
dispatched at once toward Butgenbach.
This village lay on high ground belong-
ing to the vital Elsenborn ridge and
would be the point of entry for any Ger-
man thrust on the road net north of Bull-
ingen. 4
The 26th Infantry (Col. John F. R.
Seitz) , which had been transferred to
V Corps control the previous midnight,
was the only unit thus far sent south by
the 1st Division. At Elsenborn, after
General Lauer had given a quick re-
sumé of the situation, the regimental ex-
ecutive officer, then in command, put
the 2d Battalion in the lead, sending
it south to occupy two hills midway be-
tween Butgenbach and Büllingen which
overlooked the main road connecting
the two villages. By dusk the 2d Battalion
(Lt. Col. Derrill M. Daniel) was de-
ployed on the high ground near the tiny
hamlet of Dom Butgenbach, dug in
along the reverse slopes on a 2,100-yard
front. Both flanks were wide open. The
enemy, however, failed to react force-
fully to the American move, although
a 2d Battalion patrol found that the
Germans still were in Büllingen. The
26th Infantry ultimately would be hit
4 The actions fought here by the 26th Infantry
involved very heavy fighting by attached tanks
and tank destroyers. See especially the AAR’s of
the 741st and 745th Tank Battalions; the 634th,
703d, and 801st Tank Destroyer Battalions. See
also Capt. D. E. Rivette, “The Hot Corner at
Dom Butgenbach,” Infantry Journal (October,
1945), pp. 19–23.
and hit hard, but not until the German
plans for shattering the eastern front of
the 99th and 2d Divisions had failed.
The night of 17 December passed un-
eventfully except for the booming of the
guns of the 33d Field Artillery Battalion
and 413th Antiaircraft Gun Battalion
firing from their positions with the 26th
Infantry against the hostile traffic stream-
ing through Büllingen.
Early the following morning small
enemy detachments appeared in the
Dom Butgenbach area but showed no
inclination to close with the Americans.
The 26th Infantry had been busy during
the night completing its deployment: the
3d Battalion now was dug in west of
Wirtzfeld on the left of the 2d Battalion,
which retained the responsibility for
blocking the Büllingen-Butgenbach
road; the 1st Battalion was in reserve
around Butgenbach; and considerable
artillery and tank destroyer strength re-
inforced the command. In anticipation
of an all-out German attack at this
critical section of the American front,
the V Corps truckhead at Butgenbach
was closed and all rations and gasoline
were evacuated. Farther to the west,
where no defense had yet formed, the
Robertville ammunition supply point,
holding six thousand tons, suspended
operations and moved to the rear. But
through the 18th the enemy showed no
sign of any earnest intent in front of the
26th Infantry.
The Defense of the Twin Villages
18 December
The German attempt to take Krinkelt
and Rocherath during the night of 17–
18 December had not been well co-
ordinated, carried out as it was by the

26TH INFANTRY AREA NEAR BUTGENBACH. Above, 1st Battalion en route to the village;
below, troops positioning antitank gun.

THE GERMAN NORTHERN SHOULDER IS JAMMED 115
advance guards of two divisions
attacking piecemeal in the dark
over unknown terrain against re-
sistance which was completely surprising.
By the morning of 18 December, how-
ever, the enemy strength had increased
substantially despite the miserable state
of the woods roads leading to the twin
villages. The 989th Regiment of the
277th Volks Grenadier Division (prob-
ably reinforced by a third battalion) had
reached Rocherath. The 12th SS Panzer
Division, whose tanks and armored in-
fantry carriers made extremely slow
progress on the muddy secondary roads-
quickly chewed up by churning tracks-
was able by dawn to assemble the 25th
Panzer Grenadier Regiment, an assault
gun battalion, and one full tank bat-
talion east of the villages. During the
18th this force was strengthened by one
more tank battalion, the final armored
commitment being about equally di-
vided between Panther tanks and the
heavy Tigers.
The American strength at Krinkelt
and Rocherath was substantial and by
daylight on 18 December was assuming
a cohesive defensive pattern as the bat-
talions reorganized after the race south
and the confused night battle. Most of
the 38th Infantry (Col. Francis H. Boos)
was in and around the two villages, plus
about a battalion and a half of the 9th
Infantry and a few platoons of the 23d
Infantry (Col. Jay B. Loveless). Al-
though these 2d Division troops had gap-
ing ranks, so had their opponents. For-
tunately, in view of the number of tanks
ready in the German camp, the Amer-
ican infantry had the means of antitank
defense at hand: the 741st Tank Battal-
ion, 644th Tank Destroyer Battalion, a
company of the 612th Tank Destroyer
Battalion, and a few guns from the 801st
Tank Destroyer Battalion. On Elsen-
born ridge, but well within supporting
range, lay the 2d Division artillery
(which had displaced after firing from
extreme forward positions), the bulk of
the 99th Division artillery, and some
corps field artillery battalions. The flanks
of the 2d Division position at the villages
were more or less covered by elements of
the 9th and 23d Infantry in Wirtzfeld,
to the southwest, and the battalions of
the 393d deployed in blocking positions
to hold the road net north of Rocherath.
As yet, however, there was no homo-
geneous line sealing the 2d Division
front, and the men and vehicles of the
99th Division still passing through to the
west complicated the problem of co-or-
dinating the defense and artillery fire.
An ominous quiet prevailed around
Rocherath during the early, dark hours
of 18 December, but just before first
light the enemy resumed the assault, this
time employing his tanks and infantry in
ordered company. The 1st Battalion of
the 9th Infantry, deployed east of the
village along the road from the woods,
took the first blow. Apparently a com-
pany of tanks had been brought close
to the American line during the night
battle, and these now attacked with more
than a battalion of infantry. While the
batteries on Elsenborn ridge furiously
shelled the road, a confused fight spread
all along the foxhole line. The morning
fog was heavy, visibility almost nil. The
American infantry let the tanks roll past,
then tailed them with bazookas or turned
to meet the oncoming infantry at close
quarters with grenades, and even bay-
onets or knives. This first assault was
beaten off, while a number of the Ger-
man tanks were crippled or destroyed

116 THE ARDENNES: BATTLE OF THE BULGE
by bazooka teams stalking successfully
under cover of the fog.
When the fog lifted about 0830, three
German tanks rolled right along the fox-
hole line firing their machine guns while
the German infantry rushed forward. Lt.
Stephen P. Truppner of Company A
radioed that his company had been over-
run and asked for artillery to fire on his
own position. For thirty minutes an
American battalion shelled this area.
Only twelve men escaped. Company K,
which had been attached to the battalion
the day before, likewise was engulfed.
Capt. Jack J. Garvey, sending a last
message from the cellar of the house
which was his command post, refused
to leave because he could not get his
company out. Ten men and one officer
escaped. On the left Companies B and
C were able to hold their ground; a
few from Company B broke and ran but
were sent back by the battalion com-
mander.
The German wave carried tanks and
infantry inside Rocherath, the fight
eddying from house to house, wall to
wall, along streets and down narrow
alleys. Tanks fought tanks; men were
captured, then captured again. Mean-
while, Colonel Boos did what he could
to form some defense behind what was
left of the 1st Battalion of the 9th. 5
He radioed Colonel McKinley that as
soon as the 2d Battalion of the 38th
could swing into position, a matter of
an hour or more, the 1st Battalion
should withdraw. With his remaining
two companies transfixed by direct tank
5 Here Sgt. James L. Bayliss manned his machine
gun to cover his men although he had been under
fire by a German tank. Finally he was killed by
a tank-gun round. Bayliss was awarded the DSC.
fire and surrounded by German in-
fantry, McKinley replied that no with-
drawal was possible unless friendly tanks
or tank destroyers arrived. “Miracu-
lously,” as the 1st Battalion later re-
ported, a platoon of Sherman tanks came
into view. This was a part of A company,
741st Tank Battalion, which had been
patrolling the Wahlerscheid road.
When the platoon commander was
asked if he wanted to do some fighting
the reply was profanely affirmative.
First the tanks joined the infantry in a
counterattack to reach the positions
which had been held by Companies A
and K. Two of the three German tanks
which had been harassing the battalion
were destroyed by the Shermans, but no
contact was made with the lost com-
panies. A second counterattack by the
tank platoon covered the 1st Battalion
withdrawal, but the last riflemen out
had the Germans yelling at their heels.
The shattered battalion withdrew
through the 2d Battalion of the 38th,
fell back to Rocherath, and then
marched to Krinkelt, where it billeted in
a deserted hotel. Approximately 240 offi-
cers and men were left of the orig-
inal battalion and its attached units. In
addition to the nearly total loss of Com-
panies A and K, all of the Company
M machine gunners attached to the 1st
Battalion were missing in action. Of the
group that had been rushed in the pre-
vious evening from Headquarters Com-
pany, 3d Battalion, only thirteen were
left. It seems probable that the entire
989th Regiment had been employed in
wresting the road to Rocherath from the
stubborn 1st Battalion; the fight had
gone on for nearly six hours and had
given the 38th Infantry time to regroup
to meet the enemy drive. Colonel Boos

THE GERMAN NORTHERN SHOULDER IS JAMMED 117
gratefully acknowledged that this gallant
stand had saved his regiment.
The 3d Battalion of the 393d, after
hard fighting on the 17th, had with-
drawn northeast of Rocherath and tied
in sketchily on the left of the 1st Bat-
talion, 9th Infantry. Colonel Allen’s bat-
talion was about half strength and had
lost all of its machine guns, mortars, and
antitank guns. The furious morning
attack against the 1st Battalion, with a
tank platoon in the lead, also struck the
3d Battalion. Unable to combat the tanks
although one was hit by a bazooka round,
the battalion fell back a thousand yards
to the northwest. Good radio communi-
cation with the 395th allowed its cannon
company to take a hand effectively, cover-
ing the retirement and discouraging close
pursuit. About noon Allen’s men were
ordered to Wirtzfeld, then on to the line
forming at Elsenborn.
Although enemy tanks and foot troops
had penetrated as far as the 38th com-
mand post inside Rocherath, they
were successfully hunted out during the
morning. The Germans continued to
hammer along the forest road, striving
to win free entrance to the village, but
they found the 2d Battalion of the 38th
(Lt. Col. Jack K. Norris) , now standing
in the way, a tough opponent. The most
successful assault of the afternoon forced
the 2d Battalion to retire “one hedge-
row.”
The battle for Krinkelt, if it can be
separated from that raging around
Rocherath, commenced sometime be-
fore dawn when five tanks and a body
of infantry moved cautiously up to the
eastern edge of the village. When the
enemy tankers halted to confer with their
infantry escort, Company L, 23d Infan-
try, which had been placed in the line
after its retreat from the woods the
evening before, killed some forty of the
Germans and the panzers decamped. A
brief period of quiet followed and dur-
ing this lull the foot detachment of the
394th from Mürringen passed through
the American lines en route to Wirtzfeld
and Elsenborn. By 0830, however, the
fight for Krinkelt was on in earnest. A
number of attacks were checked by
shellfire before they could make much
headway. Nonetheless, a tank platoon
penetrated as far as the 1st Battalion,
38th Infantry, command post before it
was destroyed, and a few German tanks
got as far as the road south to Wirtzfeld.
In this quarter, as at Rocherath, the
American tanks, tank destroyers, and
bazooka teams left the German tanks
smoking and broken. 6
During the night of 18 December,
the 2d Division still held the twin vil-
lages while the last organized units of the
99th Division moved west on their way
to Elsenborn. In the dark, German
bazooka teams crept along walls and
hedgerows seeking the hiding places
of the American tanks and tank de-
stroyers which had done so much to foil
the armored attacks during the day. The
panzers again made forays into the vil-
lages, made their kills, and in turn were
destroyed.
Although the American hold in this
sector remained firm, some of the con-
fusion and loss of control normally in-
herent in a tactical situation like that
faced by the 2d and 99th Divisions was
beginning to tell. Orders from the 99th
Division had been addressed to the 394th
6 During the fighting. in the twin villages on
the 18th, 1st Lt. R. A. Parker destroyed or
immobilized six enemy tanks with a rocket
launcher. Parker was awarded the DSC.

118
Infantry, at 0808, stressing that the reg-
iment was not to withdraw to Elsenborn
but instead should take position south
of Krinkelt beside the 38th Infantry. The
main body of the 394th already had
passed through Krinkelt by that hour
and probably never received the order
until it arrived at Elsenborn.
Confused communications also had
an impact in the area held by the 395th
Infantry on the north flank. General
Robertson, about 0200 on the morning
of the 18th, had radioed the 395th In-
fantry to maintain contact with the 38th
but to prepare for a move to Elsenborn.
Thus far the enemy had made no move
to strike the 395th positions in force.
A radio message reached the 395th com-
mand post about 1600 ordering the reg-
THE ARDENNES: BATTLE OF THE BULGE
CAPTURED GERMAN TANK CREWMAN
iment to withdraw to Elsenborn. The
move began while Colonel Mackenzie
went on to the 99th Division head-
quarters at Elsenborn to report. Here
he was informed that no such order
had been sent (it had been sent but
was garbled) and General Lauer told
him that his battalions must be sent
back to their positions at once. Mac-
kenzie was able to reach two battalions
on the road and turn them back, but the
1st Battalion, 395th, had arrived in El-
senborn before word could reach it. The
countermarch was made successfully and
the old positions reoccupied at 0500 on
19 December. Information that the 395th
had left, denuding the north flank,
reached the 38th Infantry commander
during the night and caused much con-

THE GERMAN NORTHERN SHOULDER IS JAMMED 119
cern. But the 990th Volks Grenadier
Regiment, at the forest edge east of the
395th positions, either had failed to
notice the withdrawal or had been un-
willing to make a move with darkness
settling.
The Last Attack at Höfen Fails
18 December
Ten miles by road north of Krinkelt
and Rocherath the 3d Battalion, 395th
Infantry, fought an isolated but impor-
tant engagement on 18 December. 7
Having failed the day before to breach
the American cavalry line at Mon-
schau, the 326th Volks Grenadier Divi-
sion turned again toward Höfen where
it had encountered such a sharp reverse
on the first day of the German counter-
offensive. The 2d Battalion of the 753d
Regiment finally had rejoined the di-
vision; so General Kaschner put this
regiment in the van, nourishing his
assault waves with companies of the re-
maining two regiments as the fight
developed. Some three hours before day-
break the German assault detachments
moved forward from the hills surround-
ing Höfen to make a first test of the
American defenses at the northern edge
of the village. Well prepared for such
an onslaught, concentrated artillery and
mortar fire blanketed the ground over
which the grenadiers had to advance.
Despite heavy casualties from this fire
the enemy broke through to the village.
There followed a confused battle, but
when day broke the last Germans were
being routed from the houses.
7 The 3d Battalion of the 395th Infantry was
given a Presidential Citation for its fight at
Höfen. Sgt. T. E. Piersall and Pfc. Richard Mills
fought with such conspicuous courage as to receive
the DSC.
The first daylight assault came about
0900 preceded by a barrage of artillery,
rocket, and mortar fire. Advancing
through a thick haze, ten tanks, seven
armored cars, and an infantry battalion
made for the village. Once more the de-
fensive gun concentrations made great
play in the gray ranks. The 3-inch tank
destroyers of the 612th Tank Destroyer
Battalion, although frozen in place, held
the German fighting vehicles at bay-
even with the limited traverse. As be-
fore, some of the attackers broke
through. Colonel Butler phoned the
forward observer of the 196th Field Ar-
tillery Battalion, whose little party was
fighting off Germans around its observa-
tion post (a three-story brick building
right in the forward line) , and asked for
three five-minute concentrations on his
own positions. 8 The shells came in
promptly. As the fire finally lifted But-
ler sent his reserve, a single platoon of I
Company, into the counterattack. Pick-
ing up strength at the foxhole line, the
Americans drove the remaining foe back
in the direction of Rohren. The German
tanks, whose appearance had caused the
3d Battalion to request help “at once,’’
took a singularly small part in the fray,
retiring behind a ridge which gave
shelter against direct antitank fire. It
must be said that the German grena-
diers were of sterner stuff. The Ameri-
can main line of resistance was not com-
pletely re-established until 1230. When
night came the Germans tried once
again but to no avail.
Thus ended the enemy plan to carry
the northern pivot of the Sixth Panzer
8 This was 2d Lt. S. D. Llewellyn, who later re-
ceived the DSC for the defense of the observation
post.

120
Army offensive as far forward as Eupen.
Kaschner had planned to shift his attack
later in the day toward Monschau, but
this attack never was made. The bloody
failure at Höfen gives a more than ade-
quate explanation. German dead liter-
ally were piled in front of the 3d
Battalion. The disparity in losses suffered
by the combatants is amazing. The Ger-
man dead counted in and around Höfen
numbered 554; prisoners numbered 53.
The American casualties were five killed
and seven wounded. From this time
on the 326th Volks Grenadier Division
abandoned all but minor action in this
sector, finally turning south to take a
secondary role in the ensuing battle at
the Elsenborn ridge. Höfen and Mons-
chau remained in American hands
through the rest of the Ardennes Cam-
paign.
The 2d Division Withdraws
to the Elsenborn Line
19 December
At 1800 on 18 December the V Corps
commander attached General Lauer’s
99th Division to Robertson’s 2d Divi-
sion. General Gerow’s instructions,
given Robertson late on 17 December
for a defense of the Rocherath-Krinkelt-
Wirtzfeld line until such time as the
isolated American troops to the east
could be withdrawn, finally were ful-
filled on the night of 18–19 December
when the remnants of the 1st Battalion
of the 393d and the 2d Battalion of the
394th came back through the 2d Divi-
sion lines. These were the last organized
units to find their way to safety, although
small groups and individual stragglers
would appear at the Elsenborn rallying
point for some days to come. Then, de-
THE ARDENNES: BATTLE OF THE BULGE
spite the fact that the 2d Division was
hard pressed, Robertson made good on
his promise to the corps commander that
he would release the 99th Division ele-
ments which had been placed in the 2d
Division line and send them to Elsen-
born for reorganization within their own
division. The tactical problem remain-
ing was to disengage the 2d Division
and its attached troops, particularly
those in the twin villages, while at the
same time establishing a new and solid
defense along the Elsenborn ridge.
The failure to break through at the
twin villages on 18 December and so
open the way south to the main armored
route via Büllingen had repercussions all
through the successive layers of German
command on the Western Front.
Realizing that the road system and the
terrain in front of the Sixth Panzer Army
presented more difficulties than those
confronting the Fifth, it had been
agreed to narrow the Sixth Panzer Army
zone of attack and in effect ram through
the American front by placing two pan-
zer corps in column. The southern wing
of the 1st SS Panzer Corps, in the Sixth
Panzer Army van, had speedily punched
a hole between the 106th and 99th
American divisions and by 18 December
the leading tank columns of the 1st SS
Panzer Division were deep in the Amer-
ican rear areas. The northern wing,
however, had made very slow progress
and thus far had failed to shake any
tanks loose in a dash forward on the
northern routes chosen for armored pen-
etration. Peremptory telephone messages
from the headquarters of OB WEST har-
assed Dietrich, the Sixth Panzer Army
commander, all during the 18th and were
repeated–doubtless by progressively
sharpening voices–all the way to the

THE GERMAN NORTHERN SHOULDER IS JAMMED 121
99TH DIVISION VEHICLES MOVING THROUGHH WIRTZFELD en route to Elsenborn.
Krinkelt-Rocherath front. But exhorta-
tion had been fruitless.
Although Dietrich continued to nee-
dle his subordinates to get the right wing
of the army rolling forward, he also
sought to remedy the situation by chang-
ing the I SS Panzer Corps tactics. Diet-
rich suggested to General Priess that the
12th SS Panzer Division disengage,
swing south, bypass Butgenbach, and get
back onto the main route some place
west of the thorny American position.
The I SS Panzer Corps commander and
his staff politely rejected this idea on the
grounds that the byroads were impass-
able and that Krinkelt, Rocherath, and
Butgenbach must be cleared to open the
better road net. Eventually Dietrich pre-
vailed—or some compromise was
reached–for late on 18 December ar-
mored elements of the 12th SS Panzer
Division began to withdraw from the
twin villages, while the 3d Panzer Gren-
adier Division, which had been sched-
uled for the fight at Monschau, marched
west from reserve to take over the battle
with the 2d Division.
The German plans for 19 December
were these: the 277th Volks Grenadier
Division and advancing troops of the
3d Panzer Grenadier Division were to
continue the attack at Krinkelt and

122 THE ARDENNES: BATTLE OF THE BULGE
Rocherath; the 89th Regiment, 12th
Volks Grenadier Division, which had
come up from reserve and initiated an
attack from Mürringen against Krinkelt
the day before, was to maintain pressure
in this sector. Meanwhile, the 12th SS
Panzer Division was to complete its
withdrawal from the twin villages and
move as quickly as the poor roads would
allow to join a kampfgruppe of the 12th
Volks Grenadier Division in a thrust
against the American flank position at
Butgenbach. The direction of the Ger-
man main effort, as a result, would shift,
substituting an armored thrust against
the flank for the battering-ram frontal
attack against the now well-developed
defenses in the area of Krinkelt-Roch-
erath. Fresh German infantry were en
route to the twin villages, and some
reinforcements would be employed
there on the 19th, but the attack would
lack the armored weight whose momen-
tum had carried earlier assault waves
into the heart of the American positions.
At dawn, on 19 December, and blank-
eted in thick fog, the German grena-
diers advanced on Krinkelt and Roche-
rath. The batteries back on Elsenborn
ridge once again laid down a defensive
barrage, ending the attack before it
could make any headway. Another
advance, rolling forward under an in-
coming fog about 1000, placed enemy
snipers and machine gunners close to the
American positions. Shortly after noon a
few German tanks churned toward the
villages and unloaded machine gunners
to work the weapons on derelict tanks
which had been abandoned close to the
American foxhole line. Apparently the
enemy infantry were edging in as close
as they could in preparation for a final
night assault. Headlong assault tactics
were no longer in evidence, however. In
the meantime the defenders picked up
the sounds of extensive vehicular move-
ment (representing the departing ele-
ments of the 12th SS Panzer Division),
and a platoon of tanks appeared north-
east of Rocherath but quickly retired
when artillery concentrations and direct
fire were brought to bear.
Inside the twin villages’ perimeter
the defenders were aware that a phase
of the battle was ending. Colonel Stokes,
the assistant division commander, was
preparing plans for withdrawal to the
Elsenborn lines. Colonel Boos had the
38th Infantry and its attached troops at
work quietly destroying the weapons and
equipment, German and American,
which could not be evacuated. Finally, at
1345, the withdrawal order was issued,
to be put in effect beginning at 1730.
The 395th Infantry was to retire from its
lines north of the villages and move
cross-country (by a single boggy trail)
west to Elsenborn. The 38th Infantry
and its attached units, more closely
engaged and in actual physical contact
with the enemy, would break away from
the villages, fall back west through
Wirtzfeld, then move along the tem-
porary road which the 2d Division
engineers had constructed between
Wirtzfeld and Berg. Once the 38th
had cleared through the Wirtzfeld posi-
tion, now held by elements of the 9th
Infantry and a battalion of the 23d, it
would occupy a new defensive line west
and northwest of Wirtzfeld, while the
9th Infantry in turn evacuated that vil-
lage.
Company officers commanding troops
facing the enemy had been carefully
briefed to avoid the word “withdrawal”
in final instructions to their men. This

THE GERMAN NORTHERN SHOULDER IS JAMMED 123
was to be “a move to new positions”;
all were to walk, not run. Col. Leland
W. Skaggs’ 741st Tank Battalion, tank
destroyers from the 644th Tank De-
stroyer Battalion, and the 2d Division
engineers would form a covering force
in the villages, laying mines and beating
off any attempt at “pursuit.” Disengage-
ment was made from left to right,
“stripping” the 2d Division line from
Rocherath to Wirtzfeld. First, the 2d
Battalion of the 38th Infantry pulled out
of the north edge of Rocherath; the 1st
Battalion, deployed in both villages,
followed; the 3d Battalion tacked on at
Krinkelt. A half hour later, just as the
Germans moved into Rocherath, Com-
pany C of the 644th and Company B of
the 741st hauled out, the tanks carrying
the engineers. The move through Wirtz-
feld, now in flames, brought the 38th
under German guns and resulted in
some casualties and confusion, but at
0200 on 20 December the rear guard
tank platoon left Wirtzfeld and half an
hour later the 9th Infantry passed
through the new lines occupied by the
38th Infantry a thousand yards west of
the village.
The four-day battle which had pitted
the 2d Infantry Division and the 99th
Infantry Division against the spearheads
of the Sixth Panzer Army had cost both
sides heavily in men and materiel. But
in the balance sheet for this desperate
initial phase of the German counteroffen-
sive, where lives weighed less than hours
won or lost, the reckoning was favorable
to the Americans. What the fruitless bid
for a quick decision had cost the Ger-
mans in terms of dead and wounded has
no accounting. The losses of the un-
tried 99th Division, fighting its first
major action under circumstances far
more difficult than was the lot of most
American infantry divisions in the Eu-
ropean Theater of Operations, have
been compiled only as a total for the
whole month of December. A careful
check shows that the 99th had few cas-
ualties prior to 16 December or after 19
December; nine-tenths or more of the
following list, therefore, represents the
cost of four days of battle: 14 officers and
119 men killed in action; 53 officers and
1,341 men missing in action; 51 of-
ficers and 864 men wounded in action.
About 600 officers and men passed
through the division clearing station be-
fore 20 December as nonbattle casual-
ties; half were trench foot cases.
The veteran 2d Division had taken
considerable punishment from exposure
and battle loss beginning on 13 Decem-
ber with the start of the Wahlerscheid
operation. It is impossible to determine
the ratio between the casualties suffered
in the first four days of attack and those
of the final three days of defense. In-
deed no total is available for the 2d
Division during these important seven
days. The 23d Infantry, in reserve be-
fore 16 December and then committed
by battalion, sustained these battle
losses: 1st Battalion, 10 officers and 221
men; 2d Battalion, 1 officer and 100
men; 3d Battalion, 10 officers and 341
men. The 9th Infantry, which was en-
gaged both at Wahlerscheid and the
twin villages, lists 47 officers and men
killed, 425 wounded, and 192 missing.
The regiment likewise had lost nearly
600 officers and men as nonbattle casual-
ties (trench foot, respiratory diseases in-
duced by exposure, fatigue, and related
causes) , a figure which tells something
of the cost of lengthy battle in snow,
damp, and mud, but also reflects the

124
high incidence of nonbattle cases in a
veteran unit whose ranks are filled with
troops previously wounded or hospital-
ized-often more than once. The bitter
character of the initial twenty-four
hours of the 2d Division fight to oc-
cupy and hold Krinkelt and Rocherath,
after the march south, is mirrored in the
battle losses taken by the 38th Infantry
in that critical period: 389 officers and
men were missing (many of them killed
in action but not so counted since the
Americans subsequently lost the battle-
ground) ; 50 wounded were evacuated;
and 11 were counted as killed in action.
In the three days at the twin villages
the 38th Infantry suffered 625 casual-
ties.
THE ARDENNES: BATTLE OF THE BULGE
The defense of Krinkelt and Roche-
rath, so successful that by the second day
many officers and men believed that the
sector could be held against all attack,
is a story of determination and skilled
leadership in a veteran command. But
more than that, the American battle here
exemplifies a high order of co-ordination
and co-operation (typed though these
terms have become) between the ground
arms. Although the infantry almost sin-
glehandedly secured the ground and held
it for the first few hours, the main Ger-
man assaults were met and checked by
infantry, tanks, tank destroyers, and ar-
tillery. The men of the 2d Division had
on call and within range ample artillery
support. Communications between the
GUN POSITION ON ELSENBORN RIDGE

THE GERMAN NORTHERN SHOULDER IS JAMMED 125
firing battalions on Elsenborn ridge
and the rifle companies in buildings and
foxholes functioned when needed-
although the losses suffered among the
artillery forward observers were unu-
sually high. Artillery throughout this
fight offered the first line of antitank de-
fense, immobilizing many panzers be-
fore they reached the foxhole line,
leaving them with broken tracks and
sprocket wheels like crippled geese in
front of the hunter. The 155-mm. bat-
teries were best at this work. The
accuracy and weight of the defensive
concentrations laid on from Elsenborn
ridge must also be accounted one of
the main reasons the American infan-
try were not completely overrun during
the night assaults of the 17th and
18th. One battalion of the 2d Division
artillery (the 38th Field Artillery (fired
more than 5,000 rounds on the 18th.
But men counted as much as weight of
metal. Of the 48 forward observers
working with the 15th Field Artillery
Battalion, 32 were evacuated for wounds
or exposure in six days of battle.
Although an experienced outfit, the
2d Infantry Division made its first fight
against a large force of tanks in the ac-
tion at Krinkelt-Rocherath. In the early
evening of 18 December General Rob-
ertson telephoned his assistant division
commander: “This is a tank battle–if
there are any tank replacements we
could use them as crews are pretty tired.
We could use the tanks mounting a
90-mm. [gun].” Robertson’s wish for an
American tank with adequate armament
to cope with the German Panthers and
Tigers was being echoed and would be
echoed—prayerfully and profanely—
wherever the enemy panzer divisions ap-
peared out of the Ardennes hills and
forests. What the 2d Division actually
had was a little less than a battalion of
Sherman tanks mounting the standard
75-mm. gun, a tank weapon already
proven unequal to a duel with Panther
or Tiger in head-to-head encounter. It
must be said, however, that the 2d Divi-
sion tank support came from a seasoned
armored outfit–the 741st Tank Battal-
ion-which had landed at OMAHA
Beach on 6 June and had been almost
constantly in action since. Unable to en-
gage the 12th SS Panthers and the GHQ
Tigers on equal terms in the open field,
the Shermans were parceled out in and
around the villages in two’s and three’s.
Hidden by walls, houses, and hedgerows,
or making sudden forays into the open,
the American tankers stalked the heav-
ier, better armed panzers, maneuvering
under cover for a clear shot at flank or
tail, or lying quietly in a lane until a Pan-
ther or Tiger crossed the sights.
Since most of the enemy tanks entered
the villages in the dark or in the fog,
the defenders generally fought on dis-
tinctly advantageous terms and at ranges
where–if the heavy frontal protection of
the German tank could be avoided–a kill
was certain. The 741st knocked out an
estimated 27 tanks (nearly all of which
actually were examined) and lost 11
Shermans. 9 Even disabled tanks, immo-
bilized inside the American lines, contin-
ued to have a hand in the fight. Two
crippled Shermans parked in a Roche-
rath lane accounted for five Tigers which
incautiously came by broadside. On the
second night the German tanks entered
the villages prepared to ferret out the
American armor. Each assault tank was
accompanied by foot soldiers armed with
9 The unit was awarded a Presidential Citation.

126 THE ARDENNES: BATTLE OF THE BULGE
bazookas, fires were started to light dark
streets and alleys, and many of the Ger-
mans boldly used their searchlights.
These tactics failed; illumination served
the waiting American tanks as well as
the enemy. German bazooka teams did
succeed in knocking out a pair of Sher-
mans but generally found the American
infantry, dismounted tankers, and tank
destroyer crewmen, waiting to erase the
walking infantry screens.
The American tank destroyers shared
honors with the tanks in this battle, but
as it often happened in the Ardennes
the fight had to be carried by the self-
propelled guns, the towed guns serving
mostly as convenient targets for the
enemy. The 644th Tank Destroyer Bat-
talion (minus one company) employed
its self-propelled 3-inch guns with such
effect as to destroy 17 tanks, disable 3,
and knock out 2 German assault guns.
Two guns of the battalion were damaged
beyond recovery. Most of these kills were
made in or near the villages against
enemy tanks which had halted and were
not firing, at ranges from 25 to 1,000
yards. In some instances one round of
high-velocity, armor-piercing ammuni-
tion was sufficient to set a Panther
aflame; generally two or three rounds
with base detonating fuzes were needed
and, as the Sherman tanks had found,
direct hits on the German frontal armor
or mantlet had the unpleasant habit of
glancing off.
The experience of the 801st Tank
Destroyer Battalion, a towed outfit, was
markedly different. Emplaced close to
the infantry line, its 3-inch guns were
brought under intense shelling and
could be moved only at night. During
attack, bogged in mud and unable to
shift firing positions, the towed tank
destroyers quickly fell prey to direct
fire or infantry assault. Between 17 and
19 December the 801st lost 17 guns
and 16 half-tracks. Indeed, the greatest
combat value of the towed battalion
came from the mines carried on the
half-tracks (which were used with effect
by adjacent riflemen) and the employ-
ment of the gun crews as infantry. On
the afternoon of 18 December, with
guns and vehicles gone, the bulk of the
battalion was ordered to Elsenborn.
Even so there were a few instances when
the towed guns were able to fight and
make kills under favorable circum-
stances. One gun from the 801st had
been placed to cover a straggler line
in the vicinity of Hünningen and here,
deep inside the American position, sur-
prised and knocked out four Mark IV’s
before it was destroyed.
The infantry antitank weapons em-
ployed in the defense of Krinkelt-Roch-
erath varied considerably in effectiveness.
The 57-mm. battalion antitank guns-
and their crews–simply were tank fod-
der. The mobility of this towed piece,
which had been a feature of the gun on
design boards and in proving ground
tests, failed in the mud at the forward
positions. Only a very lucky shot could
damage a Panther or Tiger, and at the
close of this operation both the 2d and
99th Divisions recommended the aboli-
tion of the 57-mm. as an infantry anti-
tank gun. The rifle battalions which
were hurried south from Wahlerscheid
on 17 December had left their mines
in the forest or with the battalion
trains. Even the few antitank mines
on hand could not be put to proper
use during the first night engagement
when stragglers and vehicular columns
were pouring along the same routes the

THE GERMAN NORTHERN SHOULDER IS JAMMED 127
WRECKED GERMAN TANK SHOWING “BAZOOKA PANTS,” a defense against rockets.
enemy armor was using. In the first con-
tact at the crossroads east of Rocherath
the German tanks were halted by a hasty
mine field, but the rifle company made
its most effective use of this defense by
laying mines to protect the rear of the
American position after the tanks had
rolled by. The bazooka in the hands of
the defending infantry proved extremely
useful. During the dark hours, bazooka
teams were able to work close to their
prey under the cover provided by walls,
houses, and hedgerows. But, as in the case
of the tank destroyers, most hits were
scored against tanks which had paused or
been stranded by the detonation of
mines and high-explosive shellfire. In
the various melees at the villages the
German tank crews seldom escaped no
matter what weapon was used against
them. Most crewmen were burned as
the tank blew up or they were cut down
by bullet fire at close range. The 2d
Division, like most veteran divisions,
had armed itself beyond the limits of
approved tables of equipment. Nearly
every rifle platoon, as a result, had at
least two bazookas, so that team play
to distract and then destroy the target
tank was feasible.
Although fought mostly as a series of
close quarter actions, the infantry bat-

128 THE ARDENNES: BATTLE OF THE BULGE
tle in this sector saw little American
use of the bayonet. Small arms and light
machine guns took over where the
friendly artillery left off, followed by
grenades and rifle butts when the en-
emy closed. The problem of illuminat-
ing the scene of battle was partially
solved by burning buildings and tanks.
Illuminating shells fired by the 60-mm.
mortars had some local usefulness, but
the precise co-ordination between in-
fantry and artillery required for the
effective use of star shell never was
achieved in this battle.
On 19 December German General
Staff officers from the high headquarters
of WFSt and OB WEST appeared in
the battle zone to peer over the shoulders
of the combat commanders and diagnose
the irritating failure to achieve a com-
plete breakthrough. The conclusions
they reported (which obviously took
no official account of stubborn Ameri-
can resistance) were as follows. The
check sustained in this sector could not
be attributed to intervention by Allied
air, an interesting reflection of the im-
portance which Allied air-ground co-
operation had assumed in German
tactical thought by the end of 1944. The
road net opened by the advance on 16
December had not been put in good re-
pair. This the observers attributed to a
breakdown of the para-military Todt Or-
ganization, whose labor groups were
charged with the mission. Since the
whole concept of the Todt Organiza-
tion reached high into the realm of Nazi
politics and personalities, this open
animadversion is surprising and un-
doubtedly caused some consternation.
The chief source of failure, said the Gen-
eral Staff observers, was the inadequate
training of the troops who had been
used in the attack. The conclusion
reached as to the future conduct of op-
erations on the Sixth Panzer Army
front was simple enough and in ac-
cordance with established German doc-
trine: more maneuver room must be se-
cured so that the attack could “unfold”;
the entire Elsenborn area, therefore,
must be won and at once. The right
wing must be brought abreast of the
1st SS Panzer Division, at this moment
twenty miles to the west of Stoumont.
This new plan, probably only a reflec-
tion of conclusions already reached in
the higher echelons, actually had gone
into effect on 19 December when Ger-
man tanks and infantry made the first
serious attempt to drive northwest from
Büllingen, shoulder the Americans out
of the Butgenbach position, and open
the Büllingen-Malmédy highway.
The Enemy Tries the Western Flank
19–23 December
In Butgenbach, forty-five hundred
yards straight west of the 2d Division
anchor point at Wirtzfeld, the 26th In-
fantry of the 1st Division covered the 2d
Division’s flank and rear. The area be-
tween the two villages was neutralized,
insofar as any enemy operation was con-
cerned, by a large lake and a series of
streams. To build a defense in depth
along the Büllingen-Butgenbach section
of the Malmédy road and secure a
place on high ground, the 2d Battalion
had pushed forward to a ridge near
Dom Butgenbach, a hamlet astride the
highway. When the enemy failed to
follow up his earlier sorties from Bül-
lingen, American patrols scouted on
the 18th in the direction of that village

THE GERMAN NORTHERN SHOULDER IS JAMMED 129
and established that it still belonged to
the Germans.
The 26th Infantry held a none too fav-
orable position. It was separated from its
own division and could expect little help
from the 99th, under which it had occu-
pied Butgenbach, or from the 2d
Division. Isolated action as a regimental
combat team, however, was not unknown
in the regiment’s history for it had been
so committed in North Africa during the
Kasserine fight and at Barrafranca in
Sicily. Although the lake reservoir gave
some protection on the left flank the
position held by the forward battalion,
the 2d, protruded beyond this cover.
The regimental right flank was bare-
at least no infantry had been brought
in to solidify this section of the line-
and in theory the 26th Infantry was
responsible for the defense of the four
miles to the west between Butgenbach
and the town of Weismes.
Colonel Daniel’s 2d Battalion, sticking
out like a sore thumb ahead of the rest
of the regiment, had arrived from the
north in a depleted state, a condition en-
demic throughout the 26th as a result of
the very heavy losses sustained during the
1st Division attack toward the Roer
River early in December. There, on
the fringe of the Hürtgen Forest, Com-
panies E and F had been virtually
annihilated, Company G shattered. Now
the 2d Battalion rifle companies were
nine-tenths replacements and num-
bered not more than a hundred men
apiece. All told there were only seven
officers in the battalion who had been
on the roster at the beginning of
December. Two of the heavy ma-
chine gun platoons were manned by
inexperienced gunners. There was a
shortage of BAR’S and grenade
launchers. Fortunately, however, the 2d
Battalion had been given ample time to
prepare for defense. The rifle platoons
had dug deep, covering the holes with
logs and sandbags; wire was in to the
33d Field Artillery Battalion, em-placed
to give support; and the artillery observ-
ers were dug in well forward.
During the night of 18–19 December
the I SS Panzer Corps gathered in Büllin-
gen the advance striking force designed
for the attack against Butgenbach. It
appears too that the forward command
post of the 12th SS Panzer Division
opened in Büllingen to direct the coming
fight. At least one battalion of the 25th
SS Panzer Grenadier Regiment had
arrived, plus a few tanks. The bulk of the
division kampfgruppe which had fought
at the twin villages was coming up by
way of Losheimergraben. The tanks had
an especially hard time on the road,
which had been reduced to a river of
mud (German officers later reported
tanks along the route which had churned
down nearly to their decks) . In addition
to the advance detachment and recon-
naissance units of the 12th SS Panzer Di-
vision, the Büllingen force was swelled
during the night by the 27th Fuesilier
Regiment and 12th Fuesilier Battalion,
both of the 12th Volks Grenadier Divi-
sion, but the ranks of the latter units had
been severely reduced during the fight
for Losheimergraben.
About 0225 on the 19th some twenty
truckloads of German infantry dismount-
ed just west of Büllingen, deployed be-
hind a dozen tanks, and moved against
the 2d Battalion. The 33d Field Artillery
Battalion opened up at once with illu-
minating shell, then poured in white
phosphorus and high explosive. Some of
the enemy tanks mired down before they

130 THE ARDENNES: BATTLE OF THE BULGE
could reach the American line; others
were discouraged by bazooka and battal-
ion antitank gunfire. Three tanks, how-
ever, kept on along the road leading into
Dom Butgenbach until the 155-mm.
howitzers of the 5th Field Artillery Bat-
talion began to lob HE uncomfortably
close. Possibly crippled by concussion,
the tanks were abandoned but the crews
got away.
The next German attack, at 1010, con-
sisted of attempts in company strength to
find weak points in the 1,800-yard line
occupied by the 2d Battalion. One of
these, against Company G, was broken
up by shells fired in by four battalions of
field artillery. A Panther and an armored
scout car got through. Then a 57-mm.
antitank gun crew crippled both, but the
scout car got off one round that killed the
crew, Cpl. Hale Williams and Pvt. Rich-
ard Wollenberg. However, the armored
threat was ended at this point. On the
east flank two of the battalion’s antitank
guns got the two leading tanks, and ma-
chine gun and mortar fire drove off the
accompanying infantry. This action
ended the first German attempt at crack-
ing the Butgenbach block. The next
would wait upon the assembly of the
troops and vehicles slowly gathering at
Büllingen, where the II SS Panzer Corps
had taken over direction of the battle.
On 18 and 19 December the 3d Para-
chute Division, which had been follow-
ing in the wake of the 1st SS Panzer
Division westward, began to concentrate
south of Weismes. It may be that the 3d
Parachute Division thus far had received
no orders as to the projected widening
of the Sixth Panzer Army corridor of ad-
vance and was content with holding a
blocking position along the German
flank as originally planned. As it was,
American reinforcements arrived in the
Weismes area on 19 December before the
enemy struck.
The 16th Infantry (Col. Frederick W.
Gibb) was the second regimental combat
team of the 1st Division to take its place
in the barrier being erected on the north-
ern shoulder of the expanding German
salient. The 2d Battalion, leading the
south-moving column, was well set in
Weismes when, in the late afternoon of
19 December, the 3d Parachute Division
commenced desultory jabs at the village.
At the same time the balance of the 16th
Infantry detrucked and swelled out the
Weismes front, making contact to the
west with troops of the veteran 30th In-
fantry Division which had just come into
the Malmédy sector. By the evening of
19 December, then, the 1st Infantry Di-
vision had neighbors on either flank and
its 26th Infantry, although still out in
front, could concentrate on the enemy
force building up at Büllingen.
During the night of 19–20 December
the advance kampfgruppe of the 12th
SS Panzer Division and the bulk of one
regiment from the 12th Volks Grenadier
Division completed their assembly.
About 0600 twenty German tanks and a
rifle battalion converged on Dom But-
genbach in the early morning fog and
mist from south and east. The front lit
up as the American mortars and artil-
lery shot illuminating shell over the
roads leading to the village. Concen-
tration after concentration then plunged
down, three battalions of field artillery
and a 90-mm. battery of antiaircraft
artillery firing as fast as the pieces
could be worked. The enemy infantry,
punished by this fire and the stream
of bullets from the American foxhole
line, wavered but a handful of tanks

THE GERMAN NORTHERN SHOULDER IS JAMMED 131
rolled off the roads and into Dom
Butgenbach. (They had shot down three
bazooka teams and a Company H ma-
chine gun section.) Here, in the dark,
battalion antitank guns placed to defend
the 2d Battalion command post went to
work firing point-blank at the exhaust
flashes as the German vehicles passed.
Two enemy tanks were holed and the
rest fled the village, although the anti-
tank gun crews suffered at the hands of
the German bazooka teams that had fil-
tered in with the tanks.
A second try came just before dawn,
this time straight down the road from
Büllingen. Ten German tanks in single
file were sighted as they came over a
slight ridge to the front of Company F.
Two tank destroyers and three antitank
guns drove the tanks off or at least
caused them to turn west in search of a
weaker spot in the 2d Battalion defenses.
In the next thrust a platoon of Company
G was badly cut up before friendly artil-
lery finally checked the attack. Fifteen
minutes later, apparently still seeking a
hole, the Germans hit Company E, next
in line to the west. The 60-mm. mortars
illuminated the ground in front of the
company at just the right moment and
two of three tanks heading the assault
were knocked out by bazooka and 57-
mm. fire from the flank. The third tank
commander stuck his head out of the
escape hatch to take a look around and
was promptly pistoled by an American
corporal. 10 By this time shellfire had scat-
tered the German infantry. Nor did the
10 This was Cpl. Henry F. Warner, one of the
57-mm. antitank gunners. He fought the Ger-
man tanks for two days, often by himself, and
destroyed three panzers, but finally was killed
by a machine gun burst from one of the panzers
he was stalking. Warner was awarded the Medal
of Honor.
enemy make another try until dusk, and
then only with combat patrols.
The hardest blows dealt the 2d Bat-
talion defenders at Dom Butgenbach
came on 21 December. After repeated
pleas from the 12th SS Panzer the guns
and Werfers which had been used at
Krinkelt-Rocherath were committed, and
the entire 25th Panzer Grenadier Regi-
ment was also made available, as well as
one battalion or more of the 12th SS
Panzer Regiment. About three hours be-
fore dawn guns, mortars, tanks, and
Werfers began pounding the American
foxhole line, which was outlined by a
double row of trees, and the few houses
in Dom Butgenbach. This fire continued
unremittingly until the first light in the
east, inflicting many casualties, destroy-
ing weapons by direct hits, and tearing
large gaps in the main line of resistance.
American counterbattery fire was intense
but failed to still the enemy shelling.
Now, as the Germans crossed the fields
in assault formation, the American for-
ward observers called for a defensive bar-
rage to box their own front lines. At
least ten field artillery battalions ulti-
mately joined the fight (for this batteries
of the 2d and 99th Divisions were tied
into the 1st Division fire control system)
and succeeded in discouraging the Ger-
man infantry.
Some panzers and assault guns did
make their way through the storm of ex-
ploding shells and against the 2d Battal-
ion right. During the previous night two
platoons of the regimental antitank com-
pany had taken station here right on the
foxhole line and surprised the panzers
with fire at no more than 100 yards.
Two or three kills were inflicted by the
1st Platoon, but other tanks quickly shot
down the 57-mm. crews and then over-

132 THE ARDENNES: BATTLE OF THE BULGE
ran the guns of the 2d Platoon. 11 At this
segment of the 2d Battalion main line of
resistance the foxhole line followed a
long hedgerow. Having broken through
and destroyed the American antitank
guns, the German tankers drove along
the hedgerows searching out the auto-
matic weapons which earlier had helped
check the infantry assault. Undefended
against moving steel, the BAR and ma-
chine gun crews were wiped out.
Through this gaping hole on the 2d
Battalion right more tanks appeared as
the morning progressed and moved down
the slope toward Dom Butgenbach. A
self-propelled tank destroyer belonging
to the 634th Tank Destroyer Battalion
accounted for seven tanks in succession
as these, in column, hove in sight over
the ridge line. Two Sherman tanks, ly-
ing close to a barn, got two of the Ger-
mans before they, in turn, were knocked
out. Three of the enemy reached the
cluster of buildings and fired point-
blank into the houses and barns Colo-
nel Daniel and the 2d Battalion com-
mand post group were defending. Every
device was used to reach the tanks but
with no success until, finding it warm,
two made a break for the open and
were stopped by a section of 90-mm.
tank destroyers which had just come
up. The last tank was flushed out
from behind a barn by 91-mm. mortar
fire but got away.
The battalion mortars had played an
important role all along the line (one
section firing 750 rounds before its posi-
tion was blasted by close-range tank fire) ,
and so had every American weapon that
could be brought to bear. But in late
afternoon, when the German assault was
11 Sgt. I. R. Schwartz received the DSC for gal-
lantry in this action,
dwindling, the 2d Battalion commander
paid the infantryman’s heartfelt compli-
ment to the guns. “The artillery did a
great job. I don’t know where they got
the ammo or when they took time out to
flush the guns but we wouldn’t be here
now if it wasn’t for them. . . . A hun-
dred [Germans] . . . came at one platoon
and not one of them got through.” 12
The regimental cannon company, the 1st
Division Artillery, the 406th Field Artil-
lery Group, and reinforcing batteries
from the 2d and 99th Divisions fired over
ten thousand rounds in support of the
Dom Butgenbach defenders during an
eight-hour shoot on the 21st, plastering
enemy assembly areas and the road net
and plowing up the fields across which
the German attack came. For one period
of three hours all communication between
the hard-pressed rifle battalion
and the artillery broke under German
fire, but the American shells continued
to arrive with devastating effect. A patrol
sent into the woods from which had come
the final assault against the riddled battalion
flank reported a count of three
hundred dead enemy infantry-the reason,
perhaps, why the tanks that penetrated
to the 2d Battalion command post
came alone. At any rate the 12th Volks
Grenadier Division had had enough.
The division commander told his superiors
that no more attacks could be made
unless a promised assault gun battalion
arrived to ramrod the infantry. The total
German casualty list must have been
high, and after these three days of battle
heavy inroads had been made in the tank
strength of the 12th SS Panzer Regiment.
The 2d Battalion, understrength
12 Colonel Daniel himself received the DSC.

THE GERMAN NORTHERN SHOULDER IS JAMMED 133
when it arrived to face the Germans, had
been reduced by perhaps one quarter.
Indeed, in midafternoon of the 21st, the
battalion commander had planned with-
drawing a thousand yards to the rear to
compensate for the dwindling strength in
the firing line. But when the 2d reorgan-
ized that evening its position was some-
what strengthened. Company C, with
extra bazookas, had come up to man the
denuded right flank, the 1st Engineer
Combat Battalion laid a hasty field of
about a thousand mines in front of the
lines, and the regiment had attached the
4.2-inch mortars of the 2d Division
chemical battalion to Daniel’s com-
mand.
Meanwhile the enemy regrouped to
continue the attack with new forces. The
armored infantry reserve of the 12th SS
Panzer Division, the 26th Panzer Grena-
dier Regiment, finally had negotiated the
poor roads and traffic jams along the Ger-
man line of communications and arrived
in Büllingen, ready for its first commit-
ment in the offensive. Shortly after day
broke on 22 December patrols from the
26th commenced to probe at the 2d Bat-
talion lines. The fresh enemy regiment,
however, set out to vary the unsuccessful
headlong tactics previously employed by
striking at the flanks of the Dom Butgen-
bach position. The first assault, shortly
before 1000, carried an undetermined
number of panzer grenadiers through a
gap between Companies A and K, on the
right of the 2d Battalion. Here there
were about twenty Mark V’s and tank
destroyers, but the 90-mm. tank de-
stroyers from the 613th Tank Destroyer
Battalion rushed in on the flank and
stopped the enemy. The continued
threat, though serious, was countered
by shifting local reserves from the
18th and 26th to close the gap, and by
the end of the day the situation was well
in hand. Again the American gunners
had taken over a large share of the
burden, firing over 300 missions. The
co-operation between the artillery and
infantry arms, it must be said, was re-
ciprocal. The fact that the 26th Infantry
had continued to hold its position on
ground overlooking the German routes
west had allowed the observers a grand-
stand seat and had caused the German
columns taking the 1st SS Panzer Divi-
sion detour through Schoppen to run a
gantlet of accurate and continuous fire.
The successful withdrawal from the
Krinkelt-Rocherath sector to the more
favorable terrain of the Elsenborn ridge
had resulted, by 20 December, in a fairly
homogeneous and well-constructed de-
fense with the 2d Division on the right
and the 99th Division on the left. On the
morning of this same day the 9th Infan-
try Division took over the Monschau-
Höfen sector (its 47th Infantry had
moved earlier into supporting position
west of these two towns) and so covered
the northern flank of the 99th.
The German attempt to crack the
newly formed north-south line was han-
dled in catch-as-catch-can and piecemeal
fashion, for the primary mission was the
flanking maneuver in the Butgenbach
area. The 3d Panzer Grenadier Division,
which had relieved the 12th SS Panzer
Division at the twin villages, went to
work at once against the 99th Division
portion of the Elsenborn line although
the bulk of its rifle strength was not yet
in hand. On the morning of 20 Decem-
ber German tanks and infantry made
the first of three assaults. But the 99th,
on a forward slope with perfect visibility
and good fields of fire, checked this and

134 THE ARDENNES: BATTLE OF THE BULGE
the subsequent attempts with heavy
losses to the attacker. On the following
day, the 3d Panzer Grenadier was caught
by artillery fire just as its assault waves
were forming. Confused and disorgan-
ized, the German infantry were unable
to make another bid.
Farther north, on 22 December, the
277th Volks Grenadier Division returned
to the fray after licking the wounds it
had suffered at Krinkelt-Rocherath and
adding some companies of the 29th Pan-
zer Grenadier Regiment (3d Panzer
Grenadier Division). Early in the morn-
ing two companies from the 277th made
a sharp attack to gain the high ground
east of Kalterherberg occupied by the
99th Reconnaissance Troop. No friendly
artillery was ranged in and the German
infantry marched through a mine field,
crossed a stream under direct bullet fire,
and drove through the extended cavalry
line. Two of the cavalry platoons were
encircled and the attack carried for a
thousand yards before Company E of the
47th Infantry and the remaining troop-
ers were able to halt it. Apparently
intent on driving as deeply to the Amer-
ican rear as possible, the grenadiers gave
the encircled platoons a breathing spell
and with nightfall the Americans suc-
ceeded in escaping. The fight spread to
the 39th Infantry during the afternoon
when small groups of the enemy began
to infiltrate. Reinforcements brought
forward under a smoke screen nourished
the German assault, which by nightfall
had won a foothold inside the American
main line of resistance. 13
13 During the German assault Sgt. Peter J. Dales-
sandro of Company E saved his company from
complete rout by a last-ditch stand with grenades
and an abandoned machine gun. When he could
hold no longer, the sergeant called for a mortar
During the night of 22 December an
artillery bombardment prepared the way
for German infiltration elsewhere on the
9th Division front. But when day broke
the Americans drove the enemy back
after a series of short fire fights and re-
stored the line in its entirety. The 277th
Yolks Grenadier Division no longer
possessed the strength to make a real
effort against the north wing of the
Elsenborn line. The 326th Volks Gren-
adier Division, its northern neighbor,
had given no hand in this fight-not
surprising in view of the punishment
taken at Höfen and Monschau. Both
divisions now fell out of the drive to
widen the way west. The surest signal
of the failure on the right wing of the
Sixth Panzer Army was the ignominious
end of the attack in the Butgenbach sec-
tor, On the morning of 23 December the
18th Infantry barred the gap which had
opened the day before on the right of
the 26th Infantry-and the 12th SS Pan-
zer Division threw in the sponge.
Maj. Gen. Leonard T. Gerow's V
Corps now had four infantry divisions,
the 9th, 99th, 2d, and 1st, standing firmly
on well-organized ground from Mon-
schau to Weismes. The barrier so pre-
sented would restrict and straitjacket the
northern shoulder of the German salient,
at this moment still expanding to the
west. The question remained as to
whether, at a later date, the Sixth Pan-
zer Army would or could shake this
shoulder free. As it stood, the 1st and 9th
Divisions were given time to concentrate
and regroup their hastily committed reg-
iments, while the 2d and 99th set about
the business of acquiring replacements
for lost men and weapons, gaining a
barrage right on his own position. He was awarded
the Medal of Honor.

THE GERMAN NORTHERN SHOULDER IS JAMMED 135
breather after days of savage and costly
conflict. On the enemy side the LXVII
Corps took over control of the line Mon-
schau-Weismes with the 3d Panzer Gren-
adier, 12th Volks Grenadier, 3d Para-
chute, 277th, and 326th. 14
The American troops who had
jammed the right shoulder of the Sixth
Panzer Army knew they had made a fight
of it. They could hardly know that they
had knocked a part of Hitler's personal
operations plan into a cocked hat. The
elite SS panzer formations on which the
14 See below, pp. 579–80.
Fuehrer so relied would continue to play
a major role in the Ardennes counter-
offensive but no longer would be charged
with the main effort; this had passed on
20 December to Manteuffel and the
Fifth Panzer Army. 15 And if, as Manteuf-
fel later suggested, the Fuehrer wanted
to see an SS and a regular panzer army
competing, it could be said that he had
his answer.
15 This decision was made about noon on the
20th, probably by Model supported by Rundstedt,
but this is not certain. OB WEST KTB, 20 Dec
44.

CHAPTER VII
Breakthrough at the Schnee Eifel
Introductory Note
The story of the 106th Infantry Divi-
sion and the attached 14th Cavalry
Group is tragic. It is also highly contro-
versial. Since the major part of the
division was eliminated from combined
operations with other American forces
on the second day of the German coun-
teroffensive, information from contem-
porary records is scanty and, as
to particulars, often completely lacking.
The historian, as a result, must tread
warily through the maze of recrimina-
tion and highly personalized recollection
which surrounds this story. It should not
be concluded that reminiscence by those
caught up in this disaster is consciously
tendentious. But the officers and men of
the 106th Division who so narrowly es-
caped the German trap or who spent
months in German prisons would be less
than human if they did not seek to dis-
cover the cause of this debacle in either
human error or frailty. Since the author
has been forced to depend in so great
degree on the human memory, unaided
or unchallenged by the written record,
the scholar’s old rule “one witness, no
witness” has been generally applied.
Even so, some relaxation of the rule is
necessary if a sustained and sequential
narrative is to be presented. Fortunately,
the picture as seen from the German side
of the Schnee Eifel is fairly complete
and can be applied as a corrective in
most of the major areas of controversy
and contradiction. *
* The records and reports of the 106th Division
and the 424th Infantry are intact although rather
scanty in content. The records of the 422d and
423d were destroyed before the capture of these
regiments, but the Historical Division, ETO, did
interview a large number of officers and men from
these regiments when they were released from
German prisons. First Army conducted Inspector
General investigations of the actions of the 106th
Division, the 820th Tank Destroyer Battalion, the
106th Reconnaissance Troop, and the 14th Cavalry
Group. Most of the records of the 14th Cavalry
Group were destroyed but the commanding offi-
cer, Col. Mark Devine, provided the author with
some personal papers. The VIII Corps after ac-
tion report and G–2 and G–3 journals are very
useful for the relations between corps and division.
Participants in this battle made special reports
for the Advanced Infantry Officers Course No. 1
(Maj. William P. Moon, Maj. J. C. Hollinger,
and Capt. Alan W. Jones, Jr.) See also, the 275th
Armored Field Artillery Battalion journal and
S–2 report. Col. R. Ernest Dupuy has written a
very good semiofficial history entitled, St. Vith:
Lion in the Way, the 106th Infantry Division in
World War II (Washington: Infantry Journal
Press, 1949). Dupuy’s work has been heavily
drawn on, but the reader will find several points
at which Dupuy and the present account differ.
The German manuscripts are very detailed and
useful; see particularly MSS # B–026, Effects of
Ardennes Offensive on Army Group G (SS Gen-
eraloberst Waffen-SS Paul Hauser); B–688 (incor-
porating B–734), 18th Volks Grenadier Division, 1
September 1944–25 January 1945 (Lt. Col. Dietrich
Moll) ; A–924 (Kraemer); B–333, LXVI Corps,
October–23 December 1944 (General der Artillerie
Walter Lucht) .

BREAKTHROUGH AT THE SCHNEE EIFEL 137
Dispositions of the
106th Infantry Division
From the Eifel plateau protrude three
distinct ridges or ranges, the central be-
ing called the Schnee Eifel. This middle
ridge, so important in the action that
developed in the 106th Division sector,
inclines northeast-southwest. At the west-
ern foot of the Schnee Eifel there runs a
long narrow valley incised in the high
plain, the so-called Losheim Gap. On the
western side of the gap the Our River
meanders along, and beyond the river to
the west the plateau appears once more
in heavily wooded form. The Losheim
Gap is no pleasant, pastoral valley but is
cluttered by abrupt hills, some bare,
others covered by fir trees and thick
undergrowth. Most of the little villages
here are found in the draws and potholes
which further scoop out the main valley.
The Losheim Gap was occupied on 16
December by a reinforced squadron of
the 14th Cavalry Group. (Map III)
The fate of the 106th Infantry Divi-
sion and the 14th Cavalry Group was
bound together on that day by official
orders attaching the cavalry to the infan-
try, by circumstances of terrain, and by
the German plan of attack. To the
left of the cavalry group ran the bound-
ary between the VIII Corps and V
Corps, its northern neighbor being the
99th Infantry Division. To the right
of the 106th lay the 28th Division, con-
stituting the center of General Middle-
ton's corps. The 106th itself occupied the
central and southern sections of the
heavily forested Schnee Eifel.
American successes some weeks earlier
had driven the enemy from a part of the
West Wall positions along the Schnee
Eifel, creating a salient which jutted
deep into the German lines. Although
such a salient was exposed, the possession
of at least a wedge in the West Wall
seemed to compensate for the risk in-
volved. It should be noticed that the
Schnee Eifel range is terminated in the
south by a cross corridor, running against
the usual north to south grain of the
Eifel plateau. This is the valley of the
Alf, a small creek which makes a long
horse-shoe bend around the Schnee Eifel
east to the village of Pronsfeld.
Three main roads run through this
area. From the crossroads village of Hall-
schlag the northernmost descends into
the Our valley, crossing and recrossing
the river until it reaches St. Vith. The
center road, secondary in construction,
traverses the Losheim Gap from Roth
southwestward. The southernmost road
follows the valley of the Alf from Prüm,
but eventually turns through Winter-
spelt toward the northwest and St. Vith.
Thus two main roads, of macadam con-
struction and some twenty-two feet wide,
ran through the American positions
directly to St. Vith. These roads were
characteristic of the eastern Ardennes,
winding, with many blind turns,
squeezing through narrow village streets,
dipping abruptly, and rising suddenly
across the ravines. But each of the roads
to St. Vith circles around the Schnee
Eifel at one of its termini.
The width of the sector held by the
106th Infantry Division and the attached
14th Cavalry Group was approximately
eighteen air-line miles. When traced on
the ground, the line these forces were
responsible for defending was actually
more than twenty-one miles in length.
The 14th Cavalry Group (Col. Mark
Devine) was charged with a 9,000-yard
front in the 106th Division sector along

138 THE ARDENNES: BATTLE OF THE BULGE
the line Lanzerath-Krewinkel-Roth-
Kobscheid. This disposition placed the
cavalry to the north of the Schnee Eifel
and across the northeastern entrance to
the Losheim Gap. The section of the
West Wall which barred egress from the
gap lay beyond the cavalry positions.
The dispositions of the 106th Infantry
Division (Maj. Gen. Alan W. Jones)
followed an irregular line which in gen-
eral trended from northeast to southwest.
The 422d Infantry (Col. George L.
Descheneaux, Jr.) occupied the forward
positions of the West Wall on the crest
and western slopes of the midsection of
the Schnee Eifel. This regiment and the
cavalry, therefore, combined as defend-
ers of a salient protruding beyond the
neighbors to the north and south. The
line occupied by the 423d Infantry (Col.
Charles C. Cavender) continued briefly
on the Schnee Eifel, then as this range
dropped away swung back into the west-
ern portion of the Alf valley. Thence
followed a gap screened by the division
reconnaissance troop. The 424th Infan-
try (Col. Alexander D. Reid) continued
the bend to the west at Grosslangenfeld
and joined the 28th Infantry Division,
at least by periodic patrols, north of
Lützkampen.
On 19 October the 18th Cavalry Re-
connaissance Squadron had taken over
the positions in the Losheim Gap from
another cavalry squadron attached to the
2d Infantry Division with instructions to
occupy the infantry positions then exist-
ing. The 14th Cavalry Group took over
the sector on 11 December, using the
18th and a company of 3-inch towed
tank destroyers much as they had been
deployed.' earlier. The ground occupied
by the cavalry was relatively flat here at
the mouth of the gap, although broken
by streams and knotted by hills as is
common on the Ardennes plateau. In
contrast to the ridge lines the floor of the
gap had a few trees. The infantry posi-
tions inherited by the cavalry were in
the little villages, most of which had
been built in depressions offering some
protection against the raw winds which
sweep the Ardennes. There were eight
garrison points; a homogeneous defense
line, of course, was out of the question.
In addition, there existed substantial
gaps on both flanks of the cavalry. In
the north the gap between the 14th
Cavalry Group and the 99th Infantry
Division was approximately two miles
across. A small party from the attached
tank destroyer outfit (Company A,
820th Tank Destroyer Battalion)
patrolled this opening at two-hour inter-
vals in conjunction with an I and R Pla-
toon from the 99th Division. There was
an unoccupied strip between the right
of the cavalry and the left of the 422d In-
fantry about one and a half miles across;
the responsibility for patrolling here was
given to the infantry.
At best the cavalry positions could only
be described as small islands of resist-
ance, manned usually in platoon
strength and depending on automatic
weapons dismounted from the cavalry
vehicles or on the towed 3-inch guns
of the tank destroyer company. Some
barbed wire had been strung around
the garrison villages. Mine fields, both
German and American, were known to
be in the area, but neither the 14th
Cavalry Group nor the 2d Infantry
Division before it could chart their
location. On 14 December Colonel De-
vine had asked corps for engineers and
more mines.
Contrary to the doctrine and training

BREAKTHROUGH AT THE SCHNEE EIFEL 139
of mechanized cavalry, the 14th Cavalry
Group was committed to a positional
defense. Since the cavalry squadron
does not have the staying power for
defense in depth, and since the width of
this front made an interlocking linear
defense impossible, the 14th–if hit hard
–was at best capable only of delaying
action. Lacking the freedom of maneuver
usually accorded cavalry, the 14th Cav-
alry Group would have little hope of
winning time by counterattack. The 32d
Cavalry Reconnaissance Squadron, re-
fitting near Vielsalm, Belgium, was avail-
able on short notice to reinforce the rest
of the cavalry group; its officers had
reconnoitered forward positions and
telephone wire had been laid in at a few
points. There seems to have been no
specific plan for the employment of the
32d Squadron. Colonel Devine and his
staff, during the few days available, had
worked out a general defensive plan
giving specific routes of withdrawal and
successive defense lines. Apparently this
plan was finished on the night of 15 De-
cember but was never circulated.
The staff of the cavalry group was
evidently familiar with the defensive
plan worked out earlier by the 2d Divi-
sion which, in the Losheim area, called
for an initial withdrawal to the Mander-
feld ridge and an American counter-
attack by forces taken from the Schnee
Eifel. During the brief attachment of the
14th Cavalry Group to the 106th Divi-
sion no comparable plan to support the
forces on the low ground in the gap by
withdrawing troops from the more
readily defended line on the Schnee
Eifel was ever issued, although Colonel
Devine had made several trips to the
106th on this matter. The 2d Division
also had an artillery plan which provided
for approximately 200 prearranged con-
centrations to be fired on call in the gap.
There is no evidence that this plan was
taken over by the 106th Division artil-
lery (which would have had to shift its
battalions), but the cavalry did have one
battalion of 105-mm. howitzers, the
275th Armored (Lt. Col. Roy Udell
Clay), in support about two and a half
miles west of Manderfeld.
Much of the subsequent story of events
in the Losheim Gap and the Schnee
Eifel turns on the relations between the
106th Division and the 14th Cavalry
Group. The brief span of their acquaint-
ance is therefore pertinent. On 20 Octo-
ber the 106th Division shipped from the
United States. On 11 December it as-
sumed its first combat role, taking over
the quiet sector on the left of the VIII
Corps where the veteran 2d Infantry
Division had been resting. The relief
was completed a day later. The 18th
Cavalry Squadron had been in the gap
positions since 19 October, less B Troop
which was deployed on the south flank
of the 2d Division and which remained
in that area when the 106th arrived. Gen-
eral Robertson, the 2d Division com-
mander, had long regarded the single
cavalry squadron as insufficient to cover
the Losheim Gap and had centered his
sole divisional reserve, a reinforced in-
fantry battalion, in the vicinity of Auw
so as to support either the cavalry or
infantry. Robertson’s recommendations
finally were noticed and on 11 December
the 106th Division had attached to it a
full cavalry reconnaissance group instead
of only the one squadron. But time to
organize the defense of the individual
sectors of the 106th Division, much less
to co-ordinate over-all defensive plans
and preparations, was short.

140 THE ARDENNES: BATTLE OF THE BULGE
The 106th Infantry Division had been
activated in March 1943. Early in 1944
the division took part in the Tennessee
maneuvers, but its training program (as
in the case of many new divisions) was
more or less vitiated when some 60 per-
cent of the enlisted strength was drained
off to meet the heavy demands for
trained infantry before and after D-day.
When the 106th Division relieved the 2d
Division on 11–12 December, freeing
the latter for use in the proposed V
Corps attack to seize the Roer River
dams, it moved into well-prepared posi-
tions and a fairly quiet front. The
veteran 2d Division had protected its
front-line units against the bitter Ar-
dennes weather with log dugouts for the
rifle and weapon squads. Stoves were in
the squad huts and the kitchen ranges
were up front in covered dugouts. Heavy
weapons were exchanged, the 106th
taking over the .50-caliber machine guns,
mortars, and other weapons where they
had been emplaced in order to conceal
the relief from the enemy. The extensive
communications net prepared by the 2d
Division, with wire to almost every squad
and outpost, was left to the 106th, but
unlike its predecessor the 106th had few
sound-powered telephones.
Before his departure the 2d Division
commander handed over his defensive
scheme and briefed the incoming com-
mander and staff. Because General
Robertson had looked upon the Losheim
Gap as particularly sensitive, the 2d Di-
vision defensive and counterattack plans
laid special emphasis on support for
troops in that sector. In brief, the 2d
Division planned to pull the forces in
the gap back to the Manderfeld ridge
while the two regimental combat teams
on the Schnee Eifel would withdraw
west to a shortened line along the Auw-
Bleialf ridge road, thus freeing one
combat team for counterattack in the
north. Local counterattack plans pre-
pared by regiments and battalions like-
wise were handed over. From 12 through
15 December the 106th Division com-
mander and staff reconnoitered the new
area; then, after a conference with the
VIII Corps commander, they began
study on detailed recommendations for
a more adequate defense. These were
never completed or submitted although
General Jones did make oral requests to
alter his deployment.
In the circumstances then existing,
adequate measures to cope with the
problem of such an extended front
would have required one of two things:
substantial reinforcement or withdrawal
to a shorter line. Some five weeks earlier
General Middleton had acted to reduce
the Schnee Eifel salient by withdrawing
the 23d Infantry (2d Division) from its
forward positions in the West Wall. It
was into this new westward sector on the
right flank of the salient that the 424th
Infantry moved–even so, the regiment
took over a front of nearly six miles.
Middleton was under compulsion from
higher headquarters to retain the Schnee
Eifel salient and the existing dispositions
of the two regiments therein. There
were plans afoot for an attack toward
Bonn, as part of the forthcoming Allied
offensive, and the gap in the West Wall
represented by this salient would be ex-
tremely useful in any sortie against
Bonn.
Besides the 14th Cavalry Group the
106th Division possessed the conven-
tional attached units: a tank destroyer
battalion (the 820th) and an antiair-
craft battalion (the 634th Automatic

BREAKTHROUGH AT THE SCHNEE EIFEL 141
Weapons). In addition to the 275th Ar-
mored Field Artillery Battalion, sup-
porting the cavalry, eight battalions of
corps artillery were in position to rein-
force the 106th Division artillery by fire
when called. 1 These battalions repre-
sented the bulk of the VIII Corps
artillery.
The road net within the division area
and to its front was limited and in poor
condition, but this was an endemic con-
dition in the Ardennes, particularly dur-
ing winter months. The macadam
stretches required constant mending
and the dirt roads quickly sank away
where not shored up with logs and
stone. But though transit by heavy vehic-
ular columns was difficult it was by no
means impossible-as the event proved.
Four avenues of penetration were open
to a road-bound enemy. All four would
be used. Following from north to south,
they were: (1) Hallschlag, southwest
through Manderfeld (the 14th Cavalry
Group command post) and Schönberg
(at this point crossing the Our River),
thence to St. Vith; (2) a secondary road
from Roth, west through Auw, then to
Schönberg or Bleialf; (3) Prüm (a large
German communications center) north-
west to Bleialf and on to Schönberg; (4)
Pronsfeld, directly northwest through
Habscheid and Winterspelt to the Our
River bridges at Steinebrück, then on to
St. Vith. These roads, following the
natural channels around and west of the
Schnee Eifel, extend across the Our
River by way of bridges at Andler,
Schönberg, and Steinebrück. St Vith is
the funnel through which the roads
coming from the Our pass to the west.
The degree to which the green 106th
1 These were the 770th 965th, 333d, 771st. 559th,
561st, 578th, and 740th Field Artillery Battalions.
Division had been acclimatized to its new
surroundings by the morning of 16 De-
cember is impossible to determine. The
arduous truck journey across France and
Belgium, through bitter cold and cling-
ing damp, must have been dispiriting to
untried troops. The front-line shelters in
which the veterans of the 2d Infantry
Division had made themselves relatively
comfortable probably did little more
than take the raw edge off the miserable
weather prevalent when the 106th
marched to the bunkers, foxholes, and
dugouts. By 15 December a number of
trench foot cases already had occurred,
particularly in the 422d Infantry, which
had been the last regiment to draw over-
shoes.
The extent to which the division was
armed to defend itself is also a matter
of debate. All units had the normal basic
load of ammunition on hand, although
there seems to have been a shortage of
carbine and bazooka rounds. The near-
est ammunition supply point was at
Noville, over forty miles southwest of
St. Vith, making resupply slow and diffi-
cult. Jones had requested antitank mines
but these were not delivered in time. A
thin, linear defense such as that inherited
in the Schnee Eifel required an extraor-
dinary number of automatic weapons.
Although by this time the veteran ET0
divisions were carrying BAR’S and light
machine guns far in excess of authorized
allowances, the 106th Division possessed
only the regulation number and type of
issue weapons-fewer than were needed
to organize a twenty-one mile front. On
the whole, however, the 106th seems to
have entered the line with a high state
of morale; had it not exchanged the
tedium of training and “show-down” in-
spections for the excitement of an active

142
theater of operations where victory was
always the American portion?
Enemy Preparations for Another
Cannae
Late in November 1944 General
Lucht, commander of the LXVI Corps
was called to the headquarters of the
Fifth Panzer Army. Here Manteuffel
told him of the coming offensive in the
Ardennes and said that his corps would
form the army right wing. The corps’
mission, in brief, would be to bypass the
Schnee Eifel on either side, seize the
road net at St. Vith, and thrust in
columnar formation to and across the
Meuse River. Lucht would be given only
two infantry divisions, one of which, the
18th Volks Grenadier Division, was
holding the section of the West Wall
along the northern reaches of the Schnee
Eifel. The second division, unnamed,
would not be designated or available
until shortly before the attack. The
LXVI Corps commander apparently
was not unduly concerned by the lack
of weight allotted; after all, the main
army effort turned on its two panzer
corps. But like all veteran German
field commanders on the Western
Front, Lucht was vitally concerned with
the problem of air support. The first
question he put to Manteuffel phrased
this concern. Manteuffel parried with
the stock answer: OKW had promised
adequate air support; but in any case it
was hoped that bad flying weather during
December would drastically curtail the
enemy effectiveness in the air.
About 1 December the commander of
the 18th Volks Grenadier Division,
Generalmajor Hoffmann-Schönborn, was
let in on the closely guarded secret, join-
THE ARDENNES: BATTLE OF THE BULGE
ing Lucht and his chief of staff at the
planning table. The Luftwaffe could
furnish no terrain photos, but detailed
maps and terrain appreciations for this
area were on file. The final terrain esti-
mate concluded that the sector north of
the Schnee Eifel offered fewer natural
obstacles than that to the south. Further-
more, the Losheim Gap appeared to have
the weakest defending force. The Our
River was an obstacle, but known cross-
ing sites existed at Andler, Schönberg,
and Steinebrück. St. Vith was nearly
equidistant from the planned attack
positions north or south of the Schnee
Eifel, twelve to fourteen straight-line
miles.
The final plan of maneuver, largely
dictated by Manteuffel, made the 18th
Volks Grenadier Division responsible for
a concentric attack moving north and
south of the Schnee Eifel. The division
would place its strongest kampfgruppe
in the north, however, and make the
main corps effort there. Lucht reasoned
that the 18th knew the ground and
would make the quickest progress; but
he also wished to retain close control
over the drive when it reached St. Vith,
and such control could best be exercised
by a single command. Furthermore the
second division would have no time to
learn the ground and, set to make a
single envelopment in the southern part
of the corps sector, would face extensive
field fortifications on broken, wooded
terrain. The fact that Lucht did not ex-
pect the thin American line to his front
to offer strong resistance may be one of
the reasons he risked splitting the 18th
Volks Grenadier Division, rather than
committing one division at each end of
the Schnee Eifel. Since none of the
German planners expected an American

BREAKTHROUGH AT THE SCHNEE EIFEL 143
counterthrust across the Schnee Eifel
range, a very small force from the 18th
Volks Grenadier Replacement Battalion
was reckoned a sufficient screen on the
heights. The corps lacked a tank battal-
ion and was assigned an assault gun
brigade in its place. The corps artillery
was deemed too weak to engage the
Americans in a counterbattery duel at
the outset of the attack, and in addition
the Germans hoped to make early and
deep penetrations by surprise; concerted
artillery preparations prior to H-hour,
then, were ruled out. Neither Fifth
Panzer Army nor LXVI Corps seems to
have fixed a definite timetable; the 18th
Volks Grenadier Division is said not to
have expected to reach St. Vith earlier
than 18 December.
Both the divisions which subsequently
took part in the Schnee Eifel operation
were newly organized and inexperi-
enced. The 18th had been formed dur-
ing September on the ruins of the 18th
Air Force Field Division, earlier de-
stroyed in the Mons pocket. Recon-
structed from Luftwaffe and Navy units,
plus a strong admixture of Volks-
deutsche and workers drawn in by the
new draft laws, the 18th lacked trained
noncoms and officers. But the unit was
more fortunate than many another in
that its occupation of the northern sec-
tor in the Schnee Eifel did not bring on
many losses prior to the counteroffensive
and permitted its troops to be rotated
through training areas in the rear.
The division commander seems to
have sold General Lucht on the idea of
making the main thrust toward St. Vith
from north of the Schnee Eifel–although
both were certain that the double en-
velopment envisaged would cut off a very
large American force. The right attack
group was heavily weighted, consisting
of two regiments, most of the division
artillery, and the assault gun brigade. In
reserve, for exploitation of any success
on the right wing, was a mobile battal-
lion, made up of the division tank de-
stroyer battalion, a reconnaissance com-
pany, and an engineer company. The
main breakthrough was to be attempted
in the vicinity of Roth. The left attack
group, one regiment and a battalion of
self-propelled artillery, was directed to
make its penetration through Bleialf,
where the Americans probably would
be encountered in force. Nevertheless,
this kampfgruppe had the mission of
seizing the Schönberg bridge. The divi-
sion replacement battalion, two hun-
dred strong, would be left to man the
division center along the Schnee Eifel.
Early in December the 62d Volks
Grenadier Division, Lucht’s second di-
vision, detrained at Prüm, but did not
go immediately into the forward corps
sector. The 62d bore the number of an
infantry division which had been de-
stroyed on the Eastern Front, but it had
been rebuilt from the ground up. Never
before in action, the 62d was commanded
by a general who likewise lacked combat
experience, Generalmajor Frederich
Kittel. The division was at full strength
for its class: like the 18th it num-
bered three regiments of two-battalion
strength. Equipment was new and
complete. The mission now handed the
newly arrived division was to effect a
break-through on the left of the 18th
Volks Grenadier Division in the Gross-
langenfeld-Heckhuscheid sector, advance
northwest on a broad front (clearing
the Pronsfeld–St. Vith road), and
seize the Our River crossings at Steine-
brück. The 62d Volks Grenadier Divi-

144 THE ARDENNES: BATTLE OF THE BULGE
sion was to leave to its northern neigh-
bor the task of capturing St. Vith, but
was expected to block the western and
southern exits.
The LXVI Corps staff was acutely
conscious that the American observation
posts on the Schnee Eifel overlooked the
German positions. Everything possible
was done to avoid exciting American
suspicion or arousing American interest.
All patrolling was banned from 10 De-
cember on, but the arrival of the 106th
Division (which the Germans immedi-
ately spotted as new and inexperienced)
led to a limited relaxation of this order.
Patrols working at night about 12 or 13
December did discover something of
interest-but in the 14th Cavalry Group
sector. Here it was found that the two
thousand yards separating Roth and
Weckerath (on the south flank of the
cavalry position) was unoccupied, and
that the two villages were weakly held.
Plans were made at once to exploit this
weak spot-an explanation, perhaps, of
the decision to make the main penetra-
tion by the northern attack group in the
Roth area.
From 5 to 12 December the German
artillery moved forward to carefully
camouflaged positions from which the
attack could be supported. The artillery
regiment of the 18th Volks Grenadier
Division occupied old emplacements in
the West Wall area behind the corps
right flank. Corps artillery formed a
groupment southwest of Prüm to give
general support to the southern attack
group of the 18th and the green 62d.
On the north wing the assault gun bri-
gade would have to move to its attack
positions through the West Wall anti-
tank line. Because demolition might
alert the Americans, underpinning for
inclined ramps was built over the dra-
gon’s teeth during the nights before the
attack. All that remained was to fasten
on the planking (and this job was later
done, the assault guns climbing over
with ease). Meanwhile a special field
artillery observation battalion was at
work, spotting the American gun posi-
tions and reporting minor changes in
the opposing battery alignment. The
LXVI Corps staff, it may be added, were
very much concerned over the artillery
weight known to be available to the
American defenders in the zone of pro-
jected advance.
On the night of 14 December it
seemed for a moment that all the care-
ful precautions the LXVI Corps had
taken to mask its intentions might go
for nought. The 2d Panzer Division
tanks, which had detrained at Stadtkyll,
moved along the roads behind the corps’
left flank en route to the south. Through
the clear, cold air the noise of tracks
and motors could be heard for miles.
But much to General Lucht’s relief no
American reconnaissance planes ap-
peared the following day. Apparently
the secret preparations for attack still
were secret. 2
The 18th Volks Grenadier Division
sector narrowed somewhat on 15 De-
cember when the northern neighbor,
I SS Panzer Corps, extended its left
wing to include Neuhof and Ormont;
the division sector at the commencement
of the attack now would be about ten
miles wide. The night of 15 December
was frosty and clear, offering good visi-
bility for the last moves to the line of
departure. On the right the forty guns
of the assault gun brigade took station
2 1t will be recalled that the 106th had noticed
unusual vehicular noise. See above, p. 59.

BREAKTHROUGH AT THE SCHNEE EIFEL 145
near the dragon's teeth. On the left the
two assault regiments of the 62d Volks
Grenadier Division moved for the first
time into the positions held earlier by
the 26th Volks Grenadier Division. Also
for the first time, the assault company
commanders heard officially of the great
counteroffensive and were given instruc-
tions as to their own particular roles.
With assembly completed, the juxta-
position of German and American for-
mations on the morning of 16 December
was as follows. The boundary between
the Fifth and Sixth Panzer Armies bi-
sected the 14th Cavalry Group area by
an extension south of Krewinkel and
Manderfeld. North of the line elements
of the 3d Parachute Division, reinforced
by tanks, faced two platoons of Troop
C, 18th Cavalry Squadron, two recon-
naissance platoons and one gun company
of the 820th Tank Destroyer Battalion,
plus the squadron and group head-
quarters at Manderfeld. South of the
boundary the 294th and 295th Regi-
ments of the 18th Volks Grenadier Divi-
sion, forty assault guns, and a reinforced
tank destroyer battalion faced Troop A
and one platoon of Troop C, 18th Cav-
alry Squadron. On no other part of the
American front would the enemy so out-
number the defenders at the start of the
Ardennes counteroffensive.
On the Schnee Eifel the 422d Infan-
try, composing the left wing of the 106th
Division, had only minute screening
elements opposite. The 423d Infantry,
with one flank on the Schnee Eifel range
and the other in the Bleialf depression,
was in the path of the 293d Regiment
(18th Volks Grenadier Division). The
424th Infantry, in positions running to
the southwest, stood opposite the 62d
Volks Grenadier Division. In the event
that the neighboring corps south of the
LXVI made progress, one of its regi-
ments, the 60th Regiment (116th Pan-
zer Division), would be brought against
the right flank of the 424th Infantry.
The compilation of opposing forces,
above, will show that the odds against
the defender in the Schnee Eifel area
were not inordinate-except in the cav-
alry sector. The Germans would have to
make the utmost use of surprise, con-
centration of effort, and ground favor-
able to attack, if they were to achieve
any large measure of success. Fully aware
that the American line had numerous
weak spots and that no substantial re-
serves were near, General Lucht and his
division commanders saw three factors
that might limit success: the weakness
of the 18th Volks Grenadier Division
center, enemy superiority in the artil-
lery arm, and strong intervention by
unfriendly air. All evidence of the play
of these factors, particularly the last two,
would be carefully observed as D-day
came.
Although the LXVI advance on 16
December was planned and effected as
the co-ordinated effort of two divisions,
the story must begin with the 18th Volks
Grenadier Division attack. This in turn
will follow the German scheme of ma-
neuver, the right wing first, then the
left. The fight in the zone of the 424th
Infantry quickly becomes an independ-
ent action and will be so considered?
The Attack in the Losheim Gap
The shock companies of the 18th be-
gan to move toward the American cav-
alry positions about. 0400 on 16
3 See also ch. XVII.

146 THE ARDENNES: BATTLE OF THE BULGE
December. An hour later the main
strength of the two attacking regiments
followed, the 294th advancing toward
Weckerath and the Our valley, the 295th
heading for Roth and Kobscheid. Sup-
porting artillery, mortars, and Werfers
opened fire over the heads of the Ger-
man infantry shortly after 0830. (Actu-
ally the first concentrations to arouse the
Americans were fired as part of the
Sixth Panzer Army artillery preparation
prior to H-hour and landed in the north-
ern part of the 14th Cavalry zone) . Roth
and Kobscheid, closest to the enemy
jump-off positions, received only one
battery salvo; apparently the German
infantry were already around the vil-
lages. When day broke, cloudy and
drizzling, the assault force moving be-
tween Weckerath and Roth was well on
its way to the commanding crossroads
village of Auw. Visibility was so poor,
the American village positions so dis-
persed, that the cavalrymen for some
time did not detect nor engage the infan-
try moving past. (The Germans, having
received no fire, first suspected that the
main American line had been moved
back to the Our River.) Furthermore,
predawn attacks on Roth and Kobscheid
had occupied the attention of the
troopers. At Roth a company of grena-
diers was checked by shellfire. The
attackers at Kobscheid actually got in-
side the cavalry defense, but nearly forty
were captured.
Before dawn none of the village gar-
risons in the southern sector had been
seriously menaced. The effects of the
enemy penetrations, however, became
apparent soon after daylight. At 0830
a message from Roth reported that the
Germans were inside the village, that
a tank seventy-five yards from the com-
mand post was “belting us with direct
fire.” Light tanks, dispatched from Man-
derfeld, hurried to give aid but were
stopped cold by fire from Auw, some
3,500 yards to the west, which was occu-
pied by the Germans. Nothing more was
heard from Roth. The remainder of
Troop A, in Kobscheid, also was cut off;
by 0900 the attackers had established a
hold inside the village. Weckerath,
which lay to one side of the German
advance on Auw, was hit by elements
of the 294th. Here the 3d Platoon of
Troop C was located east of the village
in a small patch of woods on the road to
Krewinkel, well dug in and protected
by barbed wire on all sides. The first
German assault was checked by mortars
and machine guns, reinforced by accu-
rate artillery fire. Two enemy com-
panies, however, swept around the wood
and converged on the village, where
some twenty men of Troop C headquar-
ters held them at bay with bullet fire.
A platoon of American light tanks ar-
rived from Manderfeld shortly after
0930, appearing just in time to engage
groups of enemy infantry infiltrating the
eastern edge of the village. At 1100
observers at Weckerath saw an enemy
column moving from Roth in the direc-
tion of Auw. They counted fifteen
“tanks”–probably a battalion of assault
guns–and at least one battalion of foot
troops, marching intermixed with the
assault guns. Artillery fire was directed
onto the column, with but little effect.
The Germans pressed on to the west.
In the northern sector of the 14th
Cavalry Group fortune had treated the
defenders with mixed favor during the
morning. The German force committed
here consisted of a reinforced regiment
of the 3d Parachute Division (it will be

BREAKTHROUGH AT THE SCHNEE EIFEL 147
recalled that the boundary between the
Fifth and Sixth Panzer Armies ran just
south of Krewinkel and Manderfeld)
attacking initially without the support of
heavy weapons. The 3d Parachute Divi-
sion axis cut straight through the north-
ern cavalry sector, then angled northwest
in the direction of Faymonville, the divi-
sion advancing as the left flank of the I
SS Panzer Corps. At Krewinkel, the most
advanced American post in the area,
the 2d Platoon of Troop C and a
reconnaissance platoon of Company A,
820th Tank Destroyer Battalion, occu-
pied a position from which excellent
observation and fields of fire covered all
approaches to the village from the east.
An hour before dawn a German shock
company boldly approached the village
in column of fours. The troopers held
their fire until the enemy infantry were
within twenty yards of the outer strands
of wire–then cut loose. The column dis-
integrated, but the assault was quickly
resumed in more open order and shortly
the Germans were in the village streets.
At one point half the village was in Ger-
man hands, but eventually the defenders
got the upper hand and the enemy with-
drew.
One of the last to leave shouted in
English, “Take a ten minute break.
We’ll be back.” An exasperated trooper
hastened to assure him profanely,
“– – –, we’ll still be here.” With the full
morning light the enemy returned, as
promised, after his artillery had tried
unsuccessfully to jar the Americans loose.
Head-on assault from the east by fresh
troops made no progress. By noon, but
two of the defenders had been wounded.
The troopers estimated that the German
dead now totaled 375—doubtless an exag-
gerated figure but still an indication of
the costliness of the German tactics. At
the neighboring village of Afst, the 1st
Platoon of Troop C was similarly
attacked. The platoon beat off two
enemy companies, with heavy loss to the
Germans.
The American left wing was composed
of Company A and two reconnaissance
platoons of the 820th Tank Destroyer
Battalion, occupying the villages of Ber-
terath, Merlscheid, and Lanzerath. The
3-inch towed guns, sited to cover the
roads and eastern approaches, had no
protection whatever. The gun sections
were unable to put up more than short
resistance to the German infantry, nor
could most of the pieces be hooked up
and towed out with the enemy already
in the position. Here as elsewhere dur-
ing the Ardennes fighting the towed tank
destroyer lacked the maneuverability to
deal with infiltration or to displace when
in danger. Three tank destroyers were
pulled back toward Manderfeld and bet-
ter firing positions; the rest, with one
exception, were destroyed on orders.
Most of the company reached the cavalry
group headquarters at Manderfeld and
continued the fight as infantry.
Colonel Devine and the staffs of the
14th Cavalry Group and 18th Cavalry
Squadron had been alerted by the first
shells of the opening predawn concen-
tration dropping on Manderfeld. Tele-
phone wires went out during the bar-
rage, and radio communication was
made difficult by the cacaphony of pho-
nograph records introduced by the Ger-
mans along the American wave lengths.
About 0600 the 14th Cavalry Group ex-
ecutive officer talked by phone to the
106th Division command post and asked
for wire teams to restore the lines.
Whether he asked for permission to

148 THE ARDENNES: BATTLE OF THE BULGE
move up the 32d Cavalry Squadron
is uncertain. In any event the orders
from the division were to alert the re-
serve squadron, but not to move it.
At 0640 another call from Manderfeld
reached the command post at St. Vith,
this time with a request to move the
32d forward to a position halfway
between the division and group com-
mand posts. Twenty-five minutes
later the G–3 journal of the 106th Divi-
sion records a telephone order to the
cavalry: “Move 32 Cavalry Squadron as
soon as you like.” This squadron had
been resting and refitting, indeed some
of its vehicles were partially disassem-
bled when the alert order arrived. About
0930 the squadron was on the road,
minus Company F, which took another
hour and a half to ready its light tanks
for movement.
Colonel Devine, realizing that the for-
ward platoons of the 18th Cavalry
Squadron were in danger of destruction
and could make no more futile efforts,
cut off and isolated as they were, planned
to make a stand along the Manderfeld
ridge. This ridge line was some 3,000
yards in the rear of the original cavalry
line and about twice that distance from
the West Wall positions out of which the
German attack had erupted. Devine in-
tended to defend along the ridge with
the 32d Squadron and thus cover the
withdrawal of his forward troops. Short-
ly after 1100 the fresh squadron reached
Manderfeld, Troop E moving its as-
sault guns into previously reconnoitered
positions at Manderfeld, Troop C de-
ploying northwest of the town to cover
the road from Lanzerath, and two dis-
mounted platoons of Troop A digging
in southwest of Manderfeld. While this
area defense was forming, Troop B took
stations near Andler; at this village, just
west of the German spearhead in Auw,
the Our bridge remained an intact and
important prize. The remainder of
Troop A was dispatched to Holzheim,
there to cover the group’s left and rear.
Shortly before the arrival of the 32d
Cavalry Squadron, Devine had asked
General Jones to make a counterattack
north from the 106th Division area. He
was told that no infantry support could
be given “at this time.” When Devine
answered that he would have to with-
draw in the south to a line from Mander-
feld through Verschneid, Jones made no
comment. Thus far, it must be said, there
was little or no inclination at the 106th
Division headquarters to regard the sit-
uation in the cavalry sector as unduly
serious. Devine’s final comment during
this telephone conversation–that he in-
tended to counterattack with the 32d
Cavalry Squadron on its arrival and
attempt to restore the Krewinkel-Roth-
Kobscheid line–may have helped con-
firm the somewhat optimistic view held
at the division headquarters.
At noon Colonel Devine finally issued
withdrawal orders to the 18th Cavalry
Squadron. Troop C alone was able to
comply. The 3d Platoon, which had held
its own in the fight east of Weckerath,
mounted two armored cars and a few
jeeps, then made its way with guns
blazing into the village. Here the com-
mand post group and light tanks joined,
the column moving west along roads
lined with German riflemen, but this
was no headlong dash because cold
motors and congealed transmission
grease slowed the column to fifteen
miles per hour. Meanwhile the village it
had just left was blasted by a terrific
shelling–apparently the Germans had

BREAKTHROUGH AT THE SCHNEE EIFEL 149
been preparing for a final assault. The
garrisons at Krewinkel and Afst moved
back at 1240 without incident. As Kre-
winkel was lost to view the troopers
could see German infantry swarming in
from the east. 4 When Troop C and the
light tanks reached Manderfeld, the
assault gun troop, which had been de-
ployed along the ridge north and south
of the town, poured direct fire on the
enemy now streaming southwest through
the draws at the source of the Our River.
The morning fog had lifted and the
gunners were able to inflict considerable
damage with their 75-mm. howitzers.
The story of the garrisons in Roth and
Kobscheid is difficult to reconstruct, al-
though the troopers held on for some
hours after being surrounded. In the
early part of the fight, forward obser-
vers in Kobscheid were in contact with
the 275th Armored Field Artillery Bat-
talion; this artillery support unquestion-
ably was of signal aid to the troopers,
as were the quad‘ mounts of the 413th
Antiaircraft Battalion which were sent
to help the Roth defenders. About 1100
the Roth command post radioed Kob-
scheid that the troops of the 106th Divi-
sion farther south were moving back,
that the Roth garrison would try to with-
draw, and that the Kobscheid group
should do likewise. Apparently the
German grip on Roth was too firm;
sometime during the afternoon the
troopers there surrendered. Kobscheid
held out until about 1630. Then, as dusk
settled, sixty-one men led by 1st Lt.
Lorenz Herdrick started through the
4 These troops were armored infantry from the
1st SS Panzer Division whose commander finally
had thrown them in to get the attack rolling.
snow cross-country in a westerly direction.
They returned to the American
lines at St. Vith on 19 December. 5
Early in the afternoon it was apparent
to the force at Manderfeld that the Germans
were pushing west around both
flanks. A patrol sent in the direction of
Auw reported that the entrance to the
Our valley was wide open, contact with
the 99th Division in the north had been
lost, and the 106th Division reported
that it lacked the troops to counterattack
toward the cavalry. Colonel Devine
therefore organized a task force about
1400 to retake the ground around Lanzerath
and thus cover his northern flank.
The task force, commanded by Maj.
J. L. Mayes, consisted of Troop C
and the assault gun troop of the 18th
Cavalry Squadron. Moving north the
task force reached a road junction 1,600
yards north of Manderfeld, where it was
beset from three sides by infantry and
self-propelled guns. The cavalry selfpropelled
howitzers were able to maneuver
and do considerable execution in this
close-range fire fight, but the counterattack
was checked. By this time the
situation on the opposite flank was
precarious; the Germans already had
passed through Wischeid, southwest of
Manderfeld, and were moving toward
the Our bridge at Andler.
Shortly after four o’clock the 14th
Cavalry Group executive officer telephoned
the 106th Division command
post and asked permission to withdraw
to the line Andler-Holzheim, a position
5 Three members of the 18th Cavalry Recon-
naissance Squadron were. awarded the DSC for
gallantry in the battle at the villages: 1st Lt.
A. L. Mills, S. Sgt. Woodrow W. Reeves, and Cpl.
C. E. Statler.

150
represented by a series of ridges covered
on the east by a tributary of the Our.
The division headquarters authorized
the withdrawal. Devine ordered Task
Force Mayes to fight a delaying action
southwest along the road from Losheim,
while the Manderfeld defenders with-
drew to the west. This movement was
carried through successfully, the 32d
Cavalry howitzers on the Manderfeld
ridge ably supporting the task force. The
last troops left Manderfeld about 1700,
setting the town afire in an attempt to
destroy records of value to the enemy.
Troops E and C of the 18th reached
Holzheim at twilight, joining Troop A
of the 32d which already was in position
as the anchor of the 14th Cavalry north
flank. Troop B of the 32d had remained
at Andler since its morning arrival; it
now screened the southern flank with
reconnaissance teams pushing out on the
roads to south, east, and north. The light
tank company of the 32d Squadron was
disposed to the southwest of the cavalry
line at Heuem, covering the road from
Schönberg to St. Vith and worrying
about the absence of communications.
The remainder of the 32d Squadron was
at Herresbach and that of the 18th
Squadron near Wereth, both villages be-
hind the Holzheim-Andler line. By early
evening the 14th Cavalry Group was in
its defensive positions, except for such
regrouping as would be needed to sort
out elements of the two squadrons. Its
supporting artillery battalion (the
275th) was in the process of moving to
new positions near St. Vith. As yet there
were no signs of an enemy pursuit. The
forward artillery observers were active
“along the deserted front” until 1900 but
found nothing to report. Contact with
the Germans had been lost.
THE ARDENNES: BATTLE OF THE BULGE
The German attack in the Losheim
Gap during 16 December had gone ac-
cording to schedule. The northern arm
of the 18th Volks Grenadier Division
envelopment had penetrated as far as
Auw and overrun most of the American
artillery positions. As daylight ended the
294th Regiment assembled around Auw
and the 295th regrouped in the Roth-
Kobscheid area, both awaiting the
arrival of their heavy weapons. Now
General Lucht told the division com-
mander to call forward his armored mo-
bile battalion and send it to join the
294th and elements of the assault gun
brigade the next morning in a drive
on Andler. In the north the 3d Para-
chute Division continued its advance
during the night, marching through
the rough, heavily forested area north-
west of Manderfeld and Lanzerath.
Along the roads to the east the armored
formations of the 1st SS Panzer Divi-
sion toiled forward in the dark, ready
to push through the opening between
the American 99th Division and the
14th Cavalry Group. As things stood,
therefore, the 14th Cavalry was deploy-
ed in the gap which was opening as
the 18th Volks Grenadier Division con-
tinued westward and the 3d Parachute
Division angled toward the northwest.
The cavalry flanks, however, rested on
roads which would be essential to the
enemy–roads along which the German
armor was moving for commitment on
the second day of the offensive. In the
meantime the 14th Cavalry Group com-
mander had gone to St. Vith to explain
to the 106th Division staff his situation
and the arrangements he had made. Gen-
eral Jones, busy with plans for a counter-
attack by armored reinforcements which
the corps commander had promised for

BREAKTHROUGH AT THE SCHNEE ElFEL
the next morning, had no comment to
offer and merely asked Colonel Devine
to wait at the command post.
The Attack Hits the
106th Division
The 14th Cavalry Group withdrawal
to the Holzheim-Andler line in the late
afternoon of 16 December had no prac-
tical adverse effect on its southern neigh-
bor, the 422d Infantry. By this time the
enemy thrust had driven so deep and
with such force between the cavalry and
the 422d that the northern flank of the
106th Infantry Division was exposed re-
gardless of movements undertaken by
the cavalry. Ominous events had tran-
spired in the zone of the 106th.
Seven of the nine rifle battalions under
General Jones’ command were in the line
on the morning of 16 December. The 2d
Battalion, 423d Infantry, was in division
reserve near Born, 5,000 yards north of
St. Vith. The 1st Battalion, 424th Infan-
try, was located at Steinebruck on the
road to Winterspelt and also was in
division reserve. The 422d Infantry had
its three battalions in the West Wall
positions on the Schnee Eifel, defending
a front of eight to nine thousand yards.
Attached was Company A, 8 1st Engineer
Combat Battalion; direct support was
given by the 589th Field Artillery Battal-
ion whose batteries were emplaced
southwest of Auw. Located west of Auw
were the 155-mm. howitzers of the 592d
Field Artillery Battalion. The regimen-
tal command post was in the crossroads
village of Schlausenbach, with the can-
non company to the west on Hill 612.
All of these locations lay in the northern
section of the regimental area not far
from the 14th Cavalry Group boundary.
151
A company of engineers occupied Auw,
the most important road center in the
422d sector. The forward positions of
the 422d in the West Wall were based on
a series of heavily wooded ridges running
north and south. However a number of
ravines, densely screened by trees, led
directly back into the regimental area;
one such ran straight down to Schlausen-
bach.
The 423d Infantry–in the division
center–was deployed on a curving line
a little more than 8,000 yards long, with
one battalion in the West Wall, the
other bending around the southern nose
of the Schnee Eifel and back to the west.
A gap existed between the rifle battalion
positions and the village of Bleialf. The
regimental right wing was fleshed out by
a provisional battalion (the antitank
company, one platoon of the cannon
company, a rifle platoon, and Troop B,
18th Cavalry Squadron) . This scratch
force, acting as riflemen, was reinforced
by Company C, 820th Tank Destroyer
Battalion. The 590th Field Artillery Bat-
talion supported the regiment from posi-
tions northwest of Oberlascheid, and the
regimental cannon company was close to
that village.
The 424th Infantry held a six-mile
line angled slightly from the Ihren
Creek southwestward to the vicinity of
Grosskampenberg. The gap between it
and the 423d, a distance of 4,000 yards,
was screened thinly by the 106th Recon-
naissance Troop and the cannon com-
pany. The 591st Field Artillery
Battalion was situated behind the regi-
mental center with two battalions for-
ward and one in the rear to cover any
displacement.
During the evening of 15 December
enemy aircraft droned through the air

152
over the 106th Division lines attempting
to divert attention from the noise created
by the German ground columns moving
forward to the line of departure. Their
efforts were wasted. The vehicular activ-
ity behind the German front was heard
and duly recorded, but it caused no
alarm. Enemy patrols also were unusu-
ally active during the night–except at
the Schnee Eifel positions of the 422d
Infantry which did not figure in the
German attack plans. Again there was no
particular reaction among the Ameri-
cans. No one anticipated a German at-
tack, although with the advantage of
hindsight all these warning signs and
others would be resurrected and given
an importance never accorded them on
the night of 15 December.
At 0530, 16 December, the guns,
Werfers, and mortars of the LX VI Corps
opened fire, marking the commence-
ment of the advance against the 106th
Division. The artillery available to the
LXVI was limited, by comparison with
most other parts of the front, but was
well served by its forward observers and
did much damage to telephone wire,
ammunition dumps, and other supply
points. The first word from a specific
target reached the division headquar-
ters at St. Vith about 0550, a report
that the 423d Antitank Company had
been shelled since 0530. The 423d In-
fantry was in fact bearing the brunt of
the enemy barrage and most of its tele-
phone lines to the forward units went
out in the first few minutes. Within the
hour messages from the 28th Division
and the 99th Division told of heavy shell-
ing to the south and the north of the
106th. But the German assault troops
who had been moving forward in the
darkness onto the 106th positions since
THE ARDENNES: BATTLE OF THE BULGE
0500 were not immediately detected.
German pressure would first be felt in
these areas within the regimental sec-
tors: the Heckhuscheid and Winterspelt
areas (424th Infantry) ; the Bleialf area
(423d Infantry); and on the Auw-
Schonberg road (422d Infantry). In the
last case, the northern assault wing of
the 18th Volks Grenadier Division con-
centric attack would strike the Ameri-
can cavalry before turning on the north
flank of the 106th Division.
At dusk on 15 December the 62d Volks
Grenadier Division, forming the left of
the LXVI Corps, had come into the lines
opposite the left and center of the 424th
Infantry. This new division would have
no opportunity to reconnoiter the bro-
ken and heavily wooded ground over
which it was to advance the next morn-
ing-a fact which had direct bearing on
the subsequent story of the 424th In-
fantry-but its scheme of maneuver
had been given detailed study. The
attack would open with two regiments
abreast attempting a breakthrough on
a wide front. The main effort would
be made in the vicinity of Winterspelt,
breaching the American switch line
southeast of that village and thus gaining
entrance to the main macadam road
to St. Vith. Once in position astride
the road, the mobile reserve of the
62d would be committed for the pene-
tration, while the two regiments ex-
tended their hold on either side of
the road. On the left, therefore, the
183d Regiment had as its objective the
northern side of the plateau on which
lay the village of Heckhuscheid. Pos-
session of this high ground was deemed
essential to the German plan. On the
right the 190th Regiment aimed at the
wooded heights at Eigelscheid around

BREAKTHROUGH AT THE SCHNEE EIFEL 153
which twisted the road to Winterspelt,
two thousand yards westward.
The 3d Battalion of the 424th Infan-
try received the first German blow in
its positions north of Heckhuscheid. Af-
ter a 20-minute concentration of artil-
lery and mortar fire a shock company
of the 183d drove in on Companies K and
L about 0645. Although the defenders
got word back to their own artillery,
when daylight came the enemy had pen-
etrated well into the position. The 3d
Battalion, however, was on ground
which favored the defender and not un-
duly extended. The most serious threat
developed to the north on the weak flank
screening the switch position. Here the
regimental cannon company (Capt.
Joseph Freesland) , armed only with rifles
and machine guns, was deployed at
the Weissenhof crossroads blocking the
main road to Winterspelt. Guided by
flashlights and flares the Germans made
their attack in column, advancing erect,
shouting and screaming. The cannon-
eers, nothing daunted, did well in their
infantry role, holding for several hours
against assault from front and flank.
Colonel Reid, the regimental command-
er, ordered his 1st Battalion, in reserve
at Steinebruck, to the support of the
threatened north flank. Company C
arrived to reinforce the cannon com-
pany and the rest of the reserve bat-
talion hurriedly established defensive
positions to the rear at Winterspelt.
In the 3d Battalion zone Company I
came in to help restore the line. A se-
ries of counterattacks, well supported by
fire from the 591st Field Artillery Bat-
talion, erased the dents in the Ameri-
can position, and a sortie led by the
battalion S–3, Capt. Lee Berwick,
entered Heckhuscheid and took 107
prisoners. A four-man patrol from
Company K rounded up another forty
prisoners in the woods nearby, By noon
the 424th had driven the enemy back
along the whole of its front.
Coincidentally and without realizing
what had been accomplished, the south-
ern elements of the 424th put a crimp
in the plans of the Germans attacking
to outflank the neighboring 112th In-
fantry. Men of the 2d Battalion, sup-
ported by the 3d Platoon of Company
B, 820th Tank Destroyer Battalion,
caught the assault company leading the
60th Panzer Grenadier Regiment attack
in a wood west of Grosskampenberg.
German reports say that the company
was “nearly destroyed.” This sharp set-
back so discouraged the 116th Panzer
Division commander that before the day
ended he switched the 60th Panzer Gren-
adier Regiment to the south. Although
this attempt to drive a wedge between
the 112th and 424th was not renewed,
the latter was able to give its neighbors
a helping hand later in the day. During
the afternoon a gunner from the tank
destroyer platoon, Pfc. Paul C. Rosen-
thal, sighted five German tanks and a
truck moving north of Lützkampen. Fir-
ing his 3-inch gun at 2,000 yards range
he destroyed all, tanks and truck; he
had used only eighteen rounds of high-
explosive and armor-piercing-capped
ammunition.
About noon a report reached the 62d
Volks Grenadier Division command post
that troops of the 190th Regiment (the
Germans who had broken through north
of the cannon company positions)
were on high ground north of Eigel-
scheid overlooking the road to Winter-
spelt. General Kittel ordered his mobile
battalion up from the 164th Regiment

154
reserve at Pronsfeld and into the attack
along the Winterspelt road. This battal-
ion, “mobile” in the sense that it was
mounted on bicycles and reinforced by
a company of self-propelled assault guns,
was forced to stick to the macadam road.
As a result it came up against the Amer-
ican cannon company at the Weissenhof
crossroads. Outnumbered and in dan-
ger of encirclement the cannoneers
and their rifle support from Company
C made a deliberate and fighting with-
drawal toward Winterspelt, platoon.
by platoon. When the 2d Platoon was
ordered back, its commander (Lt. Craw-
ford Wheeler) stayed behind with a ba-
zooka to meet the leading assault gun
and was killed by point-blank fire.
By dark the German mobile battal-
ion and infantry from the 190th Regi-
ment were closing in on Winterspelt,
where the 1st Battalion and remnants
of the cannon company stood ready to
meet them. The fight raged through
the evening and by midnight at least a
company of Germans was inside the
village, with more coming in by the
hour. In the 3d Battalion sector the en-
emy had got nowhere with his frontal
attacks around Heckhuscheid, the vil-
lage remaining under American control
at the close of the day. Casualties in the
62d Volks Grenadier Division had been
substantial, particularly, as might be ex-
pected in the case of a green division
in its first attack, among the officers.
Losses in the 424th had not been high.
But the position of the regiment on the
night of the 16th was potentially a se-
rious one–despite the rough body check
given the enemy. The battalion and
regimental reserves all had been com-
mitted, the 591st Field Artillery Bat-
talion had fired nearly all its ammuni-
THE ARDENNES: BATTLE OF THE BULGE
tion (over 2,600 rounds), and the en-
emy had made a dent toward Winter-
spelt. Contact with the 112th Infantry,
on the south flank, had been lost. But
fortunately the enemy had given over
the idea of a penetration here.
The intense fire laid on the 423d In-
fantry on the morning of 16 December
had disrupted telephone lines, but the
radio net seems to have functioned well.
By 0600 the regimental commander had
word that his antitank company was
under small arms fire at Bleialf, the key
to the southern route around the Schnee
Eifel and the Alf Creek depression. A-
long this depression extended the 423d’s
weak wing, echeloned to the right and
rear of the two rifle battalions, one on
the Schnee Eifel and one curving along
the southern nose of the range. The
heterogeneous units screening along
the wing had been grouped as a pro-
visional battalion, but they formed no
cohesive front and were charged with
defending the least defensible ground
on the regimental front. When shock
troops of the 293d Regiment (18th Volks
Grenadier Division) struck the antitank
company in Bleialf, one group filtered
into the village and another, marching
along the railroad, cut between Bleialf
and Troop B (18th Cavalry Squadron),
blocking out the latter and destroying
the right platoon of the antitank com-
pany.
Although radio reception was poor in
this area the commander of the 423d
Infantry and the regimental executive
(Lt. Col. Frederick W. Nagle) were
able to alert and move reserves
promptly, but Colonel Cavender’s re-
quest for the release of his 2d Battalion,
then in division reserve, was refused.
About 0930 the service company and

BREAKTHROUGH AT THE SCHNEE EIFEL 155
cannon company were at Bleialf, where
they found most of the village held by
the Germans. Later Company B, 81st En-
gineer Combat Battalion, and the head-
quarters company were thrown into the
fight. By 1500 these units had ejected
the enemy from Bleialf after a series of
hand-to-hand fights in the streets and
houses. The cavalry troop on the ex-
treme regimental right remained cut
off from the friendly troops to the north.
Finally getting permission by radio to
withdraw, the troopers pulled back in
the early afternoon to Winterscheid,
2,500 yards southwest of Bleialf. While
the enemy was attacking around Bleialf,
a few small patrols tried to get into the
positions of the 1st and 3d Battalions
to the north–but no real attack was
attempted during the 16th.
The 293d had failed to carry out its
part as the southern jaw of the 18th
Volks Grenadier Division pincers, for
without Bleialf the road to Steinebrück
was barred. The Americans had recov-
ered their balance quickly after the in-
itial shock at Bleialf. The battalions
on the Schnee Eifel had brought the
German flank under accurate and pun-
ishing fire at the first light of day, in-
terdicting all reinforcement by the heavy
weapons needed to reduce the village.
On the whole the situation in the 423d
sector seemed satisfactory, although two
items remained for a final accounting.
The southern flank of the regiment now
was in the air, and its 2d Battalion, as
division reserve, had been sent forward
to aid the endangered 422d Infantry on
the north.
High on the center of the Schnee
Eifel the 422d Infantry missed the
first rude shock of a predawn attack.
Although it was no part of the German
plan to engage the 422d by frontal as-
sault, the enemy penetration between
Roth and Weckerath, during the dark
hours, quickly brought the assault troops
of the 294th Regiment down the road
to Auw and onto the American regi-
ment’s flank and rear. Company A of
the 81st Engineer Combat Battalion was
billeted at Auw, and despite the enemy
shelling in the early morning the engi-
neers had turned out as usual to work
on the roads. As the enemy approached
Auw the bulk of the company hurried
back to the village, set up their machine
guns, and engaged the German column.
This column (at least a battalion of the
294th) was reinforced by self-propelled
guns, which shelled the engineers out of
their positions. When the 1st Platoon,
the last to leave, finally essayed a dash
from the village to the protection of a
nearby wood lot, Cpl. Edward S. Withee
remained behind to cover his comrades,
with only his submachine gun as a
weapon against the enemy armor. 6 By
this time the American batteries south-
west of the village were blasting the
Germans there, for a time halting fur-
ther advance. At daylight small groups
began pressure against the forward bat-
talions of the 422d, but this seems to
have been no more than an attempt to
fix American attention to the front.
Company L, however, had to be rushed
to the defense of the regimental com-
mand post at Schlausenbach.
About noon the enemy in Auw be-
came active, moving south against the
artillery groupment composed of the
589th Field Artillery Battalion (astride
the Auw-Bleialf road) and the 592d, a
6 Withee was captured after his lone fight. He
was given the DSC.

156 THE ARDENNES: BATTLE OF THE BULGE
155-mm. howitzer battalion, close by.
The German 294th was acting under
orders to clear the way into the Our val-
ley, but to do so it had to neutralize or
destroy the American artillery, whose
positions had been plotted earlier by the
corps observation battalion. Stealing for-
ward by squads and platoons, the gren-
adiers brought the battery positions
under crossfire from their machine pistols
while mortar crews and gunners worked
to knock out the American field pieces.
Colonel Descheneaux, intent on eas-
ing the increasing pressure, dispatched
a task force about 1300 to recapture
Auw and cut off the enemy to the south.
This counterattack, employing Company
L, the cannon company, and part of
the antitank company, was based on a
plan taken over from the 2d Infantry
Division. The task force started its ad-
vance in the midst of a sudden snow-
storm, made contact with the Germans
near Auw, then suddenly received or-
ders to return to the regimental com-
mand post at Schlausenbach, which was
now threatened by infantry advancing
along the draw from the east. Even while
the task force was approaching Auw
the enemy had stepped up the drive to
overrun the artillery, sending assault
guns in to do the job. But the Ameri-
can cannoneers stayed with their how-
itzers, firing with the shortest fuze
possible, while others of the artillery
worked their way to within bazooka
range of enemy assault guns. The attack
was stopped, after three assault guns
had been knocked out. The Germans
returned to the softening-up process and
waited for night to fall; artillery and
mortar fire accounted for 36 men in Bat-
tery A of the 592d in the late afternoon.
When day closed, the attempt to de-
stroy the artillery was resumed, flares
and searchlights marking the German
movements. Earlier, General Jones had
taken steps to block the gap between
the 14th Cavalry Group and the 422d,
ordering his reserve, the 2d Battalion,
423d Infantry (Lt. Col. Joseph F. Puett),
to move through St. Vith to Schönberg.
By 1730 Puett’s battalion had detrucked
and set up defenses to cover the road
net at the latter point. Three hours
later General Jones telephoned Colonel
Puett, ordering an immediate attack to
cover the open left flank of the 422d
and permit the two hard-pressed artil-
lery battalions to displace southward.
Apparently General Jones intended that
the battalion should turn north to And-
ler and push aside the enemy along
the Auw-Andler-Schönberg road. Puett,
however, got on the wrong road and
turned south–leaving the northern ap-
proach to Schönberg open. (About the
same time, the cavalry troop at Andler
pulled out.) Ultimately the 2d Battal-
ion found its way through the dark across
country and reached the 589th Field
Artillery Battalion. Meanwhile the
422d commander had swung his left
battalion (the 2d) around to face north,
expecting to link up with the reserve
battalion.
This, then, was the situation. The
106th Division had lost relatively little
ground during the daylight hours of the
16th. Still, the enemy had succeeded in
creating a shallow salient in the Win-
terspelt sector, had penetrated between
the 424th and 423d, and had uncovered
the left flank and rear of the 422d In-
fantry. Through the night of 16–17
December, therefore, the German LXVI
Corps continued to push its tired infan-
try into these sectors, while fresh troops

BREAKTHROUGH AT THE SCHNEE EIFEL 157
moved up with heavy weapons and
motor vehicles for commitment on the
morrow. There was no longer any doubt
as to the German maneuver. The intelligence
section of the 106th Division
staff analyzed the enemy plan correctly
in its report on the night of 16 December.
“The enemy is capable of pinching
off the Schnee Eifel area by employing
one VG Division plus armor from
the 14th Cavalry Group sector and one
VG Division plus armor from the 423d
Infantry sector at any time.” This estimate
hardly is vitiated by the fact that
only one German division, the 18th
Volks Grenadier, formed the pincers
poised to grip the 106th Division. After
all, the entire 62d Volks Grenadier Division
stood poised to break through in
the Winterspelt area and to strengthen
or lengthen the southern jaw of the
pincers.
General Lucht, leading the LXVI
Corps, could look with some complacency
at the events of this first day, even
though his left wing had failed to break
through the American main line of resistance.
Not a single one of the much
feared Jabo’s had appeared in the sky,
the superior weight of metal available
to the American artillery had not been
utilized in the early and crucial hours
of the assault, and the defenders on the
Schnee Eifel had made not a single
move to threaten the weak and grossly
extended center of the 18th Volks Grenadier
Division. This inactivity by the
106th Division on the first day, combined
with the failure to counterattack
against the weak center on the
Schnee Eifel or the flanks of the German
salients, was inexplicable to the
German commanders but also a matter
Americans would counterattack on 17
December but that their reaction would
come too late and the encirclements
would be completed according to plan.
His own plans for the second day were
simple. On the right the mobile battal-
ion of the 18th Volks Grenadier Division
was already moving on Andler en route
to seize the Schonberg bridge and the
road to St. Vith. The left kampfgruppe
of the 18th also would make way for a
mobile thrust. Finally, the 62d Volks
Grenadier Division had orders to break
loose at Heckhuscheid and drive for the
Our valley “at all costs.”
By the night of 16 December Gen-
eral Jones had committed all the re-
serves available to the 106th Division
except a battalion of engineers at St.
Vith. But reinforcements, hastily gath-
ered by the VIII Corps, First Army, and
12th Army Group, were on the way.
When the 2d Infantry Division turned
over its area to the 106th it had taken
its armored support, Combat Command
B, 9th Armored Division, north to the
V Corps sector. Replacement was made
by the 9th Armored’s Combat Com-
mand R, which assembled at Trois Vier-
ges–some twenty road miles south of
St. Vith–in position to reinforce the
106th if need should arise. This small
armored group represented the only mo-
bile counterattack force available in the
VIII Corps. The extent of the German
threat on 16 December, slowly compre-
hended though it was, obviously re-
quired more drastic countermeasures
than the limited resources of the VIII
Corps could provide. At 1025, therefore,
the First Army released CCB, 9th Ar-
mored, to the VIII Corps, thus per-
mitting Middleton to move his armored
of relief. Lucht anticipated that the reserve (CCR) as a backstop for the 28th

158 THE ARDENNES: BATTLE OF THE BULGE
Division. CCB, 9th Armored (Brig. Gen.
William M. Hoge), was assembled
around Faymonville, about 12 miles
north of St. Vith, awaiting orders to re-
inforce the 2d Infantry Division attack
toward the Roer River dams.
The attachment of CCB to the 106th
Division, as ordered by Middleton, was
logical; Hoge’s troops would be return-
ing to old and familiar terrain. During
the day CCB remained at Faymonville
“attached in place,” as the military
verbalism runs. The 106th Division com-
mander could not move CCB without
corps approval and was not too con-
cerned with the enemy advance in his
northern sector. He made no move to put
CCB on the road, merely ordering a
platoon of its tank destroyers to St. Vith.
Shortly after dark General Hoge and his
staff arrived at St. Vith to confer with
General Jones. There a plan was made
for CCB to counterattack and retake
Schonberg. This plan shortly was dis-
carded for during the evening the corps
commander telephoned Jones that he
now could have additional armored
help, that CCB, 7th Armored Division,
was on its way from the Ninth Army and
would reach St. Vith by 0700 the next
morning.
As events would show, this estimate
of the 7th Armored combat command’s
availability was far too sanguine. Why
it was made is not clear. Lt. Col.
W. M. Slayden of the VIII Corps staff
was with General Jones at the time of
this call. He later said that he should
have warned Jones that the corps com-
mander was “over optimistic” because
he knew that the combat command
was so far distant. In any case, Jones
decided at midnight that the 7th Ar-
mored combat command should make
the counterattack on the north flank
and that Hoge’s command should march
at once to a position near Steinebrück,
there ready to attack toward Winterspelt
where incoming reports showed a rap-
idly deteriorating situation. It would
appear that this decision to employ
CCB, 9th Armored, on the south flank
reflected either General Middleton’s in-
tention to restore the connection be-
tween the 106th and 28th Divisions or
a direct order from the corps to that
effect. Also, the corps commander did
not want to pass both armored com-
mands through St. Vith. Subsequently,
however, both commands did move
through the city.
The 424th Infantry and CCB,
9th Armored
On the morning of 17 December
the precarious situation of the 424th In-
fantry gave Colonel Reid reason to fear
encirclement. His extended left flank
was in the air. Because communications
had failed, Reid did not know that his
right flank was still covered by the
112th Infantry. In any case, the enemy
in this sector had brought up tanks
and was attacking in considerable force.
The 424th had its back to the Our Riv-
er and if the enemy seized the bridge
at Steinebrück and spread along the
far bank it would be hard put to with-
draw westward. Communications with
the division command post at St. Vith
was limited to the exchange of liaison
officers traveling along a road now be-
ing shelled by the German guns.
Through the early, dark hours of the
17th the enemy laid mortar and artil-
lery fire on the front-line positions of
the 424th. Opposite the right battalion,

BREAKTHROUGH AT THE SCHNEE EIFEL
which thus far had held its ground, Ger-
man patrols wormed forward to cut the
barbed wire and lob hand grenades to-
ward the American foxholes. An hour or
so before dawn the German searchlights
flickered on, followed by a storm of
shells from guns and Werfers. The fus-
illade actually was directed against the
juncture between the 424th and 112th,
but Company G, 424th, came under
this fire and suffered many dead as day
came and the pounding continued. The
main German thrust, however, was made
farther north, at Winterspelt. A com-
pany or more of the 62d Volks Grenadier
Division had taken possession of the
eastern half of the village during the
night and at daybreak reinforcements
finally drove the 1st Battalion from
Winters pelt .
Even so, the 424th still blocked the
road to the Our River and Steinebrück.
To speed up the attack, the German
corps commander, General Lucht, him-
self hurried to Winterspelt to get the
62d moving toward the Our. Ap-
parently the 62d had become somewhat
disorganized, its losses had been high,
and its left regiment had made little
headway in the Heckhuscheid sector.
Furthermore, the division on its left,
which had been pushing toward the
south flank of the 424th, now pulled
out and left the 62d to go it alone, seri-
ously hampering Lucht’s ability to
exploit the dent hammered into the
American lines at Winterspelt. But the
right regiment of the 62d advanced al-
most unopposed north of Winterspelt
while the division center, now composed
of the 2d Battalion, 164th Regiment,
reinforced by assault guns and engineers,
continued beyond Winterspelt to occupy
the saddle which overlooked the ap-
159
proaches to Steinebrück. The left wing
of the 424th was pushed out of the way,
folding back toward the south and west,
but finally was pegged down by a scratch
task force led by 1st Lt. Jarrett M. Hud-
dleston, Jr. To hold this flank and ex-
tend it as the enemy moved into the gap,
Colonel Reid kept adding whatever
troops he could find to this junior offi-
cer’s command. Steinebruck bridge re-
mained in American hands.
General Hoge’s CCB, 9th Armored
Division, diverted to the Winterspelt
area on the night of the 16th, arrived in
St. Vith before dawn on the 17th and
received its final orders. The armored
infantry (27th Armored Infantry Bat-
talion) would move at once to seize
the series of hills near Winterspelt; the
tanks (14th Tank Battalion) would as-
semble west of the Our River and
thence be committed as the situation
unrolled. About this time the 106th
Division commander borrowed a platoon
of the 811th Tank Destroyer Battalion
from CCB, sending it to Schonberg to
relieve the forward command post of the
106th (the platoon did reach the 423d
Infantry). The situation in front of St.
Vith was changing so rapidly that a pla-
toon of the reconnaissance troop leading
CCB had to be sent to defend the road
out of St. Vith to the east, while a com-
pany of tanks and another of tank de-
stroyers were diverted to screen the
entry of the 7th Armored Division.
Word that Winterspelt was no longer
in friendly hands reached CCB just as
its two leading rifle companies started
moving to the Our. By 0930 one com-
pany was across the river and had run
into German infantry dug in along the
high ground overlooking the village of
Elcherath, fifteen hundred yards from

160
Steinebrück. The terrain and general
uncertainty as to the enemy strength
and dispositions dictated a co-ordinated
attack. By noon the 16th Armored Field
Artillery Battalion was in position west
of the river to support the attack. At
this time General Hoge had in hand
three companies of armored infantry
and the 14th Tank Battalion, a force
deemed sufficient to drive the Germans
back from Elcherath. But the enemy
also was bringing up reinforcements, for
at noon an American spotter plane re-
ported a column of vehicles entering
Winterspelt (perhaps this was the 2d
Battalion of the 164th Regiment).
Two companies of the 27th Armored
Infantry Battalion (Lt. Col. George W.
Seeley) advanced to clear the hills flank-
ing Elcherath while Company B moved
along the main road. Threshed by
small arms fire from the grenadiers on
the wooded slopes Company B suffered
about forty casualties, but the surprise
appearance of a tank platoon shook the
enemy infantry somewhat. About ninety
Germans, hands high, came forward to
surrender. A little after 1500 General
Hoge ordered his infantry to halt and
dig in; he had decided to throw in the
less vulnerable tank battalion and
thrust for the high ground east of Win-
terspelt. The 14th Tank Battalion was
on its way to the Steinebrück bridge
when the assistant division commander
of the 106th arrived with word from
General Jones that Hoge might make
the attack if he wished, but that CCB
must withdraw behind the Our that
night. Since there was little or no point
to further effort in the direction of Win-
terspelt, Hoge told his infantry to dig
in and wait for nightfall, then with-
drew the tanks to their assembly area.
THE ARDENNES: BATTLE OF THE BULGE
In the early afternoon Colonel Reid
had gathered the staff of the 424th to
review the regimental position. Nothing
was known of friendly units to the right
and left; no information was getting
through from the division headquar-
ters; the enemy appeared to be work-
ing his way around the left flank of the
424th and had penetrated into the regi-
mental service area. If a withdrawal was
to be made starting in the early evening,
preparations would have to begin at
once. Reid decided to hold where he was
for he had no orders releasing his regi-
ment from the “hold at all costs” mis-
sion. Finally, at 1730, the regimental
liaison officer arrived with orders from
Jones that the 424th should withdraw
immediately. During the night of 17–18
December both CCB, 9th Armored,
and the 424th Infantry made a success-
ful move across the river, although in
the hurried withdrawal the latter was
forced to leave much equipment be-
hind. The line now occupied by these
two units stretched a distance of seven
thousand yards, from Weppler (north-
east of Steinebrück) south to Burg Reu-
land.
The intervention of the 9th Armored
combat command had not achieved
the results which had been hoped for,
but had contributed indirectly to the
successful withdrawal of the 424th In-
fantry and had delayed the drive by
the 62d Volks Grenadier Division toward
the Our crossings–and St. Vith. The
German division commander later
wrote of the “serious crisis” caused by
the American counterattacks around El-
cherath. The heavy concentration of
American artillery supporting CCB al-
so gave the Germans pause. It seems
probable that the failure of the 183d

BREAKTHROUGH AT THE SCHNEE EIFEL 161
Regiment to make any headway
against the American right wing in the
Heckhuscheid sector on 16 and 17 De-
cember was largely caused by the sharp
tactics in progressive displacement and
the excellent defensive fires of the 591st
Field Artillery Battalion (Lt. Col.
Phillip F. Hoover) and its reinforcing
battalions from the corps artillery. The
8-inch howitzers of the 578th Field Ar-
tillery Battalion, for example, fired 108
tons of shells between the beginning of
the German attack and 1030 on 17 De-
cember against the enemy attack posi-
tions opposite the 424th Infantry. But
only in the Heckhuscheid-Winterspelt
sector had the prearranged and sizable
groupment of VIII Corps artillery be-
hind the corps left wing played any de-
cisive role on 16 and 17 December.
Cannae in the Schnee Eifel
During a telephone conversation ear-
ly in the evening of 16 December the
corps commander had apprised Gen-
eral Jones of his concern over the se-
curity of the 422d and 423d Regiments.
General Middleton stressed the impor-
tance of retaining the Schnee Eifel posi-
tion but told Jones that it was unten-
able unless the north flank could be
“heavily protected.” Later, when re-
ports coming into the corps headquar-
ters at Bastogne indicated that enemy
pressure along the corps front was not
only continuing but increasing, Middle-
ton got a call from Jones in which the
106th commander made a tentative sug-
gestion to pull the two regiments back
to less exposed positions. Middleton
answered in the sense of the time-hon-
ored Army rule of decision by “the man
on the ground” and left the phone ex-
pecting Jones to withdraw. 7 Perhaps
General Jones’s opinion was altered by
the knowledge that armored support
was on its way, perhaps by the VIII Corps
order, received somewhat later, that no
troops were to be withdrawn unless
their positions became completely un-
tenable. (However, the “hold at all
costs” line drawn to accompany this or-
der was fixed as the west bank of the
Our and all nine rifle battalions of the
106th Division were east of that river.)
Perhaps Jones felt that the corps com-
mander was passing the buck and would
leave him in the lurch if a withdrawal
order was issued. In any case Jones de-
cided not to withdraw the two regi-
ments.
The fateful day for the 106th Division
would be 17 December. On both sides
of the battle line reinforcements were
moving, the Germans to close the trap
on the Schnee Eifel troops, the Amer-
icans to wedge its jaws apart. The bat-
tle had continued all through the night
of 16–17 December, with results whose
impact would be fully appreciated only
after daylight on the 17th.
Colonel Devine, the 14th Cavalry
group commander, left the 106th Divi-
sion command post about 0800 on the
morning of 17 December, still, insofar as
it can be ascertained, without instruc-
tions. The previous evening V Corps had
asked VIII Corps to re-establish contact
between the 99th Division and the 14th
Cavalry. This call had been routed to
Colonel Devine, at St. Vith, who spoke
on the phone to the 99th Division head-
quarters and agreed to regain contact at
Wereth. The conversation took place
7 Combat Interv with Middleton and Evans;
also Ltr, Middleton to Theater Historian ETO,
30 Jul 45.

162 THE ARDENNES: BATTLE OF THE BULGE
about 2130. But in the ensuing hours
the situation of Devine’s command had
altered radically.
It will be recalled that the 14th Cav-
alry Group had withdrawn to the Holz-
heim-Andler line, breaking contact with
the enemy. About 1830 on 16 December
the units of the 18th Reconnaissance
Squadron which had moved to Holzheim
on the lefts of the line withdrew to
Wereth, farther west, with the consent
of the group commander. This move
left Troop A of the 32d by itself at
Holzheim. The troop commander was
concerned with his exposed left flank
and requested permission to move to
Honsfeld, in the 99th Division zone,
somewhat over two miles to the north.
Group headquarters was loath to ap-
prove such a move and asked for a report
by liaison officer. Finally the commander
of Troop A decided to act on his own
initiative; the troop reached Honsfeld
at 2100 and was incorporated in the
defense of that village. Its subsequent
story belongs with that of the 99th
Division.
During the evening German troops
had been reported on the road south
of Holzheim. The executive officer of
the 32d Squadron received this report
at Herresbach, where the squadron
headquarters and Troops E and C were
assembled. Although no Germans had
yet appeared, the executive officer was
apprehensive lest Herresbach become a
cul-de-sac. The road southeast to Andler
might be ambushed. The poor secondary
road northwest to Wereth was blocked
by fallen trees, probably felled by the
Belgians. Reconnaissance showed one
way out of the village, a poor dirt trail,
which led westward for about four miles
and there joined a fairly good road. It
was decided that this trail would be used
if the elements in Herresbach had to
withdraw any farther.
As a result of the reshuffling during
the night the cavalry position extended
obliquely southeast from Wereth
through Herresbach to Andler. Troop
B at Andler, then, lay close to the enemy,
directly astride the main approach to
Schonberg and St. Vith. At daybreak
two of the troop’s reconnaissance teams
-about twenty men–were suddenly en-
gulfed by Tiger tanks and infantry.
‘This apparition was the 506th Panzer
Battalion which had been thrown in by
the Sixth Panzer Army to reinforce its
advance toward Vielsalm, and which had
detoured south of the interarmy bound-
ary in search of a passable road. Con-
tact was momentary. Troop B hastily
withdrew south to Schonberg while the
Tigers went lumbering off to the
northwest. Now that Andler was in en-
emy hands the 32d Cavalry Squadron at
Herresbach was isolated. The squadron
executive officer requested permission to
withdraw via the woods trail, which had
been surveyed earlier, and the 14th Cav-
alry Group commander–who had ar-
rived at his command post in Meyerode
-gave consent. About 0830 the 32d
Squadron and the numerous strays and
stragglers who had congregated in Her-
resbach began the difficult move. All ve-
hicles finally emerged from the woods
and joined group headquarters at Meye-
rode.
Thus far only Troop B had actually
seen and engaged the Germans. Troop
B was hit again at Schonberg, this time
by elements of the 294th Regiment led
in person by the 18th Volks Grenadier
Division commander, and headed west
along the St. Vith road, looking for a

BREAKTHROUGH AT THE SCHNEE EIFEL 163
defile or cut which would afford an
effective delaying position. The aban-
donment of Schonberg proved to be
decisive. The northern kampfgruppe
of the 18th Volks Grenadier Division
would shortly be joined by the south-
ern, which had just broken through the
American lines at Bleialf, thus closing
the trap on the American forces within
the triangle Auw-Schönberg-Bleialf.
Troop B finally reached a favorable
point at a sharp bend in the road near
Heuem, about 2,000 yards west of Schön-
berg. Here, while other American troops
streamed through from the east, the
cavalry deployed its six armored cars and
ten machine gun and mortar jeeps. When
the first German vehicle, a tank or as-
sault gun, rounded the bend two of the
armored cars opened up with 37-mm.
guns which did no damage but induced
it to withdraw. Then, for nearly two
hours, the troopers’ light machine guns
and mortars repelled every attempt that
the advance guard of the 294th made to
move forward. Finally at 1050 the 14th
Cavalry Group sent radio orders for
Troop B to withdraw through St. Vith
and rejoin the 32d Squadron northeast
of that city. This move was part of a
general withdrawal which Colonel De-
vine had ordered on his own initiative
after scouts sent out by the 18th Squad-
ron at Wereth reported seeing German
troops to the west (probably the advance
guard of the 3d Parachute Division
moving in the direction of Malmédy) .
By noontime, or shortly thereafter,
the 32d Squadron was in position at
Wallerode and the 18th Squadron was
on the high ground at Born, northwest of
Wallerode. On the whole this repre-
sented a favorable defensive line and
placed the group in position to block the
main road from Büllingen in the north
to St. Vith. Colonel Devine informed the
headquarters at St. Vith that he had
withdrawn to a “final delaying position,”
and sent an overlay to the 106th com-
mand post showing the new position.
Furthermore, Devine advised that he
would “have [a] counterattack force
available your orders.” It seems that
General Jones did not question this
latest retrograde movement, for it was
reported to the VIII Corps forthwith
and without comment. At 1220 the G–3
journal of the 106th Division records a
telephone message from the 14th Cav-
alry Group asking for “the general plan”
(this was an hour after the withdrawal
message arrived at St. Vith) . The reply
was “stay on the line where you are. Ln
O coming to you.”
Although the 106th Division had not
ordered the group to withdraw in the
first instance to the Wallerode-Born posi-
tion, a cavalry screen in this area would
be very useful as outpost cover for the
7th Armored Division elements still
moving south to St. Vith. Certainly a
roadblock here to the north of the city
was essential.
But once more the group commander
gave the order to withdraw, this about
1530. There never has been a clear
explanation for this order; the group had
no contact with the enemy and had re-
ported the Wallerode-Born line as a
“final delaying position.” A liaison offi-
cer from the 106th Division was at the
group command post, but it is impossible
to say whether Colonel Devine received
any definite order to hold this position.
Liaison officers carried the new orders to
the two squadrons: the 18th to occupy
the village of Recht and the 32d to de-
ploy along the Recht River astride the

164
St. Vith-Vielsalm road. Again there was
confusion, either in the orders issued or
their execution. Instead of moving back
by separate roads both squadrons moved
onto the main highway leading west
from St. Vith to Vielsalm. Darkness
found the group caught up in the traffic
jam, three columns wide, crawling slowly
out of or into St. Vith.
Before dawn, on 17 December, the
enemy renewed his attack to envelop the
major part of the 106th Division. At
0725 a radio message from the 423d In-
fantry reported that the Germans had
overrun Bleialf and requested the divi-
sion to send help at once to prevent a
thrust in force to the north. In the 14th
Cavalry Group sector, the enemy was in
Andler and driving toward Schonberg.
Finally, at 0905, the news reached the
106th Division command post in St. Vith
that the enemy forces striking north from
Bleialf had pushed the 423d Infantry
back to the northeast and had joined
hands with the forces at Schonberg. The
German plan of envelopment had suc-
ceeded-the 422d and 423d Regiments
were encircled. The only question re-
maining was whether the two units
could break out or be released by an
American counterthrust from the west.
The answer lies in the state and disposi-
ticns of the trapped regiments.
The 2d Battalion, 423d, committed
the previous evening, had organized a
defensive position astride the Auw-
Bleialf road close behind the belea-
guered 589th Field Artillery Battalion.
Most of the 589th reached the infantry
lines, but Battery C had become mired
in an area which was under
constant fire and toward dawn the
bogged howitzers were destroyed
where they lay. The medium pieces of
THE ARDENNES: BATTLE OF THE BULGE
the 592d Field Artillery Battalion had
been less close-pressed by the German
infantry; during the early morning of 17
December the battalion, with only one
howitzer missing, withdrew to St. Vith.
The two remaining batteries of the 589th
were less fortunate. While en route to
St. Vith the column was surprised on the
road about a mile south of Schonberg;
three of the remaining pieces were lost
there (two had been lost at firing posi-
tions). The three howitzers left to the
battalion were emplaced in support of
the hasty defenses being reared around
St. Vith. The 590th Field Artillery Bat-
talion, having moved north from the
423d Infantry zone during the night, also
was en route to the west when suddenly
its escape was blocked by the tanks which
had struck the 589th. Reconnaissance
showed that the other exit routes were
held by the enemy or were mired to the
extent of being impassable. The bat-
talion therefore rejoined the forces in
the pocket and took up firing positions
in the Halenfelder Wald. This one
battalion of the division artillery
could be of little help, for its service
battery, sent west for ammunition, would
be unable to return.
While the artillery was attempting es-
cape, with varying degrees of success, the
2d Battalion, 423d, repelled two enemy
attempts to advance south of Auw.
Meanwhile patrols had discovered some
German troops at Laudesfeld, about a
thousand yards west of the battalion
positions. The 2d Battalion commander,
now out of contact with the command
post at St. Vith, decided to fall back and
defend Schonberg. When the battalion
finally turned to follow the artillery out
of the trap, it found the way effectively
blocked by German tanks. Although the

BREAKTHROUGH AT THE SCHNEE EIFEL 165
battalion antitank guns did well in the
unequal contest with the panzers–de-
stroying three at one point–neither they
nor the attached platoon of tank de-
stroyers could hope to force the entry to
the Schonberg road. Puett’s battalion
could now move only in one direction-
to the east. At noontime the 2d Battalion
joined the 423d Infantry near Radscheid.
Communication with the division having
failed, Puett placed himself and his bat-
talion at the disposal of the commander
of the 423d and was ordered into the
perimeter defense slowly forming.
It is probable that both the 423d and
422d were aware of their plight by 0900;
at least radio reports of the unsuccessful
attempt by the 590th to run the Schon-
berg gantlet had been received. The
106th Division took cognizance of the
situation in which the regiments now
found themselves by a radio order sent
out at 0945: “Withdraw from present
positions if they become untenable.”
The message added that the division ex-
pected to clear out the area “west of you”
with reinforcements during the after-
noon. This communication, unfortu-
nately, was delayed in transit. Actually
neither regiment made any move except
to bring some troops out of the Schnee
Eifel and sketch in perimeter defenses.
The only contact between the 422d and
423d was by radio and patrols. During
the afternoon the enemy constricted
their hold, albeit loosely by deployment
along the Bleialf-Auw road, but on the
whole the Americans were left to their
own devices while German infantry,
guns, and vehicles poured past on their
way to the west.
The early morning breakthrough in
the Bleialf sector, necessary to the Ger-
man encirclement of the Schnee Eifel
forces, had been accomplished by the
southern jaw of the German vise only
after strong exhortation and admonition
of the 293d Regiment by its parent divi-
sion and corps. At the close of 16 Decem-
ber the provisional battalion of the 423d
Infantry still held Bleialf, from which the
enemy had been ejected earlier in the
day. During the night the 293d Regi-
ment re-formed for the attack, urged on
by its higher headquarters, and at 0530
the next morning struck Bleialf in force.
Within an hour the attackers had driven
the provisional battalion from the vil-
lage (the Germans later reported a stiff
fight) and were on the march north to
Schonberg. Nothing stood in the way, al-
though the enemy vanguard ran into the
American artillery withdrawal and was
slightly delayed, and about 0900 the lead-
ing troops of the 293d met their division
commander and his battalion from the
294th near Schonberg.
Most of the Bleialf garrison succeeded
in joining the two rifle battalions of the
423d. But on the extreme right flank of
the regiment, south of Bleialf, elements
of Company B, 8 1st Engineer Battalion,
were overrun and Troop B, 18th Cavalry
Squadron, was left isolated. Unable to
reach the 423d, the troop was given per-
mission to try the Schonberg exit. About
dark Troop B started north, followed by
a part of the 106th Reconnaissance
Troop which had become separated
from the 424th Infantry. Keeping to the
west of the enemy-occupied Bleialf-
Schonberg road, the cavalry column
reached the edge of Schonberg. (By this
time the situation was so confused that
a Volkswagen full of grenadiers moved
into the column just ahead of an armored
car–whose gunner promptly destroyed
the intruding vehicle and its occupants.)

166 THE ARDENNES: BATTLE OF THE BULGE
Because Schonberg was known to be
in German hands, the 3d Platoon moved
in to determine the situation. The pla-
toon had crossed the Our bridge and was
at the north end of the village when
there appeared a column of American
trucks, but filled with Germans carrying
arms. The three armored cars, forming
the point of the platoon, wheeled over
to the side of the road and raced toward
the head of the column, firing their ma-
chine guns and 37-mm. cannon as they
passed the yelling Germans. Suddenly a
Mark IV tank slipped out of a side road.
Only one of the American armored cars
got away. When informed by radio of
this engagement the 423d Infantry in-
structed Troop B to “make your own
decision.” Unsuccessful in finding any
passable secondary road, the troopers
destroyed their vehicles and broke up
into small groups for the journey toward
St. Vith. Hiding by day and traveling by
night some fifty reached the St. Vith
lines. The 106th Reconnaissance Troop
had become completely disorganized
while following Troop B, and one pla-
toon was left in Grosslangenfeld with
neither orders nor word of the with-
drawal. Most of the officers and men sur-
rendered the next morning without a
fight. 8
When darkness came on 17 December,
some eight or nine thousand Americans
were effectively bottled up west of the
Schnee Eifel. Their story henceforth has
little connection with events outside the
pocket. In addition to the 422d and 423d
Infantry Regiments the list of attached
and supporting units that were severed
from the main thread of American op-
8 This according to the FUSA Inspector General
report.
erations included all or part of the
following:
589th Field Artillery Battalion (-)
590th Field Artillery Battalion
Company B, 81st Engineer Battal-
ion
Battery D, 634th Antiaircraft Auto-
matic Weapons Battalion
Company C, 820th Tank Destroyer
Battalion
Company B, 331st Medical Battal-
ion
106th Reconnaissance Troop
Troop B, 18th Cavalry Reconnais-
sance Squadron (-)
The 422d Infantry on that night was
forming a perimeter defense, its center
south of Schlausenbach. To the south-
west the 423d Infantry was assuming a
similar stance on the high ground around
Oberlascheid and Buchet. At the mo-
ment there was no shortage of rifle
ammunition, there was a basic load for
the mortars (but the 590th Field Artil-
lery Battalion had only about 300 rounds
for its 105-mm. howitzers) , approxi-
mately one day’s extra K rations were at
hand, and surgical supplies were very
short. Most of the regimental vehicles
had been saved–although the service
company of the 422d had been cut off
near Auw and some kitchen trucks had
been lost. Casualties were not high in
either regiment; the 422d, for example,
reported only forty wounded for evacua-
tion.
Both regimental commanders had
been assured by radio that reinforce-
ments from the west would attempt to
break through sometime after daylight
on 18 December and, further, that sup-
plies would be dropped by air. A divi-
sion order to withdraw to the Our River,

BREAKTHROUGH AT THE SCHNEE EIFEL 167
sent out at 1445, was followed six hours
later by the question: “When do you
plan to move?” These orders, relayed
through the artillery radio net, took a
long time and much repetition before
they could reach the entrapped regi-
ments. The initial order to withdraw
to the Our River line was not received
until about midnight of the 17th. The
two regimental commanders agreed that
this order now was out of date because
messages, signed later in the day, had
promised resupply by air.
Late in the evening of the 17th Gen-
eral Jones consulted the VIII Corps
commander and at 0215 the next morn-
ing sent out an order: “Panzer regtl CT
on Elmerscheid 9 –Schonberg–St. Vith
Rd, head near St. Vith. Our mission is to
destroy by fire from dug in positions S
of Schonberg–St. Vith Rd. Am, food and
water will be dropped. When mission
accomplished, move to area St. Vith-
Wallerode-Weppler. Organize and move
to W.” This message reached the 423d
Infantry, which alone had some sporadic
radio link with the division, about 0730;
it reached the 422d Infantry about half
an hour later. The regimental com-
manders decided to begin the move to
the west at 1000, with their regiments
abreast (although the only contact was
by patrol) and in column of battalions.
As understood, the mission was to ad-
vance across the Bleialf-Schönberg road
and attack from the south side of the
road between Schonberg and St. Vith,
that is, bypassing Schonberg.
From the time of this joint decision
there was little contact between the regi-
ments. The 423d destroyed its kitchens
9 Probably this message referred to the Amel-
scheid “cut-off’ through which the Americans had
been attempting to evade the enemy.
and excess equipment, left the wounded
with medical aid men in the regimental
collecting station, and started off on the
road through Oberlascheid and Radscheid.
10 About 1130 Puett’s 2d Battalion,
leading, met the Germans near the
Schonberg-Bleialf road. With the aid of
its heavy weapons company, whose mortars
did yeoman service, the battalion
began to push the enemy back toward
Bleialf. Meanwhile Colonel Cavender
had gone forward to see what the situation
was, but en route he received a radio
message from General Jones telling him
that the relief attack by the American
armor would not take place and ordering
the two regiments to shift their move to
Schonberg. Cavender passed word of
this new mission to Colonel Descheneaux
and ordered his own 3d Battalion to
come up on Puett’s right. At noon Puett
sent an urgent plea for help, but none
arrived at this critical point in the fire
fight and the attack finally lost momentum.
The 3d Battalion had advanced
across the Ihren Creek and dug in perhaps
1,000 to 1,500 yards from the edge
of Schonberg, but in doing so lost touch
with both its own regiment and the 422d
Infantry. About dusk the 1st Battalion
was put in on the left of the 2d to help
clear the German infantry from the
woods astride the Bleialf-Schönberg
road, but the psychological moment had
passed. 11
The last message from the division
(actually dispatched at 1445 the day before)
was heard an hour or so before
10 Lt. Col. William Craig, commanding officer of
the 1st Battalion, died of wounds on this day.
11 1st Lt. R. H. Thompson personally destroyed
two enemy machine guns and their crews in this
series of actions; he then made a lone attack on
an enemy assault gun and was seriously wounded.
He received the DSC.

168 THE ARDENNES: BATTLE OF THE BULGE
midnight, “It is imperative that Schon-
berg be taken.” Colonel Cavender al-
ready had decided to disengage his two
left battalions, in light of the next mis-
sion, and shift northward to support a
dawn attack by the 3d Battalion. By this
time the 423d was going it alone, for all
attempts to reach the sister regiment had
failed. During the night the regiment
pulled itself together in some semblance
of order along Ridge 536, just southeast
of Schonberg. Losses had been high-
some 300 casualties (including 16 offi-
cers). No more rounds were left for the
81-mm. mortars, most of the machine
guns were gone, there was little bazooka
ammunition, and rifle clips were low.
The surrounding enemy forces were
surprised that the American regiments
made no move to counterattack during
the night of 18–19 December; one report
says: “In the Kessel absolute quiet
reigned.” The troops actually ringing the
pocket were relatively few: the 293d In-
fantry Regiment, the 18th Volks Grena-
dier Division Replacement Battalion
(which had come over the Schnee Eifel) ,
and the newly arrived 669th Ost Battal-
ion. Since the roads at the Schonberg
bottleneck were jammed, the LX VI
Corps commander could bring only one
battalion of field guns that far forward;
therefore the corps artillery was in-
structed to concentrate fire on the
pocket during the 19th.
The 423d still was attempting to form
for the attack, when, an hour or so after
dawn on 19 December, German field
pieces along the Bleialf-Schönberg road
opened fire, sweeping the southeastern
slope of Ridge 536. Soon the shelling
ceased and the enemy infantry closed in,
overrunning the 590th Field Artillery
Battalion and other heterogeneous units
which had been moving in the rear of
the rifle battalions. Despite this blow
Lt. Col. Earl F. Klinck’s 3d Battalion
jumped off in good order at 1000. One
company was cut off and captured, but
two rifle companies reached the environs
of Schonberg, then had to retire in a
storm of antiaircraft fire. The 1st Battal-
ion was able to put one company in the
advance, but by midafternoon it was
eliminated. When brought forward on
the right the 2d Battalion became sepa-
rated and was subjected to fire from the
422d Infantry, then about 400 yards to
the north. At last, with tactical control
gone, only five to ten rifle rounds per
man, no supporting weapons, and an in-
creasing number of wounded untended
(despite yeoman effort by the regimental
surgeon, Maj. Gaylord D. Fridline, and
his staff), the commander of the 423d
Infantry surrendered his regiment. The
time was about 1630.
The experience of the 422d Infantry
was very similar to that of its sister regi-
ment. Largely quiescent during the 17th,
the 422d acted as promptly as possible
when the division order was received on
the following morning. Colonel Desche-
neaux, acting in concert with the 423d,
ordered an advance in column of battal-
ions, the axis to the northwest in the
direction of Schonberg. Excess equip-
ment was destroyed, the wounded were
left with an aid man, the regimental can-
non company fired its last smoke rounds
into Auw (as a slight deterrent to enemy
observers), then spiked the pieces. In two
columns–one made up of foot troops
lugging all portable weapons, the other
made up of regimental vehicles–the
movement encountered nothing but
small groups of the enemy. Reconnais-
sance had been confined to the map, al-

BREAKTHROUGH AT THE SCHNEE EIFEL 169
though the I and K Platoon was used
as point during the march, and when
the two columns reassembled at dusk the
422d was lost. A wood had been selected
on the map as a suitable assembly area
from which to launch a co-ordinated
attack against Schonberg, this about one
and a half miles from the village. In fact,
however, the regiment had bivouacked
northeast of Oberlascheid in a wood
about three miles from its objective-
nor apparently was anyone the wiser.
During the early evening the I and R
Platoon reported that contact had been
made with the neighboring regiment,
which intended to attack Schonberg. No
further liaison was made. While gunfire
sounded off to the west and northwest
the rifle battalions marched through the
darkness to three smaller woods, prepara-
tory for an attack at daylight on the 19th.
The dispositions now taken were farther
to the north, facing the Bleialf-Auw
road, with the battalions deployed so that
the 1st Battalion was farthest north, the
2d Battalion in the center, and the 3d
Battalion on the south. At daybreak the
three battalions moved out abreast, ad-
vancing in approach march formation
toward the objective–Schönberg–be–
lieved to be little more than a mile
distant. The leading troops were just
crossing the Bleialf-Auw road when they
were hit by machine gun and tank fire
AMERICAN PRISONERS. The tank is a German Tiger.

170 THE ARDENNES: BATTLE OF THE BULGE
coming from the north. At this point the
road curved to the east, and the enemy
apparently had taken a position in woods
north of the bend which allowed him to
enfilade the straightway. The 1st Battal-
ion commander ordered his men to turn
back from the road and move southward.
In the meantime the 2d and 3d Battal-
ions had jumped off, but at the road
their lead companies also came under
severe frontal and flanking fire.
It will be recalled that the 422d and
its sister regiment to the south had no
contact. While the right wing battalion
of the 423d was attempting to advance
northwestward, it was discerned by the
left flank troops of the 422d who, mis-
taking this movement for a German
flanking attack, poured bullet fire into
the draw where the men of the 423d
were moving. In the brief exchange of
fire which followed both these inner
flank units became considerably disor-
ganized.
But finally it was fire superiority in
the hands of the enemy which checked
further movement. About 1400, tanks
were heard approaching from the north.
In a last desperate flare of optimism the
Americans thought that these were
friendly tanks–but they were not. By a
stroke of ill fortune the Fuehrer Begleit
Brigade had been ordered forward to
support the LXVI Corps attack on St.
Vith. En route from Auw to Schonberg,
the panzers arrived at the fork where
the road split toward Schonberg and
Bleialf just in time to give the coup-de-
grâce. The tanks rolled through the bat-
talions on the right while the German
infantry poured in from the woods. At
1430 the regimental commander decided
to surrender that part of his regiment
which was disorganized and entrapped.
After negotiations to determine that the
Germans would feed the Americans and
provide care for the wounded, the sur-
render was completed about 1600.
A group of about 400, however, were
reorganized by the 2d Battalion execu-
tive officer (Maj. Albert A. Ouellette)
in the woods which had been the 2d
Battalion assembly area. This group at-
tempted to move southwest the follow-
ing day, but it too was surrounded. After
destroying weapons and equipment Oue-
llette’s people surrendered on the morn-
ing of 21 December. Another band,
representing most of the vehicular col-
umn, had attempted to break out
through Bleialf on the late afternoon of
19 December but was halted by a mine
field at the edge of the village, sur-
rounded, and forced to capitulate. Not
more than 150 men of the 422d Infantry
succeeded in escaping to the American
lines.
The number of officers and men taken
prisoner on the capitulation of the two
regiments and their attached troops can-
not be accurately ascertained. At least
seven thousand were lost here and the
figure probably is closer to eight or nine
thousand. The amount lost in arms and
equipment, of course, was very substan-
tial. The Schnee Eifel battle, therefore,
represents the most serious reverse suf-
fered by American arms during the
operations of 1944–45 in the European
theater. The Americans would regard
this defeat as a blow to Allied prestige.
The Germans would see in this victory,
won without great superiority in num-
bers, a dramatic reaffirmation of the
Schlieffen-Cannae concept.
The fate of the two regiments was not
immediately known to the 106th Divi-
sion and the VIII Corps. The last mes-

BREAKTHROUGH AT THE SCHNEE EIFEL 171
sage radioed out of the pocket had been
dispatched at 1535 on 18 December,
simply saying that the regiments had
started to comply with the orders for an
attack to the northwest; it was received at
St. Vith on the morning of the 19th. By
the night of the 20th the division must
have given up hope, what with the Ger-
man reinforcements from the east con-
gregating in front of St. Vith, but one
last attempt to reach the 423d Infantry
by radio was made two days later.
The Question of Air Resupply
One question mark still dangles over
the fate of the two regiments captured
in the Schnee Eifel. Why were they not
resupplied by airdrop? General Jones
and the two regimental commanders
made their wants known as early as the
17th and evidently had some reason to
believe that ammunition, medical sup-
plies, and other necessities would be
delivered to the encircled regiments be-
fore they essayed the final attempt at
escape. Although most of the processing
involved in handling the 106th Division
requests was by telephone and without
record, two facts are certain: General
Jones did all in his power to secure air
resupply; the weather did permit planes
to fly on 18 December when resupply
was most needed. 12
12 Much effort has been made to trace this story
through the numerous headquarters which were
involved, but there are great gaps in the journal
files. Interviews with officers concerned have only
compounded confusion, yielding bits and pieces of
information, which, lacking in written record,
cannot be put together in sequence. Royce L.
Thompson made an exhaustive search of the rec-
ords and conducted a number of personal inter-
views with officers involved in staffing the 106th
requests. See his Air Supply to Isolated Units:
Ardennes Campaign. OCMH, 1951.
At 1051 on 17 December the com-
mander of the 423d Infantry radioed a
request for an airdrop. Relayed through
the division artillery net, this request
was logged in at the 106th Division head-
quarters at 1500. In the meantime Jones
apparently decided to act on his own and
asked the VIII Corps air officer to ar-
range a resupply mission. The time of
this conversation cannot be fixed, but by
1345 a message was en route from St.
Vith to the 423d Infantry promising a
drop in the vicinity of Buchet “tonight.”
Within a quarter of an hour a second
message was on the air for the 422d. The
VIII Corps air officer (Lt. Col. Josiah T.
Towne) meanwhile had relayed Jones’s
request through the IX Fighter Com-
mand to the IX Tactical Air Com-
mand. 13 At this point the chain of events
and the chain of responsibility both be-
come unclear.
The IX Tactical Air Command nor-
mally would have referred the request
to First Army for clearance. The report
of the G–4 at the latter headquarters
simply says that on the afternoon of 17
December the plight of the two regi-
ments was made known by telephone
calls and that preparations for supply by
air “were promptly set in motion.” 14
Since carrier planes would have to come
from the United Kingdom it was neces-
sary at some stage to bring CATOR
(Combined Air Transport Operations
Room) at SHAEF into the picture. How
many telephone calls were made before
the First Army request reached CATOR
13 Dupuy (St. Vith: Lion in the Way, page
134f.), goes no further than the First Army head-
quarters to find a culprit, following in this the
combat interview with Colonel Towne, 16 January
1945.
14 First United States Army, Report of Opera-
tions, an. 2, G–4 Sec, p. 120f.

172
and how many headquarters were in-
volved cannot be determined.
The IX Troop Carrier Command,
whose planes would fly the mission, got
the word from CATOR sometime dur-
ing the early morning of the 18th with
orders to prepare forty planeloads of
ammunition and medical supplies. The
435th Troop Carrier Group, at Welford,
drew this assignment and loaded up with
parapacks and door bundles. Orders
were precise. The group was to fly to the
airfield at Florennes, Belgium, and there
be briefed on the mission and meet its
fighter cover. The Welford base was
closing in when-at an unspecified time
-the first serial took off. Nonetheless
twenty-three C–47’s arrived in the air
over Florennes. This field, it is reported,
was “too busy to take care of the 435th
formation,” which was ordered to an-
other field near Liége. The commander
and his wingman landed at Florennes,
however, only to find that there was no
information for a briefing, nobody had
the map co-ordinates for the scheduled
drop, and no fighter escort had been
arranged. During this time the 435th had
been diverted again, finally landing at
Dreux in France. Here the planes would
stay until 23 December, their original
mission on-again, off-again daily. Some-
where along the line additional requests
from the 106th Division had swelled the
mission to 138 planeloads and ultimately
it was decided to make this larger drop
with planes from the United Kingdom.
THE ARDENNES: BATTLE OF THE BULGE
The entire mission was canceled on 22
December in order to support the 101st
Airborne Division at Bastogne. 15
Two melancholy facts emerge from
this story: fixed responsibility and coordination
were lacking; supplies prepared
for airdropping had to come from
the United Kingdom, despite the fact
that Allied ground troops were at the
German border. Attempts to prevent a
similar fiasco were initiated in a matter
of days, but too late to help the dispirited
Americans marching into German captivity.
On 21 December the 12th Army
Group issued an order “confirming” the
procedure for airdrops to ground troops.
This of course could be only a palliative
so long as air and ground co-ordination
remained in abeyance. A day later the
commanding officer of the Communications
Zone, Lt. Gen. John C. H. Lee,
requested SHAEF to set up stocks of
ready-packed supplies, capable of air
delivery, at airfields strategically located
on the Continent. This proposal was
accepted.
Perhaps the co-ordination of separate
services and the proper application of
new military techniques must always be
learned the hard way. If so, the cost is
very dear and the prospect in future
wars depressing.
15 Headquarters, IX Troop Carrier Command,
Operation Repulse, Resupply by Air, Belgium,
December 1944 (January 1945); 435th Troop Car-
rier Group Unit History, MS dated 1 January
1945.

CHAPTER VIII
The Fifth Panzer Army Attacks
the 28th Infantry Division
The battle plans and tactics of the
Fifth Panzer Army, more than those of
any other German army that took part
in the Ardennes counteroffensive, bore
the very strong personal imprint of its
commander, General Manteuffel. As a
junior officer in the prewar panzer
troops, Manteuffel had made a mark as
an armored specialist. His record in
North Africa and Russia, where he
achieved a reputation for energetic
leadership and personal bravery,
brought him to Hitler’s attention and
promotion directly from a division to an
army command. Despite the failure of
his Fifth Panzer Army in the Lorraine
campaign against Patton’s Third Army,
Manteuffel was listed by Hitler for com-
mand in the Ardennes. His staff, care-
fully selected and personally devoted to
the little general, was probably the best
German staff on the Western Front.
Manteuffel had found himself in al-
most complete disagreement with the
original operations plan handed down by
Jodl in November. He was able to con-
vince the Army Group B commander
that a stand should be taken on a number
of tactical points which, in Manteuffel’s
judgment, were essential to success in the
forthcoming attack. In the last planning
conference held at Hitler’s headquarters,
Model and Manteuffel combined forces
in a forthright appeal that carried the
day on a series of tactical decisions al-
though it failed to sway the Fuehrer
from his strategic decision for the Big
Solution. The Fifth Panzer Army com-
mander was bitterly opposed to that part
of the plan which called for a tremen-
dous opening barrage at 0800 and a two-
hour artillery preparation before the
attack jumped off. He argued that the
enemy literally must not be awakened
and that the assault forces should move
forward the moment the guns sounded.
This point was conceded when Hitler
ruled that the artillery fires along the
entire front would begin at 0530. Man-
teuffel also held strongly for infiltration
tactics by small detachments, such as
were conventionally employed by both
opponents on the Eastern Front. Hitler
himself seems to have favored this con-
cept (it is found in the first Fuehrer
operations order), but only in the Fifth
Panzer attack would assault detachments
be found inside the American positions
when the initial barrage opened up.
Manteuffel likewise opposed the con-
cept proposed by Jodl in which the
attack would be carried by two panzer
corps advancing in column. He wanted
an attack on a broad front with both
tank corps in the line at the opening
gun–this point Hitler conceded. View-

174
THE ARDENNES: BATTLE OF THE BULGE
GENERAL VON MANTEUFFEL GENERAL VON LUETTWITZ
ing the ground in front of his right ar-
mored corps as especially difficult, Man-
teuffel would give Generaloberst Walter
Krueger’s LVIII Panzer Corps a fairly
narrow front for the initial assault. Be-
lieving that once across the Our River,
his left armored attack force, General
der Panzertruppen Heinrich Freiherr
von Luettwitz’ XLVII Panzer Corps,
would find the going better than on the
right, he assigned Luettwitz a rather
wide front. In final form, the LVIII Pan-
zer Corps’ mission was to cross the Our
River on both sides of Ouren, drive west
on the Houffalize axis, and create a
bridgehead over the Meuse River in the
neighborhood of Namur and Andenne.
At the same time the XLVII Panzer
Corps would cross the Our in the vicin-
ity of Dasburg and Gemünd, push west
via Clerf, seize the vital road center at
Bastogne, form in a deep column echeloned
to the left and rear, then race for
the Meuse River crossings south of Namur.
Manteuffel had two armored formations
in reserve, the Panzer Lehr
Division and the Fuehrer Begleit Brigade.
1 These he intended to throw in behind
the armored corps which made the
first bridgehead at the Our.
Although success or failure would turn
1 The Panzer Lehr Division carried the same
organization as other German armored divisions.
Its name reflected the division’s original status as
a tank training unit. The Fuehrer Begleit Bri-
gade originally had been a special escort battalion
for Hitler. It was expanded. for commitment in
the Ardennes to three panzer grenadier battalions,
a panzer regiment, an artillery battalion, an anti-
aircraft battalion, and lesser units.

FIFTH PANZER ARMY ATTACKS 28TH INFANTRY DIVISION 175
on the operations of the two armored
corps, the Fifth Panzer Army had been
given a small infantry corps of two divi-
sions to flesh out its right shoulder. This
was General der Artillerie Walther
Lucht’s LXVI Corps. In early planning
there had been some question as to
whether the Americans in the Schnee
Eifel should be left to the Fifth or the
Sixth. Unhappy about this thorn in his
side, Manteuffel won the assignment of
the Schnee Eifel heights to his army and
personally developed a scheme to
mop up resistance in this sector
at the earliest possible moment.
Despite the general dictum that
defended towns would be bypassed, Man-
teuffel wanted St. Vith as a blocking
position and so ordered Lucht to capture
it. Once through St. Vith the LXVI
would follow Krueger to Andenne, but
if things grew rough on the left wing
Manteuffel intended to switch Lucht’s
corps to the south.
The Fifth Panzer commander seems to
have been fairly optimistic, although he
gave little ear to Hitler’s promise of air
support. He personally rated four of his
armored divisions as good attack forma-
tions (the 116th, 2d, Panzer Lehr, and
Fuehrer Begleit) , and his panzer corps
commanders were of his own choosing.
Krueger and Luettwitz were old hands
at mechanized warfare, had learned their
business as commanders of the 1st and 2d
Panzer Divisions, respectively, and had
fought side by side in Lorraine. Krueger
was the elder of the two and lacked
something of Luettwitz’ dash. The latter
was a hard-driving commander, daring
and tenacious, and had a reputation of
giving help to neighboring formations
without debate.
With this team Manteuffel hoped to
win a quick penetration and get rolling.
His first concern would be to gain the
ridge west of the Our and thus cover the
armor crossings, for he recognized that
it would be a difficult stream to bridge.
He expected that the tactics of predawn
infiltration would pay off and that his
assault detachments would have reached
the crest line, Lascheid-Heinerscheid-
Roder-Hosingen, before noon on D-day.
He hoped that the armored debouch-
ment into the bridgehead would com-
mence during the early afternoon. Man-
teuffel had no precise schedule for his
right wing but after the war was over
would say that he had hoped for the
seizure of St. Vith on the first day of the
attack. One thing clearly worried him:
would the Seventh Army keep pace and
cover his left flank to Bastogne? His
appeal for a mechanized division to be
given the neighboring Seventh the Fueh-
rer personally denied. 2
2 The memoirs of the leading personalities in
the Fifth Panzer Army, as collected in the German
manuscript histories are detailed and uninhibited.
They square in a remarkable manner with the
recital of events in the American records. See
especially MSS # B-151a, sequel to B–151, Fifth
Panzer Army, Ardennes Offensive (General der
Panzertruppen Hasso von Manteuffel); B–321,
LVIII Panzer Corps in the Ardennes Offensive,
16 December 1944–11 January 1945 (General der
Panzertruppen Walter Krueger) ; A-939, The As-
signment of the XLVII Panzer Corps in the
Ardennes, 1944–45 (General der Panzertruppen
Heinrich von Luettwitz) ; B–040, 26th Volks Gren-
adier Division in the Ardennes Offensive (Gen-
eralmajor Heinz Kokott). See also MSS # A-955,
Report on the Campaign in Northern France, the
Rhineland, and the Ardennes (Oberst i. G. Hans-
Juergen Dingler); B–506, LVIII Panzer Corps
Artillery, 1 November 1944–1 February 1945
(Generalmajor Gerhard Triepel) ; A–941, Panzer
Lehr Division, 1 December 1944–26 January 1945
(Generalleutnant Fritz Bayerlein) ; A-942, Panzer
Lehr Division, 15–22 December 1944 (Bayerlein) .

176
The 110th Infantry Sector
16–18 December
On the second day of December, a
staff officer from General Luettwitz’
XLVII Panzer Corps arrived at the head-
quarters of the Fifth Panzer Army to re-
ceive the highly secret word of a great
counteroffensive in the Ardennes sector.
At the moment Luettwitz’ corps was
fighting in the bogs and swamps of
southwest Holland, where the 30
British Corps and the U.S. 84th
Division had essayed an attack in the
sector around Geilenkirchen intended to
erase the salient retained by the Ger-
mans on the left flank of the U.S. Ninth
Army. Earlier the XLVII Panzer Corps
headquarters had taken part in the Fifth
Panzer Army counterattack against the
U.S. Third’ Army in September,
had been given new divisions to spear-
head the brief spoiling attack in late
October against the British and
American advance in southwest Hol-
land, and had returned to the line in
this sector in mid-November to bolster
the failing German defenses. Luettwitz
turned the Geilenkirchen sector over to
the XVII SS Corps on 6 December and
moved with his staff to Kyllburg, close to
the Fifth Panzer Army headquarters,
where a few trusted officers set feverishly
to work on plans for Christrose, the code
name for the coming offensive.
The mission given Luettwitz con-
formed to his reputation for drive and
audacity. The XLVII Panzer Corps, if all
went well, would cross the Our and Clerf
Rivers, make a dash “over Bastogne” to
the Meuse, seize the Meuse River cross-
ings near Namur by surprise, and drive
on through Brussels to Antwerp. Two
things were necessary to success. First,
THE ARDENNES: BATTLE OF THE BULGE
Luettwitz could not allow any slackening
to an infantry pace by frontal attacks
against strongly defended American
positions. Second, he had to disregard
his own flanks, particularly on the south,
and resolutely refuse to detach any force
for flank protection until the main body
was west of the Meuse. The only security
for the southern flank would have to
come from an advance in echelon and
such protection as the less mobile divi-
sions of the Seventh Army could offer
on the left.
Intelligence reports indicated that the
elements of the U.S. 28th Infantry Divi-
sion likely to be encountered during the
first hours of the attack were battle-
weary, small in number, and widely dis-
persed. The problem then, as seen by
Manteuffel and Luettwitz, was not how
to achieve the initial breakthrough at the
Our and Clerf Rivers, but rather how to
employ the armor once these two rivers
lay behind. The roads in the corps zone
of attack were narrow, twisting, and cer-
tain to be muddy; they were particularly
bad on the axis assigned to Luettwitz’
southern columns. Just east of Bastogne
the roads straightened somewhat, but
good tank-going could not be expected
until the Marche-Rochefort line was
reached midway between Bastogne and
the Meuse. The road center at Bastogne
presented a special problem, a problem
recognized in the first German plans.
Luettwitz and the army commander ran
at least two map exercises to arrive at a
solution, but Bastogne lay nineteen air-
miles west of the German jump-off
positions on the Our River and the final
orders to Luettwitz’ divisions were
couched in very general terms. One thing
was agreed upon: Bastogne had to be
taken before the bulk of the XL VII Pan-

FIFTH PANZER ARMY ATTACKS 28TH INFANTRY DIVISION 17 7
zer Corps moved beyond it to the west. 3
(Map IV)
The sector at the Our River in which
Luettwitz’ corps would begin the attack
was a little over seven miles wide, the
villages of Dahnen on the north and Stol-
zembourg on the south serving as bound-
ary markers. This initial zone was
roughly equivalent to the American de-
fensive position manned west of the Our
by the 110th Infantry, the center regi-
ment of the 28th Infantry Division, al-
though the width of the 110th front was
about two miles greater than the front
assigned the panzer corps. The latter
consisted of three divisions. The 26th
Volks Grenadier Division (General-
major Heinz Kokott) already was de-
ployed in the Eifel sector of the West
Wall adjacent to the Our where it cov-
ered not only the XLVII Panzer Corps
zone but a wide frontage beyond. An old
line division, the 26th had fought on the
Eastern Front from July 1941 to the last
days of September 1944, winning many
decorations but little rest. Finally, after
a grueling battle in the Baranôw-War-
saw sector the division was relieved for
the first time since the beginning of the
Russian campaign and brought back to
Poznan, there receiving the title of
Volks Grenadier (regarded as somewhat
less than an honor by the survivors of the
old regular army 26th Infantry Divi-
sion) .
To the surprise of the division staff
the task of re-equipping and replenishing
the 26th went amazingly fast for the be-
ginning of the sixth year of the war. Re-
placements, mostly from the Navy, were
3 MSS # A–939 (Luettwitz); A–940, XLVII
Panzer Corps in the Ardennes Offensive (Luett-
witz); A–941 (Bayerlein); A–942 (Bayerlein). For
the corps plans, see KTB: Christrose.
whipped into shape by the “Old 26th,”
and first-rate equipment replaced that
lost in the east. The division com-
mander, officers, and noncoms were
veterans; training throughout the
division was reported as adequate.
Ration strength was more than 17,000,
and forty-two 75-mm. antitank guns
supplemented the weapons organic
to the conventional Volks Grena-
dier division. Like all such units, how-
ever, the 26th was geared to foot power
and horsepower; there were 5,000 horses
in the division, including a few of the
tough “winterized” Russian breed. The
new mission given General Kokott was
this: the 26th would force the crossings
at the Our and Clerf Rivers on the left
of the corps, hold open for the armor,
then follow the more mobile panzer
units to Bastogne. At that crucial point
the infantry had to take Bastogne as
quickly as possible, with or without the
help of the armored divisions. Once this
barrier was passed the 26th would be
responsible for covering the left flank of
the corps while the armored divisions
made the Meuse crossings.
The initial penetration by the corps’
right was charged to the armored infan-
try of the famous 2d Panzer Division
(Colonel Meinrad von Lauchert) , a unit
that had fought the Allies all the way
from Normandy back to the German
frontier. When the 2d Panzer Division
was relieved at the end of September its
tanks were gone, but there remained a
large cadre of veterans who had escaped
to the West Wall on foot. In the weeks
that followed, the division rested and
re-formed in the Bitburg-Wittlich area,
its units moving constantly to escape
Allied observation. Replacements, gen-
erally better than the average, were

178 THE ARDENNES: BATTLE OF THE BULGE
brought in from Austria (the home sta-
tion for the 2d Panzer Division was
Vienna) , and new-model Panther tanks,
equipped for night fighting with the new
infrared sighting apparatus, arrived fresh
from assembly plants near Breslau. On
the eve of commitment the two tank bat-
talions were about full strength, with 27
Mark IV’s, 58 Panthers, and 48 armored
assault guns in the division tank parks.
Sufficient trucks were available to motor-
ize most of the division, but there was a
shortage of tracked cross-country vehi-
cles. One battalion of armored infantry
was given bicycles, and would move so
slowly through the mud and over the
hills that its function during the drive
to the west was simply that of a replace-
ment battalion, feeding into the more
mobile units up ahead.
Once the 2d Panzer Division had
thrown a bridge across the Our at Das-
burg and the 26th Volks Grenadier Divi-
sion had put a bridge in at Gemund,
the well-known Panzer Lehr Division
would be ready to roll, advancing behind
the two forward divisions until the corps
had cleared the Clerf River, then push-
ing ahead of the infantry on the corps
left in the race to Bastogne. The Panzer
Lehr (Generalleutnant Fritz Bayerlein)
was one of the divisions earmarked in
November for use in the Ardennes coun-
teroffensive, but the American offensive
in Lorraine and Alsace had forced OKW
to release the Panzer Lehr from its posi-
tion in the strategic reserve. Hitler had
committed Bayerlein’s tanks in an abor-
tive counterattack designed to roll up the
exposed flank of the American Third
Army on the Saar. 4 This Panzer Lehr
thrust failed, and at the beginning of
4 Cole, The Lorraine Campaign, pp. 464–71.
December Bayerlein’s command was
brought north to the Eifel district for an
emergency attempt at refitting. Losses in
equipment had been particularly heavy.
Tanks, tank destroyers, and guns were
rushed up from the depots at Mayen, but
on 15 December the two panzer grena-
dier regiments were still missing 60 per-
cent of their regular rifle strength and
the panzer regiment had ready only one
of its two battalions (with 27 Mark IV’s
and 30 Panthers). To compensate for
the armored weakness of the battered
division, two battalions of armored tank
destroyers and an assault gun brigade
were given Bayerlein just before the
attack to the west began. The best troops
and newest equipment were placed in
the division reconnaissance battalion,
heavily reinforced, which was slated to
join the reconnaissance battalion of the
26th Volks Grenadier Division in spear-
heading the advance once the Clerf
River had been crossed.
With three divisions, and added corps
troops, the XLVII Panzer Corps pos-
sessed a considerable amount of shock
and fire power. Manteuffel allotted
Luettwitz the 15th Volks Werfer Bri-
gade (108 pieces) , the 766th Volks Artil-
lery Corps (76 pieces), the 600th Army
Engineer Battalion, and the 182d Flak
Regiment, all motorized. Each division
was reinforced with additional self-pro-
pelled assault guns or tank destroyers and
each had a full complement of divisional
artillery (four battalions for the infantry
division and three motorized battalions
in the armored divisions) . Finally Luett-
witz was promised two 60-ton bridges
-capable of carrying his Panthers–and
very considerable support from the
Luftwaffe. Both Luettwitz and Manteu-
ffel had been “promised” air support

FIFTH PANZER ARMY ATTACKS 28TH INFANTRY DIVISION 179
on numerous occasions before; so it is
questionable whether either of them ex-
pected the Luftwaffe to make good.
Luettwitz, at least, pinned his faith on
bad flying weather, night operations, and
the large number of flak guns dispersed
through his columns.
The sector designated for the XLVII
Panzer Corps breakthrough was held by
the 1st and 3d Battalions of the 110th
Infantry (28th Infantry Division), com-
manded by Col. Hurley E. Fuller. This
regiment formed the division center,
with the 112th Infantry on the north and
the 109th Infantry aligned to the south.
Battered and fatigued by weary, bloody
fighting in the Hürtgen Forest, the 28th
Division came into the quiet front on
the Our during mid-November. 5 During
the division attack of 2–15 November
in the Schmidt-Vossenack sector the 28th
had taken 6,184 casualties. The task of
rebuilding the rifle companies, repair-
ing battle damage, and training replace-
ments was of necessity a slow one. But
by the middle of December the 110th
Infantry had almost a full roster–a roster
numbering many men and some officers
who yet had to see their first action.
The 109th and 112th were in like status.
Fuller had only two battalions at his
disposal because the 2d Battalion, lo-
cated at Donnange, constituted the di-
vision reserve. Anything even remotely
resembling a continuous line across the
9- to 10-mile regimental front was be-
yond the strength of the 1st and
3d Battalions. As a substitute, a system of
village strongpoints–each manned in
5 The official U.S. Army history describes this
fighting by the 28th Infantry Division as “one of
the most costly division actions in the whole of
World War 11.” MacDonald, The Siegfried Line
Campaign, p. 373.
about rifle company strength–was set up
on the ridge line separating the Our and
Clerf Rivers, which here is traced by the
excellent north-south highway connect-
ing St. Vith and Diekirch. This high-
way (known to the Americans as the
Skyline Drive) and the garrison line
paralleled the Our at a distance of one
and a half to two and a half miles. Each
battalion was responsible for five out-
posts along the west bank of the Our,
but these vantage points were occupied
only during daylight hours and then in
squad strength. At night the strip be-
tween the ridge and the river became
a no man’s land where German and
American patrols stalked one another.
Even in daytime it was possible for Ger-
man patrols to move about on the west
bank, using the cover provided by the
deep, wooded draws.
The Our, in many places, was no more
than forty feet wide and easily fordable,
but the roads leading to the river made
circuitous and abrupt descent as they
neared its banks. In the 110th zone four
roads ran from the German border at
the Our, up and over the Skyline
Drive, and down to the Clerf. The
American strongpoints were therefore
located with an eye to blocking these
entry ways while at the same time de-
fending the lateral ridge road which con-
nected the 110th with its neighboring
regiments and provided the main artery
sustaining the entire division front. The
northernmost of the four roads had a
good all-weather surface, was the only
main through road running east to west
through the area, and gave direct access
to Clerf and Bastogne. The Germans
planned to connect this route to their
own supply lines by bridging the Our
at Dasburg. The remaining roads

180 THE ARDENNES: BATTLE OF THE BULGE
through the 1 10th sector normally were
poor but were made worse by the rains
prior to 16 December; the 26th Volks
Grenadier Division intended to enter
the two southernmost roads by throwing
a bridge across at Gemünd. 6
The Americans had identified the
26th long since as the unit garrisoning
the West Wall bunkers on the German
bank. The presence of two panzer units
on the 110th Infantry front was not sus-
pected. General Cota and the 28th Divi-
sion Staff were prepared for some kind of
German effort west of the Our, but the
intelligence coming down from higher
headquarters pointed only to the possi-
bility of a limited German attack against
the 109th Infantry and the American
communications running north from
Luxembourg City. There was no hint
from any source that the enemy was
about to strike squarely into the center
of the 28th Division and in over-
whelming array.
In the late afternoon of 15 December
General Luettwitz gathered his division
commanders in the XLVII Panzer Corps
forward headquarters at Ringhuscheid
6 The American sources for the initial phase of
the defense in this sector are unusually complete.
The 28th Division after action report shows the
lines of withdrawal and is supplemented in detail
by the 28th Division G–3 journal and telephone
file. The 109th Infantry after action report and
journal are intact and useful. (See also The Old
Gray Mare of the 109th Infantry Regiment (Augs-
burg. 1953.)) The 110 Infantry has not only a
regimental after action report but one for each
of its battalions; however the 110th journal is
missing for the period prior to 24 December 1944.
The 112th Infantry S–2 and S–3 journals have
numerous overlays showing the action. Combat
interviews provide good coverage for most of the
major actions by the 28th Division. For the
German sources see note 2, above. See also The
Rise and Fall of the 2d Panzer Division (MS)
edited by TUSA, 1 PW, May 1945; MS # P-032d
(Generalmajor Hans Kokott) .
for final instructions and introduction to
the new commander of the 2d Panzer
Division, Colonel von Lauchert, who had
been selected at the last moment by the
Fifth Panzer Army leader to replace an
incumbent who was not an experienced
tanker. Lauchert arrived too late to
meet all of his regimental commanders,
but the 2d Panzer, like the rest of the
corps, was already in position to move
the moment darkness came. Apprehen-
sive lest the Americans be prematurely
warned, Army Group B had for-
bidden the movement of any troops
across the Our in advance of the opening
barrage set for 0530 on 16 December.
Conforming to these instructions
the 2d Panzer Division moved its assault
columns to Dasburg during the night
of 15–16 December but halted in as-
sembly areas east of the river.
On the corps left, however, General
Kokott and the 26th Yolks Grenadier
Division jumped the gun. Kokott’s
screening regiment, the 78th, had been
in the habit of throwing out an outpost
line west of the Our from nightfall till
dawn. On the evening of 15 December
the outpost troops, considerably rein-
forced, crossed to the west bank as usual
and moved cautiously forward. About
0300 engineers manning pneumatic rub-
ber boats began ferrying the So-man
assault companies and heavy infantry
weapons across the river. As each com-
pany debarked it marched inland to the
line of departure which the outpost force
now held close to the American gar-
rison points. The 77th Regiment formed
on the right near Hosingen and the 39th,
echeloned to the left and rear, assembled
in the woods north of Wahlhausen.
With surprise almost certainly assured
and the knowledge that the Americans

FIFTH PANZER ARMY ATTACKS 28TH INFANTRY DIVISION 181
had no cohesive line of defense, General
Kokott had ordered the 77th Regiment
to circle north of Hosingen and head
straight for the Clerf bridges at Drauf-
felt, while the 39th cut cross-country,
avoiding the villages on the western side
of the ridge line, and seized the road
junction and bridges at Wilwerwiltz on
the Clerf. The eye of the division com-
mander would be on the assault echelons
of his right wing regiment, for they
would make the main effort to reach
the Clerf. The timetable for the 26th
Volks Grenadier Division advance called
for both its attacking regiments to
reach the Clerf River by nightfall of
the first day. Adherence to this schedule
meant that the villages garrisoned by
the American companies would have
to be avoided or captured quickly.
The units of the 110th Infantry were
disposed as follows to face three full
German divisions. On the left of the
regimental zone, the 1st Battalion (Lt.
Col. Donald Paul) held the intersection
of the Skyline Drive and the Dasburg-
Bastogne main highway at Marnach, em-
ploying Company B and a platoon from
the 630th Tank Destroyer Battalion. To
the southwest, Company C and the reg-
imental cannon company were deployed
in and around Munshausen, guarding
the side road which cut cross-country
from Marnach to Drauffelt. Company A,
at Heinerscheid, was on the extreme left
flank of the 110th and so lay outside
the path of the XLVII Panzer Corps
attack, as did Company D at Grind-
hausen. The 3d Battalion (Maj. Harold
F. Milton) formed the regimental right,
with its companies on both sides of the
ridge line. Company K, reinforced by
Company B, 103d Engineer Combat Bat-
talion, garrisoned Hosingen, a village on
the Skyline Drive overlooking two of
the four roads which wound from the
Our up over the ridge. To the south
Company I held Weiler-les-Putscheid, a
hamlet in a knot of trails and byroads
on the forward slopes of the ridge line.
The 110th Antitank Company was in
Hoscheid just to the west. Both of these
positions lay adjacent to the prospective
boundary between the XL VII and
LXXXV Corps. West of the ridge,
Company L in Holzthum and the head-
quarters company and Company M in
Consthum barred a direct approach to
the Clerf crossing site at Wilwerwiltz.
Behind the Clerf River and to the west
of the regimental command post in the
town of Clerf the 2d Battalion (Lt. Col.
Ross C. Henbest) lay in divisional re-
serve. Separated of necessity by the width
of the front and the requirements of
some depth in the defenses athwart the
east-west roads, the units of the 110th
could offer little reciprocal support a-
gainst an enemy attacking in any force.
The massed guns and Werfers of
the XLVII Panzer Corps which roared
out at 0530 on 16 December gave the
Americans their first warning. But the
tactical effect of this artillery prepara-
tion was considerably less than the
German planners had anticipated. The
telephone wires connecting the Amer-
ican-held villages were shot out in the
first few minutes and Fuller could not
reach any of his battalions; artillery
radios, however, continued to function.
The German barrage, with a limited
number of rounds at the guns, dwindled
away after about half an hour to sporadic
salvos and stray single shots, leaving the
advancing infantry without cover while
they were still short of the American
positions.

182 THE ARDENNES: BATTLE OF THE BULGE
The first word of the approaching
enemy reached the 110th Infantry head-
quarters at Clerf shortly after 0615. Com-
pany L, on the western side of the ridge
at Holzthum, reported figures in the
half-light but, peering through the
ground fog, which clung all along the
division front, could not be sure whether
they were American troops passing
through the area or the enemy. In fact,
detachments of the 39th Regiment had
crossed the Skyline Drive unobserved
and were moving in to surprise Holz-
thum. To some extent, then, Kokott’s
decision in favor of premature assembly
west of the Our had gained ground for
the 26th. Fuller, however, was able to
get a warning message through to the
28th Division command post about 0900.
As the morning passed the small Ger-
man detachments west of the ridge in-
creased in strength. Before noon five
separate assaults had been made at Cons-
thum, but all were beaten off by small
arms, .50-caliber, and artillery fire. Fin-
ally the Germans took the village, only
to be driven out again. A German at-
tempt to cut the road between Cons-
thum and Holzthum failed when Capt.
Norman G. Maurer, S–3 of the 3d Bat-
talion, leading a sortie of twenty men,
surprised the enemy and drove him
back with very heavy casualties. Be-
tween Holzthum and Buchholz, Battery
C of the 109th Field Artillery was hit
hard but held its positions, firing the
105-mm. howitzers with one- and two-
second fuzes. The battery commander
and fifteen gunners were casualties of
the close-range fight before help arrived.
This came late in the morning, after the
28th Division commander, General Cota,
ordered a tank platoon from the 707th
Tank Battalion forward to clear the Ger-
man infantry out of the Battery C area.
The 26th Volks Grenadier Division
poured more troops into the 3d Bat-
talion sector, compressing the American
companies in the village positions. At
the crossroads village of Hosingen atop
the Skyline Drive, the leading detach-
ments of the 77th swung to the north,
cutting the road but moving on in the
direction of the Clerf. The 2d Buttlion
of the 77th, under the cover provided
by German artillery, drove in to the
south edge of Hosingen, contrary to
orders, and there grappled in house-to-
house fighting with Company D and
Company B, 103d Engineer Battalion.
Meanwhile the 39th Regiment, eche-
loned to the left of the 77th, ran into
a snag. The 1st Platoon of Company
I had been deployed along the Wahl-
hausen road on the forward slope of the
ridge, covering an observation post.
From this point the American artil-
lery observers could see the enemy as-
sembling in the woods just to the
north. Accurately adjusted fire held the
enemy battalion at bay and forced it
to call on neighboring battalions, at-
tacking Weiler, to help outflank the
thin infantry line on the Wahlhausen
road.
The defenders at Weiler would not
be easily pushed aside. Company I (mi-
nus the platoon at Wahlhausen) , a sec-
tion of 81-mm. mortars, and an antitank
platoon repelled wave after wave of at-
tacking German infantry. When the mor-
tar crews and antitank platoon had used
all their ammunition they joined the
infantry in the center of the village and
fought as riflemen. Twice during the
morning the attackers were allowed to
send in aid men and remove their
wounded. At 1330 the enemy ceased

FIFTH PANZER ARMY ATTACKS 28TH INFANTRY DIVISION 183
GERMAN TROOPS ADVANCING PAST ABANDONED AMERICAN EQUIPMENT
fire and sent forward a white flag, with
an offer for the Americans to surrender.
When this was refused the Germans sys-
tematically set to work to surround the
village; by dark they had ringed Weiler.
In the 1st Battalion zone to the north
the advance detachments of the 2d Pan-
zer Division moved straight for Marnach,
attempting with one quick blow to clear
the Americans obstructing the through
road from Dasburg to Clerf. 7 While the
German engineers labored at the Das-
burg site to bring their heavy tank
7 The road from Dasburg through Clerf is
marked on the OB WEST operations map by a
purple penciled line as far as Bastogne.
bridging equipment down to the river,
the 28th Panzer Engineer Battalion and
the 2d Battalion, 304th Panzer Gren-
adier Regiment, crossed the Our in rub-
ber boats and moved west through the
predawn darkness. The advance was de-
layed somewhat when the grenadiers
marched into an American mine field,
but by 0800 the leading Germans had
reached Marnach. Company B and a pla-
toon of the 630th Tank Destroyer Bat-
talion were well entrenched there and
gave the Germans a warm reception, al-
though themselves under fire from bat-
teries east of the Our. Minus his heavy
weapons, the enemy failed to knock the

184 THE ARDENNES: BATTLE OF THE BULGE
Marnach garrison out of the way, but
an hour later Company B radioed that
three hundred Germans were northwest
and southwest of Marnach. The 1st Bat-
talion commander had already ordered
Company A, located three miles farther
north on the Skyline Drive at Heiner-
scheid, to send a patrol south and make
contact with Company B. In midmorn-
ing Paul ordered Company C to march
north from Munshausen, leaving the can-
non company there, and counterattack
the Germans in the Company B area.
By this time, however, the advance
infantry detachments of the 2d Panzer
Division were not only involved in a
battle to knock out Marnach but were
pushing past the village en route to
Clerf. The 24-man patrol from Com-
pany A ran into the German flank at
Fishbach, about 1120, and had to with-
draw under intense fire. Two hours later
the enemy struck at Company A, ap-
parently an attempt to clear the north-
south Skyline Drive, but artillery fire
beat him off. In the meantime the Com-
pany C advance north toward Marnach
also ran into trouble: persistent small
arms fire forced the infantry to leave
the road and move slowly across country.
Tanks, ordered up from the division re-
serve, had not yet arrived. In Marnach
the hard-beset garrison fought on, now
under the command of the battalion ex-
ecutive officer, Capt. J. H. Burns, who
had taken over when the company com-
mander was wounded.
Back to the west, in the 28th Division
command post at Wiltz, General Cota
took what steps he could to help the
110th Infantry. The bulk of his very
limited reserve consisted of the 2d Bat-
talion, 110th Infantry, and the 707th
Tank Battalion. By the middle of the
morning it was apparent that the VIII
Corps was under attack all along the
front and that the 28th Division would
have to make out with what it had.
Radio communication, which was
functioning fairly well, showed that the
division center was most endangered.
About 1000, therefore, General Cota
ordered Companies A and B of the 707th
Tank Battalion to reinforce the 110th
Infantry, with the intention of clearing
up the deepest enemy penetrations and
sweeping the ridge road clear. Although
Fuller pled for the return of the 2d Bat-
talion to his regiment, Cota refused to
release this last division reserve.
Shortly before noon a platoon of Com-
pany B’s tanks reached the hard-pressed
field artillery battery near Buchholz and
reported the situation in hand. 8 But the
enemy here represented only the
probing forefinger of the main attack.
Company B moved east to aid the 3d
Battalion, and Company A, less a platoon
in mobile reserve at Clerf, moved to the
northern sector. At nearly every point
the American tanks would have to fight
their way down the roads to reach the
infantry holding the villages. To the
east, at Dasburg, the German engineers
were straining to finish the tank bridge
which would bring the German armor
into play. Time was running out for
the American companies: ammunition
8 An M16 half-track from the 447th Antiaircraft
Artillery (Automatic Weapons) Battalion was re-
sponsible for the fact that this battery was still
in position. Early that morning a German com-
pany had marched up to a crossroads where the
half-track was standing, apparently intending to
deploy for an attack against the battery. Seeing
the vehicle, the enemy column paused. One of
the crew thought fast and waved the Germans
forward in friendly fashion. When the .50-caliber
machine guns on the half-tracks ceased fire nearly
one hundred German dead were counted.

FIFTH PANZER ARMY ATTACKS 28TH INFANTRY DIVISION 185
was low and the short winter day was
drawing to a close–with the likelihood
that the small garrisons would be over-
whelmed in the darkness by sheer weight
of numbers.
On the Wahlhausen road the 3d Bat-
talion observation post, defended by the
Company I platoon, called for ammuni-
tion and was told that tanks were being
sent with resupply. At Weiler the rest
of the company and the antitank platoon,
their supply of ammunition dwindling,
also awaited the tanks. For some reason
the tank platoon sent from the 707th
had not reached the Company I area
when night fell. About 1830 troops at
the battalion observation post reported
that enemy vehicles were attacking
with multiple 20-mm. guns and asked
for American artillery fire on their own
positions. This was the end. Only one
man escaped. At Weiler the Americans,
with only a few rounds left, were com-
pletely surrounded and decided to fight
their way out. They divided into two
groups and headed west through the
enemy lines.
On the west slopes of the ridge a pla-
toon of medium tanks was committed
early in the afternoon to drive the Ger-
mans off the side road linking Holzthum
and Consthum. Co-ordination between
small packets of infantry and armor,
hard at best, was made most difficult by
this kind of piecemeal commitment. The
tankers had been told that there were
no friendly troops on the road and just
outside Holzthum knocked out an anti-
tank gun placed there by Company I.
After some delay, while the tank platoon
and the infantry identified themselves,
the tanks rolled south to the 3d Bat-
talion headquarters at Consthum. At
Hosingen, on the ridge road, Company
D and Company B were fighting Ger-
man infantry hand to hand inside the
village. In response to their call for re-
inforcement and ammunition four tanks
fought their way through the German
infantry along the Skyline Drive, arriv-
ing in Hosingen about 2200–but with no
rifle ammunition.
In the 1st Battalion sector, late in the
afternoon, two tank platoons arrived in
Munshausen to support Company C, al-
ready on its way north to relieve Com-
pany B in Marnach. Company C had
been driven off the road, and the tanks,
missing the infantry entirely, rolled into
Marnach. One tank platoon remained
there to bolster the defense, while the
other turned back to the south, picked
up Company C, and, on orders,
returned with the infantry to Mun-
shausen. About dusk the Marnach gar-
rison radioed that half-tracks could be
heard moving toward the village. This
was the last word from Marnach. Late
in the afternoon, Colonel Fuller had
ordered Company D, a platoon of heavy
machine guns, and a provisional rifle
company hastily assembled from men on
pass in Clerf, to move to Reuler and
protect Battery B of the 109th Field Ar-
tillery Battalion, then firing in support
of the troops in Marnach and very hard
pressed by the enemy. These reinforce-
ments arrived at Reuler in time to take
a hand against the Germans pouring
past Marnach toward Clerf and its
bridges. But Battery A of the battalion
was swept up by the Germans who had
bypassed the left wing anchor of the
regiment at Heinerscheid.
During most of this first day of at-
tack the German infantry had fought
west of the Our without heavy weapons,
although the bulk of two regiments from

186
both the 26th Volks Grenadier Di-
vision and the 2d Panzer Division had
crossed the river and taken some part
in the fight. Shortly before dark the 60-
ton bridges were completed at Gemund
and Dasburg (inexperienced engineers
and the difficulties attendant on moving
the heavy structures down to the river
bed had slowed construction markedly) ,
and the German tanks and assault guns
moved across to give the coup de grâce
to the villages still defended by the 110th
Infantry. On the left the 26th Volks
Grenadier Division finally achieved con-
tact with the 5th Parachute Division,
which had been advancing cautiously
along the boundary between the 109th
and 110th Infantry and had done noth-
ing to help Kokott’s southern regi-
ment, the 39th. With an open left flank
and under artillery fire called down by
the American observation post on the
Wahlhausen road, the 39th swerved from
the westward axis of attack and became
involved at Weiler, contrary to orders.
There the American tank platoon from
Company B, 707th Tank Battalion, hit
into the German flank while attempt-
ing to reach Weiler and, it would appear,
caused disorganization and confusion.
Kokott’s right, the 77th Regiment,
pushed elements beyond Hosingen (ac-
tually moving between the 1st and 3d
Battalions of the 110th Infantry), but
these detachments, stopped by the
American 105-mm. howitzers and the
tank platoon near Buchholz, again had
to side-step in the drive to the Clerf.
Back at Hosingen the attempt to break
American resistance had won an early
lodgment in the south edge of the vil-
lage, but had achieved no more. The
26th Volks Grenadier Division needed
Hosingen badly. Without it the western
THE ARDENNES: BATTLE OF THE BULGE
exit road from the Gemund bridge was
hopelessly blocked; through Hosingen
ran the main divisional supply route to
the Clerf. Just before dark, therefore,
Kokott threw a part of his replacement
training battalion into the action; these
fresh troops succeeded in forcing their
way into the north edge of the village, al-
though with heavy losses.
A whole series of monkey wrenches
had been thrown into the well-oiled
machinery of the 26th Volks Grena-
dier Division. The American infantry
had made excellent use of the ground
and had held their positions, refusing
to buckle under the weight of numbers.
The 39th Regiment had got involved in
local actions and been diverted from
the westward axis-sustaining high los-
ses in the bargain. The 77th had been
unable to win a quick decision at Ho-
singen. Now, at the end of the day, the
armored reconnaissance battalion of the
Panzer Lehr Division found itself craw-
ling rather than racing west from the
Gemund bridge. The road to Hosingen
was muddy and winding; but worse,
at the western exit of the bridge an
American abatis and a series of bomb
craters blocked the flow of traffic. A
few light tanks and self-propelled guns
got forward late in the evening, but the
bulk of the Panzer Lehr reconnaissance
battalion remained backed up at the
bridge.
Kokott’s infantry would have to carry
the battle through the night. The 39th
regrouped and turned to assault Holz-
thum and Consthum in force. The 77th
marched toward Drauffelt on the Clerf
River, leaving the replacement training
battalion to continue the fight at Hosin-
gen. Kokott’s reserve regiment, the 78th,
crossed the Our at dusk and moved for-

FIFTH PANZER ARMY ATTACKS 28TH INFANTRY DIVISION 187
ward between the two assault regiments.
On the right its 1st Battalion marched
on Hosingen, bringing flame throwers
and self-propelled guns to blast the
Americans from the village; the 2d Bat-
talion moved straight for the Clerf River,
aiming at control of the crossings and
road net at Wilwerwiltz. The 26th Volks
Grenadier Division was across the Our
River in force but had failed to gain
its first-day objective, control of the Clerf
River crossings. The German infantry
would have to fight step by step; the
hope of a quick breakthrough had
proven illusory.
The story in the 2d Panzer Division
zone was the same. There the infantry
driving toward the town of Clerf had
been stopped short of their objective.
Marnach remained in American hands,
even after the Dasburg bridge was com-
pleted and the leading tanks of the 3d
Panzer Regiment entered the fight. The
304th Regiment had suffered severely at
American hands: the regimental com-
mander was a casualty and one battalion
had been badly scattered during the
piecemeal counterattacks by the Ameri-
can tank platoons.
General Luettwitz was none too
pleased with the progress made by his
two attack divisions on this first day.
But the credit side of the ledger showed
a few entries. The two heavy tank bridges
were in, the Americans obviously were
weakening, and the 2d Panzer Divi-
sion had been able to move its tanks
forward on the relatively good road in
the northern part of the corps zone.
Luettwitz concluded that the Clerf River
now would be crossed not later than
the evening of the second day.
Across the lines General Cota had
little reason to expect that the 110th
Infantry could continue to delay the
German attack at the 28th Division cen-
ter as it had this first day. But at dark
he ordered his regimental commanders
to hold their positions “at all costs” and
began preparations to commit his re-
maining reserves to restore the situation
in the Marnach sector and block the
road to Clerf. This seemed to be the
most endangered sector of the whole
division front, for here the 2d Panzer
Division had been identified and here
was the main hard-surface road to
Bastogne. As yet, however, the Americans
had no way of knowing that the bulk
of the 2d Panzer Division actually was
moving down the road to Clerf or that
a counterattack would collide with any
such German force.
Meanwhile, General Middleton, the
VIII Corps commander, issued a hold-
fast order to all his troops. All VIII Corps
units were to hold their positions until
they were “completely untenable,” and
in no event would they fall back beyond
a specified final defense line. In the
110th Infantry sector this line ran
through Lieler and Buchholz to Lellin-
gen. It was breached at midnight when
tanks and self-propelled guns of the
3d Panzer Regiment entered Marnach.
General Cota still had in hand a re-
serve on the night of the 16th, but it
was the last reserve of the 28th Division.
It consisted of the 2d Battalion, 110th
Infantry, at Donnange and the light tank
company of the 707th Tank Battalion,
which was located at Weiswampach be-
hind the division north flank in support
of the 112th Infantry. By the late
evening the picture as seen at the
division command post had cleared
to this extent: the two flank regiments,
the 109th and 112th, had lost rela-

188 THE ARDENNES: BATTLE OF THE BULGE
tively little ground; the 110th was very
hard pressed; and German tanks were
moving along the main road to Bastogne
by way of Marnach. At 2100, therefore,
General Cota turned the reserve rifle bat-
talion back to the 110th Infantry, minus
Company G which was moved to Wiltz to
defend the division command post, and
agreed with Colonel Fuller’s proposal
that the battalion be used in an attack
eastward to restore American control at
Marnach. At the same time the light tank
company in the 112 th area was alerted by
division headquarters for an attack south
along the Skyline Drive, also directed to-
ward Marnach, as soon as daylight came.
To complete the concentration against
the enemy in or around Marnach, Col-
onel Fuller ordered the medium tank
platoon in Munshausen to attack to the
northeast with a rifle platoon from Com-
pany C. When Fuller heard of the light
tanks, he ordered Colonel Henbest to
delay the 2d Battalion attack next morn-
ing until the incoming tank detachment
was ready to attack on the Skyline Drive.
There was still hope on the morning
of 17 December that at least one platoon
from Company B was holding on in
Marnach. About 0730 the two rifle com-
panies of the 2d Battalion jumped off
at the ridge east of Clerf. In a matter
of minutes the left company ran into a
strong German skirmish line, deployed
at the edge of a wood, which was sup-
ported by tanks and self-propelled artil-
lery firing from around Marnach. The
battalion commander ordered his right
company down to block the paved road
from Marnach to Clerf, but this road
was in the hands of the 2d Panzer Divi-
sion, whose tanks were rolling toward
the Clerf bridges. The American artil-
lery, earlier emplaced behind the left
wing of the 110th, had been overrun or
forced to displace. Only one battery of
the 109th Field Artillery Battalion was
firing during the morning and it ran
low on ammunition. This battery was
driven from Buchholz with the loss of
half its howitzers. By noon the 2d Bat-
talion, helpless against massed tanks and
without artillery support, was held in
check along the ridge running southwest
from Urspelt to the Clerf road, only a
thousand yards from its line of depar-
ture.
The southern prong of the three-
pronged counterattack to shut off the
German armored drive moving through
Marnach toward Clerf also was out-
gunned and outnumbered but did reach
Marnach, only to report that no friendly
infantry could be found. About 1000 the
small tank-infantry team was allowed to
return to its original position at Muns-
hausen, and Fuller then ordered the
tank platoon to fight its way to Clerf
and help defend the town. These two
attacks from west and south had made no
headway but were not too costly.
The attack by the light tank company
of the 707th along the Skyline Drive was
disastrous. About 0720 the company
crossed into the 110th Infantry zone,
where the ground rose away from the
highway and forced the tanks to advance
in column on the road. As the column
emerged from the village of Heiner-
scheid, concealed high-velocity guns
opened on the skimpily armored light
tanks, picking them off like clay pipes
in a shooting gallery. Eight tanks were
knocked out by the enemy gunners and
in the confusion three more fell prey to
bazooka fire. The entire action lasted
ten minutes. Two of the American tanks
turned back to Heinerscheid, only to be

FIFTH PANZER ARMY ATTACKS 28TH INFANTRY DIVISION 189
destroyed during the German assault
later in the day. The company com-
mander withdrew the remaining five
tanks on a side road and reached Urspelt,
taking position near the 2d Battalion
command post. 9
The American pincers action had
failed to constrict at Marnach. Yet there
was still an opportunity to retard the
2d Panzer march along the road to
Bastogne. Less than two miles west of
Marnach lay the Clerf River and the
town of Clerf, the latter the head-
9 MS # A-940 (Luettwitz). The 707th Tank
Battalion has a detailed unit journal in narrative
form.
quarters of the 110th Infantry. The town
itself lies in a horseshoe bend of the
river. From town and river rise wooded
and precipitous slopes, particularly sharp
and difficult to the east. Descent to
the town and its bridges is made on
this side by two winding roads. The
main paved road from Marnach ap-
proaches Clerf through a shallow draw,
passing just to the south of the little
village of Reder, which perches on
the high ground overlooking the river
bend. This road makes a twisted and
tortuous descent to the valley floor,
finally crossing the river at the south-
eastern edge of the town and pro-
CLERF

190 THE ARDENNES: BATTLE OF THE BULGE
ceeding through narrow streets until it
emerges on the north. A secondary road,
on the right of the through highway to
Bastogne, approaches Clerf from the
hamlet of Urspelt. A sharp hairpin turn
breaks the descent; then the road crosses
the river into the northern edge of Clerf
near the railroad station and enters the
main highway. In sum, the way through
Clerf would be none too easy for an
armored division. 10
Colonel Fuller’s command post was in
a hotel only a few yards from the north
bridge. Across town the regimental headquarters
company was billeted in an
ancient chateau, now partially modernized
but retaining the heavy stone walls
behind which, since the twelfth century,
fighting men had dominated the river
bend and controlled the main bridge
site. In the late evening of 16 December
German artillery began to range into
Clerf, apparently covering the advance
of patrols from Marnach. About 0345
the German artillery quieted. Small detachments
with burp guns now crept
down through the dark and engaged the
troops in and around the chateau. At
dawn a single tank or self-propelled gun
began firing from the curving road to
the south; more enemy infantry joined
the fire fight near the chateau as the
morning advanced.
Then rolling down the Marnach road
came the German advance guard, perhaps
two platoons of Mark IV tanks and
as many as thirty half-tracks filled with
armored grenadiers. Colonel Fuller had
ordered a platoon of the 2d Battallion
to swing south and bar the
10 The 110th Infantry action here is described in
History of the 110th Infantry of the 28th Division,
United States Army, World War II, 1941–1945
(Atlanta, Ga.: Albert Love Enterprises, 1945).
road, but it was already dominated
by the German armor. About 0930 the
2d Platoon of Company A, 707th Tank
Battalion, climbed out of Clerf to meet
the German Mark IV’s. At the top of
the ascent the tanks met: four German
tanks were knocked out, three American
tanks destroyed. The 1st Platoon of Com-
pany A, which had returned to Muns-
hausen after the unsuccessful attempt
to reach Marnach, moved north mean-
while to help the 2d Platoon. A radio
message alerted the commander to the
danger of a direct approach; so the pla-
toon and some accompanying infantry
entered Clerf by a secondary road along
the river. German tanks opened fire
on them, but a direct hit stopped the
leading Mark IV, for the moment effec-
tively blocking the serpentine approach
from Marnach. At the chateau, however,
headquarters company still was hard
pressed by riflemen and machine gun-
ners in the houses nearby. And German
tanks still fired from the eastern height.
Shortly before noon German pressure
noticeably relaxed. East of Clerf the left
flank of the 2d Battalion started to move
forward against an enemy assembly
point in a woods northeast of Reuler.
This threat north of the Marnach road
seems to have caused the German com-
mander some concern. Then too, some
welcome tank support had arrived on
the scene. On General Middleton’s order,
CCR, 9th Armored Division, had put a
task force backstop position behind the
threatened center of the 28th Division.
Company B of the 2d Tank Battalion,
en route to set up a roadblock north-
east of Clerf, was appropriated by Gen-
eral Cota and sent to support the 110th
Infantry. It arrived in Clerf with nine-
teen medium tanks. Colonel Fuller set

FIFTH PANZER ARMY ATTACKS 28TH INFANTRY DIVISION 191
one platoon to clearing the Germans
out of the south end of town, sent one
platoon to Reuler to help the 2d Bat-
talion, and sent one to the 1st Battalion
at Heinerscheid where the light tanks of
the 707th Tank Battalion had been
smashed earlier in the day. The appear-
ance of the Shermans in Clerf cooled the
ardor of the German infantry.
The 2d Panzer Division advance
guard had taken a bloody nose on the
Marnach road, but more tanks and in-
fantry were arriving hourly and maneu-
ver was possible. During the afternoon
the Germans pressed the 2d Battalion
back through Reuler, the Americans
fighting stubbornly with the aid of the
dwindling tank force from the 9th
Armored Division and the few remain-
ing towed tank destroyers of Company
B, 630th Tank Destroyer Battalion. A
platoon of self-propelled tank destroyers
had arrived early in the afternoon but
left precipitately, losing one gun as it
careened down the road back through
Clerf. Shortly before dusk Companies E
and F dug in on a ridge north of
Reuler under a rain of German shells.
On their left German tanks were wip-
ing out the last posts of the 1st Bat-
talion. At Heinerscheid, Company A had
been overrun in midafternoon, leaving
open an avenue into the 2d Battalion
left flank. Then the enemy grenadiers
encircled the American roadblock at
Urspelt, whereupon the light tank pla-
toon destroyed its single remaining tank
and withdrew on foot to Wiltz–the 2d
Battalion flanks were wide open.
Colonel Lauchert was worried about
the slow rate of the 2d Panzer advance.
He even dispatched a kampfgruppe to
seize a bridge considerably south of Clerf
apparently intending to swing his attack
column to a poorer road in the event
that Clerf continued to hold. But now
the north road into the town was open.
A small tank-infantry team blasted the
single 57-mm. antitank gun in the path
and crossed the bridge at the rail-
road station. At the same time a tank
platoon, shrouded in darkness and with
no American tanks left to contest the
passage, wound its way into the south
end of Clerf. At 1825 Colonel Fuller
phoned the 28th Division chief of staff
that his command post was under fire
and that enemy tanks occupied the town.
Fuller and some of his staff made their
escape, hoping to join Company G,
which had been released at division
headquarters and was supposed to be
coming in from the west. Later Colonel
Fuller was captured, with a group of
stragglers he commanded, while at-
tempting to break through to the west.
At 1839 the sergeant at the regimen-
tal switchboard called the division to
report that he was alone–only the
switchboard was left.
This was not quite the end in Clerf.
At the château by the south bridge 102
officers and men of the regimental head-
quarters company still were in action.
Around them Clerf was crawling with
tanks, for most of the Mark IV Bat-
talion of the 3d Panzer Regiment had
assembled in the town during the night.
Perhaps the tankers were too busy loot-
ing the American freight cars and supply
dumps to bother with the little force in
the château. Perhaps they did not care
to risk bazooka fire in the dark. In any
case the defenders made radio contact
(their last) with the 28th Division as
late as 0528 on the morning of 18 De-
cember. The final word on the defense
of Clerf would come from the enemy.

192 THE ARDENNES: BATTLE OF THE BULGE
At dawn the Panther Battalion of the
3d Panzer Regiment came clanking
into Clerf, after a night move from the
Our River, and found tanks from the
Mark IV Battalion playing cat and mouse
with the Americans in the château. Bul-
let fire from the old stone walls was no
menace to armored vehicles, bazooka
teams sent down from the château were
killed or captured, and the German tank
battalions moved on, north and west
toward Bastogne. But the German in-
fantry were more vulnerable and their
march was delayed for several hours be-
fore engineers and self-propelled 88's
finally set the riddled château afire
and forced the Americans to surrender.
It is impossible to assess in hours the
violence done the 2d Panzer Division
timetable at Clerf, but it is clear that
the race by this division to Bastogne was
lost as the result of the gallant action
by the 110th Infantry in front of and at
the Clerf crossings.
On 18 December what was left of the
110th Infantry was wiped out or with-
drew to the west. 11 Survivors in the north
headed toward Donnange and, with
Company G, joined elements of the 9th
Armored Division to make a stand.
Those in the south fell back toward
Wiltz, the division command post. The
2d Battalion, surrounded on the ridge
east of Clerf, attempted to filter through
the enemy lines in the early morning
hours. Seven officers and fifty to sixty
men did reach Donnange. Of the 1st
Battalion, only a part of Company C
retained its organization. It had held on
11 There is no official record of the losses taken
by the 110th Infantry during this phase of the
battle. Estimates furnished the author by mem-
bers of the regimental staff set the figure at about
2,750 officers and men.
at Munshausen, with the 110th Cannon
Company and a section of tank de-
stroyers, all through the 17th. 12 The rifle-
men and cannoneers made a fight of
it, barricading the village streets with
overturned trucks, fighting from house
to house. After the Germans captured
the howitzers, a bazooka team of a com-
pany officer and a sergeant held the
enemy tanks at bay, destroying two
which ventured into the village. Before
daybreak on 18 December the survivors,
now only a handful, started west.
Remnants of the 3d Battalion had
assembled at Consthum, the battalion
headquarters. The garrison of a hundred
or so was reinforced by Company L,
ordered back from Holzthum to avoid
entrapment. After dark on 17 December
a captain led in about twenty-five men
of Company I from Weiler, after a des-
perate march, narrow escapes, and an
ambuscade. Only Company K in
Hosingen was yet to be heard from. For
two days and nights Company K and
Company B of the 103d Engineer Com-
bat Battalion fought off all enemy at-
tempts to eradicate this block on the
Skyline Drive. On the morning of the
17th German tanks had set the town
ablaze, but the few American Shermans
had held them at bay. By that night
the defenders were without ammunition,
but they continued the battle with hand
grenades, withdrawing slowly and stub-
bornly from house to house. The Ameri-
12 Events of this day are very obscure. Late in
the afternoon an American tank platoon came to
the edge of the village but retired, the commander
reported, when no Americans could be found.
This withdrawal was hastened by bazooka fire
which crippled two of the tanks. The troops bar-
ricaded in the houses later reported that they had
seen no American tanks but had hit two German
tanks with bazooka shots. See MS by Maj. I. D.
Warden and 28th Div G–3 Jnl.

FIFTH PANZER ARMY ATTACKS 28TH INFANTRY DIVISION 193
can artillery by this time had displaced
to the west and was out of range. Finally,
on the morning of 18 December, the
surviving members of the garrison sent
out a last radio message; they had no
choice but surrender.
After the fall of Hosingen the 3d Bat-
talion elements in Consthum offered the
last organized resistance in the 28th
Infantry Division center east of the Clerf
River. Col. Daniel Strickler, the
regimental executive officer, who now
had assumed command at Consthum, or-
ganized a perimeter defense of the town,
set out mines along the approaches, and
disposed his three effective tanks and
three armored cars to watch for the
enemy armor known to be on the road
from Holzthum. Some artillery support
was still available from a battery of the
687th Field Artillery Battalion, whose
shells swept the open fields between the
two villages. A half hour before dawn
on 18 December German guns and mor-
tars opened heavy fire. With daylight
the fire lifted and the enemy infantry
advanced, attacking in one wave after
another as the morning progressed but
making no headway. About 1300 a thick,
soupy December fog rolled in on the
village. Under this natural smoke screen
German tanks and grenadiers poured
into Consthum. While tanks dueled in
the street like gunmen of the Old West
the 3d Battalion made its orderly way
out the west side of the town, reorgan-
ized, and as night descended marched to
Nocher. There it dug in to defend the
battery which had given aid during the
battle. The Bofors crews belonging to
the 447th Antiaircraft Artillery lingered
on near Consthum as a rear guard, dis-
couraging all pursuit with their fast, ac-
curate fire. The next day General Cota
ordered the battalion to Wiltz, where
it would take part in the defense of the
division headquarters.
The 112th Infantry Sector
16–20 December
The German attack to penetrate the
front lines of the 28th Division succeeded
on the first day of the offensive in split-
ting the 112th Infantry from the rest of
the division. For this reason the fight
put up by the 112th Infantry on the
north flank of the division had little or
no effect on the operations of its sister
regiment east of Bastogne. Futhermore,
lack of communication between the 28th
Division and its northern regiment
would ultimately force the regimental
commander, Col. Gustin M. Nelson, to
act on his own. The action of the 112th
Infantry in this part of the 28th Divi-
sion story stands therefore as an episode
in itself until, after four days’ fighting,
the regiment joins the forces arrayed in
defense of St. Vith. 13
When the 28th Division arrived on the
VIII Corps front in mid-November its
regiments were in pitiable condition.
The fight in the Schmidt area had cost
the 112th Infantry alone about 2,000
killed, wounded, missing, and nonbattle
casualties. In a month’s time the flow
of replacements had brought the regi-
ment to full strength. The regimental
commander believed that morale had
been restored to a high degree and that
the new officers and men now were fair-
ly well trained.
The sector held by the 112th Infantry
was approximately six miles wide. Most
of the positions occupied lay on the east
13 See below, pp. 393–95.

194 THE ARDENNES: BATTLE OF THE BULGE
or German bank of the Our River. In
the north, contact was maintained with
the 106th Infantry Division at a point
northwest of Lützkampen The regimen-
tal position, really a series of squad and
platoon posts, followed a ridge line
south through Harspelt and Sevenig,
then bent back across the Our and
followed the western slopes of the river
nearly to Kalborn. Here in the south day-
light patrols also operated to maintain
control of the eastern bank, although the
main positions were around Lieler and
Lausdorn.
The 229th Field Artillery Battalion
was emplaced behind the north flank
near Welchenhausen on the German side
of the river. Two rifle battalions
manned the main battle positions east
of the Our: the 1st facing Lützkampen
the 3d occupying and flanking Sevenig.
The 2d Battalion manned observation
posts and operated patrols across the
river but was deployed in a refused po-
sition west of the Our. It was accounted
the regimental reserve, having fixed
schemes of employment for support of
the two battalions in the north by
counterattack either northeast or south-
east.
Hills intersected by wooded draws
marked the terrain in this sector. Ex-
tensive pine forests covered much of the
area, making observation difficult. In
general the ground on the east bank
commanded. The road net was ade-
quate, although mired by constant rain,
but the two forward battalions had to
be supplied at night because of German
fire. The 3d Battalion positions on the
German bank were built around cap-
tured pillboxes, for here earlier Ameri-
can advances had pierced the first line
of the German West Wall. Since most
of these works were “blind” the final
protective line turned on foxholes and
extensive patches of barbed wire which
the battalion itself had constructed. Be-
cause the West Wall angled away to the
east near Lützkampen the 1st Battalion
was denied pillbox protection but, at
the insistence of the regimental com-
mander, had constructed a foxhole line
with great care.
Aside from patrol activity (generally
small raids against individual pillboxes)
the 112th Infantry sector had been quiet.
Men in the observation posts watched
the enemy move about his daily chores
and reported flares and occasional rounds
of mortar or artillery fire. Early in the
month the Germans had undertaken
what appeared to be a routine relief in
their forward positions. On the nights
of 14 and 15 December, sounds of horse-
drawn vehicles and motors moving in
slow gear drifted to the American out-
posts; but since the same commotion had
attended an earlier relief in the German
lines, it was reported and perfunctorily
dismissed.
The stir and movement in the enemy
lines during the two nights prior to 16
December was occasioned by troops
moving in and troops moving out. The
26th Volks Grenadier Division, which
had allowed the 112th to go about its
training program with only very minor
interruption, marched south to join the
XLVII Panzer Corps and take part in
the attack for Bastogne. Its pillboxes and
supporting positions were occupied in
greater strength as the LVIII Panzer
Corps (Krueger) moved in. In the
first German blueprint for the Ardennes
counteroffensive the latter corps had
been assigned four divisions and the
mission of driving to and across the

FIFTH PANZER ARMY ATTACKS 28TH INFANTRY DIVISION 195
Meuse River on the right of its old com-
rade, the XLVII Panzer Corps. The mis-
sion remained, but the troops available
on 16 December were less than half the
number promised: one armored division,
the 116th Panzer Division, and two-
thirds of an infantry division, the 560th
Volks Grenadier Division.
The 116th had fought itself out in
almost continuous battles during the
withdrawal across France and the de-
fense of the West Wall but had a fine
reputation and was fairly well refitted.
It had ninety-two Panthers and forty-
seven Mark IV tanks; perhaps 40 per-
cent of its organic vehicles were missing.
The 560th, activated from inexperi-
enced garrison units in Norway and
Denmark, had been tagged for the Rus-
sian front. Directed to the west by Hit-
ler’s orders, the division would see its
first action in the Ardennes. One rifle
regiment and part of the division engi-
neers were still in Denmark. The artil-
lery supporting the LVIII Panzer Corps
consisted of five battalions plus two Wer-
fer battalions, and a few batteries of
heavy guns. It appears that the corps had
only moderate support in the way of
engineers and bridge trains.
The immediate mission of Krueger’s
corps, like that of the XLVII Panzer
Corps on its left, was to seize crossings
at the Our River. The areas selected by
the two corps for their main efforts were
some six to seven air-line miles apart-
an indication of the weight to be thrown
against the American 28th Infantry Divi-
sion. The line of departure for Krueger’s
corps began across the Our from Kalborn
and extended north to a point east of
Burg Reuland. The bulk of his two divi-
sions, as a consequence, faced the 112th
Infantry, albeit the corps zone overlap-
ped somewhat the sectors of the 106th
Infantry Division in the north and the
110th Infantry in the south. Krueger
had based his plan of attack on the in-
telligence reports dealing with the Our
bridges. Since the American troops east
of the Our were deployed in the Lütz-
kampen-Sevenig area, Krueger deter-
mined that his main effort should be
made there. Roads and bridges, he reck-
oned, must be in shape to support the
American troops east of the river. These
roads and bridges he intended to seize
by surprise.
On the corps right, then, the 116th
Panzer Division (Generalmajor Sieg-
fried von Waldenburg) had orders to
attack north of Lützkampen; at least two
or more bridges crossed the Our in this
sector. The 560th Volks Grenadier Divi-
sion (Generalmajor Rudolf Langhaeu-
ser) was assigned two specific bridges
as targets, one just north of Ouren, the
other a stone arch a little to the south
of the village. Because surprise was es-
sential in this stroke for the bridges,
artillery fire on the American forward
positions in the first moments of the
assault was forbidden.
The heavy barrage and the pyrotech-
nic display which opened elsewhere on
the 28th Division front on 16 December
was viewed at first with some detachment
by the men at the 112th observation
posts. They heard, and duly reported,
heavy artillery to the south, they saw
searchlights and flames lighting up the
sky, but again in the south. About 0620,
however, the 1st Battalion phoned to
say that shells were coming over the bat-
talion command post. The German guns
and Werfers had finally opened fire
to neutralize or destroy the rearward
artillery and reserve positions in the

196 THE ARDENNES: BATTLE OF THE BULGE
112th sector. As the enemy gun layers
dropped their range back to the river
and then to the American positions, the
searchlights blinked on, searching out
pillboxes and bunkers. When daylight
came, the German infantry already were
stealing through the draws behind and
around the forward platoons, aiming to
assemble in the wooded areas to the
rear. 14
The 3d Battalion (Maj. Walden F.
Woodward), in the regimental center,
was hit by the 1130th Regiment of the
560th Volks Grenadier Division. This
German blow fell on either side of
Sevenig, held by Company L. The Amer-
ican barbed wire line had not been com-
pleted across the draws to the north and
south of the village; through these gaps
the shock companies advanced. The com-
pany leading the left battalion surprised
a platoon of Company L at breakfast,
overran the company kitchen (which
was only 800 to 900 yards behind the
rifle line) and killed the platoon com-
mander. Leaderless, the platoon broke.
A part of the German company, perhaps
a platoon in strength, succeeded in reach-
ing the stone bridge over the Our south
of Ouren, but was dispersed.
The bulk of the 3d Battalion held
their positions despite surprise, defend-
ing from pillboxes and foxholes. Later
the Americans in this sector reported
that the attackers must have been “aw-
14 MSS # B–321 (Krueger); A–873, Commit-
ment of the 116th Panzer Division in the Ardennes,
16–26 December 1944 (Generalmajor Siegfried
von Waldenburg) ; A–874, Commitment of the
116th Panzer Division in the Ardennes, 1944–45
(Waldenburg) : B–027, 560th Yolks Grenadzer
Division, 15–29 December 1944, and 12th Yolks
Grenadier Division, 1–28 January 1945 (General-
major Rudolf Langhaeuser). The Germans sited
their searchlights five to eight kilometers from
the American main line of resistance.
fully green”-as indeed they were. The
enemy attempt to capture or destroy the
American command posts, kitchens, and
observation posts was only partially suc-
cessful, although the grenadier assault
parties were well inside the 3d Battalion
positions when day broke. Two company
kitchens were captured and one or two
observation posts cut off, but the artil-
lery observer inside Sevenig was able to
direct the 229th Field Artillery how-
itzers onto the Germans in the draw.
Meanwhile the mortar crews took a hand
from their foxholes on the hill behind
Sevenig, dropping mortar shells into the
hollows where the Germans congregated
or picking them off with carbines.
Early morning reports of considerable
German penetration and the threat to
the Our bridges in the 3d Battalion
area led the regimental commander to
put one of his counterattack plans into
operation. At 0930 two companies of
the 2d Battalion (Lt. Col. J. L. Mac-
Salka) assembled in a draw between
Ouren and Lieler (west of the river),
crossed the bridges–the German pa-
trol at the stone bridge had evapo-
rated under machine gun fire–and
moved toward Sevenig. The Germans
in the way quickly withdrew to the
east. By nightfall the 3d Battalion
line on the Sevenig ridge had been
restored while the commander of the
1130th reported that his regiment, de-
spite many attempts, had not been able
“to get going.”
The main effort launched by the
LVIII Panzer Corps on 16 December
was assigned the 116th Panzer Division.
This attack aimed at the bridges near
Burg Reuland (in the 106th Division
sector) and Oberhausen, in the rear
of the positions manned by the left

FIFTH PANZER ARMY ATTACKS 28TH INFANTRY DIVISION 197
battalion of the 112th. General Walden-
burg committed his infantry here, in the
predawn hours, hoping that the 60th
Regiment would break through on the
right or that the 156th Regiment would
reach the river on the left and so secure
a bridgehead through which his tank
regiment could be passed. The lay of
the ground and defenses in the area
north of Lützkampen were such that
Waldenburg’s right regiment had to
move northwestward at an oblique to
the axis of his left wing advance.
In common with the German assault
tactics employed all along the front on
16 December, both regiments led off
with a predawn advance by shock com-
panies eighty men strong. The company
from the 60th ran into trouble almost
immediately when it was immobilized
in some woods northwest of Berg by
flanking fire from Heckhuscheid, in the
424th Infantry sector. Later reports in-
dicate that this group was almost wiped
out. The assault company from the 156th
was initially more fortunate in its ad-
vance west of Lützkampen. By 0630 the
grenadiers were behind the command
post of the 1st Battalion (Lt. Col. Wil-
liam H. Allen) in Harspelt; the first
sign of their presence was a kitchen truck
ambushed while journeying to the rear.
The advance party of grenadiers had
moved along the wooded draw between
the two companies holding the 1st Bat-
talion line.
When day came the Americans caught
the troops following the advance party
of the assault company out in the open.
Interlocking machine gun and rifle fire
blocked off the German reinforcements,
some sixty were captured and the rest
dug in where they could. Company D,
in its support position on the high
ground overlooking Lützkampen, meanwhile
commenced mopping up the enemy
who had filtered between the companies
on the line. By noon Company D
had so many prisoners that it “couldn’t
handle them all!” Nonetheless some part
of the assault wave had broken through
as far as the battery positions near Welchenhausen,
where they were repelled
by the .50-caliber quadruple mounts of
the antiaircraft artillery.
Shortly before noon the advance guard
of the 60th Panzer Regiment, rolling
along the Lützkampen-Leidenborn road,
appeared on the knoll west of Lützkampen.
The seven tanks counted here
strangely enough made no effort to attack
(perhaps the rough terrain and
dragon’s teeth along the American bunker
line did not appear too promising).
After a brief pause they wheeled back
into Lützkampen. 15 About dark infantry
from Lützkampen attacked in close order
formation against Company B.
Maps picked up from dead Germans
showed that the American machine gun
positions had been exactly plotted–but
as they had existed up to a change made
just before the 16th. The enemy made
three attacks in the same close formation
over the same ground before they
discovered the error of their ways. Company
B, however, had been badly shot
up during the engagement and probably
somewhat shaken by the presence of
two or three flame-throwing tanks–a new
experience to most American troops on
the Western Front. Nevertheless by
midnight the 1st Battalion front had
15 It is quite possible that the German tank ac-
tivity here was discouraged during daylight by
the sharp-shooting Private Rosenthal, manning
his tank destroyer in the 424th Infantry sector.
See above, ch. VII, p. 153.

198 THE ARDENNES: BATTLE OF THE BULGE
quieted down, although there still were
small groups of the enemy crawling
about in the gap breached that morn-
ing. Lützkampen would continue as a
sally port for sorties against the 1st Bat-
talion and the best efforts by the Amer-
ican field pieces to flatten the village
failed to still the men and vehicles mov-
ing in its streets.
The German plans had been altered
during the day, but of course some
time was needed for orders to reach
the front-line troops. Bad tank-going in
the West Wall maze north of Lützkam-
pen and the initial reverse suffered by
the assault company of the 60th Regi-
ment led the corps commander to or-
der the 116th Panzer Division to pivot
its weight on Lützkampen in a drive
southwestward toward Ouren. Leav-
ing only a screening force behind, the
60th Regiment started a march intend-
ed to bring it east of Sevenig on the
left of the 156th Regiment. Although
the left division (the 560th Volks
Grenadier Division) had not fared too
well in the attack on Sevenig, farther
to the south its 1128th Regiment had
seized a blasted bridge three kilometers
east of Heinerscheid and established a
bridgehead over the Our at the bound-
ary between the 112th Infantry and the
110th Infantry. This had been accom-
plished by noon on the first day-as usu-
al a boundary line had proved a point
of little resistance-and the German en-
gineers moved in. The approach road
on the east bank was blocked with trees
and mines, the bridge debris would
have taken much effort to clear, and to
Krueger’s disappointment there was no
assurance that a bridge could be in be-
fore the night of 17 December. On the
evening of 16 December, therefore, the
German commander ordered the corps
to continue the attack for the bridges
at Ouren. Meanwhile he dispatched the
Reconnaissance Battalion of the 116th
Panzer Division to cross the XLVII Pan-
zer Corps bridge at Dasburg and com-
mence a sweep along the western bank
calculated to take the Ouren crossings
from the rear.
At the close of this first day the 112th
Infantry remained in its positions east
of the Our. 16 The 2d Battalion had not
yet been seriously engaged, although
one company had been detached to
reinforce the 3d. Both flanks of the
regiment, however, were in process of
being uncovered by enemy thrusts
against the neighboring units-although
this effect may not have been immedi-
ately apparent. A gap remained in the
center of the 1st Battalion line and small
groups of the enemy were wandering
along the Our River.
Considerable damage had been done
the German assault forces. Although the
116th Panzer Division losses were moder-
ate, the inexperienced 560th Volks
Grenadier Division had suffered an esti-
mated 1,000 casualties-a figure, how-
ever, that included the reinforced fusi-
lier company which got lost in the woods
southwest of Sevenig and was not seen
again for two days. Perhaps the Ameri-
cans had some reason for elation on the
night of 16 December, but all knew that
harder blows would be dealt on the
morrow. Wrote one in his diary: “No-
body able to sleep and no hot meals
16 During the fighting on 16 December Pfc.
W. S. Rush stayed in the line at an exposed
point, hurling grenades and firing his rifle al-
though he was badly wounded. Rush refused to
leave his post and died there of his wounds. He
was awarded the DSC.

FIFTH PANZER ARMY ATTACKS 28TH INFANTRY DIVISION 199
today. This place is not healthy any-
more.”
The presence of enemy tanks in Lütz-
kampen constituted a distinct threat,
even to infantry in pillboxes. Colonel
Nelson’s antitank reserve, Company C,
630th Tank Destroyer Battalion, was de-
ployed on the ridge west of the river,
but these were towed guns, dug in and
relatively immobile. Even so, the unit
accounted for six tanks on the 16th and
broke up two panzer assaults of com-
pany size. On the afternoon of the 16th
the division commander had loaned
Neslon the light tank company of the
707th Tank Battalion, but after a sweep
through the 1st Battalion area in which
not a shot was fired the tanks recrossed
the river. Subsequently General Cota
ordered them to go to the aid of the
hard-pressed 110th Infantry. This move
was made early in the morning with
disastrous results recorded earlier. Some
additional help for the 112th did arrive
before daybreak on 17 December, four
self-propelled tank destroyers out of the
811th Tank Destroyer Battalion bor-
rowed from Combat Command Reserve,
9th Armored Division, at Trois Vierges.
Finally, the regimental antitank and can-
non companies were disposed around
Ouren guarding the bridges, the roads,
and the regimental command post.
Through the early hours of 17 De-
cember American outposts reported
sounds of tank movement in Lützkam-
pen. This was the Mark V Battalion of
the 116th Panzer Division assembling to
lead the attack toward the Ouren
bridges. About an hour before dawn
eleven searchlights flicked on, their rays
glancing dully from the low clouds back
onto the Lützkampen-Sevenig ridge. The
German artillery could take a hand this
morning, particularly since a number of
forward observers had wormed into the
American positions. First the Werfers
and guns pounded the front line, par-
ticularly the 1st Battalion positions.
Then as the attack got moving they were
raised to lay heavy counterbattery fire
on the 229th Field Artillery Battalion
(Lt. Col. John C. Fairchild). With
the first light some eighteen Mark V
tanks started down the ridge spur point-
ing toward Ouren; at the same time the
1130th Regiment and the 156th Regi-
ment resumed the attack to cut off and
destroy the forward American compa-
nies. Company A, directly in the way,
lost a platoon to tanks rolling and firing
methodically along the foxhole line.
Through this gap the panzers moved in
on the support positions held by Com-
pany D.
Earlier a German infantry company
in close order had been caught in the
glare of its own headlights atop a hill
and been massacred by Company D
sections lying on the reverse slope, but
at 0755 Company D was forced to send
out an urgent plea for help “and damn
quick.” West of Harspelt the self-pro-
pelled tank destroyer platoon from the
811th arrived in time to destroy four
of the panzers, but at the cost of all
but one of its own guns. Colonel Nel-
son sent back request after request for
air support. The first American planes
arrived at 0935, immobilizing the Ger-
man tanks momentarily. Company D
positions had been taken by assault only
a few minutes earlier. About this time
a German tank platoon appeared on
the ridge less than a thousand yards
from the regimental command post in
Ouren. Five hundred yards from the
Germans, on the far side of a draw, the

OUREN, SHOWING BRIDGES

202 THE ARDENNES: BATTLE OF THE BULGE
cannon company gunners quickly bore-
sighted their pieces, loaded reduced
charge, and with direct fire knocked out
four of the panzers. A scratch platoon
of less than fifty men collected from the
regimental headquarters and Ouren
held the supporting German infantry
at bay along the ridge east of the vil-
lage.
The tank thrust through the 1st Bat-
talion center pushed parts of compa-
nies C (a platoon of which had joined
the battalion from training), A, and D
back through the woods toward Wel-
chenhausen. Here about ten o’clock, Bat-
tery C of the 229th came under direct
tank fire but stopped the tanks with how-
itzer fire at close range while Company
C of the 447th Antiaircraft Artillery
Battalion used its quad mount machine
guns to chop down the infantry follow-
ing behind.
About noon the 2d Battalion coun-
terattacked and German pressure along
the 112th front began to wane. The
229th Field Artillery Battalion pounded
the German assembly point at Lützkam-
pen as hard as limited stock of shells
permitted and fighter-bombers plastered
the village: “air tremendously effective”
reported the expectant ground observ-
ers. But there were too few guns and
too few air sorties to keep the enemy
immobilized for long. Probably by this
time a good share of the 116th tanks had
been committed. Certainly the enemy
infantry were spreading rapidly through
the woods and draws between the Amer-
ican front line and the Our River. By
13 15 the howitzers around Welchenhau-
sen again were firing at their minimum
range. Three-quarters of an hour later
the regimental commander ordered the
artillery to displace behind the river;
Colonel Fairchild moved the battalion
across the river without losing a piece
and immediately resumed firing.
Throughout this entire action the
229th gave the 112th Infantry such sup-
port as to elicit from the regimental com-
mander the opinion that “it was the best
artillery in the army,” an expression
which would be used by other infantry
commanders about other artillery units
during these trying days. In this case, as
in many others during the American
withdrawal, the full story is that of
the co-operation of the combined arms.
The field artillery commander in his
turn would credit the ably served .50-
caliber machine guns and 40-mm.
Bofors of the protecting antiaircraft com-
pany with saving his howitzers.
News of the battle on the right and
left of the 112th Infantry sector had
been sparse. During the afternoon Gen-
eral Cota radioed Colonel Nelson to be
especially watchful of his northern flank,
but added that if his own position be-
came untenable he should withdraw at
dark behind the Our. About 1515 Nel-
son sent his executive officer, Lt. Col.
William F. Train, to the 28th Divi-
sion command post with orders to report
personally on the regiment’s position.
Cota, as it turned out, already had
phoned the corps commander and asked
permission to bring the 112th back to
the high ground west of the river. Gen-
eral Middleton agreed, but with the pro-
viso that the regiment should remain
close enough to the river to deny an en-
emy crossing.
Although this final word seems to
have reached Ouren about 1600, Colonel
Nelson did not act immediately on the
order because he still had hopes that
the entrapped 1st Battalion could be

FIFTH PANZER ARMY ATTACKS 28TH INFANTRY DIVISION 203
reached. The 3d Battalion, fighting most-
ly against infantry, had held its own
through the day, aided greatly by the
possession of the pillbox line, far
stronger than the defensive positions in
the 1st Battalion sector. Then, too, the
2d Battalion had once again used the
stone bridge south of Ouren to launch a
counterattack across the river and, dur-
ing the afternoon, materially restored
the 3d Battalion positions. But the Ger-
man tanks were fanning out as the day
drew to a close, turning attention to the
south as well as the west. Patrols could
not reach the 1st Battalion and at dusk
the 3d Battalion reported that the pan-
zers finally were in position to rake
its ridge defenses with fire from the
north–the pillbox line no longer was
tenable. Colonel Nelson gave the order
to withdraw behind the river under
cover of darkness.
The regimental command post staff
left Ouren even while the enemy was
filtering into the village and moved to
Weiswampach. The speed of the Ger-
man attack caught most of the regimen-
tal medical company and troops from
the headquarters and cannon com-
panies. The 3d Battalion commenced
its withdrawal at 2200 under orders to
pull back through Ouren. Fortunately
Major Woodward, the battalion com-
manding officer, was suspicious of this
route. His suspicions were confirmed
when a patrol sent into the town failed
to return. The 3d Battalion then crossed
the river farther to the south, circled and
finally dug in along the Ouren-Weis-
wampach road, where its flank would be
covered by the refused line of the 2d Bat-
talion. A patrol which had been sent
from the 3d Battalion to carry the with-
drawal order to the 1st Battalion com-
mand post, still holding on at Harspelt,
failed to get through. Fortunately radio
contact was re-established from Weis-
wampach shortly after midnight and
the 1st Battalion was given orders to
withdraw through the former 3d Bat-
talion positions. Company B, on the ex-
treme north flank, had been forced
back into the 424th Infantry area, but
about 235 men withdrew cross-country
toward Ouren.
Near the village a patrol found that
the stone bridge was guarded by only
a half squad of Germans. The Ameri-
cans lined up in German formation and,
while an officer shouted commands in
German, marched boldly across the
bridge. The next morning Colonel Nel-
son was able to tell General Cota, “Very
good news. 1st Battalion has worked [its]
way back.” The little group from regi-
mental headquarters which had been de-
ployed on the ridge line at Ouren was
less successful. Completely surrounded
by the enemy, it had hoped to join the
withdrawal of the line companies. The
group never established contact, how-
ever, and most of its members were cap-
tured when they attempted to break
away the following morning.
Although the enemy had seized all
of the ground which the 112th Infantry
was occupying east of the Our and final-
ly had secured a bridgehead at Ouren,
the cost to him on 17 December had
been high. At least fifteen tanks had
been disabled or destroyed on the first
day and German sources indicate that
this figure may have doubled on the
17th. The Americans had taken 186
prisoners and killed or wounded two
or three times that number; the losses
in the 1130th Regiment were “very
high,” said the enemy reports. It is im-

204 THE ARDENNES: BATTLE OF THE BULGE
possible to give an accurate count of
losses in the 112th Infantry, but they
seem to have been moderate. Most mem-
bers of the 1st Battalion, for example,
eventually found their way back to the
regiment.
The degree of tactical success achieved
by the 112th Infantry and the fact that
it was able to hold intact as a regi-
ment may be explained by a number
of factors. The ground east of the river
was favorable to the defender, who was
well entrenched as the result of careful
planning and inspection by Nelson and
his staff, and whose guns covered the
few routes of mechanized advance. The
numerous pillboxes provided a substan-
tial amount of cover; the 3d Battalion,
for example, was not seriously endan-
gered until the attacking tanks maneu-
vered close enough for direct fire. The
refused positions of the 2d Battalion
allowed fairly free use of a regimental
reserve during both days and good
counterattack plans were ready. Equal-
ly important, the green 1130th Regiment
(incorporated into the 116th Panzer Di-
vision attack on the second day) had
failed to follow closely in the path of
the tanks and so gave American rifle-
men and machine gunners time to get
set after the tanks rolled past.
Even before the seizure of Ouren the
LVIII Panzer Corps had shifted its in-
terest to the south. By the second day
it was apparent that the combination
of stubborn resistance and poor ap-
proach roads would delay the projected
crossing at Ouren. The orders given
the 116th Panzer Division on the night of
16 December to switch to the left were
altered on the 17th to start its infantry
regiments marching still farther south
to the Dasburg bridgehead held by the
neighboring corps. Although delayed
by inadequate deliveries of POL and
the traffic jam on the damaged Dasburg-
Marnach road the entire division, in-
cluding its tank regiment, assembled
on the west bank around Heinerscheid
during the night of 17–18 December.
The main body of the 560th Volks Gren-
adier Division also had detoured around
the stubborn men and difficult ground
in the 112th Infantry area, extending
the bridgehead which the 1128th Regi-
ment had seized east of Heinerscheid on
17 December. Only the weakened
1130th Regiment and the division fusi-
lier company, once again in touch with
its fellows, were left behind to extend
the bridgehead formed at Ouren.
All this gave the 112th Infantry a
chance to get its breath on 18 December.
A few attacks were started against the
new American line, which now covered
Beiler, Lieler, and Lausdorn, but none
were energetic. Throughout the day the
American outposts watched masses of
foot troops and vehicles defile westward
through Heinerscheid, only some two
thousand yards to the south. The regi-
mental cannon company also provided
some interested spectators, who trained
their howitzers on Heinerscheid with
such good effect that enemy records take
rueful note of this harassing fire from
the north.
Communication between the 112th
and division headquarters had been
sketchy since 16 December, depending
on artillery radio nets and liaison of-
ficers. Early in the afternoon of 18 De-
cember a radio message finally arrived
at the division command post asking
that the regiment be given instructions.
General Cota had been trying through
most of the morning to reach Nelson

FIFTH PANZER ARMY ATTACKS 28TH INFANTRY DIVISION 205
with an order to hold in essentially the
positions which the regiment now occupied
. 17 But the situation east of Bastogne
was growing more precarious and
the division commander decided to
bring the 112th back to join in the defense
of Bastogne. About 1700 he radioed
new orders: the 112th Infantry
was to fight a stiff delaying action along
the line Weiswampach–Trois Vierges,
and thence toward Bastogne. Two hours
later the 112th Infantry acknowledged
receipt of these instructions.
Colonel Nelson decided to pull back
through Huldange since enemy tanks
were known to be in Trois Vierges.
Early on 19 December the 112th Infantry
and 229th Field Artillery Battalion
moved under cover of a heavy
fog and assembled without hindrance
around Huldange, the defensive front
now facing south. Here Nelson received
a message from the 28th Division which
ordered the regiment to hold the line
Lausdorn-Weiswampach-Beiler, which
the 112th Infantry had just abandoned.
Colonel Nelson at this moment had
two contradictory orders and would
have to risk his regiment if he carried
out either.
Through the roundabout artillery
channels he asked permission to join
the 106th Infantry Division, only a little
distance away to the north. Nelson
also reported to General Jones at Vielsalm
and set the problem before him.
Jones attached the 112th Infantry to
his own division on the spot, assuring
Nelson that he would assume full responsibility.
The sequence of events in
17 Cota was acting on orders from the VIII
Corps commander who wished to deny the enemy
the use of Highway N 26, the main paved road
from the south into St. Vith.
this story of difficulties in command and
communication is none too clear, but
the VIII Corps commander approved the
attachment. On the morning of the 20th
Jones ordered the regiment to sideslip
back to the east, reoccupy Beiler, and
dig in along the east-west ridge line,
Leithum-Beiler-Malscheid. Thus de-
ployed on the right of the 424th Infan-
try, the 112th was another piece filling
out the fast developing “island defense”
of St. Vith.
The Fall of Wiltz
The total impact of the severe Ger-
man blows dealt the 110th Infantry in
the late afternoon and evening of 17
December was not felt at the division
and corps headquarters for several hours.
Information on the hard-pressed battal-
ions and their companies was sketchy
and secondhand. At 2013 General Cota
phoned the VIII Corps commander to
say that the situation was critical, that
routes were open for the German tanks
to come through, and that “there is
some question in regard to the 110th
Infantry CP.” He added, however, that
he had “three battalions now trying
to counterattack from Clerf to Mar-
nach.” (By this hour, of course, the
story was quite different: the 1st Bat-
talion was cut to pieces, most of the
2d Battalion was surrounded, and the
3d Battalion was holding at Consthum
and Hosingen only by the skin of its
teeth.)
The corps commander was loath to
yield ground to the enemy. Nonethe-
less he advised Cota to withdraw the
110th back of the Clerf, that “under the
circumstances it was necessary.” Further-
more, Middleton instructed Cota to use

206 THE ARDENNES: BATTLE OF THE BULGE
his tanks and tank destroyers to block
the roads west of the river.
The 28th Division commander agreed
to pull back where he could, but by
the morning of the 18th it was apparent
that to re-establish any sort of front be-
hind the Clerf was impossible. The
bridges at Clerf and Wilwerwiltz were
in German hands (no preparations had
been made to destroy them); most of
the sixty tanks committed in the central
sector were destroyed. No help could
be expected from either the right or left
wing regiments in shoring up the divi-
sion center. The 109th Infantry was
losing ground on its north flank and soon
would be forced back fanwise into the
9th Armored Division zone. The 112th
Infantry south wing was giving way un-
der heavy attack, and during the day all
communications between the regiment
and division were lost.
Miscellaneous troops of the 110th In-
fantry had joined with units of Com-
bat Command R of the 9th Armored
Division (briefly under operational con-
trol of the 28th Infantry Division) to
defend along the main road to Bastogne
in the area west of Clerf. The respon-
sibility for command here was assumed
directly by the VIII Corps. General
Cota, as a result, decided to concen-
trate what was left to him-headquar-
ters troops, engineers, stragglers, and
the handful of organized units moving
back from across the Clerf–in defense
of Wiltz, the 28th Division command
post. This sizable town lay in a bend of
the Wiltz River valley, southwest of
Clerf and some three miles away from
the enemy-held crossings at Wilwerwiltz.
Next to the paved through highway via
Clerf, the Wiltz valley offered the best
avenue westward. The road center at
Wiltz and the bridges there were only
about twelve miles from Bastogne. It
would be natural, therefore, for the
Germans debouching from the Wilwer-
wiltz bridgehead to defile through the
Wiltz valley.
About 1000 on 18 December, Gen-
eral Cota received the welcome word
that a combat command of the 10th Ar-
mored Division was moving forward to
his assistance, probably to be in position
to give support by the late afternoon.
Middleton had ordered the 44th Engi-
neer Combat Battalion (Lt. Col.
Clarion J. Kjeldseth) to Wiltz on the
previous evening with about six hundred
men (it had been operating sawmills
and rock crushers, working on roads,
and the like). This unit now relieved
the provisional battalion, hastily formed
from the 28th Division headquarters,
by setting up positions north and east
of the town. There were also avail-
able some tanks and guns to help the
engineers, bandsmen, telephone line-
men, and paymasters who composed the
defense. All that remained of the 707th
Tank Battalion-some six crippled tanks
and five assault guns–was gathered
in Wiltz after a rear guard action in
Wilwerwiltz. Six three-inch towed tank
destroyers from the 630th Tank De-
stroyer Battalion, weapons of the 447th
Antiaircraft Battalion, and light ar-
mored cars of the 28th Reconnaissance
Troop reinforced the perimeter.
Southeast of the town the undergunned
batteries of the 687th Field Artillery
Battalion held firing positions along the
road, sited to cover the Wiltz perimeter
or support the 3d Battalion, 110th In-
fantry, fighting at Consthum.
It will be recalled that the troops at
Consthum held the 901st Panzer Grena-

FIFTH PANZER ARMY ATTACKS 28TH INFANTRY DIVISION 207
dier Regiment at bay until the after-
noon of 18 December and, even as they
withdrew, continued to block the road
to Wiltz. The northern regiment of the
Panzer Lehr Division, the 902d, made
better progress. The capitulation of the
gallant garrison at Hosingen, during
the morning, removed this threat to
the 902d supply road. The 26th Vollzs
Grenadier Division, having completed its
initial mission by seizing an undamaged
bridge across the Clerf at Drauffelt dur-
ing the night, made way for the Panzer
Lehr Division to strike for Bastogne.
The Panzer Lehr Reconnaissance Bat-
talion, earlier withdrawn from the fight
at Holzthum, reverted to its parent
command and crossed the river first.
The 902d, advancing by way of Muns-
hausen, now cleared of Americans, fol-
lowed. Despite harassing fire from
American guns and mortars the Ger-
mans moved swiftly. At the crossroads
east of Eschweiler the Reconnaissance
Battalion turned to the left and bore
down on Wiltz. The 902d, led in person
by the division commander, continued
toward the west, although briefly de-
layed in a fight with a few towed anti-
tank guns and armored cars near Esch-
weiler. 18
German field guns, by this time west
of the Clerf, opened fire on Wiltz at
noon. Two hours later tanks and self-
propelled guns struck the 44th Engi-
neers, which was outposting the little
hamlets northeast of Wiltz. A section
of tank destroyers, supporting the for-
ward outpost, was overrun by the more
18 The Americans lost four tank destroyers and
eight armored cars. It would appear they were
surprised by the speed of the German advance;
the enemy assault was being made by bicycle
troops.
mobile German tanks, but the engineers
held their fire for the German infantry
on the heels of the panzers and then
cut loose, with satisfying results. The
American howitzers, south of Wiltz, al-
so took a hand in slowing the German
attack. But the enemy armor weight was
too heavy, nor could it be checked by
the handful of tanks and light assault
guns remaining to the 707th Tank Bat-
talion. By dusk the American line had
been pushed back nearly to Wei-
dingen when orders came to withdraw
behind the Wiltz River and destroy
the bridge at Weidingen. For some rea-
son the bridge was not blown. But the
pressure on the Wiltz perimeter relaxed
briefly as the Panzer Lehr Reconnais-
sance Battalion turned back toward
the north to rejoin its division in the
race for Bastogne. Infantry of the 26th
Volks Grenadier Division took over the
attack on the northeast (probably the
39th Volks Grenadier Regiment) .
On German operations maps Wiltz
lay athwart the boundary which divided
the attack zones of the XLVII Panzer
Corps and the LXXXV Corps. On
19 December the right wing division
of the latter, the 5th Parachute Divi-
sion, took over the attack on Wiltz, or
perhaps more accurately, drifted into a
fight for the town. On the evening of
the 18th Col. Ludwig Heilmann, com-
mander of the 5th Parachute Division,
knew that the divisions on his right
and left were well ahead of his
own. In fact the troops of the 26th
Volks Grenadier Division sent against
Wiltz from the northeast were acting
under orders to protect the flank and
rear of Panzer Lehr against possible
American counterattack from the Wiltz
valley. Heilmann, therefore, had decid-

208 THE ARDENNES: BATTLE OF THE BULGE
ed to bypass Wiltz on 19 December with
his entire division but now found that
he could not get his regiments back in
hand. The 5th Parachute Division commander
had already experienced great
difficulty in maintaining control of his
units in action. His staff and regimental
commanders, appointees of Generaloberst
Kurt Student, had formed a
clique against the previous commander
and were hostile to Heilmann. 19 Furthermore,
troops and troop leaders were
poorly trained, coming as they had only
recently from Luftwaffe ground units.
Even on the first day of the offensive
one of Heilmann’s regiments had been
lost for several hours. This experience,
events would show, had borne little
fruit.
On the morning of 19 December the
headquarters of the 28th Infantry
Division transferred from Wiltz to Sibret,
southwest of Bastogne. The provisional
battalion which had been recruited
from the headquarters staff remained
in Wiltz. Meanwhile General
Cota had ordered Colonel Strickler to
move in the 3d Battalion, 110th Infantry,
from Nocher. The battalion, perhaps
200 strong, arrived in Wiltz about
noon and Strickler assumed command
of the forces in the town. During the
morning the 26th Volks Grenadier Division
engaged in desultory action, moving
troops around to the north. Since the
Wiltz bridge had not been destroyed,
the American assault gun platoon was
ordered back to Erpeldange, covering
19 The so-called Parachute Army had developed
originally as a partisan and personal creation of
Goering. As a result it was ridden with politics.
The account of Heilmann’s difficulties is in MS
# B–023, 5th Parachute Division, 1 December
1944–12 January 1945 (Generalmajor Ludwig
Heilmann) .
the northeastern approach to the bridge
and the engineer outposts. Four of
the 707th tanks that had been crippled
the previous day were drawn up on the
ridge east of Wiltz to give what help
they might as more or less stationary
artillery. The Americans were not too
worried by the flanking move because
tanks of the 10th Armored Division
were expected momentarily.
The German infantry on the north
side of town aligned for the assault
about 1400. A sharp attack drove a pro-
visional platoon, made up from the 28th
Division band, off the high ground to
the northwest, thus exposing the engi-
neer line. The 44th was hit from the
northeast and east by infantry armed
with machine pistols charging in along-
side single tanks. As American riflemen
and machine gunners cut down the Ger-
man assault teams, they saw their own
ranks thinning. In this fight the cross-
roads near Erpeldange changed hands
four times. The assault gun platoon
gave good support wherever the line
was threatened, but by the end of the
afternoon its fuel and ammunition
were nearly gone and the gunners, after
four days of nearly continuous action,
were approaching complete exhaustion.
When darkness finally came, the 44th
withdrew with the assault guns into
Wiltz, having lost four officers and 150
men. This time the bridge was blown.
On orders, the three remaining assault
guns went back to cover the wrecked
structure. Their fate is unknown.
While elements of the 26th Volks
Grenadier Division were attacking on
the north side of the Wiltz, detachments
of the 5th Parachute Division struck the
American perimeter on the south and
southeast. This timing might seem to

FIFTH PANZER ARMY ATTACKS 28TH INFANTRY DIVISION 209
indicate a co-ordinated attack. In fact
it represented Heilmann’s failure to
gain control of his division, for the or-
ders were to bypass Wiltz. The division
advance guard from the 15th Parachute
Regiment (supposedly on its way to
capture Sibret) somehow became con-
fused, wandered away northward, and
about 1500 struck the 687th Field Artil-
lery Battalion, whose batteries had dis-
placed to a road angling southeast from
the town. 20 Battery A met the tanks
leading the German column with direct
fire, disabled or destroyed them, and
briefly slowed the advance toward Wiltz.
But menaced as they were, the artil-
lery commander could not risk his how-
itzers further. Battery B fired its few
remaining rounds to cover the other bat-
teries, the battalion assembling during
the evening at a crossroad southeast
of Harlange.
By nightfall the American perimeter
had been pierced at many points and
the defenders pushed back into the cen-
ter of Wiltz. Most of the tanks and
assault guns were out of action, there
were insufficient machine guns to cover
the final protective line, radio commun-
ication between the desperate units was
practically nonexistent, searchlight rays
glancing from the low clouds lighted
the path of the attackers, and ammuni-
tion was running very low.
Attempts during the evening to send a
task force of stragglers and trains for-
ward from the 28th Division headquar-
20 The American infantry gave high praise to
the 687th for its part in this fight. Colonel Strick-
ler later said of the gunners, “a magnificent job
by some magnificent men.” Recognized as out-
standing even in this band was S/Sgt. William J.
Bennett of Battery C, who was awarded the DSC.
ters at Sibret were abortive; the roads
east to Wiltz now were blocked every
few kilometers by enemy infantry and
self-propelled guns.
On the ridges which look down over
Wiltz more Germans appeared in the
early evening, apparently eager to be
in at the kill. The 14th Parachute Regi-
ment, which had been moving slowly
westward (the 5th Parachute Division
commander ascribed its dilatory move-
ment to the habit of attacking small
villages in order to have billets for the
cold December nights), entered the
fight via a climb onto the eastern ridge
overlooking the town. At least a third
of the 5th Parachute Division was finally
engaged at Wiltz contrary to Heilmann’s
orders.
Colonel Strickler decided to evacuate
Wiltz by infiltration and regroup at
Sibret, but with the Germans pressing
in from all sides and no means of reach-
ing his units except by runner the actual
withdrawal would be difficult to control.
It was his intention, however, to move
the provisional battalion first, leaving
the 3d Battalion to keep the escape
exits open while the 44th Engineers
acted as rear guard. The 687th Field Ar-
tillery Battalion pulled out to the south-
west and the 3d Battalion also started
to move, under the impression that this
was the plan. When orders finally ar-
rived to hold in place, the 3d Battalion
had reached a trident crossroad south-
west of the town. After a long wait the
battalion commanding officer, Major
Milton, went back into Wiltz to get fur-
ther orders; when he returned most of
his battalion had disappeared. With the
few troops remaining, Milton succes-
fully made his way cross-country to the
west.

210
The bulk of the provisional battalion,
inside Wiltz, started southwest an hour
or so before midnight, some on foot, the
rest riding on trucks, half-tracks, and
tank destroyers. A few hundred yards
had been traversed when, at the first
crossroad, the leading half-track ran into
a patch of mines laid in front of a Ger-
man roadblock and exploded. An un-
identified crew of a 447th Antiaircraft
Artillery half-track drove straight onto
the mines, its .50-caliber fire searching
out the enemy riflemen. The half-track
was demolished, but the field had been
THE ARDENNES: BATTLE OF THE BULGE
WILTZ
exploded and the covering infantry
cleared away.
As the column turned northwest on
the main Bastogne highway enemy fire
increased; some in the column turned
back from the gantlet in hopes of finding
another escape route by retracing their
steps through Wiltz. About four and a
half miles west of the town, a second
block was encountered and a German
self-propelled gun lashed out at the lead
vehicles while machine gunners blazed
away from positions around it. A platoon
of Negro troops came to the head of the

FIFTH PANZER ARMY ATTACKS 28TH INFANTRY DIVISION 211
column and, attacking through the dark
with grenades and bayonets, cleared the
position.
Only a short distance beyond, at
a third block, fire swept into the col-
umn from all sides. This was the end:
shots, blazing vehicles, and screaming
wounded. Those who could left the road,
scattering in small parties into the dark.
In the darkness and confusion many
stragglers made their way into Bastogne
and Vaux-lez-Rosières. (Strickler made
it to the latter point where General Cota
placed him in charge of the defense.)
Farther to the south the 687th Field
Artillery Battalion was surrounded at a
crossroad about seven miles from Wiltz.
The gunners and their attached antiair-
craft artillery unit made a stand with
their carbines, Colts, and a few .50-cali-
ber machine guns. For nearly two hours
enemy flares methodically picked out
targets for mortar and bullet fire, while
the Americans were so closely beset that
the Bofors and murderous quad mounts
could not retaliate without cutting down
their own people. Only three of the
howitzers left could be withdrawn and
losses among the cannoneers and drivers
were high. The 44th Combat Engineers,
the rear guard unit at Wiltz, probably
suffered most, the enemy accounting for
18 officers and 160 men during the final
withdrawal.
The fall of Wiltz ended the 28th Divi-
sion's delaying action before Bastogne.
Other American troops now had to take
over the actual defense of that all-im-
portant road center, but without the
gallant bargain struck by the 110th In-
fantry and its allied units–men for
time–the German plans for a coup-de-
main at Bastogne would have turned to
accomplished fact. 21 The cost had been
high, much higher than American units
expected to pay at this stage of the war:
the 110th Infantry virtually destroyed,
the men and fighting vehicles of five
tank companies lost, the equivalent of
three combat engineer companies dead
or missing, and tank destroyer, artillery,
and miscellaneous units engulfed in this
battle. In the last analysis the losses in-
flicted on the enemy may have equaled
those sustained by the Americans–cer-
tainly the Germans paid dearly for their
hurried frontal attacks against stone-
walled villages and towns–but the final
measure of success and failure would be
in terms of hours and minutes won by
the Americans and lost to the enemy.
21 This gallant feat was recognized fully at the
time by General Middleton and its importance
later emphasized in the VIII Corps after action
report for December 1944.

CHAPTER IX
The Attack by the German Left Wing
16-20 December
Hitler’s hope of victory rode with his
two panzer armies. He was confident
that the Allies would not be able to re-
act in a forceful way until these armies
were across the Meuse and it would
appear that he expected this reaction to
take the form of a counterattack some-
where on the west bank of that river.
Under no circumstances was he pre-
pared to diminish the main striking
force in order to build up strong pro-
tection for the German flanks during the
advance east of the Meuse. The assign-
ment of four infantry divisions to cover
the southern flank of the assault armies
was as far as he would go, nor could the
numerous pleas advanced by his field
commanders for additional strength in
the south alter his decision one whit.
Despite the poverty of forces allotted
Brandenberger’s Seventh Army, the
Fuehrer was prepared, as always, to ex-
pect the impossible. At one point in the
planning period Hitler envisaged these
four divisions as forming a blocking line
all the way from the German frontier to
Charleville on the Meuse. Both Jodl and
Model resisted this idea, but when the
counteroffensive began there were still
rather vague plans afoot for employing
the Seventh Army in a push west and
south to form a position based on Lux-
embourg City, Arlon, and Neufchâteau.
Hitler likewise attempted to intervene
in the initial assault plans of the Seventh
Army by directing that the attack would
start as a pincers move in which one
prong shot west out of Trier and the
other penetrated northwest of Echter-
nach. Jodl and Model again acted as a
team in killing this idea, pointing out
that the Seventh Army had neither the
troops nor the guns to support two
separate attacks. It is clear that through-
out the planning phase Jodl took a
realistic view of the limited capability
of Brandenberger’s army. After the war
he admitted that the Wehrmachtfueh-
rungsstab would have been satisfied to
see the Seventh Army advance only half
the distance between Echternach and
Luxembourg City. 1
When Brandenberger and his chief of
staff, Generalmajor Rudolf Freiherr von
Gersdorff, finally were allowed to map
their own scheme of maneuver they
settled on a containing mission for the
two infantry divisions in the left corps
(General der Infanterie Franz Beyer’s
LXXX Corps), and an advance by the
two infantry divisions on the right which
comprised General der Infanterie Bap-
tist Kniess’s LXXXV Corps. Beyer’s
troops, in this final plan, had the mission
1 ETHINT–51, OKW, Ardennes Offensive (Gen-
eraloberst Alfred Jodl) .

ATTACK BY GERMAN LEFT WING: 16–20 DECEMBER 213
of establishing a bridgehead at Echter-
nach on the Sauer River, then undertak-
ing a limited advance to the southwest.
The LXXXV Corps was given orders to
cross the Our River, north of its juncture
with the Sauer, and advance on a west-
ward axis parallel to that of the Fifth
Panzer Army. If all went well one of the
two divisions would come to a halt in a
blocking position around Arlon, south of
Bastogne.
Brandenberger would have to rely in
the main on his artillery if the Seventh
Army was to hold its position at the
shoulder of the counteroffensive against
any strong attack from the south. One of
the first objectives, therefore, would be
to neutralize or destroy the American
artillery groupments, and for this pur-
pose the army was given a few batteries
of the new, long-range 120-mm. guns.
The total artillery strength available in
the army was 319 guns and 108 rocket
projectors. When it came to close and
mobile support for the assault Branden-
berger’s divisions would be in a bad way;
there were only thirty assault guns in
the army and half of these were with
the 5th Parachute Division on the right
wing.
At 0530 on the morning of 16 Decem-
ber the guns and rocket projectors of the
German Seventh Army opened fire, sig-
naling the attack across the Our and
Sauer Rivers. The sector in which the
Seventh Army would advance, as flank
guard for the two panzer armies carrying
the weight of the main counteroffensive,
was weakly held. Only small local re-
serves were at hand to reinforce the
vastly outnumbered American troops
facing the four divisions under General
Brandenberger’s command. The north-
ern limit of the Seventh Army attack
coincided with the north boundary of
the 109th Infantry Regiment (28th In-
fantry Division) near Stolzembourg; its
southern limit was roughly the same as
the southern boundary of the 12th In-
fantry Regiment (4th Infantry Division)
near the confluence of the Sauer and
Moselle Rivers.
Along this winding front, a distance
of some thirty miles, the opponents
would be matched at the first shock
approximately as follows. On the north
wing of the Seventh Army the 5th Para-
chute Division would cross the Our and
strike the 2d Battalion of the 109th In-
fantry. The boundary between the 109th
and 110th ran obliquely, however, and
in consequence the 5th Parachute
would shortly engage troops of the latter
regiment. Next in line on the Our the
352d Volks Grenadier Division would
cross into the zone held by the 3d Bat-
talion of the 109th. South of the village
of Wallendorf, where the Our flows into
the Sauer, the 276th Volks Grenadier
Division would push into the narrow
segment of the Sauer front held by the
60th Armored Infantry Battalion of the
9th Armored Division (-), then fan out
against the left flank of the 12th Infantry.
The 212th Volks Grenadier Division,
acting as the southern pivot for the entire
German counteroffensive, would cross
the Sauer in the Echternach sector and
drive head on against the 12th Infantry. 2
(Map V)
2 The chief German source for the Seventh Army
operations is MS # A–876, Ardennes Offensive of
Seventh Army, 16 December 1944–25 January 1945
(General der Panzertruppen Erich Branden-
berger). The corps accounts are in MSS #
B–030, LXXXV Corps, 1 December 1944–10 Janu-
ary 1945 (General der Infanterie Baptist Kniess)
and B–081, LXXX Corps, 13 September 1944–23
March 1945, Part Two (General der Infanterie
Dr. Franz Beyer). The individual divisions are

214
The 109th Infantry Defense on the
Sauer and Our Rivers
16–20 December
The 109th Infantry, led by Lt. Col.
James E. Rudder, a former Ranger com-
mander, was close to full strength, al-
though, like the rest of the 28th Divi-
sion, its rifle companies were filled by
replacements with limited experience
and training. The division commander
had considered that the enemy might
make a “distracting” attack toward Die-
kirch and Ettelbruck, in an attempt to
cut the road and rail lines running north
from the city of Luxembourg, and had
disposed the 109th accordingly. On the
division south flank, the 3d Battalion
(Lt. Col. Jim H. McCoy) was allotted
a four-mile front, but had concentrated
men and weapons in an almost contin-
uous 3,000-yard defense line along the
heights in the triangle formed by the
Our and Sauer Rivers which overlooked
the valley road west to Ettelbruck. On
this road the 1st Battalion (Lt. Col.
H. R. Williams) lay in reserve at Die-
kirch, with two field artillery battalions,
the 107th and 108th, emplaced close to
that town. The 2d Battalion sector to
the north was over five miles in width.
In this weak portion of the line, defense
was based on two strongpoints of rifle
company strength, one on a ridge road
about a mile and a half west of Vianden
covered in MSS # A–930, A–931, 212th Volks
Grenadier Division–Ardennes, 16 December 1944–25
January 1945 (Generalleutnant Franz Sensfuss) ;
B–023 (Heilmann) ; B–067, 352d Volks Grenadier
Division, 16 December 1944–25 January 1945 (Gen-
eralmajor Erich Schmidt) ; B–073 212th Volks
Grenadier Division, Ardennes (Generalleutnant
Franz Sensfuss) ; and P–032f, Ardennes Project
(Generalmajor Hugo Dempwolff). LIII Corps’ KTB
covers the first hours of action but ends with 17
December.
THE ARDENNES: BATTLE OF THE BULGE
and the Our River, the other at Führen
about a mile from the river. These
strongpoints were nearly two miles
apart; behind them the third rifle com-
pany was located in reserve at Branden-
burg with one howitzer battery to give
support. Some distance back from the
river the 2d Battalion (Maj. William J.
Maroney) maintained a series of seven
outposts watching the German fortifica-
tions on the eastern bank.
During the two nights prior to 16
December the 5th Parachute Division
moved its regiments into these east bank
fortifications and the extensive woods
which lay just to the rear. The 5th Para-
chute Division had its full complement
of officers and men, but lacked its anti-
tank battalion (which had lost much
equipment to air attack en route from
Holland) and its mortar battalion. Colo-
nel Heilmann, who had recently taken
over the division, was not too sanguine as
to its ability or state of training as a unit.
He relied on the 15th Parachute Regi-
ment, the 5th Parachute Engineer Bat-
talion, and the attached 11th Assault
Gun Brigade, which were well trained
and motorized, to furnish the main
striking force. The division artillery
lacked the motors to accompany a rapid
advance, and fire support would be given
by the assault guns and a regiment of
Volks artillery. The latter was horse-
drawn but expected to motorize with
captured American vehicles.
Only a few days before the attack
Heilmann warned Model that the 5th
Parachute Division was only a Class IV
outfit, but Model, who by now must have
been surfeited with complaints on lack
of equipment and insufficient training,
merely replied that success would be won
by the paratroopers’ “usual audacity.”

ATTACK BY GERMAN LEFT WING: 16–20 DECEMBER 215
Perhaps Model did not care to recognize
that the paratroopers in this once elite
division had been replaced by meagerly
trained Luftwaffe ground troops and
Navy battalions. Lacking experienced
fighting men and the heavy weapons
requisite for close support, Heilmann in-
structed his line officers to avoid pitched
battles for defended positions. After all,
the goal to be reached by the night of
16 December was near the town of Wiltz
some ten miles west of the Our. There-
fore the 5th Parachute Division plan
called for a quick and unopposed cross-
ing at the Our; a bridge to be in at Roth
by midafternoon of the first day; a rapid
advance past the villages where the weak
American forces were located; and a
lightning stroke to force the crossing sites
near Wiltz.
If this plan were successful the 5th
Parachute Engineer Battalion would
ferry the assault companies across the
Our, then join the advance and reach the
Wiltz sector with ferrying equipment by
the end of the first day. The 14th Para-
chute Regiment had orders to cross the
Our in the north near Stolzembourg,
drive past Putscheid and seize a crossing
point on the Wiltz someplace west of
Hoscheid. To the south the 15th Para-
chute Regiment was intended to cross
the Our at Roth (named as the main
divisional bridge site), seize the high
ground near Vianden, then establish a
bridgehead over the Sure at Bourscheid.
The task of erasing such American units
as might be left in the towns and villages
was given the 13th Parachute Regiment,
which had no transport and would be
brought forward with the bulk of the
heavy weapons once the Our bridge was
in. Since the Seventh Army had ordered
each of its divisions to commence the
attack with only two battalions, spear-
headed by single shock companies, the
initial transfer to the far bank of the Our
would be a gradual process (and would,
as it proved, lead the Americans to be-
lieve that the first Germans across were
only patrols) . Nonetheless, Heilmann
hoped that the vehicles of the 13th
Parachute Regiment and the self-
propelled 75-mm. guns of the 11th As-
sault Gun Brigade would be across the
Our River before the close of the first
day, for he counted on these two units
to lead the advance to the division ob-
jective south of Bastogne.
The second German division assem-
bled opposite the 109th Infantry was the
352d Volks Grenadier Division (Col.
Erich Schmidt) . The boundary point be-
tween the latter and its northern neigh-
bor was fixed about a half-mile south of
Roth, but for some reason the precise
extension of the boundary line west of
the Our had not been settled. As a result
complications would arise once the 5th
Parachute Division and the 352d Volks
Grenadier Division advanced beyond the
river. The 352d had full ranks, mostly
from the Luftwaffe and Navy, but lacked
training and veteran noncoms. Its artil-
lery regiment contained four battalions,
but was mostly horse-drawn and woefully
short of radio equipment. There were
only six assault guns in the divisional
company. On the night of 12 December
the 352d pulled out of the long line be-
tween Stolzembourg and Bollendorf
which then comprised the division front
and re-formed in the woods east of the
Our, leaving only a small security force
to screen the movements of the divisions
moving up on the right and left. When
the 109th Infantry sent a large combat
patrol across at Vianden on the morning

216
of the 14th, the Americans therefore
found no enemy.
The night before the attack the 352d
marched back to the new and narrow
sector on the river from which the jump-
off would be made: the 915th Regiment
on the right, the 916th on the left, and
the 914th, which had furnished the cov-
ering force, in reserve. Thus poised, the
assault regiments would cross the Our on
either side of Gentingen, with orders to
bypass defended villages, seize the dom-
inant heights in the Sauer-Our triangle,
and drive as far as the Sauer bridges at
Ettelbruck–all this on the first day of the
attack. In total, then, two German divi-
sions and the metal of the LXXXV
Corps’ artillery were to be thrown
against the 109th Infantry and neighbor-
ing troops of the 110th Infantry in the
first hours of the great counteroffensive.
There were nearly three hundred
tubes and projectors in the LXXXV
Corps groupment which opened fire at
0530 on 16 December. These pieces were
laid on targets deep in the 109th In-
fantry zone: notably Diekirch, Basten-
dorf, the ridge road running north from
Ettelbruck across the rear of the 28th
Division, and the command posts of the
two artillery battalions. It would seem
that the German gunners were firing by
the map (there had been numerous
changes of position in this area which
were unknown to German intelligence)
and the opening barrage shortly dwin-
dled away to occasional salvos without
inflicting much damage or disrupting
communications. ‘With the first sound of
gunfire the assault companies pushed
their rubber boats into the Our, only
some fifty feet wide, and the engineers
began swinging the portable infantry
THE ARDENNES: BATTLE OF THE BULGE
bridges into position over the shallow
but turbulent river.
The 109th outposts on the far bank
of the Our could see little in the half-
light of the foggy morning. Some were
quietly bypassed as the German shock
companies moved quickly inland.
Others, closer to the crossing sites, were
assaulted by small detachments. Thus
the 5th Parachute Division engineers
wiped out the 2d Battalion outpost in
the château ruins at Vianden before any
warning could be sent out. The Amer-
icans fired flares onto the east bank in an
attempt to discover the purpose be-
hind the heavy concentration of
German artillery, but no certain
word of enemy troops reached the
109th command post at Ettelbruck
until about 0900 when Company B re-
ported that a 20-man patrol had as-
saulted the outpost near Hosdorf. This
advance detachment of the 916th Regi-
ment had hit head on into the contin-
uous and strongly defended right flank
position of the 109th Infantry on the
heights at the Sauer-Our triangle. By
this time, however, the German advance
parties farther north had passed through
the weak outpost line and were gathering
strength and momentum.
The situation in the 109th area devel-
oped as follows. The 14th Regiment,
composing the right of the 5th Parachute
Division advance, was moving along the
boundary between the 110th and the
109th without much opposition. In ac-
tual fact this regiment would “lean” on
the neighboring XLVII Panzer Corps,
which had struck into the center of the
28th Division, and through most of the
day lagged while the Panzer Corps
opened the way. To the south the 15th

ATTACK BY GERMAN LEFT WING: 16–20 DECEMBER 217
Regiment took advantage of the wide
gap between the two strongpoints
manned by Companies E and F of the
109th, its leading battalion marching
without a fight to Walsdorf, an unoccu-
pied village about two miles from the
river. This move particularly threatened
Company F, which was on the ridge road
three miles north of Bastendorf (the 2d
Battalion command post), and which
represented the northern linchpin of the
regiment. At 1000 Company G came up
from reserve at Brandenburg and was
put on the right of Company F.
For some reason the German force at
Walsdorf did not press its advantage.
The forward units of the 15th Regiment
were out of contact with the rest of the
5th Parachute Division, and the regi-
mental commander had difficulty in
holding his outfit together. At dusk, how-
ever, a second German battalion had
arrived at Walsdorf and was committed
to the southwest in a drive toward Bran-
denburg, slipping through a wooded de-
pression between Companies F and G.
Colonel Rudder dispatched Company C
from the reserve battalion at Diekirch to
check this penetration. But the company
reached Brandenburg shortly before
midnight without encountering the Ger-
mans.
The 15th Regiment drive through
Walsdorf marked the most extensive
penetration of the 109th Infantry posi-
tions on this first day. Farther south bat-
tle had been joined in bitter but incon-
clusive fighting. Company E, in Fuhren,
was bypassed by the German first thrust
to Walsdorf. This crossroads village lay
athwart the main road leading west from
the Roth bridgehead and furnished ob-
servation for the American batteries
firing on the crossing site. About 1100,
detachments from the 15th Regiment in
the north turned and brought Fuhren
under small arms fire. Radio communi-
cation with the menaced company was
lost three hours later, but direct assault
failed to dislodge the Americans.
Company E was further isolated by the
interposition of the 915th Regiment be-
tween Fuhren and the 3d Battalion. The
915th had crossed the Our near Bettel
and moved swiftly and unopposed up
the draws through the 2,000-yard gap be-
tween Rudder’s 2d and 3d Battalions.
Shortly after 1000 the German advance
guard was firing its burp guns into Bat-
tery A, 108th Field Artillery, east of
Diekirch. An hour or so before, the
American gunners had seen figures mov-
ing through the fog but mistook them
for Americans. By noon the 915th Regi-
ment held Longsdorf and Tandel, the
latter two miles from the Our, and had
patrols to the south only two thousand
yards from the main supply road linking
Diekirch and Bettendorf on which the
3d Battalion, deployed facing the Our,
depended.
Colonel Rudder called on the meager
armored reserve allotted him by Cota
(the 1st Platoon of Company C, 707th
Tank Battalion), sending it north from
Diekirch about 1300 to check the 915th
thrust. With the tanks went Company A,
shortly followed by Company B, the last
of the reserve battalion. The fight
through the afternoon was hard and the
Americans made little progress, but
shortly before nightfall the counter-
attack forged ahead; Company A and the
medium tanks came to the edge of Longs-
dorf and Company B occupied the high
ground between that village and Tan-
del. 3
3 During the advance by Company A, ad Lt.

218 THE ARDENNES: BATTLE OF THE BULGE
While the American counterattack
pushed in against the south flank of the
915th that regiment continued to work
its way southwest through the darkness,
establishing an advance position on the
ridge overlooking Bastendorf. The ex-
sailors who comprised this regiment had
moved fast and gained ground, but their
commander had been wounded, their
flanks were open, and communications
with the rest of the 352d were uncertain.
In fact this leading contingent of the
915th had shot its bolt and for the next
couple of days would take little part in
the battle. Nonetheless the Seventh
Army commander was well pleased with
the advance made by his right wing.
The 916th Regiment found the going
much more difficult than its northern sis-
ter regiment. Its opponent, the 3d Bat-
talion, was deployed on what for this
sector was a narrow front, well dug in on
the heights overlooking the Our and
with its right flank protected by the
Sauer. The initial German assault near
Hosdorf had provided the 109th with the
first confirmation of an enemy advance
west of the Our, but accomplished little
else. From excellent observation on the
heights the 107th and 108th Field Artil-
lery Battalions brought the howitzers
positioned near Diekirch into play, pin-
ning the German shock troops to the
river bank where they remained for the
rest of the day. True, one arm of the
352d was reaching north of the 3d Bat-
Samuel Leo silenced two enemy machine guns
with grenades and killed five Germans with his
rifle. He was given the DSC. On this day Pvt.
J. W. Jones made a lone attack upon a machine
gun which was firing directly at him; he destroyed
the weapon and its crew but then was cut down
by a second machine gun. Jones was awarded the
DSC.
talion, but the latter still blocked the
Sauer valley road and the direct ap-
proach to Diekirch and the Ettelbruck
bridges.
The 109th Infantry had held its posi-
tions in this first day, and Rudder saw no
cause for alarm since he occupied good
terrain. The hard fact remained that the
German infantry, masked by the acci-
dents of the rugged Our country, had
achieved considerable success in exploit-
ing the gaps between the village strong-
points. Also, the German armored ve-
hicles and heavy weapons, which had
been observed just at dark assembling
across the river facing Führen, had yet to
be encountered. The 109th commander,
under orders from General Cota that
“nobody comes back,” now had to re-
store contact between his companies and
get his regiment in position to meet the
next enemy move. The regiment could
expect little aid, for most of the slim
reserves of the 28th Division would go
to the hard-pressed 110th Infantry in the
center. But the 109th had one paramount
advantage in that the solid anchoring of
its right flank on the natural barrier pro-
vided by the Sauer permitted some free-
dom to concentrate on restoring the situ-
ation to the left. Colonel Rudder’s
reserves consisted of Company A, 103d
Engineer Battalion; Company C, 707th
Tank Battalion; the towed 3-inch guns
of Company A, 630th Tank Destroyer
Battalion; and his regimental antitank
company. By midnight a platoon of en-
gineers and some tank destroyers were
moving up to reinforce the attack
through Longsdorf to relieve the com-
pany at Führen. An additional tank
platoon was ready to add weight to a
second thrust toward Fuhren by way of
Tandel.

ATTACK BY GERMAN LEFT WING: 16–20 DECEMBER 219
At 0240 on the morning of 17 Decem-
ber the division commander phoned
Colonel Rudder and made an unex-
pected demand on his reserves. What
had happened was this. On the pre-
vious evening the force from the 5th
Parachute Division which had been mov-
ing along the boundary between the
109th and 110th reached the primary
ridge road (known to the Americans as
the Skyline Drive) which extended lat-
erally across the 28th Division sector
from Weiswampach to Ettelbruck. The
5th Parachute had rafted some light field
pieces and vehicles over the Our and a
few self-propelled guns that had negoti-
ated a way across on top of a weir near
Vianden were sent down the road to
Hoscheid. Meanwhile the left battalion
of the 14th Regiment had been ordered
to take Hoscheid. This movement in the
dark appeared to pose a threat to cut
off the 109th with an attack straight
south to Ettelbruck.
General Cota ordered the 109th com-
mander to get a platoon of tanks, mount
an infantry platoon on them, and “help
out up north where things are getting
hot.” Rudder immediately dispatched
this force, plus a few engineers, north-
ward on the Skyline Drive. In the mean-
time, however, the 2d Battalion of the
14th Parachute Regiment had cut the
road south of Hoscheid and the relief
force was checked within a thousand
yards of the village by enemy fire con-
centrated on a sharp bend in the road.
Hoscheid was garrisoned by part of the
110th Infantry Antitank Company, six
medium tanks mounting 105-mm.
howitzers (which the 707th Tank Bat-
talion had organized as an assault gun
platoon) and three regular mediums.
Through most of the 17th the de-
fenders held on against infantry attack
from the west and German assault
guns attacking from the north on the
Skyline Drive. Finally, about 1530, the
Hoscheid garrison received orders to
fight its way out and join the relief
force. These orders came too late, for
an hour and a half earlier this task force
had been ordered to the aid of a bat-
tery of the 107th Field Artillery north
of Diekirch. In Hoscheid the tanks were
running low on ammunition. When
night fell they loaded on the foot soldiers
and made a dash south to the 687th
Field Artillery command post at Lipper-
scheid, where they found that the bat-
teries were in process of displacing
across the Wiltz River. The Hoscheid de-
fenders joined the withdrawal westward
and subsequently reached the town of
Wiltz, there taking part in the defense
of the 28th Division command post. The
fight at Hoscheid, German prisoners
later reported, had cost the assaulting
battalion at least a hundred dead but,
more, it had helped delay the 14th Para-
chute Regiment advance to the Wiltz
River.
In the 109th sector proper the battle
during 17 December turned on attempts
to relieve Company E (Capt. R. W.
Cureton) at the crossroads in Führen.
The enemy was determined to take this
village, located as it was on the bound-
ary between the 5th Parachute Division
and the 352d Volks Grenadier Division.
Führen was attacked during the day by
troops of the 15th Parachute Regiment,
the 915th Regiment, and the 914th Reg-
iment. As might be expected there was
little co-ordination in this assault; fur-
thermore the Germans were forced to
divert much strength to meet the twin-
pronged American counterattack mov-

220
ing on Fuhren from the south. At day-
break Company A and its tank platoon
resumed attempts 10 break through
Longsdorf and open the road to Fuhren,
but by 0845 mortar and machine gun
fire had pinned down the infantry five
hundred yards short of Longsdorf. Com-
pany B, now missing the platoon sent
with the Moscheid task force, moved a
short distance along the road between
Tandel and Fuhren but likewise was
checked. The commander of Company
C, 707th Tank Battalion, took two of his
tanks from Longsdorf to aid the infantry
beyond Tandel, but a strong German
patrol slipped through a draw lying be-
tween Companies A and B and am-
bushed the tanks.
This German force, finally amounting
to a battalion of infantry and two tanks,
moved south during the morning until
it met the 109th Antitank Company,
which was dug in with a few engineers
and a single 40-mm. Bofors where the
Tandel and Longsdorf roads met. The
American 57-mm. antitank guns scored
“many hits” on the German tanks, but
as usual without effect, and two of the
guns were lost. The enemy infantry
proved more vulnerable, twenty-five be-
ing captured and a large number killed.
Although the penetration was
checked, the dual attempt to relieve
Fuhren made no headway. On the east
road Company A dwindled under bitter
fire. By midafternoon it numbered only
twenty-five men and an artillery ob-
server commander as the single officer
left. Company B again started up the
Tandel-Fuhren road, but the Germans
swept the road with bazooka and burp
gun fire from the ridges on either side
forcing the company to withdraw to
Tandel and ask for more infantry. All
THE ARDENNES: BATTLE OF THE BULGE
this while Company E had been under
attack in Fuhren, but with its own fire
greatly thickened by accurate artillery
concentrations the company held the en-
emy at bay. Late in the day Company
E radioed for ammunition and rations.
Colonel Rudder ordered a patrol sent
from Tandel under cover of night to
bring ammunition, but it failed to reach
Fuhren.
At other points the enemy strength
increased as the day wore on. The 352d
Volks Grenadier Division succeeded in
crossing a few tanks and assault guns,
as well as more light artillery. With
these heavy weapons the advance guard
of the reserve regiment, the 914th, ap-
peared on the west bank to take a hand
in the fight. On the north flank of the
109th Infantry a tank platoon attack east
of Brandenburg had restored the con-
nection between Companies F and G
early in the morning. But as the day
wore on German infantry and assault
guns poured into the Our bridgehead
and across the open flanks of the two
companies. Company F knocked out two
assault guns in a 5th Parachute column
with bazooka fire. Near Brandenburg
the American tank platoon destroyed
four assault guns belonging to the 352d.
But the German march to the west con-
tinued.
In the 3d Battalion sector, on the ex-
treme right flank, the enemy achieved
little success during the day and Ger-
man reports speak of “bloody fighting.”
Having failed to take the heights by
frontal assault, the 916th Regiment
started a flanking attack along the south
bank of the Sauer, moving for this pur-
pose into the zone of the 276th Volks
Grenadier Division, which thus far had
been held in check around Reisdorf and

ATTACK BY GERMAN LEFT WING: 16–20 DECEMBER 221
Bigelbach. Although there were no
American troops in the Sauer valley,
observers on the heights were able to
follow every move of the 916th. One
infantry officer, 1st Lt. E. L. Peer,
Company L, adjusted the fire of the sup-
porting howitzers “so effectively that an
estimated enemy infantry battalion was
destroyed.” With good wire and radio
communication, excellent observation
and a wealth of targets, the two artillery
battalions were able to fire 3,123 rounds
on 17 December, contributing particular-
ly to the defense of Fuhren and the
checkmate of the flanking movement by
the 916th.
As the day progressed, however, the
enemy spread through the rear areas
of the 109th and menaced the gun posi-
tions west of the Diekirch-Hoscheid
road. Battery A, 107th Field Artillery,
for example, had been harassed by fire
from small groups of Germans since
the previous midnight. By midafternoon
the 2d Battalion of the 915th Regiment,
which had bypassed Bastendorf earlier,
was pressing in on that battery and Bat-
tery A, 108th Field Artillery, em-
placed nearby. The gunners, fighting as
infantry, first beat off the approaching
Germans while a neighboring battery
blasted the woods east of the road in
which the enemy assembled.
Hard pressed as the day wore on, the
gunners were relieved by a series of
friendly sorties. Two motor carriages
mounting quadruple .50-caliber machine
guns (the M16) from the 447th Anti-
aircraft Artillery Battalion were put on
the Diekirch-Hoscheid road. One was
crippled by enemy fire, its driver and
loader wounded by a rifle grenade when
it drove squarely into the files of Ger-
man infantry on the road, guns blazing:
but the other fought its way north to
the beleaguered batteries. Lt. Col. James
C. Rosborough, commanding officer of
the 107th Field Artillery, meanwhile
gathered a scratch force and with it
fought through to the howitzer posi-
tions. (Rosborough was awarded the Dis-
tinguished Service Cross for gallantry in
this action.) About the same time the
tanks which had been in the Hoscheid
task force were ordered into the fight
and rolled from the north in on the
enemy. The batteries were saved, but
the positions from which the gunners
had given such heartening support to
the 109th were no longer tenable.
At the close of the second day the
109th still was holding tenaciously but
against increasingly heavy attack. All its
reserves were committed, and the larger
part of the attached company from the
630th Tank Destroyer Battalion had
been called away to defend the 28th Di-
vision command post at Wiltz. The gap
between the 2d and 3d Battalions in the
Longsdorf-Fuhren area had been
widened while the enemy column in the
north had driven deep between the
109th and 110th.
The German attacks suddenly gained
strength on the night of 17 December.
For two days the 5th Parachute Divi-
sion had operated with only such
heavy weapons as could be ferried
across the Our or maneuvered over the
Vianden wier, because for two days trou-
ble had dogged the bridge builders at
Roth. The selection of this particular
site had been forced upon the German
commander because it was the only point
at which the river had moderate banks
that could be reached by a passable ap-
proach road. On the east side of the
river. however, American bombers had

222
left a large bomb crater in the road
close to the Our. No work could be done
to fill the crater until the attack actually
began on 16 December. Bridging equip-
ment promised by the Seventh Army
had arrived late and inexperienced en-
gineers had further delayed the con-
struction. American artillery and mortar
fire also played its part in harassing the
bridge builders.
Finally, in the early evening of 17
December, the bridge was completed,
and the bulk of the assault gun brigade,
the antitank battalion, and the vehicles
of the 15th Parachute Regiment began
to roll, the division artillery and trains
lining up to await their turn. The 14th
Parachute Regiment, badly disorganized
in the series of village fights at Hoscheid
and elsewhere, was pulled together and
sent marching to the Clerf River. Here,
during the night, the 14th made a cross-
ing near Kautenbach, opening the way
to Wiltz and the west for the main forces
of the division. The higher German
headquarters no longer expected any
concerted resistance in front of the 5th
Parachute Division and attached its im-
mediate reserve, the 13th Parachute
Regiment, to the neighboring division
on the south.
This division, the 352d Volks Gren-
adier, also had met obstacles at the Our
River. Bridge work at Gentingen went
badly on the first day. Men and matériel
were lost when American howitzers and
mortars found the range. Handling
bridge sections in the swift current and
on the muddy river bottom was difficult
enough without this steady fire. The
approach roads on both sides of the river
were steep, curved, and mud slick. The
352d had been promised a Todt Bri-
gade for work on the roads and at the
THE ARDENNES: BATTLE OF THE BULGE
bridge, but the labor brigade never ap-
peared. A wooden support bridge was
finished at Gentingen late on 17 De-
cember, but the transfer of artillery and
motor vehicles would be very slow and
only a portion of the division’s heavy
weapons were west of the river by the
next morning.
Troops of the 914th Regiment had
arrived in the bridgehead late in the
day with orders to form a link between
the 915th and 916th, now widely sep-
arated, and to mop up the pockets of
American resistance wherever found.
But there was no contact between the
three German regiments when daylight
ended. The chief problem, however, was
not so much that of establishing a homo-
geneous front as of jarring the Americans
loose from the heights at the Sauer-Our
triangle. The defenders at this point
not only had stopped the left regiment
of the 352d Volks Grenadier Division
but also had helped check the right reg-
iment of the neighboring 276th Volks
Grenadier Division by laying fire across
the Sauer valley.
Resupply and evacuation were the
chief concern of the 109th Infantry on
the night of 17–18 December, particu-
larly the problem of getting ammuni-
tion to the tanks and Companies E and
F. Carrying parties were used and tanks
employed to bring up supplies and evac-
uate the wounded. The 2d Platoon of
the 707th’s Company C, supporting
Companies F and G of the 109th, was
refueled and resupplied during the
night. But the 1st and 3d Platoons could
not be reached because of enemy patrol
activity.
When day broke on 18 December the
109th Infantry was no longer in contact
with its northern foe, the 5th Parachute

ATTACK BY GERMAN LEFT WING: 16–20 DECEMBER 223
Division, because this division, under
peremptory orders from its commander,
had continued the westward advance
through the night, the forward troops
defiling into the Kautenbach bridgehead.
The 352d Volks Grenadier Division
was still on hand; it was approaching
full strength west of the Our and for
the first time could employ a number
of its heavier supporting weapons in
the attack. At dawn the 916th Regiment
launched the strongest assault yet leveled
at the 3d Battalion position on the
109th right flank, striking hard under
cover of smoke to break through at the
left of the battalion northwest of Hosdorf.
Early in the assault a platoon from
Company K was captured when its ammunition
gave out. Company E, which
had served to deflect some pressure from
the 3d Battalion by its stubborn defense
at Führen, was no longer in the fight.
No word had come from Führen since
2300 the previous evening. Company B,
sent up the Tandel road to reach Führen,
had paused at about the same hour
only a short distance from the village. 4
The next morning a patrol with a tank
and a jeep reached the edge of Fuhren,
but found the company command post
burned and no sign of American troops.
The loss of Company E and the platoon
from Company K made the 3d Battalion
position precarious. Meanwhile
the twenty-five men left in Company A
had withdrawn from the Longsdorf road
under cover of indirect fire laid down
by two tanks which formed a rear guard.
The tankers were shown how to give
4 The 109th Infantry AAR says of this incident:
“It is believed that if Company B had been more
aggressive in their attack to Fouhren [Fuhren],
they could have relieved the pressure on Company
E, permitting them to conduct a withdrawal.”
indirect fire by a forward observer from
the 107th Field Artillery Battalion. The
remnants of Company A joined the reg-
imental antitank company at road junc-
tion 206, the avenue by which enemy
vehicles had to move to cut the supply
road to the 3d Battalion, with orders
to “hold that road.” But in the north
there was no longer any question that
Companies F and G could hold on, iso-
lated as they were, along the road be-
yond Bastendorf. About 0900 the divi-
sion chief of staff gave Colonel Rudder
permission to withdraw the two com-
panies for use as a reserve. Under cover
of the attached tank platoon roadblock
at Bastendorf the companies fell back
to Diekirch.
During the afternoon the situation of
the 109th Infantry rapidly deteriorated.
At 1300 two Mark VI tanks appeared
on the Longsdorf road and with infantry
assistance attacked the vital road junc-
tion 206. In the fight that followed the
antitank company lost all six of its re-
maining 57-mm. guns, one of the three
tanks left with Company A was knocked
out by a direct hit, and a breakthrough
threatened momentarily. At 1410, while
the fight was in progress Colonel Rudder
asked for and received permission to pull
his regiment together on the high ground
around Diekirch; this withdrawal, how-
ever, already was in progress. Forty tons
of supplies and the hospital units were
moved first. At 1300 the tank platoon
at the battery positions on the Hoscheid
road hooked up the artillery pieces and
started south. By then the 2d Battalion
was moving from Bastendorf, under
small arms fire “from all directions.”
The 3d Battalion, last out, made its way
west along the Bettendorf road, which
already was under fire. During the late

224 THE ARDENNES: BATTLE OF THE BULGE
evening the assembly of the regiment at
Diekirch was completed, the 3d Battal-
ion and engineers blowing the bridges
at Bettendorf over which the enemy
might pass to the south bank of the
Sauer. With the river momentarily se-
cure at its back the regiment dug in
along an arc facing out from Diekirch.
But the 109th was no longer strong
enough to man a continuous defensive
line. Five hundred officers and men had
been lost in the three-day battle; of the
heavy infantry weapons only one section
of 81-mm. mortars and four sections of
heavy machine guns were left; the anti-
tank company had no pieces; the tank
company badly needed fuel and main-
tenance. But in these three days the reg-
iment had held the enemy short of
the Ettelbruck crossing and prevented
the planned concentration of the 352d
Volks Grenadier Division south of the
Sauer. That the 109th had used every
weapon at its disposal is shown by the
ammunition expenditure for these days:
280,000 rounds of small arms ammuni-
tion, 5,000 rounds of mortar, 3,000 gre-
nades, and 300 bazooka rounds. That
the 109th had disrupted the German
plans is witnessed by the fact that the
commander of the 352d was unable to
get his division in hand until 19 De-
cember, while the attack in force could
not be resumed until 20 December.
ETTELBRUCK

ATTACK BY GERMAN LEFT WING: 16–20 DECEMBER 225
The 109th Infantry, however, had
been forced back fanwise away from the
rest of the 28th Division. Its closest
friendly forces were those of CCA, 9th
Armored Division, now south and east
of the 109th across the Sauer. Colonel
Rudder, still under orders to fight for
time and space, was enjoined by General
Cota on the morning of 19 December
“not to recoil any further than the Sure
[Sauer] River.” The 109th, fortunately,
was given a few hours to rest and better
its defenses before the enemy continued
the advance to wipe out the Diekirch-
Ettelbruck bridgehead.
Early in the afternoon German guns
opened up on the Diekirch positions
(the artillery regiment of the 352d had
just come into position west of the Our),
and those elements of the 915th and
916th Regiments which the 352d com-
mander could personally gather were
thrown into a series of piecemeal as-
saults. For two hours the fight went back
and forth, 5 involving the 2d Battalion
on the Diekirch-Hoscheid road and
the 3d Battalion aligned on the ridge
east of Diekirch. Schmidt, the German
division commander, tried to lead
his troops forward and was seriously
wounded. When night came the fight
flared up once more, small groups of
the enemy probing for weak points while
artillery fire and searchlights were em-
ployed to guide the attack and distract
the defenders. Colonel Rudder phoned
the 28th Division chief of staff about
2000, told him that the 109th might be
5 When the antitank company was forced to pull
back to a new position, Capt. Paul F. Gaynor re-
mained alone to cover the withdrawal. He killed
eight Germans with his carbine, wounded several
ochers, then made a dash under fire across open
ground and rejoined his company. He was awarded
the DSC.
cut off and surrounded, and suggested
that he should pull his regiment back
to the southwest across the Sauer to cover
the left flank of the 9th Armored Divi-
sion. General Cota agreed that a further
withdrawal could be made but in-
structed Rudder to stay in his own zone
of action, that is, to make a withdrawal
to the west.
Fifteen minutes later the 28th Divi-
sion commander got in touch with
General Middleton, the VIII Corps com-
mander, and presented the alternatives
now facing the 109th Infantry. The
109th “could fight it out . . . and that
would be the end”; the regiment could
tie in closely with the 9th Armored force
and withdraw to the south; or the 109th
and the 9th Armored force could be
pulled back toward Bastogne. General
Middleton had just finished speaking
to Maj. Gen. John W. Leonard, the 9th
Armored commander, and had promised
a battalion from the incoming 80th In-
fantry Division to fill the gap between
Leonard and Rudder. (General Brad-
ley or Maj. Gen. William H. H. Morris,
Jr., the provisional corps commander,
later canceled this move so as to keep
the 80th together.) Middleton therefore
told Cota that the 109th was to hold,
but if forced back it should retire to the
west behind the Alzette, a stream line
directly south of Ettelbruck. These
orders were passed on to the 109th. How-
ever the final instructions to Rudder rec-
ognized the need for reliance on the
commander on the ground; he was to
“act according to the situation.” In point
of fact the 109th already was on the
march west through Ettelbruck.
General Leonard still expected that the
109th would fall back to the south and
join the 9th Armored (the 109th was

226
not yet under his command), but Rud-
der was in contact with the enemy and
could not risk the disorganization at-
tendant on a change in plans at this
point.
The withdrawal itself was a success,
despite the intense interdiction fire laid
down by the Germans, fire that cost
thirty-four casualties from shelling alone.
The 107th and 108th Field Artillery Bat-
talions, emplaced near Bissen, answered
the enemy guns and gave what protec-
tion they could to the marching infantry.
Engineer parties laid mines on the main
roads and blew the last bridges at Die-
kirch. The rear guard, formed from
the attached tank company, stayed on in
Diekirch, where the first platoon cap-
tured 107 prisoners. By midnight the 1st
and 3d Battalions were west of the Al-
zette, strung along the west-reaching
line of hills which began just south of
Ettelbruck and anchored near Grosbous.
Here the 109th faced north, forming the
westernmost segment of the still firm
south shoulder of the VIII Corps line.
General Leonard ordered the 2d Bat-
talion, reduced to half strength, over to
the east side of the Alzette to offer some
infantry protection for the 9th Armored
tanks in the Stegen-Ermsdorf area. In
Ettelbruck demolition parties remained
at work until the morning of 20 Decem-
ber; then they withdrew, blowing the
bridges behind them.
The troop withdrawal from Diekirch
was followed by a mass exodus of the
civilian population. When the Germans
first shelled the town on 16 December,
the citizenry had started to leave Die-
kirch but had been halted by American
officers and local officials so as to keep
the supply roads open to the 109th.
Rumors of the American withdrawal on
THE ARDENNES: BATTLE OF THE BULGE
the 19th brought the people of Die-
kirch out of their cellars and into the
streets. They were particularly apprehen-
sive because members of the local gen-
darmerie had fought alongside the
Americans and taken a score of German
prisoners who now were housed in the
local jail. Finally it was agreed that the
civil population would evacuate the town
at midnight on the 19th following the
main troop movement. So, in freezing
cold, some three thousand men, women,
and children set out on the road to
Mersch, leaving behind four hundred
of the townspeople who refused to aban-
don aged relatives or property. 6
All during the day of the 20th the
109th Infantry was out of touch with the
enemy. The 352d Volks Grenadier Divi-
sion had assembled two of its regiments
west of Bastendorf during the previous
night, leaving the 916th Regiment to
occupy Diekirch as the Americans left.
Strict orders had arrived from the Sev-
enth Army headquarters, located at In-
gendorf (a little village southwest of
Bitburg), that the 352d must start the
attack rolling once more and take posses-
sion of the vital crossings at Ettelbruck.
To make success certain, General
Brandenberger, the Seventh Army com-
mander, sent army artillery and rocket
projectors to join the 352d artillery bat-
talions in creating an “artillery center
of gravity” at Bastendorf. The short-
age of bridging equipment continued to
plague the Seventh Army, but Branden-
berger’s staff scraped together an im-
promptu bridge train and started it to-
6 This story is given in Rapport sur L’activité
de la Gendarmerie Grand-Ducale lors du bom-
bardment et de L’evacuation de la ville de Die-
kirch, provided the author by the Luxembourg
liaison officer at Headquarters, SHAPE.

ATTACK BY GERMAN LEFT WING: 16–20 DECEMBER 227
ward Ettelbruck. Fortunately for the
Seventh Army drivers, gunners, and pon-
toneers, the skies remained overcast and
the columns moved freely along the
roads. At Diekirch the 916th Regiment
found that one bridge had escaped com-
plete destruction and could bear infantry
and single heavy weapons; so the regi-
ment moved across the Sauer, its inten-
tion to take Ettelbruck from the rear.
The German center, and the bridge
train, converged on Ettelbruck. Mean-
while part of the 352d Volks Granadier
Division crossed the north-south branch
of the Sauer and marched west to the
Wark Creek, apparently intending to
CAVE REFUGE FOR CIVILIANS
envelop the open American flank from
the left.
Elements of the 9th Armored
Division Battle at the Sauer
16–20 December
Only six days prior to the German
attack, troops of the 9th Armored Divi-
sion (General Leonard) had been as-
signed a 3-mile sector on the VIII Corps
front between the 28th Infantry Divi-
sion and the 4th Infantry Division. This
sector fronted on the Sauer River south
of the junction with the Our and earlier
had been held by a battalion of the 109th

228 THE ARDENNES: BATTLE OF THE BULGE
Infantry. The bulk of the 9th Armored
Division, a unit with no prior battle
experience, was held in the west as the
VIII Corps reserve, but just before the
German attack CCB was transferred to
V Corps. The new sector was manned
by the 60th Armored Infantry Battalion
(Lt. Col. Kenneth W. Collins), sup-
ported by the 3d Armored Field Artil-
lery Battalión at Haller. As was custom-
ary the armored infantry had been
placed in line in this quiet sector for
combat indoctrination, and in the first
few days the Germans on the opposite
bank of the Sauer showed so little in-
clination to disturb the prevailing quiet
that Collins was concerned lest his bat-
talion secure no combat experience what-
ever. He need not have worried.
Across the river a fresh German Divi-
sion, the 276th Volks Grenadier (Gen-
eralleutnant Kurt Moehring) , had just
come in from Poland and was dispersed
in the little Eifel villages between Ech-
ternach and Bitburg. Units of the 276th
were moved frequently in the week be-
fore the attack, companies exchanging
billets to mislead both the local pop-
ulace and the American intelligence.
Finally, in two night marches the divi-
sion concentrated on the east bank of
the Sauer, its zone of attack defined in
the north by Wallendorf (at the junction
of the Our and the Sauer) and in the
WALLENDORF, VIEWED FROM REISDORF on the western side of the Sauer River.

ATTACK BY GERMAN LEFT WING: 16–20 DECEMBER 229
south by Bollendorf. The 276th Volks
Grenadier Division, then, generally
faced the 60th Armored Infantry Bat-
talion, but it should be noticed that the
tortuous gorge of the Schwarz Erntz lay
in the zone of the 276th and would be
used to gain entry to the left flank and
rear of the 4th Infantry Division.
Moehring’s division had been recon-
stituted during the autumn following
almost complete destruction in Nor-
mandy and the retreat across France.
Rebuilt around wounded veterans who
had returned from the hospitals, the
division was fairly young in terms of the
conscription classes it represented and
was at full strength when it moved west
from Poland. The 276th, however,
could not count on accompanying gun
support for its infantry since no assault
guns had been supplied. In addition the
divisional artillery and train were horse-
drawn. In the Seventh Army plan this
division formed the right wing of the
LXXX Corps. The 276th Volks Gren-
adier Division, which with the 212th
Volks Grenadier Division constituted
this corps, had no distant objective such
as those assigned the Fifth Panzer Army
formations on its right. The only definite
mission given the 276th was to gain the
high ground across the Sauer, dislocate
the American artillery positions around
Haller, and form the western extension
of the blocking line which the LXXX
Corps was to present to any American
thrust aimed at the southern pivot of
the great counteroffensive. Once the
western Sauer heights between Wallen-
dorf and Bollendorf were in hand, the
advance of the 276th would turn toward
the southwest, moving alongside the
212th. In case the opportunity offered,
advance contingents might push as far
as Mersch and the area north of Luxem-
bourg. This last maneuver, however,
was not a mandatory part of the Seventh
Army plan.
On the morning of the attack the
LXXX Corps artillery broke the long
quiet on the Sauer River as six bat-
talions and a rocket projector brigade
divided their fire to reinforce the divi-
sional artillery of the 276th and 212th.
The initial concentration in the 9th
Armored Division (-) sector, estimated
by the Americans at about a thousand
rounds, was aimed principally at Beau-
fort, the largest town in this area, and
the batteries around Haller. Damage
was not extensive but the forward tele-
phone lines were shot out. The thick
fog and early morning darkness must
have been as much a problem to the
German assault units as to the American
observers looking out toward the river.
In any case there was considerable con-
fusion and delay on the east bank, and
few or none of the rubber assault boats
landed on the American side before 0630.
Once across, the German assault troops
moved rapidly up the draws, masked
from view by the fog and the heavy
woods.
The main crossing was made by the
986th Regiment near Wallendorf. Part
of one battalion circled into the sharp
valley where the Our and Sauer meet,
intending to seize Hill 402 (southwest
of Bigelbach) , which offered the best
observation in the vicinity. These troops
succeeded in wiping out a squad of
armored infantry that had been sta-
tioned to watch the valley, but soon
mortar and machine gun fire from the
3d Battalion, 109th Infantry, watching
from the heights north of the Our,
stopped the Germans in their tracks.

230 THE ARDENNES: BATTLE OF THE BULGE
The second battalion of the 986th moved
cautiously up the draws and ravines to-
ward Bigelbach. This village lay on a
slope and had not been occupied, al-
though American patrols moved in now
and then at night to check suspicious
lights. As a result the 986th was able to
report that it had made gains on its left
and “taken” Bigelbach. For some reason
the Germans did not push on and Com-
pany C, holding the hills and crests
south of Bigelbach, engaged them in a
desultory, long-range fire fight for the
rest of the day.
The center German regiment, 988th,
made its crossings near Dillingen, aim-
ing in the direction of Beaufort and
Haller. Here Company A was deployed
in the woods above the Sauer with ob-
servation on the river but with insuffi-
cient strength to block the numerous
ravines running up the wooded heights.
By noon the attack threatened to over-
run the company and infiltration had
taken place at several points, the German
movements hidden by the dense pine.
Colonel Collins committed Company B,
in reserve at Beaufort, to attack through
Company A in an effort to restore the
position and drive the Germans back
over the Sauer. The reserve company
ran up against units of the 988th which
had penetrated between the two forward
companies but moved fast and reached
a position abreast of A and C. All this
while the batteries around Haller had
been shelling the enemy crossing points;
the cost to the Germans must have
been high, but they kept coming.
In midafternoon General Leonard
dipped into his reserves to support the
60th Armored Infantry Battalion. Since
the 9th Armored Division was in this
sector with a force equivalent only to a
combat command, Leonard’s reserves
consisted of one tank battalion (the
19th) , a company from the divisional
engineers, a battery from the 482d Air-
craft Artillery Battalion, most of the
89th Cavalry Reconnaissance Squadron,
a company of self-propelled tank de-
stroyers, and two reconnaissance pla-
toons belonging to the 811th Tank De-
stroyer Battalion. These units would
fight as a combat command, although
the sector was not turned over to Col.
‘Thomas L. Harrold and CCA head-
quarters until the next morning. One
troop was taken from the cavalry and
given to the 60th Armored Infantry Bat-
talion; the armored cars moved forward
and spent the night of 16–17 December
outposting Beaufort and patrolling the
road which ran from the town into the
Schwarz Erntz gorge.
This deep, thickly wooded gorge
posed a constant threat to both CCA
and the 4th Infantry Division. As yet
the enemy made no attempt to utilize
the natural sally port, but in the 4th
Division sector German infantry sur-
rounded Berdorf, which controlled a
lateral road descending into the gorge.
In the 9th Armored sector three lateral
draws debouched west from the gorge
toward Haller, Waldbillig, and Christ-
nach. In the late afternoon Company A,
19th Tank Battalion, joined the 12th
Infantry (4th Division) as a mobile
reserve in this area. Troop B, 89th
Cavalry Reconnaissance Squadron, came
up to reinforce Company B, 811th Tank
Destroyer Battalion, whose 76-mm. self-
propelled guns covered the Waldbillig
and Christnach draws. The right flank
of the 9th Armored, although none too
secure, at least was outposted. During
the late afternoon the enemy, who ear-

ATTACK BY GERMAN LEFT WING: 16–20 DECEMBER 231
lier had been stopped on the left flank,
worked closer in toward Reisdorf using
the cover of the woods. This threat as
yet was not too serious, but the light
tank company of the 19th Tank Bat-
talion was dispatched north of Ermsdorf
to watch the road which angled from
Reisdorf behind the left flank of the
position occupied by the 60th Armored
Infantry Battalion.
The 276th Volks Grenadier Division
had failed to seize control of the Sauer
heights. Although assault parties had
made successful penetrations in unde-
fended sectors, some as deep as one and
a half miles, stubbornly defended strong-
points had checked any co-ordinated ad-
vance. The deeply incised terrain had
given tactical advantage, but this had
been canceled by communications fail-
ures brought on by the poor perform-
ance of the German radio sets on the
deep-pocketed ground. Futhermore, the
276th lacked the artillery so necessary
for close infantry support in this type
of terrain and had been forced to parcel
its two howitzer battalions in small sec-
tions along the east bank. On the whole
the Seventh Army command was far from
pleased by the day’s performance, press-
ing General Moehring to continue the
attack through the night.
Infiltration tactics began to bear fruit
as day came on 17 December. In the
center of the 9th Armored sector the
60th Armored Infantry Battalion head-
quarters at Beaufort discovered that the
enemy had cut in between the head-
quarters and the three companies of
armored infantry in the line. 7 Six ar-
7 Companies A and C had no communications
with the battalion. During the night of the 16th
the two company commanders, Capt. John W.
Schalles and Capt. Roger L. Shinn, each got a
mored cars counterattacked and cleared
the high ground north of Beaufort but
were unable to drive the Germans from
the woods behind the isolated compa-
nies. The enemy meanwhile bore in on
both flanks. On the south the 987th Reg-
iment, thus far missing in American
identifications of the 276th Volks Gren-
adier Division, appeared during the
morning. One of its battalions marched
unopposed through the Schwarz Erntz
gorge and occupied Mullerthal, the
point at which narrow, wooded defiles
led out to Waldbillig and Christnach in
the 9th Armored (-) zone, and to Cons-
dorf in the 4th Division rear.
About 1330 Troop B, 89th Cavalry
Reconnaissance Squadron, and four tank
destroyers from the 811th Tank De-
stroyer Battalion, launched a counter-
attack from Waldbillig to regain Muller-
thal. The leading tank destroyer was set
afire by a German Panzerfaust, effec-
tively blocking the narrow road. The
dismounted cavalry encountered accu-
rate small arms fire as they attempted
to work ahead and the acting command-
er of Troop B was killed. The unseen
enemy, firing behind the cover of huge
boulders and trees, had the upper hand:
at dark a platoon of cavalry assault guns
laid down a protective barrage and the
American task force withdrew to the
hills flanking the exit from the Wald-
billig-Müllerthal defile.
German efforts to achieve a real pene-
tration on the left flank were less success-
ful than on the right. Advance troops
of the 2d Battalion, 986th Regiment,
worked their way through the crossfire
coming from the 109th Infantry and the
half-track loaded with rations and ammunition
and ran it through to the rifle line.

232 THE ARDENNES: BATTLE OF THE BULGE
60th Armored Infantry Battalion and
briefly occupied Eppeldorf, only to be
run out by the light tanks based on
Ermsdorf.
The chief German success on 17 De-
cember came at the close of day, with
an attack by the 1st Battalion, 988th
Regiment, on Beaufort. Here, during
daylight hours, the attackers had literal-
ly been “blown all over” (as American
observers reported) by the howitzers fir-
ing from Savelborn and the guns on
three headquarters tanks. But at dark
Germans seeped into the town from as-
sembly points in the woods, only some
fifteen hundred yards distant, and am-
bushed an 81-mm. mortar platoon when
this shifted to meet the assault. Colonel
Collins ordered the headquarters of the
60th Armored Infantry Battalion back
to the motor park near Savelborn and
committed Troop A, 89th Cavalry Re-
connaissance Squadron, to fight a rear
guard action in Beaufort. The cavalry
unit, led by Capt. Victor C. Leiker, held
on until 2030, by which time the Ger-
man infantry controlled all the street
corners, then fought its way south to
Waldbillig. This rear guard stand cost
Troop A 16 jeeps and 7 of its 12 armored
cars as well as 43 casualties.
While the 60th Armored Infantry Bat-
talion headquarters withdrew to Savel-
born, the 3d Armored Field Artillery
Battalion moved its batteries west from
Haller to the Savelborn-Medernach
road. Despite continuous counterbattery
fire, the gunners had given steady and
effective support whenever called upon,
expending about 4,000 rounds during
the two-day action. When the batteries
displaced, forty artillerymen, with four
half-tracks, and Battery A of the 482d
Antiaircraft Artillery Battalion re-
mained behind to block any German
penetration through the cross-corridor of
the Schwarz Erntz which led past Haller
back into the Savelborn position. By
midnight, then, the 9th Armored line
was re-forming, from Waldbillig (still
held by cavalry and tank destroyers) to
Ermsdorf, where the light tanks con-
tinued to patrol. Contact with the three
line companies was lost, but they fought
on in their original positions, under
orders from the battalion commander to
hold their ground. With company fronts
a mile wide, the fight became a series of
squad actions as the enemy infantry
filtered through and behind the Ameri-
can “line.” Each attempt to re-lay a
telephone wire or carry forward an am-
munition case became a major tactical
effort.
Although the 276th Volks Grenadier
Division had driven a number of wedges
into the 9th Armored sector during 17
December, the Seventh Army command-
er was very dissatisfied with the divi-
sion performance. The 276th was still
hung up on the Sauer River. A part
of its infantry and nearly all supporting
heavy weapons remained on the east
bank waiting for a bridge to be com-
pleted at Wallendorf, where American
shells had smashed much equipment and
killed many engineers. Brandenberger
sent word to OB WEST that a new
commander was needed for the 276th
Division. But General Moehring did not
live to greet his successor: en route in
his staff car from Beaufort to Muller-
thal he was killed by machine gun fire.
The fighting armored infantry had so
successfully contained the German main
forces on 16 and 17 December that the
infiltrating units which first made head-
way in the Beaufort area were relatively

ATTACK BY GERMAN LEFT WING: 16–20 DECEMBER 233
small. The 9th Armored intelligence
estimates set the enemy strength to be
encountered here at approximately three
companies. Against this supposedly lim-
ited force the CCA commander mustered
his remaining men, assault guns, and
armored vehicles for a counterattack to
re-establish contact with the three iso-
lated companies “and drive the enemy
into the river.” Colonel Harrold’s avail-
able force now included only Company
B, 19th Tank Battalion; a platoon of
Company D’s light tanks; a cavalry as-
sault gun platoon; the I and R platoon
from the 60th; and Company A, 9th Ar-
mored Engineer Battalion (a part of
which was loaded in half-tracks) .
The counterattack was to be made by
two task forces. Task Force Hall (Capt.
John W. Hall) would lead from the
Savelborn assembly area north to Berens
and then drive north to Company C
while the second task force, Task Force
Philbeck (Maj. Tommie M. Philbeck),
attacked to the east and northeast to
reach the other two companies. Before
dawn on 18 December the I and R pla-
toon started in its jeeps along the narrow
road to Berens, reconnoitering in ad-
vance of the main column. Fire sud-
BELGIAN WOMAN SALVAGING GRAIN IN GUTTED BARN

234 THE ARDENNES: BATTLE OF THE BULGE
denly poured in from all sides, killing the
platoon commander and cutting the unit
to pieces in a matter of minutes. Task
Force Hall, continuing the advance in
daylight, reached the thick Eselbour
woods, but there took the wrong turning
at a crossroad. The light tanks, forming
the advance guard, had moved only a few
hundred yards when the Germans
opened fire with bazookas, knocking out
the lead tank and blocking the road.
Captain Hall, the leader of this task
force, was wounded but manned an as-
sault gun and cleared the enemy from
the road. He was awarded the Distin-
guished Service Cross. Shortly after noon
Task Force Philbeck passed through
Hall’s position, only to lose more tanks.
The Americans lost seven tanks before
the order finally came to withdraw.
The American setback had stemmed
from the last act of General Moehring
as commander of the 276th. Moehring
had collected a battalion of the 986th
Regiment and an antitank company
armed with fifty-four Panzerfausts for an
attack across the Savelborn-Ermsdorf
road to seize Medernach. During the
night of 17–18 December this force as-
sembled in the cover of the Eselbour
woods, waiting to jump off at dawn.
There it lay, with perfect cover for close-
in work with the bazooka, when the
American advance began. Lacking suffi-
cient infantry to clear the woods or de-
fend the tanks, the Americans had been
unable to profit by their superority in
heavy weapons.
The situation on the flanks in the CCA
sector also was unfavorable to the Ameri-
cans. At Ermsdorf, which had been the
linchpin on the northern flank, elements
of the 1st Battalion, 986th Regiment,
brought up mortars and attacked. The
light tanks beat off the Germans but
were forced to give up their screening
activities in this area. On the right flank
Troop C of the cavalry made a dismount-
ed assault from Haller with the intention
of retaking Beaufort. The troopers were
supported by six half-tracks from Com-
pany A, 482d Antiaircraft Artillery Bat-
talion, mounting the deadly quadruple
.50-caliber machine guns, but the half-
tracks found it impossible to maneuver
in the heavy woods. The Germans ahead
laid down mortar fire; the cavalry were
hard hit and could not maneuver, the
half-tracks could not close with the Ger-
man mortar crews, and the attack was
abandoned. 8
In fact the American force was too
slight to hold the original position on
the high ground north of Haller, and
it withdrew to the new defensive po-
sition being formed by CCA as an after-
math to the reverses suffered during the
day. In the course of this withdrawal
the armored field artillery batteries were
hard beset and had to beat off the enemy
at four hundred yards range. Two bat-
teries actually took new firing positions
in front of the rifle line. After dark CCA
reorganized on a line running roughly
northwest from Waldbillig to Ermsdorf,
thence west to the high ground around
Stegen, the latter about two and a half
miles south of Diekirch where the
109th Infantry was in the process of
assembly. The Germans finally had
opened the western Sauer valley and
driven an entering wedge between the
9th Armored Division and the 109th In-
fantry. The gap between Stegen and
Diekirch could be closed to the enemy
8 Pfc. T. J. Zimmerer, an aid man, stayed be-
hind enemy lines for eleven days with a severely
wounded soldier. He was awarded the DSC.

ATTACK BY GERMAN LEFT WING: 16–20 DECEMBER 235
only by roadblocks and roving patrols,
but the Germans failed to follow up
their advantage on the night of 18–19
December.
There was no longer thought of re-
lieving the three armored infantry com-
panies still behind the enemy lines. Colo-
nel Collins sent word to withdraw, via
a radio which a forward observer from
the 3d Field Artillery Battalion had re-
paired and by officers from the isolated
companies who previously had made
daring dashes by jeep through the Ger-
mans to bring out wounded and carry
forward ammunition. During the next
three days volunteers led back nearly
60 percent of the armored infantry,
but the three-day fight had cost the 60th
an estimated 231 casualties. 9
Across the lines the psychological lift
which might have been given by the
appearance of the new commander, Col.
Hugo Dempwolff, and the successful at-
tack against the 109th Infantry by the
352d Volks Grenadier Division, which
had finally shaken the 276th north flank
loose, was offset by General Moehring’s
death and the failure to provide a bridge
in the division bridgehead. So short was
bridging equipment in the Seventh
Army that the initial losses at Wallen-
dorf could not be immediately replaced.
9 The 9th Armored Division never fought as a
complete division during the period covered by
the present volume. As a result the 9th Armored
after action report and files are of little value in
tracing the action of one of its combat commands.
For the series of events described in this section
the main sources are the combat interviews; the
60th Armored Infantry Battalion AAR; the 9th
Armored Engineer Battalion AAR, which tells the
very detailed story, by companies; the CCA AAR
and S–3 Jnl; the separate troop histories in the
89th Cavalry Reconnaissance Squadron AAR; and
the useful AAR of the 811th Tank Destroyer
Battalion.
On the night of 18–19 December, the
divisions on the right and left of the
276th permitted artillery, some rocket
projectors, and supplies to move across
their bridges to the 276th. As yet the
company of assault guns which the
Seventh Army had promised was no-
where in sight.
Colonel Dempwolff, taking stock of
conditions in his new command, found
that losses had been high (ascribed by
the unit commanders to the continued
absence of assault gun support) and that
spirits were low. He determined to con-
tinue the attack, nevertheless, this time
using the newly arrived supporting
weapons to bring his left and center reg-
iments together in a co-ordinated thrust
against Waldbillig, the anchor position
for the south flank of the 9th Armored
Division. On 19 December, then, Demp-
wolff reorganized his regiments, moved
artillery and rocket projectors forward,
and gave his troops food and rest. At
Bollendorf his engineers finally com-
pleted a bridge over the 40-yard-wide
river, lessening somewhat the pinch on
the 276th.
CCA took this much needed breath-
ing spell to prepare roadblocks and dem-
olitions in front of its new 7-mile-long
main line of resistance. At best this posi-
tion amounted to a thin screen with nu-
merous gaps; so a slim reserve was creat-
ed consisting of two engineer platoons
and a dozen assault guns. During the
morning, contact with the Germans was
lost. Patrols that went out to the front
and flanks found nothing in the danger-
ous gap between Ermsdorf and Diekirch
but drove off a German patrol which
was moving south from Eppeldorf, not
west into the gap. At the right end of
the American line patrols discovered a

236 THE ARDENNES: BATTLE OF THE BULGE
large group of Germans in a farmhouse.
After a platoon of tank destroyers shelled
the house, a volunteer squad of seven
noncoms from Battery A, 48rd Antiair-
craft Artillery Battalion, made the as-
sault with Tommy guns and hand gre-
nades. A corporal killed three Germans
with a blast from his Tommy gun, after
he himself had been shot in the stomach,
and fifty-nine Germans gave up the fight.
The 9th Armored Division could re-
port on the night of the 19th that the
situation on its right flank was satisfac-
tory, and on the left flank too as far as
Stegen; beyond Stegen the situation was
“obscure.” General Leonard borrowed
the 90th Cavalry Reconnaissance Squad-
ron (less three troops) from the 4th
Infantry Division zone, where a part of
its parent organization, the 10th Ar-
mored Division, had initiated counterat-
tacks the previous day. But the gap be-
tween the 9th Armored Division and the
109th Infantry was too large to be COY-
ered by a minimal cavalry screen. Worse,
the gap widened during the evening as
the 109th withdrew from Diekirch en
route to the Ettelbruck-Grosbous line.
The compromise solution that moved
one much depleted battalion of the
109th southeast to make contact at Ste-
gen gave General Leonard’s tanks some
badly needed infantry protection but
could hardly deflect any determined en-
emy thrust around the left flank of the
9th Armored Division. In this instance,
however, the military axiom that a com-
mander who is worried about the enemy
may reflect on the worries besetting the
enemy commander, was proven by the
event. While General Leonard voiced
concern to his corps commander over the
gap between the 9th Armored Division
(-) and the 109th Infantry, Colonel
Dempwolff was plagued by the thought
of the widening gap between the 276th
Volks Grenadier Division and the 352d
Volks Grenadier Division. But he had a
clear order from General Brandenber-
ger: the 276th must contain as many
American troops as possible. This mis-
sion in Dempwolff’s judgment required
a continuation of the attack southwest-
ward toward Waldbillig and Christnach
where American reinforcements already
had arrived to help the 4th Infantry
Division.
Late on 19 December word reached
the 276th that its missing assault gun
company had detrained at Trier. The
planned attack against the 9th Armored
right flank was therefore postponed un-
til the guns could reach the 988th Regi-
ment, which had been assigned the main
role. In midafternom on 20 December
the weapons remaining to the company,
apparently not more than three or four,
joined the 988th at Haller and the at-
tack against Waldbillig commenced.
Twice the American 76-mm. tank de-
stroyers and supporting batteries of the
3d Field Artillery Battalion drove off
the Germans. But when night fell Demp-
wolff brought the 987th Regiment
through Mullerthal and into the gorge
running west to Waldbillig. Menaced
from two sides by superior strength, the
American tank destroyers and cavalry
were ordered to withdraw to the ridge
south of the village.
The capture of Waldbillig on 20 De-
cember marked the high-water mark of
the 276th Volks Grenadier Division ad-
vance. The division now had a bridge
at Bollendorf, its weapons were west of
the Sauer, the division command post
had been moved across to Beaufort, and
the center and left regiments had made

ATTACK BY GERMAN LEFT WING: 16–20 DECEMBER 237
contact at Waldbillig. The 276th, how-
ever, had paid heavily for the restricted
success achieved in the five days’ attack,
success more limited than that gained
by any other division in the Seventh
Army.

CHAPTER X
The German Southern Shoulder
Is Jammed
In the first week of December the 4th
Infantry Division (Maj. Gen. Raymond
O. Barton) left the VII Corps after a
month of bloody operations in the Hurtgen
Forest. Having lost over 5,000 battle
casualties and 2,500 nonbattle casualties
from trench foot and exposure, the division
now had to be rebuilt to something
approaching its former combat effectiveness.
It moved south to Luxembourg,
“the quiet paradise for weary troops,”
as one report names it, taking over the
83d Infantry Division positions on the
right flank of the VIII Corps (and First
Army) while the 83d occupied the old
4th Division sector in the north. The
35-mile front assigned to the 4th Division
conformed to the west bank of
the Sauer and Moselle Rivers. Across
these rivers lay a heterogeneous collection
of German units whose lack of activity
in past weeks promised the rest the
4th Division needed so badly. The division
completed its concentration within
the Grand Duchy of Luxembourg on the
13th, its three regiments deployed as
they would be when the German attack
came. The 12th Infantry was on the left
(next to the 9th Armored Division)
and fronting on the Sauer; the 8th Infantry
was in the center, deployed on
both the Sauer and Moselle; the 22d Infantry
reached to the right along the
Moselle until it touched the First and
Third Army boundary just beyond the
Luxembourg border. Of the three regiments
only the 12th Infantry (Col. Robert
H. Chance) lay in the path of the
projected German counteroffensive. 1
(See Map V.)
As soon as it reached the quiet VIII
Corps area, the 4th Infantry Division
began to send groups of its veterans on
leave-to Paris, to Arlon in Belgium,
even a fortunate few to the United
States. Rotation in the line allowed
1 Histories have been published for three of the
units involved in the defense described in this
section: Col. Gerden F. Johnson, History of the
Twelfth Infantry Regiment in World War II
(Boston: National Fourth (Ivy) Division Associ-
ation, 1947); History of the Eleventh Infantry
Regiment, Fifth Infantry Division (Baton Rouge:
Army and Navy Publishing Company, 1946); and
Lester M. Nichols, Impact, The Battle Story of
the Tenth Armored Division (New York: Brad-
bury, Sales, O’Neill, 1954). The combat interviews
are excellent for the 4th Division, less useful for
the 10th Armored. The 4th Division AAR pro-
vides a good narrative but the division journals
are scanty. Of the regiments only the 12th In-
fantry has much information in its AAR and unit
journal. The AAR of the 70th Tank Battalion
can be used to flesh out much of the story. For
the participation of the 10th Armored troops, see
the 10th Armored G–3 journal and the CCA
AAR. An interesting account by a participant
will be found in Maj. Glenn W. Zarger’s manu-
script, Defense of Little Switzerland, prepared for
the Advanced Officers Class No. I, Armored
School, Fort Knox, Ky., 1 May 1948.

THE GERMAN SOUTHERN SHOULDER IS JAMMED 239
others a few hours in Luxembourg City,
ice cream in several flavors, well-watered
beer, and the dubious pleasure of hear-
ing accordionists squeeze out German
waltzes and Yankee marching songs of
World War I vintage. Replacements,
now by order named “reinforcements,”
joined the division, but by mid-Decem-
ber the regiments still averaged five to
six hundred men understrength. Infan-
try replacements were particularly hard
to obtain and many rifle companies re-
mained at no better than half strength.
Equipment, which had been in use since
the Normandy landings, was in poor con-
dition. A number of the divisional ve-
hicles had broken down en route to
Luxembourg: a part of the artillery was
in divisional ordnance shops for repair.
When the Germans attacked, the 70th
Tank Battalion, attached to the 4th Di-
vision, had only eleven of its fifty-four
medium tanks in running condition.
Neither the 83d Division, which the
4th had relieved, nor any higher head-
quarters considered the Germans in this
sector to be capable of making more
than local attacks or raids, and patrols
from the 4th Division found nothing to
change this estimate. Even so General
Barton made careful disposition of his
understrength and weary division, even
ordering the divisional rest camps, orig-
inally back as far as Arlon, to be moved
to sites forward of the regimental com-
mand posts. Since any static linear de-
fense was out of the question because of
the length of the front and the meander-
ing course of the two rivers, Barton in-
structed his regimental commanders to
maintain only small forces at the river
outpost line, holding the main strength,
generally separate companies, in the vil-
lages nearby. Each regiment had one bat-
talion as a mobile reserve, capable of
moving on four-hour notice. Each regi-
ment, by standard practice on such a
wide front, had one of the division’s
105-mm. howitzer battalions in direct
support. General support was provided
by the division’s own 155-mm. howitzer
battalion and two additional medium
battalions belonging to the 422d Field
Artillery Group, but even this added
firepower did not permit the 4th Di-
vision massed fire at any point on the
extended front. Mobile support was pro-
vided by those tanks of the 70th Tank
Battalion which were operational, the
self-propelled tank destroyers of the 803d
Tank Destroyer Battalion, and the
towed tank destroyers of the 802d The
plans to utilize these positions were
briefed by General Barton to his com-
manders on the 13th. Barton was appre-
hensive that the enemy would attempt
a raid in force to seize Luxembourg City,
and in the battle beginning on the 16th
he would view Luxembourg City as the
main German objective.
Intelligence reports indicated that the
4th Division was confronted by the 212th
Volks Grenadier Division and miscella-
neous “fortress” units, deployed on a
front equal to that held by the 4th. Un-
til the night of 14 December this estimate
was correct. As yet no American troops
had had opportunity to try the mettle of
the 212th (Generalmajor Franz Sens-
fuss) . After three years of campaigning
on the Eastern Front the division had
been so badly shattered during with-
drawals in the Lithuanian sector that
it was taken from the line and sent to
Poland, in September 1944, for over-
hauling. The replacements received,
mostly from upper Bavaria, were judged
better than the average although there

240 THE ARDENNES: BATTLE OF THE BULGE
were many seventeen-year-olds. Unit
commanders and noncommissioned offi-
cers were good and experienced; morale
was high. Although the 212th was at
full strength it shared the endemic weak-
nesses of the volks grenadier division:
insufficient communications and fewer
assault guns than provided by regulation
(only four were with the division on 16
December).
Brandenberger rated the 212th as his
best division. For this reason the 212th
was assigned the mission of protecting
the flank of the Seventh Army, just as
the latter was responsible for guarding
the flank of the forces in the main
counteroffensive. More specifically, the
Seventh Army plans called for the 212th
to attack over the Sauer on either side
of Echternach, reach and hold the line
of the Schlammbach, thus eliminating
the American artillery on the plateau
in the Alttrier-Herborn-Mompach area,
and finally to contain as many additional
American troops as possible by a thrust
toward Junglinster. Radio Luxembourg,
the powerful station used for Allied
propaganda broadcasts, was situated
near Junglinster. As in the case of the
276th Volks Grenadier Division, there is
no indication that the LXXX Corps ex-
pected to send the 212th into Luxem-
bourg City, although the Germans knew
that the 12th Army Group Headquarters
and the advance command post of the
Ninth Air Force were located there.
On the night of 13–14 December the
212th commenced to strip its extended
front in concentration for its part in the
counteroffensive. The 423d Regiment
made a forced march from the sector
southwest of Trier and by daylight had
bivouacked on the right wing of the
212th. The following night all three
regiments assembled behind a single bat-
talion which acted as a screen along the
Sauer between Bollendorf and Ralingen,
the prospective zone of attack. On the
final night (15-16 December) the divi-
sion moved into the position for the
jump-off: the 423d on the right, north of
Echternach; the 320th on the left, where
the Sauer turned east of Echternach; and
the 316th in army reserve northeast of
the city. The long southern flank of the
old 212th Volks Grenadier Division sec-
tor had been drastically weakened to
permit the concentration at Echternach.
Only two Festung battalions were left to
cover the twelve miles south to the
boundary between the Seventh and
First Armies, but in this denuded sector
the Sauer and Moselle Rivers afforded
a considerable natural defense.
The Germans had excellent intelli-
gence of the 4th Infantry Division
strength and positions. The Luxem-
bourg-German border was easily crossed,
and despite the best efforts of the Amer-
ican Counter Intelligence Corps and the
local police the bars and restaurants in
Luxembourg City provided valuable
listening posts for German agents. It is
likely that the enemy had spotted all the
American outpost and artillery positions;
it is certain he knew that the 212th Volks
Grenadier Division would be opposed
only by the 12th Infantry during the
first assault phase.
The German Thrust Begins
When the German artillery opened up
on the 12th Infantry at H-hour for the
counteroffensive, the concentration fired
on the company and battalion command
posts was accurate and effective. By day-
break all wire communication forward of

THE GERMAN SOUTHERN SHOULDER IS JAMMED 241
the battalions was severed. Many radios
were in the repair shops, and those at
outposts had a very limited range over
the abrupt and broken terrain around
Echternach and Berdorf, Luxembourg’s
“Little Switzerland.” Throughout this
first day the 12th Infantry would fight
with very poor communication. The
problem of regimental control and co-
ordination was heightened by the wide
but necessary dispersion of its units on
an extended front and the tactical isola-
tion in an area of wooded heights
chopped by gorges and huge crevasses.
In accordance with the division orders to
hold back maximum reserves, the 12th
Infantry had only five companies in the
line, located in villages athwart the main
and secondary roads leading southwest
from the Sauer River crossings to the in-
terior of the Grand Duchy. These vil-
lages, at which the crucial engagements
would be fought, were Berdorf, Echter-
nach, Lauterborn, Osweiler, and Dick-
weiler. Actually, only a few men were
stationed with the company command
post in each village; the rifle platoons
and weapon sections were dispersed in
outposts overlooking the Sauer, some of
them as far as 2,000 yards from their
company headquarters.
The leading companies of the two
German assault regiments began crossing
the Sauer before dawn. Apparently the
crews manning the rubber boats had
trouble with the swift current, and
there were too few craft to accommodate
large detachments. The immediate ob-
jective of the northern regiment, the
423d, was the plateau on which stood
the village of Berdorf; beyond this the
regiment had orders to cut the road
running west from Lauterborn and Ech-
ternach and link forces with the 320th
Regiment. The latter crossed east of
Echternach, its first objective being the
series of hills north of Dickweiler and
Osweiler. Once in possession of these
hills the 320th was to seize the two vil-
lages, then drive on to join the 423d.
General Barton had warned his regi-
ments at 0929 to be on the alert because
of activity reported to the north in the
28th Division area, intelligence con-
firmed by a phone call from General
Middleton. But the first word that the
Germans were across the river reached
the 12th Infantry command post in Jung-
linster at 1015, with a report from
Company F, in Berdorf, that a 15-man
patrol had been seen approaching the
village a half-hour earlier. At Berdorf
most of Company F (1st Lt. John L.
Leake) had been on outpost duty at the
four observation posts fronting the river.
The company radio was back for repair
but each of the artillery observers, for-
ward, had a radio. Either these sets failed
to function or the outposts were sur-
prised before a message could get out.
The 1st Battalion, 423d Regiment, over-
ran three of the outpost positions, cap-
tured the company mortars, machine
guns, and antitank guns sited in support
of the forward detachments, and moved
in on Berdorf. Outpost 2 at Birkelt
Farm, a mile and a half east of Berdorf,
somehow escaped surprise. Here the 2d
Platoon (with twenty-one men and two
artillery observers) held out in the stone
farm buildings for four days and from
this position harassed the Germans mov-
ing up the ravine road to Berdorf. Direct
assault failed to dislodge these Ameri-
cans, and the attempt was abandoned
pending the arrival of heavy weapons
from across the river.
At Berdorf itself, Lieutenant Leake

242
gathered about sixty men in the Parc
Hotel as the enemy closed in. The Parc
was a three-storied reinforced concrete
resort hotel (indicated in the guide-
books as having “confort moderne”) sur-
rounded by open ground. Leake’s force
had only one .50-caliber machine gun
and a BAR to reinforce the rifles in the
hands of the defenders, but the Germans
were so discouraged by the reception
given their initial sorties that their suc-
ceeding attempts to take the building
were markedly half hearted.
Meanwhile the 7th Company, 423d
Regiment, pushed forward to cut the
Echternach-Lüxembourg road, the one
first-class highway in the 12th Infantry
sector. This company struck Lauterborn,
on the road a mile and a half southwest
of Echternach, and cut off the Company
G outposts. By 1130 the remainder of
Company G, armed with rifles and one
BAR, was surrounded but still fighting
at a mill just north of the village, while
a platoon of the 2d Battalion weapons
company held on in a few buildings at
the west edge of Lauterborn. Company
E, in Echternach, likewise was surprised
but many of the outpost troops worked
their way back to a hat factory, on the
southwestern edge of the city, which had
been organized as a strongpoint. The
first German assault here did not strike
until about 1100, although Echternach
lay on low ground directly at the edge of
the river. Attempts by the 320th Infan-
try to make a predawn crossing at Ech-
ternach had been frustrated by the swift
current, and finally all the assault com-
panies were put over the Sauer at Edin-
gen, more than three miles downstream.
This delay brought the advance troops
of the 320th onto the hills above Os-
weiler and Dickweiler well after day-
THE ARDENNES: BATTLE OF THE BULGE
light, and almost all of the American
outposts were able to fall back on the
villages intact. Late in the morning two
enemy companies attacked Dickweiler,
defended by Company I, but were
beaten off by mortar fire, small arms,
and a .50-caliber machine gun taken
from a half-track. The Germans with-
drew to some woods about 800 yards to
the north, ending the action; apparently
the 320th was more concerned with get-
ting its incoming troops through Echter-
nach. Osweiler, west of Dickweiler, thus
far had seen no enemy.
With wire shot out, radios failing, and
outposts overrun, only a confused and
fragmentary picture of the scope and in-
tent of the attack was available in the
4th Infantry Division headquarters. By
noon, however, with Berdorf and Ech-
ternach known to be under attack, Dick-
weiler hit in force, and Lauterborn re-
ported to be surrounded, it was clear that
the Germans at the very least were en-
gaged in an extensive “reconnaissance in
force,” thus far confined to the 12th In-
fantry sector. Artillery, normally the
first supporting weapon to be brought
into play by the division, had very
limited effect at this stage. The field ar-
tillery battalions were widely dispersed
behind the various sections of the long
4th Division front; only fifteen pieces
from the 42d Field Artillery Battalion
and the regimental cannon company
were in range to help the 12th Infantry.
The one liaison plane flying observation
for the gunners (the other was shot up
early on 16 December) reported that
“the area was as full of targets as a pin-
ball machine,” but little could be done
about it. Radio communication, poor as
it was, had to serve, with the artillery
network handling most of the infantry

THE GERMAN SOUTHERN SHOULDER IS JAMMED 243
and command messages in addition to its
own calls for fire. The gunners neverthe-
less began to get on the targets, and the
German infantry reported very punish-
ing artillery fire during the afternoon.
At noon the picture of battle had
sharper definition; so General Barton
authorized the 12th Infantry to commit
the 1st Battalion (Lt. Col. Oma R.
Bates), the regimental reserve. At the
same time he gave Colonel Chance eight
medium tanks and ten light tanks,
leaving the 70th Tank Battalion (Lt.
Col. Henry E. Davidson, Jr.) with only
three mediums and a platoon of light
tanks in running order. Small tank-infan-
try teams quickly formed and went for-
ward to relieve or reinforce the hard-
pressed companies. Unfortunately rain
and snow, during the days just past, had
turned the countryside to mud, and the
tanks were bound to the roads. Later
Barton phoned the corps commander to
ask for reinforcements. Middleton had
nothing to offer but the 159th Engineer
(Combat) Battalion, which was working
on the roads. He told Barton that if he
could find the engineers he could use
them.
Company A, mounted on a platoon of
light tanks, was ordered to open the
main road to Lauterborn and Echter-
nach which supplied the 2d Battalion
(Maj. John W. Gorn) . This team fought
through some scattered opposition south-
west of Lauterborn, dropped off a rifle
platoon to hold Hill 313 (which com-
manded the southern approach), and
moved through the village to the Com-
pany G command post, freeing twenty-
five men who had been taken prisoner
in the morning. By nightfall the Ger-
mans had been driven back some dis-
tance from Lauterborn (they showed no
wish to close with the tanks), but the
decision was made to dig in for the night
alongside Company G rather than risk a
drive toward Echternach in the dark.
Companies A and G together now
totaled about a hundred officers and
men.
Early in the afternoon Company B
mounted five light and five medium
tanks and set out to reach Company F.
At the southern entrance to Berdorf,
which is strung out along the plateau
road for three-quarters of a mile, the re-
lief force ran into a part of the 1st Bat-
talion, 423d Regiment, which opened
bazooka fire from the houses. When
darkness fell the Americans still were
held in check, and the infantry drew
back, with two tanks in support, and dug
in for the night. The rest of the tanks
returned to Consdorf for gasoline and
ammunition.
The morning situation in the sector
held by the 3d Battalion (Maj. Herman
R. Rice, Jr.) had not seemed too press-
ing. The 320th had not reached Osweiler
and the first assault at Dickweiler had
been repulsed handily. But Colonel
Chance sent out all of the usable tanks
in Company B, 70th Tank battalion–a
total of three–to pick up a rifle squad
at the 3d Battalion command post (lo-
cated at Herborn) and clear the road to
Osweiler. When this little force reached
Osweiler, word had just come in that
Dickweiler was threatened by another
assault. The tanks and riflemen pro-
ceeded to run a 2,000-yard gauntlet of
bursting shells along the high, exposed
road to Dickweiler (probably the enemy
guns beyond the Sauer were firing inter-
diction by the map).
The little column came in on the flank
of the 2d Battalion, 320th Regiment,

244 THE ARDENNES: BATTLE OF THE BULGE
which was in the process of moving two
companies forward in attack formation
across the open ground northwest of
Dickweiler. The tanks opened fire on
the German flank and rear, while all the
infantry weapons in the village blazed
away. Thirty-five of the enemy, including
one company commander, surrendered;
the commander of the second company
was killed, as were at least fifty soldiers.
Later the 4th Infantry Division historian
was able to write: “This German battal-
ion is clearly traceable through the rest
of the operation, a beaten and ineffective
unit.”
But the 320th Regiment, although
badly shaken in its first attempts to take
Dickweiler, was rapidly increasing the
number of its troops in this area, spread-
ing across the main road and encircling
the two villages. About an hour after
dark a message from the 3d Battalion
reached the 12th Infantry command
post: “Situation desperate. L and I com-
pletely surrounded.” Colonel Chance
took Company C, the last troops of the
12th Infantry, and sent them to the 3d
Battalion command post for use on the
morrow.
The 12th Infantry had rigidly obeyed
the division commander’s order that
there should be “no retrograde move-
ment,” despite the fact that nine days
earlier it had been rated “a badly deci-
mated and weary regiment” and that on
16 December its rifle companies still
were much understrength. The 42d
Field Artillery Battalion in direct sup-
port of the 12th, though forced to dis-
place several times during the day be-
cause of accurate counterbattery fire, had
given the German infantry a severe
jolting.
In the face of the German build-up
opposite the 12th Infantry and the ap-
parent absence of enemy activity else-
where on the division front, General
Barton began the process of regrouping
to meet the attack. There was no guaran-
tee, however, that the enemy had com-
mitted all his forces; the situation would
have to develop further before the 4th
Division commander could draw heavily
on the two regiments not yet engaged.
The 2d Battalion of the 22d Infantry,
in regimental reserve, was alerted to
move by truck at daylight on 17 Decem-
ber to the 12th Infantry command post
at Junglinster, there to be joined by two
tank platoons. The 9th Armored Divi-
sion loaned a medium tank company
from the 19th Tank Battalion, also to
report to the 12th Infantry on the fol-
lowing morning. Three battalions of
155’s and two batteries of 105-mm. how-
itzers began the shift north to reinforce
the fifteen howitzers supporting the 12th
Infantry. And the division reserve, the
4th Engineer Combat Battalion and
4th Cavalry Reconnaissance Troop,
concentrated behind the 12th Infantry
lines. Most important, just before mid-
night the corps commander telephoned
General Barton that a part of the 10th
Armored Division would leave Thion-
ville, in the Third Army area, at day-
break on 17 December. The prospect
must have brightened considerably at
the 4th Division headquarters when the
promise of this reinforcement arrived.
The 4th Division would not be left to
fight it out alone.
On the second day of the battle both
sides committed more troops. As yet the
212th had no bridge, for the American
artillery had shot out. the structure
erected on the 16th before it could be
used. The 4th Division switched all local

THE GERMAN SOUTHERN SHOUL DER IS JAMMED 245
reserves to the threatened left flank to
block further penetrations and to rein-
force and relieve the garrison villages
in the north. The 212th Volks Grena-
dier Division took a shock company from
the 316th Regiment, which was still held
in reserve under Seventh Army orders,
and moved it into the fight. The division
fusilier battalion was committed against
the 12th Infantry center in an attempt
to drive a wedge through at Scheidgen
while a part of the 23d Festung Battal-
ion crossed the Sauer near Girst to ex-
tend the left flank of the German attack.
During the night of 16 December
searchlights had been brought down to
the river opposite Echternach to aid the
German engineers attempting to lay
spans on the six stone piers, sole relic
of the ancient bridge from whose exit
the people of Echternach moved yearly
in the “dancing procession” on the feast
of St. Willibrord. American shellfire
finally drove the enemy away from the
bank, necessitating a new effort in broad
daylight farther to the north. The enemy
infantry would outnumber the Ameri-
cans opposing them in the combat area,
but on 17 December the Germans in the
bridgehead would meet a far greater
weight of artillery fire than they could
direct against the Americans and would
find it difficult to deal with American
tanks. The superiority in tanks main-
tained by the 4th Infantry Division
throughout this operation would effec-
tively checkmate the larger numbers of
the German infantry.
Fighting on 17 December took place
along the axes of three principal German
penetrations: on the American left flank
at Berdorf, Consdorf, and Mullerthal; in
the center along the Echternach-Lauter-
born-Scheidgen road; and on the right in
the Osweiler-Dickweiler sector.
About three hours before dawn, Gen-
eral Barton, concerned over his left
flank, dispatched the 4th Engineer Com-
bat Battalion and 4th Cavalry Recon-
naissance Troop to Breitweiler, a small
village overlooking the wishbone ter-
minus of the Schwarz Erntz gorge and
the ganglia ravine roads which branched
thence into the 12th Infantry flank and
rear. The Schwarz Erntz gorge lay with-
in the 4th Infantry Division zone but in
fact provided a natural cleavage between
the 4th Division and the 9th Armored
Division. Both units would therefore be
involved in guarding the cross-corridors
and ravines which stemmed from the
gorge itself. The advance of the 423d
Regiment across the Berdorf plateau on
16 December had reached the winding
defile leading down into the gorge west
of Berdorf village, there wiping out a
squad of infantry and one 57-mm. anti-
tank gun which had been placed here to
block the gorge road. When the 4th Divi-
sion reserves arrived in Breitweiler on
the morning of 17 December the threat
of a flanking move through the gorge
was very real but the Americans had
time to dig in.
At 0936 American observers reported
a very large force moving along the
bottom of the gorge, and at 1044, “5
companies counted and still coming.”
What had been seen were troops of the
987th Regiment, the reserve regiment
of the 276th Volks Grenadier Division,
then attacking in the 9th Armored Divi-
sion sector. Company C, 70th Tank Bat-
talion, now had eight tanks in running
condition and these were hurried to
Breitweiler to reinforce the cavalry and
engineers. Two platoons from Company
A, 19th Tank Battalion, which had just

246
arrived from the 9th Armored, the as-
sault gun and mortar platoons of the
70th Tank Battalion, a battery of 105-
mm. howitzers, the reconnaissance com-
pany of the 803d Tank Destroyer Battal-
ion, and the 2d Battalion, 8th Infantry,
were hastily assembled in Colbet, a mile
and a half south of Müllerthal, and
organized at 1104 as Task Force Luckett
(Col. James S. Luckett) .
An hour earlier the tank destroyer
reconnaissance company had begun a
long-range fire fight but the German ad-
vance guard, despite heavy shelling from
three field artillery battalions and every
self-propelled piece which could be
brought to bear, drove straight on to
THE ARDENNES: BATTLE OF THE BULGE
BREITWEILER
Müllerthal. Consdorf, the command post
of the 2d Battalion, 12th Infantry, was
left open to an attack from Müllerthal
up the Hertgrund ravine. Major Gorn
organized a hasty defense with a few
cooks, MP’s, stragglers, and one tank, but
the blow did not fall. The 987th Regi-
ment failed to emerge from the gorge
and even may have withdrawn from
Mullerthal, after beating off the counter-
attack launched there in the afternoon
by elements of the 9th Armored Divi-
sion.
The failure on the part of the 987th
to push past Mullerthal on 17 December
or to overflow from the gorge onto the
flanks of the two American units remains

THE GERMAN SOUTHERN SHOULDER IS JAMMED 247
a mystery. Possibly this failure is ex-
plained by the lack of heavy weapons
needed to blast a way up from the gorge
bottom. Possibly the American artillery
and self-propelled guns had disorganized
and disheartened the German infantry;
prisoners later reported that shell frag-
ments from the tree bursts in the bottom
of the wooded gorge “sounded like fall-
ing apples” and caused heavy casualties.
Whatever the reason, this enemy pene-
tration went no further than Müllerthal.
By early afternoon, however, a new
threat was looming in the Consdorf area,
this time from an enemy penetration on
the right along the Scheidgen section of
the main highroad to Echternach. This
turned out to be only a patrol action and
the enemy was quickly beaten off.
Early in the day Company B and ten
tanks from the 70th Tank Battalion re-
newed the attack at Berdorf in an at-
tempt to break through to Company F,
still encircled at the opposite end of the
village. This time the tanks deployed on
the roads and trails south of Berdorf and
moved in with five riflemen on each tank
deck. The five medium tanks drove
through to the northeastern edge and
just before noon began shelling the Parc
Hotel in the mistaken belief that it was
held by the enemy. One of the Company
F men had been rummaging about and
had found an American flag. This was
unfurled on the shattered roof. Contact
thus established, an assault was launched
to clear Berdorf. But the Germans de-
fending the houses were heavily armed
with bazookas and the tanks made little
progress. At dark the Americans drew
back to the hotel, while the Germans
plastered the area with rockets, artillery,
and mortar shells, lobbed in from across
the river. 2
In the central sector Companies A and
G, with five light tanks, started from
Lauterborn along the road to Echter-
nach. The enemy here was in consider-
able strength and had established
observation posts on the ridges ringing
Lauterborn and bordering the road.
Heavy and accurate shellfire followed
each American move. When the day
ended the relief force had accomplished
no more than consolidating a defensive
position in Lauterborn. In Echternach
Company E, 12th Infantry, had occupied
a two-block strongpoint from which it
harassed the German troops trying to
move through the town. No large-scale
assault was attempted this day, appar-
ently because the enemy was still wait-
ing for guns to cross the river. Troops
from the 320th Regiment and fusilier
battalion circled around Echternach and
Lauterborn meanwhile in an attempt to
cut the main road at Scheidgen. The
platoon from Company A, 12th Infantry,
which had been posted on Hill 313 the
day before, fell back to Scheidgen and
there was overwhelmed after a last mes-
sage pleading for tank destroyers. At the
day’s end only the regimental antitank
company, numbering some sixty men,
stood between the enemy and the 2d
Battalion command post at Consdorf.
Although the German penetrations on
the left and in the center of the 12th
Infantry sector deepened during the day,
the situation on the right was relatively
encouraging. At the break of day on 17
December Company C, the 12th Infantry
reserve, moved out of Herborn en route
2 1st Sgt. Gervis Willis later was awarded the
DSC for his conduct in the defense of Berdorf.

248
to join the two companies beleaguered
in Osweiler. As Company C worked its
way through the woods south of Osweiler
the left platoon ran head on into the
2d Battalion. 320th Infantry; all the
platoon members were killed or cap-
tured. By some chance the two platoons
on the right missed the German hive. In
the meantime the 2d Battalion, 22d In-
fantry (Lt. Col. Thomas A. Kenan), had
arrived in the 12th Infantry zone. Com-
pany F was mounted on tanks from the
19th Tank Battalion, which had just
come in from the 9th Armored Division,
and also set out for Osweiler. This force
arrived on the scene shortly after the
enactment of the German ambush,
fought a short sharp engagement, res-
cued some of the prisoners from Com-
pany C, and pushed on into Osweiler.
With this reinforcement a new de-
fensive line was organized on the hills
just east of the village. The original de-
fenders had taken a large bag of prison-
ers the previous day; these were sent
back to Herborn with a tank platoon. In
midafternoon the remaining companies
of the 2d Battalion, 22d Infantry, started
for Osweiler, advancing in column
through the woods which topped a ridge
line running southwest of the village.
While the American column moved in
a northeasterly direction, a German col-
umn, probably a battalion in strength,
suddenly intersected the 2d Battalion
line of march. In the fire fight which
followed the 2d Battalion companies be-
came separated, but the early winter
darkness soon ended the skirmish. The
Americans dug in for the night, and the
Germans passed on toward Scheidgen.
In Dickweiler the troops of the 3d
Battalion, 12th Infantry, had been har-
assed by small forays from the woods
THE ARDENNES: BATTLE OF THE BULGE
above the village. The three tanks which
had come up the evening before, and
very effective fire by American batteries,
put an end to these German efforts. Thus
both Osweiler and Dickweiler remained
tight in American hands. Toward the
close of day Company C of the 12th In-
fantry took position on some high
ground between and slightly south of the
two villages, thus extending the line
here on the right.
General Barton’s headquarters saw
the situation on the evening of 17 De-
cember as follows. The 3d Battalion and
its reinforcements had “a semblance of
a line” to meet further penetration in
the vicinity of Osweiler and Dickweiler.
On the opposite flank things were tem-
porarily under control, with Task Force
Luckett not yet seriously engaged and
the enemy advance thus far checked at
Mullerthal. However, there was a pres-
ent danger that the large German force
might turn the 4th Division flank by a
successful attack through the 9th Ar-
mored Division blocking position at
Waldbillig. All that could be said of the
12th Infantry center was that the situa-
tion was fluid, for here the road junction
at Scheidgen was in enemy hands and
German detachments were on the loose.
Across the river at the headquarters
of the 212th Volks Grenadier Division
there was little realization of the extent
to which the American center had been
dented. General Sensfuss told his supe-
riors that the 212th had made little
progress beyond completing the encircle-
ment of Echternach. Despite the com-
plete surprise won by the 212th on 16
December, it had been unable to effect
either a really deep penetration or ex-
tensive disorganization in the 12th In-
fantry zone. With the close of the second

THE GERMAN SOUTHERN SHOULDER IS JAMMED 249
day it may be said that the German
opportunity to exploit the initial sur-
prise and attendant tactical gains com-
menced to fade.
On the morning of 17 December
the 10th Armored Division (General
Morris) had moved out of Thionville
for Luxembourg, the first step (al-
though at the time not realized) which
General Patton’s Third Army would
make to intervene in the battle of the
Ardennes. General Morris drove ahead
of his troops and reported to General
Middleton at Bastogne. The VIII Corps
commander originally had intended to
use a part of the 10th Armored in direct
support of the 28th Division, but now he
instructed Morris to send one combat
command to the Bastogne area and to
commit the remainder of the 10th Ar-
mored with the 4th Infantry Division in
a counterattack to drive the Germans
back over the Sauer. General Middleton
regarded the German advance against
the southern shoulder of his corps as
potentially dangerous, both to the corps
and to the command and communica-
tions center at Luxembourg City. There
was, of course, no means by which the
VIII Corps commander could know that
the Seventh Army scheme of maneuver
was limited to a swing only as far as
Mersch, eight miles north of the city.
General Morris left Bastogne and
met the 4th Infantry Division com-
mander in Luxembourg. The two
were of one mind on the need for coun-
terattack tactics and arranged that CCA
(Brig. Gen. Edwin W. Piburn), the
leading combat command, should make
an immediate drive to the north be-
tween the Schwarz Erntz gorge and the
main Echternach-Luxembourg road.
CCA made good speed on the 75-mile
run from Thionville, but the leading
armor did not arrive in the 12th In-
fantry area until late in the afternoon
of 17 December. Apparently some troops
went at once into the line, but the ac-
tual counterattack was postponed until
the next morning. Then, so the plan
read, CCA would advance in three task
forces: one through the Schwarz Erntz
gorge; one on the Consdorf-Berdorf
road; and the third through Scheidgen
to Echternach. The infantry to the front
were alerted for their role in the com-
bined attack and half-tracks with radios
were moved close to the line of depar-
ture as relay stations in the tank-infantry
communications net.
The counterattack moved off on the
morning of 18 December in a thick
winter fog. On the left, Task Force
Chamberlain (Lt. Col. Thomas C.
Chamberlain) dispatched a small tank-
infantry team from Breitweiler into the
gorge. The Schwarz Erntz, taking its
name from the rushing stream twisting
along its bottom, is a depression lying
from three to five hundred feet be-
low the surrounding tableland. At sev-
eral points canyonlike cliffs rise sheer
for a hundred feet. The floor of the
gorge is strewn with great boulders;
dense patches of woods line the depres-
sion and push down to the edge of the
stream. In time of peace the gorge
of the Schwarz Erntz offered a pictur-
esque “promenade” for holiday visitors
in the resort hotels at Berdorf and Beau-
fort, with “bancs de repos” at conven-
ient intervals. In December, 1944, the
gorge represented a formidable military
obstacle, difficult of traverse for both foot
troops and vehicles, capable of defense
by only a few.
The entrance to the gorge was SO

250 THE ARDENNES: BATTLE OF THE BULGE
narrow that the tanks had to advance in
single file, and only the lead tank could
fire. The accompanying infantry were
under constant bullet fire; and when the
lead tank was immobilized by an anti-
tank projectile some time was required
to maneuver the rest of the column
around it. With every yard forward, ba-
zooka, bullet, and mortar fire increased,
but the enemy remained hidden. Finally,
the Americans halted near the T in the
gorge road just south of Müllerthal.
It was clear that to capture Müllerthal,
or even to block the southern exit from
the gorge, the surrounding hills and
tableland had to be won. The infan-
try and engineers belonging to Task
Force Luckett were given this mission,
advancing in the afternoon to bypass
Müllerthal on the west and seize the
wooded bluff standing above the gorge
road north of Müllerthal. Tanks
pumped seven hundred rounds into the
woods to shake the Germans there, but
little time was left in the short winter
day and the foot soldiers only got across
the Müllerthal-Waldbillig road.
The center task force (Lt. Col. Miles
L. Standish), which had been assigned
to help the 2d Battalion, 12th Infantry,
clear the enemy from Berdorf, had lit-
tle better success. Elements of Task
Force Standish were strafed by a pair
of German planes but moved into Ber-
dorf against only desultory opposition
and before noon made contact with the
two companies and six tanks already in
the village. Then the German gunners
laid down smoke and a bitter three-hour
barrage, disabled some tanks and half-
tracks, and drove the Americans to cover,
When the fire lifted the attack was re-
sumed, but the enemy fought stubborn-
ly for each house. This house-to-house
assault gained only seventy-five yards
before darkness intervened. Meanwhile
the sixty-some members of Company
F remained in the Parc Hotel, whose
roof and upper story had been smashed
in by German shelling. Pole charges
or bazooka rounds had blasted a gaping
hole in one side of the hotel, but thus
far only one man had been wounded.
Morale was good, bolstered superbly
by the company cook who did his best
to emulate the “cuisine soignée” prom-
ised in the hotel brochures by pre-
paring hot meals in the basement and
serving the men at their firing posts.
While part of Task Force Standish
was engaged in Berdorf, another team
attacked through heavy underbrush to-
ward Hill 329, east of Berdorf, which
overlooked the road to Echternach.
Despite the presence of the tanks, which
here could maneuver off the road, the
infantry were checked halfway to their
objective by cross fire from machine
guns flanking the slope and artillery
fire from beyond the Sauer. About forty
men were wounded, creating a problem
for evacuation by this small force.
The third task force from CCA, 10th
Armored (led by Lt. Col J. R.
Riley), made good progress in its attack
along the Scheidgen-Lauterborn axis.
Scheidgen was retaken early in the after-
noon virtually without a fight (the Ger-
man battalion which had seized the
village had already moved on toward the
south). Five tanks and two companies
of the 159th Engineer Combat Battalion,
which Barton had located on the road
job as promised by Middleton, then
launched a surprise attack against the
Germans on Hill 313, overlooking the
road to Lauterborn. The tanks rolled
down the road from Scheidgen with

THE GERMAN SOUTHERN SHOULDER IS JAMMED 251
their motors cut and caught the enemy
on the slopes while the engineers moved
in with marching fire. But a thick winter
fog rolled in before the Americans
could occupy the hill. Other elements
of Task Force Riley meanwhile had advanced
to the mill beyond Lauterborn
where the command post of Company
G was located. Two tanks and two
squads of riflemen continued along
the main road to the hat factory
at the southwestern edge of Echternach
where Company E, 12th Infantry,
had established itself. Here the
company was found to be in good spirits,
supplied with plenty of food and wine,
and holding its own to the tune of over
a hundred of the enemy killed. The
tank commander offered to cover the
withdrawal of Company E from the
city, but Capt. Paul H. Dupuis, the senior
officer in Echternach, refused on
the ground that General Barton’s “110
retrograde movement” order of 16 December
was still in effect. 3 As darkness
settled in, the small relief force turned
back to the mill north of Lauterborn,
promising to return on the morrow
with more troops.
While CCA, 10th Armored, gave
weight to the 4th Division counterattack,
General Barton tried to strengthen the
12th Infantry right flank in the Osweiler-
Dickweiler sector. The 2d Battalion, 22d
Infantry, which had met the German
column in the woods west of Osweiler
the day before, headed for the village
on the morning of 18 December. The
last word to reach Osweiler had been
that the 2d Battalion was under serious
3 General Barton says that he told the tank
commander to inform Captain Dupuis that his
order to hold in Echternach was revoked, but
apparently this message was not delivered. Ltr,
Gm Barton to author, 17 Nov 59.
attack in the woods; when the battalion
neared the village the American tanks
there opened fire, under suspicion that
this was a German force. After two
hours, and some casualties, a patrol
bearing a white flag worked its way in
close enough for recognition. Osweiler
now had a garrison of one tank company
and four understrength rifle companies.
As the American reinforcements
stiffened the right flank and the ar-
mored task forces grappled to wrest the
initiative from the enemy on the left,
German troops widened and deepened
the dent in the 12th Infantry center,
shouldering their way southward
between Scheidgen and Osweiler. The
burden of this advance was carried by
battalions of the 320th Regiment (which
explains the relaxing of pressure in the
Osweiler-Dickweiler area) , and the ad-
vance guard of the 316th Regiment
which General Sensfuss had pried from
the Seventh Army reserve by reporting
the arrival of the 10th Armored Division.
The first appearance of any enemy
force deep in the center occurred near
Maisons Lelligen, a collection of two
or three houses on the edge of a large
wood northwest of Herborn. The 12th
Infantry cannon company was just mov-
ing up to a new position when fire
opened from the wood. The drivers and
gunners dived for cover and returned
fire. After a few minutes of this ex-
change Sgt. J. C. Kolinski got up, ran
back to a truck, fixed a round, and fired
it from a howitzer still coupled to the
truck. This idea caught on and other
men started to serve the howitzers,
awkward as the technique was, some
firing at ranges as short as sixty yards.
Ammunition at the pieces ultimately
gave out, but a volunteer raced to the

252 THE ARDENNES: BATTLE OF THE BULGE
rear of the column and drove an am-
munition truck, its canvas smouldering
from German bullets, up to the gun
crews. The action lasted for over three
hours. At last two howitzers were man-
handled into a position from which
they could cover the company; guns and
vehicles were laboriously turned around
in the mud, and the company withdrew.
Farther to the west another part of
the German force which had come from
Scheidgen surrounded the rear head-
quarters of the 2d Battalion, 22d In-
fantry, and a platoon of towed tank de-
stroyers in Geyershof. Tanks en route
to Osweiler got word of this situation,
picked up twenty-five cannoneers from
the 176th Field Artillery Battalion, and
intervened in the fight. Covered by this
counterattack the battalion headquar-
ters withdrew to Herborn.
The engagements at Geyershof and
Maisons Lelligen were comparatively
minor affairs, involving only small
forces, but German prisoners later re-
ported that their losses had been severe
at both these points. This fact, com-
bined with the American pressure on
either shoulder of the penetration area,
may explain why the enemy failed to
continue the push in the center as 18
December ended.
The net day’s operations amounted
to a stand-off. The Americans had
strengthened the Osweiler-Dickweiler
position, but the Germans had extended
their penetration in the 12th Infantry
center. Elsewhere neither side clearly
held the field. Enemy artillery had
interdicted many of the roads in the
area and had been very effective at
Berdorf. American artillery, now in-
creased in the 12th Infantry zone, gave
as good support as communications
permitted and succeeded in destroying
a ponton bridge at the Echternach site
before it could be put in use. Both sides
were forced to rely largely upon radio
communication, but it would appear
that the Germans had particular dif-
ficulty: prisoners reported that “nobody
seems to know where anybody else is.”
American intelligence officers esti-
mated on 17 December that the enemy
had a superiority in numbers of three
to one; by the end of 18 December the
balance was somewhat restored. Losses
and stragglers, however, had reduced
the American infantry companies, al-
ready understrength at the opening of
the battle. The two companies in Berdorf
reported a combined strength of sev-
enty-nine men, while the 2d Battalion of
the 22d Infantry listed an average of on-
ly sixty in each company. The Amer-
ican makeweight would have to be its
armor. Lacking tanks and self-propelled
artillery, the 212th Volks Grenadier
Division had to rely on the infantry.
Accordingly, the 316th Infantry began to
cross the Sauer, moving up behind the
center of the parent division.
During the night of 18–19 December
the 9th Armored Division (–) withdrew
to a new line of defense on the left of the
4th Infantry Division. Actually the 9th
Armored (–) did not abandon the right
flank anchor at Waldbillig and so contin-
ued direct contact with the friendly
forces deployed near the Waldbillig-
Mullerthal road. The problem of dealing
with the 987th Regiment and clearing
the enemy out of the Schwarz Erntz
gorge, or containing him there, was left
to the 4th Division and CCA, 10th Ar-
mored. As a result, these two units faced
four German regiments in the 12th In-
fantry sector. Of the 4th Division, it must

THE GERMAN SOUTHERN SHOULDER IS JAMMED 253
be remembered, four rifle battalions still
were retained on guard along the twenty
miles of the division front south of the
battle area.
When the Americans resumed the
counterattack early on 19 December
Task Force Luckett made another at-
tempt to bring forward the extreme left
flank in the gorge sector. As before, the
maneuver was a. flanking movement
designed to seize the high ground over-
looking Müllerthal. Troops of the 2d
Battalion, 8th Infantry (Lt. Col. George
Mabry), with tanks and armored field
artillery firing in support, first attacked
east from Waldbillig to take the wooded
nose around which looped the Wald-
billig-Müllerthal road. This advance
was made across open fields and was
checked by extremely heavy shellfire.
Next Mabry shifted his attack to the
right so as to bring the infantry through
the draw which circled the nose. Com-
pany E, which had about seventy men
and was the strongest in the battalion, led
off. By now the German artillery was
ranged inaccurately. The casualties suf-
fered by Company E cannot be num-
bered, but have been reported as the most
severe sustained by any company of the
4th Division in the battle of the Ar-
dennes. Casualties among the officers left
a lieutenant who had just joined the com-
pany in command. Despite its losses
Company E drove on, clearing the Ger-
mans from the lower slopes before the
recall order was given.
The division commander now called
off the attack and assigned Task Force
Luckett the mission of denying the en-
emy the use of the road net at Müller-
thal, a task which could be accomplished
in less costly fashion. Colonel Luckett
deployed his troops along the ridge
southwest of the Müllerthal-Waldbillig
road, and a log abatis wired with mines
and covered by machine guns was
erected to block the valley road south of
Müllerthal. Task Force Chamberlain,
whose tanks had given fire support to
Task Force Luckett, moved during the
afternoon to a backstop position near
Consdorf.
The tank-infantry counterattack by
Task Forces Standish and Riley in the
Berdorf and Echternach areas also re-
sumed. The enemy resisted wherever en-
countered, but spent most of the daylight
hours regrouping in wooded draws and
hollows and bringing reinforcements
across the river, stepping up his artillery
fire the while. Intense fog shielded all
this activity. Apparently the assembly of
the 316th Regiment behind the 212th
Volks Grenadier Division center was
completed during the day. A few rocket
projectors and guns were ferried over at
the civilian ferry site above Echternach,
and about the middle of the afternoon a
bridge was finished at Edingen, where
the 320th Regiment had crossed on 16
December. The American counterattack
on the 19th, then, first would be opposed
by infantry and infantry weapons, but
would meet heavier metal and some ar-
mor as the day ended.
At Berdorf a team from Task Force
Standish and a platoon of armored en-
gineers set to work mopping up the en-
emy infantry who had holed up in
houses on the north side of the village.
This proved to be slow work. First a
ten-pound pole charge would be ex-
ploded against a wall or house; then a
tank would clank up to the gap and blast
away; finally the infantry would go to
work with grenades and their shoulder
weapons. At dark the Germans had lost

254 THE ARDENNES: BATTLE OF THE BULGE
a few houses, but were in the process of
being reinforced by Nebelwerfers and
armored vehicles.
Other troops of Task Force Standish
returned to the attack at Hill 329, on the
Berdorf-Echternach road, where they
had been checked by flanking fire the
previous day. Sharp assault destroyed
the German machine gun positions and
the attack reached the ridge leading to
Hill 329. Then the advance had to be
halted short of the objective in order to
free the tanks and half-tracks for use
in evacuating the large number of
wounded. This ambulance convoy was
en route to Consdorf, in the late after-
noon, when a radio message reported
that the Germans had cut the road north
of Consdorf and bazooka’d two tanks on
their way back from Berdorf for am-
munition. The wounded were left in
Berdorf and the task force tanks, ham-
pered by milling civilian refugees, began
a nightlong fire fight with the 2d Bat-
talion, 423d Regiment, which had con-
centrated to capture Consdorf.
Task Force Riley sent tanks carrying
infantry into the edge of Echternach on
the morning of 19 December. There they
re-established contact with Company E
and covered the withdrawal of outlying
detachments to the hat factory. The 12th
Infantry commander already had given
permission for Company E to evacuate
Echternach, but communications were
poor–indeed word that the tanks
had reached Company E did not arrive
at the 12th Infantry command post until
four hours after the event–and the relief
force turned back to Lauterborn alone.
The tanks were hardly out of sight be-
fore the Germans began an assault on
the hat factory with bazookas, demoli-
tion charges, and an armored assault
gun. Two volunteers were dispatched in
a jeep to make a run for Lauterbarn,
carrying word that enemy tanks were
moving into the city and asking for
“help and armor.” The two, last of the
Americans to come out of Echternach,
made the run safely despite direct fire
aimed by the German assault gun. At
Lauterborn, however, they were told
that the tanks could not be risked in
Echternach after dark. American artil-
lery observers by the failing light saw
“troops pouring into Echternach.” Or-
ders were radioed to Company E (a
fresh battery for its radio had been
brought in by the tanks) to fight its way
out during the night. It was too late.
The defenders had been split up by the
German assault and the company com-
mander had to report that he could not
organize a withdrawal. Through the
night of 19–20 December Riley’s tanks
waited on the road just north of Lauter-
born, under orders from the Command-
ing General, CCA, not to attempt a
return through the dark to Echternach.
Although the fighting on 19 December
had been severe on the American left,
a general lull prevailed along the rest of
the line. The enemy made no move to
push deeper in the center. The combat
engineers in Scheidgen returned to Hill
313 and occupied it without a fight. A
few small affrays occurred in the Os-
weiler-Dickweiler sector, but that was
all. By nightfall the situation seemed
much improved–despite the increased
pressure on the 4th Division companies
closely invested in the north. Both flanks
were nailed down, and the German at-
tack seemed to have lost momentum.
Elsewhere on the VIII Corps front the
enemy advance was picking up speed
and reinforcements were rolling forward

THE GERMAN SOUTHERN SHOULDER IS JAMMED 255
to widen the avenues of penetration be-
hind the panzers. Reports that two new
German divisions were en route to attack
the 109th Infantry and 9th Armored
Division had reached General Morris,
coming by way of the 12th Army Group
intelligence agencies. If this additional
weight should be thrown against the thin
American line immediately to the north
of the 4th Infantry Division, there was
every likelihood that the line would
break.
It was imperative that the line be
held. Troops of the Third Army were al-
ready on the move north, there to form
the cutting edge of a powerful thrust in-
to the southern flank of the German
advance. The 109th Infantry, the 9th
Armored Division, the 4th Infantry Divi-
sion, and CCA, 10th Armored Division,
had to win both the time and the space
required for the assembly of the Ameri-
can counterattack forces. General Patton,
commanding the Third Army, to which
the VIII Corps was now assigned, gave
General Morris a provisional corps on
19 December, composed of the 10th Ar-
mored Division (–) , the 9th Armored,
the 109th Infantry, and the 4th Infantry
Division. Morris, now charged with uni-
fying defensive measures while the
Third Army counterattack forces gath-
ered behind this cover, alerted CCA,
10th Armored Division, early on the
morning of 20 December, for employ-
ment as a mobile reserve. Morris had
already dispatched one of his armored
infantry battalions to help the 9th Ar-
mored in an attack intended to retake
Waldbillig. Task Force Chamberlain
had been placed in reserve the previous
day, but it was not immediately feasible
to withdraw the two task forces that
were still engaged alongside the 4th
Division for it would take General Bar-
ton’s division a few hours to reorganize
on a new line and plug the gaps left
by the outgoing armored units.
While General Morris made plans to
hold the ground needed as a springboard
for the projected counterattack, General
Beyer, commanding the German LXXX
Corps, prepared to meet an American
riposte. Higher German headquarters
had anticipated the appearance of some
American reinforcements opposite the
LXXX Corps as early as the third day
of the operation. Intervention by ele-
ments of the 10th Armored Division on
18 December, as a result, was viewed
only as the prelude to a sustained and
forceful American attempt to regain the
initiative. It cannot now be determined
whether the German agents (V-Leute) ,
who undoubtedly were operating be-
hind American lines, had correctly diag-
nosed the beginning of the Third Army
shift toward Luxembourg and Belgium,
or, if so, whether they had been able to
communicate with the German field
headquarters.
In any event the LXXX Corps com-
mander decided on the night of 19 De-
cember to place his corps on the defen-
sive, his estimate of the situation being
as follows. His two divisions generally
had reached the line designated as the
LXXX Corps objective. The force avail-
able was insufficient to continue the
attack. On the north flank there was a
dangerous and widening gap between
the LXXX Corps and the LXXXV
Corps. The supply situation was poor
and could become critical, in part be-
cause of the Allied air attacks at the
Rhine crossings, in part because of the
Allied success-even during poor flying
weather–in knocking out transportation

256 THE ARDENNES: BATTLE OF THE BULGE
and forward supply dumps in the Trier-
Bitburg area. A large-scale American
counterattack against the LXXX Corps
could be predicted, but lacking aerial
reconnaissance German intelligence
could not expect to determine the time
or strength of such an attack with any
accuracy. General Beyer’s orders for 20
December, therefore, called upon the
212th and 276th Volks Grenadier Divi-
sions to crush the small points of resist-
ance where American troops still con-
tended behind the German main forces,
continue local attacks and counterattacks
in order to secure more favorable
ground for future defense, and close up
along a co-ordinated corps front in prep-
aration for the coming American on-
slaught.
On 20 December there was savage
fighting in the 4th Infantry Division
zone despite the fact that both of the
combatants were in the process of going
over to the defensive. The 4th Division
and 10th Armored sought to disengage
their advance elements and regroup
along a stronger main line of resistance,
and the enemy fought to dislodge the
American foothold in Berdorf and Ech-
ternach. At the same time elements of
the 276th Volks Grenadier Division
struck through Waldbillig, the point of
contact between the 4th Division and
the 9th Armored, in an attempt to push
the right wing of the LXXX Corps for-
ward to a point where the road net lead-
ing east to the Sauer might be more
easily denied the gathering American
forces.
The team from Task Force Standish
had made little progress in its house-to-
house battle in Berdorf. Company F,
12th Infantry, retained its position in
the Parc Hotel, despite a German demo-
lition charge that exploded early in the
morning of the 20th and blew in part of
one wall. After a short melee in the
darkness American hand grenades dis-
couraged the assault at this breach and
the enemy withdrew to a line of foxholes
which had been dug during the night
close to the hotel. When the fight died
down one of the defenders found that
the blast had opened a sealed annex in
the basement, the hiding place of several
score bottles of fine liquor and a full
barrel of beer. Lieutenant Leake re-
fused permission to sample this cache, a
decision he would regret when, after
withdrawal from Berdorf, he and
twenty-one of his men were returned to
the foxhole line with neither their coats
nor blankets.
At daylight on 20 December the 1st
Battalion, 423d Regiment, which had
been brought in from the Lauterborn
area, initiated a counterattack against
the team from Task Force Standish at
the edge of Berdorf and recovered all
the ground lost during the previous two
days. The American artillery forward
observer’s tank was crippled by a ba-
zooka and the radio put out of commis-
sion, but eventually word reached the
supporting artillery, which quickly
drove the enemy to cover. Although the
evacuation of Berdorf was part of the
4th Division plan for redressing its line,
the actual withdrawal was none too easy.
The Germans had cut the road back to
Consdorf; so the right team of Task
Force Standish was withdrawn from the
attack on Hill 329 and spent most of the
afternoon clearing an exit for the men
and vehicles in Berdorf. Finally, a little
after dark, Companies B and F (12th
Infantry), ten engineers, and four
squads of armored infantry loaded onto

THE GERMAN SOUTHERN SHOULDER IS JAMMED
eleven tanks and six half-tracks and
made their way past burning buildings
to the new 4th Division line north and
east of Consdorf.
The elements of Task Force Riley,
which had waited outside of Lauterborn
through the night of 19–20 December in
vain expectation that Company E would
attempt to break out of Echternach, re-
ceived a radio message at 0823 that
Company E was surrounded by tanks and
could not get out. Through the morning
rumors and more rumors poured over
the American radio nets, but there was
no sign of Company E. About noon Colo-
nel Riley agreed to send a few tanks in
one final effort to reach the infantry in
Echternach, provided that the 12th In-
fantry would give his tanks some pro-
tection. Company G, therefore, was
assigned this task. At 1330 a report
reached the 12th Infantry that Company
E had gotten out. Half an hour later
this report was denied; now a message
said the company was coming out in
small groups. Finally, in the late after-
noon, Colonel Chance sent a call over
the radio relay system: “Where is
Riley?” Thirty minutes later the answer
came back from CCA: a section of tanks
and some riflemen were fighting at the
outskirts of Echternach.
This was the last effort. Night had
come, Echternach was swarming with
Germans, and the 10th Armored Divi-
sion headquarters had ordered all its
teams to reassemble behind the 4th
Division lines preparatory to moving “in
any direction.” Since most of Task Force
Riley by this time had reverted to the
reserve, Lauterborn, the base for opera-
tions against Echternach, was aban-
doned. Company G, now some forty
men, and the last of Riley’s tanks with-
257
drew to the new main line of resistance.
It is probable that the Americans in
Echternach were forced to surrender
late on 20 December. General Sensfuss
had determined to erase the stubborn
garrison and led the 212th Fusilier Bat-
talion and some assault guns (or tanks)
in person to blast the Americans loose.
The commander of the 212th Volks
Grenadier Division received a slight
wound but had the satisfaction of taking
the surrender of the troublesome Amer-
icans, about 111 officers and men from
Company E, plus 21 men belonging to
Company H. On this same day the Com-
pany F outpost which had held out at
Birkelt Farm since 16 December capitu-
lated.
Finally the enemy had control of most
of the northern section of the road net
between the Sauer River and Luxem-
bourg-but it was too late. The new
American line, running from Dickweiler
through Osweiler, Hill 313, Consdorf, to
south of Müllerthal, was somewhat weak
in the center but solidly anchored at the
flanks. The German attack through the
9th Armored sector beyond Waldbillig
had been checked. At the opposite end of
the line enemy guns and mortars worked
feverishly to bring down Dickweiler
around the ears of the defenders, but the
Americans could not be shelled out.
(When one blast threw a commode and
sink from a second story down on the
rear deck of a tank the crew simply com-
plained that no bathing facilities had
been provided.) At Bech, behind the
American center, General Barton now
had the 3d Battalion, 22d Infantry, in
reserve, having further stripped the 4th
Division right. And in and around Eisen-
born, CCA, 10th Armored Division, was
assembling to counter any German at-

258 THE ARDENNES: BATTLE OF THE BULGE
tack. Barton’s troops and Morris’ tanks
had brought the 212th and the 276th
Volks Grenadier Division to a halt, had
then withdrawn most of their advance
detachments successfully, and now held
a stronger position on a shortened line.
The southern shoulder of the German
counteroffensive had jammed.
Southern Flank–A Summing Up
The Seventh Army had thrown three
of its four divisions into the surprise at-
tack at the Sauer River on 16 December.
The Americans had met this onslaught
with two infantry regiments (the 12th
and 109th) , an armored infantry battal-
ion (the 60th), and an understrength
tank battalion (the 70th), these units
and others attached making the total
approximately division strength. The
stubborn and successful defense of
towns and villages close to the Sauer had
blocked the road net, so essential to
movement in this rugged country, and
barred a quick sweep into the American
rear areas.
In like manner the enemy had failed
in the quick accomplishment of one of
his major tasks, that is, overrunning the
American artillery positions or at the
least forcing the guns to withdraw to
positions from which they could no
longer interdict the German bridge sites.
General Barton, it may be added, had
refused absolutely to permit the artillery
to move rearward. The failure to open
the divisional bridges over the Sauer
within the first twenty-four hours had
forced the German infantry to continue
to fight without their accustomed heavy
weapons support even while American
reinforcements were steadily reducing
the numerical edge possessed by the
attacker. Further, the German inability
to meet the American tanks with tanks
or heavy antimechanized means gave the
American rifleman an appreciable moral
superiority (particularly toward the end
of the battle) over his German counter-
part.
It should be added that Seventh Army
divisions suffered as the stepchild of the
Ardennes offensive, not only when
bridge trains failed to arrive or proved
inadequate but also in the niggardly
issue of heavy weapons and artillery
ammunition , particularly chemical
shells. Perhaps these German divisions
faced from the onset the insoluble tacti-
cal dilemma, insoluble at least if the out-
numbered defenders staunchly held
their ground when cut off and sur-
rounded. Strength sufficient to achieve a
quick, limited penetration the German
divisions possessed, so long as the assault
forces did not stop to clean out the vil-
lage centers of resistance. Strength to ex-
ploit these points of penetration failed
when the village centers of resistance
were bypassed.
Successful the American defense in the
Sauer sector had been, but costly too.
In six days (through 21 December, after
which the Americans would begin their
counterattack) the units here on the
southern shoulder lost over 2,000 killed,
wounded, or missing. German casualties
probably ran somewhat higher, but
whether substantially so is questionable.
In any case, about 800 German prisoners
were taken and nonbattle casualties must
have been severe, for German com-
manders later reported that the number
of exposure and trench foot cases had
been unusually high, the result of the
village fighting in which the defender
had the greater protection from cold
and damp.

CHAPTER XI
The 1st SS Panzer Division's Dash
Westward, and Operation Greif
The bulk of the fourteen divisions
under First U.S. Army command on 16
December were deployed north of the
Belgian Ardennes. Behind them, roughly
in the triangle formed by the cities of
Liège, Verviers, and Spa, lay the supply
installations built up through the au-
tumn to support the advance toward the
Rhine. At Spa, which had served the
German Emperor as headquarters in
World War I, the First Army had estab-
lished its command post surrounded on
every side by service installations, supply
dumps, and depots. Liège, twenty miles
northwest of Spa, was one of the great-
est American supply centers on the Con-
tinent. Verviers, an important and dense-
ly stocked railhead lay eleven miles
north of Spa. (See Map I.)
General Hodges’ First Army head-
quarters, set up in the déclassé resort
hotels and casinos of the once fashion-
able watering place, was remote from
sound of battle on the morning of 16
December, but in a matter of hours the
slashing thrust of the 1st SS Panzer Divi-
sion roughly altered its ordered exist-
ence. The nature of the ground along
which the Americans would attempt to
defend the myriad headquarters and
service installations, railheads, and
depots, must be explained. Southeast of
Spa runs the Amblève River, the creation
of a series of tributaries flowing south
from the springs and swamps of the
rugged Hohes Venn. The Amblève,
bending westward, is joined by the Salm,
GENERAL HODGES
a north-flowing tributary, at the town of
Trois Ponts, then angles northwest until
it meets the Ourthe River and finally the
Meuse at Liège. The Amblève and the
Salm are narrow. and rather minor
streams; the valleys through which they
course are deep-cut, with long stretches

260 THE ARDENNES: BATTLE OF THE BULGE
of steep and rocky walls. A line on the
map tracing the course of the Ambèke
River and its initial tributaries will pass
from northeast to southwest through
three important bridgeheads and road
centers, Malmédy, Stavelot, and Trois
Ponts. From the first two, roads led north
to Spa, Verviers, and Liège. Although
both Malmédy and Stavelot were admin-
istrative centers of importance (Stavelot
contained the First Army map depot
with some 2,500,000 maps), the most
important item hereabouts was the great
store of gasoline, over two million gal-
lons, in dumps just north of the two
towns.
The 1st SS Panzer Division (SS Ober-
fuehrer Wilhelm Mohnke) was the
strongest fighting unit in the Sixth Pan-
zer Army. Undiluted by any large influx
of untrained Luftwaffe or Navy replace-
ments, possessed of most of its T / O&E
equipment, it had an available armored
strength on 16 December of about a
hundred tanks, equally divided between
the Mark IV and the Panther, plus forty-
two Tiger tanks belonging to the 501st
SS Panzer Detachment. The road net in
the Sixth Panzer Army would not per-
mit the commitment of the 1st SS Pan-
zer as a division, even if two of the five
roads allocated the army were employed.
The division was therefore divided into
four columns or march groups: the first,
commanded by Colonel Peiper, con-
tained the bulk of the 1st Panzer Regi-
ment and thus represented the armored
spearhead of the division; the second was
made up from the division’s Reconnais-
sance Battalion; the third and fourth
each comprised armored infantry and
attached heavy weapons; the heavy Ti-
ger detachment was left to be fed into
the advance as occasion warranted.
Kampfgrupfe Peiper on the Move
On the morning of 16 December Colo-
nel Peiper journeyed to the advance
command post of the 12th Volks Grena-
dier Division, whose troops were sup-
posed to make the gap in the lines of
the American 99th Infantry Division
north of the Schnee Eifel through which
his armor would be committed. 1 To
Peiper’s disgust the infantry failed in
their assigned task and the day wore on
with Peiper’s column still waiting on the
roads to the rear. The blown bridge
northwest of Losheim increased the de-
lay; for some reason the engineers failed
to start repair work here until noon or
later. This was not the end. In midafter-
noon the horse-drawn artillery regiment
of the 12th Volks Grenadier Division
was ordered up to support the infantry,
hopelessly clogging the approaches to
the bridge. Peiper himself took over the
job of trying to straighten out this traffic
jam but more time was lost. It was not
until 1930 that the armored advance
guard was able to reach Losheim, the
village which gave its name to the gap
at the northern terminus of the Schnee
Eifel. At this time Peiper received a
radio message saying that the next rail-
road overpass was out, that the engineers
would not get up in time to make repairs,
and that he must turn west to Lanzerath
2 The records of Peiper’s unit were destroyed
just before his capture. In 1945, however, Peiper
was interviewed by members of the ETO His-
torical Section. (See Ferriss, Rpt Based on Intervs
in January 1945. passim.) Much of the tactical
detail used herein comes from the 3,268-page
trial transcript of the so-called Malmédy Case
tried before the U.S. General Military Government
Court in 1946. A good summary of the latter is
found in a manuscript by Royce L. Thompson
entitled The ETO Ardennes Campaign: Opera-
tions of the Combat Group Peiper, 16–26 December
1944 (1952), in OCMH files.

THE ENEMY DASH WESTWARD AND OPERATION GREIF 261
in the 3d Parachute Division sector.
This move was completed by midnight,
although a number of tanks and other
vehicles were lost to mines and anti-
tank fire while making the turnabout at
Losheim. At Lanzerath Colonel Peiper
discovered that the 3d Parachute also had
failed to punch any sizable hole through
the American line, although the 1st SS
Panzer Division had taken Krewinkel
and so helped the 3d Parachute forward.
Irritated by the hours frittered away,
Peiper took an infantry battalion, put
two of his Panther tanks at the point of
the column, and at 0400 attacked toward
Honsfeld. Opposition had evaporated.
Honsfeld was surprised and taken with
ease. 2
The original route assigned Peiper’s
kampfgruppe ran west to Schoppen. This
was a poor road, bogged with mud from
the winter rains, and since the 12th SS
Panzer Division had not yet come up
Peiper pre-empted the latter’s paved
route through Büllingen. Also he had
been told that there were gasoline stores
in Büllingen, and a great deal of fuel
had been burned during the jockeying
around Losheim. Sure enough, the gaso-
line was found as predicted. Using
American prisoners as labor, the Ger-
mans refueled their tanks. They scooped
up much other booty here and destroyed
a number of artillery planes on a near-
by field. When American gunners com-
menced to shell the village the
column was already moving on, although
it suffered some casualties. By this time
Peiper and his staff believed that the
breakthrough was complete; no Amer-
ican troops appeared on the sensitive
north flank, and only an occasional jeep
scuttled away to the west of the column.
2 Ch. VIII.
It was between noon and one o’clock
of 17 December, on the road between
Modersheid and Ligneuville, that the
German advance guard ran into an
American truck convoy moving south
from Malmédy. This was ill-fated Bat-
tery B of the 285th Field Artillery Ob-
servation Battalion. The convoy was shot
up and the advance guard rolled on,
leaving the troops to the rear to deal
with the Americans who had taken to
the woods and ditches. About two hours
after, or so the dazed survivors later re-
called, the Americans who had been
rounded up were marched into a field
where, at a signal, they were shot down
by machine gun and pistol fire. A few
escaped by feigning death, but the
wounded who moved or screamed were
sought out and shot through the head.
At least eighty-six Americans were mas-
sacred here. This was not the first killing
of unarmed prisoners chargeable to
Kampfgruppe Peiper on 17 December.
Irrefutable evidence shows that nineteen
unarmed Americans were shot down at
Honsfeld and fifty at Büllingen. 3
The Malmédy massacre would have
repercussions reaching far wider than
one might expect of a single battlefield
atrocity in a long and bitter war. This
“incident” undoubtedly stiffened the
will of the American combatants (al-
though a quantitative assessment of this
fact is impossible) ; it would be featured
in the war crimes trials as an outstanding
3 The massacres perpetrated by Peiper’s troops
were the subject of a special Congressional in-
vestigation: 81st Cong., 1st sess., Report of the
Subcommittee on Armed Services, United States
Senate, Malmédy Massacre Investigation (dated 13
October 1949). 3 Records of the War Crimes
Branch, USFET, 1946. The postwar SS view of
the Malmédy incident is given in Paul Hausser’s
Waflen–SS im Einsatz (Goettingen, 1953), pp.
242–57.

262
THE ARDENNES: BATTLE OF THE BULGE
PEIPER’S TROOPS ON THE ROAD TO MALMÉDY
example of Nazi contempt for the ac-
cepted rules of war; and it would serve
a United States Senator as a stepping-
stone toward a meteoric career. But the
Malmédy massacre and the other mur-
ders of 17 December did not complete
the list chargeable to Peiper and the
troops of the 1st SS Panzer Division. By
20 December Peiper’s command had
murdered approximately 350 American
prisoners of war and at least 100 un-
armed Belgian civilians, this total de-
rived from killings at twelve different
locations along Peiper’s line of march.
So far as can be determined the Peiper
killings represent the only organized and
directed murder of prisoners of war by
either side during the Ardennes battle. 4
The commander of the Sixth SS Panzer
Army took oath in the trials of 1946 that,
acting on Hitler’s orders, he issued a
directive stating that the German troops
should be preceded “by a wave of terror
and fright and that no human inhibi-
tions should be shown.” There is con-
flicting testimony as to whether the or-
ders finally reaching Peiper specifically
enjoined the shooting of prisoners.
There is no question, however, that
4 Hitler’s order to take no prisoners probably
had wide circulation. Lt. Col. George Mabry,
commander of the 2d Battalion, 8th Infantry, has
stated that his unit captured a German colonel
from the Seventh Army who had such an order.
Ltr, Gen Barton to author, 17 Nov 59.

THE ENEMY DASH WESTWARD AND OPERATION GREIF 263
MASSACRED AMERICAN SOLDIERS NEAR MALMÉDY
some of Peiper’s subordinates accepted
the killing of prisoners as a command
and that on at least one occasion Peiper
himself gave such an order. Why Peiper’s
command gained the bestial distinction
of being the only unit to kill prisoners in
the course of the Ardennes is a subject
of surmise. Peiper had been an adjutant
to Heinrich Himmler and as a battalion
commander in Russia is alleged to have
burned two villages and killed all the
inhabitants. The veteran SS troops he
led in the Ardennes had long experience
on the Eastern Front where brutality
toward prisoners of war was a common-
place. On the other hand Peiper’s for-
mation was well in the van of the Ger-
man attack and was thus in position to
carry out the orders for the “wave of
terror” tactic—which might be excused,
or so Peiper claimed, by the rapid move-
ment of his kampfgruppe and its in-
ability to retain prisoners under guard.
The speed with which the news of the
Malmédy massacre reached the Ameri-
can front-line troops is amazing but, in
the perfervid emotional climate of 17
December, quite understandable. The
first survivors of the massacre were
picked up by a patrol from the 291st
Engineer Combat Battalion about 1430
on that date. The inspector general of

264 THE ARDENNES: BATTLE OF THE BULGE
the First Army learned of the shootings
three or four hours later. Yet by the late
evening of the 17th the rumor that the
enemy was killing prisoners had reached
as far as the forward American divisions.
There were American commanders who
orally expressed the opinion that all SS
troops should be killed on sight and
there is some indication that in isolated
cases express orders for this were given. 5
It is probable that Germans who at-
tempted to surrender in the days imme-
diately after the 17th ran a greater risk
than would have been the case during
the autumn campaign. There is no evi-
dence, however, that American troops
took advantage of orders, implicit or ex-
plicit, to kill their SS prisoners.
The point of Peiper’s column reached
Ligneuville sometime before 1300, in
time to eat the lunch which had been
prepared for an American detachment
stationed in the village. Here the road
divided, the north fork going to Mal-
médy, the western leading on to Stavelot.
Although it was agreed that the armored
columns should have considerable lee-
way in choosing the exact routes they
would follow, a general boundary line
gave the 1st SS Panzer Division the
southern part of the zone assigned the
I SS Panzer, while the 12th SS Panzer
Division advanced in the northern sector.
The 12th SS Panzer Division, of course,
was still back at the line of scrimmage,
nor would it break into the clear for
many hours to come, but all this was un-
known to Peiper. He did know that the
5 Thus Fragmentary Order 27, issued by Head-
quarters, 328th Infantry, on 21 December for the
attack scheduled the following day says: “No SS
troops or paratroopers will be taken prisoners but
will be shot on sight.”
Americans thus far had shown no disposi-
tion to throw punches at his north flank.
Furthermore, the 3d Parachute Division
had a clear field to follow up and protect
his line of communications, while the 2d
Panzer Division-so Peiper understood-
was moving fast in the south and roughly
abreast of his own advance.
Peiper had a precisely defined mis-
sion: his kampfgruppe was to seize the
Meuse River crossings at Huy, making
full use of the element of surprise and
driving west without regard to any flank
protection. The importance of this mis-
sion had been underlined during the
initial briefing at the command post of
the 1st SS Panzer Division on 14 Decem-
ber when Peiper had been assured that
his command would play the decisive
role in the coming counteroffensive.
There seems to have been some hope ex-
pressed among the higher German staffs
that the advance guard elements of both
the 1st SS Panzer Division and the Fifth
Panzer Army’s 2d Panzer Division would
reach the Meuse within twenty-four
hours of the time of commitment. The
distance by road, on the 1st SS Panzer
Division axis, was between 125 and 150
kilometers (about 75 to 95 miles). Pei-
per himself had made a test run on 11
December to prove that it was possible
for single tanks to travel 80 kilometers
(50 miles) in one night. Whether an
entire tank column could maintain this
rate of progress for a day and a night
in enemy country and on the sharp turns
and grades of the Ardennes road net was
a matter of guesswork. 6
Whatever schedule Peiper was using,
6 Peiper later said that if the German infantry
had made a penetration by 0700 on 16 December
he could have reached the Meuse the same day.

THE ENEMY DASH WESTWARD AND OPERATION GREIF 265
if indeed he had any precise timetable
in mind, the kampfgruppe of the 1st SS
Panzer Division was making good prog-
ress and the element of surprise, as
shown by the lack of any formal resist-
ance, was working to German advantage.
His path lay straight ahead, through
Stavelot, Trois Ponts, Werbomont, Ouf-
fet, Seny, Huy–a distance of some 50
miles, from where the head of the 1st SS
Panzer Division column stood in Ligneu-
ville, to Huy and the Meuse. Only
a few short miles to the north lay Mal-
médy and the road to Spa and Liège.
Malmédy and the Meuse crossing sites in
the vicinity of Liège, however, were in
the zone assigned the 12th SS Panzer
Division. Peiper stuck to his knitting.
About 1400 the column resumed the
march, taking some time to negotiate the
sharp turns and narrow streets in Ligneu-
ville. At the western exit the point
of the column ran onto the trains be-
longing to CCB, 9th Armored Division,
which was preparing to move east in sup-
port of the combat command then en-
gaged in the St. Vith sector. A couple of
Sherman tanks and a tank destroyer
made a fight for it, demolishing the
leading Panther and a few other armored
vehicles. Peiper’s column was delayed for
about an hour.
Advancing along the south bank of the
Amblève, the advance guard reached
Stavelot, the point where the river must
be crossed, at dusk. Looking down on the
town the Germans saw hundreds of
trucks, while on the opposite bank the
road from Stavelot to Malmédy was
jammed with vehicles. Although the
Germans did not know it, many of these
trucks were moving to help evacuate the
great First Army gasoline dumps north
of Stavelot and Malmédy. March serials
of the 7th Armored Division also were
moving through Stavelot en route to
Vielsalm.
The small town of Stavelot (popula-
tion 5,000) lies in the Amblève River
valley surrounded by high, sparsely
wooded bluffs. Most of the town is built
on the north bank of the river or on the
slopes above. There are a few scattered
buildings on the south bank. Like most
of the water courses in this part of the
Ardennes, the Amblève was no particular
obstacle to infantry but the deeply in-
cised valley at this point offered hard
going to tanks, while the river, by reason
of the difficult approaches, was a tougher
than average tank barrier. Only one
vehicular bridge spanned the river at
Stavelot. The sole approach to this
bridge was by the main highway; here
the ground to the left fell away sharply
and to the right a steep bank rose above
the road.
Stavelot and its bridge were open for
the taking. The only combat troops in
the town at this time were a squad from
the 291st Engineer Combat Battalion
which had been sent from Malmédy to
construct a roadblock on the road lead-
ing to the bridge. For some reason Pei-
per’s advance guard halted on the south
side of the river, one of those quirks in
the conduct of military operations which
have critical import but which can never
be explained. Months after the event
Peiper told interrogators that his force
had been checked by American antitank
weapons covering the narrow approach
to the bridge, that Stavelot was “heavily
defended.” But his detailed description
of what happened when the Germans
attacked to take town and bridge shows
that he was confused in his chronology
and was thinking of events which tran-

266
spired on 18 December. It is true that
during the early evening of the 17th
three German tanks made a rush for the
bridge, but when the leader hit a hasty
mine field, laid by American engineers,
the others turned back–nor were they
seen for the rest of the night.
Perhaps the sight of the numerous
American vehicles parked in the streets
led Peiper to believe that the town was
held in force and that a night attack
held the only chance of taking the bridge
intact. If so, the single effort made by
the German point is out of keeping with
Peiper’s usual ruthless drive and daring.
Perhaps Peiper accepted the word of his
leading troops and failed to establish the
true situation for himself. Perhaps he
was interested at this moment only in
closing up his third column, which in
march formation extended for fifteen
miles. Perhaps, as he says, Peiper was
waiting for his infantry. Whatever the
reason–and it never will be known–the
German kampfgruppe came to a halt on
the night of 17–18 December at the
Stavelot bridge, forty-two miles from the
Meuse.
During the night the First Army fed
reinforcements into Malmédy, for it
seemed impossible that the Germans
could forfeit the opportunity to seize the
town. As part of the defense being or-
ganized here a company of the 526th
Armored Infantry Battalion and a pla-
toon of 3-inch towed tank destroyers
were ordered to outpost Stavelot. Maj.
Paul J. Solis, commanding this detach-
ment, began moving his troops into posi-
tion just before daybreak: two platoons
on the south bank of the river (with a
section of tank destroyers at the old road-
block) ; one platoon with three 57-mm.
antitank guns and the second section of
THE ARDENNES: BATTLE OF THE BULGE
tank destroyers in reserve around the
town square north of the river.
Before the riflemen could organize a
defense the German infantry attacked,
captured the tank destroyers south of the
river, and drove the two platoons back
across the bridge. Taken by surprise, the
Americans failed to destroy the bridge
structure, and a Panther made a dash
about 0800 which carried it onto the
north bank. More tanks followed. For
some while the Germans were held in
the houses next to the river; an antiair-
craft artillery battery from the 7th Ar-
mored Division wandered into the fire
fight and did considerable damage be-
fore it went on its way. A company from
the 202d Engineer Combat Battalion
entered the town and joined in the fray.
By the end of the morning, however, the
German firing line had been built up to
the point where the Americans could no
longer hold inside the village proper,
particularly since the hostile tanks were
roving at will in the streets.
Solis ordered his detachment to retire
to the top of the hill above Stavelot, but
in the confusion of disengagement the
remaining antitank weapons and all but
one of the rifle platoons fell back along
the Malmédy road. With German tanks
climbing behind the lone platoon and
without any means of antitank defense,
Solis seized some of the gasoline from the
Francorchamps dump, had his men pour
it out in a deep road cut, where there
was no turn-out, and set it ablaze. The
result was a perfect antitank barrier.
The German tanks turned back to
Stavelot–this was the closest that Kampf-
gruppe Peiper ever came to the great
stores of gasoline which might have
taken the 1st SS Panzer Division to the
Meuse River. Solis had burned 124,000

THE ENEMY DASH WESTWARD AND OPERATION GREIF 267
gallons for his improvised roadblock, but
this was the only part of the First Army’s
POL reserve lost during the entire Ar-
dennes operation.
While the engagement in Stavelot was
still in progress, Peiper turned some of
his tanks toward Trois Ponts, the im-
portant bridgehead at the confluence of
the Salm and the Amblève. As Peiper
puts it: “We proceeded at top speed
towards Trois Ponts in an effort to seize
the bridge there. . . . If we had cap-
tured the bridge at Trois Ponts intact
and had had enough fuel, it would have
been a simple matter to drive through
to the Meuse River early that day.” One
company of Mark IV tanks tried to reach
Trois Ponts by following a narrow side
road on the near bank of the Amblève.
The road was almost impassable, and
when the column came under American
fire this approach was abandoned. The
main part of the kampfgruppe swung
through Stavelot and advanced on Trois
Ponts by the highway which followed the
north bank of the river. Things were
looking up and it seemed that the only
cause for worry was the lowering level in
the panzer fuel tanks. Missing in Peiper’s
calculations was an American gun, the
puny 57-mm. antitank weapon which
had proven such an impuissant answer to
German tanks.
Trois Ponts gains its name from three
highway bridges, two over the Salm and
one across the Amblève. The road from
Stavelot passes under railroad tracks as
it nears Trois Ponts, then veers sharply
to the south, crosses the Amblève, con-
tinues through the narrow valley for a
few hundred yards, and finally turns
west at right angles to cross the Salm and
enter the main section of the small vil-
lage. A number of roads find their way
through the deep recesses of the Salm
and Amblève valleys to reach Trois
Ponts, hidden among the cliffs and hills.
Most, however, wind for some distance
through the gorges and along the tor-
tuous valley floors. One road, a con-
tinuation of the paved highway from
Stavelot, leads immediately from Trois
Ponts and the valley to the west. This
road, via Werbomont, was Peiper’s ob-
jective.
Company C, 51st Engineer Combat
Battalion, occupied Trois Ponts, so im-
portant in the itinerary of the kampf-
gruppe. Quite unaware of the impor-
tance of its mission, the company had
been ordered out of the sawmills it had
been operating as part of the First
Army’s Winterization and Bridge Tim-
ber Cutting Program, and dispatched
to Trois Ponts where it detrucked
about midnight on 17 December. Num-
bering around 140 men, the company
was armed with eight bazookas and ten
machine guns. Maj. Robert B. Yates,
commanding the force, knew only that
the 1111th Engineer Group was prepar-
ing a barrier line along the Salm River
from Trois Ponts south to Bovigny and
that he was to construct roadblocks at
the approaches to Trois Ponts according
to the group plans. During the night
Yates deployed the company at road-
blocks covering the bridge across the
Amblève and at the vulnerable highway
underpass at the railroad tracks north of
the river. On the morning of 18 Decem-
ber a part of the artillery column of the
7th Armored Division passed through
Trois Ponts, after a detour to avoid the
German armor south of Malmédy; then
appeared one 57-mm. antitank gun and
crew which had become lost during the
move of the 526th Armored Infantry

268
Battalion. Yates commandeered the crew
and placed the gun on the Stavelot road
to the east of the first underpass where
a daisy chain of mines had been laid.
A quarter of an hour before noon the
advance guard of Peiper’s main column,
nineteen or twenty tanks, came rolling
along the road. A shot from the lone
antitank gun crippled or in somewise
stopped the foremost German tank, but
after a brief skirmish the enemy knocked
out the gun, killed four of the crew, and
drove back the engineers. The hit on
the lead tank checked the German column
just long enough to give warning
to the bridge guards, only a few score
yards farther on. They blew the Amblève
bridge, then the Salm bridge, and
fell back to the houses in the main part
of town. In the meantime one of the
engineer platoons had discouraged the
German tank company from further
advance along the side road and it had
turned back to Stavelot 7 .
Frustrated by a battalion antitank gun
and a handful of engineers, Kampf-
gruppe Peiper now had no quick exit
from the valley of the Amblève. With
but one avenue remaining the column
turned northward toward La Gleize,
moving through the canyons of the Am-
blève on the east side of the river. At
La Gleize there was a western exit from
the valley, although by a mediocre,
twisting road. Nearby, at the hamlet of
Cheneux, the Germans found a bridge
intact over the Amblève. This stroke of
good luck was countered by bad when
the weather cleared and American fight-
er-bombers knocked out two or three
7 The ubiquitous 51st Engineer Combat Bat-
talion will crop up at many points in this narra-
tive. The battalion was awarded a Presidential
Citation.
THE ARDENNES: BATTLE OF THE BULGE
tanks and seven half-tracks, blocking the
narrow road for a considerable period.
When night came the armored point was
within some three miles of Werbomont,
an important road center on the main
highway linking Liège and Bastogne.
Then, as the Germans neared a creek
(the Lienne) a squad of Company A,
291st Engineer Combat Battalion, blew
up the only bridge. Reconnaissance
north and south discovered other
bridges, but all were too fragile to sup-
port the Tiger tanks which had come
forward with the advance guard. Dur-
ing the evening one detachment with
half-tracks and assault guns did cross on
a bridge to the north and swung south-
west toward Werbomont. Near Chevron
this force ran into an ambush, set by a
battalion of the 30th Division which had
been sent to head off Peiper, and was cut
to pieces. Few of the Germans escaped.
Since there was nothing left but to dou-
ble back on his tracks, Peiper left a
guard on the bridge at Cheneux and
moved his advance guard through the
dark toward the town of Stoumont, situ-
ated on the Amblève River road from
which the abortive detour had been
made during the afternoon. Scouts
brought in word that Stoumont was
strongly held and that more American
troops were moving in from Spa. There
was nothing left but to fight for the town.
All through the afternoon of the
18th, liaison planes from the First Army
airstrip at Spa had been skidding under
the clouds to take a look at Peiper’s
tanks and half-tracks. One of these light
planes picked up the advance at Cheneux
and called the Ninth Air Force in to
work over this force. By the evening of
18 December Peiper’s entire column,
now spread over many miles of road,

THE ENEMY DASH WESTWARD AND OPERATION GREIF 269
had been located and the word flashed
back to First Army headquarters. The
element of surprise, vital to the German
plan of a coup .de main at the Meuse,
was gone. American forces from the 30th
Infantry Division were racing in on
Peiper from the north, and the 82d Air-
borne Division was moving with all pos-
sible speed to the threatened area.
It is doubtful that Peiper realized how
the American net was being spread for
a cast from the north, but he had
experienced enough reverses on 18 De-
cember to feel the stiffening of opposi-
tion in his path. Radio contact between
Peiper and the higher German head-
quarters had broken down, the armored
sending apparatus failing to carry over
the Ardennes terrain, and the Sixth
Panzer Army was forced to follow
Peiper’s progress through intercepted
American radio messages. Peiper, on
the other hand, had little or no in-
formation as to what was happening be-
hind him and where the following
kampfgruppen of his own division were
located. A Luftwaffe ultrahigh-fre-
quency radio set was rushed to Peiper
by liaison officer late this day, but its
possession did not alter the relative
independence and isolation of Peiper’s
command.
Sometime during the night of 18–
19 December the radio link with the
headquarters of the 1st Panzer Division
was restored. By this means Peiper may
have learned what he already must
have suspected, that the 30th Infantry
Division was on the move south from
the American Ninth Army sector. Ger-
man reconnaissance and intelligence
agencies opposite the U.S. Ninth Army
had been alert from the first hours of
the counteroffensive for any sign that
troops were being stripped from the
Roer front for intervention in the south.
The first two divisions to leave the Ninth
Army area, the 30th Infantry and 7th
Armored, actually were in reserve and
out of contact, but when the two started
moving on 17 December the word was
flashed back to OB WEST almost at
once. Again American radio security had
failed.
Operation Greif
During the last days before the great
offensive which would send the German
armored spearheads plunging west,
Hitler belatedly set about replicating
the winning combination of rapid and
deep armored penetration, paratroop
attacks in the enemy rear, and in-
filtration by disguised ground troops
which had functioned so effectively in
the western campaign of 1940 and the
Greek campaign of 1941. To flesh out
this combination, a special operation
named Greif (or Condor) was hurriedly
organized as an adjunct to the armored
operation assigned the 1st SS Panzer
Division. 8
The plans for the ground phase of
Greif consisted of three parts: the seizure
intact of at least two bridges across the
Meuse by disguised raiding parties, the
prompt reinforcement of any such coup
de main by an armored commando for-
mation; and an organized attempt to
create confusion in the Allied rear areas
through sabotage carried out by jeep
parties clad in American uniforms. Later
it would be rumored that a feature of
8 The origins of this scheme are described by
Manteuffel in Frieden and Richardson, eds., The
Fatal Decisions, pp 272–74. See also B. H. Liddell
Hart, The Other Side of the Hill (London:
Cassell and Company, Ltd., 1951).

270 THE ARDENNES: BATTLE OF THE BULGE
Operation Greif was the planned assassination
of Allied leaders, notably
General Eisenhower, but there is no
evidence of such plotting in the plan.
The idea for the ground operation
was probably Hitler’s and the leader,
Lt. Col. Otto Skorzeny, was selected personally
by Hitler. Skorzeny had achieved
a considerable reputation as a daring
commando leader, had rescued Mussolini
from the Italians, and had seized
the Hungarian Regent, Admiral Miklós
von Nagybánya Horthy, when the Hungarian
regime began to waver in its
loyalties. For Operation Greif, Skorzeny
formed the special Panzer Brigade 150
(or Brandenburger) numbering about
two thousand men, of whom one hundred
and fifty could speak English. 9
Captured Allied equipment (particularly
tanks and jeeps), uniforms, identification
papers, and the like were hastily
collected at the front and sent to Skorzeny’s
headquarters. The disguised jeep
parties did go into action with varying
degrees of success on 16 December, but
the Brandenburger Brigade would be
engaged as a unit only in a single and
abortive skirmish near Malmédy five
days later.
The airborne phase of Operation
Greif, whose code name was Hohes
Venn, seems to have been completely an
afterthought, for the orders setting up
the operation were not issued until 8
December. 10 Hitler, like most of the
9 The original Brandenburg Division seems to
have been none too happy that Skorzeny’s group
was given the name of the Brandenburgers. H.
Kriegsheim, Getarnt, Getauescht und doch Getreu:
Die Division “Brandenburg” (Berlin, 1958), p. 305.
10 The story of the Hohes Venn operation is
given by its leader in MS # P–051, Airborne
Operations: A German Appraisal (Generalmajor
Hellmuth Reinhardt) . Cf., the C.S.D.I.C. (U.K.)
higher German commanders, had lost
confidence in airdrop tactics after the
many casualties suffered by the German
paratroopers in the Crete jump. Then
too, in late 1944 the necessarily lengthy
training for paratroop units was a lux-
ury denied by the huge drain of battle-
field losses. Apparently it was Model
who suggested that paratroop tactics be
tried once again, but undoubtedly Hitler
seized upon the proposal with alacrity
although there was no longer a single
regular paratroop regiment active in the
Wehrmacht. Model wanted the jump
to be made in the Krinkelt area, and
one may wonder what effect such a ver-
tical attack might have had on the fight
put up at the twin villages by the Ameri-
can 2d and 99th Infantry Divisions.
Hitler, however, had one of his intuitive
strokes and ordered the jump to be made
north of Malmédy.
His choice for commander devolved
on Col. Friedrich A. Freiherr von der
Heydte, a distinguished and experienced
paratroop officer then commanding the
Fallschirm Armee Waffen school where
the nominal parachute regiments were
being trained as ground troops. Colonel
von der Heydte was ordered to organize
a thousand-man parachute formation for
immediate use. Four days later von der
Heydte received his tactical mission
from the Sixth SS Panzer Army com-
mander during an uncomfortable session
in which Dietrich was under the in-
fluence of alcohol. The paratroopers
were to jump at dawn on D-day, first
opening the roads in the Hohes Venn
leading from the Elsenborn-Malmédy
area toward Eupen for the armored
spearhead units, then blocking Allied
documents S.I.R. 1377 (n.d.) and G.R.G.G. 359
(c) 24 Sep 45.

THE ENEMY DASH WESTWARD AND OPERATION GREIF 271
forces if these attempted to intervene.
Colonel von der Heydte was told that
the German armor would reach him
within twenty-four hours.
The preparations for Operation
Hohes Venn were rushed to completion.
The troops received their equipment
and a little jump training (many had
never attended jump school) ; 112 war-
weary, Junkers troop-carrier planes were
gathered with an ill-assorted group of
pilots, half of whom had never flown
combat missions; 300 dummy figures
were loaded for drops north of Camp
Elsenborn to confuse the Americans
(this turned out to be about the most
successful feature of the entire oper-
ation) ; and the pilots and jump-masters
were given instructions-but no joint
training. It must be said that these prep-
arations for what would be the first
German paratroop assault at night and
into woods left much to be desired.
On the evening of 15 December Colo-
nel von der Heydte formed his compa-
nies to entruck for the move to Pader-
born, where the planes were assembled.
The trucks never arrived-they had no
fuel. Now the jump was ordered for
0300 on the 17th. This time the jump
was made on schedule, although not
quite as planned and into very bad cross
winds. One rifle company was dropped
behind the German lines fifty kilo-
meters away from the drop zone, most
of the signal platoon fell just in front of
the German positions south of Mon-
schau, and the bulk of the command and
the weapons packages were scattered al-
most at random. Despite this bad be-
ginning about one hundred paratroopers
reached the rendezvous at the fork in
the Eupen road north of Mont Rigi.
Since this group was obviously too weak
for open action, Colonel von der Heydte
formed camp in the woods and sent out
patrols to pick up information and harass
the Americans in the vicinity. These pa-
trols gathered in stragglers until some
three hundred paratroopers had as-
sembled, but it was now too late to carry
out the planned operation. On the night
of the 21st the paratroopers were or-
dered to find their way back to the Ger-
man lines believed to be at Monschau.
Von der Heydte was taken prisoner two
days later. The tactical effect of this hast-
ily conceived and ill-executed operation
proved to be almost nil although Ameri-
can commanders did dispatch troops on
wild-goose chases which netted little but
a few paratroopers, empty parachutes,
and dummies . 11
11 The
repor ts of enemy paratroopers did result
in numerous troop alerts in the American rear
areas. For example, the 1102d, 1107th, and 1128th
Engineer Groups were alerted. (VIII Corps, G–3
Jnl, 16 Dec 44.) The German soldiery, surprisingly,
were told of Colonel von der Heydte’s failure in
an article entitled “Operation Mass Murder”
which appeared in the Nachrichten Fur Die
Truppe (the German equivalent of The Stars and
Stripes) on 22 December 1944. This article, as the
title implies, is extremely bitter over the lack of
troop training and preparation.

CHAPTER XII
The First Attacks at St.Vith
St. Vith lay approximately twelve threefold: to insure the complete isomiles
behind the front lines on 16 De- lation of the troops that might be
cember. This was an average Belgian trapped on the Schnee Eifel, to cover
town, with a population of a little over the German supply lines unraveling be-
2,000 and sufficient billets to house a hind the armored corps to the north
division headquarters. It was important, and south, and to feed reinforcements
however, as the knot which tied the roads laterally into the main thrusts by using
running around the important Eifel bar- the St. Vith road net. The closest of
rier to the net which fanned out toward the northern armored routes, as these
the north, south, and west. Six paved appeared on the German operations
or macadam roads entered St. Vith. maps, ran through Recht, about five
None of these were considered by the miles northwest of St. Vith. The closest
German planners to be major military of the primary armored routes in the
trunk lines, although in the late sum- south ran through Burg Reuland, some
mer of 1944 work had been started to five miles south.
recondition the road running east from St. Vith is built on a low hill sur-
St. Vith to Stadtkyll as a branch of the rounded on all sides by slightly higher
main military system, because normally rises. On the south the Braunlauf Creek
the Schnee Eifel range served as a break- swings past St. Vith and from the stream
water diverting heavy highway traffic so a draw extends to the west edge of the
that it passed to the north or south of town. About a mile and a half to the
St. Vith. (See Map III.)
east a large wooded hill mass rises as
In German plans the hub at St. Vith a screen. This is crossed by the road to
was important, but it was not on the axis Schönberg, which then dips into the Our
of any of the main armored thrusts. The valley and follows the north bank of the
German armored corps advancing river until the Schönberg bridge is
through the northeastern Ardennes were reached, approximately six miles from
slated to swing wide of the Schnee Eifel St. Vith.
and St. Vith, the I SS Panzer Corps On the morning of 16 December the
passing north, the L VIII Panzer Corps messages reporting the initial German
passing south. But despite admonitions attacks in the 106th Division positions
from the German High Command that were punctuated for the division staff
the armored spearheads should race for- by occasional large-caliber shells falling
ward without regard to their flanks it in St. Vith. This fire was quite ineffectual
was obvious that St. Vith had to be and there was little comprehension in
taken early in the game. The reason was these early hours of the serious nature

THE FIRST ATTACKS AT ST. VITH 273
of the German attack. The attachment
of CCB, 9th Armored Division, to
the 106th Division late in the morning
promised such aid as then seemed neces-
sary, but Hoge’s command post was at
Monschau and he would not receive his
orders from Jones until about 1800. As
a result CCB began its move for St. Vith
about 2000 on the 16th.
As the size and direction of the first
enemy effort began to assume some
shadowy form on the situation maps
in the corps and division headquarters,
General Middleton advised the 106th
Division commander that he could use
the 168th Engineer Combat Battalion,
which was engaged in routine duties
around St. Vith and Vielsalm. This bat-
talion (Lt. Col. W. L. Nungesser)
was at about half strength–attendance
at schools or special assignments account-
ed for the rest. The men had not been
given any recent training in the use
of bazookas or machine guns; a large
percentage of the machine gunners
would therefore be killed in the fight
for St. Vith. At 1030 on 17 December,
reports of the German penetration from
the east led General Jones to send the
168th out the St. Vith–Schönberg road
with orders to defend astride the road
at the village of Heuem. While en route,
the engineers met troopers of the 32d
Cavalry who had been involved in a run-
ning fight along the road west of Schön-
berg. Heuem, they reported, was in
enemy hands and a German column was
heading straight for St. Vith.
On the morning of the 17th Colonel
Slayden, VIII Corps’ assistant G–2, and
Lt. Col. Earle Williams, the 106th
Division signal officer, while doing in-
dependent scouting east of St. Vith, had
seen the enemy and tapped the signal
wire to ask for artillery interdiction of
the highway. The combat engineer bat-
talion deployed about two miles east
of St. Vith along the outer edge of a
pine forest fringing the ridge mask over
which climbs the road from Schönberg.
Here forty men or so of the 81st Engineer
Combat Battalion (106th Division)
joined the 168th. CCB, 9th Armored Di-
vision, had passed St. Vith en route to
aid the 424th Infantry, and a platoon of
Troop C, 89th Cavalry Squadron, was
commandeered to reinforce the watch
east of the town. 1 This little force was
digging in when, at noon, the first
enemy patrols were sighted.
The 7th Armored Division
Move to St. Vith
When the counteroffensive began, the
7th Armored Division (Brig. Gen. Robert
W. Hasbrouck) was in the XIII
Corps reserve, planning for possible
commitment in the Ninth Army Operation
DAGGER intended to clear the Germans
from the west bank of the Roer
River once the dams were destroyed. 2
1 The subsequent story of these units is threaded
together from the VIII Corps G–2 and G–3 jour-
nals; combat interviews with the VIII Corps staff
and the 168th Engineer Battalion; the separate
troop histories in the 89th Cavalry Reconnais-
sance Squadron, AAR; the 168th Engineer Combat
Battalion AAR; and the journals of CCB, 9th
Armored. (The AAR of the latter is worthless
and the journals are very confused; they do,
however, have many map overlays from which the
action can be traced.)
2 The history of the 7th Armored in the battle
of St. Vith is better documented than any part
of the Ardennes story, with the sole exception of
the defense of Bastogne. All of the units organic
to this command prepared AAR’s, including the
division trains and artillery. The unit journals,
as is common in an armored division, are rather
slim, although, in this case, fairly accurate. A
quite complete and accurate account was prepared
by one of the participants, Maj. Donald P. Boyer,

274 THE ARDENNES: BATTLE OF THE BULGE
The division, assembled about fifteen
miles north of Aachen, had taken no
part as a unit in the November
drive toward the Roer, although com-
panies and battalions on occasion had
been attached to attacking infantry di-
visions. The period of rest and refitting,
after heavy fighting at Metz and in Hol-
land, had put the 7th Armored in good
condition. When General Bradley and
the 12th Army Group staff met in the
afternoon of the 16th to make a tenta-
tive selection of divisions which could be
taken from other fronts to reinforce the
Ardennes sector, the choice in the north
fell on Hasbrouck’s command. Actually
there were armored divisions in the
First Army closer to the scene, but they
had been alerted for use in the first
phases of the attacks planned to seize
the Roer River dams (a design not
abandoned until 17 December) and as
yet little sense of urgency attached to
reinforcements in the VIII Corps area.
General Hasbrouck received a tele-
phone call at 1730 alerting his division
for movement to the south (it took five
more hours for the 7th Armored G–2
to learn that “three or four German di-
visions were attacking”) . Two hours
later while the division assembled
and made ready, an advance party left
the division command post at Heerlen,
Holland, for Bastogne where it was to
receive instructions from the VIII Corps.
Vielsalm, fourteen miles west of St. Vith
by road, had already been designated as
the new assembly area. At Bastogne
Jr., in 1947 and was published as St. Vith: The 7th
Armored Division in the Battle of the Bulge, 17–
23 December 1944. (I have used Major Boyer’s
original typescript which is written in greater
detail.) The combat interviews (particularly
those compiled by Robert Merriam) are very in-
formative.
General Middleton outlined the mission:
one combat command would be pre-
pared to assist the 106th Division, a
second could be used if needed, but
under no circumstances was the third to
be committed. The decision was left to
General Hasbrouck, who first was to con-
sult with the 106th Division as to how
and when his leading combat command
would be employed. Even at this hour
the scope of the German counteroffen-
sive was but dimly seen and the 7th Ar-
mored Division advance party was in-
formed that it would not be necessary
to have the artillery accompany the com-
bat command columns–in other words
this would not be a tactical march from
Heerlen to Vielsalm.
The movement plans prepared by the
First Army staff assigned General Has-
brouck two routes of march: an east
route, through Aachen, Eupen, Mal-
médy, and Recht, on which CCR would
move; a west route, through Maastricht,
Verviers, and Stavelot, which would be
used by the main body of the division.
The division artillery, which had been
firing in support of the XIII Corps, was
not to displace until the late morning of
17 December, when it would move on
the eastern route. Shortly after midnight
the Ninth Army was informed that the
two columns would depart at 0330 and
0800; actually the western column moved
out at 0430. The estimated time of ar-
rival was 1400, 17 December, and of
closure 0200, 18 December. A couple of
hours earlier the First Army headquar-
ters had told General Middleton that
the west column would arrive at 0700
and close at 1900 on the 17th, and that
the combat command on the east road
would arrive at 1100 and close at 1700.
It was on this estimate that General

THE FIRST ATTACKS AT ST. VITH 275
Middleton and the 106th Division com-
mander based their plans for a counter-
attack by a combat command of the 7th
Armored east of St. Vith early on 17
December.
Although this failure to make an ac-
curate estimate of the time of arrival
in the battle area bore on the fate of
the two regiments on the Schnee Eifel,
it was merely a single event in the
sequence leading to the final encircle-
ment and lacked any decisive import.
The business of computing the lateral
movement of an armored division close
to a front through which the enemy was
breaking could hardly attain the exact-
ness of a Leavenworth solution com-
plete with march graphs and tables.
None of the charts on traffic density com-
monly used in general staff or armored
school training could give a formula for
establishing the coefficient of “friction”
in war, in this case the mass of jeeps,
prime movers, guns, and trucks which
jammed the roads along which the 7th
Armored columns had to move to St.
Vith. Also, the transmittal of the 7th
Armored Division’s own estimate of its
possible progress was subject to “fric-
tion.” This estimate was received at the
headquarters of the VIII Corps at 0500
on 17 December, the first indication, it
would appear, that the leading armored
elements would arrive at 1400 instead
of 0700 as planned. Thus far the Ninth
Army had given Hasbrouck no informa-
tion on the seriousness of the situation
on the VIII Corps front.
The advance party sent by General
Hasbrouck reached St. Vith about
0800 on 17 December, reporting to
General Jones, who expected to find
the armored columns right behind. Brig.
Gen. Bruce Clarke, in advance of CCB,
agreed with Jones’s recommendation that
his combat command be organized
upon arrival into two task forces and
committed in an attack to clear the St.
Vith–Schönberg road. At Schönberg the
7th Armored task forces would turn
south to join CCB of the 9th Armored
Division, already engaged along the road
to Winterspelt. If successful, the attack
by the two combat commands would pro-
vide escape corridors for the beleaguered
regiments of the 106th.
CCB of the 7th Armored had mean-
while been making good progress and
arrived at Vielsalm about 1100, halting
just to the east to gas up. Although Viel-
salm was only fourteen miles by road
from St. Vith, it would be literally a
matter of hours before even the lightly
armored advance guard could reach St.
Vith. The mass of artillery, cavalry, and
supply vehicles moving painfully
through St. Vith to the west–with and
without orders–formed a current al-
most impossible to breast. Although the
mounted military police platoon in St.
Vith had orders to sidetrack the with-
drawing corps artillery when the armor
appeared, the traffic jam had reached the
point where the efforts of a few MP’s
were futile.
General Jones, beset by messages re-
porting the German advance along the
Schönberg road, sent urgent requests for
the armor to hurry. At 1300 German
vehicles were seen in Setz, four and a
half miles from the eastern edge of St.
Vith. Half an hour later three enemy
tanks and some infantry appeared be-
fore the 168th Engineer Battalion posi-
tion astride the St. Vith road. Care-
lessly dismounting, one tank crew was
riddled by machine gun fire; a second
tank received a direct and killing blast

276
from a bazooka; the third tank and the
infantry withdrew. Another small Ger-
man detachment deployed in front of the
engineers an hour later was engaged
and was finally put to flight by Ameri-
can fighter planes in one of' their few
appearances over the battlefield on this
day.
About the same time the 87th Cavalry
Reconnaissance Squadron, temporarily
under the command of Maj. Charles A.
Cannon, Jr., reported to General Clarke
in St. Vith, the first unit of the 7th
Armored to reach the 106th Division.
Troop B was sent out the east road to
THE ARDENNES: BATTLE OF THE BULGE
TRAFFIC JAM IN THE ST. VITH AREA
reinforce the engineers, but the main
body of the reconnaissance battalion de-
ployed to screen the northeastern ap-
proaches to the Wallerode area. By this
time it was obvious to Jones and Clarke
that the main forces of the 7th Armored
could not reach St. Vith in time to
make a daylight attack. General Has-
brouck reached St. Vith at 1600–
it had taken him all of five hours to
thread his way through the traffic jam
between Vielsalm and St. Vith. He found
that General Jones already had turned
the defense of St. Vith over to Clarke
and the 7th Armored Division. After a

THE FIRST ATTACKS AT ST. VITH 277
hasty conference the counterattack was
postponed until the following morning.
It was just turning dark when the
assistant G–2 of the 7th Armored led
a company of tanks and another of
armored infantry into St. Vith. This de-
tachment had literally forced its way,
at pistol point and by threatening to run
down the vehicles barring the road, from
Vielsalm to St. Vith. About this time
the Germans made another attempt,
covered by artillery fire, to thrust a few
tanks along the east road. Three Ameri-
can tank destroyers which had been dug
in at a bend in the road were abandoned
-their crews shelled out by accurate
enemy concentrations–but the attack
made no further headway and perhaps
was intended only as a patrol action.
The 106th Division now could report,
“We have superior force in front of St.
Vith.”
Why did the LXVI Corps fail
to make a determined push toward St.
Vith on 17 December? German assault
guns or tanks had been spotted west of
Schönberg as early as 0850. By noon
German infantry were in Setz, with at
least five hours of daylight remaining
and less than five miles to go, much of
that distance being uncontested. By mid-
afternoon the enemy had reached the
168th Engineer positions less than two
miles from St. Vith. Yet at no time dur-
ing the day did the Germans use more
than three assault guns and one or two
platoons of infantry in the piecemeal
attacks west of Schönberg. The succes-
sive concentrations laid by the Ameri-
can artillery on Schönberg and both sides
of the road west–from 9 o’clock on-
must have affected enemy movement
considerably. The bombs dropped on
Schönberg and its narrow streets late in
the day may have delayed the arrival of
reinforcements, and air attack certainly
helped to scatter the most advanced Ger-
man troops. The stand made by Troop
B, 32d Cavalry Squadron, near Heuem
and the later fight by the engineers gave
the German point an excuse to report-
as it did–the presence of “stubborn re-
sistance” east of St. Vith.
It seems likely, however, that only
small German detachments actually
reached the Schönberg–St. Vith road
during the daylight hours of 17 De-
cember. The German corps commander,
General Lucht, had ordered the Mobile
Battalion of the 28th Volks Gren-
adier Division up from reserve during
the previous night with orders to ad-
vance via Andler. (It will be remem-
bered that the 18th Volks Grenadier
Division was charged with the encircle-
ment and capture of St. Vith.) The
Mobile Battalion (comprising three
platoons of assault guns, a company of
engineers, and another of fusiliers) did
not arrive at Schönberg until after noon.
During the morning the division com-
mander had led a battalion of the 294th
Regiment to Schönberg, but seems to
have halted there (perhaps to secure the
Schönberg bridge against recapture) ,
sending only small detachments against
Troop B at Heuem. With the arrival
of the assault guns some attempt was
made to probe the American defenses
east of St. Vith. This, however, was not
the main mission assigned the advance
guard of the 18th Volks Grenadier Divi-
sion, for the original plan of advance
had called on the Mobile Battalion to
seize the high ground at Wallerode,
northeast of St. Vith, which overlooked
the valley road from Schönberg. The
bulk of the German advance guard, as

278 THE ARDENNES: BATTLE OF THE BULGE
a result, toiled through the woods to-
ward Wallerode, arriving there in the
early evening.
An opportunity had been missed. Per-
haps the German command did not
realize the full extent of the gains won
in the St. Vith area and was wedded
too closely to its prior plans. In any case
the German armored reserve was not
available. Tanks of the Fuehrer Begleit
Brigade, theoretically attached to the
LXVI Corps but subject to commitment
only on army orders, would not be re-
leased for use at St. Vith until too late
for a successful coup de main.
On the movement of the main body
of the 7th Armored Division on 17 De-
cember hung the fate of St. Vith. Behind
the reconnaissance and advance elements
the bulk of the division moved slowly
southward along the east and west lines
of march, forty-seven and sixty-seven
miles long, respectively. The division
staff knew little of the tactical situation
and nothing of the extent to which the
German armored columns had penetrat-
ed westward. It is probable that night-
flying German planes spotted the Ameri-
can columns in the early hours of the
17th, but it is doubtful that the tank
columns of the Sixth Panzer Army travel-
ing west on roads cutting across the 7th
Armored routes were aware of this
American movement. Actually CCR of
the 7th Armored, on the eastern route,
came very close to colliding with the
leading tank column of the 1st SS
Panzer Division south of Malmédy but
cleared the road before the Germans
crossed on their way west. The western
column made its march without coming
in proximity to the west-moving German
spearheads, its main problem being to
negotiate roads jammed with west-
bound traffic.
The division artillery, finally released
in the north, took the east route, its
three battalions and the 203d Antiaircraft
Battalion moving as a single column.
Early on the afternoon of the 17th
the 440th Armored Field Artillery, leading
the column, entered Malmédy, only
to be greeted with the sign THIS ROAD
UNDER ENEMY FIRE. The town square
was a scene of utter confusion. Trucks
loaded with soldiers and nurses from a
nearby hospital, supply vehicles, and
civilians of military age on bicycles eddied
around the square in an attempt
to get on the road leading out to the
west; a battalion from a replacement
depot threaded its way on foot between
the vehicles, also en route to the west.
All that the artillery could learn was
that a German tank column was south
of Malmédy. This, of course, was the
panzer detachment of the 1st SS Panzer
Division.
The 440th Armored Field Artillery
Battalion, unable to reverse itself,
turned west to Stavelot and subsequently
joined the western group on its way to
Vielsalm. Alerted by radio from the
440th, Maj. W. J. Scott (acting in
the absence of the artillery commander
who had gone ahead to report at the
division headquarters) turned the column
around in the square and to avoid
the narrow and congested road led it
back toward Eupen, cutting in to the
western divisional route at Verviers.
This roundabout move consumed the
daylight hours and through the night
the gun carriages streamed along the
Verviers-Vielsalm road. The main artillery
column again missed the 1st SS Panzer
Division by only a hair’s breadth.
As Battery D, 203d Antiaircraft (AW)

THE FIRST ATTACKS AT ST. VITH 279
Battalion, at the tail of the column,
rolled through Stavelot about 0800 on
the morning of 18 December, it found
itself in the middle of a fire fight be-
tween the advance guard of the 1st SS
Panzer Division and a small American
force of armored infantry, engineers,
and tank destroyers. The battery swung
its quadruple machine guns around for
ground laying and moved into the fight,
firing at the enemy assembling along the
banks of the Amblève River, which
here ran through the south edge
of the town. After an hour or so the
battery turned once again and, taking
no chances, circled wide to the west. It
finally arrived in the division assembly
area east of Vielsalm late in the after-
noon. The bulk of the artillery column
closed at Vielsalm during the morning,
although the last few miles had to be
made against the flow of vehicles surg-
ing from the threatened area around St.
Vith.
While the 7th Armored Division artil-
lery was working its way onto the west
road during the evening of 17 December,
most of the division assembled in the St.
Vith area along positions roughly indic-
ative of an unconsciously forming per-
imeter defense. From Recht, five miles
northwest of St. Vith, to Beho, seven
miles to the southwest of the 106th Divi-
sion headquarters, the clockwise dis-
position of the American units was as
follows. At Recht were located the com-
mand post of CCR and the rear head-
quarters of CCB, with the 17th Tank
Battalion assembled to the southeast.
The disorganized 14th Cavalry Group
was dispersed through the area between
Recht and Poteau. East of Hunningen the
87th Cavalry Reconnaissance Squadron
(–) had formed roadblocks to bar the
northern and northeastern approaches
to St. Vith. To the right of the cavalry
the most advanced units of CCB had
reinforced the 168th Engineer Combat
Battalion on the Schönberg road and
pushed out to either side for some dis-
tance as flank protection. During the
night, CCB, 9th Armored Division, and
the 424th Infantry withdrew across the
Our River and established a defensive
line along the hill chain running from
northeast of Steinebrück south to Burg
Reuland; these troops eventually made
contact with the advance elements of
CCB, 7th Armored Division. Some six
or seven miles west of Burg Reuland,
CCA of the 7th Armored had assembled
near Beho.
West of St. Vith, in position to give
close support, were located the 275th
Armored Field Artillery Battalion (Lt.
Col. Roy Udell Clay) and the remainder
of CCB. The 275th, reinforced by the
16th Armored Field Artillery Battalion,
and three batteries of corps artillery,
fired through the night to interdict the
eastern approaches to St. Vith; this was
all the artillery support remaining to the
American troops in this sector. The
112th Infantry, now beginning to fold
back to the north as the center of the
28th Division gave way, was no longer
in contact with the 424th Infantry, its
erstwhile left flank neighbor, but the
axis of withdrawal ultimately would
bring the 112th Infantry to piece out
the southern sector of the defense slowly
forming around St. Vith.
While it is true that an outline or
trace of the subsequent St. Vith perim-
eter was unraveling on the night of
17–18 December, this was strictly fortui-
tous. General Jones and General Has-
brouck still expected that CCB would

280 THE ARDENNES: BATTLE OF THE BULGE
make its delayed drive east of St. Vith
on the morning of the 18th. The strength
of the German forces thrusting west was
not yet fully appreciated. Information
on the location of the enemy or the
routes he was using was extremely vague
and generally several hours out of date.
Communication between the higher
American headquarters and their sub-
ordinate units was sporadic and, for long
periods, nonexistent. Late in the evening
of the 17th and during the morning of
the 18th, however, the scope and direc-
tion of the German drive thrusting past
St. Vith in the north became more clear-
ly discernible as the enemy struck in a
series of attacks against Recht, Poteau,
and Hünningen.
The Enemy Strikes at the
St. Vith Perimeter
The 1st SS Panzer Division, forming
the left of the I SS Panzer Corps advance
in the zone north of St. Vith, had
driven forward on two routes. The
northern route, through Stavelot and the
Amblève River valley, carried the main
strength of the division, led by its pan-
zer regiment. It was the first group in
this northern column which CCR had
unwittingly eluded and from which the
tail of the 7th Armored artillery column
had glanced at Stavelot. The southern
route, through Recht and Vielsalm,
was assigned to a kampfgruppe of the
1st SS Panzer Division made up of a
reinforced panzer grenadier regiment
and a battalion of assault guns. This
group had been delayed by poor roads
and American mine fields west of Man-
derfeld, and by the end of 17 December
it was some hours behind the north col-
umn.
The headquarters of CCR, 7th Ar-
mored, opened in Recht in midafter-
noon of the 17th. At that time the com-
bat command retained only the 17th
Tank Battalion (assembled to the south-
east) because its armored infantry bat-
talion had been diverted to St. Vith.
About 2045 CCR got its first word of the
Germans it had so narrowly missed when
the driver for the division chief of staff,
Col. Church M. Matthews, appeared at
the command post with the report that
during the afternoon he had run afoul
of a large tank column near Pont and
that the colonel was missing. 3 These Ger-
mans, of course, were part of the north-
ern column. Lt. Col. Fred M. Warren,
acting commanding officer, sent the
driver on to division headquarters to tell
his story, and at the same time he asked
for a company of infantry. He then or-
dered the 17th Tank Battalion (Lt. Col.
John P. Wemple) to send a tank com-
pany into Recht. Warren and Wemple
studied the road net as shown on the
map and agreed to try to hold Recht
through the night. Stragglers came pour-
ing through Recht in the meantime with
rumors and reports of the enemy just
behind them. The headquarters and
tank company had little time to get set,
for about 0200 the advance guard of
the southern German column hit the
village from the east and northeast. Un-
willing to risk his tanks without infantry
protection in a night fight through nar-
row streets, and uncertain of the
enemy strength, Warren ordered a with-
drawal after a sharp 45-minute engage-
ment. CCR headquarters started down
3 Colonel Matthews’ body. was discovered about a
month later. Col. John L. Ryan, Jr.. who had
commanded CCR, became the 7th Armored chief
of staff.

THE FIRST ATTACKS AT ST. VITH 281
the road southwest toward Vielsalm, and
the tanks rejoined Wemple.
Made cautious by the collision at
Recht, the German column moved slow-
ly, putting out feelers to the southeast
before the main force resumed the
march southwest along the Vielsalm
road. Wemple and his tankers were able
to repel these probing attempts without
difficulty. CCR headquarters had mean-
while become ensnarled with the rem-
nants of the 14th Cavalry Group and the
residue of the corps artillery columns
at the little village of Poteau, where the
roads from Recht and St. Vith join en
route to Vielsalm. This crossroads ham-
let had been the worst bottleneck in
the traffic jam on 17 December; indeed
the situation seems to have been com-
pletely out of hand when the CCR head-
quarters arrived in the early morning
hours and succeeded in restoring some
order.
On the afternoon of 17 December the
14th Cavalry Group commander had
ordered the remnants of his two squad-
rons to fall back to Recht. Through
some confusion in orders both squadrons
got onto the St. Vith–Poteau highway,
although three reconnaissance teams did
reach Recht and took part in the action
there. About midnight orders from the
106th Division arrived at the group head-
quarters which had been set up in Po-
teau: the cavalry were to return to Born,
which they had just evacuated, and
occupy the high ground. By this time
most of the 32d Squadron had threaded
their way south through Poteau, appar-
ently unaware that the group had es-
tablished a command post there. Short-
ly after dark Colonel Devine departed
with most of his staff for the 106th
Division command post, but this com-
mand group was ambushed near Recht
(Colonel Devine and two of his officers
escaped on foot).
Early on the 18th, Lt. Col. Augustine
Duggan, senior of the remaining staff,
intercepted elements of the 18th Squad-
ron, part of Troop C, 32d Squad-
ron, and the one remaining platoon of
towed 3-inch guns from the 820th Tank
Destroyer. These were placed under the
command of Maj. J. L. Mayes as
a task force to comply with the orders
from division. With great difficulty the
task force vehicles were sorted out, lined
the road, and then turned about and
faced toward Recht. Mayes’s group
moved out from the crossroads at first
light on 18 December but had gone only
some two hundred yards when flame shot
up from the leading light tank and an
armored car, the two struck almost si-
multaneously by German bazooka fire.
The glare thrown over the snow sil-
houetted the figures of enemy infantry-
men advancing toward the Poteau cross-
roads. The task force pulled back into
the village and hastily prepared a de-
fense around the dozen or so houses
there, while to the north a small cavalry
patrol dug in on a hill overlooking the
hamlet and made a fight of it. By this
time the last of the milling traffic was
leaving Poteau; eight 8-inch howitzers
of the 740th Field Artillery Battalion
were abandoned here as the German
fire increased, ostensibly because they
could not be hauled out of the mud
onto the road.
All through the morning the enemy
pressed in on Poteau, moving his ma-
chine guns, mortars, and assault guns
closer and closer. At noon the situation
was critical, the village was raked by
fire, and the task force was no longer

282
in communication with any other Americans.
Colonel Duggan finally gave the
order to retire down the road to Vielsalm.
Three armored cars, two jeeps, and
one light tank were able to disengage
and carried the wounded out; apparently
a major part of the force was able
to make its way to Vielsalm on foot.
During the early morning Headquarters,
CCR, set out from Poteau, heading
down the valley road toward Vielsalm.
At the small village of Petit Thier
it was discovered that a lieutenant from
the 23d Armored Infantry Battalion,
separated from his column on the march
south, had heard the firing at Poteau
and had rounded up a collection of
stray tanks, infantry, cavalry, and engineers
to block the way to Vielsalm. 4 The
CCR commander took over this roadblock
and, as the force swelled through
the day with incoming stragglers and
lost detachments, extended the position
west of the village. The German column
at Poteau, however, made no attempt to
drive on to Vielsalm. The main body
of the 1st SS Panzer Division needed
reinforcements. The panzer grenadier
regiment and the assault guns therefore
were ordered off their assigned route and
turned northeast to follow the column
through Stavelot.
The 7th Armored counterattack from
St. Vith to relieve the two trapped regiments
of the 106th Division had been
postponed on the 17th, not canceled.
During the early morning hours of 18
December preparation was completed
for the attack on Schönberg by the 31st
Tank Battalion and the 23d Armored
Infantry Battalion, now brigaded under
4 This outfit was called Task Force Navaho, so
named because its leader had worked his way
through college selling Indian blankets.
THE ARDENNES: BATTLE OF THE BULGE
CCB. This was risky business at best.
The divisional artillery would not be in
position to support the attack. The
similar effort by CCB, 9th Armored Divi-
sion, had been called off and the Ameri-
can forces south of the 422d Infantry
and 423d Infantry had withdrawn be-
hind the Our. That the German strength
was increasing was made apparent by
the events during the night of 17–18
December, but the 7th Armored light
observation planes were not available
for scouting the enemy dispositions or
movements east of St. Vith. General
Clarke was well aware of the chancy
nature of this enterprise and, at 0645,
when reporting to Colonel Ryan, the
division chief of staff, pointed out that
General Hasbrouck still had the option
of canceling the attack.
It would be the enemy, however, and
not a command decision that forced the
abandonment of the proposed effort.
About 0800 the Germans launched a re-
connaissance in force northeast of St.
Vith, advancing from Wallerode to-
ward Hünningen. Here, only two thou-
sand yards from St. Vith, two troops of
the 87 th Cavalry Reconnaissance Squad-
ron and a few antiaircraft half-tracks
offered the sole barrier to a thrust into
the city. Who made up the enemy force
and its strength is uncertain–probably
this was the Mobile Battalion of the 18th
Yolks Grenadier Division, making the
preliminary move in the scheme to en-
circle St. Vith. In any event enough
pressure was exerted during the morn-
ing to drive the small American screen-
ing force back toward St. Vith.
As the cavalry commenced its delay-
ing action a hurried call went out to
CCB, 9th Armored, for tanks and anti-
tank guns. Moving through St. Vith,

THE FIRST ATTACKS AT ST. VITH 283
two companies from the 14th Tank Bat-
talion (Maj. Leonard E. Engeman) and
one from the 811th Tank Destroyer Bat-
talion took over the fight. One company
of Shermans circled in the direction of
Wallerode, falling on the enemy flank
while the tank destroyers contained the
head of the German column on the Hün-
nange road. Both American units were
able to drive forward and the Shermans
knocked out six light panzers or as-
sault guns. By this time the 7th Armored
plans for the Schönberg attack were
definitely off and a company from the
31st Tank Battalion joined in the affair.
American losses were small, the Ger-
man foray was checked, and before the
day closed the Hiinningen position was
restored, but it was clear that the enemy
now was concentrating to the north as
well as to the east of St. Vith.
Like the probing thrust at Hünnange,
the German efforts on the road east
of St. Vith during 18 December were
advance guard actions fought while the
main German force assembled. The 18th
Volks Grenadier Division, charged with
the initial attack against St. Vith, actually
was riding two horses at the same time,
attempting to close up for a decisive
blow at St. Vith while maintaining the
northern arc of the circle around the
Americans on the Schnee Eifel. This
tactical problem was made more diffi-
cult for the 18th Volks Grenadier Divi-
sion and the LXVI Corps by the traffic
situation on the roads east and north
of Schönberg where columns belonging
to the Sixth SS Panzer Army were swing-
ing out of their proper zone. Although
the corps commander, General Lucht,
personally intervened to “rank” the in-
truders out of the area he seems to have
been only moderately successful. Then,
too, the artillery belonging to the divi-
sion had been turned inward against the
Schnee Eifel pocket on 18 December;
only one battalion got up to the Schön-
berg-St. Vith road. 5
The attacks made east of St. Vith on
18 December were carried by a part
of the 294th Infantry, whose patrols had
been checked by the 168th Engineers the
previous day. Three times the grenadiers
tried to rush their way through the fox-
hole line held by the 38th Armored
Infantry Battalion (Lt. Col. William
H. G. Fuller) and B Troop of the 87th
astride the Schönberg road. The second
attempt, just before noon, was made
under cover of a creeping barrage laid
down by the German artillery battalion
near Schönberg and momentarily shook
the American firing line. But the ar-
mored infantry, rallied by their officers
and aided by Nungesser’s engineers,
drove back the attackers. The last Ger-
man assault, begun after a two-hour fire
fight, made a dent in the center of the
38th Armored Infantry line. Again the
168th Engineers gave a hand, the bulk of
the 23d Armored Infantry Battalion
appeared to reinforce the line east of
St. Vith, and by dark all lost ground had
been retaken. During this entire action
the 275th Armored Field Artillery Bat-
talion, emplaced along the Recht road
northwest of St. Vith, fired concentration
after concentration against the enemy
thrusting against the 38th and the engi-
neers. Observation was poor–the 18th
was a day of low-hanging fog–but the
nine hundred rounds plunging onto the
Schönberg road did much to check the
grenadiers,
5 The German operations are discussed in MSS
# B–333 (Lucht). and B–688 (Moll). See also
ETHINT #21.

284
Although the 18th Volks Grenadier
Division was able, on this third day of
the counteroffensive, to push some of its
troops close in toward St. Vith, the 62d
Volks Grenadier Division on the left
had moved more slowly. Despite the
American withdrawal from the Winter-
spelt-Heckhuscheid area and the
promptings of the impatient commander
of the LXVI Corps, the 62d only
tardily brought itself into conformity
with the forward kampfgruppen of the
18th Volks Grenadier Division. The
164th Regiment, reinforced by engineers
and assault guns, apparently took some
time to re-form after its fight with
the 9th Armored Division counterattack
force on 17 December. Although Ger-
man patrols continued up the road to
Steinebrück, attempting in vain to seize
the bridge during the night, the attack
was not pressed until after daylight on
the following morning. Two of the
three Our bridges chosen for capture in
the LXVI Corps’ plan now were in Ger-
man hands, but the bridge at Steine-
brück still had to be taken.
The bend in the Our River near
Steinebrück necessitated a switch in the
new American positions on the far bank;
thus while the main frontage held by
the 424th and CCB, 9th Armored, faced
east, the line at Steinebrück faced south,
then swung back until it again faced
east. In this sector Troop D, 89th
Cavalry Reconnaissance Battalion, plus
a light tank platoon and an assault gun
platoon, was deployed along the 3,000-
yard stretch between Steinebrück and
Weppler, its left flank in the air at the
latter village, its right more or less se-
cured by a provisional company from the
424th Infantry west of Steinebrück.
On the morning of 18 December Gen-
THE ARDENNES: BATTLE OF THE BULGE
eral Hoge, CCB commander, was or-
dered to hurry to the 106th headquarters
where he was told of the threat develop-
ing north of St. Vith. When he sent
back orders for the emergency task force
from CCB to hasten north, the cavalry
troop was included. Covered by one re-
connaissance platoon and the cavalry as-
sault guns, sited near the bridge, the
remaining platoons of Troop D had left
their positions and started filing toward
the. Steinebrück–St. Vith road when
suddenly the movement order was can-
celed. The cavalry had been under fire
since daybreak, and when the 2d Pla-
toon attempted to return to its position
on a commanding hill between Steine-
brück and Weppler it was forced to move
dismounted in a rain of bullets and
shells. At the Steinebrück bridge the en-
emy increased in number as the morning
progressed, slipping into positions on the
south bank under cover given by ex-
ploding smoke shells. To counter this
threat the light tank platoon moved in-
to Steinebrück, leaving the American
left uncovered. About the same time the
provisional rifle company west of Steine-
brück took off and one of the cavalry
platoons had to be switched hastily to
cover this gap.
Thus far the all-important bridge had
been left intact, for there was still some
hope that the 423d Infantry, at the least,
might free itself from the Schnee Eifel
trap. By noon the situation was such that
the little group of troopers dared delay
no longer. On General Hoge’s order a
platoon of armored engineers went down
and blew the bridge–almost in the teeth
of the grenadiers on the opposite bank.
An hour later the platoon west of the
village saw an enemy column of horse-
drawn artillery driving into position.

THE FIRST ATTACKS AT ST. VITH 285
The American gunners in the group-
ment west of Lommersweiler immedi-
ately answered the cavalry call for aid,
apparently with some effect: yet within
the hour at least a part of the twenty-
two enemy guns counted here were in
action, firing in preparation for an as-
sault across the river. It would seem that
a German rifle company first crossed
into Weppler, now unoccupied, then
wheeled and encircled the 2d Platoon
on the hill. Only five Americans es-
caped. 6 Two or more companies crossed
near the blasted bridge and by 1530,
despite the continual pounding admin-
istered by the 16th Armored Field Artil-
lery Battalion and the rapid fire from the
cavalry tank, assault, and machine guns,
had nearly encircled Troop D. A cavalry
request for medium tanks perforce was
denied; the tank companies sent north
to Hünningen had not yet returned and
General Hoge had no reserve. A com-
pany of the 27th Armored Infantry Bat-
talion, however, was put in to cover the
cavalry left flank. With the enemy infan-
try inside Steinebrück and excellent
direct laying by the German gunners
picking off the American vehicles one
by one, the cavalry withdrew along the
St. Vith road.
The CCB position at the Our (where
two companies of armored infantry, a
company each of light and medium
tanks, plus the reconnaissance company,
were deployed on a front over 4,000
yards) was no longer tenable. There had
been no contact whatever with the 424th
Infantry to the south. General Hoge con-
ferred with General Jones at St. Vith
6 2d Lt. R. L. Westbrook commanded this pla-
toon. Although severely wounded he led the sur-
vivors to safety, then went back to his platoon’s
position to search for stragglers. He was given
the DSC.
and the two decided that the combat
command should withdraw from the
river northwest to slightly higher ground.
Commencing at dark, the move was
made without trouble and CCB settled
along an arc whose center was about
two and a half miles southeast of St.
Vith. In this position the combat com-
mand blocked the main Winterspelt–
St. Vith highway and the valley of the
Braunlauf Creek, a second natural cor-
ridor leading to St. Vith. The gap be-
tween Hoge’s command and CCB, 7th
Armored, which at dark had been 3,000
yards across, closed during the night
when a light tank company and an anti-
aircraft battery came in. Later, liaison
was established with the 424th Infantry
on the right, which had been out of
contact with the enemy during the day
and remained in its river line position.
Although the 62d Volks Grenadier Divi-
sion was quick to occupy the ground
vacated by CCB, no attempt was made
to follow into the new American posi-
tion.
During the afternoon of 18 December
while the combat commands of the 7th
and 9th Armored Divisions were fight-
ing holding actions along the eastern
front of the St. Vith area, General Has-
brouck engaged in an attempt to restore
the northern flank of the 7th Armored
in the Poteau sector. The opportunity
for a decisive American counterattack to-
ward Schönberg was past, if indeed it
had ever existed, and Hasbrouck’s im-
mediate concern was to establish his divi-
sion north flank in a posture of defense
in the St. Vith–Vielsalm area. The loss
of the vital road junction at Poteau,
earlier in the day, made the connection
between the forces of the division at
St. Vith, around Recht, and in the Viel-

286 THE ARDENNES: BATTLE OF THE BULGE
salm assembly area, more difficult and
tenuous. Then too, it appeared that the
enemy was concentrating in Recht and
might try an attack through Poteau to
Vielsalm. CCA (Col. Dwight A. Rose-
baum) , watching the southern flank of
the 7th Armored around Beho, had not
yet met the Germans (who were in fact
driving past to the west, but on roads
south of Beho) . General Hasbrouck de-
cided to leave a small force as observers
around Beho and commit CCA to re-
cover Poteau.
At noon the 48th Armored Infantry
Battalion and the 40th Tank Battalion
(–) , representing the bulk of CCA,
rolled through St. Vith and out along the
Vielsalm road. As the leading tank pla-
toon hove in sight of Poteau it came
immediately under small arms and as-
sault gun fire. The few houses here were
separated by an abandoned railroad cut,
just south of the crossroads, which ran
east and west. Colonel Rosebaum sent
the tank platoon and an armored in-
fantry company to clear the houses south
of the cut. This action continued
through the afternoon, while tanks and
assault guns played a dangerous game
of hide-and-seek from behind the houses
and the American infantry tried to knock
out the German machine guns enfilading
the railroad cut. Toward dark the Amer-
icans crossed the northern embankment
and reached the road junction. Rose-
baum posted the infantry company-
now supported by an entire tank com-
pany–to hold the village, cheek by jowl
with the Germans in the northernmost
houses. Thus far CCA had no contact
with CCR headquarters and its scratch
force to the west at Petit Thier because
the road from Poteau was under fire.
With the Poteau crossroad more or
less in the hands of the 7th Armored,
with a defensive arc forming north, east,
and southeast of St. Vith, and with the
Vielsalm–Petit Thier area under con-
trol in the west, the next step was to
block the possible routes of approach
from the south and southwest. Nearly
all the American units in the St. Vith
area were already committed; all that
General Hasbrouck could do was to
station a light tank company, a company
of armored engineers, the headquarters
battery of an antiaircraft battalion, and
a reconnaissance troop piecemeal in a
series of small villages south and west
of Beho. At best these isolated detach-
ments could serve only as pickets for the
7th Armored, but fortunately the Ger-
man columns continued marching west.
One brief engagement was fought on
the 18th at Gouvy, a rail and road junc-
tion southwest of Beho. The headquar-
ters battery, 440th Antiaircraft (AW)
Battalion (Lt. Col. Robert O. Stone),
and a light tank platoon had been sent
to set up an outpost at the village. As
they approached Gouvy station, a rail-
road stop south of the village, they ran
afoul of three German tanks which were
just coming in from the south. The Ger-
mans started a dash to sweep the column
broadside, but the first shot knocked out
an air-compressor truck whose unwieldy
hulk effectively blocked the road. After
firing their last rounds at the town and
the column, the German tanks with-
drew. When Stone took a look around
he found himself in charge of a rail-
head stock of 80,000 rations-which had
been set ablaze by the depot guards-
an engineer vehicle park, and 350 Ger-
mans in a POW cage. Fortunately the
fire could be checked without too much
damage. Stone then organized a defense

THE FIRST ATTACKS AT ST. VITH 287
with the engineers, ordnance, and quar-
termaster people on the spot. Unwit-
tingly, in the process of “freezing” this
heterogeneous command, Stone stopped
the westward withdrawal of badly need-
ed engineer vehicles (carrying earth
augers, air compressors, and similar
equipment) which the VIII Corps com-
mander was attempting to gather for
work on a barrier line being constructed
by the corps engineers farther to the
west.
The artillery battalions of the 7th Ar-
mored Division were in firing positions
north and east of Vielsalm at the close
of 18 December. They could not give
RAILROAD YARDS AT GOUVY
aid to CCB, east of St. Vith, but there
the 275th Armored Field Artillery Bat-
talion was in range and already had giv-
en a fine demonstration of effective
support. The 7th Armored trains, which
had reached Salmchâteau by the west-
ern route on the morning of the 18th,
were sent twenty-two miles west of La
Roche, partly to keep them out of enemy
reach but also because of the possibility
that the division might soon have to re-
tire behind the Ourthe River. The re-
serve available to General Hasbrouck
was scant for such wide-flung positions:
some 90-mm. guns from the 814th Tank
Destroyer Battalion and the provisional

288
squadron being formed from the re-
mains of the 14th Cavalry Group.
Late in the day General Jones moved
the 106th command post to Vielsalm,
setting up near General Hasbrouck’s
headquarters. The orders given the 7th
Armored Division still held—to assist
the 106th Division. In fact, however,
there was little left of the 106th; so re-
sponsibility tended to devolve on the
junior commander, Hasbrouck.
The two generals had only a vague
idea of what was happening beyond their
own sphere. Telephone service to the
VIII Corps headquarters at Bastogne
ended on 18 December when that head-
quarters moved to Neufchâteau. But
THE ARDENNES: BATTLE OF THE BULGE
Hasbrouck had no doubt that General
Middleton counted on the continued de-
fense of the St. Vith road center—this
part of the mission needed no reiteration.
Since the VIII Corps itself was in posses-
sion of only fragmentary information
on the German strength and locations
there was little to be passed on to the
division commanders.
Liaison and staff officers coming
from Bastogne brought word of only
meager American reinforcements any-
where in the neighborhood of St. Vith.
One regiment of the 30th Infantry Divi-
sion was in Malmédy, thirteen or four-
teen miles to the north, but the
intervening countryside was swamped
ANTITANK GUNNERS GUARDING A CROSSING near Vielsalm in the 7th Armored Division
area.

THE FIRST ATTACKS AT ST. VITH 289
by German columns heading west. The
82d Airborne Division, it was estimated,
would reach Werbomont (about the
same distance northwest of Vielsalm)
on the morning of 19 December, but it
was apparent that in this area also the
enemy barred any solid contact with the
St. Vith defenders. At Bastogne the 101st
Airborne Division was arriving to take
over the fight at that critical road junc-
tion, but there were no additional rein-
forcements which General Middleton
could employ in plugging the gap be-
tween St. Vith and Bastogne.
The problem of maintaining control
over the heterogeneous formations in
the St. Vith–Vielsalm area or of giv-
ing complete tactical unity to the de-
fense was very difficult. Under sustained
German pressure a wholly satisfactory
solution never would be achieved. The
piecemeal employment of lower units,
made unavoidable by the march of
events, resulted in most involved meth-
ods of communication. A tank company,
for example, might have to report by
radio through its own battalion head-
quarters, some distance away, which
then relayed the message on other chan-
nels until it reached the infantry battal-
ion to which the tank company was
attached. The homogeneity of the bat-
talion, in American practice the basic
tactical unit, largely ceased to exist, nor
did time and the enemy ever permit any
substantial regrouping to restore this
unity. It is surprising that under the
circumstances control and communica-
tion functioned as well as they did. But
the 7th Armored Division was a veteran
organization; the general officers in the
area dealt with one another on a very
co-operative basis; and within the sub-
commands, established around the coa-
lescing perimeter, the local commanders
acted with considerable freedom and
initiative.
Although all intention of attempting
to breach the German ring around the
two regiments of the 106th Division had
been abandoned on 18 December and
the mission no longer was counterat-
tack, but rather defense in place, there
still was a faint hope that the 422d and
423d somehow might be able to fight
their way out through Schönberg as Gen-
eral Jones had ordered. During the
early morning hours of 19 December
messages from the 423d Infantry (dis-
patched at noon on the previous day)
finally reached Vielsalm. From these
Jones learned that both regiments had
begun the attack westward, but no word
on the progress of the attack followed-
nor did the American outposts on the
Schönberg road catch any sound of fir-
ing moving west. Finally, late in the
evening, a radio message arrived from
the VII Corps: bad weather had inter-
vened; the supplies promised the en-
trapped troops had not been dropped.
By this time the last bit of hope for
the lost regiments must have gone.
There was one fortunate but unex-
pected event on the 19th. The exact
location and strength of the 112th In-
fantry, somewhere south of the 424th,
were unknown. 7 That a gap existed on
the right of the 424th was known. Early
on 19 December word reached General
Jones by way of liaison officer that, as
of the previous evening, the 112th In-
fantry was cut off from the 28th Divi-
sion and had fallen back from the Our
to the neighborhood of Weiswampach.
A few hours later more information fil-
7 See above, pp. 204–05.

290 THE ARDENNES: BATTLE OF THE BULGE
tered back to Vielsalm: the 112th had
withdrawn to Huldange, thus coming
closer to the 7th Armored and 106th.
Finally, in midafternoon, Colonel Nel-
son (commanding the 112th) appeared
at the 106th Division command post and
reported his situation, and the regiment
was taken over by General Jones—a so-
lution subsequently approved by Gen-
eral Middleton. Colonel Nelson brought
a welcome addition to the St. Vith forces.
His regiment had lost most of its vehi-
cles, radios, and crew-served weapons
but had suffered relatively light casual-
ties and lost but few stragglers. It was
well in the hand of its commander and
ready to fight. Jones ordered the 112th
Infantry to draw northward on the night
of 19–20 December and make a firm con-
nection with the southern flank of the
424th.
Throughout the 19th there were spo-
radic clashes with the enemy around the
perimeter. The threatened sector re-
mained the line from Poteau to St. Vith,
and from St. Vith along the eastern front
covered by CCB, 7th Armored, and
CCB, 9th Armored. At Poteau CCA
brought more troops into and around
the village, while the enemy fired in
from the hill to the north rising along-
side the Recht road. The southern col-
umn of the 1st SS Panzer Division, which
first had captured the town, was long
since gone, hurrying west. But the newly
committed 9th SS Panzer Division, fol-
lowing in its wake via Recht, threw a
large detachment of panzer grenadiers
into the woods around Poteau, either to
retake the crossroad or to pin the
Americans there. The resulting state of
affairs was summed up when the execu-
tive officer of CCA reported to the divi-
sion G–3: “The CO of CCA wanted
these facts made known. He is extended
and cannot protect the right flank of the
zone between Recht and Poteau. He
cannot protect Poteau. He needed two
companies of infantry deployed and one
in reserve. He is getting infiltration in
his rear from the vicinity of Recht. The
woods are so thick that he needs almost
an infantry platoon to protect three
tanks sitting out there. Dismounted in-
fantry in foxholes control the intersec-
tion at Poteau but [it is] covered by
enemy fire.” Nevertheless the Poteau
road junction was denied the enemy, and
by the close of day patrols had estab-
lished contact between CCR, to the west,
and CCA.
At St. Vith enemy pressure failed to
increase during the 19th, and the Amer-
ican commanders took advantage of the
breathing spell to reassess their disposi-
tions for defense. The two CCB com-
manders, Clarke and Hoge, given a free
hand by General Jones and General
Hasbrouck, agreed that in the event of
any future withdrawal CCB, 9th Ar-
mored Division, might be trapped as
it then stood because Hoge’s combat
command, deployed southeast of St. Vith,
had no roads for a direct move west-
ward and would be forced to retire
through St. Vith. Clarke would hold as
long as possible east of the town, but
with both combat commands in its
streets St. Vith was an obvious trap. It
was decided, therefore, that Hoge should
pull his command back during the com-
ing night to a new line along the
hills west of the railroad running out
of St. Vith, thus conforming on its left
with CCB, 7th Armored.
The withdrawal was carried out as
planned. A small German attack hit the
right flank just as the move was being

THE FIRST ATTACKS AT ST. VITH 291
made but was checked by fire from the
American tank guns and mortars. The
armored infantry were now disposed in
the center with the medium tank com-
panies, which had circled through St.
Vith, at either flank. The draw extend-
ing from the south to the west edge of
town served as a boundary between the
two CCB’s. Because this piece of the
front was regarded by both commanders
as potentially dangerous, a tank com-
pany and a platoon of tank destroyers
were placed to back up the troops at
the junction point. As part of the re-
organization on the 19th, CCB, 7th Ar-
mored, took over the 17th Tank Bat-
talion, which had been holding the road
southeast of Recht. This fleshed out a
more or less connected but thin line
running as a semicircle from south of
Recht to a point about a thousand yards
east of St. Vith, then curving back to
the southwest where the 424th Infantry
and CCB, 9th Armored, met near Gruf-
flange.
During the 19th the two CCB’s had
been operating with very limited artil-
lery support, although the 275th Ar-
mored Field Artillery Battalion and the
16th Armored Field Artillery Battalion
had done yeoman service for their re-
spective combat commands. The arrival
of an additional field artillery battalion
belonging to the 7th Armored and two
155-mm. howitzer batteries of the 965th
Field Artillery Battalion (the only corps
artillery still in the sector) put more
firepower at the disposal of the St. Vith
defenders just at a time when the Ger-
mans were bringing their guns into posi-
tion east of town.
Supply routes to the 7th Armored
Division trains were still open, although
menaced by the roving enemy and ob-
structed by west-moving friendly traffic.
Having set up installations west of La
Roche, the trains’ commander (Col.
Andrew J. Adams) used his own peo-
ple and all the stragglers he could find
to man roadblocks around the train area.
About 1700 two German tanks and a rifle
platoon suddenly struck at one of these
positions south of La Roche manned by
Company C, 129th Ordnance Main-
tenance Battalion. The ordnance com-
pany beat off the Germans, but the ap-
pearance this far west of enemy troops
(probably from the 116th Panzer Divi-
sion) indicated that not only the 7th
Armored Division trains but the entire
division stood in danger of being cut
off from the American force gathering
around Bastogne.
At the forward command post of the
7th Armored in Vielsalm, the Division
G–4 (Lt. Col. Reginald H. Hodgson)
sent a message back to Colonel Adams,
depicting the view of the situation tak-
en by the St. Vith commanders and their
staffs as the 19th came to a close:
All division units holding firm. Units to
south have apparently been by-passed by
some Boche. Army dump at Gouvy was
abandoned by Army but D / 40th Tank Bat-
talion took the town over. . . . 82 Parachut-
ists (82d Airborne Division) now coming
up so we can probably get some ammo. . . .
I have no contact with Corps . . . but Corps
has ordered us to hold and situation well in
hand. . . . Hope to see you soon: have sent
you copy of all messages sent you. Hope you
don’t think I’m crazy. CG was well pleased
with everything you have done. Congrats.
Don’t move ’til you hear from me.
The defense of the St. Vith–Vielsalm
area had taken form by the night of 19
December. The troops within the per-
imeter occupied an “island” with a Ger-
man tide rushing past on the north and

292 THE ARDENNES: BATTLE OF THE BULGE
south and rising against its eastern face.
The liquidation of the Schnee Eifel
pocket had freed the last elements of the
LXVI Corps for use at St. Vith; General
Lucht now could concentrate on the re-
duction of that town.
During the day the commanders of
Army Group B and the Fifth Panzer
Army joined General Lucht at the com-
mand post of the 18th Volks Grenadier
Division near Wallerode Mill. The
LXVI Corps commander left this con-
ference with orders to encircle St. Vith,
putting his main weight in enveloping
moves north and south of the town. Bad
road conditions, the blown bridge at
Steinebrück, and continued attempts by
Sixth Panzer Army columns to usurp the
corps main supply road at Schönberg
combined to delay Lucht’s concentra-
tion. Lucht ordered a barrier erected at
Schönberg to sift out the interlopers
(Lucht and his chief of staff personally
helped make arrests), but this was of
little assistance. Corps and division artil-
lery was brought forward piece by piece
whenever a break in a traffic jam oc-
curred, but the appearance of these
horse-drawn guns in the motorized col-
umns only succeeded in further disrupt-
ing the march order. Like the Americans
on 17 December, jammed on the St.
Vith–Vielsalm road, the Germans lacked
adequate military police to handle the
situation.
Even so, by the evening of 19 De-
cember the two infantry divisions of the
LXVI Corps were in position to launch
piecemeal attacks at or around St. Vith.
The 18th Volks Grenadier Division, on
the right, had fed the foot troops of its
295th Regiment in between the Mobile
Battalion, deployed around Wallerode,
and the 294th, astride the St. Vith-
Schönberg road. The 293d Regiment,
having aided in the capture of the
Schnee Eifel regiments, filed into Schön-
berg during the night. The division ar-
tillery might be in firing position by the
morning of the 20th. The 62d Volks
Grenadier Division, to the south, finally
brought its inner flank into echelon with
the left of the 18th near Setz by pivoting
the 190th Regiment west. The division
left wing was formed by the 164th Regi-
ment, which had occupied Lommers-
weiler and Hemmeres following the
withdrawal of CCB, 9th Armored. The
main body of the 183d remained in re-
serve at Winterspelt. During the night of
19–20 December the Germans com-
pleted a division bridge at Steinebrück
near that destroyed by the American
armored engineers, and division artil-
lery and heavy vehicles began their
move north and west.
The real punch in the forthcoming at-
tack would be delivered by the tanks
belonging to the Fuehrer Begleit Bri-
gade. This armored brigade, com-
manded by Col. Otto Remer, had been
hastily thrown together around a cadre
composed of Hitler’s former headquar-
ters guard. 8 When the Fuehrer’s com-
mand post on the Eastern Front was
closed by Hitler’s return to Berlin, in
November, Remer was given some addi-
tional troops and shipped to the west.
The final composition of the brigade was
roughly equivalent to a reinforced Amer-
ican combat command: three grenadier
battalions, a battalion of Mark IV tanks
from the Grossdeutschland Panzer Di-
vision (a unit that caused Allied in-
telligence no end of trouble since Gross-
8 Remer had come to Hitler’s attention by his
prompt actions designed to protect the Fuehrer
during the July Putsch.

THE FIRST ATTACKS AT ST. VITH 293
deutschland was known to be on the
Eastern Front), a battalion each of
assault and field guns, and eight batteries
of flak which had formed the antiair-
craft guard for Hitler. Despite repeated
requests by General Lucht, this brigade
was not released to reinforce the LXVI
Corps until late afternoon on 18 De-
cember? Colonel Remer reached the
corps headquarters that same night, but
the movement of his complete brigade
9 Manteuffel tells how he met Model on foot out-
side St. Vith and persuaded the latter to commit
Remer’s brigade so as to speed up the Sixth SS
Panzer Army and thus shake the Fifth loose. Freiden
and Richardson, eds., The Fatal Decisions, Part 6.
from Daun via Prüm to St. Vith would
take considerable time. The orders he
received from General Lucht were
these: the Fuehrer Begleit Brigade
would take part in the St. Vith attack
but would not get too involved in the
fight; once the town fell the brigade
must drive posthaste for the Meuse
River. After a personal reconnaissance
east of St. Vith on 19 December Remer
concluded that a frontal attack in this
sector was out of the question. He
decided, therefore, to flank the St. Vith
defenses from the north as soon as his
brigade, scheduled to arrive on 20 De-
cember, was in hand.

CHAPTER XIII
VIII Corps Attempts To Delay the Enemy
CCR, 9th Armored Division, and
the Road to Bastogne
CCR, 9th Armored Division, the ar-
mored reserve of the VIII Corps, had
been stationed at Trois Vierges on 13
December in position to support the
corps left and center. It consisted of the
52d Armored Infantry Battalion, 2d
Tank Battalion, 73d Armored Field Ar-
tillery Battalion, and the conventional
task force attachments. By the afternoon
of 17 December German armored gains
at the expense of the 28th Division,
forming the center of the corps front,
caused General Middleton to start gath-
ering what antimechanized means he
could find for commitment; this in-
cluded the platoon of self-propelled tank
destroyers from CCR which, as described
earlier, he dispatched toward Clerf.
When the second day of the battle
came to a close, it had become apparent
that the German columns advancing in
the central sector were aiming at the
road system leading to Bastogne. De-
layed reports from the 28th Division in-
dicated that an enemy breakthrough
was imminent. The 9th Armored Divi-
sion commander already had sent CCR
south to Oberwampach, behind the 28th
Division center, when General Middle-
ton ordered the combat command to set
up two strong roadblocks on the main
paved road to Bastogne “without delay.”
This order came at 2140, ten minutes
after word that the enemy had crossed
the Clerf reached the VIII Corps com-
mand post.
The two roadblock positions selected
by the corps commander lay on High-
way N 12, which extended diagonally
from St. Vith and the German border
southwestward to Bastogne. Both posi-
tions were on the line which General
Middleton would order held “at all
costs.” Earlier, Middleton had directed
the commander of the 106th Division to
watch the northern entrance to this
road, but the immediate threat on the
night of the 17th was that the mobile
spearheads of the German attack would
gain access to this road much closer to
Bastogne. One of the blocking positions
was the intersection near the village of
Lullange where the hard-surfaced road
from Clerf entered that leading to Bas-
togne. Clerf and its bridges were only
five miles away from this junction and,
on the evening of 17 December, already
under German fire. The second position,
three miles to the southwest on Highway
N12 near the village of Allerborn,
backed up the Lullange block. More
important, the Allerborn road junction
was the point at which a continuation
of Highway N12 turned off to the
southeast and down into the Wiltz valley
where advance patrols of the main Ger-
man forces, albeit still on the far bank

VIII CORPS ATTEMPTS TO DELAY THE ENEMY 295
of the Clerf, had appeared. The Aller-
born block was only nine miles from
Bastogne.
A little after midnight CCR had
manned these two important positions,
under orders to report to the VIII Corps
command post the moment they were
brought under assault. Off to the east,
however, the 110th Infantry continued
the unequal contest with an enemy
whose strength was growing by the hour.
The force in the hands of the CCR com-
mander, Col. Joseph H. Gilbreth, was
small. Now split into two task forces and
the supporting CCR headquarters
group, the whole was spread thin indeed.
Task Force Rose (Capt. L. K. Rose),
at the northern roadblock, consisted
of a company of Sherman tanks,
one armored infantry company, and a
platoon of armored engineers. The
southern roadblock was manned by Task
Force Harper (Lt. Col. Ralph S. Har-
per), which consisted of the 2d Tank
Battalion (–) and two companies of the
52d Armored Infantry Battalion.
In midmorning the troops peering out
from the ridge where the northern road-
block had been set up saw figures in
field gray entering a patch of woods
to the east on the Clerf road, the first in-
dication that the enemy had broken
through the Clerf defenses. These
Germans belonged to the Reconnais-
sance Battalion of Lauchert’s 2d Panzer
Division, whose infantry elements at
the moment were eradicating the last
American defenders in Clerf. Lauchert’s
two tank battalions, unaffected by the
small arms fire sweeping the Clerf
streets, were close behind the armored
cars and half-tracks of the advance guard.
Two attempts by the Reconnaissance
Battalion to feel out Task Force Rose
were beaten back with the help of a
battery from the 73d Armored Field
Artillery Battalion whose howitzers
were close enough to give direct fire at
both American roadblocks. About 1100
the first Mark IV’s of the 2d Battalion,
3d Panzer Regiment, appeared and un-
der cover of an effective smoke screen
advanced to within 800 yards of the
Shermans belonging to Company A,
2d Tank Battalion. The Germans dal-
lied, probably waiting for the Panzer
Battalion, which finally arrived in the
early afternoon, then deployed on the
left of the Mark IV’s. Taken under
direct fire by the enemy tank guns, the
American infantry withdrew in the
direction of the southern roadblock
and Rose’s tanks now were surrounded
on three sides.
Colonel Gilbreth, whose combat com-
mand was directly attached to VIII Corps
and who was charged with the defense
of the entry to the Bastogne highway,
could not commit his tiny reserve with-
out the approval of the corps command-
er. A telephone message from Gilbreth
to the VIII Corps command post, at
1405, shows the dilemma in all tactical
decisions made during these hours when
a few troops, tanks, and tank destroyers
represented the only forces available to
back up the splintering American line.
TF Rose . . . is as good as surrounded.
. . . have counted 16 German tanks there.
. . . TF is being hit from 3 sides. Recom-
ment that they fight their way out. They
could use 2 platoons of A / 52d Armd Inf
Bn [the last rifle reserve in CCR]–every-
thing else is committed. . . . Did not com-
mit any of the TDs, will wait until the
over-all plan is known.. Plan to push TF
Rose toward the other road block. If the
decision is to stay, some units will be sent
there to help them out.

296 THE ARDENNES: BATTLE OF THE BULGE
The corps commander refused to let
Rose move; and even if adequate rein-
forcement for Task Force Rose had been
at hand the hour was too late. A flanking
move had driven back the American
howitzers, German assault guns satu-
rated the crest position with white phos-
phorus, and when the Shermans pulled
back to the rear slope the panzers
simply ringed Rose’s company. CCR
headquarters got the word at 1430 that
the northern roadblock and its defend-
ers had been overrun, but despite the
loss of seven Shermans Company A con-
tinued to hold. It had been forced back
from the road junction, however, and
the bulk of the 3d Panzer Regiment was
moving out onto the Bastogne highway.
The early winter night gave the Amer-
icans a chance. Captain Rose broke out
cross-country with five tanks and his
assault gun platoon, rolling fast with-
out lights through little villages to-
ward Houffalize, near which the detach-
ment was ambushed. A few vehicles and
crews broke free and reached Bastogne.
The southern roadblock came under
German fire in the late afternoon, light
enemy elements seeping past the be-
leaguered block at the northern junc-
tion. The Mark IV’s and Panthers ac-
tually did not reach Task Force Har-
per until after dark. Sweeping the area
with machine gun fire to clear out any
infantry who might be protecting the
American tanks, the panzers overran
and destroyed two tank platoons of
Company C, 2d Tank Battalion. Per-
haps the weight of this night attack had
caught the American tankers off guard:
the enemy later reported that only three
Shermans at the Allerborn block were
able to maneuver into a fighting stance.
The armored infantry, about 500 yards
from the Shermans, had no better for-
tune. The panzers set the American
vehicles afire with tracer bullets, then
picked out their targets silhouetted by
the flames. During this action Colonel
Harper was killed. What was left of
Task Force Harper and stragglers from
Task Force Rose headed west toward
Longvilly, where CCR headquarters had
been set up.
Longvilly, five and a half miles from
Bastogne, was the scene of considerable
confusion. Stragglers were marching
and riding through the village, and the
location of the enemy was uncertain, al-
though rumor placed him on all sides.
About 2000 an officer appeared at Gil-
breth’s command post and, to the de-
light of the CCR staff, reported that a
task force from the 10th Armored Divi-
sion (Team Cherry) was down the
Bastogne road. The task force command-
er, Lt. Col. Henry T. Cherry, he then
announced, had orders not to advance
east of Longvilly. This word abrupt-
ly altered the atmosphere in the com-
mand post.
Two armored field artillery battal-
ions (the 73d and 58th) still were fir-
ing from positions close to Longvilly,
pouring shells onto the Allerborn road
junction from which Task Force Har-
per had been driven. A handful of rifle-
men from the 110th Infantry, including
Company G which had been ordered to
Clerf and the remnants of the 110th
headquarters which had been driven
out of Allerborn, were still in action.
These troops, together with four tank
destroyers from the 630th Tank De-
stroyer Battalion (–), had formed a
skirmish line. to protect the firing bat-
teries of the 58th south of the village.
Late in the evening firing was heard

VIII CORPS ATTEMPTS TO DELAY THE ENEMY 297
behind the CCR position. This came
from Mageret, next on the Bastogne
road, where German troops had infil-
trated and cut off the fire direction cen-
ter of the 73d Field Artillery Battalion.
The firing batteries nevertheless con-
tinued to shell the road east of Longvilly,
tying in with the 58th Field Artillery
Battalion. Both battalions were firing
with shorter and shorter fuzes; by 2315
the gunners were aiming at enemy in-
fantry and vehicles only two hundred
yards to the front. Somehow the batter-
ies held on. A little before midnight
Colonel Gilbreth ordered what was left
of CCR and its attached troops to begin
a withdrawal via Mageret. A few vehi-
cles made a run for it but were am-
bushed by the Germans now in posses-
sion of Mageret. When a disorderly
vehicle column jammed the exit from
Longvilly, Gilbreth saw that some order
must be restored and stopped all move-
ment until morning light. 1
Under orders, the 73d Armored Field
Artillery Battalion displaced westward,
starting about 0400, one battery cover-
ing another until the three were west of
Longvilly firing against enemy seen to
the east, north, and south, but giving
some cover for the CCR withdrawal. The
58th Field Artillery Battalion and its
scratch covering force were hit early in
the morning by a mortar barrage, and
very shortly two German half-tracks ap-
peared through the half-light. These
were blasted with shellfire but enemy in-
fantry had wormed close in, under cover
of the morning fog, and drove back the
1 Gilbreth was convinced that he must “freeze”
the vehicles in place after he had talked to the
commander of the 58th Field Artillery Battalion,
who had witnessed such precipitate withdrawals
during the North African campaign. Ltr, Col
Joseph H. Gilbreth to author, 6 Sep 58.
thin American line in front of the bat-
teries. About 0800 the fog swirled away,
disclosing a pair of enemy tanks almost
on the howitzers. In a sudden exchange
of fire the tanks were destroyed.
About this time CCR started along the
Bastogne road, although a rear guard
action continued in Longvilly until
noon. The 58th Field Artillery Battal-
ion, with cannoneers and drivers the
only rifle protection, joined the move,
Battery B forming a rear guard and
firing point-blank at pursuing German
armor. The head of the main column
formed by CCR was close to Mageret
when, at a halt caused by a roadblock,
hostile fire erupted on the flanks of the
column. There was no turning back, nor
could the vehicles be extricated from the
jam along the road. The melee lasted
for several hours. Company C of the
482d Antiaircraft Artillery Battalion
(Capt. Denny J. Lovio) used its mobile
quadruple machine guns with effect,
working “heroically,” as CCR later ac-
knowledged, to hold the Germans at bay.
The two batteries of the 58th Armored
Field Artillery Battalion that had been
able to bring off their self-propelled
howitzers went into action, but the fog
had thickened and observed fire was
well-nigh impossible. At long last the
dismounted and disorganized column
was brought into some order “by several
unknown officers who . . . brought
leadership and confidence to our troops.”
(Map VI)
In midafternoon CCR headquarters,
the remnants of the 58th, and the strag-
glers who had been accumulated in the
Longvilly defense made their way
around to the north of Mageret, thence
to Foy, and finally to Bastogne, this move
being made under cover of fire laid down

298 THE ARDENNES: BATTLE OF THE BULGE
by paratroopers from the 101st who
seemed to materialize out of nowhere.
The losses sustained by CCR cannot be
accurately determined, for a part of those
listed in the final December report were
incurred later in the defense of Bas-
togne. 2 The 58th Armored Field Ar-
tillery Battalion had lost eight of its
howitzers; the 73d Armored Field Artil-
lery Battalion had lost four. That these
battalions were self-propelled accounts
for the fact that so many pieces, closely
engaged as the batteries had been, were
saved to fire another day.
While the battle for the roadblocks
and Longvilly was going on, a third task
force from CCR (Lt. Col. Robert M.
Booth) had been separately engaged. As
a guard against tank attack from the
north, the CCR commander sent Booth
with the headquarters and headquarters
company of the 52d Armored Infantry
Battalion, plus a platoon from the 811th
Tank Destroyer Battalion, and a platoon
of light tanks to occupy the high ground
north of the Allerborn-Longvilly section
of the main highway. During the night of
18–19 December Booth’s position re-
ceived some enemy fire but did not come
under direct assault. Communications
with CCR had broken down, however,
and German tanks had been identified
passing to the rear along the Bourcy
road.
Booth decided that the best chance of
escaping encirclement lay in moving out
to the northwest. At daylight on the
19th the column started, picking up
stragglers from the original roadblocks
as it moved. The light tank platoon
2 The total losses for December 1944 (which in-
clude those sustained later in the defense of
Bastogne) are reported in the AAR as being about
800 killed and missing; the 2d Tank Battalion
lost 45 medium tanks and 14 light tanks.
dropped off early in the march to fight a
rear guard action against the enemy who
was closing in on the column and to pro-
tect a number of half-tracks which had
bogged down. Hard pressed and unable
to disengage its vehicles, the rear guard
finally escaped on foot. The main col-
umn dodged and detoured in a series of
small brushes with the Germans, who by
this time seemed to be everywhere, until
it reached Hardigny, three miles north-
west of the starting point. German
tanks and infantry were waiting here,
and in the ensuing fight the column was
smashed. About 225 officers and men es-
caped into the nearby woods and after
devious wanderings behind the German
lines, some for as long as six days, finally
reached Bastogne.
The Advance of the XLVII
Panzer Corps
Luettwitz’ XLVII Panzer Corps was
coming within striking distance of Bas-
togne by the evening of 18 December.
The 2d Panzer Division, particularly,
had picked up speed on the north wing
after the surprising delay at Clerf. Luett-
witz’ mission remained as originally
planned, that is, to cross the Meuse in
the Namur sector, and the capture of
Bastogne remained incidental–although
none the less important–to this goal.
Having erased the two roadblocks
defended by CCR, General Lauchert
turned his 2d Panzer Division to the
northwest so as to swing past the Bas-
togne road nexus and maintain the
momentum of the westward drive. This
maneuver was according to plan for
there was no intention to use the 2d Pan-
zer Division in a coup de main at
Bastogne. Lauchert’s column followed

VIII CORPS ATTEM PTS TO DELAY THE ENEMY
the remnants of Task Force Harper
from the Allerborn roadblock, then
turned off the Bastogne highway
near the hamlet of Chifontaine and
headed toward Bourcy and Noville. It
was the 2d Panzer tanks which Task
Force Booth had heard rolling in its rear
on the night of 18–19 December and
with which its rear guard collided on the
19th. Although Task Force Booth and
the Germans at first missed each other,
the subsequent American attempt to
circle around the northwest and thus
attain Bastogne threw Booth’s column
straight into the German path. Lauch-
ert’s advance guard had hit Noville but
found it strongly held and was forced to
withdraw. As a result a strong detach-
ment moved north to Hardigny, before
a flanking attempt against the Noville
garrison, and here encountered and cut
to pieces Booth’s column.
The American troops defending in
and around Longvilly were given a
period of grace by Lauchert’s decision to
turn off on the Bourcy road. A second
on-the-spot decision by another German
commander added a few hours’ breath-
ing space. Bayerlein’s Panzer Lehr
Division was slowly climbing out of the
Wiltz valley on the afternoon and
evening of 18 December, en route to an
assembly point at Niederwampach. The
division had met little resistance but the
roads were poor (the corps commander
had caviled against the zone assigned the
Panzer Lehr even during the planning
period), and march control was further
burdened by the fact that the 26th Volks
Grenadier Division was marching two of
its rifle regiments toward the same as-
sembly area. Theoretically the mobile
columns of Panzer Lehr now should have
been ahead of the infantry division. In
299
fact the foot troops of the 26th were
making nearly as much speed as the ar-
mor. Horse-drawn artillery was mixed
up with armored vehicles, the roads had
been pounded to sloughs, and the Ger-
man timetable for advance in this sector
had gone out the window.
In the early evening Bayerlein him-
self led the advance guard of the Panzer
Lehr (four companies of the 902d Pan-
zer Grenadier Regiment and some fif-
teen tanks) into Niederwampach. On the
march the advance guard had heard the
sounds of battle and seen gunfire flaming
to the north, “an impressive sight,”
Bayerlein later recalled. This was the
2d Panzer Division destroying the Aller-
born roadblock defense. Bayerlein had
two choices at this point. He could direct
his division south to the hard-surfaced
road linking Bras, Marvie, and Bastogne,
or he could risk an unpaved and muddy
side road via Benonchamps which would
put the Panzer Lehr onto the main Bas-
togne highway at Mageret, three miles
east of Bastogne. Bayerlein decided on
the side road because it was shorter and
he believed that it probably was un-
guarded.
A kampfgruppe (a dozen tanks, a bat-
talion of armored infantry, and one
battery) was sent on to seize Mageret
and arrived there an hour or so before
midnight. The Americans occupied the
village, but only with a small detach-
ment of the 158th Engineer Combat
Battalion, which had been ordered in to
block the road, and a few of the service
troops belonging to CCR. Fighting here
continued sporadically for an hour or
two as Americans and Germans stumbled
upon each other in the dark. By 0100 on
19 December the enemy had set up his
own roadblock east of the village, for

300 THE ARDENNES: BATTLE OF THE BULGE
about that time ambulances evacuating
wounded from Longvilly were checked
by bullet fire. 3 Thus far the Panzer Lehr
advance guard had run into no serious
trouble, but a friendly civilian reported
that American tanks had gone through
Mageret earlier, en route to Longvilly. 4
These tanks belonged to Team Cherry
from CCB of the 10th Armored Division.
Team Cherry on the Longvilly Road
On the evening of 18 December Team
Cherry moved out of Bastogne on the
road to Longvilly. 5 Since he had the
leading team in the CCB, 10th Armored,
column, Cherry had been assigned this
mission by Colonel Roberts because of
the immediate and obvious enemy threat
to the east. Cherry had Company A and
two light tank platoons of his own 3d
Tank Battalion, Company C of the 20th
Armored Infantry Battalion, the 2d Pla-
toon of Company D, 90th Cavalry Recon-
naissance, and a few medics and armored
engineers. His headquarters and head-
3 Sgt. M. N. Shay was awarded the DSC for or-
ganizing a group of soldiers to man machine guns
and defend the village. When the defenders at-
tempted to break out, Sergeant Shay stayed behind
to cover the withdrawal and there was killed.
4 The German sources for the Longvilly fight
are MSS # A–939 (Luettwitz); A–942 (Bayer-
lein) ; and B–040 (Kokott) .
5 he useful records of the early and confused
American reaction east of Bastogne are for the
most part those compiled in the combat inter-
views, shortly after the event, with personnel of
the 9th and 10th Armored Divisions. The journals
of the 2d Tank Battalion, for example, were
destroyed. Most units lost their records and then
attempted to compile an AAR from memory. The
interviews mentioned above have served as the
basis for the description of the Longvilly action in
three publications: The Armored School, Armor
at Bastogne (1949); Marshall, Bastogne: The Story
of the First Eight Days; and Nichols, Impact: The
Battle Story of the Tenth Armored Division.
quarters company was established in
Neffe, just east of Bastogne; his
trains, fortunately as it turned out,
remained in Bastogne. The VIII
Corps commander had designated Long-
villy as one of the three positions which
CCB was to hold at all costs. Cherry
knew that CCR, 9th Armored Division,
was supposed to be around Longvilly,
but beyond that he was totally in the
dark. Even the maps at hand were nearly
useless. The I: 100,000 sheets were accu-
rate enough for a road march but told
little of the terrain where the team would
deploy.
About 1900, after an uneventful move,
1st Lt. Edward P. Hyduke, commanding
the advance guard, reached the western
edge of Longvilly. Seeing that the village
was jammed with vehicles, he halted on
the road. An hour later Cherry and his
S–3 arrived at the headquarters of CCR
where they learned that the situation was
“vague.” CCR had no plans except to
carry out the “hold at all costs” order,
and at the moment its southern road-
block had not yet been overrun. Cherry
went back to Bastogne to tell the CCB
commander, 10th Armored Division,
how things were going, leaving orders
for the advance guard to scout and estab-
lish a position just west of Longvilly
while the main force (Capt. William F.
Ryerson) closed up along the road with
its head about a thousand yards west of
the town. Hyduke’s reconnaissance in
the meantime had convinced him that
the main gap in the defenses around
Longvilly was in the south, and there he
stationed the cavalry platoon, four Sher-
man tanks, and seven light tanks.
Just before midnight Lieutenant Hy-
duke learned that CCR intended to fall
back toward Bastogne (although, in fact,

VIII CORPS ATTEMPTS TO DELAY THE ENEMY 301
the CCR commander later curtailed this
move) and radioed Colonel Cherry to
this effect. When Cherry got the message,
about two hours later, he also learned
that Mageret had been seized by the Ger-
mans and that his headquarters at Neffe
now was cut off from the team at Long-
villy. Team Hyduke was in the process
of shifting in the dark to cover Long-
villy on the east, north, and south. Ryer-
son had sent a half-track load of infantry
to feel out the situation at Mageret,
while independently CCR headquarters
(9th Armored Division) had dispatched
a self-propelled tank destroyer from its
platoon of the 811th Tank Destroyer Bat-
talion on the same mission. After appre-
hensive and belated recognition the two
crews agreed that the road through Mag-
eret could be opened only by force. This
word ultimately reached Cherry who
sent back orders, received at 0830, that
Ryerson should fight his way through
Mageret while the erstwhile advance
guard conducted a rear guard defense of
Longvilly .
During the night small German forces
had tried, rather halfheartedly, to get in-
to Longvilly or at least to pick off the
weapons and vehicles crowded in the
streets by the light of flares and search-
lights directed on the town. As yet the
German artillery and heavy mortars had
not come forward in any number and
Longvilly was shelled only in desultory
fashion. The two right-wing regiments
of the 26th Volks Grenadier Division
were reoriented to the northwest in a
move to reach the Noville-Bastogne road
and place the division in position for a
flanking attack aimed at penetrating the
Bastogne perimeter from the north. On
the extreme right the 77th Grenadier
Regiment had bivouacked near Ober-
wampach, its orders to advance at day-
break through Longvilly and head for
Foy. Its left neighbor, the 78th, was to
make the main effort, swinging around
to the north of Mageret and attacking
to gain the high ground beyond Luzery.
This plan failed to recognize the lim-
itations of physical stamina and supply.
With the dawn, the two regimental com-
manders reported that their troops must
be rested and resupplied before the ad-
vance could resume. Shortly after 1000
the 77th was ready to start its advance
guard through Longvilly, believing that
the town was in German hands. In light
of the way in which troops of the 26th
Volks Grenadier Division, Panzer Lehr,
and 2d Panzer Division had poured into
the area east of Bastogne during the
night, crossing and recrossing boundary
lines which now existed mostly on paper,
it is not surprising that General Kokott
and his commanders were a little vague
as to whose troops held Longvilly.
The 77th was close to the town, ad-
vancing in route column when patrols
suddenly signaled that the Americans
were ahead. It was too late to bypass
the town; so the German regimental
commander hastily organized an attack
behind a screen of machine guns which
he rushed forward, at the same time
borrowing some tanks from the 2d Pan-
zer Division for a turning movement
northeast of Longvilly. The division
commander, however, ordered the attack
held up until it could be organized and
supported, made arrangements with the
Panzer Lehr Division to join by a thrust
from the southwest, and hurried guns
and Werfers up to aid the infantry. Gen-
eral Luettwitz, the corps commander,
also took a hand in the game, without
reference to Kokott, by ordering the 78th

302 THE ARDENNES: BATTLE OF THE BULGE
Grenadier Regiment to turn back toward
the east in support of the 77th. When
Kokott heard what had been done with
his left regiment the 78th already was on
the road, and it took until early after-
noon to get the regiment turned around
and moving west. An hour or so after
noon the reinforced 77th was ready to
jump off from the attack positions south,
east, and northeast of Longvilly.
By this time the bulk of CCR (9th
Armored Division) and the mass of
stragglers who had attached themselves
to CCR were jammed in an immobile
crowd along the road to Mageret, but a
few riflemen were still holed up in the
houses at Longvilly and the third platoon
of Company C, 811th Tank Destroyer
Battalion, was manfully working its guns
to cover the rear of the CCR column.
The main action, however, devolved on
the tanks and armored infantry which
Hyduke had shifted during the night to
form a close perimeter at Longvilly.
The first indication of the nearing
assault was a storm of Werfer and artil-
lery shells. Then came the German tanks
borrowed from the 2d Panzer Division,
ramming forward from the north and
east. In the confused action which fol-
lowed the American tankers conducted
themselves so well that Lauchert later
reported a “counterattack” from Long-
villy against the 2d Panzer flank. But the
Shermans and the American light tanks
were not only outnumbered but out-
gunned by the Panthers and the 88’s of
a flak battalion. The foregone conclusion
was reached a little before 1400 when the
last of the light tanks, all that remained,
were destroyed by their crews who found
it impossible to maneuver into the clear.
The armored infantry were forced to
abandon their half-tracks. The same
thing happened to the three tank de-
stroyers. At least eight panzers had been
destroyed in the melee, but Longvilly
was taken.
Lieutenant Hyduke’s team, acting un-
der orders to rejoin Captain Ryerson’s
main party, threaded a way west on foot
and in small groups through the broken
and burning column now in the last
throes of dissolution, in the woods along
the road, under a rain of shells and bul-
lets. Ryerson’s team, which Colonel
Cherry had instructed early in the morn-
ing to withdraw to the west, had been
hard put to reverse itself and negotiate
the cluttered road leading to Mageret.
The leading American tank had reached
a road cut some three hundred yards east
of Mageret when a hidden tank or anti-
tank gun suddenly opened fire, put a
round into the Sherman, and set it
aflame. The road into Mageret was
closed and all possibility of a dash
through the village ended.
Protected somewhat by the banks
rising on either side of the road the
Americans spent the day trying to inch
forward to the north and south of the
village. Some of the gunners and infantry
from the CCR (9th Armored Division)
column attempted to take a hand in the
fight and help push forward a bit, but
constant and accurate shelling (probably
from Panzer Lehr tanks which had been
diverted northward from Benonchamps
to aid the 26th Volks Grenadier Divi-
sion) checked every move. At dark a
small detachment from Ryerson’s team
and CCR reached the houses on the edge
of Mageret. The village was held in some
strength by detachments of the 26th
Reconnaissance Battalion and Panzer
Lehr. Ryerson had to report: “Having
tough time. [The Germans] are shooting

VIII CORPS ATTEMPTS TO DELAY THE ENEMY 303
flares and knocking out our vehicles with
direct fire.” But the Americans held onto
their little chunk of the village through
the night.
While the bulk of Team Cherry was
engaged at Longvilly and Mageret, the
team commander and his headquarters
troops were having a fight of their own
at Neffe, a mile and a quarter southwest
of Mageret. Here, cut off from his main
force, Colonel Cherry had waited
through the small hours of 19 December
with the comforting assurance that
troops of the 101st Airborne Division
were moving through Bastogne and
would debouch to the east sometime that
day. At first light a detachment of tanks
and infantry from the Panzer Lehr hit
the Reconnaissance Platoon, 3d Tank
Battalion, outposting the Neffe cross-
roads. The platoon stopped one tank
with a bazooka round, but then broke
under heavy fire and headed down the
Bastogne road. One of the two American
headquarters tanks in support of the
roadblock got away, as did a handful of
troopers, and fell back to Cherry’s com-
mand post, a stone château three hun-
dred yards to the south.
The enemy took his time about follow-
ing up, but just before noon moved in to
clear the château. For four hours the 3d
Tank Battalion command post group
held on behind the heavy walls, working
the automatic weapons lifted from its
vehicles and checking every rush in a
blast of bullets. Finally a few hardy Ger-
mans made it, close enough at least to
pitch incendiary grenades through the
window. Fire, leaping through the
rooms, closed this episode. Reinforce-
ments, a platoon of the 501st Parachute
Infantry, arrived just in time to take part
in the withdrawal. But their appearance
and the covering fire of other troops be-
hind them jarred the Germans enough to
allow Cherry and his men to break free.
Before pulling out for Mont, the next
village west, Colonel Cherry radioed the
CCB commander this message: “We are
pulling out. We’re not driven out but
burned out.”
Through the afternoon and evening of
19 December Captain Ryerson and the
little force clutching at the edge of Mag-
eret waited for reinforcements to appear
over the ridges to the south, for CCB
had radioed that help (from the 101st
Airborne Division) was on the way.
Finally, after midnight, new word came
from CCB. Ryerson was to withdraw
northwest to Bizory at dawn and join the
501st Parachute Infantry there. A little
after daybreak Team Ryerson took its re-
maining vehicles, its wounded, and the
stragglers who had paused to take part
in the fight and pulled away from Mag-
eret. Forty minutes across country and it
entered the paratrooper lines. The total
cost to Team Cherry of the engagements
on 19 December had been 175 officers
and men, one-quarter of the command.
Materiel losses had included seventeen
armored half-tracks and an equal num-
ber of tanks. Team Cherry records fif-
teen German tanks destroyed in this day
of catch-as-catch-can fighting, a likely
figure since the 2d Panzer Division
counted eight of its own tanks knocked
out in one spot north of Longvilly.
The story here set down has been one
of mischance and confusion. But regard
the manner in which CCR, 9th Armored
Division, and Team Cherry altered the
course of the German drive on Bastogne.
Through the night of 18–19 December
General Luettwitz hourly expected word
that the advance guard of the XLVII

304
Panzer Corps had reached Bastogne and
the road there from north to Houffalize.
This good news failed to arrive. While
it was true that the resistance in the sec-
tor held by the American 110th Infantry
had finally crumbled, the cost to the Ger-
mans had been dear in men, matériel,
and tactical disorganization, but most of
all in time. Fatigue too was beginning to
tell. Yet Luettwitz had some reason to
expect, as he did, that the road to the
west at last was clear and that the lost
momentum would shortly be restored.
Instead, as the record shows, the XLVII
Panzer Corps continued to encounter
irritating delays, delays compounded by
American resistance, fatigue among the
attacking troops, disintegrating roads, a
general loss of control on the part of the
German commanders, and, most telling
of all, a momentary thickening of the
“fog of war.” On the right wing of the
corps the fight waged at the Lullange
road junction by Task Force Rose
cheated the 2d Panzer Division of vital
daylight hours. More time was lost in
reducing the Allerborn roadblock, and
Lauchert’s advance guard found itself on
the Bourcy-Noville road in the middle of
the night. It is not surprising that the
.German advance was cautious and fur-
ther attack to the northwest delayed.
The whole affair added up to several
extra hours that allowed the American
defenders at the Noville outpost of Bas-
togne until midmorning on the 19th to
get set.
The story of events at Longvilly and
on the Longvilly-Mageret road merits
particular attention by the student of
tactics. Here was a confused and hetero-
geneous force whose main concern on the
night of 18–19 December and the follow-
ing day was to find a way out of the Ger-
THE AR DENNES: BATTLE OF THE BULGE
man trap whose jaws were in plain view.
Further resistance by either CCR or
Team Cherry was intended strictly as a
rear guard action. Yet the mere physical
presence of these troops in the Longvilly
area caused a confusion in German plans
and a diversion of the German main
effort on 19 December out of all pro-
portion to the tactical strength or im-
portance of the American units involved.
The “discovery,” on the morning of 19
December, that American troops were in
and around Longvilly cost the 26th Volks
Grenadier Division at least four hours
of precious daylight, first in setting up
an attack for the 77th Grenadier Reg-
iment and then in straightening out the
78th. As a result when night came the
right wing of the 26th Volks Grenadier
Division was only a little over two miles
beyond Longvilly, and the left, which
had crossed to the north side of the Bas-
togne road in the late afternoon, reached
Bizory too late for a full-scale daylight
assault.
Although the main advance guard of
the Panzer Lehr Division continued to
the west on 19 December, where it ran
afoul of Cherry’s headquarters group at
Neffe, a considerable part of the Panzer
Lehr armored strength was diverted
north from Benonchamps to use its tank
gun fire against the Americans seen along
the road east of Mageret and later to
attack that village. Troops of both the
901st and 902d were thrown in to mop
up the woods where the CCR column
attempted to make a stand and they did
not complete this job until midafter-
noon. So, although the Panzer Lehr
elements had helped free the Longvilly-
Mageret road for the belated advance
by the 26th Volks Grenadier Division
to the northwest, the Panzer Lehr ad-

VIII CORPS ATTEMPTS TO DELAY THE ENEMY 305
vance west of Bastogne was not the full-
bodied affair necessary at this critical
moment. The sudden blow at Bastogne
which the commander of the XLVII Pan-
zer Corps had hoped to deliver failed to
come off on 19 December. Some Amer-
ican outposts had been driven in, but
with such loss of time and uneconomical
use of means that the remaining outposts
in front of Bastogne now were manned
and ready.
The 101st Airborne Division
Moves Into Bastogne
After the long, bitter battle in Hol-
land the 82d and 101st Airborne Divi-
sions lay in camp near Reims, resting,
refitting, and preparing for the next air-
borne operation. General Ridgway’s
XVIII Airborne Corps, to which these
divisions belonged, constituted the strate-
gic reserve for the Allied forces in west-
ern Europe. Although the Supreme
Allied Commander had in the past
attempted to create a SHAEF Reserve of
a size commensurate with the expedition-
ary forces under his command, he had
been continually thwarted by the de-
mands of a battle front extending from
the North Sea to Switzerland. On 16
December, therefore, the SHAEF Re-
serve consisted solely of the two airborne
divisions in France.
Less than thirty-six hours after the
start of the German counteroffensive,
General Hodges, seeing the VIII Corps
center give way under massive blows and
having thrown his own First Army
reserves into the fray plus whatever
Simpson’s Ninth could spare, turned to
Bradley with a request for the SHAEF
Reserve. Eisenhower listened to Bradley
and acceded, albeit reluctantly; the two
airborne divisions would be sent imme-
diately to the VIII Corps area. Orders
for the move reached the chief of staff of
the XVIII Airborne Corps during the
early evening of 17 December and the
latter promptly relayed the alert to the
82d and 101st. There seems to have been
some delay in reaching the corps com-
mander in England, where he was ob-
serving the training of a new division
(the 17th Airborne), but a couple of
hours after midnight he too had his
orders and began hurried preparations
for the flight to France.
The two divisions had little organic
transportation-after all they were
equipped to fly or parachute into battle-
but in a matter of hours the Oise Section
of the Communications Zone gathered
enough io-ton open trucks and trailers
plus the work horse 2½-tonners to
mount all the airborne infantry. Because
the 82d had been given a little more rest
than the 101st and would take less time
to draw its battle gear and get on the
road, it was selected to lead the motor
march into Belgium. Ridgway would be
delayed for some hours; so General
Gavin, commanding the 82d, assumed
the role of acting corps commander,
setting out at once for the First Army
headquarters where he arrived in mid-
morning on the 18th. Since Maj. Gen.
Maxwell D. Taylor was on leave in the
United States, Brig. Gen. Anthony C.
McAuliffe, artillery commander of the
101st, prepared to lead this division into
battle.
To alert and dispatch the two veteran
airborne divisions was a methodical busi-
ness, although both moved to the front
minus some equipment and with less
than the prescribed load of ammunition.
This initial deployment in Belgium pre-

306 THE ARDENNES: BATTLE OF THE BULGE
sents a less ordered picture, blurred by
the fact that headquarters journals fail
to square with one another and the
memories of the commanders involved
are at variance, particularly as regards
the critical decision (or decisions) which
brought the 101st to Bastogne and its
encounter with history. 6
General Middleton, the VIII Corps
commander, had his headquarters in
Bastogne when the storm broke in the
east. The city quite literally commanded
the highway system lacing the southern
section of the Belgian Ardennes. Middle-
ton, having done all he could on the 16th
and 17th to assemble his meager reserve
of tanks and engineers in last-ditch posi-
tions on the roads entering Bastogne
from the east, read the pattern of the
enemy advance in these terms on the
17th. The number of German divisions
and the speed at which they were moving
would require the acquisition of a much
larger road net than the Germans had
thus far used. If St. Vith held and the
V Corps shoulder did not give way, the
enemy would attempt to seize the excel-
lent highway net at Bastogne. Middle-
ton therefore planned to hold the orig-
inal VIII Corps positions as long as
possible (in accordance with orders from
General Hodges) , and at the same time
to build strong defenses in front of St.
Vith, Houffalize, Bastogne, and Luxem-
bourg City.
For the second stage of his plan he
counted on prompt assistance from the
First and Third Armies to create the
defenses for St. Vith and Luxembourg,
6 Combat interviews; VIII Corps AAR and G–3
Jnl; XVIII Airborne Corps AAR and G–3 Jnl;
101st Airborne Div AAR and G–3 Jnl.
GENERAL MCAULIFFE
while the two airborne divisions-which
Hodges had assured him would be forth-
coming-took over Bastogne and Houff-
alize. Middleton reasoned that a strong
American concentration in the Bastogne-
Houffalize sector would force the enemy
to come to him, and that in any case he
would be in strength on the German
flank and rear. At midnight on the 17th
the VIII Corps commander had a tele-
phone call from Hodges’ headquarters
and heard the welcome word that he
probably would get the 82d and 101st
Airborne Divisions “immediately.”
Middleton’s plan, it seemed, could be
put in effect by the morning of the 19th.
Eisenhower’s order to commit the two
airborne divisions did not specify exactly
how they would be employed. Bradley
and Hodges were agreed that they would
be thrown in to block the German spear-
head columns, but Lt. Gen. Walter Be-
dell Smith, the SHAEF chief of staff,

VIII CORPS ATTEMPTS TO DELAY THE ENEMY 307
seems to have selected Bastogne as the
initial rendezvous point in Belgium
without any knowledge of the First
Army and VIII Corps plans. In any event
Smith expected both of the airborne
divisions to assemble around Bastogne.
The subsequent order of events is
rather uncertain. When Gavin reported
at Spa on the morning of the 18th, he
found the First Army staff gravely con-
cerned by Peiper’s armored thrust to-
ward Werbomont and he was ordered
to divert the incoming bad, then en route
to Bastogne, toward Werbomont. Initi-
ally both Gavin and McAuliffe were un-
der the impression that the 101st was to
go to Werbomont; actually McAuliffe
started with his advance party to report
to Gavin at that point but detoured with
the intention of first getting Middleton’s
view of the situation. Middleton, on the
other hand, expected that the 82d Air-
borne would be put in at Houffalize to
seal the gap opening on the north flank
of the VIII Corps. McAuliffe reached
Bastogne about 1600.
The VIII Corps roadblocks east of
Bastogne had meanwhile begun to give
way. Middleton got Bradley’s permission
to divert the 101st to the defense of Bas-
togne, whereupon Hodges turned the
101st over to Middleton and ordered him
to withdraw his corps headquarters from
the threatened city. Middleton, however.
remained with a few of his staff to brief
Ridgway, who reached Bastogne in the
early evening, and to help McAuliffe
make his initial dispositons, the latter
selecting an assembly area around
Mande-St. Etienne, some four miles west
of Bastogne. The VIII Corps commander
telephoned Bradley that he had ordered
the 101st to defend Bastogne, that there
was no longer a corps reserve, and that
the 101st might be forced to fight it out
alone.
Turning the motor columns of the
101st was catch-as-catch-can. At the vil-
lage of Herbomont two main roads ex-
tend southeast to Bastogne and northeast
of Houffalize (en route to Werbomont) .
When the leader of the 101st column,
Col. Thomas L. Sherburne, Jr., reached
Herbomont about 2000 he found two
military police posts some two hundred
yards apart, one busily engaged in direct-
ing all airborne traffic to the northeast,
the other directing it to the southeast.
This confusion was soon straightened
out; the last trucks of the 82d roared
away in the direction of Werbomont and
Sherburne turned the head of the 101st
column toward Bastogne. The story now
becomes that of the 101st Airborne Divi-
sion and of those units which would join
it in the fight to bar the way west through
Bastogne.
The 501st Parachute Infantry Regi-
ment (Lt. Col. Julian J. Ewell) headed
the 101st Division columns rolling into
Belgium, followed by the 506th Para-
chute Infantry (Col. Robert F. Sink),
the 502d Parachute Infantry (Lt. Col.
Steve A. Chappuis) , and the 327th Gli-
der Infantry Regiment (Col. Joseph H.
Harper) to which was attached the 1st
Battalion of the 401s Glider Infantry.
(The 1st Battalion from the 401st is
carried as the “3d Battalion” in the
journals of the 327th and this designa-
tion will be used throughout the narra-
tive.)
The division was smaller than a con-
ventional infantry division (it numbered
805 officers and 11,035 men), but the
organization into four regiments was
better adapted to an all-round or four-
sided defense than the triangular forma-

308 THE ARDENNES: BATTLE OF THE BULGE
PARATROOPERS OF THE 101ST AIRBORNE MOVING UP TO BASTOGNE
tion common to the regular division.
The 101st had three battalions of light
field pieces, the modified pack howitzer
with a maximum effective range of about
8,000 yards. In place of the medium ar-
tillery battalions normally organic or
attached to the infantry division, the air-
borne carried one battalion of 105-mm.
howitzers. Also the airborne division had
no armor attached, whereas in practice
at least one tank battalion accompanied
every regular division. The odd bits and
pieces of armored, artillery, and tank
destroyer units which were en route to
Bastogne or would be absorbed on the
ground by the 101st would ultimately
coalesce to provide a “balanced” combat
force in the defense of Bastogne.
Three of these ancillary units retained
their tactical identity throughout the
fight at Bastogne. The 705th Tank De-
stroyer Battalion (Lt. Col. Clifford Tem-
pleton) was in Germany with the Ninth
Army when it received orders on the
evening of the 18th to go south to Bas-
togne. By the time the column reached
the Ourthe River, German tanks were
so close at hand that Templeton had to
detour to the west. To protect his trains
he dropped off two platoons to hold the
Ortheuville bridge, one of those acci-
dents of war which have fateful conse-

VIII CORPS ATTEMPTS TO DELAY THE ENEMY 309
quences. On the night of the 19th the
battalion reached Bastogne. The 705th
was equipped with the new self-pro-
pelled long-barreled 76-mm. gun which
would permit a duel on equal terms with
most of the German tank guns.
The 755th Armored Field Artillery
Battalion (Lt. Col. William F. Hartman)
was sent from Germany on the eve-
ning of the 18th with equally vague
orders to proceed to Bastogne. The bat-
talion reached its destination the follow-
ing morning to find Bastogne jammed
with vehicles. Middleton ordered Colo-
nel Hartman to keep his bulky prime
movers and 155-mm. howitzers out of the
city until, in the evening, some traffic
order had been restored.
The 969th Field Artillery Battalion
(Lt. Col. Hubert D. Barnes), also
equipped with medium howitzers,
joined the Bastogne defense more or less
by chance. Originally assigned to sup-
port the 28th Division artillery, the bat-
talion had been ordered to displace west
as the enemy broke into the open. Sent
hither and yon by liaison officers who
apparently knew no more of the situa-
tion than did the cannoneers, the battal-
ion was moving out of the Bastogne
sector when orders came to emplace and
fire by map on German troops along the
road entering Noville from the north.
Thus the 969th joined the Bastogne bat-
tle. Ordered by McAuliffe into the
slowly forming perimeter, it took firing
positions at Villeroux near the 755th
and the 420th Armored Field Artillery
Battalions. These three battalions to-
gether would form a groupment firing
from the west around the entire sweep
of the Bastogne perimeter. 7
The 101st move from Camp Mour-
melon to Bastogne was made in rain and
snow flurries; for the later serials most of
the 107-mile trip was in darkness. All
parts of the column were forced to buck
the mass of vehicles streaming back to
the west. But the move was made in good
time, the 501st in the van taking only
eight hours before it detrucked at mid-
night. By 0900 on 19 December McAu-
liffe had all four regiments in hand.
There could be no prolonged pause
for an integrated division deployment,
for all through the night messages of
apprehension, defeat, and disaster-
none too precise-came into Bastogne.
Middleton counted on CCB of the 10th
Armored Division (Col. William
Roberts) to heal the breach–for a time
at least-opened on the main road east
of Bastogne. He expected McAuliffe to
support this force, but as yet the enemy
dispositions and intentions were too un-
certain to permit any wholesale commit-
ment of the 101st.
7 The 705th Tank Destroyer Battalion AAR,
755th Armored Field Artillery Battalion Unit His-
tory, and 969th Field Artillery Battalion AAR are
must reading for anyone attempting to reconstruct
the Bastogne defense.

CHAPTER XIV
The VIII Corps Barrier Lines
On the morning of 16 December Gen-
eral Middleton’s VIII Corps had a for-
mal corps reserve consisting of one
armored combat command and four
engineer combat battalions. In dire cir-
cumstances Middleton might count on
three additional engineer combat battal-
ions which, under First Army command,
were engaged as the 1128th Engineer
Group in direct support of the normal
engineer operations on foot in the VIII
Corps area. In exceptionally adverse
circumstances, that is under conditions
then so remote as to be hardly worth a
thought, the VIII Corps would have a
last combat residue-poorly armed and
ill-trained for combat-made up of rear
echelon headquarters, supply, and tech-
nical service troops, plus the increment
of stragglers who might, in the course of
battle, stray back from the front lines.
General Middleton would be called up-
on to use all of these “reserves.” Their
total effect in the fight to delay the Ger-
man forces hammering through the VIII
Corps center would be extremely im-
portant but at the same time generally
incalculable, nor would many of these
troops enter the pages of history. 1
1 The author has made an exhaustive (and ex-
hausting) effort to read all the documents, jour-
nals, and reports belonging to each of the units
mentioned-no matter how cursorily-in this chap-
ter. Of course a great number of records were
destroyed; this is particularly true of the artillery
battalions. The journals of most of the engineer
units are extant, but these vary greatly in value.
A handful of ordnance mechanics
manning a Sherman tank fresh from the
repair shop are seen at a bridge. By their
mere presence they check an enemy col-
umn long enough for the bridge to be
demolished. The tank and its crew dis-
appear. They have affected the course of
the Ardennes battle, even though min-
utely, but history does not record from
whence they came or whither they
went. A signal officer checking his wire
along a byroad encounters a German
column; he wheels his jeep and races
back to alert a section of tank destroyers
standing at a crossroad. Both he and the
gunners are and remain anonymous. Yet
the tank destroyers with a few shots rob
the enemy of precious minutes, even
hours. A platoon of engineers appears in
one terse sentence of a German com-
mander’s report. They have fought
bravely, says the foe, and forced him to
waste a couple of hours in deployment
and maneuver. In this brief emergence
from the fog of war the engineer platoon
Surprisingly, many of the ordnance and antiair-
craft units provided records which helped con-
siderably in unwinding the involved tactical
situation in their particular area. Any reader
wishing to delve further into the story should
begin with the following records: the VIII Corps
G–3 Journal and Artillery AAR; First U.S. Army,
G–3 Journal; the 51st Engineer Combat Battalion
S–3 Operations Journal (a model of what such a
record should be); the very complete 158th En-
gineer Combat Battalion S–3 Journal; and the
brief but graphic AAR of the 58th Armored Field
Artillery Battalion (whose records were destroyed) .

THE VIII CORPS BARRIER LINES 311
makes its bid for recognition in history.
That is all. A small group of stragglers
suddenly become tired of what seems to
be eternally retreating. Miles back they
ceased to be part of an organized combat
formation, and recorded history, at that
point, lost them. The sound of firing is
heard for fifteen minutes, an hour, com-
ing from a patch of woods, a tiny village,
the opposite side of a hill. The enemy
has been delayed; the enemy resumes
the march westward. Weeks later a
graves registration team uncovers mute
evidence of a last-ditch stand at woods,
village, or hill.
The story of the units that were re-
tained under tactical control and em-
ployed directly by General Middleton
in the attempt to form some defense in
depth in the VIII Corps center has been
partially recorded and therefore can be
narrated. The effect that these units had
in retarding the German advances, a
course of action evolving extemporane-
ously, must be considered along with
the role played by the un-co-ordinated
front-line formations in the haphazard
sequence of their delaying actions from
east to west. For convenience sake the
VIII Corps action is recounted here in
independent detail.
With the very limited forces at his dis-
posal prior to 16 December the VIII
Corps commander found it physically
impossible to erect any of the standard
defenses taught in the higher army
schools or prescribed in the field service
regulations. The best he could do to de-
fend the extended front was to deploy
his troops as a screen, retaining local
reserves for local counterattack at poten-
tially dangerous points. In effect, there-
fore, the main part of Middleton’s re-
serve consisted of the battalions and
companies assembled in or close to the
villages which formed the strongpoints
of the screen. Under the circumstances
there could be no thought of an elastic
defense with strong formations eche-
loned in any depth behind the forward
positions. In the event of a general attack
in great strength delivered against all
parts of the corps front simultaneously,
Middleton had little choice but to carry
out the general directive to “defend in
place.” With four engineer battalions
and one small armored combat command
as the only corps reserve behind an elon-
gated and brittle linear defense Middle-
ton’s commitment of this last reserve
would turn on the attempt to plug a few
of the gaps in the forward line, slow the
enemy columns on a few main roads, and
strengthen by human means two or three
of the natural physical barriers deep in
the corps rear area.
Middleton’s First Moves
During the daylight hours of 16 De-
cember the direction of the German
main effort and the weight of the forces
involved was only vaguely perceived by
the VIII Corps and higher commands.
In the front lines the troops actually
grappling with the enemy initially re-
ported piecemeal and seemingly local-
ized attacks. As the day progressed and
the attackers appeared in greater num-
bers the changing situation duly was re-
ported through the chain of command.
By this time, however, communications
had been so disrupted that the time lag
as represented on the situation maps in
corps and army headquarters was a
matter of several hours. As a result CCR,
9th Armored Division, and the four en-
gineer combat battalions received alert

312 THE ARDENNES: BATTLE OF THE BULGE
orders and carried out assembly, but
only the 168th Engineer Combat Battal-
ion was committed and it had a string
attached that restricted its free employ-
ment by the 106th Infantry Division. Of
the three army engineer battalions in the
VIII Corps zone under the 1128th En-
gineer Group, one, the 299th Engineer
Combat Battalion, already was in the
battle area. During the day its sawmills
at Diekirch received a part in a First
Army security plan, prepared a fortnight
earlier. About one o’clock on the morn-
ing of the 16th the 299th was put on
alert status with other units in the army
rear area to meet expected landings of
German paratroops. Through the first
day of the counteroffensive, therefore,
the 1128th had most of its men reinforc-
ing the guards at rear area headquarters
and installations or manning observation
points.
During the night of 16 December
communications deteriorated still fur-
ther, particularly from regimental com-
mand posts forward. The outline of the
German attack began to emerge, and the
pattern tentatively pointed to Liège as
the enemy objective and made the size of
the German effort more or less apparent.
But the growing hiatus in time between
the initial contact with enemy troops at
a given point and the ultimate “fix” in
grease pencil on the acetate overlays in
the higher American headquarters made
any true and timely picture of the extent
of the German penetrations impossible.
Enough information filtered into the
VIII Corps command post at Bastogne,
nevertheless, to enable Middleton to
formulate his countermoves. The defen-
sive pIan he adopted consisted of two
phases: first, to defend in place along the
corps front as long as possible, thus
carrying out the existing First Army
directive; second, to deny the enemy full
and free use of the Ardennes road net
by building the strongest possible de-
fense, with the limited force at hand, in
front of the key communications centers,
St. Vith, Houffalize, Bastogne, and Lux-
embourg City. Although General Mid-
dleton counted on reinforcements from
outside his own command to garrison
these four key points, it would fall to the
VIII Corps to deny the enemy access
thereto during the hours or days which
would pass before reinforcements could
take over.
St. Vith and Bastogne appeared to be
in the greatest immediate danger as
cracks commenced in the linear defense
on the 17th. Friendly armor was hurry-
ing down from the north to bolster the
106th Division and St. Vith; so, having
turned one of his engineer battalions
over to General Jones, the corps com-
mander directed his attention to the ap-
proaches to Bastogne, a natural thing in
view of the dangerous condition of the
VIII Corps center. Thus a pattern was
forming in which the meager resources
at Middleton’s disposal would be com-
mitted to delaying actions in the south-
western part of the corps area while a
vacuum formed south of St. Vith and to
the rear of that sector. (See Map IV.)
By the afternoon German advances at
the expense of the 28th Division center
forced Middleton to deploy the bulk of
his reserve along the road net east of
Bastogne. The presence of enemy recon-
naissance at the Clerf River indicated
that the main crossings would be made
near Clerf and Wilwerwiltz. From the
Clerf bridgehead a main, hard-surfaced
highway led into Bastogne. The Wil-
werwiltz bridgehead gave entry to the

THE VIII CORPS BARRIER LINES
Wiltz valley and a complex of secondary
roads wending toward Bastogne. CCR,
9th Armored (which earlier had sent
some tank destroyers to Clerf) , drew the
assignment of blocking the Clerf-Bas-
togne highway. One engineer battalion,
the 44th, was ordered to reinforce the
headquarters force of the 707th Tank
Battalion for the defense of Wilwerwiltz,
but events were moving too fast and the
battalion was diverted to the 28th Divi-
sion command post at Wiltz. There re-
mained the problem of barring the way
to Luxembourg City, east of which the
4th Infantry Division was having a hard
time. Already in the area, the 159th En-
gineer Combat Battalion was attached to
Barton’s division in the late afternoon
and headed for Consdorf.
Of what might be considered the for-
mal reserve of the VIII Corps, General
Middleton had left, by 1600 of 17 De-
cember, only the 35th Engineer Combat
Battalion; he retained in addition a
partial voice in the disposition of the
1148th Engineer Group. The corps en-
gineer officer, meanwhile, had proposed
1 plan for defending a line from Foy to
Neffe which would screen the eastern
entries to Bastogne. To form this screen
the 35th and the 158th Engineer Combat
Battalion, the latter taken from the
1128th Group, assembled their com-
panies, vehicles, and equipment. Both
battalions had been dispersed in num-
erous working parties; their trucks were
hauling road-building stores, timber,
and the like. Weapons long in disuse had
to be collected and checked; land mines
and explosives had to be gathered. Fur-
thermore the 55th had the responsibility
of guarding the VIII Corps headquarters
and could not be released immediately.
At the close of day other engineer
313
units were on the move. Ponton and
light equipment companies pulled onto
the roads leading west with orders to
take their bridges, air compressors,
graders, and other paraphernalia out
of enemy reach. Some of these units, like
the 626th Engineer Light Equipment
Company, would find themselves di-
rectly in the path of the German ad-
vance. At Diekirch the 299th Engineer
Combat Battalion, under orders to rejoin
its group in the west, shut down the saw-
mills and entrucked under artillery fire.
As yet no large numbers of foot strag-
glers had come from the front lines, but
the roads to the rear were crowded with
supply vehicles, medium and heavy ar-
tillery, service and headquarters trucks,
jeeps, and command cars. Around the
headquarters and installations farther to
the west, clerks, mechanics, truck driv-
ers, and the like stripped the canvas from
truck-mounted machine guns, filled the
ammunition racks on deadlined tanks,
listened to hurried explanations of ba-
zooka mechanisms, or passed in inspec-
tion before sergeants who for the first
time in weeks were seriously concerned
with the appearance of each carbine and
pistol.
At daylight on 18 December the 158th
Engineer Combat Battalion commenced
digging on its designated position north-
east of Bastogne between Foy and Neffe.
In addition barriers manned in platoon
strength were set up at Neffe, Mageret,
and Longvilly on the Clerf highway. By
dint of borrowing right and left 950 anti-
tank mines could be used to strengthen
the 158th position. At Bizory, northwest
of Mageret, a part of Company C, 9th
Armored Engineer Battalion, had been
loaned by CCR and during the morn-
ing dug in on the high ground facing

314 THE ARDENNES: BATTLE OF THE BULGE
toward the Bastogne road.
Help was on the way to the VIII
Corps, two airborne divisions and one
armored. Of these reinforcements the
101st Airborne Division and the 10th
Armored Division were expected to as-
semble in the neighborhood of Bastogne.
The problem then, during the 18th, was
to extend the slim screen already in
position east of Bastogne so as to provide
cover north and south of the city against
any enemy interruption of the assembly
process. On the south side the 1102d En-
gineer Group gathered ordnance, quar-
termaster, signal, and engineer units,
placing them east of the highway run-
LA ROCHE AND THE OURTHE RIVER
ning to Arlon. At the moment, however,
this sector gave no cause for immediate
concern, for the southern flank of the
corps still was holding.
North of Bastogne a German threat
was beginning to take shape. During the
morning word reached the VIII Corps
command post that the 740th Field Ar-
tillery Battalion had been overrun by
the 1st SS Panzer Division at Poteau,
west of St. Vith. Also, the left wing of
the 28th Infantry Division had been
forced back across the Our River and it
appeared that a penetration was in prog-
ress south of St. Vith. To head off any
roaming German reconnaissance units

THE VIII CORPS BARRIER LINES
north of Bastogne, a collection of anti-
aircraft, tank destroyer, ordnance, and
engineer units moved to intersections
and bridges along the Bastogne-La
Roche road. In the latter bridgehead
town the 7th Armored Division trains
took over responsibility for blocking the
roads which there united to cross the
Ourthe River. East of this line lay HOUff-
alize, one of the four key road centers
designated by Middleton for defense,
but the 82d Airborne Division was en
route to the battle and the VIII Corps
commander expected that it would be
deployed in the Houffalize sector. The
Germans were moving too fast. At 1400
on the eighteenth a radio message
reached Bastogne that the enemy had
overrun the rear command post of an
engineer company at Steinbach, just east
of Houffalize.
There remained the very real threat
of a coup de main against Bastogne from
the east. In the afternoon bad news from
this sector came thick and fast: at 1405
a telephone call from the commander
of CCR, 9th Armored Division, reported
that his most advanced roadblock force
(Task Force Rose) was “as good as sur-
rounded”; at 1430 the Germans were
reported advancing on the second road-
block; at 1525 came confirmation that
Task Force Rose had been overrun. On
the Clerf highway, then, the enemy was
less than nine miles from Bastogne.
Troops of the 28th Division continued
to hold the town of Wiltz, but they could
not bar the valley corridor to the Ger-
mans. An officer patrol, in armored cars
taken out of ordnance workshops, made
an attempt to reconnoiter a proposed
barrier line between CCR and Wiltz.
Toward evening their report reached
Bastogne: the Germans were west of the
315
proposed line. The project was dropped.
As ordered by General Hodges,
most of the VIII Corps headquarters
moved during the day to Neufchateau,
about eighteen miles southwest of
Bastogne, but General Middleton and
a small staff remained in the city to
brief the incoming airborne and ar-
mored commander and to maintain
what little control still could be exer-
cised over the course of battle. The 35th
Engineer Combat Battalion, headquar-
ters guard, was more urgently needed
east of Bastogne; at 1800 Middleton or-
dered the battalion to move in on the
right of the 158th. With two battalions
in line there was a screen, albeit very
thin, extending from the Houffalize-Bas-
togne road to the Arlon-Bastogne road.
Then, since the center of gravity for the
corps was rapidly shifting to the south-
west, Middleton took his last two engi-
neer battalions, the 1278th and 299th, to
establish a screen facing generally north
between Libramont and Martelange. Be-
hind this screen, southwest of Bastogne,
he hoped to assemble the stragglers and
broken units of his corps.
The situation as seen by Middleton
and his staff on the night of the 18th
was this. CCB of the 10th Armored had
arrived from the Third Army and taken
positions between Bastogne and Wiltz.
Some part of CCR, 9th Armored, re-
mained intact at Longvilly astride the
Clerf road. The 101st Airborne Division
was detrucking in its concentration area
west of Bastogne. The Germans had
achieved a clear penetration in the corps
center and for all practical purposes
the American forces in the St. Vith sector
were separated from those under Middle-
ton’s immediate control. The deep and
dangerous penetration made by the

316
armored columns of the 1st SS Panzer
Division in the V Corps sector north and
west of St. Vith had forced the First
Army and 12th Army Group command-
ers to choose between an attempt to re-
store the breach between Bastogne and
St. Vith and one to stop the 1st SS Panzer
Division.
The decision, made during the after-
noon, was to assemble the 82d airborne
Division at Werbomont, instead of
Houffalize as Middleton had intended.
Houffalize would have to go and with-
out a fight. Rumors in the early evening
already placed it in German hands. Since
there was no force at hand to close the
Houffalize gap the most that could be
done was to vulcanize the edges of the
tear by holding on at St. Vith and
Bastogne. Perhaps, too, the enemy rush-
ing through the gap might be caused
some difficulty and delay by the creation
of a barrier line along the Ourthe River
and its tributaries. Plans for such a
barrier line already were in execution
in heterogeneous units hurrying to out-
post bridges, villages, and road inter-
sections between La Roche and Bas-
togne.
The night of 18 December was rife
with rumor. By the quarter hour new
reports came in from excited truck
drivers, jeep patrols, or lonely clerks on
unfamiliar outpost duty, placing the Ger-
mans in some village or on some road
actuaIly well to the west of the real
locations of the most advanced enemy
spearheads. The rear areas of the corps
-if one could continue to speak of any
“rear” area–was crawling with vehicles.
Supply points, truckheads, and medical
installations were moving to the west-
some for the third time in as many days.
New collecting points for the dead were
THE ARDENNES: BATTLE OF THE BULGE
opening. And closer to the vague and
fragmentary front line, roads, trails, and
paths carried stragglers singly or in large
herds, toiling painfully on foot or cling-
ing tenaciously to some vehicle, back
to Bastogne or beyond to the west.
The Cap North of Bastogne
The action east of Bastogne during
the night of 18 December, the absorption
of the engineer screen into the larger
defending forces, and the final fate of
CCR, 9th Armored, has already been
described. Here the focus is on the at-
tempt to impede the probing advance
guards and reconnaissance parties of the
Fifth Panzer Army pushing into the gap
north of Bastogne.
Construction of a really tough bar-
rier line along the Ourthe River hardly
could be expected. The stream itself,
even when swollen by the winter snows,
was narrow. At some points the ap-
proaches to the crossing sites were diffi-
cult to negotiate and lent themselves to
blocks and barriers, but there were many
bridges and numerous fords which an
enemy could use to bypass a barred cross-
ing site. At best only a very few compa-
nies of engineers could be found for the
business of preparing bridge demolition
charges, erecting barriers, laying anti-
tank mines, and blasting craters in the
roads. Some engineer tools and equip-
ment had been lost to the enemy, but
there was probably as much available
as the small number of engineers could
properly use. It was one thing to
strengthen the physical barriers in the
path of the oncoming enemy; it was
quite another to defend at these barriers
with sufficient rifle strength and antitank
weapons. The men and weapons re-

THE VIII CORPS BARRIER LINES 317
quired for a continuous defensive line
along the Ourthe simply were not avail-
able. On the other hand the German col-
umns would not hit the Ourthe line in a
co-ordinated and general attack; further-
more their initial appearance could be
predicted along the well-defined and
major routes westward.
On the morning of 19 December re-
connaissance troops of two German
armored divisions, the 2d Panzer Divi-
sion and the 116th Panzer Division, fun-
neled through a narrow corridor, only
two miles in width, between Noville and
Houffalize. The southern wall of this
corridor was formed by the American
troops who had pushed the rapidly form-
ing Bastogne perimeter as far out as
Noville. In the-north where the town
of Houffalize had been abandoned the
corridor wall was formed by nature, for
Houffalize was a bridgehead on the east-
west channel of the Ourthe River. The
two corps whose armored divisions were
leading the Fifth Panzer Army pack in
the race for the Meuse were strung
out for miles behind the foremost re-
connaissance forces. The main forces of
the two armored divisions, although rela-
tively close to the reconnaissance teams,
were still a few hours behind.
On the German left the 2d Panzer Di-
vision, leading the XL VII Panzer Corps,
collided with the Noville defenses early
on the 19th. Partly by chance and partly
by design, for General Lauchert needed
more road room in which to pass his
division around Bastogne, the 2d Panzer
Division column became involved in a
fight which extended from Noville east
to Longvilly and lasted all through the
day and following night. Caught up in
this fight the advance elements of the
division did not push beyond the
Houffalize-Bastogne road until darkness
had fallen. On the German right the
reconnaissance battalion of the 116th
Panzer Division moved along the south
side of the Ourthe swinging wide to
avoid Houffalize (this before noon),
then turning to the northwest with the
intention of crossing the Ourthe and
seizing the La Roche bridges from the
rear. This advance, though unopposed,
was slow. Shortly after noon a few light
reconnaissance vehicles reached Ber-
togne, from which a secondary road led
across the Ourthe and on to La Roche.
General Middleton had spotted
Bertogne as one of the chief approaches
to the Ourthe and La Roche. Having
been promised the 705th Tank Destroyer
Battalion, en route south from the Ninth
Army, he ordered the battalion to erect
roadblocks at both Bertogne and La
Roche. The 705th, coming by way of
Liège, was a few hours distant when the
German scouts entered Bertogne. Across
the river the commander of the 7th Ar-
mored Division trains had taken inde-
pendent action to protect his trucks and
supplies gathered in the neighborhood
of La Roche by installing outpost detach-
ments and roadblocks to the south and
east. Someone (who is not clear) had
blown the Ourthe bridge northwest of
Bertogne. To prevent the reconstruction
of this bridge Colonel Adams sent Com-
pany C, 129th Ordnance Maintenance
Battalion, and a couple of antiaircraft
half-tracks mounting 37-mm. guns to
form a block on the near bank about a
half mile from the village of Ortho.
It was midafternoon when the enemy
reached the far bank. A self-propelled
gun at the head of the small German col-
umn got in the first blow, its shells knock-
ing out the half-track crews. Capt.

318 THE ARDENNES: BATTLE OF THE BULGE
Robert E. Spriggs withdrew his com-
pany to a ridge overlooking the river
and radioed for reinforcements. The
enemy would not risk a daylight cross-
ing, nor could the German engineers
repair the damaged span while under
direct fire. In the early evening five
more half-tracks from the 203d Antiair-
craft Battalion and a pair of self-pro-
pelled tank destroyers from the 705th
Tank Destroyer Battalion came up.
It must have been about this time that
the 116th Panzer Division command-
er received the unwelcome news that
he had no bridge on which to cross the
western branch of the Ourthe. The
forward combat teams of the division
were west of the Houffalize-Bastogne
road but not yet up to the river. They
had defiled with difficulty on the limited
road net north of the Bastogne outworks,
and a part of the tank regiment had
stopped by the way to aid the 2d Panzer
Division at Noville. In the twilight re-
connaissance troops who had pushed
west along the Ourthe after the setback
at the Bertogne crossing discovered a
Bailey bridge, still standing, at Ortheu-
ville. Whether the bridge could be cap-
tured in usable condition was yet to be
seen, but as soon as this find was radioed
to the 116th Panzer Division command-
er he directed the advance guard of the
division toward Ortheuville.
The Ourthe River resembles a mis-
shapen Y in which the down stroke runs
east to west and the open arms extend
toward the northwest and southwest.
The bifurcation in this Y comes about
five miles west of Houffalize. The west
branch of the Ourthe, as Belgian hydrog-
raphers name it, was the obstacle con-
fronting the German armored spear-
heads on the night of 19 December. All
during that day engineers from the VIII
Corps and First Army had toiled to
make a barrier line of the two arms west
of Houffalize, blowing bridges which
were not on the main American supply
lines, fixing charges for future destruc-
tion of others, planting antitank mines
at possible fording sites, erecting and
manning roadblocks on roads and in the
villages along the main approaches to
the river. On the north branch, that is
the line Durbuy-Hotton-La Roche, the
51st Engineer Combat Battalion (Lt.
Col. Harvey R. Fraser) was hard at
work. 2 Only three companies were on
hand to prepare this twelve-mile stretch
of the river barrier, for Company C had
been hurried northeast to Trois Ponts
where it would administer a severe set-
back to Kampfgruppe Peiper of the 1st
SS Panzer Division. South of La Roche,
whose important bridges were outposted
by the 7th Armored trains, the 9th
Canadian Forestry Company had left
sawmills and logging tracts to prepare
demolitions and guard the crossing sites
on a tributary of the Ourthe. The steps
taken to bar the western branch of
the Ourthe northwest of Bertogne and
the initial reverse imposed on the enemy
reconnaissance there have already been
noted. Strung across the land neck be-
tween La Roche and the bridgehead at
Ortheuville were a few platoons of the
1278th Engineer Combat Battalion.
At Ortheuville one of the main VIII
Corps supply roads (Bastogne-Marche-
Namur) crossed the western branch of
3 The 51st held its main position for five days
and was given a Presidential Citation. The Ca-
nadian Forestry Company which worked with the
51st pays high tribute to the battalion and its
commander. See No. 1 Coy, Canadian Forestry
Corps, Report of Operations, 16–21 December
1944.

THE VIII CORPS BARRIER LINES 319
the river by means of a heavy Bailey
bridge. Shortly after noon on the 19th
a platoon or less of the 299th Engineer
Combat Battalion arrived in Ortheuville
to prepare this important span for de-
struction. Although the VIII Corps staff
had given priority to defense at this
bridge, there was little enough that
could be put in the effort. Three com-
panies of the 299th and a small portion
of the 1278th Engineer Combat Battal-
ions comprised all the troops available
for a barrier line now being constructed
from Martelange northwest along High-
way N46 to the Ourthe River, thence
on both banks of the river to Ortheu-
ville–a distance of about twenty-seven
miles.
In the meantime the 158th Engineer
Combat Battalion (Lt. Col. Sam Tabets)
which, as part of the screen east of
Bastogne, had been in a fire fight
throughout the morning, 3 was relieved
by the 501st Parachute Infantry, the bat-
talion leaving the sector about 1430. The
companies of the 158th were returning
to their separate and original bivouacs
when corps orders suddenly arrived dis-
patching the battalion to the Ourthe
line. It would take some while to reas-
semble the battalion but Company C was
reached and diverted to Ortheuville.
Here it closed about 1900. To his sur-
prise and relief the engineer company
commander found that he would have
some antitank support-desultory shell-
fire already was falling on the village and
3 When the first German assault hit the 158th,
Pvt. Bernard Michin took on an enemy tank with
a bazooka at a range of ten yards, was badly
burned by the explosion but destroyed the tank.
Unable to see because of his wounds he located
an enemy machine gun by sound, threw a hand
grenade, and wiped out the crew. He was awarded
the DSC.
it was known that German armor was
close at hand. The 705th Tank Destroyer
Battalion, which Middleton had attached
to the 101st Airborne Division, was on
the move to Bastogne. Originally ordered
to use the road through Bertogne, the
battalion had been forced to detour
when the battalion commander found
the enemy there. The 705th, following
the near bank of the Ourthe west to St.
Hubert, dropped off eight tank destroy-
ers to bar an enemy crossing while its
trains passed through Ortheuville. These
guns, as it turned out, would not reach
Bastogne for a number of days.
So things stood as the evening ad-
vanced: the engineers and tank destroy-
er crews waiting for some enemy move
to take the bridge; the German self-
propelled guns and tanks lobbing in a
shell now and again to keep the Ameri-
cans away from the bridge and perhaps
with hopes of cutting the wires on the
demolition charges. Back to the east the
advance guard of the 116th Panzer Divi-
sion was marching toward Ortheuville.
At this point General Krueger, the
L VIII Panzer Corps commander, made
his fateful decision. The bridge north-
west of Bertogne was gone, the bridge
at Ortheuville probably would be blown
in any attack, and furthermore it would
be difficult to squeeze the entire corps
through the small opening between the
east-west channel of the Ourthe and
Noville. Late in the evening he ordered
the 116th Panzer Division advance
guard, then at Salle three miles south-
east of the Ortheuville bridge, to a halt.
Then he sent orders to the division com-
manders and corps troops which would
countermarch the forces west of the
Houffalize-Bastogne road and turn the
entire LVIII Panzer Corps to the north,

320 THE ARDENNES: BATTLE OF THE BULGE
through the Houffalize bridgehead, and
away from the western branch of the
Ourthe.
A flurry of enemy activity a little be-
fore midnight on the roads northwest
of Bastogne masked the withdrawal of
the LVIII Panzer Corps. Armored cars
and half-tracks raced up and down the
roads shooting up small convoys, sparring
with American outposts, and engender-
ing a flock of rumors which placed
German spearheads in a half dozen spots
beyond the Ourthe. In truth the only
serious efforts to cross the west branch
in the late evening were those made by
roving reconnaissance elements of the
2d Panzer Division, whose main combat
strength remained tied down in the fight
for Noville. An hour before midnight
these scouts did appear in front of a
bridge at Sprimont, which crossed a
tributary of the Ourthe south of Ortheu-
ville; for their pains the American en-
gineers blew the bridge in their faces.
A few engineers, ordnance troops, and
antiaircraft and tank destroyer crews on
19 December had contributed mightily
to the German decision which turned an
entire armored corps from the road west
and plunged it into profitless adventures
in a side alley. Of all the disappoint-
ments suffered by the Fifth Panzer
Army on this day, and there were many,
perhaps the greatest stemmed from the
reverses suffered in fact at the bridge
beyond Bertogne and in anticipation at
the Bailey span in Ortheuville.
While Krueger’s corps turned in its
tracks during the night of 19 December,
General Luettwitz issued commands to
his XL VII Panzer Corps, whose forward
column was bunching up around
Bastogne. Reports from the troops press-
ing onto the city from the north and
east led Luettwitz to conclude that hard-
hitting tactics in the coming day might
break the will of the defenders, loosen
their grip on the Bastogne road net,
and give the armor of the 2d Panzer
Division and Panzer Lehr a clear high-
way west. Luettwitz put a time limit on
the attack prepared for the 20th, in-
structing his armored divisions to be
ready to bypass Bastogne. His recon-
naissance pushed around the city, mean-
while, both north and south, and tangled
with the defenders of the makeshift,
attenuated barrier lines.
At Ortheuville a lull developed short-
ly after midnight as the light armor
screening the 116th Panzer Division final-
ly pulled away. The engineers patrolled
across the river along the Bastogne road
but found no one except American
wounded whose trucks had been shot
up by German raiders earlier in the
night. Just before dawn, light tanks
and armored infantry from the 2d Pan-
zer Division arrived to take their turn
at the bridge. After some time spent
probing the bridge defenses by fire, the
German infantry rushed forward behind
a careening scout car. As much to their
surprise as to that of the American
engineers the bridge remained intact.
For some reason, perhaps the enemy
shelling a few hours earlier, the demo-
lition charges on the span failed to ex-
plode when the plunger went home. At
the first shock the defenders had fallen
back across the bridge to the houses by
the river bank and started firing. They
had only a few minutes to wait before
a column of German vehicles led by a
light tank appeared on the opposite
bank. When the leader started across
the span, one of the two American tank
destroyers which had been run down

THE VIII CORPS BARRIER LINES 321
close to the bridge got a direct hit, thus
blocking the span. Peculiarly enough
the enemy made no further attempt to
win a way across. In the afternoon, when
the troops of the 158th and the 9th
Canadian Forestry Company undertook
a counterattack across the river they
found no trace of the enemy. So confused
was the location of friend and foe that
for a few hours two-way traffic between
Marche and Bastogne was resumed.
The capture of Noville during the
afternoon freed the 2d Panzer Division
to continue the advance toward the
Meuse. On the other hand, Luettwitz’
corps was having trouble bringing gasoline
forward on the crowded, winding
supply roads in its sector; furthermore,
the 2d Panzer Division would take some
time to reassemble for the move on
Marche. 4
It remained for the division reconnaissance
battalion, reinforced by artillery
and engineers, to make the next
foray against the Ortheuville crossing
site. The reconnaissance troops got there
about 2200. For two hours German
howitzers, mortars, and machine guns
pummeled the American defenses on the
far bank, setting buildings aflame and
tying the engineers and tank destroyers
to their positions. At midnight the enemy
infantry forded the river, attacking
from out of the darkness against defenders
whose movements were etched by
the light of flares and burning houses.
While those who had waded the river
circled to the engineer flanks, more Ger-
4 The difficulties which beset the 2d Panzer are
well described in MSS # A–939 (Luettwitz) and
B–456, 2d Panzer Division, 21–26 December 1944
(Oberstleutnant Ruediger Weiz) and also in the
Third U.S. Army interrogation of Lauchert.
mans crossed into the village, this time
by way of the bridge. Earlier the Ameri-
cans had rewired demolition charges and
installed the detonator in a foxhole close
to the span, but for some reason there
again was no explosion.
The bridge defenders were in con-
tact with the 1128th Engineer Group
headquarters through the Belgian tele-
phone system (which continued in oper-
ation although its wire ran through the
German lines). A request for infantry
support could not be filled and the com-
manding officer of the 1128th ordered
the defenders to fall back southwest to
St. Hubert. Most of the 158th Engineer
Combat Battalion reached St. Hubert.
As a parting gesture the tank destroyers,
which had seen no tank targets, laid
indirect fire on the bridge. A muffled
explosion led the engineers to report
that the span was at least severely dam-
aged.
If so, the German engineers were
quick to make repairs, for the advance
guard of the 2d Panzer Division began
to roll almost immediately on this and
other temporary bridges thrown across
east of Ortheuville. When daylight came
the 2d Panzer Division was bunched up
in assembly area with its head across
the river near Tenneville and its rear
guard, arrayed to meet a counterattack
from Bastogne, near Salle. Inexplicably,
so far as the American patrols were con-
cerned, the 2d Panzer Division did not
bestir itself during the 21st to employ
its victory at Ortheuville for a move on
Marche, in which the advance regimental
combat team of the 84th Infantry Divi-
sion was assembling. The answer here
was logistical, not tactical: Lauchert’s
armor would have to waste the entire
day waiting for gasoline.

322 THE ARDENNES: BATTLE OF THE BULGE
Defense Southwest of Bastogne
Throughout the 21st the VIII Corps
had worked hard to strengthen the
engineer barrier line in front of Neuf-
château and Arlon, centers around which
the corps was re-forming, because the
presence of German patrols south and
southwest of Bastogne gave ample warn-
ing of imminent attack. Actually it is
incorrect to consider these defenses in
the sense of a line. There was no contin-
uous natural barrier on which to build.
The defense of this sector, as a result,
consisted of erecting obstacles at impor-
tant road crossings, bridge demolitions,
cratering concrete and macadam road
surfaces, and mining fords and narrow
stretches of roads. The troop detach-
ments to cover these barriers remained
small and heterogeneous, their weapons
usually no more than carbines, rifles,
machine guns, and bazookas. Heavy
antitank weapons–a handful of tank de-
stroyers, headquarters tanks, and how-
itzers-would be found in ones and twos
at the most important points. In general
these defensive positions were organized
with an eye to barring the roads which
approached Neufchâteau ( (the VIII
Corps headquarters) and Arlon (the
western gateway to Luxembourg City)
from the north.
Strongpoints–the term is relative-
had been created at St. Hubert, Libra-
mont, Sibret, and Martelange, of which
the last two were in the most imminent
danger. Sibret, where remnants of the
28th Infantry Division had reorganized
as Task Force Caraway, lay only four
miles southwest of Bastogne. Martelange,
on the highway to Arlon, was thirteen
miles due south of Bastogne. Possession
of this town was of pressing importance.
General Middleton asked his troops, at
1600, to hold the barrier line in front
of Neufchâteau and Arlon for forty
hours, or until help could come, and he
specifically named Martelange. Here a
branch of the Sure River provided a
natural hindrance to troops advancing
from the north; but here also an enemy
penetration would endanger the assem-
bly of reinforcements coming up through
Luxembourg and Arlon and would lay
bare the right flank of the VIII Corps
screen.
At dusk a platoon from Company B,
299th Engineer Combat Battalion,
which was holding Martelange, came
under attack by tanks and infantry. The
platoon blew the two bridges in the cen-
ter of the town and withdrew. In great
confusion the corps hastily gathered
more engineers to defend the road to
Arlon by a counterattack, but the Ger-
mans remained quietly in the town and
made no attempt to repair the bridges.
An advance in force south on Arlon was
no part of the XL VII Panzer Corps plan.
The foray at Martelange had been made
by column from the assault gun bri-
gade attached to the 5th Parachute Divi-
sion, the division itself being strung out
around Wiltz, which it had taken earlier.
Poor communications, by this time as
baneful an influence on the operations
of the XLVII Panzer Corps as on those
of the American VIII Corps, gave the
5th Parachute Division commander an
extremely muddled picture of what had
happened at Martelange. Heilmann did
not know for sure who had the town
until the next afternoon and in the
interim became gravely worried about
his exposed south flank, which at this
moment was the left anchor of both the
corps and army. In a postwar account

THE VIII CORPS BARRIER LINES 323
Heilmann concluded that in the Marte-
lange action “quite a few things had gone
wrong,” a conclusion which General
Middleton could have shared.
The next engagement in the new VIII
Corps sector took place at Sibret. As
the enemy closed on Wiltz General Cota
had withdrawn the 28th Division com-
mand post, setting it up in Sibret on
the night of 19 December. A straggler
line established around Neufchateau
brought in some troops, and these were
placed at roadblocks between Bastogne
and Sibret. The 630th Tank Destroyer
Battalion, having supported the 28th In-
fantry Division from 16 December on,
took station at a road junction south of
Sibret. The battalion, be it said, con-
sisted of parts of Company B and the
headquarters–but without their guns.
North and west of Sibret a number of
artillery outfits belonging to the 333d
Field Artillery Group and the 28th Di-
vision had gone into firing positions
from which to support the 101st Air-
borne troops around Bastogne. Some
were intact, others were no more than
headquarters batteries with a few pieces
and a collection of cannoneers armed
with rifles or carbines. Cavalry, tank, and
tank destroyer units which had come
back as the 28th Division center
withdrew also were present with
the artillery, but they too were
remnants of battalion and company head-
quarters with few men and few weapons.
In Sibret General Cota had perhaps two
hundred men, mostly stragglers and
strangers, for his headquarters and serv-
ice people had been organized as a pro-
visional battalion and thrown in to help
hold Wiltz. There were three howitzers
near the village, but the main antitank
defense consisted of two bazookas which
the assistant division commander,
Brig. Gen. George A. Davis; ordered
held “in reserve.” Sibret, then, was a
“strongpoint” in the VIII Corps screen
but could be so considered only in re-
lation to the surrounding roadblocks
manned by squads and sections.
Renewed Drive Around Bastogne
Around the eastern arc of the Bastogne
perimeter the events of the 20th had
convinced the Fifth Panzer Army that
no more time should be wasted here
and that the westward momentum of
the XLVII Panzer Corps must be re-
vived. The command solution to the
Bastogne problem called for the 2d Pan-
zer Division to shake loose and hurry
past the city in the north. This move,
highlighted by the seizure of the Ortheu-
ville bridge, began late on the 20th.
Luettwitz divided the armor of the Pan-
zer Lehr Division, one kampfgruppe to
swing south of Bastogne and on to the
west, one to stay behind for a few hours
and aid the 26th Volks Grenadier Divi-
sion in reducing the city. The latter
division would be left the unpleasant
and difficult task (as General Kokott,
the commander, saw it) of containing
the American forces in and around the
city while at the same time shifting the
axis of attack from the east to the south
and west.
On the afternoon of the 20th General
Kokott gave orders to set the first phase
of this new plan in motion. The 39th
Regiment, attacking on the south side
of Bastogne, was told to continue across
the Bastogne-Martelange highway and
capture the high ground in the vicinity
of Assenois. The 26th Reconnaissance
Battalion would assemble, pass through

324 THE ARDENNES: BATTLE OF THE BULGE
the rifle regiment at dark, swing around
Bastogne, and seize and hold the village
of Senonchamps immediately west of
Bastogne. From this point the battalion
would lead an attack into the city. The
26th’s commander had high hopes for
this admittedly risky foray. The recon-
naissance battalion was in good condi-
tion and its commander, Major Kunkel,
had a reputation for daring. Kokott ex-
pected the battalion to reach Senon-
champs during the morning of the 21st.
Through the dark hours General
Kokott waited for some word from
Kunkel’s kampfgruppe. At daybreak the
first report arrived: the reconnaissance
battalion was in a hard fight at Sibret,
two miles south of its objective. Next
came an irate message from the corps
commander: the 5th Parachute Division
had captured Sibret and what was the
26th Reconnaissance Battalion doing
hanging around that village? Kokott, his
pride hurt, sent the division G–3 jolting
uncomfortably on a half-track motor-
cycle to find out what had gone wrong.
From very sketchy German and Ameri-
can sources the following broad outline
of the fight for Sibret emerges. When
Kunkel crossed the Bastogne-Neufchâ-
teau road, he came upon a stray rifle
company of the 5th Parachute Division
which was engaged south of Sibret in a
fire fight. About 0300 this German com-
pany had reached the road junction at
which the remnants of the 630th Tank
Destroyer Battalion formed their road-
block. The American gunners, fighting
on foot with rifles, apparently delayed
the Germans for a couple of hours. Then
the rifle company and troopers from
Kunkel’s command advanced through
the dark to the south edge of Sibret,
while German mortar fire started falling
in the village. The first rush carried a
group of the enemy into the solidly built
gendarmerie at the southern entrance.
Probably it was this initial success which
was credited to the 5th Parachute Divi-
sion.
General Cota went through the streets
rounding up all the troops he could find
for a counterattack against the gen-
darmerie, but the building could not
be taken by unsupported riflemen. It
was well after daybreak now, but very
foggy; the armored vehicles of the Ger-
man battalion were closing on the vil-
lage and it was necessary to reoccupy the
gendarmerie as a barrier. The three
howitzers in the village defense had been
overrun by tanks, but a battery of the
771st Field Artillery Battalion remained
emplaced some two thousand yards
northwest of the village. After much
maneuvering to attain a firing site where
there was no minimum elevation, the
battery opened on the Germans bar-
ricaded in the gendarmerie. At almost
the same time the enemy started a very
heavy shelling. It was about 0900 and
Kampfgruppe Kunkel was well behind
schedule. The garbled radio messages
reaching the XLVII Panrer Corps re-
tracted the early report that Sibret had
been taken and told of heavy fighting
in the “strongly garrisoned” village. But
the Germans could not be shelled out
of the gendarmerie, tanks moved in on
the American battery, and General Cota
ordered his small force to retire south
to Vaux-lez-Rosikres; there he set up
his division command post.
Meanwhile the staff of the 771st Field
Artillery managed to get two guns into
position to meet the enemy advance
north of Sibret, but both guns and their
tractors were put out of action by direct

THE VIII CORPS BARRIER LINES 325
shelling. Kampfgruppe Kunkel rode
roughshod into the artillery assembly
areas north and west of Sibret, coming
upon guns hooked to their prime movers,
motors turning, and all the signs of
hurried exodus. Kunkel reported the
capture of more than a score of artillery
pieces, much ammunition, and many
prisoners. Quickly the kampfgruppe
moved on Senonchamps, leaving only a
small force to protect its left flank by a
drive toward Chenogne.
The 26th Reconnaissance Battalion
was not alone west of Bastogne. During
the previous night the reconnaissance
battalion of the Panzer Lehr Division
had been relieved at Wardin, strength-
ened by the attachment of the division
engineer battalion, and started on a
march around the south side of Bastogne
as advance guard in the resumption of
the Panzer Lehr attack toward the
Meuse. This Panzer Lehr task force had
orders to scout in the direction of St.
Hubert, the key to the road complex
west of Bastogne. Following the 26th
Reconnaissance Battalion through Sib-
ret, the Panzer Lehr column turned
northwest and fanned out on the eastern
side of the Ourthe River in the neighbor-
hood of Amberloup and Tillet. There
were numerous fords and crossing sites
along this stretch of the river, but the en-
emy was concerned with securing good
roads and bridges for the heavy columns
following.
The approaches to St. Hubert were
defended on the 21st by the 35th Engi-
neer Combat Battalion (Lt. Col. Paul H.
Symbol) , which had barricaded the
northern entrance from Ortheuville and
erected a strongpoint (held by Company
C) at a crossroad in a loop of the Ourthe
north of the village of Moircy. This
latter defense barred the most direct line
of march between Bastogne and St.
Hubert. A company of German infantry
and four tanks appeared in front of the
Company C abatis and foxholes before
0900, but two of the tanks were rendered
hors de combat by a bazooka team and
the action turned into a small arms duel.
For some reason the attackers were not
immediately reinforced, perhaps be-
cause there were other and more at-
tractive targets in the vicinity. The 724th
Engineer Base Depot Company, earlier
manhandling supplies in the depots at
St. Hubert, marched in to thicken the
American firing line, and by noon the
fight had dwindled to an occasional ex-
change of shots. During the lull of early
afternoon the 158th Engineer Combat
Battalion and the tank destroyers which
had retreated from Ortheuville to St.
Hubert were ordered south to take over
the defense of Libramont. The 35th was
left alone to blockade and delay a pos-
sible thrust by the 2d Panzer Division
forces now crossing at Ortheuville or
the more direct threat from the east.
During the morning roving detach-
ments of the Panzer Lehr task force had
enjoyed a field day. For one thing they
seized a large truck convoy, perhaps
sixty to eighty vehicles, en route to
Bastogne. They also surrounded the 58th
Armored Field Artillery Battalion near
Tillet, although no serious attempt was
made to eradicate it. The bulk of the
German task force crossed the Ourthe
north of the Company C strongpoint but
found that the American engineers had
done a remarkably thorough job of
blocking the roads leading to St. Hubert.
Abatis (mined and booby-trapped) ,
blown culverts, stretches corduroyed
with felled trees, and extensive mine

326 THE ARDENNES: BATTLE OF THE BULGE
COMBAT ENGINEER SETTING
When the charge detonates, the tree will fall
across the road to form part of a roadblock.
A CHARGE.
fields prompted reports to the Panzer
Lehr Division commander that it would
be some time before the eastern and
northeastern approaches to St. Hubert
could be cleared.
In the late afternoon the Panzer Lehr
task force brought artillery into position
and started shelling the Company C posi-
tion. By this time the VIII Corps line
no longer ran north and south in front
of the German drive but was forming
from east to west with the enemy pass-
ing across the corps front. A single bat-
talion of engineers and miscellaneous
antiaircraft and depot troops could not
be expected to hold what remained of
the barrier line on the western branch
of the Ourthe. Fearful lest the engineers
be cut off, VIII Corps headquarters
ordered the 35th to hold as long as
feasible, then rejoin the VIII Corps in
the south. Using several hundred pounds
of TNT which had arrived in the after-
noon the engineers prepared demolitions
to be blown coincident with the with-
drawal through St. Hubert and Libra-
mont. The enemy, hindered by darkness,
mines, craters, and abatis, did not inter-
fere with the engineers, and the latter
fell back through Libramont, entrucked,
and by midnight were in a new assembly
area at Bouillon close to the French
frontier.
Somewhat earlier a German detach-
ment had seized a bridge over the
Ourthe at Moircy, to the south of the
Company C strongpoints. This bridge
gave access to a back road which entered
St. Hubert from the southeast. Despite
the fact that this secondary route was
relatively free from the craters and ob-
stacles which cluttered the main roads,
the Panzer Lehr task force made no
move to strike for the town but instead
spread out farther north. The 902d Regi-
merit of the division had been relieved
near Neffe during the evening of 21 De-
cember and been assigned an advance
via St. Hubert. The light armor of the
task force remained nearly immobile for
the next twenty-four hours, and it was
left to the main body of the division to
utilize the Moircy road. 5
With the withdrawal of the 35th
Engineer Combat Battalion the VIII
Corps no longer had elements directly
in the path of the main German drive,
always excepting, of course, the troops
5 The Panzer Lehr commander was well forward
with his troops. For his recollections, which have
proven to be excellent, see MSS # A–941 through
A–943 (Bayerlein) .

THE VIII CORPS BARRIER LINES 327
defending Bastogne, which by this time
were cut off from the rest of the corps.
The outposts of the corps at Recogne
(held by the 7th Tank Destroyer Group)
and at Vaux-lez-Rosières (defended by
a scratch force from the 28th Division,
reinforced by the 527th Engineer Light
Ponton Company) thus far had escaped
the attention of an enemy moving west,
not southwest. General Middleton was
concerned about his open left flank and
as his engineers came back ordered a
barrier line formed along the Semois
River. On the VIII Corps right, in the
area south of Bastogne, reinforcements
from the Third Army were concentrat-
ing under the command of the III Corps.
The VIII Corps tactical air command
post, which had been moved to Floren-
ville on the 21st, continued to receive
rumors and half-true reports of German
forces turning southwest against its front,
but it was fairly clear that the main
threat was past.
To meet the German forces scouting
and probing along the corps sector
General Middleton organized a counter-
reconnaissance screen. Behind this were
collected stragglers and strays, many of
whom had crossed the French border
and got as far as Sedan. What was left
of the corps artillery, mainly the 402d
Field Artillery Group, assembled for
tactical control and re-equipment. Other
field artillery battalions, as well as tank
destroyer battalions, engineer regiments,
and the like, were arriving to reinforce
the corps and help make good its losses.
New infantry formations were on the
way to restore the striking power of the
corps and the Third Army commander
already was planning the employment-
on the offensive–of a revitalized VIII
Corps.
There remained one more battle to
be fought by the residue of General
Cota’s command, gathered around the
outpost position at Vaux-lez-Rosières on
the Bastogne-Neufchâteau road. During
the night of 21 December some two
hundred survivors of the 110th Infantry
fight at Wiltz reached the 28th Division
command post. Those who could be
provided with clothes and weapons were
put back into the line. Cota had in addi-
tion the engineer light ponton company,
retained as riflemen over the protests of
the corps engineer, a few howitzers sited
as single pieces around the village perim-
eter, and a platoon of self-propelled
76-mm. tank destroyers from the 602d
Tank Destroyer Battalion, which had
just come up from the Third Army.
While the stragglers were being organ-
ized, about 0800 on the 22d, German
shells commenced to burst over the per-
imeter. Enemy riflemen opened fire and
an incautious light tank poked its nose
into range of an American tank de-
stroyer, which destroyed it. One prisoner
was taken before this first flurry ended, a
rifleman from the 5th Parachute Divi-
sion.
The 5th Parachute Division, it will
be recalled, had the mission of extend-
ing westward the cordon which the
Seventh Army was to erect to forestall
American counterattack against the
south flank of the Fifth Panzer Army.
The terminus of this extension was in-
tended as the line Sibret–Vaux-lez-
Rosières–Martelange, at which point the
5th Parachute Division would go over
to the defense. Colonel Heilmann’s
troops had taken Martelange, the east-
ern anchor for this .projected line, late
on the 21st while small detachments re-
connoitered to the west; it was one of

328 THE ARDENNES: BATTLE OF THE BULGE
these which briefly engaged the 28th
Division (-) perimeter at Vaux-lez-
Rosières.
When the dispositions of the XLVII
Panzer Corps around Bastogne were al-
tered on the 21st, Heilmann expected
that his division would be given a more
ambitious mission. For this reason he
ordered reconnaissance to be pushed
south from Martelange and southwest
toward Libramont on the 22d. That
morning, however, a new corps com-
mander, General der Kavallerie Edwin
Graf von Rothkirch, arrived on the
scene. He advised Heilmann to be “fore-
sighted,” advice which the latter, draw-
ing on his battle experience in Italy,
interpreted as a warning to secure the
original defensive line in preparation
for imminent American counterattack.
Sibret and Martelange were held by the
5th Parachute; so Heilmann started his
leading regiment, the 14th, for Vaux-lez-
Rosières. It was growing dark when the
German advance guard appeared north-
east of the village.
General Cota had placed his tank
destroyers here, anticipating correctly
the point of greatest danger, but this pre-
caution was useless. The enemy pushed
to the fore a platoon of long-barreled
88-mm. assault guns mounted on an old
model Tiger body with exceptionally
heavy armor. The armor-piercing shells
fired by the American 76-mm. guns had
no effect whatever. The 28th Division
headquarters flashed a radio warning to
the VIII Corps command post, reported
that it had five bazookas left, and af-
firmed that these weapons could stop
Tiger tanks, so much had the American
infantryman’s respect for the bazooka
grown in the trying days of the Ardennes.
But the troops manning the perimeter
were untrained engineers or men ex-
hausted by constant battle and retreat,
thrown again into a fight where the odds
were with the enemy and organized in
pitifully small groups with strange
officers and companions. Vaux-lez-
Rosières fell to the Germans, and the
28th Division command post moved once
more, this time to Neufchâteau.
There is a footnote to the events west
of Bastogne on 22 December–the story
of the 58th Armored Field Artillery Bat-
talion. This battalion, commanded by
Lt. Col. Walter J. Paton, had taken part
in the fight at Longvilly and the ensuing
withdrawal to Bastogne. With eight guns
left the 58th went into position west
of the town to fire for the 101st Airborne.
On the afternoon of the 21st, with the
enemy on the prowl in every direction,
the battalion moved close to Tillet. Here
it was cut off by enemy reconnaissance
units, and Colonel Paton ordered his
drivers and gunners to dig a foxhole
circle around guns and vehicles. Shortly
after midnight a radio message came
through: the battalion was to try to
reach Bastogne. The column formed but
had gone only a little way when the tank
at its head was knocked off by an anti-
tank gun; then mortars and machine
guns raked the road. Returning to the
position which it had just left, the bat-
talion waited for daylight.
In the meantime strong forces of the
Panzer Lehr Division were on the move
west and troops were detached to wipe
out this “strongpoint.” For most of the
morning the encircled Americans stood
to their guns or fought from their fox-
holes. As one participant in the bitter
fight phrased it, “We gave them every-

THE VIII CORPS BARRIER LINES 329
thing we had and they gave it back just
as fast.” Only one of the eight self-
propelled howitzers was in firing condi-
tion when Colonel Paton gave the order
to destroy all equipment and make a
break for it. Moving in little groups,
shielded by trees and falling snow, most
of the battalion succeeded in reaching
the VIII Corps lines.
There is a German peroration to this
action. The commander of the Panzer
Lehr Division recalling the route taken
by his division as it marched toward St.
Hubert drafts a detour showing the ad-
vance guard swerving close to Tillet
to engage an American “armored unit.”
And late on the night of the 22d a gray-
clad staff officer posting the situation
map in the operations section of OKW
makes a heavy pencil stroke. It is under
the name Tillet.
No accurate computation can be made
of the hours added to the German march
tables by the efforts of the engineers,
artillery, and other small detachments
who fought to delay the enemy advance
through the rear areas of the VIII
Corps. But there is no question that the
LVIII Panzer Corps was diverted from
the main stream of the western advance
by these efforts–halving, for many hours,
the spearhead strength of the Fifth Pan-
zer Army. Students of the retrograde
action fought by the VIII Corps be-
tween 16 and 22 December will wish
to examine the question as to the most
profitable use of engineer troops who
formed the backbone of the rear area
defense in such circumstances. 6 The
“magnificent job” which General Mid-
dleton later ascribed to the engineers
credits the engineers in their role as
infantry. The VIII Corps engineer and
the various engineer group commanders
at that time and later believed the
engineer battalions and companies
could have done more to impede the
German advance if they had been denied
the eastern firing line and employed in
a tactically unified second line of defense
in the western part of the corps area.
For this latter purpose General Middle-
ton would have had some 3,300 engineers
in addition to those organic in the divi-
sions. But it is questionable whether the
7th Armored Division would have had
time to establish itself at St. Vith, not
to speak of the 101st Airborne Division
at Bastogne, without the intervention of
the engineer battalions. Nonetheless, the
story of the Ardennes barrier lines does
make clear that the use of engineers in
their capacity as trained technicians of-
ten paid greater dividends than their use
as infantry, and that a squad equipped
with sufficient TNT could, in the right
spot, do more to slow the enemy advance
than a company armed with rifles and
machine guns.
9 In theory both Americans and Germans recog-
nized the need for proper employment of their
technically trained engineer troops. Model, for
example, put out an order on 18 December posi-
tively forbidding the use of the German Pioneers
as infantry. (LVIII Corps KTB, 18 Dec 44.) Doc-
trine and tactical exigencies, however, often proved
contradictory during the Ardennes battle.

CHAPTER XV
The German Salient Expands to the West
The reaction of rifle companies and
battalions to the German surprise attack
on the morning of 16 December was
an automatic reflex to an immediate
threat. The speed of reaction in higher
American headquarters was appreciably
slower since the size of the enemy threat
and its direction could be determined
only when the bits and pieces of tactical
information, ascending the command
ladder echelon by echelon, began to ar-
ray themselves in a credible manner.
The fact that the German High Com-
mand had chosen to make the main effort
on the north flank contributed to an
early misreading of the scope of the
attack, for in this sector of the Allied
line there were two possible German
military objectives which were tactically
credible and compatible with the Allied
preconception of a limited objective at-
tack. These were, first, a spoiling opera-
tion to neutralize the gains of the 2d
and 99th Infantry Divisions in the ad-
vance into the West Wall, and, second,
a line-straightening operation to reduce
the salient held by the 106th Infantry
Division within the old West Wall posi-
tions. Either or both of these interpre-
tations of the initial German effort
could be made and would be made at
corps and higher headquarters during
the 16th.
The chain reaction during the early
hours of the attack followed two paths,
one via Gerow’s V Corps and the other
via Middleton’s VIII Corps. The first
report of enemy action on the 16th
seems to have come to Gerow from the
102d Cavalry Group in the Monschau
sector. The second report reaching V
Corps was initiated by the 393d Infan-
try and was circumstantial enough to in-
dicate a German penetration on the
front of the 99th Division. By noon
Gerow had sufficient information to jus-
tify a corps order halting the attack be-
ing made by the 2d and 99th. Although
the First Army commander subse-
quently disapproved Gerow’s action and
ordered a resumption of the advance
for 17 December, the American attack
in fact was halted, thus permitting a
rapid redeployment to meet the German
thrust. Gerow’s decision seems to have
been taken before V Corps had any cer-
tain word from the 394th Infantry on
the corps right flank. Neither Gerow
nor Middleton was given prompt in-
formation that contact between the 99th
Division and the 14th Cavalry Group
had been broken at the V-VIII Corps
boundary.
Since Middleton’s corps had been
hit on a much wider front than in the
case of its northern neighbor, a some-
what better initial appreciation of the
weight of the attack was possible. Even
so, Middleton and his superiors had too
little precise information during most

THE GERMAN SALIENT EXPANDS TO THE WEST 331
of the 16th to assess the German threat
properly. Middleton seems to have felt
intuitively that his thinly held corps
front was being hammered by some-
thing more serious than local and
limited counterattacks. By 1030 he had
convinced General Hodges that CCB,
9th Armored Division, should be taken
out of army reserve and turned over to
the VIII Corps, for he had no armor in
reserve behind the corps left flank.
Shortly after noon telephone conversa-
tions with his corps liaison officers at the
106th headquarters in St. Vith convinced
Middleton that he had to be ready to
commit his own available corps reserves,
four battalions of combat engineers and
CCR, 9th Armored Division. By 1400
the 168th Engineer Combat Battalion
was assembling at St. Vith and with-
in the next few hours the remaining
engineers and CCR were alerted and
assembled, the latter moving up
behind the corps center where, Middle-
ton learned at 1415, all regiments of the
28th Division were under attack.
The sequence of events in the hours
before midnight on the 16th is difficult
to time. Middleton talked with the
commander of the 106th Division by
telephone and apparently believed that
he, Middleton, had sanctioned a with-
drawal of Jones’s exposed two regiments
and that such a withdrawal would be
made. 1 Impressed with the growing
strength of the German attack, Middleton
drafted a “hold at all costs” order which
left his command post at 2120 and which
set the final defense line generally along
1 Intervs with Middleton and Capt L. B. Clarke,
19 Jan 45 and 20 Apr 45; Ltr, Middleton to Col
S. L. A. Marshall, 30 Jul 45.
the west bank of the Our, Clerf, and
Sure Rivers. General Bradley, whose
12th Army Group headquarters in Lux-
embourg City had a better telephone
link to the VIII Corps than had the
First Army command post at Spa,
talked with Middleton, then telephoned
General Patton that the 10th Armored
Division would have to come north to
help Middleton’s corps. At midnight
General Hodges ordered the 26th In-
fantry attached to V Corps and set it
marching for Camp Elsenborn. About
the same time Hodges alerted part of
the 3d Armored.
It is unlikely that the responsible
American commanders slept soundly on
the night of the 16th, but as yet they
had no real appreciation of the magni-
tude of the enemy attack. The tactics
followed by the Germans in the first
hours had made it very difficult for even
the front-line commanders to gauge the
threat. The disruption of the forward
communications nets by German shell-
fire on the morning of the 16th had led
to long periods of silence at the most
endangered portions of the front and a
subsequent overloading, with conse-
quent delays, of those artillery radio net-
works which continued to function. The
initial enemy employment of small
assault groups, company-size or less, had
led the combat commanders on the line
to visualize and report a limited-scale
attack. The broken and wooded nature
of the terrain in the area under attack
had permitted extensive German infil-
tration without any American obser-
vation, which also contributed to an
erroneous first estimate of the enemy
forces. Finally, the speed with which the
American observation or listening posts
were overrun and silenced had resulted

332 THE ARDENNES: BATTLE OF THE BULGE
in large blank spaces on the G–2 maps
in the American headquarters.
At the close of this first day of bat-
tle, therefore, the only certain view of
the enemy was this: German forces
were attacking all along the line from
Monschau to Echternach; they had suc-
ceeded in making some dents in the for-
ward American positions; at a number
of points the defenders seemed to need
reinforcement; and the amount of Ger-
man artillery which had been used was
suspiciously large for only a limited ob-
jective attack. During the night of 16
December the German assault waves
overran or destroyed a large number of
communications points and much radio
or wire equipment in the forward areas,
drastically slowing the flow of informa-
tion to higher American headquarters.
To many American units 17 Decem-
ber opened as just another day. Com-
pany B of the 341st Engineer General
Service Regiment, for example, went
that morning to work on a railroad
bridge under construction at But-
genbach. (Before noon the surprised
engineers were shelled out.) As the
morning progressed, however, the higher
American headquarters began to com-
prehend that the enemy was making a
full-scale attack and this with no limited
objective in mind. By 0730 the V Corps
commander had sufficient information
to convince him that the enemy had
broken through the lines of the 99th
Division. At 0820 the VIII Corps artil-
lery radio reported to Middleton that
German troops were approaching St.
Vith along the Schonberg road. Two
hours later the American command nets
were jammed with Allied air force re-
ports of large enemy vehicular columns
moving westward. Even more significant
was the fact that the fighter-bomber
pilots were having to jettison their bomb
loads in order to engage increasingly
large flights of German planes.
Two other key pieces helped fill out
the puzzle picture of enemy forces and
intentions. Prisoners had been taken
from a number of units known to belong
to the Sixth Panzer Army, a formation
long carried in Allied G–2 estimates
as the German strategic reserve in
the west. Second, some ninety Junker
52's had been counted in the early morn-
ing paratroop drop, an indication that
the Germans had planned a serious air-
borne assault. By late morning of the
17th, therefore, it can be said that the
American commanders had sufficient in-
formation to construct and accept a pic-
ture of a major Geramn offensive. It
would take another thirty-six hours to
produce a really accurate estimate of the
number of German divisions massing on
the Ardennes front.
The 12th Army Group commander,
General Bradley, had gone to Paris to
discuss the replacement problem with
General Eisenhower, when, on the after-
noon of the 16th, a message from his
own headquarters in Luxembourg City
gave word of the German attack. Eisen-
hower suggested that Bradley should
move the 7th Armored Division down
from the north and bring the 10th Ar-
mored Division up from the Third
Army. The 12th Army Group had no
strategic reserve, but plans already exist-
ed to move troops in from Patton's
Third Army and Simpson's Ninth in the
unlikely event that the undermanned
VIII Corps front was threatened. Brad-
ley telephoned Patton and told him to
send the 10th Armored Division north
to help Middleton. Patton, as Bradley

THE GERMAN SALIENT EXPANDS TO THE WEST 333
expected, demurred. His own army was
readying for a major attack on 19 De-
cember, an attack which had been the
subject of controversy between Eisen-
hower and Montgomery and which rep-
resented the Third Army’s last chance
to be the chief ball carrier in the Al-
lied push to cross the Rhine. Bradley,
however, was firm and Patton at once
gave the order to assemble the 10th
Armored.
Bradley’s second call went to Gen-
eral Simpson whose grueling attack to
close along the Rhine River had come
to a halt on 14 December beside the
muddy western banks of the Roer. Here
the choice fell, as Eisenhower had sug-
gested, on the 7th Armored Division,
which was resting and refitting in the
rear of the XIII Corps zone. The 7th
was turned over to the First Army and
now Bradley had a fresh armored di-
vision moving in to shore up each of the
endangered VIII Corps flanks. More
troops, guns, and tanks would be moved
out of Simpson’s army on 16 and 17
December, but the authorization for
these reinforcements is hard to trace.
In many cases the transfer of units would
be accomplished in simple fashion by
telephone calls and simultaneous agree-
ment between the higher commanders
concerned. 2 Hodges and Simpson had
2 The general story of the command decisions
on the first days of the battle will b: found in
Dwight D. Eisenhower, Crusade in Europe (New
York: Doubleday and Company, 1948); Omar N.
Bradley, A Soldier’s Story (New York: Henry Holt
and Company, 1951); and Conquer: The Story of
the Ninth Army. The Sylvan Diary and the Gay
Diary give details of the reactions at the First and
Third Army headquarters, respectively. Details
of troop movements are given in the First U.S.
Army Report of Operations and the AAR’s of the
V and VIII Corps. A good analysis of troop
strengths will be found in a British study by the
Directorate of Tactical Investigation, War Office,
been comrades in World War I, and
when Hodges asked for assistance Simp-
son acted promptly and generously. On
the 16th, for example, Simpson offered
the 30th Infantry Division and the 5th
Armored on his own initiative.
Prior to the invasion of Normandy
there had been a great deal of staff
planning for the creation of a SHAEF
strategic reserve for use in the first nine-
ty days of the operation in western Eu-
rope. The Allied successes during the
summer and autumn put these plans in
moth balls and the subject was not re-
opened until early December when
Eisenhower ordered that a strategic re-
serve be assembled and placed under
the 12th Army Group, but for employ-
ment only at his direction as Supreme
Allied Commander. Two days before
the Ardennes attack the SHAEF opera-
tions section submitted a plan calling for
a strategic reserve of at least three di-
visions. The concept, quite clearly, was
to amass a force capable of exploiting
a success on any sector of the Allied
front without diverting divisions from
other parts of the front. Some opera-
tions officer, possibly imbued with the
Leavenworth doctrine of “Completed
Staff Work,” inserted the observation
that “a strategic reserve could be used
to repel a serious breakthrough by
German forces,” but hastened to add:
“In view of current G–2 estimates, it
is unlikely that such employment will
become necessary.” 3
To understand fully the position in
which the Supreme Commander found
himself on 16 December, it should be
entitled The German Counter Offensive in the
Ardennes (n.d.).
3 Hq SHAEF files: GCT 322-12/Ops(A), sub:
SHAEF Reserve.

334 THE ARDENNES: BATTLE OF THE BULGE
remembered that American troops were
in constant movement to Europe and
the higher staffs tended to look upon
the next few troopships as containing a
reserve which could and would be used
by the Supreme Commander to influ-
ence the direction of the battle. Four
U.S. infantry divisions and one armored
division were scheduled to arrive on the
Continent in December, with an equal
number slated for January. Of the De-
cember contingent two infantry divisions
(the 87th and 104th) were already in
the line when the Germans struck.
There remained en route the 11th
Armored Division and the 66th and
75th Infantry Divisions, the 75th hav-
ing already crossed the Channel on
its way to the front. Two additional
U.S. divisions were training in the
United Kingdom and waiting for equip-
ment, but neither was expected to cross
the Channel during December: the 17th
Airborne was scheduled for France in
January, and the 8th Armored Division,
still missing many of its authorized ve-
hicles, was not as yet on a movements
list. 4
The only combatwise divisions ready
to the hand of the Supreme Command-
er were the 82d and 101st Airborne
Divisions, which had been brought back
to France after the long, tough battle
in the Netherlands and were not expect-
ed to regain full operational status un-
til mid-January. By the 17th, however,
it was clear that the First Army had to
be heavily reinforced, and promptly.
General Eisenhower reluctantly gave the
airborne troops to Bradley.
From this point on the immediate re-
inforcements needed to meet and halt
4 Hq SHAEF files: O and E SHAEF G–3, 370.5-
4, vol. 1, Flow of Divisions.
the German counteroffensive would have
to come from the armies in the field.
(Simpson had already thrown the 30th
Infantry into the pot, in addition to the
7th Armored.) Late in the evening of
the 17th Bradley telephoned Patton,
who was starting to move his troops in-
to assembly areas for the Third Army
attack on the Saar, and told the latter
that two more divisions might have to
go north. By midnight of 17 December
approximately 60,000 men and 11,000
vehicles were on the move to reinforce
Hodges’ First Army. In the following
eight days three times this number of
men and vehicles would be diverted
from other areas to meet the Germans
in the Ardennes.
One piece of military thinking dom-
inated in all the higher U.S. military
headquarters and is clearly traceable in
the initial decisions made by Eisenhow-
er, Bradley, and the army and corps
commanders. The Army service schools
during the period between the two
World Wars had taught as doctrine-
a doctrine derived from the great offen-
sives of 1917 and 1918 on the Western
Front–that the salient or bulge pro-
duced by a large-scale offensive can be
contained and finally erased only if the
shoulders are firmly held. The initial
movements of the American reinforce-
ments were in response to this doc-
trine.
The 30th Division Meets Peiper
The 30th Division (Maj. Gen. Leland
S. Hobbs) was resting in the neighbor-
hood of Aachen, Germany, after hard
fighting in the Roer River sector, when
a call from the XIX Corps informed its
commander of the German attack along

THE GERMAN SALIENT EXPANDS TO THE WEST 335
the V and VIII Corps boundry. 5 At this
time (the evening of 16 December)
the situation did not seem too ominous
and the division commander
merely was told that he should alert
his units in the rest area. Shortly before
noon of the following day the corps
commander, Maj. Gen. Raymond S. Mc-
Lain, telephoned to say: “I don’t know
any of the details but you are going
south. I think it is only temporary.”
The 30th Division was to move to an
assembly area north of Eupen where
the V Corps commander, General Gerow,
would issue detailed orders. Gerow’s instructions,
actually received at noon,
directed the 30th Division to relieve
the 18th Infantry (1st Division) around
Eupen and prepare for a counterattack
to the southeast in support of the 2d
and 99th Divisions farther south. The
rapid advance of Kampfgruppe Peiper,
however, would catch the division in
midpassage, drastically changing the
manner of its ultimate commitment. (See
Map II.)
At 1630, on 17 December, the division
started the forty-mile trip to its
new assembly area moving by combat
teams prepared to fight. The 30th Reconnaissance
Troop, the 119th Infantry,
117th Infantry, and 120th Infantry
moved in that order, with tanks and
tank destroyers interspersed between
the regiments. Despite the presence of
5 The records kept by the 30th Division are in
a very good state and are particularly valuable in
that they include a telephone record, attached to
the G–3 journal, of important conversations be-
tween the commander and his chief officers. Pub-
lished works on the history of the division include
Robert L. Hewitt, Workhorse of the Western
Front (Washington: Infantry Journal Press, 1946) ;
History of the 117th Infantary (Washington,
1946); and History of the 120th Infantry Kegi-
rnent (Washington, 1947).
a few German aircraft which picked up
the column early in the move and hung
about dropping flares or making futile
strafing passes, the leading regiment
closed by midnight. Meanwhile the V
Corps commander, apprehensive lest the
1st SS Panzer Division column thrusting
south of Malmédy should destroy the
last connection between his own and the
VIII Corps, ordered General Hobbs to
switch his leading combat team to Mal-
médy at daylight.
Since the 119th had detrucked and
bedded down for the night, the assist-
ant division commander, Brig. Gen.
William K. Harrison, Jr., caught the
117th Infantry on the road and direct-
ed it toward Malmédy. Its way fitfully
lighted by enemy flares, the 117th (Col.
Walter M. Johnson) moved cautiously
south from Eupen. In early morning
the head of the regimental column was
bucking the heavy stream of traffic leav-
ing Malmédy when new orders arrived:
one battalion was to go to Stavelot, erect
a roadblock, and prevent the Germans
from advancing north of the Ambleve
River. Colonel Johnson hurried his 1st
Battalion toward Stavelot, deployed the
2d Battalion on the ridge between Stave-
lot and Malmédy, then organized the
defense of Malmédy with the 3d Bat-
talion and the troops already in the
town.
At daybreak on 18 December the re-
mainder of the 30th Division was on
the road to Malmédy with the 120th
Infantry in the lead, under new orders
for a division attack to the southeast.
The V Corps G–3 had told General
Hobbs that he expected this attack to
be made not earlier than 19 December.
But the German attack on Stavelot dur-
ing the morning caused consternation

336 THE ARDENNES: BATTLE OF THE BULGE
in both the corps and army headquar-
ters, from which erupted a stream of
orders and demands for greater speed.
Harassed by confusing and contradic-
tory directions, Hobbs finally had to
ask that he be given orders from but
one source. As it was, the 119th Infan-
try, still in Eupen, was alerted for Stave-
lot while the 120th Infantry, painfully
slipped and slid along the muddy roads
to Malmédy. Before trucks could arrive
for the 119th Infantry Stavelot had fallen
to the enemy. The First Army com-
mander called Hobbs to Spa about noon.
Before leaving Eupen, General Hobbs
instructed the 119th Infantry (Col. Ed-
ward M. Sutherland) to meet him at
Theux, five miles north of Spa, at which
time he expected to have new orders.
General Hodges had just finished a
conference with the acting commander
of the XVIII Airborne Corps, Maj.
Gen. James M. Gavin, whose two divi-
sions, the 82d and 101st Airborne, had
started advance parties from France for
the Bastogne area where, according to
the initial orders from SHAEF, the divi-
sions were to be employed. The First
Army commander, under whose orders
the XVIII Airborne Corps now fell,
determined to divert the 82d Airborne
Division to Werbomont as a backstop in
case Kampfgruppe Peiper succeeded in
crossing the Amblève and Salm Rivers.
The 82d, however, would not be in posi-
tion before 19 December at the earliest.
Meanwhile the 30th Division com-
mander reached the First Army head-
quarters. In the midst of a discussion of
new plans, word came in that the First
Army Iiaison planes scudding under the
clouds had seen the German armor mov-
ing north from Trois Ponts in the di-
rection of La Gleize and Stoumont. It
was apparent that the enemy had two
choices: he could continue north along
the Ambléve valley, thus threatening the
rearward installations of the First Army;
or he could turn west toward Werbo-
mont and so present a grave menance to
the assembly of the 82d. Hobbs, then,
met Colonel Sutherland with First Army
orders which would split the 119th In-
fantry, sending one force along the val-
ley of the Amblève, the other to Wer-
bomont and thence to Trois Ponts.
The 119th left General Hobbs and
traveled south to Remouchamps. At
this point it divided, one detachment
made up of the 2d Battalion and the
cannon company heading for Werbo-
mont, the second and stronger column
winding along the road that descended
into the Amblève valley. The 2d Bat-
talion reached Lienne Creek after dark
and threw up hasty defenses on the hills
about three miles east of Werbomont.
The Germans under Peiper had been
stopped at the creek earlier, it will be
recalled, but the battalion was in time
to ambush and destroy the separate
scouting force in the late evening. The
3d Battalion, leading the truck column
carrying the bulk of the combat team,
reached Stoumont after dark and hur-
ried to form a perimeter defense. Pa-
trols pushing out from the village had
no difficulty in discovering the enemy,
whose pickets were smoking and talk-
ing not more than 2,000 yards away. At
least forty German tanks were reported
in bivouac east of the village. Under
cover of darkness the remainder of the
American force assembled some three
miles northwest of Stoumont, while the
400th Armored Field Artillery Battal-
ion, picked up during the march, moved
its batteries forward in the dark. Both

THE GERMAN SALIENT EXPANDS TO THE WEST 337
Americans and Germans, then, were
ready with the coming of day to do bat-
tle for Stoumont.
The 117th Infantry, first of the 30th
Division regiments to be fed into the
line, had been deploying on the morn-
ing of 18 December around Malmèdy.
Its 1st Battalion (Lt. Col. Ernest
Frankland), under orders to occupy
Stavelot, circled through Francorchamps
to approach the town from the north.
On the road Colonel Frankland met of-
ficers of the 526th Armored Infantry
Battalion who told him that the enemy
was in Stavelot. About this time word
of the German success reached the V
Corps headquarters, where it was as-
sumed that the 1st Battalion would per-
force abandon its mission. Frankland,
on the contrary, kept on going. He
made contact about 1300 with a rifle
company of the 526th Armored Infan-
try Battalion remaining near Stavelot,
then detrucked his battalion north of
the still-flaming gasoline roadblock and
started south toward the town.
All this while Peiper believed that
the 3d Parachute Division was close
behind his column. Expecting it to
reach Stavelot by the evening of 18
December, he had left only a small
holding force in the town. In fact, the
3d Parachute Division had been held up
by a combination of jammed roads and
unexpectedly tenacious American resist-
ance. The Sixth Panzer Army there-
fore did not expect the advance guard
of the 3d Parachute Division to arrive in
Stavelot before 19 December. At this
point the failure of communications be-
tween Peiper and rearward German
headquarters began to influence the
course of operations, to the distinct dis-
advantage of the Sixth Panzer Army.
Although without artillery support,
Colonel Frankland launched his at-
tack at Stavelot. On the slope north
of the town a platoon of 3-inch towed
tank destroyers from the 823d Tank
Destroyer Battalion made good use of
positions above the Germans to knock
out a brace of Mark VI tanks and a few
half-tracks. The two leading companies
of the 1st Battalion had just reached the
houses at the northern edge of the town
when ten hostile tanks, returning in
haste from Trois Ponts, counterattacked.
It might have gone hard with the
American infantry but for the
fighter-bombers of the IX Tactical Air
Command and XXIX Tactical Air Com-
mand which opportunely entered the
fray. During the afternoon the American
planes had worked east from the La
Gleize area, where the little liaison
planes had first signaled the presence
of German columns, and struck where-
ever Peiper’s tanks and motor vehicles
could be found. Perhaps the trail pro-
vided by the rearward serials of Kampf-
gruppe Peiper led the fighter-bombers
to Stavelot; perhaps the 109th Tactical
Reconnaissance Squadron, which broke
through the clouds to make one sweep
over the town, tipped off the squadrons
working farther west. Before the Ger-
man tanks could make headway, planes
from the 365th Fighter Group, rein-
forced by the 390th Squadron (366th)
and the 506th Squadron (404th),
plunged in, crippled a few enemy ve-
hicles, and drove the balance to cover,
leaving the infantry and tank destroyers
to carry out the clean-up inside Stavelot
on more equitable terms. By dark the two
American companies held half of the
town, had tied in with the 2d Battalion
between Stavelot and Malmèdy, and were

338 THE ARDENNES: BATTLE OF THE BULGE
reinforced by a tank platoon from the
743d Tank Battalion. Also the riflemen
had the comforting knowledge that they
could call for and receive artillery sup-
port: the 118th Field Artillery Battalion
had moved through bullet fire and set
up northeast of the town.
The fight for Stavelot continued all
through the night of the 18th with Ger-
man tanks, now free from the air threat,
working through the streets as far as
the town square. At daybreak the 1st
Battalion and its tanks went to work and
by noon had reclaimed all of the town
down to the Amblève River. Twice dur-
ing the afternoon tank-led formations
drove toward the town, but both times
the American gunners dispersed the field
gray infantry and the tanks decided not
to chance the assault alone. It is not sur-
prising that the German infantry gave
over the field. The 118th cannoneers
fired 3,000 shells into the assault waves,
working their guns so fast that the tubes
had to be cooled with water.
By the night of 19 December the 1st
Battalion had a firm grip on Stavelot—
but, in the most telling stroke of all,
its attached engineers had dynamited
the Amblève bridge across which Pei-
per’s force had rolled west on the morn-
ing of 18 December. The armored
weight of the 1st SS Panzer Division
could make itself felt only if it con-
tinued punching westward. Without
fuel the punch and drive were gone.
AMBLEVE RIVER BRIDGE AT STAVELOT

THE GERMAN SALIENT EXPANDS TO THE WEST 339
Without the Amblève bridge and a free
line of communications through Stavelot
there was no fuel for Peiper. Without
Peiper the freeway to the Meuse which
the 1st SS Panzer Division was to open
for the following divisions of the Sixth
Panzer Army remained nothing more
than a cul-de-sac.
Could the 30th Division surround and
destroy Kampfgruppe Peiper before
German reinforcements from the east
reopened the way to their now isolated
comrades? Would the 30th Division, its
rear and right flank partially uncovered,
be left free to deal with Peiper? The
latter question was very real, even with
the 8rd Airborne moving in, for on the
morning of 19 December the V Corps
commander had warned the 30th Divi-
sion chief of staff (Col. Richard W.
Stephens) that large German forces
had slipped by to the south and were
moving on Hotton. An additional
question plagued the 30th Division:
where was the 7th Armored? Patrols
sent out toward Recht on the 19th could
find no trace of the tankers.
While the 1st Battalion, 117th Infan-
try, was busily severing the lifeline to
Kampfgruppe Peiper on 19 December,
Peiper was engaged with the bulk of
his troops in an attempt to blast a
path through Stoumont, the barrier to
the last possible exit west, that is, the
valley of the Amblève. Battle long since
had been joined at Stoumont when
scouts finally reached Peiper with the
story of what had happened to his line
of communications.
The kampfgruppe, whose major part
was now assembled in the vicinity of
La Gleize and Stoumont, consisted of a
mixed battalion of Mark IV tanks and
Panthers from the 1st SS Panzer Regi-
ment, a battalion of armored infantry
from the 2d SS Panzer Grenadier Regi-
ment, a flak battalion, a battalion of
Tiger tanks (which had joined
Peiper at Stavelot), a battery of
105-mm. self-propelled guns, and a
company from the 3d Parachute Division
which had ridden on the tanks from
Honsfeld. The force had suffered some
losses in its breakthrough to the west,
but these were not severe. By now the
critical consideration was gasoline. A
few more miles on the road or a few
hours of combat maneuvering and Pei-
per’s fuel tanks would be bone dry.
When the 119th Infantry (minus the
2d Battalion) moved into the Stoumont
area on the night of 18 December, the
rifle companies of the 3d Battalion (Lt.
Col. Roy G. Fitzgerald) deployed in a
hastily established line north, south,
and east of the town. The 3d was backed
up by light 3-inch towed tank destroyers
belonging to the 823d Tank Destroyer
Battalion, two 90-mm. antiaircraft guns
detached from the 143d Antiaircraft
Battalion, and three battalion 57-mm.
antitank guns. The 1st Battalion, it will
be remembered, dismounted in an as-
sembly area about three miles northwest
of Stoumont, where Colonel Sutherland
located the regimental command post.
The moment patrols had established the
proximity of the large German force
Sutherland was alerted, and he promised
a tank company as reinforcement first
thing in the morning. For the rest of
the night the troops around Stoumont
dug foxholes, planted mines, and waited
uneasily for day to break.
Stoumont and the American lines
lay on a bald hill mass rising on the
north bank of the Amblève. La Gleize,
the enemy assembly area, shared a simi-

340 THE ARDENNES: BATTLE OF THE BULGE
lar situation on the road east of Stou-
mont. The road itself, some distance
from the river bank, approached Stou-
mont through patches of trees, which
gave way at the eastern edge of the
town to a border of level fields. The
whole lent itself admirably to the em-
ployment of armor.
As the first light came on 19 Decem-
ber Peiper threw his infantry into the
attack, supporting this advance from the
east with tanks firing as assault guns.
The grenadiers and paratroopers were
checked by fire from the American
lines as they crossed the open fields.
But the gunners of the 823d, who could
not see fifty yards from the muzzles of
their guns and whose frantic calls for
flares to be fired over the German tanks
went unheeded, could not pick out the
enemy armor. The panzers, formed in
two columns, moved toward the fox-
hole line and the American company
on the east edge of Stoumont fell back
to the houses, uncovering the outnum-
bered and immobile towed tank de-
stroyers, all eight of which were cap-
tured. 6 At this moment the ten tanks
from the 743d Tank Battalion promised
by Sutherland arrived and went into ac-
tion. The enemy thereupon reverted to
tactics successfully employed in reducing
village resistance on the march west,
sending two or three of the heavy-ar-
mored Panthers or Tigers in dashes
straight along the road and into the
town. At least six German tanks were
crippled or destroyed in this phase of
the action, two of them by antiair-
craft crewmen, Private Seamon and
6 The 30th Division G–3 journal for 19 Decem-
ber sums up this fight very simply: “We didn’t
have as many ID’S as they had tanks.” Cf., 823d
Tack Desrioyei Bn AAR, Dec 44.
Pvt. Albert A. Darago, who were
handling bazookas for the first time and
who were awarded the DSC for their
bravery. (An infantry officer had showed
the antiaircraft crew how to load
and fire the bazooka just before the
battle began.) One of the two 90-mm.
antiaircraft guns also did yeoman serv-
ice in the unfamiliar ground-laying
role and destroyed two tanks from Pei-
per’s heavy Mark VI battalion before
the German infantry got in close enough
to force its abandonment.
The Germans took some two hours to
force their way inside Stoumont, but
once the panzers ruled the streets the
fight was ended. The rifle company on
the south was cut off and the company in
the town liquidated. The third company
withdrew under a smoke screen laid
down by white phosphorus grenades,
reaching the reserve position manned by
the 1st Battalion about noon. The tanks,
commanded by 1st. Lt. Walter D. Macht,
withdrew without loss, carrying survivors
of the center company on their decks.
The 3d Battalion had lost most of its
equipment, as well as 267 officers and
men.
This engagement had seen the Amer-
icans fighting without the artillery sup-
port so essential in American tactics.
The 197th Field Artillery Battalion,
assigned the direct support mission, did
not reach firing positions in time to help
the 3d Battalion. The 400th Armored
Field Artillery Battalion was finally able
to place one battery where it could give
some help, but by this time the battle
had been decided and the cannoneers
fired only a few missions.
Word that the fight was going against
the troops at Stoumont impelled Colonel
Sutherland to alert his reserve battalion.

THE GERMAN SALIENT EXPANDS TO THE WEST 341
Company C, dispatched as reinforce-
ment, had reached the village of Targ-
non when it began to pass men of the
3d Battalion moving to the rear. The
company dismounted from its trucks and
marched as far as the entrance to Stou-
mont. Failing to find the 3d Battalion
commander the riflemen joined the
tanks, which by this time had no infantry
cover and were running low on ammuni-
tion. The newly wedded tank-infantry
team yielded ground only in a slow and
orderly withdrawal. The impetus of the
German advance was considerably re-
duced when a 90-mm. antiaircraft gun,
sited at a bend in the road west of Stou-
mont, knocked out a couple of German
tanks and momentarily blocked the high-
way.
The situation was precarious–and not
only for the force left to Sutherland. The
only armor between the 119th Infantry
command post and Liége was a detach-
ment of ten Sherman tanks which had
been whipped out of the First Army
repair shops, manned with ordnance
mechanics, and dispatched through Ay-
waille to block the Ambléve River road.
In front of the 119th command post the
ten tanks of the 743d had but few rounds
left in their ammunition racks.
At 1035 the 30th Division commander,
who was in Sutherland’s command post,
called the First Army headquarters to
ask for the 740th Tank Battalion. The
S–2 of the 119th Infantry had discovered
that this outfit, a new arrival on the Con-
tinent, was waiting to draw its tanks and
other equipment at an ordnance depot
near Sprimont, about ten miles north of
the 119th command post. The First
Army staff agreed to Hobbs’s request,
but the unit it handed over was far from
being ready for combat. The depot had
few fully equipped Shermans on hand
and the first tank company drew four-
teen Shermans fitted with British radios
(unfamiliar to the American crews) , five
duplex drive tanks, and a 90-mm. self-
propelled gun. While Hobbs was on the
phone trying to convince the army staff
that he must have the tanks, his chief of
staff, Colonel Stephens, was being bom-
barded by army demands that some part
of the 119th should be pulled out and
shifted north to cover the road to Spa and
First Army headquarters. This was out
of the question for the moment, for
Sutherland had only a single battalion
at his disposal.
All this while the little tank-infantry
team held to its slow-paced withdrawal
along the river road, lashing back at the
Panthers in pursuit. Retreating through
Targnon and Stoumont Station the force
reached a very narrow curve where the
road passed between a steep hill and the
river bank. Here Lt. Col. Robert Her-
long, who now had all of his 1st Battalion
engaged, ordered the tanks and infantry
to make their stand. It was about 1240.
Fog was beginning to creep over the
valley. A forward observer from the
197th Field Artillery Battalion, whose
pieces now were in position, saw three
German tanks leave Targnon and head
down the road. A call sent a salvo crash-
ing down on the western side of the vil-
lage just as a large tank column started
to follow the German point. Followed by
more shells these tanks turned hurriedly
back into Targnon. One of the point
tanks did reach the American position,
poked its nose around the bend in the
road, got a round of high explosive un-
comfortably close, and took off.
If is true that Herlong’s tanks and in-
fantry held a naturally formidable road-

342
block. And the presence of artillery once
again showed what it could do to alter
the course of battle. But Peiper’s object
in the advance beyond Stoumont was not
to crush his way through the 119th Infan-
try and move north through the defiles
of the Amblève valley. His object, thus
far unachieved, was to climb out of the
valley confines and resume the westerly
advance toward Huy and the Meuse.
Peiper had been thwarted at Trois Ponts
and at Lienne Creek in turn. The ad-
vance through Stoumont offered a last
opportunity, for midway between Targ-
non and Stoumont Station lay an easy
approach to the river, a bridge as yet
untouched, and a passable road rising
from the valley to join the highway lead-
ing west through Werbomont, the road
from which Peiper’s force had been de-
flected. With this bridge in German
hands, Peiper had only to contain the
119th Infantry which had been retiring
before his tanks while his main column
crossed to the west. But Peiper knew by
this time that his supply line had been
cut at Stavelot. “We began to realize,” he
says, “that we had insufficient gasoline to
cross the bridge west of Stoumont.” 7
Unaware of the enemy predicament,
the 119th Infantry took advantage of the
lull which had followed the single Ger-
man pass at the roadblock position to re-
organize the remnants of the 3d Battal-
ion. About 1530 the leading platoon of
the conglomerate company taken from
the 740th Tank Battalion arrived, but
the additional infantry for which Colo-
nel Sutherland had pleaded were not
forthcoming. Indeed, his weakened 3d
7 Ferriss, Special Rpt Based on Intervs in Janu-
ary 1945. Peiper’s progress as it was known to
the higher command may be traced in the daily
entries of the OB WEST KTB.
THE ARDENNES: BATTLE OF THE BULGE
Battalion was already earmarked for use
in the event the enemy turned north on
the secondary road running from Stou-
mont directly to Spa and the First Army
headquarters. However, Sutherland was
told that the 2d Battalion, 119th Infan-
try, was in process of turning its position
east of Werbomont over to the 82d Air-
borne Division and would be available
in a few hours.
Anxious to feel out the enemy and
establish a good line of departure for an
attack on 20 December, Sutherland or-
dered the 1st Battalion commander to
push out from the roadblock, using Capt.
James D. Berry’s untried and con-
glomerate tank company. About 1600
Herlong started east, Company C advanc-
ing on both sides of the road and tanks
moving in the center. Just west of Stou-
mont Station three Panthers were sighted
and destroyed in quick succession, one by
a fluke shot which glanced from the pave-
ment up through the tank flooring. The
dead tanks blocked the road; so Herlong
sent his infantry on alone and organized
a line at the western edge of the station.
There was no further contact with the
Germans. Peiper, whose mechanized
force by this time was nearly immobile,
had withdrawn his advanced troops back
to Stoumont, about two and a half miles
east of the station. As for the road lead-
ing from Stoumont to Spa, a matter of
grave concern to First Army headquar-
ters on 19 December, Peiper, acutely
conscious of his lack of mobility, never
gave it a serious thought.
In midafternoon the 119th Infantry
and the 740th Tank Battalion (Lt. Col.
George K. Rubel) had been detached
from the 30th Division and assigned to
the operational control of the XVIII Air-
borne Corps, which at the same time took

THE GERMAN SALIENT EXPANDS TO THE WEST 343
back its 82d Airborne Division from the
V Corps and in addition received the 3d
Armored Division (-) . The XVIII
Corps commander thus had an entire
airborne division, more than half of an
armored division, and a reinforced regi-
mental combat team to employ in check-
ing a further westward drive by the
Germans assembled in the La Gleize-
Werbomont-Stoumont area.
The subsequent operations of the
XVIII Airborne Corps would be molded
in considerable degree by events prior to
its appearance in the battle area. Already
set forth have been the engagements in
the Stoumont sector with two battalions
of the 119th Infantry committed. The 2d
Battalion of the 119th Infantry had left
the regiment on 18 December with the
independent mission of blocking the
Germans at Werbomont and Trois
Ponts, thus covering the assembly of the
82d Airborne. Late in the afternoon the
battalion reached Werbomont, found no
sign of the enemy, and detrucked for the
march to Trois Ponts. About dusk the
column reached the Lienne Creek in the
vicinity of Habiemont, a village on a
bald summit overlooking the Lienne.
Here Maj. Hal D. McCown, the battal-
ion commander, learned that German
tanks had been sighted at Chevron,
another hamlet a mile or so north on the
Lienne. McCown, whose battalion was
reinforced by a platoon each of tanks,
tank destroyers, and infantry cannon,
turned north only to find that the bridge
near Chevron had been destroyed by
friendly engineers and that no hostile
crossing had been made. He moved
north again but this time encountered
fire from across the creek. Uncertain as
to the situation and with darkness upon
him, McCown ordered the battalion to
deploy on the bare ridge line rising west
of the creek.
Some time later the Americans heard
tracks clanking along the road between
their position and the creek; this was the
reconnaissance detachment which Peiper
had sent north and which had found a
bridge, albeit too weak a structure for
the German tanks. A brief fusillade from
the ridge and the Germans fled, leaving
five battered half-tracks behind. One
prisoner from the 2d SS Panzer Grenu-
dier Regiment was taken. His company,
he told interrogators, was the advance
guard of a four-company detachment
whose mission was to reconnoiter toward
Werbomont and take that town. But no
other attempt was made that night to run
the 2d Battalion gauntlet. Screened by
McCown’s force, the 82d Airborne Divi-
sion was free to detruck and assemble
around Werbomont, as the night pro-
gressed, according to plan.
Recall that on the morning of 18
December the 82d Airborne Division
started for Bastogne but was diverted
short of its destination and ordered to
Werbomont. General Gavin had gone
from the First Army headquarters to
Werbomont and made a personal recon-
naissance of the ground as far as the
Amblève River. This, of course, was on
the morning of the 18th so that he saw
none of the enemy forces who at that
moment were turning in the direction of
Werbomont. The advance party of the
82d arrived in the village at dark and
opened the division command post. Al-
though there was now serious question
whether the convoys of the 82d would
reach Werbomont in force before the
Germans, the bulk of the division moved
without opposition into the area during
the night of 18 December. The follow-

344 THE ARDENNES: BATTLE OF THE BULGE
ing morning Maj. Gen. Matthew B.
Ridgway, who had resumed command
of the airborne corps, opened his corps
command post near that of the 82d,
once again under Gavin.
Later in the morning at the First
Army headquarters (which had moved
to Chaudfontaine) , General Hodges
gave Ridgway the directive which would
make the airborne corps operational and
flesh it out with troops. The corps’ mis-
sion was to block further German ad-
vance along an irregular line extending
GENERAL RIDGWAY AND GENERAL GAVIN
from the Amblève through Manhay and
Houffalize to La Roche on the Ourthe
River, placing the corps’ right boundary
twenty miles northwest of Bastogne.
Three threatened areas were known to
be in the newly assigned zone of opera-
tions: the Amblève River sector, where
the 119th Infantry was deployed; the
Salm River sector, especially at Trois
Ponts where a lone engineer company
still barred the crossings (although this
information was unknown to the 82d) ;
and the general area north of the Ourthe

THE GERMAN SALIENT EXPANDS TO THE WEST 345
River where a vague and ill-defined Ger-
man movement had been reported. But
beyond checking these specific enemy ad-
vances the XVIII Airborne Corps had
the more difficult task of sealing the gap
of nearly twenty miles which had opened
between the V and VIII Corps.
During the morning of 19 December
the 504th and 505th Parachute Infantry
Regiments marched out of the Werbo-
mont assembly area under orders to push
to the fore as far as possible, relieve the
2d Battalion, 119th Infantry, and im-
prove the American defense line by
adding a bridgehead across the Lienne
Creek. There were no Germans here and
by noon the initial deployment was close
to completion. Meanwhile rumors had
reached the First Army command post
that the enemy had cut the main north-
south highway running between Bas-
togne and Liège in the neighborhood of
Houffalize. More rumors, mostly from
truck drivers whose missions on the rear
area roads usually gave them first sight
of the westernmost German spearheads,
put the enemy somewhere near Hotton,
ten miles northwest of the XVIII Air-
borne Corps boundary marker at La
Roche. Hastily complying with First
Army orders, the 3d Battalion of the
325th Glider Infantry Regiment and a
tank destroyer platoon set off southwest-
ward to block the approaches to Hotton.
By nightfall the battalion was in place,
stuck out alone on the corps’ right wing
and waiting for troops of the 3d Armored
to appear. A couple of hours before mid-
night a patrol did meet the armored
“point”-Maj. Gen. Maurice Rose, the
3d Armored commander, riding in a
jeep far in front of his tank columns.
The main body of the 82d Airborne
Division began to push toward the east
and south in midafternoon. With the
508th Parachute Infantry in support, the
504th and 505th moved along the roads
toward La Gleize and Trois Ponts re-
spectively. This proved to be only a route
march, for the Germans were nowhere
about. 8 By midnight the 505th had a bat-
talion each in the villages of Haute-Bo-
deux and Basse-Bodeux, effectively back-
stopping the small American force which
still held Trois Ponts. The 504th, which
had marched northeast, occupied the
village of Rahier with two battalions.
The 325th Glider Infantry, minus the
battalion sent to Hotton, remained in
and around Werbomont as corps and
division reserve. One of its companies
moved during the evening to the cross-
roads at Manhay, due south of Werbo-
mont, a crossroads which General Ridg-
way styled “of vital significance.” And a
company of the 508th meanwhile estab-
lished an outpost position on the
Manhay-Trois Ponts road at Bras.
By the morning of 20 December, there-
fore, the 82d Airborne Division had
pushed a defensive screen north, east,
south, and west of Werbomont. It is true
that to the south and west the screen con-
sisted only of motorized patrols and
widely separated pickets in small vil-
lages, but now there was a good chance
that any major enemy thrust could be
detected and channelized or retarded.
Thus far, however, the XVIII Airborne
Corps was making its deployment against
an unseen enemy. Indeed, so confused
was the situation into which Ridgway
8 The German intelligence was unaware that the
XVIII Airborne was in this area. Radio intercept,
however, had warned that a combat command of
the 3d Armored would move to the Werbomont
sector very shortly. OB WEST: I.C. Tagesmeldung,
Anlage 1:2 (19 Dec 44).

346 THE ARDENNES: BATTLE OF THE BULGE
TROOPS OF 325TH GLIDER INFANTRY MOVING THROUGH FOG TO A NEW POSITION
had been thrust that at midnight on 19
December he was forced to send an ur-
gent message to Hodges asking for infor-
mation on any V or VIII Corps units in
his zone. But his corps was substantially
strengthened by the next morning. CCB
of the 3d Armored Division had reached
Theux, about ten miles north of Stou-
mont, and was ready for immediate use.
The 3d Armored Division (minus CCA
and CCB) had reached the road between
Hotton and Manhay on the corps’ right
wing. 9
9 Since the 3d Armored Division was deployed
Ridgway had detailed plans for con-
tinuing the pressure along the corps
front from northeast to southwest. CCB,
with little connection between its combat com-
mands and subordinate task forces, it is necessary
to rely on the three combat commands’ AAR’s
and journals. The separate task forces can be
followed in the battalion S–3 journals. The semi-
official history of the division, Spearhead in the
West, 1941–45 (Frankfurt a/M, 1945), is very
readable and informative. The story of Task Force
Lovelady is related in A. E. Roberts, Five Stars to
Victory (Birmingham, 1949). Both the 30th Di-
vision and the 3d Armored are fairly well rep-
resented in the collection of combat interviews. In
addition, see Victory TD: The History of the
628th TD Bn.

THE GERMAN SALIENT EXPANDS TO THE WEST 347
3d Armored, was to clear the east and
north banks of the Amblève and estab-
lish contact with the 117th Infantry,
which had its hands full in Stavelot. The
reinforced 119th Infantry was to secure
the Amblève River line from Stoumont
to La Gleize. The 82d Airborne Division
was to take over the Salm River bridges
at Trois Ponts, drive the enemy from the
area between the Amblève and the Wer-
bomont-Trois Ponts road, and make
contact with CCB when the latter
reached Stavelot, thus completing the en-
MAP 2
circlement of such enemy forces as might
be left to the north. The 3d Armored Di-
vision was to fan out and push reconnais-
sance as far as the road between Manhay
and Houffalize, locating and developing
the shadowy German force believed to
be bearing down on the sketchy corps
right wing somewhere north of Houffa-
lize.
The immediate and proximate threat,
on the morning of 20 December, was
Peiper’s force of the 1st SS Panzer Divi-
sion, now concentrated with its bulk in
H.C Brewer, Jr.

348 THE ARDENNES: BATTLE OF THE BULGE
the Stoumont-La Gleize area, but with
an outpost holding the light bridge over
the Amblève at Cheneux and its tail in-
volved in a fight to reopen the rearward
line of communications through Stave-
lot. Kampfgruppe Peiper, it should be
noticed, was considerably weakened by
this piecemeal deployment: further-
more, it lacked the gasoline to undertake
much maneuver even in this constricted
area. (Map 2)
CCB (Brig. Gen. Truman E. Bou-
dinot) moved south past Spa on the
morning of the 20th in three task forces,
using three roads leading to the Stou-
mont-La Gleize-Trois Ponts triangle.
The largest of these detachments, Task
Force Lovelady (Lt. Col. William B.
Lovelady), had been given a complete
tank battalion, reinforced by a company
of armored infantry, and the important
job of cutting the Stavelot-Stoumont
road. Colonel Lovelady, then, led the
force which formed the left jaw of the
vise forming to clamp down on Kampf-
gruppe Peiper. His task force, proceed-
ing on the easternmost of the three
routes, reached the junction of the Trois
Ponts-Stoumont roads without sign of
the enemy. Just as the column was mak-
ing the turn south toward Trois Ponts,
a small enemy column of artillery, infan-
try, and supply trucks appeared, appar-
ently on its way to reinforce Peiper’s
main body.
Since Trois Ponts and Stavelot were
both in American hands, the appearance
of this train was surprising. What had
happened was this: German engineers
had reinforced a small footbridge east of
Trois Ponts, at least to the point that it
would sustain a self-propelled gun car-
riage, and since the night of 18 Decem-
ber supply trucks and reinforcements
had used the bridge to slip between the
two American-held towns. German rec-
ords indicate that some much-needed
gasoline reached Peiper through this
hole in the American net, but the
amount was insufficient to set the kampf-
gruppe rolling again even if the road
west had been free. As to this particular
German column, the Americans disposed
of it in short order. Task Force Lovelady
continued on its mission and established
three roadblocks along the main road
between Trois Ponts and La Gleize. The
Germans in the Stoumont sector were
definitely sealed in, albeit still active, for
four Shermans were destroyed by hidden
antitank guns.
The two remaining task forces of CCB
and companion units from the 30th
Division were less successful. Task Force
McGeorge (Maj. K. T. McGeorge) , the
center column, made its advance along
a road built on the side of a ridge
which ran obliquely from the north-
east toward La Gleize. Most of the
ridge road was traversed with no sight of
the Germans. At Cour, about two miles
from La Gleize, Task Force McGeorge
picked up Company K of the 117th In-
fantry and moved on to assault the latter
town. Midway the Americans encoun-
tered a roadblock held by a tank and a
couple of assault guns. Because the pitch
of the ridge slope precluded any tank
maneuver, the rifle company circled the
German outpost and advanced as far as
the outskirts of La Gleize. A sharp
counterattack drove the infantry back in-
to the tanks, still road-bound, and when
the tanks themselves were threatened by
close-in work McGeorge withdrew the
task force for the night to the hamlet of
Borgoumont perched above La Gleize. It
was apparent that the Germans intended

THE GERMAN SALIENT EXPANDS TO THE WEST 349
to hold on to La Gleize, although in fact
the greater part of Peiper’s command by
this time was congregated to the west on
the higher ground around Stoumont.
The attack on Stoumont on the 20th
was a continuation of that begun late on
the previous afternoon by the 1st Battal:
ion of the 119th Infantry. The maneu-
ver now, however, was concentric. The
1st Battalion and its accompanying tank
company from the 740th Tank Battalion
pushed along the road from the west
while Task Force Jordan (Capt. John
W. Jordan), the last and smallest of
the three CCB detachments, attempted
a thrust from the north via the Spa road,
which had given the First Army head-
quarters so much concern. Task Force
Jordan was within sight of Stoumont
when the tanks forming the point were
suddenly brought under flanking fire by
German tanks that had been dug in to
give hull defilade. The two American
lead tanks were knocked out immediate-
ly. The rest of the column, fixed to the
roadway by the forest and abrupt
ground, could not deploy. Search for
some other means of approach was fu-
tile, and the task force halted for the
night on the road.
The 1st Battalion, 119th Infantry, and
the company of medium tanks from the
740th Tank Battalion found slow but
steady going in the first hours of the
attack along the western road. With
Company B and the tanks leading and
with artillery and mortars firing rapidly
in support, the battalion moved through
Targnon. The Germans had constructed
a series of mine fields to bar the
winding road which climbed up the
Stoumont hill and had left rear guard
infantry on the slopes north of the road
to cover these barriers by fire. At the
close of day the attacking column had
traversed some 3,000 yards and passed
five mine fields (with only two tanks
lost), the infantry advance guard climb-
ing the wooded hillside to flank and
denude each barrier.
Now within 800 yards of the western
edge of Stoumont and with darkness and
a heavy fog settling over the town, Colo-
nel Herlong gave orders for the column
to close up for the night. One of the dis-
abled tanks was turned sidewise to block
the narrow road, while Companies B and
C moved up the hill north of this im-
provised barrier to seize a sanatorium
which overlooked the road and the town.
The main sanatorium building stood on
an earthen platform filled in as a pro-
jection from the hillside rising north of
the road. Its inmates, some two hundred
sick children and old people, had taken
to the basement. After a brief shelling
the American infantry climbed over the
fill and, shrouded in the fog, assaulted
the building. The German infantry were
driven out and four 20-mm. guns taken.
Companies B and C dug in to form a
line on the hillside in and around the
sanatorium, and Company A disposed
itself to cover the valley road. Four tanks
were brought up the slope just below
the fill and in this forward position were
refueled by armored utility cars. The
enemy foxhole line lay only some three
hundred yards east of the companies on
the hill.
An hour before midnight the Germans
suddenly descended on the sanatorium,
shouting “Heil Hitler” and firing wildly.
On the slope above the building German
tanks had inched forward to positions
from which they could fire directly into
the sanatorium. American tanks were
brought up but could not negotiate the

350
steep banks at the fill. One was set afire
by a bazooka; two more were knocked
out by German tanks which had crept
down the main road. The flaming tanks
and some outbuildings which had been
set afire near the sanatorium so lighted
the approach to the building that fur-
ther American tank maneuver on the
slope was impossible. By this time Ger-
man tanks had run in close enough to
fire through the windows of the sanato-
rium. The frenzied fight inside and
around the building went on for a half
hour or so, a duel with grenades and
bullet fire at close quarters. About thirty
men from Company B were captured as
the battle eddied through rooms and
hallways, and the attackers finally gained
possession of the main building. How-
THE ARDENNES: BATTLE OF THE BULGE
STOUMONT, SHOWING THE SANATORIUM
ever, Sgt. William J. Widener with a
group of eleven men held on in a small
annex, the sergeant shouting out sens-
ings-while American shells fell-to an
artillery observer in a foxhole some fifty
yards away. (Widener and Pfc. John
Leinen, who braved enemy fire to keep
the defenders of the annex supplied with
ammunition, later received the DSC.)
Although the German assault had won
possession of the sanatorium and had
pushed back the American line on the
slope to the north, accurate and incessant
shellfire checked the attackers short of a
breakthrough. About 0530 the enemy
tried it again in a sortie from the town
headed for the main road. But tank rein-
forcements had arrived for the 1st Bat-
talion and their fire, thickening that of

THE GERMAN SALIENT EXPANDS TO THE WEST 351
the artillery, broke the attack before it
could make appreciable headway. When
day broke, the Americans still held the
roadblock position but the enemy had
the sanatorium. In the night of wild
fighting half the complement of Com-
panies B and C had been lost, including
five platoon leaders.
Despite the setbacks suffered during
the American advance of 20 December
on the Stoumont-La Gleize area, the net
had been drawn appreciably tighter
around Peiper. The German line of sup-
ply-or retreat–was cut by Task Force
Lovelady and the Americans in Stavelot.
The roads from Stoumont and La Gleize
north to Spa were blocked by tank-
infantry teams which had pushed very
close to the former two towns. The 1st
Battalion of the 119th Infantry had been
checked at the sanatorium but nonethe-
less was at the very entrance to Stoumont
and had the 2d Battalion behind it in
regimental reserve.
Also, during the 20th, the 82d Air-
borne Division moved to close the circle
around Peiper by operations aimed at
erasing the small German bridgehead at
Cheneux on the Amblève southeast of
Stoumont. The 82d had planned an ad-
vance that morning to drive the enemy
from the area bounded on the north by
the Amblève River and by the Trois
Ponts-Werbomont road on the south.
The two regiments involved (the 504th
Parachute Infantry on the left and the
505th on the right) marched to their
attack positions east of Werbomont with
virtually no information except that they
were to block the enemy, wherever he
might be found, in conjunction with
friendly forces operating somewhere off
to the north and south. The first task.
obviously, was to reconnoiter for either
enemy or friendly forces in the area.
Patrols sent out at daybreak were gone
for hours, but about noon, as bits of information
began to arrive at General
Gavin’s headquarters, the picture took
some shape. Patrols working due north
reached the 119th Infantry on the road
west of Stoumont and reported that the
countryside was free of the enemy.
Civilians questioned by patrols on the
Werbomont-Stoumont road told the
Americans that there was a concentration
of tanks and other vehicles around
Cheneux. Working eastward, other patrols
found that Trois Ponts was occupied
by Company C, 51st Engineers, and
that the important bridges there had all
been damaged or destroyed. This word
from Trois Ponts came as a surprise back
at General Gavin’s headquarters where
the presence of this single engineer company
at the critical Trois Ponts crossing
site was quite unknown. 10
The most important discovery made
by the airborne infantry patrols was the
location of the 7th Armored Division
troops in the gap between the XVIII Airborne
Corps and Bastogne. The whereabouts
of the westernmost 7th Armored
Division positions had been a question of
grave import in the higher American
headquarters for the past two days. Now
a patrol from the 505th Parachute Infantry
came in with information that they
had reached a reconnaissance party of the
7th Armored in the village of Fosse, a
little over two miles southwest of Trois
Ponts, and that troops of that division
were forming an outpost line just to the
south of the 505th positions.
10 The engineers were not unaware of their im-
portant role and the commanding officer showed this
in his greeting to Colonel Ekman: “I’ll bet you guys
are glad we’re here.” Combat Interv with Col Wil-
liam-E. Ekman.

352 THE ARDENNES: BATTLE OF THE BULGE
Once General Gavin had a moderately
clear picture of the situation confronting
his division he ordered the two leading
regiments forward: the 504th to Cheneux,
where the enemy had been reported,
and the 505th to Trois Ponts. The 505th
Commander, Col. William E. Ekman,
already had dispatched bazooka teams to
reinforce the engineer company at the
latter point and by late afternoon had
his 2d Battalion in Trois Ponts, with one
company holding a bridgehead across the
Salm.
Acting under orders to reach Cheneux
as quickly as possible and seize the Am-
blève bridge, the 504th commander, Col.
Reuben H. Tucker, 3d, sent Companies
B and C of his 1st Battalion hurrying
toward the village. The leading company
was nearing the outskirts of Cheneux in
midafternoon when it came into a hail
of machine gun and flak fire. Both com-
panies deployed and took up the fire
fight but quickly found that the village
was strongly defended. Ground haze was
heavy and friendly artillery could not be
adjusted to give a helping hand. Dark
was coming on and the companies with-
drew to a wood west of Cheneux to await
further orders.
The 1st Battalion had not long to wait.
New plans which would greatly extend
the 82d Airborne Division front were
already in execution and it was impera-
tive that the German bridgehead on the
north flank of the division be erased
promptly. Colonel Tucker ordered the
1st Battalion commander (Lt. Col.
Willard E. Harrison) to take the two
companies and try a night attack. At
1930 they moved out astride the road
west of Cheneux, two tank destroyers
their only heavy support. The approach
to the village brought the paratroopers
across a knob completely barren of cover,
sloping gradually up to the German posi-
tions and crisscrossed with barbed wire.
The hostile garrison, from the 2d SS
Panzer Grenadier Regiment, was heavily
reinforced by mobile flak pieces, mor-
tars, machine guns, and assault artillery.
To breast this heavy fire and rush the
four hundred yards of open terrain, the
two companies attacked in four waves at
intervals of about fifty yards. The mo-
ment the leading American assault waves
could be discerned through the darkness
the enemy opened an intense, accurate
fire. Twice the attackers were driven
back, both times with gaping ranks. The
first two waves were almost completely
shot down. Company C ran into the wire
and, having no wire cutters available,
was stalled momentarily. Finally the two
tank destroyers worked their way to the
front and began to shell the German
guns. With their support a third assault
was thrown at the village. This time a
few men lived to reach the outlying
houses. In a brief engagement at close
quarters the Americans silenced some of
the flak and machine guns, then set up a
defense to guard this slight toehold until
reinforcements could arrive.
The West Flank of the XVIII
Airborne Corps, 20 December
The general advance of the XVIII Air-
borne Corps on 20 December included
the mission assigned to the 3d Armored
Division of securing the Bastogne-Liège
highway between Manhay and Houffa-
lize, thus screening the right or western
flank of the corps. The bulk of the 3d
Armored was engaged elsewhere: CCA
deployed as a defense for the Eupen
area, CCB driving with troops of the

THE GERMAN SALIENT EXPANDS TO THE WEST 353
30th Infantry Division against Kampf-
gruppe Peiper. When General Rose
moved his forward command post to
Hotton on 20 December, the residue of
the 3d Armored was assembling between
Hotton and Soy, a force numbering only
the small reserve combat command and
the 83d Reconnaissance Battalion.
Nothing was known of any friendly
troops to the front, nor did information
on the location and strength of the
enemy have more than the validity of
rumor. Since it was necessary to recon-
noiter and clear the area west of the
important section of the north-south
highway, now his objective, General
Rose decided to divide his limited
strength into three columns, two attack-
ing via generally north-south routes and
then swinging eastward: the third, on
the extreme left, driving east to the
Manhay crossroads and then turning
south on the main highway.
This was a risky decision, as the 3d
Armored commander well knew, for the
zone of attack was very broad and if one
of the small columns ran into a superior
enemy force the best it could do would
be to fight a delaying action on its own.
Terrain and weather, however, would
aid the reconnaissance somewhat, for al-
though the area was laced by back roads
and trails German maneuver would be
drastically curtailed and a German ad-
vance limited to the few open and pass-
able roads. General Rose tried to retain
as much flexibility as he could, in view
of the vague status of the enemy and the
width of the front to be covered. The
three task forces, or more properly recon-
naissance teams, assigned to Lt. Col.
Prentice E. Yeomans each had a recon-
naissance troop, a medium tank com-
pany, a battery-of armored field artillery,
and a platoon of light tanks. The re-
serve, commanded by Col. Robert L.
Howze, Jr., was made up of an armored
infantry battalion, two companies of
light tanks and one of mediums, plus a
company of engineers. This reserve
would follow the middle task force.
The attack or reconnaissance, time
would tell which, began in early after-
noon. On the right Task Force Hogan
(Lt. Col. Samuel M. Hogan) set out
along a secondary road surmounting the
ridge which rose on the east bank of the
Ourthe River and extended south to La
Roche, the boundary for the XVIII Air-
borne Corps right wing. The Ourthe
River, then, would form a natural screen
on this flank. Hogan's column met no
opposition en route to La Roche and up-
on arrival there found that the town was
defended by roadblocks that had been
thrown up by the 7th Armored Division
trains. At this point the route dropped
into the river valley, following the twists
and turns of the Ourthe toward the
southeast. Hogan sent on a small scout-
ing force which covered some three miles
before it was confronted by a German
roadblock. There was no way around,
daylight was running out, and the force
hal t ed .
The road assigned Task Force Tucker
(Maj. John Tucker), the center column,
followed the Aisne River valley south-
ward. At the village of Dochamps this
route began an ascent from the valley
onto the ridge or tableland where lay
the town of Samrée. At Samrée Task
Force Tucker was to make a left wheel
onto the La Roche-Salmchâteau road
(N28), which followed a high, narrow
ridge line to the east, there crossing the
main Liège-Bastogne highway. This in-
tersection, the Baraque de Fraiture,

354 THE ARDENNES: BATTLE OF THE BULGE
would have a special importance in later
fighting.
Tucker’s column moved unopposed
through the Aisne valley but at
Dochamps, where began the ascent to
the Samrée highland, it was engaged by
a German force of unknown strength.
In an attempt to continue the reconnais-
sance Major Tucker split his command
in three. One force circled west and
south to Samrée where, it had only now
been learned, a part of the 7th Armored
Division trains was fighting to hold the
town. The second group turned east and
finally made contact with Task Force
Kane. Tucker’s third group moved back
north to Amonines.
Late in the afternoon General Rose
learned that the 3d Armored tanks sent
to Samrée had been knocked out and the
town itself lost to the enemy. The eleva-
tion on which Samrée stood and its im-
portance as a barrier on the highway
from La Roche to the division objective
made recapture of the town almost man-
datory. Rose ordered Colonel Yeomans
to regain Samrée and hold it; for this
mission two companies of armored infan-
try from the reserve combat command
were detailed to Lt. Col. William R.
Orr. Colonel Orr picked up the remain-
ing elements of Task Force Tucker and
arrived outside of Dochamps a little be-
fore midnight, setting up a roadblock for
the remainder of the night.
Task Force Kane (Lt. Col. Matthew
W. Kane), on the left in the three-
column advance, found easy going on 20
December. Acting as the pivot for the
swing south and east, Kane’s column was
charged with the occupation of Malem-
pré, about 3,000 yards southeast of the
vital Manhay crossroads. This latter
junction on the Liège-Bastogne highway
represented a position tactically unten-
able. Hills away to the east and west
dominated the village, and to the south-
east an extensive woods promised cover
from which the enemy could bring fire
on the crossroads. By reason of the
ground, therefore, Malempré, on a hill
beyond the woods, was the chosen ob-
jective. Kane’s task force reached Man-
hay and pushed advance elements as far
as Malempré without meeting the en-
emy.
The three reconnaissance forces of the
3d Armored Division by the close of 20
December had accomplished a part of
their mission by discovering the general
direction of the German advance north-
west of Houffalize and, on two of the
three roads, had made contact with the
enemy. It remained to establish the en-
emy’s strength and his immediate inten-
tions. As yet no prisoners had been taken
nor precise identifications secured, but
the G–2 of the 3d Armored Division (Lt.
Col. Andrew Barr) made a guess, based
on earlier reports, that the three task
forces had met the 116th Panzer Division
and that the 560th Volks Grenadier Divi-
sion was following the former as support.
Action in Front of the XVIII
Airborne Corps Right Wing on
20 December
As the 3d Armored Division assembled
for advance on the morning of 20 Decem-
ber, and indeed for most of the day, it
was unaware that little groups of Amer-
icans continued to hold roadblocks and
delay the enemy in the area lying to the
front of the XVIII Airborne Corps right
wing. These miniature delaying posi-
tions had been formed on 18 and 19
December by men belonging to the 7th

THE GERMAN SALIENT EXPANDS TO THE WEST 355
Armored Division trains, commanded by
Colonel Adams, and by two combat en-
gineer battalions, the 51st and 158th. As
the 7th Armored advanced into combat
around St. Vith on 18 December and it
became apparent that German thrusts
were piercing deep on both flanks of this
position, Adams received orders to move
the division trains into the area around
La Roche and prepare a defense for that
town and the Ourthe bridges. Most of
the vehicles under Adams’ command
were concentrated west of La Roche by
MAP 3
20 December, but large stores of ammu-
nition, rations, and gasoline had just
been moved to dumps at Samrée. (Map
3) The 51st Engineer Combat Battalion
(Lt. Col. Harvey R. Fraser) had arrived
at Hotton on 19 December with orders
to construct a barrier line farther south
which would utilize the Ourthe River as
a natural obstacle. The battalion was mi-
nus Company C, which, at Trois Ponts,
did much to slow the pace of Kampf-
gruppe Peiper’s westward march. It did
H.C. Brewer, Jr.

356 THE ARDENNES: BATTLE OF THE BULGE
have the services of the 9th Canadian
Forestry Company, which took on the
task of preparing the Ourthe crossings
south of La Roche for demolition. From
La Roche north to Hotton and for several
kilometers beyond, the remaining
two companies worked at mining passable
fording sites, fixing explosives on
bridges, and erecting roadblocks; but
the extensive project was far from com-,
plete on 20 December. The sketchy barrier
line on the Ourthe was extended
toward Bastogne by the 158th Engineer
Combat Battalion. 11 To the 7th Armored
trains and the engineers were added little
groups of heterogeneous composition
and improvised armament, picked up by
the nearest headquarters and hurried’ to
the Ourthe River line in answer to
rumors of the German advance over
Houffalize. It is hardly surprising, then,
that the 3d Armored Division began its
advance unaware of efforts already afoot
to delay the enemy.
While little American detachments
worked feverishly to prepare some kind
of barrier line on the Ourthe River and
around La Roche and Samrée, the north
wing of the Fifth Panzer Army was
coming closer and closer. Krueger’s
LVIII Panzer Corps pushed its advance
guard through the Houffalize area on 19
December, while the rear guard mopped
up American stragglers and isolated detachments
on the west bank of the Our
River. Krueger’s orders were to push as
far west as possible on the axis Houffalize-La
Roche while his neighbor on the
left, the XXXVII Panzer Corps, cut its
11 The combat operations of these engineer
battalions would have some effect on the German
advance against the western wing of the XVIII
Airborne Corps, but since they are integral to
the VIII Corps defense they constitute part of
that story. See above, Chapter XIII.
way through Bastogne or circled past
the road complex centered there.
The Reconnaissance Battalion of the
116th Panzer Division, several hours
ahead of the main body of Krueger’s
corps, had reached Houffalize on the
morning of 19 December, but because
Krueger expected the town to be strong-
ly defended and had ordered his recon-
naissance to avoid a fight there the
battalion veered to the south, then west
toward La Roche. This brief enemy
apparition and sudden disappearance
near Houffalize probably account for the
conflicting and confusing rumors as to
the location of the Germans in this sec-
tor which were current in American
headquarters on 19 December. Between
Bertogne and La Roche the Recon-
naissance Battalion discovered that the
bridge over the west branch of the
Ourthe had been destroyed. At this
point the Germans had a brush with one
of the roadblocks put out by the 7th
Armored troops in La Roche and thus
alerted Colonel Adams. 12 Adams had no
other information of the enemy.
It seemed to Adams, as a result of the
skirmish, that the German advance to-
ward La Roche was being made on the
northwest bank of the main branch of
the Ourthe River and that the final at-
tack would come from the west rather
than the east. He therefore moved the
7th Armored dumps from locations west
of La Roche to Samrée, from which
point he hoped to maintain contact with
and continue supplies to the main body
of the division at St. Vith. By early morn-
ing of 20 December the transfer had
12
It was unusual during World War II for the
division trains to keep a special narrative journal,
but the 7th Armored did keep one that has proven
a gold mine for this section.

THE GERMAN SALIENT EXPANDS TO THE WEST 357
been completed. Adams now was con-
fronted with the necessity of pushing his
defenses farther east to protect the new
supply point. He dispatched part of a
battery of the 203d Antiaircraft Artillery
Battalion to the Baraque de Fraiture
crossroads formed by the intersection of
the Samrée-Salmchateau road and the
main Liège-Bastogne highway, the same
junction which had seemed so important
to the XVIII Airborne Corps com-
mander in his map reconnaissance of this
area. Upon arrival there the newcomers
found that some gunners from the 106th
Infantry Division, commanded by Maj.
Arthur C. Parker, already had dug in to
defend the vital crossroads.
The German appearance at the bro-
ken bridge which altered Colonel
Adams’ plans had even greater effect in
General Krueger’s headquarters. Krue-
ger had no bridging available in the
corps trains when the word reached him
on the night of the 19th. The fact that
he had to rely on the limited capacity of
the 116th Panzer Division engineers
meant that the western branch of the
Ourthe could not be spanned before the
evening of 20 December. Such a delay
was out of the question. To sidestep to
the south would bang the corps against
very strong resistance forming around
Bastogne and would scramble the vehic-
ular columns of Krueger’s armor with
the 2d Panzer Division. By this time the
116th Panzer Division rear guard had
occupied Houffalize without a fight. The
main body of the division, having
marched unopposed nearly to the road
which runs from Bastogne northwest to
Marche, was preparing to seize a second
bridge over the west branch of the
Ourthe at Ortheuville. Krueger had no
faith that any stroke of fortune would
deliver the Ourtheuville bridge untouched.
This was the end of the fourth
day of the German advance and the
Americans, he reasoned, were long since
on guard against a coup de main there.
Weighing the apparent American
strength in the Bastogne sector against
the total absence of resistance at Houffalize
the LVIII Panzer Corps commander
decided, late in the evening of the
19th, to shift his advance to the north
bank of the Ourthe River and reroute
the 116th Panzer Division toward Samrée
by way of Houffalize. The order to halt
his division and countermarch to Houffalize
was a distinctly unpleasant experience
for General von Waldenburg. (He
would later say that his decision was
“fatal to the division.”) The business of
reversing a mechanized division in full
swing under conditions of total darkness
is ticklish at best; when it is conducted
by tired officers and men unfamiliar with
the road net and is hampered by supply
and artillery trains backing up behind
the turning columns it is a serious test
for any unit. Nevertheless the 116th
sorted itself out, issued supplies, refueled
its vehicles, and by early morning was
en route to Houffalize. Meanwhile the
1128th Regiment, leading the 560th
Volks Grenadier Division, had been
closing up fast on the 116th Panzer Division
in a series of forced marches (that
later won for the 560th a commendation
for its “excellent march performance”) .
By noon of 20 December the bulk of the
116th Panzer Division followed by a
large portion of the 560th Yolks Grenadier
Division had defiled through Houffalize
and was on the north bank of the
Ourthe River. 13
13 The German sources for other units than
Kampfgruppe Peiper include: MSS ETHINT-21

358 THE ARDENNES: BATTLE OF THE BULGE
The maneuver now to be executed was
a left wheel into attack against Samrée
and La Roche, with the main effort,
carried by the tank regiment of the
116th Panzer Division, made at Samrée.
The right flank of the attack would be
covered by the 560th Volks Grenadier
Division. As the morning drew along the
Americans had made their presence felt
by increasingly effective artillery fire
from the north. German scouts reported
that there were tanks to be seen near
Samrée (actually the American garrison
there had only one) but that the ground
would sustain a German tank attack.
The 60th Panzer Grenadier Regiment
assembled under cover of the woods
south of the town, and the tanks (from
the 16th Panzer Regiment) moved out
onto the Samrée road. Advance patrols,
which had started a fire fight in the late
morning, were able to occupy a few
houses when a fog settled in shortly after
noon.
All this time the 7th Armored Division
quartermaster, Lt. Col. A. A. Miller,
had been issuing rations, ammuni-
tion, and gasoline as fast as trucks
could load. The force he had inside
Samrée was small: half of the 3967th
Quartermaster Truck Company, the
quartermaster section of the division
headquarters, part of the 440th Ar-
mored Field Artillery Battalion’s Service
Battery, two sections of D Battery, 203d
Antiaircraft Artillery Battalion, armed
with quadruple-mount machine guns,
plus a light tank and a half-track from
the 87th Cavalry Reconnaissance Squad-
(Kraemer) , and ETHINT-34, OKW, Ardennes
Offensive (Maj. Herbert Buecks); MSS A–873
(Waldenburg) ; A–924 (Kraemer) ; A–955 (Ding
ler) ; B–027 (Langhaeuser) ; B–321 (Krueger); B-
506 (Triepel) .
ron. About noon word reached Samrée
that the 3d Armored Division was send-
ing a task force to the town. The Ger-
man patrols had not yet entered the
town; so, heartened by the approach of
the friendly armor, Miller gave orders
that no supplies were to be destroyed.
About 1430 the fire fight quickened.
Hearing that the 3d Armored tanks had
reached Dochamps, Miller drove to find
the task force and insure that he would
get immediate aid. Not more than a half
hour later the Germans swarmed in un-
der a sharp barrage of rocket fire. By
this time the one tank was out of ammu-
nition, the machine gunners manning
the .50-caliber weapons on the quarter-
master trucks were also running low, the
antiaircraft outfit had lost three of its
weapons and fired its last round, and the
division Class III officer had ordered the
units to evacuate. A majority of the
troops got out with most of their trucks
and the remaining artillery ammunition,
but 15,000 rations and 25,000 gallons of
gasoline were left behind.
Shortly after, the detachment sent
from Task Force Tucker appeared. Two
armored cars, at the point, entered the
north edge of the town, but the six
medium tanks following were quickly
destroyed by German armor coming in
from the east. During the shooting the
armored cars were able to pick up the
surviving tankers and escape to La
Roche. The 7th Armored Division head-
quarters received word of the fight, and
from La Roche the commander of the
Trains Headquarters Company, 1st. Lt.
Denniston Averill, hurried to Samrée
with two medium tanks and a self-
propelled tank destroyer. Averill’s little
party attempted to enter Samrée, but
was not heard from again.

THE GERMAN SALIENT EXPANDS TO THE WEST 359
Off to the east, at Salmchâteau, Troop
D of the 87th Cavalry Reconnaissance
Squadron also got orders sending it to
Samrée. Passing the friendly outpost at
the Baraque de Fraiture the troop came
within two and a half miles of Samrée
when it encountered a German road-
block, not well defended. Smashing it,
the troop moved on. Shortly it struck a
second block formed by abandoned
American trucks and defended by a
large force of German infantry (two
companies of the 560th Volks Grenadier
Division). Having felt out the enemy
and with night drawing on, the cavalry
commander pulled his troop back a little
to the east to await the morning. Later in
the evening radio orders came from the
7th Armored Division headquarters tell-
ing him to arrange a co-ordinated attack
with the 3d Armored Division task force
north of Dochamps.
The action at Samrée had delayed
Krueger’s corps considerably. But the
gasoline stores captured there had re-
fueled all the vehicles of the 116th Pan-
zer Division; despite assurances by Amer-
ican prisoners that sugar had been mixed
with the gasoline the enemy drivers re-
ported that it suited the German motors
very well.
The Net Closes on Peiper
General Hobbs’s division and CCB, 3d
Armored Division, had a job to do before
the XVIII Airborne Corps could be free
to direct all its strength into a drive to
re-establish contact with the VIII Corps
and close the gap between Houffalize
and Bastogne. Kampfgruppe Peiper, esti-
mated as comprising at least half of the
1st SS Panzer Division, had to be eradi-
cated north of the Amblève River. This
force, whose rapid drive to the west had
caused such alarm only a few hours be-
fore, appeared to be pocketed in the
Stoumont-La Gleize sector. Effectively
blocked off on the west the trapped Ger-
mans would probably try to cut their
way to the rear via Stavelot or at least
establish a bridgehead there as a po-
tential escape hatch. Probably, too, the
troops in the pocket would receive some
aid from new’ German units moving
along the north flank of the St. Vith sali-
ent through the gap between Malmédy
and Recht.
The operations designed for 21 De-
cember left the 30th Division and its re-
inforcing armor to finish off Peiper by
tightening the net spread the day before.
Thereafter the 30th had orders to link
up with the 82d Airborne at Trois Ponts
and prepare to join in the XVIII Air-
borne Corps advance by pushing south.
The varied indications that the Germans
were moving in some force toward
Malmédy, the pivot point for both the
corps and division left wing, seemed to
be no reason for reverting strictly to
the defensive. Malmédy had been pre-
pared for defense since the scare of 17
December, the reports of enemy forces
thereabouts were rather vague, and six
American artillery battalions were in
position to give support where needed.
In detail, then, the plans prepared by
Hobbs and his staff were formulated
against the Germans in the pocket.
On the morning of 21 December the
American forces in and around Malmédy
were substantial: the 120th Infantry
(minus a battalion in division reserve) ;
the “Norwegians,” that is, the 99th In-
fantry Battalion; the 526th Armored In-
fantry Battalion; a company from the
291st Engineer Battalion; a tank com-

360 THE ARDENNES: BATTLE OF THE BULGE
MINED BRIDGE IN MALMEDY. Tapes mark safe passageway.
pany from the 740th; and two platoons
from the 823d Tank Destroyer Battal-
ion. 14 The American infantry line
formed an arc south of the town, swing-
ing to east and west. On the left this
line touched the 1st Infantry Division
outposts near Waimes; on the right it
had a tenuous connection with the 117th
Infantry at the junction of the road
from Stavelot and the road running
north to Francorchamps. In passing it
must be said that the responsibilities of
14 History of the 120th Infantry Regiment and
H. R. Bergen, History of 99th Infantry Battalion
(Oslo, n.d.); also 120th Inf AAR. The story of
other detachments in the Malmèdy fight is told in
12th Army Group, Special Forces, AAR, December
1944.
the two sister regiments at the vaguely
defined interregimental boundary were
none too explicit. All roads leading to
Malmèdy had been blocked by mines
and barricades or were barred by out-
post detachments.
The first action of 21 December, as
it turned out, was neither against Peiper
nor at the pocket, but an engagement
at Malmèdy with new German troops
thus far unidentified as a regular tactical
unit. The night before, an enemy force
had assembled in Ligneuville, five miles
south of Malmèdy. This was the noto-
rious 150th Panzer Brigade which, under
the command of the equally notorious
Colonel Skorzeny, had been especially
trained to seize the Meuse bridges as

‘THE GERMAN SALIENT EXPANDS TO THE WEST 361
a part of Operation Greif. When
the German plans to reach the Hohes
Venn on the second day of the counter-
offensive miscarried and the regular
German formations were checked so far
from the Meuse as to make a dash by
this special task force out of the question,
Colonel Skorzeny sought for some other
road to fame and glory. His recommen-
dation, made to the Sixth Panzer Army
commander, that the group be re-
assembled and committed as an ordinary
combat unit was accepted, and the cap-
ture of Malmédy was assigned as its first
mission.
The troops that gathered in Ligneu-
ville must have made a motley crew.
Some were completely equipped with
American uniforms and dog-tags; others
had olive drab trousers and American
combat boots surmounted by field gray
tunics; still ,others wore the German
field uniform. Their vehicles were an
assortment of German makes; captured
American armored cars, tanks, and
jeeps; and German models which had
been given a face-lifting job by the
addition of dummy turrets, decks, and
fronts to simulate an American equiva-
lent. Despite this rag-tag appearance
Skorzeny’s command was composed of
tough, picked men, abundantly armed
with automatic and heavy weapons.
Skorzeny divided his brigade into
three groups, two for the assault and
one in reserve. About two hours before
dawn the right group struck straight
north along the Ligneuville road in an
effort to seize the bridge south of Mal-
médy. The assault force was engaged by
the 1st Battalion of the 120th Infantry,
and the 3d Battalion joined the fire fight
as well; but it was left to the artillery
to “plaster” the Germans, as the in-
fantry were quick to acknowledge. Two
hours later the attackers had disap-
peared. The morning came with a dense
fog floating out from the Amblève River.
Attacking under this cover the left Ger-
man assault group, two rifle companies,
and a tank company rolled in column
along a secondary road which would
bring it west of Malmédy against the
3d Battalion of the 120th. One detach-
ment turned toward the town but came
to a sudden halt when the lead vehicles
hit a mine field in front of B Company,
99th Infantry Battalion. It took only
minutes for mortars, machine guns, and
artillery to dispel this assault.
Here, on the first day of use of the
new POZIT fuze, the Germans were
roughly dealt with. Nearly a hundred
were killed by the shellbursts and for
a moment panic spread among them,
some running forward into the fire shout-
ing “Kamerad.” But Skorzeny’s troops
were tough and tried repeatedly to break
Lt. Col. Harold D. Hansen’s “Nor-
wegians,” an outfit characterized in the
German intelligence reports as “old
men.” German machine gun crews tried
to set up their pieces right in front of
the railroad embankment where B Com-
pany lay but were shot down or blasted
by hand grenades. Several times the
enemy infantry reached the foot of the
embankment, but could go no farther.
Finally the assault died down.
The main enemy detachment headed
for the Malmedy-Stavelot road, pushing
its infantry to the fore. In the fog it en-
countered K Company of the 120th In-
fantry, knocked out a platoon deployed
at a roadblock, and, using its tanks,
drove the remaining American infantry
back some distance to the north. Four
3-inch towed tank destroyers covering the

362
THE ARDENNES: BATTLE OF THE BULGE
GERMAN TANK DISGUISED AS AN AMERICAN TANK
road were abandoned after their crews
removed the firing pins.
Not all the Americans fell back, how-
ever. One who stayed was 1st Lt.
Kenneth R. Nelson, who decided to hold
on with a few men left in his section
and did so, savagely beating back the
attackers. Nelson led the fight until he
died of the wounds he had suffered. He
received the DSC posthumously. T/Sgt.
John Van Der Kamp then took com-
mand, although wounded, and held the
position until ordered to withdraw. He
was awarded the DSC. Part of K Com-
pany withdrew to a nearby factory, where
Pfc. Francis Currey essayed a series of
gallant deeds for which he later received
the Medal of Honor. He knocked out
a tank with bazooka fire, drove the Ger-
man crews out of three tanks with anti-
tank grenades, with a bazooka blew in
the front of the house where the enemy
tankers had taken refuge, and turned a
half-track machine gun on the house
with such effect as to silence the German
fire and permit the escape of five Amer-
icans who had been cornered by the
enemy.
This confused fight in the fog, taking
place as it did on the boundary be-

THE GERMAN SALIENT EXPANDS TO THE WEST 363
tween the 120th and the 117th, had re-
percussions out of all relation to the
event. By noon garbled reports and
rumors placed German tanks (errone-
ously as it proved) in villages northwest
of Malmédy; the 117th Infantry was wor-
ried that the Germans were left free to
strike their left flank at Stavelot; the
staff of the 120th Infantry was trying
desperately to find out exactly what had
happened; two battalions of antiaircraft
artillery with 90-mm. guns were hurried-
ly taking positions to build a defense in
depth as far back as the division com-
mand post; the 120th Infantry reserve
was rushed west to Burnenville–but
found no Germans. The much-touted
German penetration finally boiled down
to one tank and a half-track which had
driven up and down the road in the fog
with an English-speaking soldier shout-
ing out lurid promises of warm female
companionship for the Americans if they
only would surrender.
The German thrust along the
boundary between the two American
regiments, as the event showed, had be-
come jammed in the narrow corridor
and most of its armor destroyed by cross
fire coming in from the flanks. Deprived
of tank support and followed unrelent-
ingly by the new variety of shellbursts,
the enemy infantry had withdrawn.
Skorzeny, by this time fully aware of the
defending strength at Malmédy, or-
dered his brigade to pull back to the
south. Thus ended the first and the last
attack on Malmédy. The lines of the 3d
Battalion were restored and two of the
abandoned tank destroyer guns recov-
ered and placed in action. Nonetheless,
the unexpected strength of the German
attack on Malmédy had impacts all up
and down the American chain of com-
mand. At Hodges’ First Army head-
quarters there had been a continuing
question as to whether the enemy would
try to shake loose in the north and drive
for Liège. Momentarily it looked as if
this indeed was the German intention.
To the west at Stavelot, a detachment
from the rearward march echelons of
the 1st SS Panzer Division made an
abortive attempt to cross to the north
bank of the Amblève preparatory to
reopening the route leading to Kampf-
gruppe Peiper. The Americans holding
the major section of the town had blown
the last bridge, and the panzer grena-
diers were forced to take to the icy
stream. This crossing brought a hundred
or so of the assault force in front of
B Company, 117th Infantry, whose rifle-
men picked off most of the attackers
while they still were in the stream. Be-
yond this one alarm the day passed
quietly at Stavelot–although one major
disaster occurred when a section of the
743d Tank Battalion fired high explosive
into a building and set it afire, only to
learn that it was filled with champagne
and cognac.
The march echelons of the 1st SS
Panzer Division en route to relieve
Peiper were slow in assembling and their
concentration area, southeast of Stave-
lot, was under constant interdiction by
artillery fire. The 1st SS Panzer troops
trapped to the west were closely engaged,
and as yet Peiper had no orders which
would permit a retrograde movement.
On the American side the skirmish at
Stavelot, coupled with German counter-
attacks in the La Gleize-Stoumont sec-
tor, made for bewilderment. General
Hobbs dryly stated the prevailing
opinion on the intentions of the trapped
enemy, “They are trying to get out

364 THE ARDENNES: BATTLE OF THE BULGE
forward or backward or something.”
The main task for the 30th Division
and its reinforcing armored task forces
remained that of eradicating all German
troops north of the Amblève. The
general plan was a continuation of the
one set in operation the day before: the
119th Infantry (reinforced) , now or-
ganized under the assistant division com-
mander, General Harrison, as Task
Force Harrison, to capture Stoumont and
continue its eastward drive as far as La
Gleize; the 3d Battalion of the 117th
Infantry (reinforced) and the two 3d
Armored task forces to carry through the
concentric attack to seize La Gleize.
The latter maneuver got under way on
21 December. Task Force Lovelady,
which had cut south between Stavelot
and La Gleize on the previous day, re-
versed its course and moved north from
the Trois Ponts area with the intention
of securing the ridge which overlooked
La Gleize from the southeast. Task Force
McGeorge, stopped cold the evening be-
fore on the narrow ridge road which
angled to La Gleize from the north,
resumed the attack with K Company,
117th Infantry, trying to pry out the
German block to the front. South of the
Amblève, Task Force Lovelady was
screened by the low-hanging fog from
the strong enemy patrols working
through the area; on the north bank,
however, it ran into trouble while ad-
vancing on the sunken La Gleize road.
Two leading tanks were crippled when
they hit a patch of mines. Then German
tanks or antitank guns knocked out the
last two tanks in the column. At this
point, therefore, the road was effectively
blocked against further American or
future German counterattacks. The in-
fantry with Lovelady and a tank com-
pany spent the remainder of the day
mopping up in the small villages along
the river bank, finding evidences of re-
volting atrocities earlier perpetrated on
the defenseless Belgians by Peiper’s
troops. Attempts to mount the ridge were
checked by machine gun fire, and it be-
came evident that the enemy had a
strong force concentrated in this sector.
Task Force McGeorge and riflemen of
the 117th Infantry likewise were unable
to make much headway in extending the
northern arm of the planned envelop-
ment. The German barrier interposed
by dug-in tanks and assault guns at a
little stream about a thousand yards
north of La Gleize could not be taken by
maneuver, for McGeorge’s tanks were
unable to get off the road, or by single-
handed infantry assault. The American
column then drew back along the valley
road. About a mile east of La Gleize
the task force turned west to cross the
valley and approach the town but was
halted at a curve in the road by fire
from dug-in tanks and antitank guns.
The riflemen formed a line of skirmishers
in front of the German block and the
task force halted for the night.
The drive to pinch out the western
contents of the Peiper pocket at Stou-
mont got off to a late start on the 21st.
General Harrison’s original plan called
for a co-ordinated attack in the early
morning. The 1st Battalion, 119th In-
fantry, was to continue the drive to enter
the town from the west (after recaptur-
ing the sanatorium and the high
ground flanking the entrance). The 2d
Battalion would swing wide through the
woods north of the town, block the es-
cape route to La Gleize, and then attack
from the east. Task Force Jordan and
the reorganized 3d Battalion (which

THE GERMAN SALIENT EXPANDS TO THE WEST 365
earlier had been thrown out of Stou-
mont) would attack from the north as
soon as the sanatorium, which over-
looked the northern entrance to the
town as well as the western, was wrested
from enemy hands. The sanatorium,
then, and the rise on which it stood
held the final control of Stoumont.
Peiper did not wait for the counter-
attack which might lose him the
sanatorium. Sometime before 0500 the
lull which had succeeded the night of
fierce fighting was broken by a German
assault against the 1st Battalion posi-
tions on the roadway west of the town.
The road itself was blocked by a tank
platoon from the 740th Tank Battalion,
the infantry dug in behind. The first
tank facing the enemy fell to an anti-
tank gun; in the darkness three more
were set aflame by Panzerfausts in the
hands of the infiltrating enemy infantry.
The Germans were finally thrown back,
but they had succeeded in disorganiz-
ing the 1st Battalion to the point where
General Harrison felt that his own at-
tack would have to be postponed. The
division commander agreed to Harrison’s
proposal that the attack be launched
at 1245 instead of 0730 as planned. In
the meantime the regimental cannon
company and the 197th Field Artillery
Battalion set to work softening up the
Germans.
At the new hour the 1st and 2d Bat-
talions jumped off. The 1st Battalion
assault drove the enemy infantry out of
some of the sanatorium rooms, but when
a heavy German tank moved in on the
north side (where it was screened from
the Americans) and started blasting
through the windows the Americans
withdrew under smoke cover laid down
by friendly mortars. Although the 2d
Battalion made some progress in its ad-
vance through the woods the battalion
commander, Major McCown, was cap-
tured while making a personal recon-
naissance, and his troops fell back to
their original position. The American
tanks, unable to advance along the nar-
row sunken road under the guns of the
Panthers and Tigers, remained north of
the town.
A call from the division commander
in late afternoon for “the real picture
down there” elicited a frankly pessimis-
tic answer from General Harrison. Two
battalions, the 1st and 3d, had been cut
down and demoralized by earlier enemy
counterattacks; they were “in pretty bad
shape.” As to the armored detachment:
“The trouble is the only places where
tanks of any kind can operate are on
two sunken roads. The Germans have
big tanks, so tanks have been of no help
to us.” Further, Harrison told Hobbs,
he would advise against continuing the
attack on the morrow: “That place
[Stoumont] is very strong. I don’t think
those troops we have now, without some
improvement, can take the thing. That is
my honest opinion. They are way down
in strength. The trouble is that we can
only get light artillery fire on the town,
and the Germans can shoot at us with
tank guns and we can’t get tanks to
shoot back unless they come out and get
hit.” 15 To this forthright opinion there
was little to add. General Hobbs
cautioned Harrison to be on the lookout
for a German attempt to break out dur-
ing the night and head west, and told
him that an attempt would be made
to work out a scheme with General Ridg-
way for an attack by the 82d Airborne
15 30th Div telephone journal, 21 Dec 44.

366 THE ARDENNES: BATTLE OF THE BULGE
Division against the southern side of the
Stoumont-La Gleize pocket.
Earlier in the day Hobbs had assured
the corps commander that if the 82d
Airborne cleared out the south bank of
the Ambleve no further help would be
needed. His request that evening for an
attack by the 82d from the Trois Ponts
sector came at a time when the situation
along the entire corps front had drastically
altered and in part deteriorated. 16
To the south the XVIII Airborne Corps
was heavily engaged, the 7th Armored
Division was being pushed out of the
St. Vith salient, and even in the Trois
Ponts area there had been a sudden enemy
resurgence. Furthermore a frontal
attack from the south would be almost
suicidal so long as the Germans held the
higher ground on the north bank of the
Amblève.
Hobbs’s diagnosis of the problem as
“the physical proposition of human beings”
may have been a truism but it
was sound. On the one side a tough
force of cornered Germans weighted the
scales, fighting in desperate fashion and
given physical and moral backing by
heavily armored tanks mounting a superior
gun and able to employ hull defilade,
blocking a few well-defined and
straightened avenues of approach. On
16 The recital of the subsequent operations by
the 82d Airborne Division comes from a variety
of sources, mostly at regimental level, although
some combat interviews cover battalions and com-
panies: 325th Glider Inf AAR and Jnl; 517th Para
Inf AAR; 504th AAR and S–3 Jnl, 505th S–2 and
S–3 Per Rpts, 508th “The Belgian Campaign, Part
I, 17–31 December”; 82d Abn Div, Commander’s
Rpt, G–2 and G–3 Jnls. Published sources are
mostly of the pictorial public relations type but
some are of use, notably: W. G. Lord, Combat
Record of the 504th Parachute Infantry Regiment
(Paris, 1948); History of the 508th Parachute In-
fantry (Washington, 1945); and Saga of the All
American (Atlanta, 1946).
the other side the counterweight con-
sisted of a relatively few tanks whose
crews knew that their tanks were not
heavy enough for a headlong attack and
their guns could not match the German
tank guns in long-range dueling, and
who were working with infantry whose
strength was no longer sufficient to pry
the Panthers and Tigers out of their
lairs. Nonetheless the “human being”
could not be exactly equated at a dis-
count rate against machines. Pfc. Jack
Gebert demonstrated the point when he
advanced through machine gun fire, de-
stroyed a German tank with a bazooka
round, climbed onto a U.S. tank, and
directed its fire until shot down. He
was awarded the DSC posthumously.
The answer seemed to be air attack.
The missions set up to aid the 30th Divi-
sion had been canceled on the morning
of 20 December because of bad weather.
The First Army air officers, however, had
told Ridgway and Hobbs that there was
a fair chance of flying weather on the
morning of the 22d. Hobbs assured the
corps commander that he “could use up
to sixteen groups in one day,” that his
own air support officer would have the
targets ready. Here the matter rested-
in the lap of the weather gods.
Although there was little direct help
that the 82d Airborne Division could
give the 30th Division while the Ger-
mans still held Stoumont, it had aided
the attack north of the Ambleve on 21
December by soldering the southern link
in the bank around Kampfgruppe Peiper
and by beating off the relief detachments
of the 1st SS Panzer Division who were
trying to lever an opening in this ring.
The two companies of the 1st Bat-
talion, 504th Parachute Infantry, that
fought their way into Cheneux on the

THE GERMAN SALIENT EXPANDS TO THE WEST 367
20th, had endangered Peiper’s only re-
maining foothold on the south bank
of the Amblève. Since the companies,
B and C, had suffered very severe losses
from the waist-high fire of the German
.20-mm. self-propelled flak pieces while
making the assault across the open
ground around the village, Colonel
Tucker ordered in G Company and in
the hours after midnight effected some
reorganization. Fighting continued in-
side the village all through the night,
for the most part a hunt with knife and
grenade to destroy the crews of the anti-
aircraft half-tracks (the flak wagons)
which had punished the paratroopers so
badly. During the battle Pfc. Daniel
Del Grippo, who had been painfully
wounded, attacked and killed the crew
of a self-propelled gun. S/Sgt. William
Walsh, leading a platoon which became
pinned down by flanking fire from a
flak wagon, rushed the Germans and
destroyed them with a grenade, although
he was so badly wounded that a comrade
had to arm the grenade. Both of these
soldiers received the DSC.
When morning dawned General
Gavin turned the entire regiment over
to Tucker with orders to “wipe out”
the Germans at Cheneux. The 3d Bat-
talion (Lt. Col. Julian A. Cook) made
a wide flanking movement in a six-hour
march over rough ground and entered
the village from the north side; by late
afternoon the fight was ended. The
Americans had lost 225 dead and wound-
ed, mostly from the two assault com-
panies. Company B had 18 men left and
no officers; C Company had 38 men and
3 officers. Few Germans were captured.
The rear guard fought to the end, but
most of the garrison still living had with-
drawn during the night leaving scores of
dead behind. Booty taken here included
fourteen flak wagons and a battery of
105-mm. howitzers, as well as many ve-
hicles. Only one German tank was taken
-a clue to the ability of the few survi-
vors from the initial assault to hang on
in the village till help arrived.
Peiper’s bridgehead was gone. Lack-
ing the gasoline to make an advance out
of it on 19 December, and hoping that
some resupply would be forthcoming, he
had ordered it held as a possible future
sally port, from which to resume the
westward drive. But even as the bridge-
head was torn from the hands of his
kampfgruppe, so the German relief
forces were stopped before they could re-
open the line of communications behind
Peiper. In this feat also the 82d Air-
borne had a share on 21 December by
defending the Salm River line.

CHAPTER XVI
One Threat Subsides; Another Emerges
The Attempt To Relieve Peiper’s
Kampfgruppe
The quick and cheaply won victories
which had taken Peiper’s armored
kampfgruppe so close to the Meuse
bridges in so short a time may have
blinded the higher German staffs for
a while to the fact that Peiper was in
danger. By the 21st, however, the most
strenuous efforts were being made to
save the ground he had won north of
the Amblève and to rescue the men
and materiel in his command. What
happened to leave the kampfgruppe
stranded and alone?
The 1st SS Panzer Division had begun
its drive west in four march groups mov-
ing independently. The bulk of the 1st
Panzer Regiment, a motorized battalion
of armored infantry, a mobile company
of engineers, and a battery of self-pro-
pelled artillery (as well as most of the
gasoline available) had gone to Peiper
with the expectation that the armored
weight and the mobile character of this
spearhead detachment would permit a
quick breakthrough and exploitation
even to the Meuse River. The balance
of the division was to follow hard on
Peiper’s heels, provide reinforcement as
required, and keep the line of com-
munications open until such time as
following divisions could take over and
be prepared to re-form as a unit at the
Meuse. By noon of 17 December Peiper’s
kampfgruppe was out of touch with the
second and third march columns of the
division and was racing alone toward
the west. The strongest of the rearward
columns, the fourth, which amounted
to a reinforced armored infantry regi-
ment, had been held up by mines at the
entrance to its designated route and in
fact never made a start until 18 De-
cember. The student of first causes may
wish to speculate on the fateful role of
the unknown cavalry, engineers, and
foot soldiers who laid the mines between
Lanzerath and Manderfeld, thus delay-
ing most of the 1st SS Panzer Division
armored infantry for a critical twenty-
four hours.
By 19 December, it will be recalled,
Peiper was over the Hohes Venn high-
lands, had crossed to the north bank
of the Ambléve River, and had secured
the Stoumont-La Gleize area. At the
same time he had almost completely
drained his fuel tanks. On that same day
radio communication of a sort had been
re-established between Peiper and the
1st SS Panzer Division headquarters,
so that his plight was known. The sec-
ond march group, the mobile recon-
naissance battalion, had come up and
engaged the Americans at Stavelot, get-
ting through some reinforcement to
Peiper but failing in the larger task of
keeping the door open behind Peiper.
Meanwhile the third march group was
moving slowly toward Stavelot while the

ONE THREAT SUBSIDES; ANOTHER EMERGES 369
fourth, following the southern route
through Recht, had become involved
at roadblocks on the north flank of the
7th Armored Division salient.
The hardening American resistance
ahead of Peiper and on his exposed north
flank, plus reports that his fuel supply
was low, prompted the Sixth Panzer
Army commander and staff to undertake
new plans and orders calculated to get
the kampfgruppe rolling once again.
The army chief of staff was particularly
concerned lest Peiper be forced to face
north so as to protect his endangered
flank and line of communications–as in
fact happened. The nearest intact for-
mation was the 3d Parachute Division.
But if this division were taken out
of its blocking position south of Waimes
the road would be open for American
reinforcements from the north to reach
St. Vith. The 12th SS Panzer Division,
originally scheduled to be the 1st SS
Panzer Division’s running mate on the
north, had been taken out of the fight
at Krinkelt-Rocherath but was engaged
in refitting and a very roundabout move
to get back onto the road west. There
was no chance now that the 12th SS
could reach the Malmedy sector as
planned and so cover Peiper’s flank.
Peculiarly enough (and a commentary
on the state of communications), both
Peiper and the commander of the 3d
Purachute Division thought that the
12th SS Panzer Division actually was in
the vicinity of Malmédy, there covering
the north flank. The II SS Panzer Corps,
whose two armored divisions were sup-
posed to form a second wave behind the
I SS Panzer Corps, was still in the army
rear and could not reach the Stoumont-
La Gleize sector for three or four days,
even if committed at once.
The glaring fact was that the Sixth
Panzer Army had failed to crack a gap
in the American front wide enough for
the passage west of the two armored
divisions supposedly leading the I SS
Panzer Corps or for the quick forward
movement of the infantry divisions that
were earmarked for the northern block
protecting the line of communications
to the west. The best the Sixth Panzer
Army could do on the 19th and 20th
was to order supply troops and a small
reconnaissance detachment of the 12th
SS Panzer Division to guard the north
flank between the 3d Parachute Division
positions and Peiper, tell General Priess
(the I SS Panzer Corps commander) to
collect the 1st SS Panzer Division (-)
for an attack to relieve Peiper, and ur-
gently request the Luftwaffe to drop
gasoline and ammunition for the isolated
kampfgruppe. (One air resupply mis-
sion was flown on the night of 21 De-
cember. But it was difficult to hit the
constricted zone in darkness, and the
kampfgruppe got only enough gasoline
to keep its radios going and to move
a few of its tanks to more favorable
firing positions. Thereafter the Luft-
waffe refused all Sixth Army requests
for such missions.)
On the morning of 21 December SS-
Oberfuehrer Mohnke, the 1st SS Pan-
zer Division commander, had collected
most of his third and fourth march
groups in the area south of Stavelot and
east of Trois Ponts. To reach Peiper it
would be necessary to get onto the north
bank of the Amblève and strike north-
west or to cross the Salm and then turn
north. What Mohnke’s intentions actu-
ally were is hard to tell. Apparently he
sent part of his infantry to ford the Am-
blève between Trois Ponts and Stavelot

370 THE ARDENNES: BATTLE OF THE BULGE
about the same time that Task Force
Lovelady crossed to the north bank. The
two forces probably missed each other
in the morning fog, but it seems certain
that the sizable German detachment en-
countered by Colonel Lovelady when
he attempted to push away from the
north bank and up the ridge was that
sent by Mohnke. Meanwhile, when the
Germans tried to cross heavy assault
guns on the temporary bridge above
Trois Ponts the frail structure collapsed
out of hand. Attempts to put in bridges
at other points were all frustrated by
artillery fire.
Mohnke made his main effort with a
westward thrust at the Salm River line,
first in the direction of Trois Ponts,
then as a groping attempt to find some
weak spot farther south. His force
would collide with the 505th Parachute
Infantry, now spread along an 8,000-
yard front reaching from Trois Ponts
south to Grand Halleux. The initial Ger-
man attack was thrown against E Com-
pany of the 505th Parachute Infantry,
which had organized a small bridgehead
on the cliff across the river east of Trois
Ponts the day before. Fleeing civilians
halted by patrols on the morning of the
21st bore word of German tanks and
infantry assembling in Wanne. Shortly
before noon a company led by self-pro-
pelled guns appeared through the fog
along a road running past the rise held
by the paratroopers. An 8-man ba-
zooka section knocked out the assault
guns, but its members were captured or
killed. The howitzers of the 456th Para-
chute Field Artillery Battalion west of
the river went to work and for a time
disorganized the enemy. Tanks were
seen moving about and more German
infantry were heard gathering. in the
woods and draws.
The commander of the 2d Battalion,
505th Parachute Infantry (Lt. Col. Ben-
jamin H. Vandervoort) tried unsuccess-
fully to reach his regimental command-
er by radio. In the absence of specific
instructions as to the bridgehead, he
then dispatched Company F to climb
the cliff across the river. Company F
moved into the woods on the right of
Company E, while a jeep towed a single
57-mm. antitank gun across stringers laid
atop the broken bridge structure. This
gun, manned by Lt. Jake Wurtich,
fought an unequal duel with the panzers
-its shells bouncing off the German
armor–until it was knocked out and
Wurtich killed. The tanks, however,
could not maneuver on the soggy, snow-
covered ground and the fight broke into
a series of hand-to-hand engagements
swirling around little knots of infantry-
men.
The American rifle line was steadily
decreasing in strength, denuded by
casualties and carrying parties laborious-
ly moving the wounded down and am-
munition up the cliff. Vandervoort put
one more platoon across the river. By
this time the assistant division com-
mander and the regimental commander
both had reached Trois Ponts and it was
agreed that Ekman could withdraw his
troops from the minuscule bridgehead.
Having a third of his regiment commit-
ted at this single point on his extend-
ed and exposed front, Colonel Ekman
decided to chance a daylight withdrawal.
Some troops came back over the bridge
but many, hard pressed, leaped off the
cliff into the river. A number of the
enemy, in close pursuit, crossed behind
the Americans by fording or swinging
along the broken bridges. Before the 2d

ONE THREAT SUBSIDES; ANOTHER EMERGES 371
Battalion could reorganize on the west
bank, at least two German platoons had
crossed the river. They were immedi-
ately knocked back, however.
To the south of Trois Ponts the 3d
Battalion of the 505th had been de-
ployed on a wide front which was ex-
tended still more as its neighboring bat-
talion concentrated at Trois Ponts. Near
the three or four houses of the hamlet of
La Neuville a bridge still spanned the
Salm, covered by a platoon roadblock
on the east bank. At dark a German
column of tanks (or assault guns) and
infantry approached the bridge. The
platoon called for artillery, engaged in
a short exchange of fire, withdrew, and
blew the bridge. Four large enemy fight-
ing vehicles remained at the bridge site
when the rest of the thwarted column
turned away. They were too close for
shellfire; so a four-man patrol armed
with Gammon grenades crossed in the
dark to deal with them, but as the patrol
reached the east bank the tanks turned
and lumbered off. During the evening
enemy foot soldiers also tried to sneak
across the wreckage of the railroad
bridge south of Trois Ponts, an attack
quickly ended when shellfire caught
them right at the river.
Although most of the night of 21 De-
cember passed quietly it was a time of
strain because the 505th line at Trois
Ponts was thin, the enemy was known
to be strong, and the river was fordable.
The 82d Airborne Division as a whole
was too widely dispersed to permit im-
mediate and large-scale help in the Trois
Ponts sector. General Gavin, who had
been in and out of the regimental com-
mand post all day long, could give Colo-
nel Ekman only one rifle company and
a battery of groundmount .50-caliber
machine guns for help on the morrow.
When 22 December dawned the
XVIII Airborne Corps still was engaged
in maneuvering to create a solid barrier
along its 45-mile front against the Ger-
mans heading for the Meuse. Things
were not going too well. The St. Vith
salient had been dealt heavy blows and
the lines there were crumbling. The
enemy had pushed as far along the
Ourthe River valley as Hotton and
was gathering to the west of that river.
General Hobbs, whose 30th Division was
holding the corps north flank, felt that
his sector now was secure although he
knew that enemy reinforcements had
crossed the Ambléve. But he was con-
cerned lest the Germans bring off a
successful eccentric attack north of Trois
Ponts which would separate the 30th
Division from the 82d Airborne. This
he told General Ridgway in a telephone
conversation on the morning of the 22d,
but Ridgway gave him Gavin’s assurance
that the paratroopers would hold, that
nothing would get through to the west.
To the corps commander the priority
project in this sector remained that of
eliminating the La Gleize-Stoumont
pocket as rapidly and as thoroughly as
possible, freeing the 30th Division and
its attached armor for urgent work else-
where.
After a quiet night in most of the
30th Division lines the day came with
intense cold, falling snow, and heavy
overcast. Veteran troops by this time had
learned that beautifully clear weather
at the foxhole line often meant bad
flying weather back at the air bases:
but they knew too that close tactical
support necessitated a decent modicum
of clear weather. At 0806 the 30th Divi-
sion air officer learned that his targets

372 THE ARDENNES: BATTLE OF THE BULGE
had been approved and that a fighter-
bomber group would be on hand
“weather permitting.” At almost the
same moment General Hobbs got the
word that he could expect no help from
the air. The resumption of the attack to
deflate the pocket would depend on
ground troops and guns, most of all
guns. The artillery, however, was finding
it difficult to get into good firing posi-
tions, and the American troops were so
near the target towns as to require the
nicest type of precision ranging. Pros-
pects for the attackers seemed as dis-
couraging as the weather.
The plan of 22 December included
the continuation of the drive to take
La Gleize and Stoumont plus an attack
to mop up the 1st SS Panzer Division
relief detachment which had dug in
north of the Ambléve between Stavelot
and Ster. This latter group was estab-
lished on the nose of a ridge, from which
its fire swept north, west, and south, and
in surrounding woods. Two rifle com-
panies of the 3d Battalion, 117th In-
fantry, working from the north, and the
rifle company of the 120th Infantry
attached to Task Force Lovelady,
attacking from the west, found every
move checked by mortars, Werfers, and
bullet fire. Finally a rifle company was
sent from Stavelot to hit the Germans
in the rear. Thereafter the Americans
were able to converge on the ridge, but
as day ended pockets of the enemy still
remained in the woods. During the day
other enemy troops had crossed the
Ambléve and for a time isolated one of
Lovelady’s roadblocks north of Trois
Ponts. 1 But at no time on the 22d did
1During the confused ebb and flow of battle on
22 December, Sgt. John Bueno and Cpl. Adam F.
Burko of the division engineer battalion (105th
organized units of the relieving force
of the 1st SS Panzer Division succeed in
breaking through to Peiper in La Gleize.
At the west end of the Peiper pocket
the night of 21 December had witnessed
the final reduction of the sanatorium,
opening the way for a direct attack on
Stoumont by Task Force Harrison. Early
that evening an officer of the 740th Tank
Battalion had crawled into the enemy
lines, scouting for a way to bring tanks
around to the northwest of the build-
ing. Returning to his own lines he called
for volunteers to build a ramp over
the fill, or embankment, which had
barred direct assault earlier in the
fight. The ramp, constructed from shell
castings, worked, and by midnight four
Shermans were firing into the sanatori-
um. Shortly thereafter the Germans left
the place. When the Americans entered
the basement, they found that none of
the civilian inhabitants had been killed
or injured.
General Harrison felt that it would
be possible to bring in his attached
armor and the 3d Battalion, 119th In-
fantry, from the north, now that the
enemy flanking position on the high
ground was gone. He set up this attack
to precede the final assault from the west.
Patrols, groping their way through the
morning snowstorm, found Stoumont
strangely quiet, but Harrison was well
aware that the 119th had been seriously
weakened and went ahead with plans
for pounding the town with artillery
Engineer Combat Battalion) took part in a fierce
and successful attempt to recapture an American
aid station and evacuate the wounded. After the
platoon leader was killed, these two men inspired
their comrades, led in the fight, and were largely
responsible for the rescue of the wounded. Both
were awarded the DSC.

ONE THREAT SUBSIDES; ANOTHER EMERGES 373
preparatory to the all-out infantry-armor
push he had ordered for 1300. At noon
the storm was beginning to break and
visibility promised to improve, a neces-
sity if the artillery was to give support
by fire so close to the American lines.
At 1320 the guns opened the fifteen-
minute drum fire intended to pave the
way for the northern assault. Almost at
once shells began to explode in the
American assembly areas, and there
was nothing to do but call off the bar-
rage. The 3d Battalion and the tanks
nevertheless started forward. By 1410
they were at the edge of Stoumont, and
the 1st Battalion had started in from the
west.
No German fire was received-the oc-
cupants of Stoumont were wounded Ger-
mans and Americans left in the houses.
Peiper had withdrawn his last forces in
Stoumont during the night and early
morning with the intention of fighting a
last-ditch action at La Gleize where the
ground permitted an easier all-round
defense. La Gleize, be it added, lay closer
to the area where the remainder of the
1st SS Panzer Division had assembled.
But it seems likely, as Peiper himself
later said, that Peiper’s decision to aban-
don the western town had been prompt-
ed to great degree by the threat, posed
by the 2d Battalion, 119th Infantry, on
21 December, to the line of communica-
tions linking Stoumont and La Gleize.
Despite General Hobbs’s insistence that
Task Force Harrison push on promptly
to La Gleize the advance was halted just
east of the recaptured town. It was now
late in the day, and patrols had dis-
covered German tanks operating as rear
guard on the road to La Gleize.
Elsewhere on the northern edge of the
Peiper pocket the status quo had ob-
tained through most of the day. A little
after noon Task Force McGeorge,
blocked on the valley road east of La
Gleize, saw a column of German tanks
and infantry move out to the north
along the ridge road on the opposite side
of the valley, the same route McGeorge’s
column had been forced to abandon the
day before. This reconnaissance, for it
seems to have been no more, was driven
off by a few artillery concentrations.
Later in the day Task Force McGeorge
made a pass at the block barring the
river road in the bend but lost its two
lead tanks. Colonel Johnson of the 117th
Infantry, commanding in this sector, ad-
vised General Hobbs that tanks could
not get past the bend and into La Gleize,
that foot soldiers would have to do the
job.
To the south along the Salm River
line the 1st SS Panzer Division made
a number of attempts on 22 December
to seize a bridge, build a bridge, or in
some manner gain a crossing. The 505th
Parachute Infantry had little trouble in
wiping out the few small detachments
that actually made it across, but with so
much enemy activity apparent on the
east bank the 505th anticipated momen-
tarily the launching of a full-scale as-
sault. Mohnke, it appears, was trying
to do too much with too little and so
dissipated his limited strength that a
forthright blow was not struck at any
one point during the 22d. The strongest
effort came late in the evening when two
of his companies tried to seize the bridge
at Grand Halleux; this bridge was blown
when the leading Germans actually were
on the span. On the whole the day had
gone as badly for the 1st SS Panzer
Division as for Peiper. It is true that
few of the American riflemen had had

374 THE ARDENNES: BATTLE OF THE BULGE
German infantry in their sights, but the
artillery supporting the 30th Division
and 505th by interdiction fire had taken
heavy toll in the enemy assembly areas
and on the roads, as later attested by
the Germans themselves.
Priess, the I SS Panzer Corps com-
mander, had reasoned with the Sixth
Panzer Army staff that Peiper should be
given a chance to break out to the east
while his force still was reasonably in-
tact. The higher German commands,
all the way up to OKW, remained con-
vinced on 22 December that despite the
growing strength of the Americans on
the north flank the build-up there
would not reach dangerous proportions
before their own armored columns had
reached and crossed the Meuse. Peiper,
therefore, had to hold until such time
as reinforcement and resupply could
once again set his kampfgruppe on the
way west.
During the night of 22 December
twenty Luftwaffe planes carrying gaso-
line and ammunition flew to the trapped
force. Probably the pilots had been
briefed on the assumption that Peiper
still held Stoumont, for many of the
gasoline containers parachuted into
American hands there. Peiper certainly
was helped little by this minor and mis-
taken effort. On this occasion, as it
turned out, the American air-warning
net worked a bit too well. Both the 30th
Division and the 82d Airborne were
placed on alert against an airborne at-
tack (although General Hobbs avowed
that such an attack made little sense in
this heavily forested and broken coun-
try). The numerous antiaircraft artil-
lery batteries backing up the divi-
sions stood to their guns all night long,
and the infantry were given little sleep
as rumors ran wild of parachutists
sighted hither and yon.
Interrogation of prisoners and artil-
lery observer reports had indicated that
the Germans were moving troops into
the sector south of Malmédy reviving
the earlier American concern that a
hard blow might be dealt there at the
30th Division. As a result General Hobbs
was able to hold onto all the reinforce-
ments which had accumulated to the
30th, as well as CCB, 3d Armored Divi-
sion. The Malmédy threat seems to have
been raised by a few troops of the 3d
Parachute Division, who had moved west
of Waimes, and by rumors rife in the
German camp that the 12th SS Panzer
Division (held up by the Sixth Army
attempt to seize the Elsenborn ridge)
was moving in to support the 1st SS
Panzer Division. Actually the 23d passed
quietly in the Malmédy-Stavelot sector.
Opposite the 505th Parachute Infantry
the enemy contented himself with spo-
radic firing across the river. Mohnke, it
would appear, lacked the strength
needed for resumption of the attack to
free Peiper. At least his corps com-
mander, Priess, asked the II SS Panzer
Corps to deflect the 9th SS Panzer Divi-
sion, coming forward on the left, and
throw it in at Stavelot. This request was
denied.
Major action on 23 December did
flare up at La Gleize and along the north
bank of the Amblève, where a part of
the 1st SS Panzer Division relief force
still maintained a foothold. In the latter
sector six American rifle companies were
assembled to clear out the woods and
restore the cut made by the enemy on
the road between Trois Ponts and Stave-
lot. Regrouping in the heavy woods took
nearly all day and was marked by some

ONE THREAT SUBSIDES; ANOTHER EMERGES 375
sharp clashes. At Petit Coo, close by
Stavelot, S/Sgt. Paul Bolden and T/Sgt.
Russell N. Snoad decided to attack a
house from which the Germans were
firing. While his companion fired to
cover him, Bolden rushed the door,
tossed in a pair of hand grenades, then
went in firing his Tommy gun. Bolden
killed twenty of the enemy, then with-
drew. A blast of fire killed Bolden’s com-
rade and wounded the sergeant, but he
dashed back into the house, killing fif-
teen more of the enemy. (Bolden later
received the Medal of Honor and Snoad
was awarded the DSC posthumously.)
As for La Gleize the story once again
was one of frustration and failure. Most
of Peiper’s troops were driven to the
cellars of the town by the incessant shell-
fire, increasing in the afternoon as the
American attack brought forward ob-
servers closer to the target, and made
even more effective by the new POZIT
fuze which the 113th Field Artillery
was using. But wherever and whenever
the attacking tanks and infantry tried
to move along the roads and trails wind-
ing up the ridge nose to La Gleize,
they encountered mine plots swept by
direct fire from deeply dug in tanks and
antitank guns. Progress then was slow;
the leading American tank would be
knocked out or burned by a direct hit
with armor-piercing ammunition, even-
tually the infantry would work around
and destroy or neutralize the German
105-MM. HOWITZERS M7 OF THE 30TH DIVISION IN ACTION near La Gleize.

376 THE ARDENNES: BATTLE OF THE BULGE
weapon, the engineers would remove
the mine field, and the advance would
continue.
Harrison decided that a flanking move
through the woods to the north might
work and in the afternoon elements of
the American rifle companies reached
the edge of La Gleize, only to come
under machine gun and 20-mm. fire
from streets and houses. General Har-
rison's main worry was the heavy
German tanks gathered in the center of
the town. Would they break out in a
desperate counterattack against the
lighter and more vulnerable Shermans?
Would they slip through the net and
bludgeon their way to the Amblève? To
deal with the tanks, Allied planes
were promised for a strike at the town
square. They came as promised but hit
Malmédy instead of La Gleize, their
bombs burying a number of civilians
in one of the hotel buildings before the
strike could be called off.
Peiper had yet to be driven out of
La Gleize; the 1st SS Panzer Division
bridgehead force north of the Ambléve
(which had cut off a part of Task Force
Lovelady) still had to be liquidated.
But this fight in the bend of the Ambléve
had become anticlimactic, dwarfed by
far more important operations elsewhere
on the northern shoulder of the Arden-
nes salient. Through the early evening of
the 23d the telephone wires connecting
the headquarters of the First Army, the
XVIII Airborne Corps, and the 30th
Division were busy: the First Army in-
sisting that Hobbs must release CCB,
3d Armored, for immediate return to
its hard-pressed division; the 30th Divi-
sion commander protesting that the loss
of the combat command would leave
La Gleize open on two sides and make
it impossible to mop up the bridgehead
force; General Ridgway for his part.
essaying on the scene the role of the
honest broker. The final decision was
favorable to Hobbs: General Boudinot,
the CCB commander, would start his
trains moving but at least two-thirds of
the command would be left for the final
tough fight envisaged for the coming
morning.
The net had been drawn tight around
Peiper, as tight as it could be drawn in
this complex of woods and hills. But
on the morning of the 24th most of
the quarry had flown. Late the previous
afternoon Mohnke had radioed Peiper
permission to break out. Peiper knew
that he could not take his vehicles or
his wounded, that the escape would
have to be made at night and on foot.
Leaving a rear guard to demolish the
tanks, trucks, and guns, Peiper and some
eight hundred of his command started
at 0100 in single file through the woods
fringing La Gleize on the south, crossed
the river, and as day broke took cover
among the densely wooded hills north of
Trois Ponts. On the night of the 24th
Peiper's force crossed the Salm, briefly
engaging troops of the 82d Airborne
Division in a brisk exchange of fire,
and on Christmas morning rejoined the
1st SS Panzer Division south of Stavelot.
The 30th Division commander, under
pressure from corps and army to finish
the job at La Gleize and release Boudi-
not's armor, had made no promises that
La Gleize would fall on the 24th but
had urged his unit commanders to get
the attack rolling early and finish off
the defenders. To tired troops who had
expected a desperate last stand it must
have been gratifying to find the town
open for the taking. They liberated

ONE THREAT SUBSIDES: ANOTHER EMERGES
about 170 Americans, most of whom had
been captured at Stoumont on 19 De-
cember. The prisoners they took, nearly
all wounded, numbered 300. Twenty-
eight tanks, 70 half-tracks, and 25 artil-
lery pieces were found in the town. This
booty, plus the German tanks and guns
destroyed earlier in the operation, ac-
counted for nearly the entire heavy
equipment of the 1st SS Panzer Regi-
ment. Although those of Peiper’s troops
who had escaped were back in the line
with the reconstituted 1st SS Panzer
Division, that elite unit could no longer
be considered an armored division.
In an epilogue to the taking of La
Gleize, foot troops of the 117th and
120th Infantry Regiments began the
slow work of beating the woods in the
triangle formed by the Salm and the
Amblève where a part of the 1st SS
Panzer Division relief force continued
to hold out. In the woods north of La
Gleize some fifty Germans who apparent-
ly had not received the orders to with-
draw tried to fight it out. All were killed.
What German strength had seeped into
this appendix at the rivers no one knew.
Rumors of twenty-five enemy tanks hid-
ing in the road cuts north of Trois Ponts
had the result of delaying the relief of
CCB of the 3d Armored Division. That
some armored vehicles had crossed to
the north bank of the Amblève by im-
provised bridging seems certain, but
most succeeded in escaping to the south,
By the 26th the last Germans had been
captured, killed, or driven off from the
north bank of the Amblève. The satis-
faction which the 30th Division could
take in giving the quietus to Kumpf-
gruppe Peiper was alloyed by untoward
events at Malmédy on the 24th and 25th.
On these days American planes bombed
377
the 120th Infantry (at least thirty-seven
Americans lost their lives on the first
day), killed a considerable number of
civilians, and set the town afire. A mass
flight started by the population was
halted only with great difficulty. 2
The 3d Armored Division Is
Checked, 21–23 December
Still minus two of its combat com-
mands the 3d Armored Division was pre-
pared, on the morning of 21 December,
to retake Samrée, the communications
and supply center on the middle route
of the 3d Armored (-) advance which
had been seized by the enemy the pre-
vious afternoon. (Map VII) With this
intent General Rose sent a part of his
very small reserve to reinforce the center
task force (now Task Force Orr) north
of the village of Dochamps. During the
previous night Rose had asked General
Ridgeway for respite from his main mis-
sion, that is, the advance to the Liège-
Bastogne highway and an attempt to
re-establish contact with the VIII Corps,
until the situation at Samrée could be
cleared up. At 0815, however, Rose as-
sured Ridgway that the 3d Armored was
moving once again to accomplish its
major mission. Less than a half-hour later
German tanks were discovered moving
toward Hotton, where the rear command
2 The unfortunate and costly bombing raids on
Malmédy were the result of tragic errors. This was
acknowledged by the IX Bombardment Division,
but the Ninth Air Force and General Carl Spaatz
at first refused to do so and referred to the “al-
leged” errors at Malmédy, a view corrected in
Craven and Cate (eds.) , Europe: ARGUMENT to
V–E Day, p. 670. Royce L. Thompson has a quite
complete study of these air strikes in his unpub-
lished manuscript entitled Malmédy, Belgium, Mis-
taken Bombing, 23 and 25 December 1944 (1952),
in OCMH files. Thompson’s work is based on
official Air Force records.

378 THE ARDENNES: BATTLE OF THE BULGE
post and installations of the 3d Armored
Division were located. The immediate
result of this threat was to nullify the
reinforcement readied for dispatch from
Soy, where the combat reserve held by
Colonel Howze was located, to the
Samrée sector.
General Krueger, the LVIII Panzer
Corps commander, had reason to con-
gratulate himself at the close of the
40th for the decision to back away from
the Ourthe River line northwest of Bas-
togne. In turning north his corps had
crossed the east-west segment of that
river without trouble, had discovered
large stocks of gasoline at Samrée,
and had met so little opposition as to
indicate a general retrograde move on
the part of the Americans. Krueger de-
termined to strike while the iron was
hot, drive northwest at top speed to
the bridgehead town of Hotton, recross
the Ourthe River at that point, and con-
centrate his corps on the far bank be-
fore the Americans could establish a
blocking line. Thus far Krueger’s ad-
vance guard had fought only outpost or
patrol actions with the 3d Armored
Division and there was little reason, as
Krueger saw it, to anticipate much re-
sistance during the next twenty-four
hours. He did know, from radio mes-
sages intercepted by OB WEST, that
one combat command of the 3d Armored
Division had moved into the Wer-
bomont area on 19 December.
After the seizure of Samrée, Krueger
dispatched an armored task force
(Kampfgruppe Buyer) from the 116th
Panzer Division to gain control of the
road between Soy and Hotton prelimi-
nary to seizure of the latter bridgehead
town. During the night of 20 Decem-
ber this task force marched northwest
along a secondary route parallel to
and between the roads on which Task
Force Hogan and Task Force Orr had
made their advance during the day.
Just at daybreak members of an Amer-
ican patrol operating out of the Com-
bat Command Reserve headquarters
at So): were fired upon. They reported
that they “thought” they had heard
German voices. This was the first
evidence that the enemy had pene-
trated to the 3d Armored rear. The
next message from Soy to reach the
division command post at Erezée came
at 0850: “many enemy tanks” had de-
bouched astride the Soy-Hotton road
and were heading west toward Hotton.
Actually the attack at Hotton had al-
ready begun.
The town of Hotton (about ten miles
northwest of La Roche), is built astride
the main channel of the Ourthe at
a point where the valley widens. Here
a series of roads converge to cross the
river and proceed on the west bank
to the more important junction center
at Marche from which roads radiate
in all directions. In the center of Hot-
ton the river was spanned at this time
by a class 70 two-way wooden bridge.
In the buildings east of the river were
installed about two hundred men from
the service detachments of the division
and CCR headquarters. There were, in
addition, one light and one medium
tank. On the west bank at the bridge
exit a platoon of the 51st Engineer
Battalion (Capt. Preston C. Hodges)
was deployed, reinforced by two 40-mm.
antitank guns, a 37-mm. antitank gun,
and a Sherman tank. A squad of engi-
neers guarded a footbridge at Hamp-
teau, two thousand yards south of the
town.

ONE THREAT SUBSIDES: ANOTHER EMERGES 379
At dawn mortar and small arms fire
suddenly gave notice of the enemy. De-
spite casualties and confusion a defense
was hastily set up by the executive
officer of the 23d Armored Engineer
Battalion (Maj. Jack W. Fickessen) , en-
gineer trucks were driven out to block
the roads, and bazookas and machine
guns were distributed for a close-in de-
fense of the town. Taking advantage of
the woods that came right up to the
eastern edge of Hotton, four or five en-
emy tanks rumbled forward to lead the
assault. The two American tanks east of
the river were knocked out at once; but
on the opposite bank a 90-mm. tank
destroyer “appeared from nowhere,” got
a direct hit on a Panther and perhaps
a second German as well. The enemy
infantry were able to take about half
the buildings on the near bank but were
checked short of the bridge by the rifles,
bazookas, and machine guns in the
hands of men on both banks of the riv-
er. (A “hailstorm of fire,” say the Ger-
mans.) The engineer squad guarding
the footbridge south of Hotton was over-
run, apparently by Germans wearing
American uniforms, but fortunately this
bridge could bear no vehicles.
By the middle of the morning the de-
fenders, now recovered from their in-
itial surprise, were holding their own
and the vehicles in the town were evac-
uated to the north along with most of
the medical personnel and ambulances.
Two or three more German tanks were
destroyed by bazookas (one was even
chalked up to the account of the 37-
mm. antitank gun). For some reason
the enemy had not thrown all of his
tanks into the battle at once, a fortu-
nate circumstance. By 1400 the tanks
still in town joined those on the hill
east of Hotton against the counterat-
tack which Colonel Howze had launched
along the Soy road. About this time
Howze was able to get a small group
of tanks and infantry around to the
north of the attackers and into Hotton,
redressing the balance somewhat. As yet
it was impossible to bring any friendly
artillery to bear, and the foot troops
continued to rely largely on their own
weapons for the rest of the day.
General Rose, as already indicated,
had at his immediate disposal a very
limited reserve. Although he had or-
dered Howze to counterattack with the
entire force of the Combat Command
Reserve it became apparent as day
wore on that this would be insufficient.
The ground over which the counterat-
tack from Soy had to move gave every
advantage to the Germans. Maneuver
was restricted by the cuts through
which ran the Hotton road, by a stream
bordering the road on the south, and
by the German position atop the nose
of the hill between the two towns which
gave observation and fire over the bar-
ren ground to the north. Since Gener-
al Rose had been promised the use of
a battalion from the 5 17th Parachute
Infantry, he decided to hold up the drive
from Soy until it arrived. Also it ap-
peared that the defenders of Hotton
would shortly be reinforced by part of
the leading RCT of the 84th Infantry
Division, moving via Marche under
orders from Ridgway to secure the
Ourthe River line south of Hotton.
This help was slow in coming. As
early as 0900 the 51st Engineer Battal-
ion commander had asked the 84th to
send aid to Hotton but the staff of the
latter seem to have taken rather skeptical-
ly reports of the enemy strength in-

380 THE ARDENNES: BATTLE OF THE BULGE
volved. Two platoons finally arrived in
Hotton late in the afternoon but by this
time the German infantry were leaving
the town and loading into their half-
tracks as if the fight were over. Through
the night American mortars in Hotton
laid down a defensive barrage of illumi-
nating shell and high explosives, but the
enemy made no move to return to the
assault.
The commander of the 116th Panzer
Division, as well as General Manteuf-
fel, would later pay tribute to “the brav-
ery of the American engineers” at
Hotton. They had reason for this ac-
knowledgment (in which they could
have included signal and service troops,
unknown gun and tank crews) because
the failure to secure the Hotton bridge
was decisive in the future history of the
LVIII Panzer Corps. Credit must al-
so go to the Combat Command Reserve
at Soy whose fire, as the enemy acknowl-
edged, caught Kampfgruppe Buyer in
the flank and checkmated its single-
minded employment against Hotton.
Finally, a share in the successful defense
of the Hotton bridge should be assigned
those elements of the three 3d Armored
task forces which, on the 21st, had en-
gaged the bulk of the 116th Panzer Divi-
sion and 560th Volks Grenadier Divi-
sion and prevented a wholesale advance
into the Hotton sector.
Krueger’s original intention had been
to risk a. thrust for the Hotton bridge
without regard to flank security. The
armored task force moving on Hotton
accordingly contained most of the for-
ward combat elements of the 116th Pan-
zer Regiment and 60th Panzer Grena-
dier Regiment. But the presence of
American armor and infantry in the
area between Soy and Dochamps, as this
became apparent during the morning
of 21 December, forced Krueger to face
much of the strength of the two regi-
ments to the east and northeast so as
to form a protected corridor for the
drive into Hotton.
Through this corridor the 156th Pan-
zer Grenadier Regiment, which had
been in reserve south of Samrée, moved
late in the afternoon to an assembly area
around Beffe. At the base of the corri-
dor, that is, around Dochamps, the
1128th Regiment of the 560th Volks
Grenadier Division made an attack to
widen the path northwest to the Ourthe
crossing. Early in the day the grenadiers
collided with Task Force Orr while the
latter was trying to eradicate the road-
block which barred the road up to
Dochamps and Samrée. In a sharp action
at a hairpin turn in the road at the base
of the Dochamps hill the German in-
fantry infiltrated close enough to ba-
zooka three tanks but themselves took a
beating from the American artillery.
Twice during the day Orr had to order
a withdrawal, the last bringing the task
force to Amonines, three miles south-
east of Soy. Here on a slight rise over-
looking the Aisne valley road Orr’s
column formed a perimeter defense for
the night.
Task Force Hogan, checked the pre-
vious day in the winding Ourthe val-
ley southeast of La Roche, came under
attack early on the 21st by small enemy
groups striking out from the roadblock.
The LVIII Panzer Corps commander
had no intention of taking La Roche
unless it could be occupied without a
fight and had committed only a frac-
tion of the 60th Panzer Grenadier Regi-
ment to throw out a screen here. Later
in the day part of the Reconnaissance

ONE THREAT SUBSIDES: ANOTHER EMERGES 381
Battalion, 116th Panzer Division, arrived
from Houffalize and started running
combat patrols through the woods in
front of La Roche. Hogan, under orders
to hold up his own advance until Orr
could take Samrée, finally received a
change in orders about 1300 which
directed his task force to fall back on
Amonines. It was crystal clear by this
hour that there could be no advance to
Samrée. Hogan’s column moved north,
skirmishing with small German forces
along the way, but at twilight ran into
machine gun fire and lost its lead tank
to a German bazooka just at the edge of
the hamlet of Beffe. Without realizing
the fact, the Americans had hit the as-
sembly area of the 156th Panzer Grena-
dier Regiment. There was nothing for
it at this time of day but to pull away.
Task Force Hogan retired to the south
and bivouacked on a hill near Marcou-
ray. Although their plight was not im-
mediately apparent, Hogan and his 400
men had been cut off from the rest of
the 3d Armored Division.
The eastern column, Task Force
Kane, alone of the 3d Armored forces
passed the morning of the 21st without
enemy contact. As planned, Kane sent
a detachment south to the important
crossroads at Baraque de Fraiture, on
the Vielsalm-Samrée route, to reinforce
the mixed group of Americans already
there and to take part in the final attack
on Samrée. This detachment reached the
crossroads in the middle of the afternoon
and there met the 7th Armored Division
cavalry which had come in from Viel-
salm the previous evening. Caught up
in the fight already started at the cross-
roads, the tanks and armored cars were
unable to proceed to Samrée. The re-
maining troops of Task Force Kane re-
ceived orders during the afternoon to
move on Dochamps as part of a pro-
jected concentric maneuver to retake
Samrée and did advance about a mile
south of Grandménil before darkness
closed in.
The 3d Armored Division had met a
superior force on the 21st, had failed
to retake Samrée, had been forced to
use its reserves in a fight to reopen the
road to Hotton, and had seen its west-
ern and center task forces pushed back.
But there were some reasons to expect
an improvement in what had been a
deteriorating situation. The Hotton
bridge had been held and there was
word that the 84th Infantry Division
would lend a hand. The 3d Armored
Division was going to get back its own
CCA, although under a corps prohibi-
tion against using it save in dire cir-
cumstances, and during the. night of 21
December CCA did close north of Man-
hay. At least a battalion of the 517th
Parachute Infantry was on its way to
reinforce the Combat Command Re-
serve at Soy. The eastern flank had
been more or less secured by contact
made between Task Force Kane and the
82d Airborne Division during the day.
All this was heartening, but there re-
mained the worry as to what the full
enemy strength and intentions might be.
Operations maps posted on the night
of the 21st in the bunkers housing the
Wehrmachtfuehrungsstab showed the
LVIII Panzer Corps as the most ad-
vanced unit of all the German forces
driving west, with its 116th Panzer Divi-
sion at Hotton, only twenty air-line miles
from the Meuse River. But the fight at
Hotton, despite what the operations
map might show, had convinced the
L VIII Panzer Corps commander that,

382 THE ARDENNES: BATTLE OF THE BULGE
instead of finding a quick and easy way
to cross the Ourthe by his shift to the
northwest, he stood an excellent chance
of running his corps into a cul-de-sac.
Unwilling to continue down what might
turn into a blind alley, if the Americans
continued to defend Hotton as stanchly
as they had during the day, General
Krueger revised his plans. His southern
neighbor, Lauchert’s 2d Panzer Divi-
sion, was reported to have seized a
bridge across the western arm of
the Ourthe and might be expected to
move so rapidly into the Marche sector,
on the west side of the main channel,
that the American barrier line which
Krueger had feared at the Ourthe could
not be placed in operation. Krueger,
therefore, ordered the 116th Panzer
Division to disengage on the Soy-Hotton
road, pull back as rapidly as possible to
the south, and cross the Ourthe at La
Roche. This town had been abandoned
by the Americans during the afternoon
when the 7th Armored Division trains,
threatened with encirclement, crossed
the river and moved to Marche, leaving
only some pickets to guard the road-
blocks at the various bridges.
Krueger intended to use the 560th
Volks Grenadier Division to continue
the attack northwest, aiming for the
Ourthe crossings at Han north of Hot-
ton. At twilight the leading elements of
the 2d SS Panzer Division were in posi-
tion on the right flank of the 560th.
This fresh division, when assembled, was
to pass to the LVIII Panzer Corps and
could be used to cover the exposed east-
ern flank-a source of continuous con-
cern to the corps commander. General
Krueger, an experienced and intelligent
officer, may not have been as hopeful of
success as his plans for 22 December
would indicate. He records that his com-
mand had suffered very heavy casualties
during the fighting of the 21st, that troop
morale was flagging, that fatigue was be-
ginning to tell, and that, for the first
time, the advance had begun to decel-
erate.
While Krueger laid plans for shift-
ing the LVIII Panzer Corps armor to
the west bank of the Ourthe, his oppo-
nent, General Ridgway, was issuing or-
ders designed to strengthen and extend
the XVIII Airborne Corps right wing
west of the Ourthe. At dawn of the 22d,
CCA of the 3d Armored Division had
just completed its move to rejoin Gen-
eral Rose when the corps commander
ordered Rose to throw out a screen on
the west bank between La Roche and
St. Hubert as cover for the American
concentration in process around Marche.
By noon a task force from CCA
was en route to carry out this mission.
Of the reinforcement that General Rose
had counted on only one tank battalion
and one company of armored infantry
were left. The 3d Armored Division
would have to continue the battle to
establish a holding position with forces
hardly stronger than those which had
been driven back on the 21st. The
final orders for the day were “counter-
attack”: first, to drive the enemy out
of the Soy-Hotton sector, second, to re-
take the hill mass at Dochamps-Sam-
rée in the center of the division zone.
The job of dealing with German pene-
tration between the Ourthe and the
Aisne Rivers fell to CCR (and Task
Force Hogan). For this Colonel Howze
would get the battalion from the 517th
Parachute Infantry as soon as it arrived.
Those troops of CCA still in the
division commander’s hand (Task Force

ONE THREAT SUBSIDES; ANOTHER EMERGES 383
Richardson) would serve as backstop be-
hind the two remaining task forces, Orr
and Kane, which were charged with the
capture of Dochamps.
Task Force Orr was at the vortex
of the action on the 22d, standing as
it did in the path of the main move-
ment by the 560th Volks Grenadier
Division. The 116th Panzer Division, on
the German left, would have to dis-
engage its forward units during the
coming night, and in order to effect
the relief the 560th had to be brought
forward. This German advance, be-
gun by two regiments abreast, started
at daylight, its object the command of
the Erezée-Soy-Hotton road. Meanwhile
Colonel Orr led his counterattack force
out of Amonines, heading down the
Aisne valley road for Dochamps. One
company of armored infantry had been
left to defend the base at Amonines.
The detachment with Orr consisted of
a company of armored infantry plus
three medium and three light tanks.
About 0900 the small American col-
umn saw an enemy column coming up
the road from Dochamps, and each
halted to size up the other. Task Force
Orr’s opponent was the 1128th Regiment
which, though reduced to a combat
strength of seven hundred, was the
strongest unit in the 560th Volks Gren-
adier Division. As it happened a part
of the German force had been pinned
down by an attack against flank and
rear thrown in by Task Force Kane,
but this intelligence was unknown to
Orr. The German commander disen-
gaged from Kane, put in his engineer
battalion to hold Dochamps, then moved
to the ridge east of the valley road and
began the fire fight. Shortly after noon
Orr’s scouts on the ridge west of the
valley reported more German troops
moving northwest. This looked like a
trap of some sort and Orr withdrew his
column to the starting point on the crest
at Amonines, where he was reinforced
by infantry and tank destroyers. The
1128th did not follow in force (Task
Force Kane still threatened from the
east) but was content to fire smoke shells
onto the American position and probe
with patrols. The troops in field gray
seen moving west of the valley were the
1129th Regiment en route to Beffe to re-
lieve the 116th Panzer Division. They
paid no attention to Task Force Orr.
Task Force Kane, easternmost of the
3d Armored detachments, obviously
was playing an important part in de-
laying the German advance toward Amo-
nines. The attack toward Dochamps,
started the previous afternoon and re-
sumed on the 22d, was hampered by
the necessity of keeping a blocking force
at the Manhay junction and reinforcing
the scratch defense farther south at the
Baraque de Fraiture crossroads. De-
spite the fact that Task Force Kane was
fighting with its left arm tied down,
by noon the drive toward Dochamps
reached the village of Lamormenil. Dur-
ing these morning hours the American
tanks proved too much for the German
infantry; it is probable that an entire
battalion of the 1128th was engaged and
siphoned away from the attack against
Orr.
The terrain beyond Lamormenil,
however, was distinctly adverse to ar-
mored tactics. A single road wound
southward through a narrow semi-
wooded valley until, about eight hun-
dred yards east of Dochamps, it climbed
abruptly up the east face of a bare
hill to reach the village. As soon as

384 THE ARDENNES: BATTLE OF THE BULGE
Kane’s tanks reached the foot of the
hill German antitank guns started to
work. Maneuver on the soft earth flank-
ing the road promised that the tanks
would bog down; attack straight along
the road was suicidal. After futile at-
tempts at counterbattery against the
enemy gunners the tanks withdrew to
the north. Kane’s column had been
short of infantry, and Dochamps pre-
sented a problem to which the answer
was infantry.
Just after dark there appeared in the
American bivouac six trucks carrying
two officers and eighty men belong-
ing to the 1st Battalion, 517th Para-
chute Infantry. Lost from its convoy the
detachment had been passed around
from headquarters to headquarters,
finally ending up with Kane. The para-
troopers were handed the job of taking
Dochamps, this time by an attack from
the north guiding on a narrow-gauge
railway which approached the village.
Twice the detachment moved forward,
only to meet machine gun fire from
front and flank. The second try ended
when the Germans counterattacked
from a hill northwest of the village.
More than a handful of infantry would
be required if the 3d Armored Divi-
sion was to regain control of the
Dochamps-Samrée heights.
The story of Task Force Hogan on
the 22d is quickly told. Cut off at Mar-
couray, Hogan received radio orders to
try once more to break out northeast
through Beffe. Little aid could be spared
by the Americans in the north, but
a small task force from CCA was or-
ganized to drive toward Hogan. There
proved to be simply too many Germans
between Beffe and the Soy-Hotton road.
In any case, Hogan, who had been
rushed into action with his tanks half
full, was running out of gasoline. In
early afternoon his column retired to
Marcouray and sent out requests for
fuel, surgical supplies, and reinforce-
ments. All this while the enemy knew
Hogan’s exact whereabouts but paid
him scant attention. When the 116th
Panzer Division moved out on the
night of 22 December, the com-
mander of the 560th detailed some of
his engineers to watch Hogan’s laager.
The armored German kampfgruppe
astride the road between Soy and Hot-
ton was content to remain on the defen-
sive pending its withdrawal southward,
but the German tanks and antitank guns
ruled as “King of the Rock” on the
crest overwatching the road. Grooved
by the road, the first American attack
from Soy toward Hotton slammed
straight into direct fire and lost six
medium and two light tanks. Cross-
country maneuver by infantry was indi-
cated. Long awaited, the 1st Battalion
of the 517th Parachute Infantry and
a company from the 643d Tank De-
stroyer Battalion arrived in Soy at twi-
light. Howze had expected to use the
paratroopers in a daylight attack to re-
open the Hotton road, but the division
commander demanded an immediate
commitment. Thrown into assault over
strange ground, only half an hour
after crawling out of their trucks, the
paratroopers made little headway against
six German self-propelled guns and
clusters of machine gun nests. By 2000
the attack west from Soy was stopped
dead still.
An alarm from Hotton, suddenly as-
sailed after a day of quiet, forced a
second try. This time Howze ordered
two of the paratroop platoons, tank-sup-

ONE THREAT SUBSIDES; ANOTHER EMERGES 385
ported, to circle around and into Hot-
ton from the north, intending a squeeze
play by attack in the dark from both
Soy and Hotton. But neither claw was
able to grip the enemy holding the
core high ground. So the night ended.
During its course the 560th Volks Gren-
adier Division had made a smooth
and unperceived relief of the 116th
Panzer Division. At dawn the grena-
diers held an irregular front reaching
from the Ourthe River east to the Ba-
raque de Fraiture crossroads athwart
the Liège-Bastogne highway. This sec-
tor from river to highway now formed
the center of the LVIII Panzer Corps
with the 2d SS Panzer Division moving
in on the east and the 116th Panzer
Division circling to form the western
wing beyond the Ourthe.
Events of the 22d had shown a move-
ment of large German forces to the
west, consequent to the fall of St. Vith,
and brought the threat–epitomized
by the appearance of the 2d SS Panzer
Division–of a large-scale build-up for
an attack to push through the XVIII
Airborne Corps in a climactic, dramat-
ic bid for Spa and Liège. The orders is-
sued by General Ridgway on the night
of 22 December, it will be remem-
bered, were a detailed expression of the
larger Allied plan to halt and then
amputate the German forces swelling
the western end of the salient, orders
to hold the line or win more favorable
positions while the VII Corps assembled
on the right flank and a counterattack
to regain St. Vith formed on the left.
Between the Ourthe River and the
Liège-Bastogne road the single combat
command of the 3d Armored Division,
now reinforced, had the mission on
the 23d of building a forward line
along the Salmchâteau-La Roche road
as a breakwater against the anticipated
German surge to the north. From the
head of the enemy salient, between Soy
and Hotton, to the Salmchâteau-La
Roche road was a distance of eleven
miles. Attempts to get this counterat-
tack moving in the night battles near
Hotton and Dochamps had failed.
Strength to do the job had increased
somewhat but far from enough to guar-
antee success. With the main force of
CCA west of the Ourthe and CCB still
mopping up in Kumpfgruppe Peiper's
stronghold, General Rose had available
three tank battalions and four armored
infantry companies of his own divi-
sion. Newly arrived reinforcements had
swelled the rifle contingent by two bat-
talions, the 1st Battalion of the 517th
Parachute Infantry and the 509th Para-
chute Infantry Battalion. Total artillery
support consisted of the 105-mm. self-
propelled howitzers belonging to the
54th and 83d Armored Field Artillery
Battalions, plus three self-propelled 155-
mm. guns from the 991st Field Artil-
lery Battalion–any unbalance of force
favorable to the Germans hardly would
be redressed by the weight of Ameri-
can gun metal. In conference on the
morning of the 23d the commanders of
the XVIII Airborne and VII Corps
agreed that Rose needed more troops.
But the one battalion of the 75th In-
fantry Division assigned could not reach
the scene for some hours.
The story of the 23d is one of local
counterattacks to hold or restore exist-
ing positions against an enemy who re-
tained the initiative and maintained
the momentum of the attack rolling
northward. The critical point would be
the Baraque de Fraiture crossroads at

386 THE ARDENNES: BATTLE OF THE BULGE
the boundary between the 3d Armored
Division and the 82d Airborne Division,
a point marking the thrust line along
which the 2d SS Panzer Division intend-
ed to proceed north. The action at this
road junction, “Parker’s Crossroads,”
requires independent treatment. It has
bearing at this point because the small
combat reserve available to the 3d Ar-
mored Division would be drained away
here and because American operations
set in train to east and west would
be conditioned by the shaky character
of the 3d Armored left flank.
In front of Dochamps Task Force
Kane resumed the attack broken off in
the early morning. German mortars lob-
bing down 81-mm. and 120-mm. shells
stopped the infantry on the slopes, and
direct fire knocked out an entire platoon
of Sherman tanks when they tried to as-
cend the hill road. The plain fact was
that Kane lacked the men, tanks, and
guns to take Dochamps. But this was
not all. During the day a part of the
task force had to be diverted to man
roadblocks along the valley north to
Grandmenil which was both Kane’s
flank and line of communications. In
the afternoon the 1130th Regiment
(possibly reduced to battalion strength)
and an assault gun platoon moved in
from the west to cut the Dochamps-
Grandmenil road. Fighting at Frey-
neux and Lamorménil was touch and
go, but the enemy suffered badly and
failed to gain the road. This maneuver
from the west had been given top pri-
ority by the 560th Volks Grenadier Di-
vision. whose command was as anxious
to erase the Dochamps salient as Gen-
eral Rose was to pinch out the Hotton
bulge.
Sometime after dark the Germans hit
the valley route again, but this time
farther north and from the opposite
side. Five light tanks and a squad of
riflemen posted at Odeigne were set
upon by enemy infantry who lighted
their targets by flares and moved in
with self-propelled 40-mm. guns to
make the kill. The Americans held
their ground until nearly surrounded,
then-when so ordered-withdrew. This
foray came from the Baraque de
Fraiture crossroads sector, where the 2d
SS Panzer Division finally had broken
through, and was made by elements of
the 3d Panzer Grenadier Regiment
moving with much difficulty along the
narrow forest trails south of Odeigne.
Now Task Force Kane would have to
battle to hold its narrow corridor
against an enemy closing in from both
flanks and circling to the rear.
In the center sector, at Amonines,
Task Force Orr waited for CCR to wipe
out the enemy between Soy and Hot-
ton, then turn south in an attack with
the two forces abreast. With the ex-
ception of the maneuver to clear the
Americans out of the territory north
of Dochamps described earlier, the
560th Volks Grenadier Division was
in no hurry to attack those American
positions where the defenders seemed
willing and able to put up a stiff fight.
After all, the German corps commander
had promised the support of fresh as-
sault troops. Therefore, although the
Germans pressed in around Amonines
they made no move to tackle Task
Force Orr.
The vise created the night before to
close on the German hill positions
astride the Soy-Hotton road compressed
very slowly on the 23d, nor did the jaws
meet. Radio communication between the

ONE THREAT SUBSIDES; ANOTHER EMERGES 387
two American assault forces failed to
function in the morning, the Hotton
group was forced to spend much of the
day mopping up the enemy who had
seeped into the village during the night
battle, and both the eastern and western
groups–when the attack finally started
moving–were too weak to make head-
way against German tanks and antitank
guns firing from hull defilade on the
high ground. Four tanks from the Soy
force were knocked out in five minutes;
there was little point in courting such
losses and in any case there was only a
single tank still operating so the battle
was left to the infantry.
Lacking the numbers needed to envel-
ope the German position, the infantry
turned to a fire fight that lasted well into
the night. Pfc. Melvin Biddle, a para-
trooper, tried to carry the fight to the
enemy by advancing in front of his own
troops to throw grenades and pick off the
enemy infantry with his rifle. (Later he
was awarded the Medal of Honor.) But
there was no apparent diminution in the
enemy firepower and toward dawn the
fight dwindled away. The rifle battalion
promised from the 75th Infantry Divi-
sion had not arrived.
Task Force Hogan, out of gasoline and
immobile in its ridge road laager at
Marcouray, was not hard pressed by the
encircling German pickets. Enemy par-
lementaires appeared during the after-
noon with a demand for immediate
surrender but were politely told that if
they wanted Marcouray they could come
and take it. To underline the isolation
of the American force, a detachment of
enemy infantry started an assault; this
promptly was blasted by slugs pouring
from the multiple .50-caliber machine
guns carried by a half-track section of the
486th Antiaircraft Artillery Battalion.
Hogan had accompanied his radio re-
port of the German surrender demand
with a request for “maximum support.”
CCR was having its hands more than full
in its own backyard on the 23d, and the
Germans obviously could not be left to
one side while a relief party went to aid
Hogan. The immediate question then
was how to supply the task force and keep
it in being until the tactical situation
improved. The 54th Armored Field Ar-
tillery Battalion was near enough to
Marcouray for an attempt to shoot med-
ical supplies into Hogan’s lines. The
gunners loaded howitzer shells with med-
ical packets, using the same technique
as with propaganda leaflets, but the
supplies were so damaged on impact as to
be worthless. Resupply by airdrop went
awry. 3
The position of the 3d Armored Divi-
sion was measurably more difficult by the
end of the 23d. As in the days just past
General Rose had the promise of some
addition to his command, but thus far
piecemeal reinforcement had failed to
keep pace with growing enemy strength,
much less create a balance. Late in the
afternoon the 3d Armored Division was
assigned to the VII Corps, which had
assumed the conduct of operations west
of the Ourthe. Tactically the transfer
made no marked change. Rose’s com-
mand east of the Ourthe remained tied
to the 82d Airborne Division and the
XVIII Airborne Corps, sharing the same
terrain compartment and facing the
same major enemy maneuver. General
Collins, the VII Corps commander,
3 A very complete and instructive analysis of
the failure to resupply Task Force Hogan by air
is in Thompson’s MS, Air Supply to Isolated
Units, pp. 34–63.

388 THE ARDENNES: BATTLE OF THE BULGE
managed to provide some assistance to
the 3d Armored, during the night at-
taching the 290th Infantry of the 75th
Division and the 188th Field Artillery
Battalion, whose 155-mm. howitzers
would provide a weight and range sadly
deficient in the artillery supporting
Rose.
Even so, the coming day promised to
be grim. All plans for counterattack to
regain the La Roche–Salmchâteau line
were dismissed. The critical hour was at
hand. General Rose told the CCR com-
mander, “Impress on every individual
that we must stay right here or there will
be a war to be fought all over again,
and we won’t be here to fight it.” The
560th Volks Grenadier Division could be
held, had been held. Could the 3d Ar-
mored Division and the troops forming
the western wing of the 82d Airborne
Division throw back the fresh 2d SS Pan-
zer Division, which had already punched
a deep hole at the interdivision bound-
ary, and hold other German forces be-
lieved to be moving into the battle zone?
The Fight at the Baraque de Fraiture
Crossroads, 23 December
Baraque de Fraiture is a handful of
buildings at a crossroads south of the
Belgian hamlet of Fraiture. There are
many such crossroads in the Belgian
Ardennes, but this crossing of ways
stands on one of the highest summits of
BARAQUE DE FRAITURE

ONE THREAT SUBSIDES; ANOTHER EMERGES 389
the Ardennes, a small shelf or tableland
at an elevation of 652 meters (2,139
feet). The roads which here intersect
are important: N15, the north-south
road, is the through paved highway link-
ing Liège and Bastogne; N28, the east-
west road, is classed as secondary but is
the most direct route for movement
along the northern side of the Ourthe
River, connecting, for example, St. Vith
with La Roche. The crossroads and the
few buildings are on cleared ground, but
heavy woods form a crescent to the north
and west, and a fringe of timber points
at the junction from the southeast. In the
main the area to south and east is com-
pletely barren. Here the ground de-
scends, forming a glacis for the firing
parapet around the crossroads.
The tactical stature of the Baraque de
Fraiture intersection was only partially
derived from the configuration of roads
and terrain. The manner in which the
XVIII Airborne Corps had deployed its
units in the initial attempt to draw a
cordon along the northwest flank of the
German advance was equally important.
The mission assigned the three recon-
naissance forces of the 3d Armored Divi-
sion had been to close up to the Liège-
Bastogne highway (with the crossroads
as an objective), but it had not been
carried out. East of the same highway the
82d Airborne had deployed, but with its
weight and axis of advance away from the
crossroads. Circumstance, notably the
direction of the German attacks from 20
December onward, left the Baraque de
Fraiture crossroads, and with it the inner
flanks of the two divisions, to be de-
fended on a strictly catch-as-catch-can
basis.
On the afternoon of 19 December
Maj. Arthur C. Parker III, led three
105-mm. howitzers of the ill-starred
589th Field Artillery Battalion on the
crossroads. The rest of the battalion had
been cut off on the Schnee Eifel or am-
bushed during the withdrawal to St.
Vith. Parker’s mission was to establish
one of the roadblocks that the 106th
Division was preparing behind St. Vith.
The next day, four half-tracks mounting
multiple .50-caliber machine guns ar-
rived from the 203d Antiaircraft Artil-
lery Battalion, now moving in with the
7th Armored Division to establish the
defensive lines around St. Vith. That
night, for the first time, vehicles were
heard moving about to the south along
the road to Houffalize. (They probably
belonged to the 560th Volks Grenadier
Division, which that afternoon had taken
part in the capture of Samrée.) Before
dawn an 80-man enemy patrol came up
the road from Houffalize, stumbled onto
the American half-tracks, and was cut to
pieces by streams of bullet fire. The dead
and prisoners were grenadiers from the
560th, but among them was an officer
from the 2d SS Panzer Division, scouting
out the route of advance for his incoming
division. In the afternoon D Troop of
the 87th Cavalry Squadron, earlier
dispatched by the 7th Armored to
aid Task Force Orr in the projected
counterattack at Samrée, came in to join
the crossroads garrison. The troop leader
had gone to Dochamps to meet Orr but,
finding Germans in the town, disposed
his men and vehicles under orders from
General Hasbrouck that the crossroads
must be held.
Fog settling over the tableland in late
afternoon gave the enemy a chance to
probe the defense erected at the cross-
roads, but these jabs were no more than
a warning of things to come. Meanwhile

390 THE ARDENNES: BATTLE OF THE BULGE
eleven tanks and a reconnaissance pla-
toon arrived from Task Force Kane. The
Americans spent the night of 21 Decem-
ber ringed around the crossroads, tanks
alternating with armored cars in a stock-
ade beyond which lay the rifle line.
There was no sign of the enemy despite
reports from all sorts of sources that Ger-
man armor was gathering at Houffalize.
Messengers coming in from the head-
quarters of the 3d Armored and 82d Air-
borne Divisions brought the same
message, “Hold as long as you can.”
General Gavin was especially con-
cerned by the threat to the 82d flank
developing at the crossroads and went to
talk the matter over with Rose at his
command post in Manhay. The 3d Ar-
mored commander assured Gavin that
his troops would continue to cover the
western wing of the 82d Airborne. Gavin
nevertheless acted at once to send the 2d
Battalion, 325th Glider Infantry, from
his division reserve to defend Fraiture,
the latter on a ridge three-quarters of a
mile northeast of Parker’s crossroads
position. In addition, having made a per-
sonal reconnaissance of the area, Gavin
told Col. Charles Billingslea, the regi-
mental commander, to dispatch a com-
pany of the glider infantry to reinforce
the crossroads defenders. The 2d Battal-
ion reached Fraiture before dawn on the
22d, and Capt. Junior R. Woodruff led
F Company into the circle around the
crossroads just before noon. This slight
reinforcement was negated when Kane
took away his tanks to stiffen the attack
going on in front of Dochamps.
The day of 22 December was spent in
waiting. The 2d SS Panzer Division was
having ‘fuel troubles and moving in fits
and starts. Mortar fire, laid on by the
German reconnaissance screen left in
this area as the 560th Volks Grenadier
Division advanced northwest, from time
to time interrupted movement in and
out of the crossroads position. That was
all. During the day the 3d Armored had
received some reinforcements; these were
parceled out across the front with a pla-
toon from the 643d Tank Destroyer Bat-
talion going to the crossroads. En route
south from Manhay on the night of the
22d the tank destroyer detachment lost
its way and halted some distance north
of the crossroads. German infantry sur-
prised and captured the platoon in the
early morning. Already the 2d SS Pan-
zer Division was moving to cut off and
erase the crossroads garrison. Attack was
near at hand, a fact made clear when an
officer patrol from the 2d SS was cap-
tured at dawn in the woods near the
American foxholes.
At daylight, shelling increased at the
crossroads as German mortar and gun
crews went into position; yet the long
awaited assault hung fire. The reason
was lack of fuel. The 2d SS Panzer Divi-
sion had only enough gasoline to move
its Reconnaissance Battalion on the 2 1st
and this had been committed near Viel-
salm. All through the 22d the division
waited in its final assembly areas. To-
ward evening enough fuel arrived to set
the 4th Panzer Grenadier Regiment,
some tanks, and an artillery battalion to
moving. In the course of the night the
grenadiers relieved the small reconnais-
sance detachments of the 560th, which
had been watching the crossroads, and
filed through the woods to set up a cor-
don west and north of Baraque de
Fraiture. The commander of the 4th
Panzer Grenadier had placed his 2d
Battalion on the right of the main north-
south highway, while his 3d Battalion

ONE THREAT SUBSIDES; ANOTHER EMERGES 391
deployed around and to the rear of the
crossroads. In the dark hours before
dawn of the 23d the first move came,
as the 2d Battalion made a surprise at-
tack on Fraiture and was driven back
after a bitter fight with the para-
troopers. 4
The surprise attack at Fraiture having
aborted, the Germans settled down to
hem in and soften up the crossroads de-
fense. Radios that had been taken from
captured American vehicles were used
to jam the wave band on which the
American forward observers were calling
for fire, Whenever word flashed over the
air that shells were on their way, enemy
mortar crews dumped shells on Amer-
ican observation posts–easily discernible
in the limited perimeter–making sens-
ing virtually impossible. Late in the
morning Lt. Col. Walter B. Richardson,
who had a small force backing up Kane
and Orr, sent more infantry and a pla-
toon of tanks toward the crossroads. By
this time the German grenadiers occu-
pied the woods to the north in sufficient
strength to halt the foot soldiers. The
American tanks, impervious to small
arms fire, reached the perimeter at about
1300, whereupon the rifle line pushed
out to east and south to give the tankers
a chance to maneuver.
But at the crossroads time was running
out. Shortly after 1600 the German ar-
tillery really got to work, for twenty
minutes pummeling the area around the
crossroads. Then, preceded by two pan-
zer companies (perhaps the final assault
had waited upon their appearance), the
entire rifle strength of the 4th Panzer
Grenadier Regiment closed upon the
Americans. Outlined against new-fallen
4 The main actions of the 2d SS Panzer in this
sector are developed as a part of Chapter XXIII.
snow the line of defense was clearly vis-
ible to the panzers, and the Shermans
had no maneuver room in which to back
up the line. The fight was brief, moving
to a foregone conclusion. At 1700 the
commander of F Company asked Bill-
ingslea for permission to withdraw; but
Gavin’s order still was “hold at all
costs.” Within the next hour the Ger-
mans completed the reduction of the
crossroads defense, sweeping up prison-
ers, armored cars, half-tracks, and the
three howitzers. Three American tanks
managed to escape under the veil of half-
light. Earlier they had succeeded in
spotting some panzers, who were firing
flares, and knocked them out. A number
of men escaped north through the woods;
some got a break when a herd of cattle
stampeded near the crossroads, providing
a momentary screen. Company F of the
325th Glider Infantry suffered the most
but stood its ground until Billingslea
gave permission to come out. Ultimately
forty-four of the original one hundred
sixteen who had gone to the crossroads
returned to their own lines. Drastically
outnumbered and unable to compensate
for weakness by maneuver, the defenders
of the Baraque de Fraiture crossroads
had succumbed, like so many small forces
at other crossroads in the Ardennes.
The dent made here at the boundary
between the 3d Armored and the 82d
Airborne Divisions could all too quickly
develop into a ragged tear, parting the
two and unraveling their inner flanks.
The next intersection on the Liège road,
at Manhay, was only four miles to the
north. From Manhay the lateral road be-
tween Trois Ponts and Hotton would
place the Germans on the deep flank and
rear of both divisions. Generals Rose and
Gavin reacted to this threat at once; so

392 THE ARDENNES: BATTLE OF THE BULGE
did General Ridgway. Order followed
order, but there remained a paucity of
means to implement the orders. The def-
icit in reserves was somewhat remedied
by the troops of the 106th Division and
the 7th Armored who, all day long, had
been pouring through the lines of the
82d Airborne after the hard-fought bat-
tle of St. Vith. 5 General Hoge, CCB, 9th
Armored commander, had been told at
noon to send his 14th Tank Battalion to
bolster the right flank of the 82d. One
tank company went to the Manhay cross-
roads; the rest moved into Malempré,
two miles to the southeast and off the
Liège highway. Coincident with the Ger-
man attack at Baraque de Fraiture
General Hoge received a torrent of re-
ports and orders. By this time Hoge was
not sure as to either his attachment or
mission. He finally gathered that the
5 The final withdrawal from St. Vith into the
lines of the XVIII Airborne Corps is described at
length in the following chapter.
Baraque de Fraiture crossroads had been
lost and CCB was to join the defense al-
ready forming on the road to Manhay.
As darkness settled and the enemy re-
formed to continue the attack beyond
the crossroads, Maj. Olin F. Brewster
formed a strongpoint at the north edge
of a fringe of woods about 3,000 yards
north of Baraque de Fraiture. There he
placed Company C of the 509th Para-
chute Infantry Battalion, which earlier
had failed to break through from the
north with Richardson’s tanks, a platoon
of armored infantry, and a tank platoon.
With straggling tanks and infantry drift-
ing in from the south and a platoon of
tank destroyers sent in by General Hoge,
Brewster’s force grew. All through the
night German infantry tried to filter past
and on toward Manhay, but when morn-
ing came Brewster’s command still stood
between the 2d SS Panzer Division and
Manhay. A new and critical phase of
operations was about to open–the battle
for the Manhay crossroads.

The Defenders of St. Vith Pass to the
XVIII Airborne Corps
CHAPTER XVII
On the morning of 20 December the
Americans defending St. Vith held the
easternmost position of any organized
nature in the center sector of the Ar-
dennes battleground. The most advanced
elements of the German drive by this
time were twenty-five air-line miles to
the southwest of St. Vith. The St. Vith
perimeter, now of substantial size, con-
tinued to act as a breakwater holding the
LXVI Corps in check while other Ger-
man units forged westward past its north-
ern and southern extensions. As yet the
enemy forces passing to the north and
south had failed to coalesce to the west
of the St. Vith perimeter. The northern
penetration, represented at its tip by the
1st SS Panzer Division, remained narrow
and road-bound. Well to the rear of the
1st SS the 9th SS Panzer Division, rein-
forced by the 519th Heavy Antitank
Battalion, was toiling slowly westward on
the single, free main road which served
as the main supply route for two armored
and two infantry divisions. The advance
guard had arrived near Recht the pre-
vious evening, The southern advance,
which had carried a mass of German ar-
mor and infantry from the XLVII and
LVIII Panzer Corps toward Bastogne
and Houffalize, had the troops and the
maneuver room to constitute a real
threat to the southern and western sec-
St. Vith Is Lost
tions of the St. Vith perimeter. The Ger-
man successes in this area had already
isolated the St. Vith forces from the re-
mainder of the VIII Corps, although a
slim connection remained between the
7th Armored Division rear installations
at La Roche and the VIII Corps head-
quarters at Bastogne. Communication
between the 7th Armored rear head-
quarters and the St. Vith command post
(thirty-five miles by road) was extremely
difficult. Communication between the
VIII Corps headquarters and the St. Vith
command post was almost nonexistent,
even by radio.
The road to Spa and the First Army
headquarters, albeit roundabout and
hazardous, remained open on the morn-
ing of the 20th. Thither the 7th Armored
Division commander sent a liaison offi-
cer (Lt. Col. Frederic Schroeder) with a
letter to the First Army chief of staff,
Maj. Gen. William B. Kean, and orders
to explain that St. Vith was out of touch
with the VIII Corps. The letter, safely
delivered, gave the First Army its first
definite picture of events in the far-
removed St. Vith sector:
Dear Bill:
I am out of touch with VIII Corps and
understand XVIII Airborne Corps is
coming in.
My division is defending the line St.
Vith–Poteau both inclusive. CCB, 9th AD,
the 424th Inf Regt. of the 106th Div and
the 112th Inf Regt of the 28th Div are on
my right and hold from St. Vith (excl)

ST. VITH

ST. VITH IS LOST 395
to Holdingen. Both infantry regiments are
in bad shape. My right flank is wide open
except for some reconnaissance elements,
TDs and stragglers we have collected and
organized into defense teams at road
centers back as far as Cheram [Chérain]
inclusive. Two German Divisions, 116 Pz
and 560 VG, are just starting to attack
NW with their right on Gouvy. I can delay
them the rest of today maybe but will be
cut off by tomorrow.
VIII Corps has ordered me to hold and
I will do so but need help. An attack from
Bastogne to the NE will relieve the situa-
tion and in turn cut the bastards off in
rear. I also need plenty of air support. Am
out of contact with VIII Corps so am
sending this to you. Understand 82AB is
coming up on my north and the north
flank is not critical. BOB HASBROUCK
The First Army headquarters was in
process of drafting plans for uniting the
XVIII Airborne Corps and the St. Vith
force when General Hasbrouck’s letter
arrived. General Hodges’ answer, dis-
patched at 1230, stated:
Ridgway with armor and infantry is
moving from west to gain contact with you.
When communication is established you
come under command of Ridgway. You
retain under your command following
units: 106th Inf Div, RCT 112, and CCB
9th Armed Div. . . . [Ridgway] holds
Malmédy, Stavelot and Trois Ponts. . . .
For the first time since forming the St.
Vith perimeter the force there knew
what measures were under way for its
reinforcement or relief as well as the
precise status of command within the
force. Thus far General Hasbrouck and
General Jones, the two division com-
manders, had directed the units in the
perimeter on a basis of mutual agree-
ment, although Hasbrouck, with the
largest force in his own command, made
most of the decisions. As the 7th Ar-
mored commander phrased it: “I never
knew who was in my command. I just
did everything I thought necessary. The
command status was more or less of an
assumption.” Actually the perimeter
held from St. Vith westward was so large
and the defending units so thoroughly
mixed that command functioned on an
area basis, even after the receipt of the
First Army order, with the 106th Divi-
sion headquarters continuing to direct
the defense south and southwest of St.
Vith. 1
To the surprise of the St. Vith forces
this day (the 20th) passed rather quietly.
Only a few feeble German jabs were di-
rected against the American line, which
on its eastern face had been strengthened
by a series of withdrawals to more favor-
able ground during the previous night.
The American positions were much bet-
ter integrated than on previous days: the
7th Armored Division artillery and at-
tached battalions-of particular impor-
tance the one medium tank battalion-
were tied in closely with the troops they
supported. Finally, the enemy was under
compulsion to reconnoiter anew the out-
lines of the American eastern front which
had been redrawn during the night of
19 December. German reports covering
activity on the 20th assume the defense
of the St. Vith area as much stronger than
it was in fact. The enemy was much im-
1 The exchange between the commanders in-
volved in the St. Vith defense will be found in
the G–3 journals of the XVIII Corps, the 7th
Armored Division, and the 106th Division. The
military student will be interested in the delay
between the dispatch of the various messages and
their receipt. For the last phase of the battle see
Boyer, St. Vith; CCB, 9th Armored, journal and
AAR; the various battalion journals cited in
Chapter XIX; and General Matthew B. Ridgway,
Soldier: The Memoirs of Matthew B. Ridgway
(New York: Harper & Brothers, 1956).

396 THE ARDENNES: BATTLE OF THE BULGE
pressed by the collection of American
armor confronting him–“tanks were
everywhere,” said the 18th Volks Gren-
adier Division–and by the amount of ar-
tillery fire his every movement attracted.
It must be added, however, that
Lucht’s LXVI Corps was not in position
to bring off the smashing attack against
St. Vith which had been set tentatively
for the 20th. The Fuehrer Begleit Bri-
gade, whose tanks were supposed to add
new punch to operations of the infantry
corps, was still strung out along the
jammed and miry roads east of St. Vith.
Its commander, Colonel Remer, impa-
tient with delay, had ordered an assault
west of Wallerode at midnight on the
19th, but the small detachment of ar-
mored infantry and assault guns at hand
came under shellfire each time it formed
for attack and Remer finally gave over
the whole idea. Before daylight some of
his tanks arrived in the woods west of
Born. Having convinced the corps com-
mander that direct attack on St. Vith
from the east was no longer feasible, Re-
mer tried to make good on his own
favored plan for an armored flanking at-
tack in the north even at the risk of a
piecemeal effort.
Taking advantage of a heavy fog which
rose in midafternoon, Remer sent a tank
company through Ober-Emmels and up
the slope west of Hünningen. American
90-mm. tank destroyers from the 814th
Tank Destroyer Battalion, waiting on
the reverse slope, caught the first wave
of four Panthers in their sights, fired
seven rounds, and knocked out all four.
Remer’s battalion of armored infantry
and two assault gun batteries, waiting in
reserve in the valley below, never were
committed. This then was the extent of
the Fuehrer Begleit effort on the 20th;
Remer decided to await the arrival of
the full brigade. 2
East of St. Vith the 18th Volks Grena-
dier Division was regrouping as it waited
for its artillery and trains, involved in
the traffic jam caused by the Fuehrer
Begleit columns. As usual, attempts to
bring up the horse-drawn caissons past
the armor only resulted in more delay
and confusion. The division commander,
General Hoffmann-Schönborn, did try a
piecemeal attack on the high ground
north of the Schönberg road with the in-
tent to seize the St. Vith railroad station.
He personally accompanied the 295th
Regiment in the assault. The attacking
troop assembled in Wallerode toward
midmorning where they offered wonder-
ful targets for the artillery supporting
CCB, 7th Armored. The gunners, as in-
fantry observers reported, “threw every-
thing at Wallerode but the shoes on their
feet.” Within half an hour the German
regimental commander was hors de com-
bat and the attack dissipated.
South of St. Vith, where CCB, 9th Ar-
mored, had redressed its lines during the
previous night consonant with the 7th
Armored position on the left and taken
over a five-mile front, the enemy made
some attempt to press westward. The
62d Volks Grenadier Division had been
given the mission of cutting the possible
escape routes southwest of St. Vith by an
advance through Grufflange and Maldin-
gen. The fact that this attack, launched
about 1630 by the German center and
left, miscarried was due as much to the
enemy’s failure to locate the new line of
The detailed recital of the Fuehrer Begleit
actions, supported by documents and memorabilia,
is given in Die Geschichte Des Panzerkorps
Grossdeutschland (Bielefeld 1958) , vol. 2, Teil
VIII (hereafter cited as Panzerkorps G-D).

ST. VITH IS LOST 397
defense as to American resistance. The
190th Regiment advanced in close for-
mation toward the 27th Armored Infan-
try Battalion, almost as if in route march,
and took a terrible beating from artillery,
mortars, tank destroyers, antitank guns
on ground mounts, and machine guns.
The 164th Regiment, advancing oppo-
site the southern flank of CCB, reported
success while moving unopposed through
Maspelt and across ground which had
been abandoned the previous night, but
at a crossroads in the Grufflange woods
American shells suddenly poured in and
the advance came to a dead stop. Pris-
oners subsequently told of very severe
losses here in the forest. 3
Although action had flared up on 20
December along the eastern face of the
St. Vith perimeter, the feature of this
day was the series of rearrangements to
tighten the perimeter on the north and
south. Hasbrouck earlier had been “sus-
picious” of what was happening in the
northern sector around Recht and Po-
teau, but he was no longer too apprehen-
sive after the successive march groups of
the 1st SS Panzer Division had bounced
off the 7th Armored Division roadblocks.
The gap between the western anchor of
the north flank at Vielsalm and the east-
ern outposts of the 82d Airborne Divi-
sion was closed toward the end of the
day when patrols from the 505th Para-
chute Infantry met a reconnaissance
party from the 7th Armored south of
Trois Ponts. In addition light tanks be-
longing to the 87th Cavalry Reconnais-
sance Squadron had established radio
3 The operations of the LXVI Corps around St.
Vith are described in MSS #B–026 (Hauser);
B–333 (Pcht); and B–688 (Moll). The midday
and evening reports on OB WEST KTB are par-
ticularly useful.
contact with the 3d Armored task force
north of Samrée. On the whole it appeared
that the north flank of the St.
Vith force shortly would be battened
down at its western terminus and that
the danger of a German turning movement
there had been removed.
The main danger, apparent since 19
December, was the open south flank of
the St. Vith defense hanging on the air
at Holdingen. It was known that a German
move northwest toward this open
flank was in process-indeed the 116th
Panzer Division and the 560th Volks
Grenadier Division had been identified.
Furthermore the 7th Armored trains had
reported signs of an enemy force far to
the west of the 7th Armored outpost
positions. Acutely aware of the
threat now forming, General Hasbrouck
stripped such elements as he dared from
his north flank, added the remnants of
the 14th Cavalry Group, and created
Task Force Jones (Lt. Col. Robert B.
Jones, Commanding Officer, 814th Tank
Destroyer Battalion) to guard the south
and southwestern flank. Admittedly this
scratch force was too weak to make a serious
defense in the endangered sector,
but it could be expected to block the key
road junctions and sound a warning
should the enemy attempt any flanking
movement.
Colonel Jones organized three small
detachments to occupy Deifeld, Gouvy,
and Chérain, a screening position a little
over six miles from east to west. Deifeld
was occupied without trouble. The high
ground commanding Chérain, seven
miles northeast of Houffalize at the junction
of the roads from Vielsalm and St.
Vith which led to that town, was organized
for defense without enemy
hinderance. By chance the Chérain de-

398 THE ARDENNES: BATTLE OF THE BULGE
tachment received reinforcement late in
the afternoon when a company of the
112th Infantry appeared. At an earlier
and more optimistic hour this com-
pany had been dispatched to Houffalize
with orders to make a counterattack
southward to relieve the pressure on
Bastogne. The company commander
was persuaded that the situation had
changed somewhat and that he should
wait at Chérain for further orders. A
little later a company of German infan-
try was detected marching north along
the valley toward Chérain. During the
night a few of the enemy entered the
village but quickly were driven out. Gen-
eral Hasbrouck decided to wait further
developments before committing any of
his meager reserves at Chérain.
The detachment which Jones had sent
to Gouvy, midway between Deifeld and
Chérain, was surprised to find the village
occupied by German infantry. On 18
December the 7th Armored had learned
in a roundabout way that a “Lieutenant
Colonel named Stone” had collected a
few troops and was holding Gouvy. Sub-
sequently Hasbrouck sent a platoon of
light tanks to help out and an injunction
that it was “imperative” that the village
be held. All through the day and night of
19 December German vehicles (units of
the 116th Panzer Division and the ad-
vance guard of the 560th Volks Grena-
dier Division) had rolled past Gouvy to
the south and west, but no attempt had
been made to repeat the attack of the
previous day. Stone sent out one of his
staff to try to line up some help; this
officer discovered the command post of
the 965th Field Artillery Battalion, near
the town of Beho, and put forth the case
of the Gouvy defenders “who were at-
tempting to hold the line despite their
not being trained infantrymen.” Battery
C had been assigned to support the
112th Infantry and with the consent of
the latter shifted its 155-mm. howitzers
to give Stone’s men a hand,
Actually the pick-up force of quarter-
master troops, light tanks, and stragglers
under Stone’s command was deployed so
as to defend the railhead stocks at Gouvy
Station east of the village proper, but
this fact was unknown to the 7th Ar-
mored Division headquarters. During
the night of 19 December the bulk of the
1130th Regiment, 560th Volks Grena-
dier Division, bivouacked in and west of
the village of Gouvy. This regiment,
which had sent combat patrols against
Stone’s force on the 18th, was at the tail
end of the LVIII Panzer Corps columns
pushing past Houffalize. It had become
embroiled with the 112th Infantry at
Sevenig, had suffered intensely (the
fighting strength of the regiment now
was between five and six hundred), and
had been unable to disengage in the Our
River sector as quickly as the rest of the
division. The LVIII Panzer Corps com-
mander was anxious to get the 1130th up
to cover his right rear and had ordered
the regiment to seize and block the St.
Vith–Houffalize road in the neighbor-
hood of Gouvy and Chérain.
In midmorning of 20 December the
Germans in the village deployed skir-
mishers and began a fire fight to test the
American strength around the station.
After three hours of this the Americans
observed the enemy going into attack
formation in an open field next to the
village church. Using the church spire as
a reference point the cannoneers of Bat-
tery C opened fire, their 155-mm. how-
itzers scattering the German formation
in every direction. When the 7th Ar-

ST. VITH IS LOST
CHÉRAIN. A disabled German self-propelled gun is in the foreground.
mored detachment arrived to set up the
Gouvy roadblock, it found the Germans
inside the village. The detachment drove
them out in a sharp fight but at nightfall
withdrew to a road junction a mile and
a half to the west, here blocking any
further German move toward the north.
Stone’s group was incorporated in Task
Force Jones. The next day it was able,
with some pride, to turn over to the 7th
Armored Division the 350 German
prisoners it had guarded since 18 De-
cember and the stores at the railhead.
Possession of the First Army ration
dumps at Gouvy Station was a boon to
the units in the St. Vith–Vielsalm de-
fense, for by 20 December the 7th Ar-
mored Division trains for all practical
purposes were cut off from the forward
399
combat elements. On this day it was nec-
essary to instruct all unit commanders
that the rations, water, and gasoline on
hand must be made to last for three days.
The eight battalions of field artillery
taking part in the defense were put on a
strict ration, seven rounds for each 105-
mm. howitzer, to fire only on the most
urgent and well-defined targets. Harass-
ing and interdiction fire, therefore, was
turned over to the mortar crews, who
mixed high explosives and white phos-
phorous shells to make the supply last.
Fortunately the stock of artillery shells
was replenished (for the first time in
three days) from the Samrée dump be-
fore it was overrun by the enemy. An
attempt to give greater weight to the
artillery in the St. Vith–Vielsalm area

400 THE ARDENNES: BATTLE OF THE BULGE
failed when the 4.5-inch guns of the
770th Field Artillery Battalion were cut
off at Samrée en route from La Roche.
Even when separated from the 7th
Armored trains the St. Vith front was
considerably stronger and better organ-
ized than it had been. Incidentally, the
quick and forceful reaction to all Ger-
man probing during the day and the fact
that Hasbrouck had kept only a very
small reserve out of the line had created
an impression of American strength in
the enemy headquarters well beyond the
fact. The front held by the 7th Armored
Division, CCB of the 9th Armored, and
attached units by this time had expanded
to about thirty-two miles. Traced on the
map the line assumed the form of a
horseshoe, the bend at St. Vith, the open
prongs facing west. This opening had
been partially covered by the advance
southeastward of the 82d Airborne Divi-
sion, but a gap of some five miles still
existed north of the Chérain outpost set
up by Task Force Jones.
The VIII Corps passed to General
Patton’s Third Army during the 20th.
Word of this, handed down by Colonel
Ryan who had been at the VIII Corps
headquarters in Neufchâteau and had
worked his way back to the division
trains, caused a little confusion as to the
exact status of the units attached to the
7th Armored Division. In the early eve-
ning CCB, 9th Armored Division, re-
ceived orders to revert to the VIII Corps
and move that same night to St. Hubert,
seventeen miles west of Bastogne. The
loss of this combat command would
create a wide breach in front of the
enemy congregating south of St. Vith, a
breach which hardly could be filled by
the last reserves at Hasbrouck’s disposal.
The 7th Armored commander, at Hoge’s
request, got Middleton to cancel the or-
der, and CCB, 9th Armored, subse-
quently was taken under the First Army
command. The attachment already exist-
ing was thus legalized. What Hasbrouck
needed now he tersely relayed in a mes-
sage through the 7th Armored trains to
the XVIII Airborne Corps: “We can
hold if no troops are taken away from us
and our right rear is given protection.”
The addition of the 7th Armored
Division to the XVIII Airborne Corps
had contributed greatly to the phenom-
enal expansion of a corps front which
measured only some twenty-five miles on
19 December but which represented a
sector of approximately eighty-five miles
on the evening of 20 December. On the
19th most of Ridgway’s troops had en-
gaged in patrolling with no enemy con-
tact; on the 20th the XVIII Airborne
Corps faced the westernmost elements of
the I SS Panzer Corps, the entire LXVI
Corps, and the LVIII Panzer Corps.
Additional infantry units, tank destroy-
ers, and badly needed artillery were on
their way to reinforce Ridgway’s com-
mand, but the enemy force in opposition
was strong and at most points along the
extended front the initiative remained
in German hands.
Whether the XVIII Airborne Corps
could maintain the freshly added burden
imposed by the 7th Armored Division
salient remained to be seen. But that the
XVIII Airborne Corps lacked the
strength to close the gap of thirteen road
miles between the VIII Corps and itself
(that is, the gap between the 7th Ar-
mored Division detachment at Chérain
and the elements of the 101st Airborne
at Foy) was rapidly becoming apparent
to all. The corps’ mission, as it had de-
volved by the end of the day, would be

ST. VITH IS LOST
this: pivoting on Malmédy, to continue
the advance to the southeast and east with
“utmost vigor,” driving back the German
forces found west of the line Malmédy-
Pont-Vielsalm-Hebronval-Houffalize.
That the enemy was prepared to con-
test this move all intelligence reports
affirmed. True, Kampfgruppe Peiper
had been pretty well bottled up on the
corps left wing; but this effort had been
made by thinning the line between
Malmédy and Trois Ponts. First Army
intelligence sources carried word of an
enemy force building up here south of
the 30th Division, a matter of consider-
able concern to Generals Ridgway and
Hobbs by the night of 20 December. Fur-
thermore, it was recognized that Peiper
might try to break out through Stavelot.
German documents, taken in the fight at
Gouvy, showed clearly the intention of
the LVIII Panzer Corps to drive on
Hotton, at the moment the location of
the 3d Armored Division command post.
Already the advance guard of this force
had pushed beyond Samrée. The St. Vith
salient, where the 7th Armored Division
was to remain on the defensive during
the XVIII Airborne advance, was con-
fronted with growing German forces on
three sides. Prisoners had reported that
the Grossdeutschland Panzer Division,
previously identified on the Eastern
Front, had joined the LXVI Corps be-
fore St. Vith. Even though the new ar-
mored outfit did not prove to be the
famous division but Remer’s much
weaker panzer brigade, the report was
of particular concern.
The Enemy Closes on the
St. Vith Salient
The St. Vith salient looked like this
401
by the morning of the 21st:
on the north
and east the line was as well organized
as the forces available would permit; the
southern flank had been somewhat rein-
forced and prolonged by a covering
screen extending westward; the 82d Air-
borne Division was in position to give
some support in the northwestern seg-
ment of the gap to the rear of the 7th
Armored and 106th Infantry Division;
and there was a fair number of light
batteries supporting the front and flanks
of the salient. Although rationing had
begun, there was no immediate threat
that food, gasoline, or ammunition
would fail. The piecemeal German at-
tacks on the 20th had been turned back
with little loss or difficulty. Command
relations under the XVIII Airborne
Corps had been clarified (the 106th was
no longer attached to the 7th Armored)
and communications established. For
the first time the two divisions holding
the salient had some clear picture of the
dispositions and plans of neighboring
friendly units. No one could say with
certainty, of course, what strength the
enemy was preparing for the final assault
to gain St. Vith. (See Map VII.)
The Fifth Panzer Army, constantly
prodded by the higher staffs and acutely
aware that the St. Vith road net must
be opened to allow forward movement
of the reinforcements needed to main-
tain the momentum of the advance to-
ward the Meuse, was in no mood for
further delay. General Manteuffel was
anxious to free the LXVI Corps and
hurry it forward to the Salm River sec-
tor as right wing cover for the two pan-
zer corps. General Model hoped to shake
the corps free and use Remer’s armor to
help the Sixth Panzer Army get moving
in the north. Lucht, therefore, was or-

402 THE ARDENNES: BATTLE OF THE BULGE
dered to make an all-out attack and take
St. Vith itself on 21 December, whether
or not the Fuehrer Begleit Brigade was
ready. This, one of his division com-
manders opined, was easier said than
done.
The course of battle on 21 December
initially affirmed the pessimistic view
with which most of German unit com-
manders seem to have started the attack.
Remer, still missing most of his tanks,
had been instructed to drive from
Nieder-Emmels straight south into St.
Vith. South of Nieder-Emmels the St.
Vith road crossed the ridge where, the
day before, the American tank destroyers
had broken the back of the German at-
tack before it could get rolling. The
Fuehrer Begleit commander, with the in-
dependence that characterized the ac-
tions of a man who stood ace-high with
Hitler, decided to shift the attack and
take Rodt (Sart-lez-St. Vith) , about two
and a half miles west of his assigned ob-
jective. The rifle battalion assigned to
carry out this mission happened to come
under American artillery fire while as-
sembling west of Nieder-Emmels be-
fore dawn, or thus Remer explains the
failure to strike Rodt. So he compro-
mised by sending a large combat patrol
into the woods west of that village with
orders to find a covered route along
which the tanks might advance on Viel-
salm once they arrived.
The section of the main St. Vith-
Vielsalm supply road west of Rodt was
guarded by two American medium tank
companies spread over a distance of
three miles. It was easy for the German
infantry to move unnoticed through the
heavy timber. They even succeeded in
ambushing enough vehicles, passing
back and forth along the road, to prom-
ise motorization of the brigade’s bicycle
battalion. The American tankers caught
on to what had happened when mes-
sengers and liaison officers failed to
arrive at their destinations, but by this
time the Germans had journeyed on to
the southwest. Near Hinderhausen they
attempted to surprise the 275th Ar-
mored Field Artillery Battalion, an out-
fit that had been exposed to close-quarter
fighting before. With the help of two
tanks and an antiaircraft artillery half-
track mounting the dreaded .50-caliber
quad, the artillerymen beat off the. at-
tack. When the raiders turned back to
rejoin Remer they found the American
tankers waiting: however, evasion in the
woods was easy, although at this point
the prized vehicles were abandoned and
most of the captured Americans escaped.
Meanwhile Remer’s amored group had
arrived north of St. Vith and the brigade
was ready for attack as soon as darkness
came.
On most of the front held by the 7th
Armored and the troops of the 9th Ar-
mored and 106th the morning passed in
ominous quiet. Patrols working in front
of the American lines came back with
reports of enemy activity and movement:
some kind of an attack was in the offing
but it seemed slow in coming. Appar-
ently the German corps command had
some difficulty in organizing a co-ordi-
nated and well-timed advance over the
broken and wooded ground around St.
Vith. In fact, he had not reached the com-
manders of his two infantry divisions
with orders until daylight. The center
regiment of the 62d Volks Grenadier
Division (the 190th) , charged with seiz-
ing the high ground in the thick forest
east of Grufflange, did get one battalion
under way in the morning and succeeded

ST. VITH IS LOST 403
in overrunning an armored infantry pla-
toon and three tank destroyers belong-
ing to CCB, 9th Armored. Once the
element of surprise was lost the Germans
made no further headway in the forest;
artillery and bullet fire held them until
a platoon of American tanks arrived,
whereupon they withdrew. 4
The American defense of St. Vith it-
self was based on the possession of ridge
lines and hills masking the town to the
northeast, east, and southeast. Two
draws cut through this shield of high
ground, one on the north represented by
the highway running from Büllingen in-
to St. Vith, the other angling from the
southeast and traversed by the road and
railroad line from Prüm. Directly east
of St. Vith ran the Schönberg highway,
which had been the avenue of the very
first German attacks, but this road ran
over a ridge just outside St. Vith where
the Americans had stood successfully to
meet all previous enemy thrusts. Much
of the area here described was covered
with dense stands of timber spaced
irregularly with clearings between. Con-
necting the Büllingen and Schönberg ap-
proaches a spider web of secondary roads
and trails ran back and forth, centering
at the hamlet of Wallerode (two miles
northeast of St. Vith) behind which lay
a large forest. It was here that the un-
successful attacks launched earlier by the
4 During the skirmish around Grufflange Cpl.
Horace M. Thorne, Troop D of the 89th Cavalry
Reconnaissance Squadron, led a patrol to scout
out the enemy location. He killed the crew of an
immobilized enemy tank, set up a light machine
gun on the tank deck, and there conducted a fire
fight in which he personally accounted for two
machine gun crews. He was killed by rifle fire
while trying to clear a stoppage on his weapon.
Corporal Thorne was awarded the Medal of
Honor.
18th Volks Grenadier Division and the
Fuehrer Begleit Brigade had formed.
Faced with the problem of organizing
and integrating a defensive line which
had come into being piecemeal and with
little regard to the integrity of the tactical
units involved, the Americans divided
command responsibility along
easily discerned map features. Thus the
draws coming in from the southeast
marked the boundary between CCB of
the 9th Armored and CCB, 7th Armored,
while the northern defile and the
Büllingen road designated the boundary
between two sector commands within
CCB, 7th Armored. The easternmost defenses,
as a result, were in the sector
bounded by the Prüm road on the right
and the Büllingen road on the left, susceptible
to penetration at either flank or
both. This sector was under Lt. Col.
William H. G. Fuller (commanding
officer of the 38th Armored Infantry
Battalion) , whose command consisted of
four companies of armored infantry,
Troop B of the 87th Reconnaissance
Squadron, and some four hundred men
remaining from the 81st and 168th Engineer
Combat Battalions (the men who
had taken the first enemy blows at St.
Vith), backed up by a tank company
and a platoon of self-propelled 90-mm.
tank destroyers.
The frontal attack planned by the
LXVI Corps commander, under pressure
for a quick victory, would be mounted
by the 18th Volks Grenadier Division
and the 62d Volks Grenadier Division,
whose highly successful envelopment
tactics east of St. Vith had bagged prisoners
finally counted on this day as approaching
eight thousand. The main
effort would be made by the 18th in the
north and the 183d Regiment from the

404 THE ARDENNES: BATTLE OF THE BULGE
right wing of the 62d, this force attack-
ing in the sector outlined by the two
draws where Colonel Fuller’s command
was deployed. To the right of the main
effort Remer’s brigade was under or-
ders to enter St. Vith by direct assault
from the northwest via the Hunningen
road, orders which he subsequently dis-
obeyed. To the left the two remaining
regiments of the 62d were to attack due
west with the object of reaching the road
between St. Vith and Maldingen; they
would take no part, however, in the as-
sault on St. Vith.
By prodigious effort the LXVI Corps
artillery finally had been wormed
through the traffic jam east of St. Vith,
and towed and manhandled into posi-
tion. Around 1400 the German guns and
Werfers opened up against Fuller’s posi-
tions in front of the town. West of
Wallerode the 295th Regiment started
into the assault, possibly only as a feint,
but withdrew as the guns supporting
CCB, 7th Armored, went into action.
This gambit was succeeded by a fifteen-
minute artillery concentration; as it
raised westward the main German attack
moved forward. It was now about 1600
hours.
One of the heaviest and longest-sus-
tained barrages the veteran American
combat command had ever encountered
tied the troops of CCB to their foxholes,
and even there tree bursts claimed
many a victim. On both sides of the
main Schönberg road the 294th Regi-
ment moved groups of forty to fifty men
forward in bounds through the woods. A
platoon of Sherman tanks stationed just
north of the road was caught in the
thickest of the German concentrations.
Three lost their commanders and the
platoon withdrew. The first German
waves then hit between Company A of
the 38th Armored Infantry Battalion
and Company A of the 23d Armored
Infantry Battalion. Meanwhile the 293d
Regiment had pushed south of the
Schönberg highway toward Company B
of the 38th Armored Infantry Battalion,
Troop B, 87th Reconnaissance Squad-
ron, and Company A, 81st Combat
Engineers, left to right. Only two
medium tanks were barring the road.
For some reason this attack never fully
developed–later German reports indi-
cated that the assault waves lost their
direction while moving through the
thick woods. Suddenly, about 1700,
the German pressure along the Schön-
berg road eased. The enemy had found
a soft spot and was regrouping while
his tanks and assault guns moved for-
ward. General Lucht ordered the com-
mander of the 18th Volks Grenadier
Division to throw everything he had
behind the 294th and continue the at-
tack.
North of the threatened area the
295th Regiment had come out of the
woods behind Wallerode and started an
advance southwest, covered by assault
gun or tank fire from the ridge west
of the town. This move brought the
grenadiers across open ground and
under flanking fire from American tanks
located by the railroad underpass just
north of St. Vith. At the same time Com-
pany A of the 38th Armored Infantry
Battalion fired into their ranks from the
front. American artillery joined in, the
attack broke, and the 295th streamed
back from whence it had come.
At 2000 the battle along the Schön-
berg road flared up again. This was the
end. Most of the American troops were
killed or captured, so that only a condi-

ST. VITH IS LOST 405
tional reconstruction of the German
breakthrough east of St. Vith can ever
be made. The American units flanking
the road had been badly understrength
before the 21st, but the lengthy and de-
structive barrage laid down by the enemy
had caused very severe casualties and
shaken the defenders. Sustained shelling
had also destroyed all means of com-
munication, except by runner, and left
the little groups isolated and unable to
support one another. Troop B of the
87th Reconnaissance Squadron and Com-
pany A of the 81st Engineer Combat
Battalion, both directly in the German
path, probably numbered less than forty
men apiece when the final blow fell.
It appears that if there were any mines
left on the Schönberg road they had
been lifted in preparation for a promised
counterattack by American tanks.
Actually there were only three Sher-
mans on the main road, remnant of a
reserve platoon which had been com-
mandeered when the initial tank sup-
port had decamped. During the earlier
lull the enemy infantry worked through
the thick woods, penetrating the thin
and disordered American line at a
number of points. The final assault,
made by the 294th and one or two pla-
toons of Tigers, simply peeled the
Americans back on both sides of the
road. The three Shermans had aimed
their guns to blast the first tanks as
they came over the ridge where the
American foxhole line had been drawn.
In the darkness, and with radios and
wire no longer functioning, the first sign
of the enemy armor was a volley of
flares fired in flat trajectory from the
Panthers. Silhouetted in light and with
blinded crews the Shermans were dis-
posed of in one, two, three order. In
a matter of minutes German infantry
and tanks were to the rear of the foxhole
line. Lt. Col. Thomas J. Riggs, Jr., com-
mander of the 81st Engineer Combat
Battalion, who had tried to organize a
counterattack to wipe out the earlier
penetrations was lost trying to organize
a last-ditch defense in the hamlet of
Prümerberg on the main road. No with-
drawal orders reached the troops now
behind the enemy. Some held where
they were; some stampeded blindly
through the woods in search of an exit to
the west.
A double column of enemy troops and
vehicles marched along the road into
St. Vith. On the right of Colonel Fuller’s
sector Company B of the 23d Armored
Infantry Battalion and a platoon of the
814th Tank Destroyer Battalion, after
having withstood almost continuous as-
sault for four hours, succumbed about
the same time to the 183d Regiment,
which attacked along the draw from
the southeast between CCB, 7th Ar-
mored, and CCB, 9th Armored. The
183d Regiment now poured through the
draw into St. Vith. Two of the American
tank destroyers reached St. Vith and here
blocked the main street until nearly mid-
night, when one was destroyed by a
bazooka round. Of the force originally
commanded by Colonel Fuller in the
eastern sector only some two hundred
escaped, and half of these had to be
evacuated for wounds or exhaustion.
The loss here of the four armored in-
fantry companies would be keenly felt
by CCB, 7th Armored Division.
General Clarke, the CCB, 7th Ar-
mored Division, commander, could do
little to influence the course of the battle.
Communications were gone and he had
no reserves. About 2130 he ordered what

406 THE ARDENNES: BATTLE OF THE BULGE
was left of his command to fall back
to the high ground west of the city,
planning to anchor the new line on those
of his troops who were still intact in
the Nieder-Emmels sector, northwest of
St. Vith. The troops east of St. Vith
simply had to be written off (at least
600 officers and men) although some
later would be able to work their way
back through the German lines.
The new defense ordered by Clarke
began to form shortly before midnight.
It was a ragged, piecemeal affair about
two miles long, running south from
Hünningen along the chain of hills a
thousand yards west of St. Vith. Lt. Col.
Robert C. Erlenbusch (Commanding
Officer, 3 1st Tank Battalion) was
charged with the organization of this new
position. He and Lt. Col. Robert L. Rhea
(Commanding Officer, 23d Armored In-
fantry Battalion), who had taken over
from Colonel Fuller when the latter was
evacuated because of exhaustion, were
able to restore some measure of confi-
dence and order. CCB, 7th Armored
Division, be it remembered, was a
battle-tested outfit of superior morale-
as was the entire division–so credit also
must go to the unnamed officers,
noncoms, and men who withdrew in
good order to the new line. Fortunately,
the enemy, too, had to regroup before
he resumed the battle,
CCB, 9th Armored, also made read-
justments to meet the new situation.
General Clarke had informed General
Hoge, whose command post was close
at hand, that his command was moving
back to re-form west of St. Vith. Since
the shift would leave Hoge’s northern
flank open, it was agreed that contact
between the two combat commands
would be re-established at Bauvenn,
necessitating that Hoge’s left be pulled
back some two thousand yards. This was
accomplished. The remainder of CCB,
9th Armored Division, remained in the
positions on the ridge line west of the
Braunlauf Creek and draw.
About 2200 General Clark reached
General Hasbrouck with word of what
had happened at St. Vith and the latter
immediately informed the XVIII Air-
borne Corps. But this was not all that
the 7th Armored Division commander
had to report. Earlier, Task Force Jones
(deployed on the southern flank of the
salient) had captured a German engi-
neer officer who, under questioning,
said that his division, the 2d SS Panzer
Division, was moving toward Gouvy.
Thus far the 2d SS Panzer Division had
not been located. Its presence on the
weak southern flank (in case the cap-
tured officer was not a “plant”) was
disturbing. Apparently General Has-
brouck accepted the veracity of the re-
port (he could hardly risk the chance
that it was not true) and so recom-
mended that General Ridgway send the
3d Armored Division east and south to
meet this new enemy. Already Has-
brouck had ordered Task Force Jones to
shorten its line because the last reserve
available behind the southern wing (the
17th Tank Battalion) was en route to re-
inforce CCB. Without Wemple’s tanks,
or with them, Task Force Jones was no
match for any large detachment of the
2d SS Panzer Division.
The First Army commander still ex-
pected, on the night of the 21st, that
Ridgway’s corps would shortly gain con-
tact with the 7th Armored–but the
situation was deteriorating at a fast clip.
After a hasty meeting of his corps staff
the XVIII Airborne commander sent

ST. VITH IS LOST 407
new orders to Hasbrouck (it was now
about 0200 on the 22d). The 424th and
112th Infantry Regiments were to with-
draw from their positions. The entire
force under Generals Hasbrouck and
Jones was to form a defensive ring west
of St. Vith and east of the Salm River.
By early morning of the 22d the with-
drawal of the southernmost units was
under way and the circle was beginning
to form. The command situation finally
was “regularized” when Ridgway gave
Maj. Gen. Alan W. Jones the com-
mand of the 7th Armored Division
(he ranked Brig. Gen. Robert W.
Hasbrouck) in addition to his own divi-
sion and its attachments. Actually this
change had no effect on the conduct
of subsequent operations and was
effective for only a few hours.
A perimeter defense by units cut off
from the rest of the XVIII Airborne
Corps was a very temporary expedient;
the ground now occupied, in the opinion
of the local commanders, could not be
held for long. General Clark later
phrased the problem thus:
In studying the map of the area it will
be noted that the troops were to be dis-
posed surrounding a forest through which
there was a paucity of roads. There was
practically no possibility of being able to
shift forces to meet a threat at any point.
HOW units were to be supplied in such
a situation is not understood. Air supply
of such a large and scattered force would
have been most difficult. Without supply
the force would have been through in two
or three days.
Fortunately for the forces in the sali-
ent the withdrawal to the “goose egg”
defense, a move made with extreme
difficulty on muddy and congested roads
and trails, was unhampered in its first
phases by any German reaction. The
occupation of St. Vith had considerably
disorganized the attacking division,
whose regiments jammed into the town
from east, north, and south. Orders given
the 18th Volks Grenadier Division early
on the 22d to continue the attack along
the main road through Rodt and Poteau
toward the Salm River could not be
carried out for some hours. On the left
the bulk of the 62d Volks Grenadier
Division was still confronted with an un-
broken defense. The only force in posi-
tion for an immediate exploitation was
Remer’s Fuehrer Begleit Brigade, whose
tanks finally had arrived on the evening
of 21 December.
The Final Withdrawal from
the St. Vith Sector
The raid made by Remer’s infantry
past Rodt now paid dividends. Having
found a negotiable route for his heavy
vehicles, Remer prepared to capture
Rodt, cut the main road between that
village and Vielsalm, and overrun such
of the American batteries as remained
in the way. In the midst of a snowstorm,
sometime around midnight of the 21st,
Remer’s tank group and his armored
infantry started along the narrow trails
winding through the thick woods north
of the Rodt-Vielsalm road. By daybreak
the Fuehrer Begleit advance guard had
arrived at the edge of the forest north
of Rodt. This small village, 4,000 yards
west of St. Vith, lay on the reverse slope
of a ridge line along which extended
the north flank of the 7th Armored Divi-
sion. Here a number of secondary roads
entered the St. Vith–Vielsalm highway,
one from Recht in the north, others from
Hinderhausen and Crombach in the
south. As a result of the regrouping

408
THE ARDENNES: BATTLE OF THE BULGE
TANKOF THE 7TH ARMORED DIVISION in a temporary position near St. Vith.
under way in the 7th Armored zone,
Rodt was the junction point between
CCA, still holding the division north
flank, and CCB, raising a new line along
the low hill chain that extended south of
the village. The ground at Rodt, then,
overlooked the flank and rear of CCB.
The village itself was garrisoned by
the service company of the 48th Armored
Infantry Battalion and some drivers be-
longing to the battalion whose vehicles
were parked there. Astride the woods
road running north to Recht were small
blocking detachments of tanks, engi-
neers, and antitank guns. Between Rodt
and the next village to the west, Poteau,
two companies of medium tanks pa-
trolled the main road and watched the
trails running in from the north. To the
northeast the troop from CCB which
originally had held the left wing of the
St. Vith sector around Hünningen was
still in position; as yet it had not
sustained any heavy blows.
As light broke, the right battalion of
Remer’s brigade attacked to cut the main
western road close to Poteau. The
German assault here was beaten off by
the drivers in a vehicle park who used
the .50-caliber machine guns on their
two-score half-tracks in a withering
fusillade. In the east, at Rodt, Remer’s
left battalion tried to rush the village
from the woods but ran straight into
artillery fire. Some of the Germans made
it to the houses and defended them-

ST. VITH IS LOST 409
selves in the cellars, but most of the
battalion finally had to pull back. A
number of prisoners were later rounded
up by the Americans on the Recht road.
The second German assault was made in
a more methodical manner. First,
mortars went to work against houses
and foxholes. Then the German tank
group, which had been delayed by a
mine field, and an infantry company or
two swung to the west and rolled down
the main road into the village. The
Sherman tanks on the Recht road were
caught in masked positions from which
they could not return the panzer fire
coming in from higher ground, and the
troops in Rodt could not stand alone
against the Panthers. The enemy took
the village quickly, and with it many
of the half-tracks belonging to the 48th
Armored Infantry Battalion.
Word that the St. Vith–Vielsalm road
had been cut at Rodt reached Lt. Col.
Vincent L. Boylan, Commanding Officer,
87th Cavalry Reconnaissance Squadron,
who took charge of the few troops of
CCB remaining north of St. Vith on the
wide open flank. Boylan got orders from
Clarke to withdraw south at once. De-
spite a brush with Remer’s group and
the loss of several tanks in the swampy
ground south of Rodt the command
reached Crombach and Hinderhausen,
where General Clarke was building a
second line of defense. This line was
now gravely endangered on its open
north flank by the German position
astride the ridge at Rodt.
In the meantime, Colonel Rosebaum,
the CCA commander, sent two of his
tank companies east of Poteau to engage
Remer’s tanks. In a long-distance duel
along the ridge the Shermans were out-
ranged. Rosebaum asked for some tank
destroyers, hoping to stop the Panthers
if they should turn west from Rodt.
Remer’s objective, however, was not in
that direction.
All during the morning of 22 Decem-
ber American observers had watched
enemy troops and vehicles milling
around Recht, just to the north of
Poteau. Here the first identification
was made of the 9th SS Panzer Divi-
sion. This fresh armored division was in
fact moving its main strength west from
Recht toward the Salm River and col-
lision with the 82d Airborne Division,
but a kampfgruppe had been dropped
off to cover the south flank of the divi-
sion by attacking in the direction of
Vielsalm. With the discovery of this new
enemy force in the north and the knowl-
edge that the only route of withdrawal
remaining to CCA was along the road
from Poteau to Vielsalm, Colonel Rose-
baum gave over the effort against
the Fuehrer Begleit armor and gathered
the major part of his command in a
circular defense around the Poteau
crossroads. As yet he had only vague in-
formation of the serious situation con-
fronting the American troops in the
south and southeast.
The capture of Rodt left General
Clarke no alternative but further with-
drawal. In the early afternoon the
sketchy line just west of St. Vith was
abandoned and CCB fell back to the
secondary position which had been
under preparation since the early morn-
ing hours. The villages of Hinderhausen
and Crombach, on which this position
was based, both offered emergency exits
to the west along dirt roads and trails.
The three task forces organized along
the new line nominally represented a
total of five medium tank companies, a

410 THE ARDENNES: BATTLE OF THE BULGE
light tank company, three platoons of
90-mm. tank destroyers, two troops of
cavalry, and the equivalent of four or
five rifle companies. But unit integrity
had been lost, the armored components
were far below strength, and many of
the armored infantry were weary, ill-
equipped stragglers who had been put
back in the line after their escape from
St. Vith. General Clarke’s plea for rein-
forcements brought in a rifle company,
a company of tank destroyers, and a few
light armored vehicles. That was all.
Supplies were running short and the
ground now occupied was not well
adapted to defense. Still worse, CCB
had no friendly contact on the north,
and a patrol sent to establish connection
with CCB, 9th Armored, on the south
had disappeared. The fact was that the
62d Volks Grenadier Division had thrust
a force through the woods and along
Braunlauf Creek into the gap between
the two combat commands.
It will be recalled that on the night
of 21 December General Hoge had set
in motion a withdrawal of the northern
flank of CCB, 9th Armored, to conform
with Clarke’s first defensive position just
west of St. Vith. In blinding snow, on
slippery roads, 9th Armored tanks and
infantry headed for Bauvenn, desig-
nated as the linkage point for the two
combat commands. Confusion, darkness,
and mud slowed the move, but by morn-
ing a medium tank company and a
platoon of riflemen had reached the vil-
lage.
Bauvenn, no more than a jog in the
road, lay three-quarters of a mile north
of the natural corridor through which
flowed the Braunlauf Creek, the corridor
at whose eastern entrance the enemy
had attacked the night before in sever-
ing the connective tissue between the
7th and 9th Armored combat commands.
The course of the valley westward
proffered a natural line of advance, and
through it, in the early hours of the
22d, pushed small detachments of the
62d Volks Grenadier Division. Unde-
tected, a German rifle company reached
Neubrueck, in the valley southwest of
Bauvenn, where the command post of
the 27th Armored Infantry Battalion
was located. About 1000 the enemy
rushed the village and killed or captured
the entire battalion staff. A counterat-
tack thrown in by a scratch force of in-
fantry and tanks from Bauvenn drove
the Germans out and freed those Amer-
icans still alive. In a subsequent read-
justment of the CCB line to round out
the goose egg, Hoge’s tanks and infantry
were arrayed from Neubrueck south and
west through Grufflange and Maldingen.
Late in the afternoon a battalion of the
424th Infantry was added to the line,
but as yet the enemy made no appear-
ance in force in this sector.
The LXVI Corps was in no position
to capitalize with speed and immediate
effect on its capture of St. Vith. As the
intermingling of roadways at St. Vith
had made it possible for the defenders
to bar the way west, so now this knot
in the Belgian-German road prevented
a quick transfer of men and guns in
pursuit. Of the LXVI Corps only those
units which had swung wide of the city
during the attack were able to main-
tain pressure on the Americans: the
Fuehrer Begleit Brigade, executing
its semi-independent turning movement,
and the advance guard of the 190th
Grenadier Regiment, inserting a com-
pany or so between the two CCB’s. In
the course of the night battle at St. Vith

ST. VITH IS LOST 411
the German assault units had become
badly scrambled. The problem involved
in extricating and re-forming these units
was enhanced by the natural desire of
the German soldiers to make the most
of this opportunity to sleep for a little
while in warm billets. Service and army
troops, with and without orders, jammed
into the city in a kind of scavenger hunt
for anything usable that the Americans
had left behind.
The Sixth Panzer Army, thus far un-
able to win enough roads for a mass
movement to the west, turned its reserve
formations into the roads threading into
the city. The traffic jam thus created
was made worse by the horde of officers
and men driving American vehicles
captured in the Schnee Eifel who were
grimly determined to hang onto their
loot. By midmorning of 22 December
the flood of vehicles streaming into St.
Vith was out of control. For some hours
the columns could move neither forward
nor back, and when Field Marshal Model
arrived on the scene he was forced to
dismount and make his way into the
city on foot. Corps and division military
police, too few in number for a traffic
problem of this magnitude, were brushed
aside. The volks grenadier officers who
tried to restore some semblance of order
found the SS officers of the army units
truculent and unyielding. Divisional
and corps artillery, emplaced with great
effort in the woods east of the city, now
had to be snaked out along the narrow,
muddy, woods trails and wedged piece
by piece onto the overburdened roads
entering St. Vith. Even the batteries
supporting the 62d Volks Grenadier
Division on the south flank were
brought to a standstill in the mire on the
bypass through Galhausen.
To the commander of the 18th Volks
Grenadier Division, whose men had
taken St. Vith, the events of 22 De-
cember spelled catastrophe; to the
Americans falling back from the city they
were a godsend. Given this breath-
ing spell, the Allies now faced the ques-
tion of whether the tired, depleted, and
divided forces trying to form a new
perimeter should make a lone and
desperate stand or fall back to join the
XVIII Airborne Corps. This decision
rested with Field Marshal Montgomery,
the newly assigned commander of all
Allied forces north of the German sali-
ent, who had been authorized by the
Supreme Commander to give up such
ground as was necessary in order to as-
semble sufficient strength for a decisive
counterattack. During the morning of
the 22d a red-tabbed British captain
arrived at General Hasbrouck’s head-
quarters, introducing himself as one of
the field marshal’s liaison officers. Po-
litely he asked Hasbrouck what he
thought should be done with the 7th
Armored. The general answered that the
division naturally would continue to de-
fend if its present position was con-
sidered to be vital but that he personally
favored withdrawal. 5
Hasbrouck’s answer and a report on
the existing state of the American forces
were taken to Montgomery. Mean-
while Hasbrouck dispatched a memo-
5 Montgomery’s first source of information on the
American situation and, subsequently, his best
liaison agency with the American commanders
was the British intelligence-communications organi-
zation known as Phantom. The Phantom officers
were particularly welcome at Hodges’ headquarters
and Collins’ VII Corps headquarters, a partial
explanation of the close tie-in between Montgomery
and these particular commands. See R. J. T. Hills,
Phantom Was There (London: Edward Arnold &
Co., 1951).

412 THE ARDENNES: BATTLE OF THE BULGE
randum to the XVIII Airborne Corps
commander setting forth the hard facts
of the case already put to the British
captain.
. . . Unless assistance is promptly forth-
coming I believe our present position may
become serious for several reasons, namely:
a. Our supplies must come in through a
bottleneck over a bridge near Vielsalm. b.
We may become subjected to enemy artil-
lery fire from practically any direction. c.
The road net within our position is
totally inadequate to the troops and ve-
hicles concentrated therein. The map
shows many roads, but on the ground, the
majority of these are mere tracks on which
even a jeep bogs down if more than two
or three travel on it. d. If the 2d SS Panzer
Division attack should succeed in driving
back the two RCTs of the 82d Airborne
Division now between Salmchâteau and
Hebronval even as little as 3000 yards we
will be completely severed from any source
of supplies.
Since the chances of assistance in the
immediate future do not seem bright, I
would like to suggest that consideration be
given to withdrawal of the 7th Armored
and 106th Divisions to a position to the
right (west) of the 82d Airborne Division
where they may be of assistance in halting
a possible advance north by the 2d SS
Panzer.
The withdrawal of CCB, 7th Armored
Division, last night from St. Vith was ex-
pensive. So far we are missing at least one
half of Clarke’s force. Of course many of
them will show up, but they will be minus
weapons, ammunition, blankets and ra-
tions as well as at a low physical level. I
don’t think we can prevent a complete
break-through if another all-out attack
comes against CCB tonight [italics sup-
plied] due largely to the fact that our
original three infantry battalions have at
present melted to the equivalent of only
two very tired battalions.
It was about an hour before noon.
Hasbrouck had not yet sent his message
to Ridgway when word came of the
German advance against the north flank
of CCB, 7th Armored, in the Rodt sector.
General Hasbrouck now had a postscript
to add, one bringing tenseness and
urgency to the precise military form and
phraseology of the main text.
P.S. A strong attack has just developed
against Clarke again. He is being out-
flanked and is retiring west another 2,000
yards refusing both flanks. I am throwing
in my last chips to halt him. Hoge has
just reported an attack. In my opinion if
we don’t get out of here and up north of
the 82d before night, we will not have a
7th Armored Division left. RWH.
This message reached Ridgway’s head-
quarters ten minutes before noon.
Hasbrouck was not alone in this ap-
prehensive view of things to come. Over
the field telephone General Jones con-
curred in the opinion furnished Mont-
gomery and Ridgway, but at 1250 Jones
dispatched a memo to Ridgway saying,
“My intentions are to retain the ground
now defended.” Without further orders
the two commanders, their staffs, and
subordinates set to work on plans for
demolitions and a rear guard stand to
keep the escape routes to the Salm open.
During the afternoon the 7th Armored
Division trains, whose officers and men
had done a remarkable job in support-
ing the troops in the salient, got through
one last supply column of ninety ve-
hicles to Salmchâteau. The arrival
of gasoline, rations, ammunition, and
the presence of a few replacement ve-
hicles in the division park would make
the last-ditch stand or withdrawal,
whichever it might be, a little easier.
In the middle of the afternoon the
order came-withdraw. Montgomery had
consulted with General Hodges, the
First Army commander, and here

ST. VITH IS LOST 413
showed the ability to honor the fighting
man which had endeared him to the
hearts of the Desert Rats in North
Africa: “They can come back with all
honor. They come back to the more
secure positions. They put up a wonder-
ful show.” The First Army commander,
tired and worried from the strain under
which he had lived since 16 December,
agreed to the withdrawal. 6
In the chain of command only General
Ridgway demurred. He still hoped to
counterattack and restore the line
Malmédy–St. Vith. As an airborne com-
mander thoroughly indoctrinated in the
concept of isolated action by units cut
off from friendly ground contact and
supply he took a sanguine view of the
ability of the goose-egg defenders to hold
until the projected corps counterattack
relieved them. This optimism, as the
record shows, was not shared by the
commanders in the ring itself. At 1500
a radio message from the XVIII Air-
borne Corps headquarters informed
Hasbrouck that the “request of CG, 7
AD” for withdrawal had been approved.
With this concrete mission assigned,
planning began for the extremely diffi-
cult job of disengaging from an enemy
who might continue the attack at any
moment. Even as a logistical exercise
withdrawal presented a tricky staff prob-
lem. The roads to be used were few
and in poor state, the troops and vehicles
to be moved were so numerous that a
thirty-minute gap in a column on any
6 The role played by Montgomery while in
command on the north flank of the Ardennes is
described in two of his books: Field Marshal
Montgomery of Alamein, Normandy to the Baltic
(Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1948) and
The Memoirs of Field-Marshal the Viscount
Montgomery of Alamein (Cleveland, Ohio: The
World Publishing Company, 1958). For the numer-
ous visits to General Hodges see the Sylvan Diary.
one of the roads would be serious. The
7th Armored Division, CCB of the 9th
Armored, the remnants of the 106th
Division, and the sizable attached units
all would have to make their westward
exit through a 3,000-yard-wide bottle-
neck with only two bridges, those span-
ning the Salm River at Vielsalm and
Salmchâteau. To achieve the tight con-
trol needed in this type of operation
General Ridgway ordered General Has-
brouck to take charge of all the troops
in the ring, General Jones becoming
assistant to the corps commander and
General Hoge being named deputy com-
mander of the 7th Armored.
The plan for withdrawal, slowly and
carefully worked out by Hasbrouck and
Colonel Ryan on the evening of the 22d,
envisaged a progressive siphoning from
the units farthest to the east in which
these troops passed gradually into the
main routes leading to the bridges while
rear guard forces staged holding actions
in echelon along the roads and trails.
Originally three routes were chosen: a
northern route along the Poteau-Viel-
salm road; a center route from Comman-
ster to the Vielsalm bridge (nothing
more than a poor woods road); and
a southern route via Maldingen, Beho,
and Bovigny, thence north along the
Salm valley road to the Salmchâteau
bridge and east along the Salmchâteau-
La Roche road by way of the Baraque
de Fraiture crossroads, which at this
time was still in American hands.
General Ridgway estimated that Has-
brouck’s troops would have fourteen
hours of darkness in which to make their
getaway. But at least four hours were
consumed in drafting the plan and dis-
patching liaison officers, who had to
memorize the general plan and the

414 THE ARDENNES: BATTLE OF THE BULGE
specific instructions for the unit to which
they were sent. At 0030 on the 23d
General Hasbrouck informed General
Hoge that his combat command, which
was to initiate the move west, would
begin withdrawal at 0200. By this time
both Hoge’s and Clarke’s combat com-
mands were under attack. The two com-
manders consulted, agreed that Hoge
could not break loose and thus expose
Clarke to encirclement from the rear,
and telephoned Hasbrouck at his com-
mand post in Vielsalm that the with-
drawal must be delayed. Meanwhile the
hours of darkness were slipping away.
The bulk of the LXVI Corps re-
mained wedged in the streets of St. Vith
or backed up along the roads funneling
in from the east. But the combat eche-
lons of the two regiments of the 62d
Volks Grenadier Division which had by-
passed the city on the south were in posi-
tion by the night of the 22d to renew the
attack. A few tanks, light armed recon-
naissance troops, most of the division
engineers, and considerable rifle strength
struck through the dark against the east-
ern arc of the loosely organized Ameri-
can ring. At first there was no artillery
forward to give weight to the assault,
but densely wooded approaches and
darkness gave the advantage to the at-
tackers.
At Crombach, in the sector held by
CCB, 7th Armored, the attack came in
along the railroad, and the American
tanks again were blinded by high
velocity flares which gave the first clear
shot to the enemy armor. East of the
village American infantry and engineers
were aided by friendly gunners, for the
434th Armored Field Artillery Battalion
had received some ammunition when the
trains came in and its forward observers
were well posted. A protective barrage
dropped in a half moon, sometimes no
more than three hundred yards in front
of the American foxholes, checked part
of the 190th Grenadier Regiment east
of Crombach. But some Germans filtered
into town from the north and started
hunting down the American tanks and
assault guns. With little protection
against the German bazooka teams a
number of the fighting vehicles pulled
out of danger. Colonel Wemple and
other officers restored a line, but when
daylight came it was hard to tell whether
friend or foe really held Crombach.
The left battalion of the 190th made
use of the predawn hours on the 23d
to renew the push along Braunlauf
Creek (on the north flank of Hoge’s
combat command) , which had been
beaten back by the American tankers
early in the day. This time the enemy
gained Neubrueck and held it, feeding
in more troops hourly from the assembly
area of Galhausen. Horse-drawn artillery
succeeded in getting into position near-
by and had a share in the action. The left
flank of CCB, 7th Armored, folded back
to the southwest. Then Hoge’s center
was hit, at this point by the 164th
Grenadier Regiment whose troops got
into Grufflange in the darkness and over-
ran a medium tank platoon. The situa-
tion at Grufflange was so confused that
neither Americans nor Germans reacted
to the fight there, either to seal off the
sector or to continue the penetration.
Meanwhile, as dawn drew near, the left
wing of the 164th moved against
Thommen, where a cavalry platoon held
an outpost to the south of the main
CCB, 9th Armored, lines. A heavy bar-
rage (the 62d Volks Grenadier Division
by this time had a number of pieces

ST. VITH IS LOST 415
in firing position) and a massed infantry
assault drove the troopers out. When
ordered back into the village the cavalry-
men found it jammed with German in-
fantry.
By daylight small hostile groups had
pushed far to the west in the sectors
of the two armored combat commands.
Some had even climbed out of the
Braunlauf valley and engaged in scat-
tering fire against the battalion of the
424th Infantry in the reserve position
at Maldingen. In general, however, the
battle was waning all along the eastern
arc, bringing a brief respite to the men
in the foxholes, now subjected to a
freezing, blasting wind after hours of
fighting in snow and slush. Although
no major disruption had occurred in the
ring defense, the night attacks had de-
veloped cracks in the line at Crombach
and in the valley of the Braunlauf
which would widen under a little more
pressure. Most important, the 62d Volks
Grenadier Division had robbed the
Americans of their chance for a night
withdrawal.
At Vielsalm General Hasbrouck
waited impatiently for word that the two
harassed combat commands were ready
to disengage. He was acutely conscious
of the narrow margin of protection af-
forded by the 82d Airborne Division and
worried lest a northward attack by the
incoming 2d SS Panzer Division beat
back the west flank of the 82d and
close off the Salm River exits once and
for all. Finally, at 0500, this message
went out from the command post of the
7th Armored Division:
The situation is such on the west of the
river south of [the] 82d that if we don’t
join them soon the opportunity will be
over. It will be necessary to disengage
whether circumstances are favorable or
not if we are [to] carry out any kind of
withdrawal with equipment. Inform me of
your situation at once particularly with re-
gard to possibility of disengagement and
execution of withdrawal.
General Hoge, whose combat com-
mand was first in the march table, was
able to give a favorable answer, but
all this last-minute improvisation took
time. As a result, orders charging CCB,
9th Armored, to pull out at 0600 were
received in Hoge’s command post at
0605. About ten minutes later the with-
drawal commenced, running smoothly
to conclusion. One tank company was
left as rear guard north of Maldingen,
there blocking the approach from the
German concentration area at Gal-
hausen, but the enemy reacted slowly
and the rear guard got away with the loss
of only two tanks. A small cavalry de-
tachment, Task Force Lindsey (Capt.
Franklin P. Lindsey, Jr.), remained
through the morning, screening the
exit route at its Maldingen entrance.
The first phase of the withdrawal had
been auspicious. Be it noted, however,
that the southern route (via Beho,
Salmchâteau, and through the 82d Air-
borne lines at Lierneux) followed a
hard-surfaced motor road, that as yet
there was little traffic congestion, and
that the enemy efforts prior to the with-
drawal had not disorganized the com-
mand but had simply forced its left flank
closer to the avenue of escape.
The southern force of CCB, 7th Ar-
mored, under Colonel Wemple, was next
to go, the plan calling for a move south
through Braunlauf and onto the route
traveled by Hoge’s columns. Wemple’s
task had been complicated by the events
of the night, since the Germans had

416 THE ARDENNES: BATTLE OF THE BULGE
won partial control of Crombach and
were sitting across the road in the rear
of the American tanks and riflemen to
the east of the village. But the assault
guns which had pulled out of Crombach
and gone south during the night battle
now came handily into play. At 0718
Wemple sent the guns blazing into the
western side of the village in an attempt
by smoke and shell to drive the Germans
off the streets.
The enemy grenadiers and gunners
refused to stay put. When the American
tanks rolled in from the east, two of
the leaders were hit by antitank fire
and left helplessly blocking the road.
Fate took a hand to save the rest of
the column. During the night a quick
freeze had hardened the ground just
enough to allow the tanks and half-
tracks from the east, covered with cling-
ing foot troops, to swing cross-country
and south to the Braunlauf road. Even
so, a number of vehicles mired and had
to be abandoned at the soft banks of
a small stream. At Braunlauf the col-
umn found a company of the 424th
Infantry in a fire fight with German
infantry who had sneaked in during the
night. The tankers, mindful of their
passengers, could not use the tank can-
non; so the column rolled through the
streets with the infantry riders firing
wildly in every direction. The Germans
were somewhat disconcerted, but snipers
accounted for two American officers. The
rest of the journey behind Hoge’s col-
umns into the 82d Airborne lines was
without incident. By noon most of the
424th Infantry and Wemple’s force were
across the Salm. Of the southern half
of the original ring there remained only
the rear guard and covering forces strung
along the roads east of Salmchâteau.
The bulk of CCB, 7th Armored Divi-
sion, represented by Task Force Lohse
(formerly Erlenbusch), commanded by
Maj. Leslie A. Lohse, and Task Force
Boylan, started to withdraw shortly after
daybreak, Boylan’s command acting as
the division rear guard. Maneuver by
these elements of CCB was rigidly con-
stricted by the presence of the Fuehrer
Begleit armor in the north around Rodt
and by the German hold on Crombach.
Access to the Poteau-Vielsalm route in
the north or the Beho-Salmchâteau
route in the south was no longer possible.
There remained a narrow, rutted trail
running from Hinderhausen (around
which Task Force Boylan was deployed)
west through the woods to the crossroads
at Commanster, from which a secondary
road ran to the bridge at Vielsalm. This
jeep trail–it was no more–had been
reconnoitered by General Clarke on the
22d and designated (with much mis-
giving) as an emergency exit. The
emergency had arrived, fortunately along
with the sudden freeze that gave a
surface hard enough to bear the weight
of armored vehicles. Even so the one-
way trail was a poor and precarious
road to safety; a sudden thaw or one
tank askew could trap both Lohse and
Boylan.
While Boylan’s men took positions to
defend Hinderhausen against attack
from Rodt, Lohse’s heavy column formed
to enter the trail at Hinderhausen.
It consisted of four tank companies, two
cavalry reconnaissance troops, a com-
pany of tank destroyers, and many foot
soldiers hitchhiking on the vehicles. The
move had no more than started when
the Fuehrer Begleit Brigade descended
on Hinderhausen. While Boylan took on
the Germans, Lohse’s column circled

ST. VITH IS LOST 417
the village, then funneled slowly into the
woods. One tank threw its track on the
one-way stretch but obligingly coasted
off the trail and into the trees. At
Commanster a traffic jam started. Most
of the nine field artillery battalions in
the ring had been grouped in this area
and their displacement–while some bat-
teries remained to keep up fire–was a
slow, painful process. General Clarke
took a hand here as a kind of super
traffic cop until the jam cleared. By noon
Task Force Lohse and most of the artil-
lery had crossed the river at Vielsalm.
Having cut the St. Vith–Vielsalm road
by capturing Rodt in the late morning
of the 22d, Remer’s Fuehrer Begleit
Brigade made no serious attempt to push
beyond Rodt, either against CCA, 7th
Armored Division, to the west or CCB
to the south. Remer’s heavy Panthers
had made bad going of the muddy roads
north of Rodt. Only a few arrived in
time to take part in the battle there;
for the rest of the day and far into the
night the Panthers crawled into the
Rodt assembly area. The Fuehrer
Begleit trains could not negotiate the
churned and mired trails at all. They
would have to be threaded through the
St. Vith bottleneck.
In the early morning of 23 December
Remer gathered a truck-mounted bat-
talion of armored infantry, put some
tanks at their head, and started them
for Hinderhausen, with the intention of
cutting south across the rear of the
Americans. About 0800 the Panthers en-
gaged the small covering force at
Hinderhausen. A brace of 90-mm. tank
destroyers knocked out two of the lead
tanks, temporarily halting the attack
and giving Lohse’s column time to reach
Commanster. When the Germans finally
maneuvered into position to renew the
attack, the Americans broke free and
fell back toward Commanster. German
infantry and a few tanks pursued but
were held off until the last of the CCB
column had been pushed through the
village and was on its way northwest
to the Vielsalm bridge.
Colonel Boylan led the rear guard
back toward the bridge but then was
ordered, because of a traffic jam at the
bridge, to hold on the east bank until
the 7th Armored Division headquarters
could cross. This covering force con-
sisted of a few light tanks, a couple of
tank destroyers and a few rifle squads
from the 112th Infantry. The Fuehrer
Begleit Brigade did not follow CCB.
Remer’s orders were to join the LVIII
Panzer Corps west of the Salm, and his
immediate design was to reach the paved
road leading to Salmchâteau. The motor-
ized rifle battalion, now led by an as-
sault gun company, headed south toward
the road center at Beho, found it free
of American troops, and there joined a
part of the 62d Volks Grenadier Divi-
sion. The time now was midafternoon.
Task Force Lindsey, whose cavalry
and infantry had screened the main with-
drawal of the southern segment of the
ring, had come under damaging shell-
fire as the 62d Volks Grenadier Division
artillery got into position. About 13 15
the task force fell back through Beho
and proceeded west to Salmchâteau,
picking up other small blocking groups
as it went. Thus far events in the
southern sector had gone well for the
Americans. There remained the task of
evacuating the blocking force which for
so long had held the southernmost out-
posts of the St. Vith salient. This was
Task Force Jones, assembling in the

418 THE ARDENNES: BATTLE OF THE BULGE
middle of the afternoon at Bovigny some
three and a half miles south of Salm-
château on the west side of the Salm
River. To protect the valley corridor
through which Task Force Jones would
have to move some companies of the
112th Infantry were still left east of the
river in the villages of Rogery and
Cierreux.
When CCB of the 9th Armored, the
424th Infantry, and the larger part of
CCB, 7th Armored, had peeled away in
layers from the ring, the last two combat
commands of the 7th Armored defend-
ing the Poteau-Vielsalm highway had
to be drawn off. At Poteau, five miles
from the river, CCA stood facing the
enemy to north, east, and south. CCR
maintained its cordon along the valley
road. The Americans did not know that
the troops of the 9th SS Panzer Division,
who in past days had made raids from
Recht southwest toward Poteau, were
few in number and that only the day
before the main body of the 9th SS
Panzer Division had started on a forced
march to the northwest in an attempt
to break through to Kampfgruppe
Peiper, now nearing the end of its tether.
The German force left at Recht was no
more than a screen, although under
orders to maintain pressure on Poteau.
To the east of CCA, 7th Armored
Division, however, some part of the 293d
Regiment of the 18th Volks Grenadier
Division finally had worked its way
through St. Vith, arriving during the
night of 22 December at Rodt. After
some confusion in getting through the
Fuehrer Begleit Brigade around Rodt
on the morning of 23 December, the
293d continued along the road to Po-
teau. Again a confused command situa-
tion took its price. The infantry and
assault guns in the 9th SS Panzer Divi-
sion screen mistook the newcomers for a
withdrawing American column and
poured in heavy flanking fire. It was
some hours later–and the Americans
had decamped–when the 293d finally
entered Poteau.
Poteau lends itself well to defensive
action. It stands at the entrance to the
valley road which leads to Vielsalm, and
mechanized attack from either Recht or
Rodt had to funnel through the narrow
neck at this crossroads, vehicle maneuver
off either of the two approaches being
almost impossible. Away from the cross-
roads the ground rises sharply and is
cluttered with thick stands of timber.
The formation adopted by CCA was
based on a semicircle of ten medium
tanks fronting from northwest to east,
backed by tank destroyers and with rifle-
men in a foxhole line well to the front.
About 1035 the blocking troops left by
the 9th SS Panzer Division made an
attack. Tank and artillery fire stopped
the Germans just as it had on previous
days. Perhaps the enemy would have
returned to the fray and made the final
withdrawal hazardous, but shortly after
noon some P–38’s of the 370th Fighter
Group, unable to make contact with the
82d Airborne Division control to which
they were assigned, went to work for
the 7th Armored Division, bombing
and strafing along the road to Recht.
The enemy recovery was slow.
At 1345 Hasbrouck sent the signal for
CCA to pull out. In an hour the armored
infantry were out of their holes and
their half-tracks were clanking down the
road to Vielsalm. Forty minutes later
the tanks left Poteau, moving fast and
exchanging shots with German tanks,
while the 275th Armored Field Artillery

ST. VITH IS LOST
fired a few final salvos to discourage
pursuit. When the last vehicle of CCA
roared over the Vielsalm bridge (at 1620)
the remaining artillery followed; then
came the little force from CCR which
had held the road open while CCA made
its withdrawal. Darkness descended over
the Salm valley as CCR sped across the
Vielsalm bridge.
The vacuum which had existed for
some hours in the northern reaches of
the one-time ring had filled rapidly in
the late afternoon as the 18th Volks
Grenadier Division brought its infantry
out of St. Vith. Through most of the
23d, confusion and immobility char-
acterized the St. Vith bottleneck. But
the process of disentangling this mass
of men and vehicles was speeded up
considerably during the afternoon when
the 402d and 485th Squadrons (370th
Fighter Group) winged their bombs
onto the city and its approaches. By
dark the 293d Regiment was march-
ing through Poteau and the rest of the
infantry formations of the division were
jumbled along a five-mile front on the
east side of the Salm. Control, as the
18th’s commander later reported, was
almost nonexistent. As a result the small
body of riflemen from the 112th Infantry
and Boylan’s tiny armored rear guard
were able to see the headquarters of the
7th Armored safely across the Vielsalm
bridge and to withdraw themselves
through that city without much inter-
ference from the enemy closing along
the river. This was sometime after 1900.
Although troops of the 18th Volizs
Grenadier Division or the 9th SS Panzer
Division fired on Boylan as his detach-
ment reached the river, they made no
attempt to rush the bridge–a fortunate
circumstance, as it turned out, for when
419
the 82d Airborne engineers tried to blow
the bridge the charge failed to explode.
It was after midnight when the engineers
finally reported that the charge had been
replaced and successfully detonated. 7
Even then the span was only partially
wrecked and was still capable of bearing
foot troops; but the German tanks mill-
ing about the burning buildings east of
the river would have to find other means
of crossing the Salm.
As for the last American troops extri-
cated from the ring, Task Force Jones,
it will be recalled, had assembled at
Bovigny, south of Salmchâteau and on
the west bank of the river, while ele-
ments of the 112th Infantry waited east
of the river at Rogery and Cierreux for
the withdrawal order from General Has-
brouck. The Germans driving on Salm-
château were held in tighter control
than those advancing toward Vielsalm
and moved with greater speed and co-
ordination. Around 1500 the mobile col-
umn of the Fuehrer Begleit Brigade
appeared in front of Rogery. There two
companies of the 1st Battalion, 112th
Infantry, were deployed, guarding a
draw and secondary road which provided
quick access to the Salm valley at a
point midway between Jones’s assembly
area at Bovigny and Salmchâteau. Lack-
ing armored or other antitank means,
the American infantry fell back in some
confusion through the draw to Cierreux,
less than a half-mile east of the river.
General Hasbrouck was apprised of this
new enemy threat; by what he later
remembered as “one of the funniest
7 1st Lt. George D. Lamm of the 508th Parachute
Infantry led a series of charges to hold back the
Germans while the bridge was being prepared
for demolition; thereafter he braved the enemy
fire to detonate the explosives himself. He was
given the DSC.

420 THE ARDENNES: BATTLE OF THE BULGE
orders I ever issued,” the 7th Armored
commander sent his “division reserve”
-two tank destroyers–hurrying south
from Vielsalm. One of the tank destroy-
ers arrived just as a German tank pla-
toon hove into sight at Cierreux, hit the
two leaders, and drove off the five re-
maining tanks. During the lull that
followed, a platoon of light cavalry tanks
and a section of towed tank destroyers
came east from the river road to give a
hand.
Colonel Nelson, commanding the
112th Infantry, had sent a radio message
some time around 1300 telling Has-
brouck that the withdrawal east of the
river had been completed, that only the
112th covering force remained. Nelson
waited for three hours for the division
order to withdraw (a liaison officer with
such an order had left Hasbrouck’s com-
mand post at 1345) . Then, with German
tanks only two hundred yards from the
regimental command post, lacking any
communication with the 7th Armored
headquarters, and out of touch with what
was happening elsewhere, he gave the
word to pull out of Salmchâteau. By
this time Task Force Jones was moving
along the Bovigny-Salmchâteau road
which traversed the narrow defile cut
by the Salm River. The infantry, con-
siderably disorganized, had just crossed
the river west of Cierreux and started
feeding into the 2,500-yard-long column
on the valley road when word passed
down the line that the light tanks in
the van had been hit by enemy fire as
they entered Salmchâteau. Here was the
column, strait-jacketed on the valley floor
by high ridges to either side, unable to
move forward or back, and with the
enemy apparently closing in from every
side. But Colonel Nelson, his executive
officer, Col. William F. Train, and a few
other officers set to work to organize a
breakout.
Actually the column was blocked at
Salmchâteau before the pursuing troops
of the Fuehrer Begleit Brigade caught
up with the tail. This bridgehead village
lay in the outpost line of the 508th
Parachute Infantry. Just north, the wing
of the 82d Airborne defense running
west to the Baraque de Fraiture cross-
roads (and junction with the 3d Ar-
mored Division) rested on the Salm
River. In the late afternoon of the 23d
the single company of the 112th Infantry
at the eastern end of the SaIm River
bridge had been attacked by a larger
force from the 62d Volks Grenadier
Division. The Americans had blown the
bridge and fallen back through Salm-
château to the lines of the 82d, where-
upon a few of the Germans crossed the
river and entered the village. The
stopper was more firmly seated in the
bottleneck just at dark with the arrival
of a detachment from the 2d SS Panzer
Division coming in from the southwest.
While the 2d SS Panzer Division
was awaiting the gasoline needed for
its projected attack north along the
seam between the 82d Airborne Di-
vision and the 3d Armored in the Bara-
que de Fraiture sector, the reinforced
Reconnaissance Battalion (Maj. Ernst
Krag) had been dispatched on the 22d
to cut the main road between Salm-
château and the Baraque de Fraiture
crossroads. Krag’s detachment attacked
straight north, driving in the American
outposts in villages south of the road
and dropping off small parties en route
to form blocking positions covering the
eastern flank of the division advance.
An attack to seize the village of Jou-

ST. VITH IS LOST 421
biéval, on the main road, was launched
late in the day but was repulsed by
the American artillery.
Krag decided to shift his advance to-
ward Salmchâteau and there possibly
link up with friendly forces he knew
to be coming from St. Vith. He had
available nearly three reconnaissance
troops and an assault gun battalion.
His accompanying battalion of self-pro-
pelled artillery was within range of
Salmchâteau. A sharp attack in the
late afternoon brought Krag’s detach-
ment through the American outposts
in the hamlets west of Salmchâteau,
and by nightfall he had a troop in the
south section of the town, its task
made easier by the preliminary shell-
ing laid in by the battalion of field
guns. From this point on Kampfgrup-
pe Krag fought two battles, one to
mop up the town, the other to capture
American vehicles trying to break out
of the valley road in the south.
As the evening wore on, the leading
Americans bottled up in the defile
hastily organized an attack to open the
exit through Salmchâteau, but there
was little room to deploy, and this at-
tempt failed. At the tail of the column
disaster, in the form of the Fuehrer
Begleit advance guard, suddenly struck.
The light tanks and tank destroyers,
earlier disposed at Cierreux, and now
brought back to form the column rear
guard, were spotted by German scouts
and set upon in the dark by assault
guns that lighted their targets with
high velocity flares. Several of the
American fighting vehicles were de-
stroyed before they could return fire.
To make matters worse some engineers
blew a culvert, trapping the tail of
the column. In sharp fighting most of
the mechanized force at the tail was
destroyed.
This was not to be the end. A trail
had been discovered leading west out
of the valley, and most of the middle
of the column, led by a light tank
company, escaped over it. Fortunately
bright moonlight allowed some maneu-
ver. Striking northwest and fighting
off the small blocking forces left be-
hind by Kampfgruppe Krag, the bulk
of this part of the column succeeded
in reaching the 82d Airborne. By mid-
night on the 23d over two hundred
men from the column had reached the
508th Parachute Infantry and many
others straggled in before daylight.
How many vehicles and men were cap-
tured by the enemy is impossible to
say.
There is a postscript to this story.
During Task Force Jones’s disengage-
ment the 440th Armored Field Artil-
lery had emplaced to give covering fire
and protect the flank of the task force.
When the 440th commenced its with-
drawal word came in that the Germans
had blocked the designated crossing
site at Salmchâteau. Thereupon the
440th formed in column, cut loose with
every available machine gun, knifed
through the startled enemy, and roared
over the bridge at Vielsalm.
The troops under General Has-
brouck’s command who came back across
the Salm River were greeted by a
warm letter of commendation from the
Supreme Commander and orders to
return at once to the fight. It is
difficult to determine with surety how
much of the 7th Armored Division,
CCB, 9th Armored, 424th Infantry,
112th Infantry, and the numerous at-
tached’ units had been lost during the

422 THE ARDENNES: BATTLE OF THE BULGE
fight for St. Vith and in the subsequent
withdrawal. Many records were de-
stroyed during the final retreat, units
were put back in the line on the 23d
with no accounting of their existing
strength, and the formations of the 106th
Division and 14th Cavalry Group had
taken very severe losses before the de-
fense of St. Vith began. Casualty figures
subsequently compiled for the 7th Ar-
mored Division, and the 14th Cavalry
Group list 3,397 officers and men either
killed, wounded, or missing, Statistics
on losses suffered by the various artil-
lery, engineer, and tank destroyer units
have never been compiled. The 7th Ar-
mored Division (by fairly accurate reck-
oning) had lost 59 medium tanks, 29
light tanks, and 25 armored cars. 8
8 Ridgway was told that there were about one
The losses sustained by the defend-
ers of St. Vith must be measured
against their accomplishments. They had
met an entire German corps flushed
with easy victory and halted it in its
tracks. They had firmly choked one of
the main enemy lines of communica-
tion and forced days of delay on the
westward movement of troops, guns,
tanks, and supplies belonging to two
German armies. They had given the
XVIII Airborne Corps badly needed
time to gather for a co-ordinated
and effective defense. Finally, these
units had carried out a successful with-
drawal under the most difficult condi-
tions and would return again to do
battle.
hundred usable tanks in the forces which came
out of St. Vith. Cf. XXIII below, pp. 582–83.

CHAPTER XVIII
The VII Corps Moves To Blunt the Salient
Thus far the story of the German
counteroffensive has been developed on
a geographical pattern generally from
east to west with particular attention
given the initial battles fought by the
American forces attempting to hold the
shoulders of the salient, the defense of
St. Vith, the VIII Corps’ attempt to
form a barrier line across the area of
penetration, and the First Army’s efforts
to extend the north flank alongside the
expanding bulge. While these bitter de-
fensive battles were being waged, Amer-
ican forces were already moving to go
over to the offensive in the south,
for as early as 19 December General
Eisenhower and his field commanders
had laid plans for a major counterat-
tack. But before this counterattack, by
the Third Army, takes stage center,
three important developments are un-
folding: the division of the Ardennes
battlefield between Field Marshal Mont-
gomery and General Bradley, the assem-
bly and intervention of the VII Corps
in an extension of the American north
shoulder, and the initial defense of the
Bastogne sector. 1
Division of the Battlefield
Late on Tuesday evening, 19 De-
cember, Maj. Gen. Kenneth w. D.
Strong, the SHAEF chief of intelligence,
1 This last will be the subject of the next
chapter.
went to Maj. Gen. J. F. M. Whiteley,
deputy chief of staff for operations at
SHAEF, with a proposal which would
have very audible repercussion. The
German drive, said Strong, showed no
sign of turning northwest toward Liège
but seemed to be developing on a
thrust line directly to the west. This
meant, in his opinion, that the Ameri-
can forces north and south of the grow-
ing salient would be split by its further
expansion toward the Meuse. It was his
idea, therefore, that two commands
should be created to replace General
Bradley’s 12th Army Group control of
the divisive battle front, General Brad-
ley to retain command of the troops on
the southern shoulder of the salient,
Field Marshal Montgomery to take
those in the north under the wing of
the British 21 Army Group. Strong’s
proposal seemed sound to Whiteley.
Although both officers were British,
neither had broached this idea to the
field marshal.
Whiteley immediately took his col-
league in to see the SHAEF chief of
staff, Lt. Gen. Walter Bedell Smith.
General Smith, famous in the head-
quarters for his hair-trigger temper, first
reacted negatively and with considerable
heat, then cooled off and admitted the
logic of the proposal. Sometime that
same evening Smith telephoned Brad-
ley. Bradley was none too sympathetic
toward the idea but did concede that

424 THE ARDENNES: BATTLE OF THE BULGE
Montgomery would be more apt to
throw British reserves into the battle
under such a command arrangement.
The next morning Smith brought up the
matter in the Supreme Commander's
usual meeting with his staff. Eisenhower
in his turn telephoned Bradley, who
agreed to the division of command.
The new army group boundary line,
now ordered by Eisenhower, would ex-
tend from Givet, on the Meuse, to St.
Vith. (That both these locations would
be Montgomery's responsibility was not
clarified until nearly twenty-four hours
later.) The reorganization placed the
U.S. First and Ninth Armies under
Montgomery's 21 Army Group. Bradley
would command all forces to the south
of the salient–which in effect meant
Patton's Third Army–and eventually he
might add Devers’ 6th Army Group.
The reorganization required a like shift
in the Allied air forces, meaning that
the U.S. IX and XXIX Tactical Air
Commands (Maj. Gen. Elwood R.
Quesada and Maj. Gen. Richard E.
Nugent) were put under the operation-
al control of the British Second Tac-
tical Air Force commanded by Air Chief
Marshal Sir Arthur Coningham. Be-
cause the British had very strong forces
of fighter-bombers, enough of these
planes were taken from IX Tactical
Air Command to give Brig. Gen. Otto
P. Weyland's XIX Tactical Air Com-
mand, slated to support Patton's coun-
terattack into the German bulge, ten
fighter-bomber groups. 2
2 Daily notes kept by the Chief of the Air Staff,
SHAEF, Air Marshal James M. Robb on the meet-
ings held in the Supreme Commander's office,
SHAEF (Main), in OCMH files (hereafter cited
as Robb Notes) ; SHAEF (Main) files: Montgomery
to Eisenhower.
The decision to pass the U.S. First
and Ninth Armies to British command
must have been hard to make, since
both Eisenhower and Smith were acute-
ly conscious of the smoldering animos-
ity toward the British in general and
Montgomery in particular which exist-
ed in the headquarters of the 12th
Army Group and Third Army, not to
mention the chronic anti-British senti-
ment which might be anticipated from
some circles in Washington. 3 This de-
cision involved no question of Bradley's
ability as a commander–that had been
abundantly proven–but rather was a rec-
ognition of the communications prob-
lem presented by the German thrust
between Bradley’s headquarters in Lux-
embourg City and Hodges’ headquar-
ters, which had been moved on the 19th
from Spa to Chaudfontaine.
Face-to-face discussion between Brad-
ley and Hodges–let alone Simpson–so
needful if the army group commander
was to give the continuous encourage-
ment and counsel demanded in these
trying days, was already difficult. If
German raiders crossed the Meuse, it
might become impossible. Bradley had
last visited Hodges in the early evening
of the 17th by motoring directly from
Paris. Further visits would involve tra-
versing three sides of a square: west
from Luxembourg across the Meuse
(and perhaps as far west as Reims),
north into Belgium, then east again be-
hind the none too certain American
front. Telephone and radio contact still
existed; indeed, Bradley talked half a
dozen times on the 18th with Hodges
and General Kean, the First Army chief
of staff, and at least twice on the 20th.
3 Pogue, The Supreme Command, pp. 378–80
and n.; Eisenhower, Crusade in Europe, p. 355.

THE VII CORPS MOVES TO BLUNT THE SALIENT 425
CAR BEARING GENERAL BRADLEY FORDS A BELGIAN RIVER
But this was hardly a satisfactory substi-
tute for personal presence.
The 12th Army Group had approx-
imately fifty important wire circuits
on 16 December between Luxembourg
and First and Ninth Armies, these ex-
tending laterally to link the three head-
quarters in sequence. The mainstay
and trunk line of this system was a com-
bination open-wire and buried cable
line from Aubange, near Luxembourg,
via Jemelle to Namur and Liège. Jem-
elle was a repeater station (near Mar-
che) and the key to the whole northern
network. As it turned out the Germans
subsequently cut both the wire line and
cable; the signal operators, as well as
a rifle platoon and a few light tanks
on guard duty at Jemelle, were or-
dered out when the enemy was in sight
of the station. Very high frequency radio
stations seem to have been available
throughout the battle but transmission
did not carry very far and had to be
relayed. These stations twice had to be
moved farther west to avoid capture.
Nonetheless the Signal Corps would
succeed in maintaining a minimum
service, except for short interruptions,
by stringing wire back into France and
through the various army rear areas.
Whether this would have sufficed for the
12th Army Group to exercise adminis-
trative as well as tactical control of the
First and Ninth Armies from Luxem-
bourg is problematical.

426 THE ARDENNES: BATTLE OF THE BULGE
A British major presented himself at
the First Army headquarters about two-
thirty on the morning of the 20th. Ush-
ered up to Hodges’ bedroom he told
the general and Kean that Montgomery
was moving 30 British Corps (Lt. Gen.
B.G. Horrocks) south into the Has-
selt–Louvain–St. Trond area to back
up the Meuse line if needed, that four
divisions were on the way and a fifth
would follow. Further, he said, the Brit-
ish were taking over the responsibility
for the Meuse bridges at Namur,
Liège, Huy, and Givet. One of Hodges’
main worries could now be shouldered
by somebody else. Whether there would
be a sufficient force available to halt
the German drive if it reached the
Meuse River south of Givet was still
open to question.
News of the decision to split the Amer-
ican forces battling in the Bulge came
to the First Army later in the morning
when Bradley telephoned this word.
Montgomery himself arrived at Hodges’
command post an hour or so after noon,
commencing a series of daily visits. He
promptly agreed with Hodges that the
V Corps’ position jamming the German
northern shoulder would have to be
held at any cost and concurred in the
handling of the XVIII Airborne Corps
as it had been deployed in the past
thirty-six hours. Eisenhower’s formal or-
GENERAL COLLINS, FIELD MARSHAL MONTGOMERY, AND GENERAL RIDGWAY, after
a conference at VII Corps headquarters.

THE VII CORPS MOVES TO BLUNT THE SALIENT 427
der placing the First and Ninth Armies
under Montgomery’s command stressed
that the flanks of the penetration must
be held but added that all available
reserves should be gathered to start
counterattacks in force. Montgomery’s
problem, then, was to cover the west
flank of the First Army between the
XVIII Airborne Corps and the Meuse
while re-forming his new command for
the counterattack mission. It would
appear that at this juncture the field
marshal was thinking in terms of a
counterattack against the western tip
of the salient, for he told Hodges that
he wanted the most aggressive Ameri-
can corps commander who could be
found and sufficient troops to launch an
attack from the area southwest of the
XVIII Airborne.
As to the first item, the marshal made
his wishes very clear: he wanted Maj.
Gen. J. Lawton Collins (“Lightning
Joe”), whose VII Corps had been car-
rying the left wing of the December
Roer River offensive; nor would he lis-
ten to any other names. Where to find
the divisions needed was more difficult.
But Bradley already had ordered the
84th Infantry Division to leave the
Ninth Army and come in on Ridgway’s
flank, the 75th Infantry Division had
just arrived from the United States and
would reach the battle zone in a few
days, the 3d Armored Division might
be available in the proximate future.
This, then, was the line-up for the new
VII Corps when Collins reported to
Hodges in the early morning of the 21st.
Collins got the promise of an addition
to his putative force when Brig. David
Belchem, 21 Army Group chief of opera-
tions, who was visiting headquarters,
suggested that the 2d Armored Division
be taken from the Ninth Army reserve.
Collins, who considered the veteran, 2d
and 3d the best armored divisions in
the U.S. Army, accepted with enthusi-
asm. Later in the day Montgomery
met with Hodges and Simpson, confirm-
ing the proposed transfer of the 2d Ar-
mored from Simpson’s command.
The VII Corps Assembles
Along the Roer River front the Ninth
Army was being stripped progressively
of its reserves as the German threat
in the south increased. After the 7th Ar-
mored and 30th Infantry Divisions had
been rushed to the First Army on 17
December, the next to go would be
the 84th Infantry Division (Brig. Gen.
Alexander R. Bolling), taken out of
the Geilenkirchen sector. Bolling re-
ceived orders on the night of the 19th
to make ready for relief by the 102d
Infantry Division, and at noon the next
day his leading regimental combat team,
the 334th, was on the road to Belgium.
At Chaudfontaine the First Army G–3
told Bolling to assemble the 84th in the
Marche sector, but the First Army staff
could furnish little accurate information
as to the location of friendly or enemy
troops in that area. Temporarily at-
tached to the XVIII Airborne Corps,
Bolling had no knowledge of the embryo
attack plan for the VII Corps. He was
alerted, however, to be ready to attack
northeast or east on order. 4
4 Both the VII Corps and the 84th Division
prepared AAR’s and G–3 journals. The regiments
of the 84th also have AAR’s and unit journals.
The semiofficial history of the latter division was
prepared by a member of the division, Lt. Theo-
dore Draper, The 84th Infantry Division in the
Battle of Germany, November 1944–May 1945
(New York: The Viking Press, 1946). See also

428 THE ARDENNES: BATTLE OF THE BULGE
Two hours before midnight on 20
December the leading troops of the 84th
entered Marche. The remainder of the
division was coming out of the line
about the same time, ready to begin the
seventy-five-mile move from Germany to
Belgium. As it stood it would be some
twenty-four hours before Bolling could
be sure of having the entire division
in hand. The 84th had been blooded on
the West Wall fortifications in the
Geilenkirchen sector and had spent a
month in combat before the move south.
Battalions had been rotated in the front
lines and were less battle-weary than
many of the troops thrown into the
Ardennes, but losses had been heavy and
the division was short 1,278 men.
The area in which the 84th Division
(and the VII Corps) would assemble
was high and rolling. There was no
well-defined system of ridges but in-
stead a series of broad plateaus separat-
ed by deep-cut valleys. Although some
sections were heavily forested, in gen-
eral the countryside was given over to
farm and pasture land dotted with small
wood lots. Concealment was possible in
the narrow stream valley and the larger
forests. The sector in question was
bounded on the east by the Ourthe
River, a natural barrier of considerable
significance. At a right angle to the
Ourthe another and less difficult river
line composed of the Lesse and its tribu-
tary, L’Homme, ran south of Marche,
through Rochefort, and into the Meuse
near Dinant. Beyond Marche a plateau
Cpl. Perry S. Wolff, A History of the 334th In-
fantry (Mannheim, Germany: Mannheimer Gross-
druckerei, 1945). The tank battalion supporting
the 84th also has published its combat record:
Capt. E. Castagna, The History of the 771st Tank
Battalion (Berkeley, Calif.: Lederer, Street & Zeus
Co., Inc., 1946).
suffused with the upland marshes and
bogs so common to the Ardennes ex-
tended as far south as St. Hubert. Marche
was the central and controlling road
junction for the entire area between the
middle Ourthe and the Meuse. Here
crossed two extremely important paved
highways; that running south from
Liège to Sedan; and N4, the Lux-
embourg City–Namur road which ran
diagonally from Bastogne northwest to
Namur and the Meuse with an offshoot
to Dinant. Eight miles south and west
of Marche the Liège-Sedan highway
passed through the town of Rochefort, at
which point secondary but hard-surfaced
roads broke away to the west, north,
and southwest. Rochefort, by road, was
approximately twenty miles from Din-
ant and the Meuse. Marche was some
twenty-eight miles from Bastogne and
about the same distance from the
confluence of the Sambre and Meuse
at Namur. The entire area was rich in
all-weather primary and secondary roads.
(Map VIII)
In the small, dark hours of 21 De-
cember while the leading regimental
team of the 84th Infantry Division was
outposting Marche and bedding down
in the town, the advance guard of the
crack 2d Panzer Division bivouacked on
the west bank of the Ourthe only fifteen
miles away. Neither of these future
antagonists had knowledge of the other.
At this point in the battle, the Fifth
Panzer Army had taken the lead from
the Sixth, whose hell-for-leather Peiper
had run his tanks into a net on the north
flank. Two armored divisions from the
Fifth were driving for the gap which
German reconnaissance had found open
between the XVIII Airborne Corps and
the VIII Corps. In the north the 116th

THE VII CORPS MOVES TO BLUNT THE SALIENT 429
Panzer Division had righted itself, after
the countermarch ordered on the night
of 19 December, and had pushed the
attack over Samrée on the 20th. The
order for the following day was to cross
the Ourthe in the neighborhood of Hot-
ton, just northeast of Marche, before the
Americans could bring troops into the
area, and thus open the road straight to
the Meuse. The 116th Panzer had lost at
least twenty-four hours by the counter-
march on the 19th, for on that night its
armored cars had been as far west as the
Bastogne-Marche road. In the neigh-
boring corps to the south, the 2d Panzer
Division finally had taken Noville on the
20th and been ordered to head for
Namur, disregarding the fight which had
flared up from Bastogne. When its re-
connaissance battalion seized the Ourthe
bridge at Ortheuville, shortly after mid-
night, the road to Marche and Namur
opened invitingly. Luettwitz, the XL VII
Panzer Corps commander, ordered Lau-
chert to disengage the 2d Panzer Divi-
sion north of Bastogne and speed for the
Meuse.
Here, then, were two armored divi-
sions from two different corps striking
out for the Meuse, one in the possession
of a crossing on the Ourthe, one ex-
pecting to seize a crossing in only a
few hours, but both divisions with their
flanks uncovered and both uncomfort-
ably aware of the fact. Nonetheless the
two corps commanders expected to
thicken their armored thrusts within
twenty-four hours: Luettwitz was trying
to shake the Panzer Lehr loose south
of Bastogne; Krueger had been promised
that the 2d SS Panzer Division was on
its way to the LVIII Panzer Corps.
During the 21st, however, the Fifth Pan-
zer Army’s advance would be carried
only by forward patrols of the 2d Pan-
zer Division and the 116th, the two
spearhead formations separated by the
Ourthe River and, in ensuing days, fight-
ing distinctly separate battles. 5
The commander of the 84th Infantry
Division set up his command post in
Marche on the late afternoon of 21 De-
cember under order to assemble his
division in this area. The enemy, so far
as he knew, was some miles away. The
only friendly troops he found in the
neighborhood were those of the 51st En-
gineer Combat Battalion, whose com-
mand post was located in Marche. This
battalion was part of the small engineer
force which the VIII Corps had gath-
ered to construct the barrier line along
the Ourthe River. The engineer com-
mander, Colonel Fraser, spread out his
two companies at roadblocks and dem-
olition sites all the way from Hotton,
on the river, to a point just south of
the Champlon crossroads on the Bas-
togne-Marche highway. This latter road-
block was only three miles north of the
Ortheuville bridge, which the 2d Panzer
advance guard wrested from the detach-
ment of the 158th- Engineer Combat
Battalion during the night of 20 De-
cember.
A few German patrols probed at the
roadblock before dawn but no attempt
was made to break through. The Ger-
man reconnaissance troops bedded down
in Tenneville, and batteries of the
division flak rolled into position to
guard the new bridgehead. For some
hours this was all. Lauchert’s tanks
were waiting for gasoline and literally
could not move. Although the 2d Panzer
had captured enough American trucks,
5 OB WEST KTB, daily entries for this period.

430 THE ARDENNES: BATTLE OF THE BULGE
jeeps, and half-tracks to motorize both
of its bicycle battalions, the grenadiers
would have to start the march west on
foot for the same reason. Furthermore,
fatigue had begun to tell; the 2d Panzer
troops had been marching and fighting
almost without respite since 16 De-
cember. Some of the human grit was
beginning to slow the wheels of the mili-
tary machine. But why Lauchert, a ruth-
less and driving commander, did not
prod his reconnaissance and flak for-
ward on the morning of the 21st can
only be surmised.
The first word of an attacking enemy
reached the 84th Division command
post in Marche at 0900, but the attack
was being made at Hotton, to the north-
east, where the 116th Panzer Division
had thrown in an assault detachment
to seize the Ourthe Bridge. General
Bolling ordered his single RCT, the
334th under Lt. Col. Charles E. Hoy,
to establish a perimeter defense around
Marche. Meanwhile the 5 1st Engineer
Combat Battalion asked for help in
the Hotton fight. But when troops of
the 334th reached the scene in midaf-
HOTTON, SHOWING KNOCED-OUT GERMAN TANK

THE VII CORPS MOVES TO BLUNT THE SALIENT 431
ternoon, the embattled engineers, aided
by a few men from the 3d Armored
Division, had halted the enemy and
saved the bridge–a feat of arms subse-
quently acknowledged by the German
corps and army commanders.
About noon Bolling received word
from the XVIII Airborne Corps that
the 334th was to hold the enemy south
of the Hotton-Marche line, both these
villages to be the responsibility of his
division. A few minutes later a corps
message arrived saying that fifteen Ger-
man tanks and an infantry company
had been reported five miles southeast
of Marche in the hamlet of Bande
and that they were heading west. By
this time General Bolling had a more
precise statement of his mission, for he
had telephoned army headquarters
about eleven o’clock to report the enemy
blow at Hotton and to ask whether his
single RCT should be committed to bat-
tle on the Marche-Hotton line. The an-
swer was “Yes, hold.” The question
posed by the commander of the 84th
had been much in the minds of Hodges
and Collins that morning. With the
German armored spearheads breaking
out toward the west, the risk entailed
in assembling the VII Corps piecemeal
as far forward as Marche was very real,
and the American commanders consid-
ered that perhaps the corps concentra-
tion should be made farther back to the
north. But with the order given Bolling
the die was cast.
There remained the question of how
best to bring in the rest of the 84th
and the bulk of the corps. Collins asked
for CCR of the 5th Armored Division,
which was at Rötgen under V Corps,
to be detailed to help the 3d Armored
hold N4, the road from Namur.
V Corps, however, still was hard beset
and Hodges would not at this moment
cut into its reserve. The commander of
the 84th, who did not know that a 3d
Armored picket still held Hotton, or-
dered the rest of his division to come
in on a road farther to the west. By
midnight of the 21st, he had his en-
tire division and the attached 771st
Tank Battalion assembled and in proc-
ess of deploying on a line of defense.
About dark, as the second RCT de-
trucked, Bolling relieved the 334th of its
close-in defense of Marche and moved
the 2d and 3d Battalions out to form
the left flank of the division, this an-
chored at Hotton where troops of the
3d Armored finally had been met. The
335th (Col. Hugh C. Parker) deployed
to the right of the 334th with its right
flank on N4 and its line circling south
and east through Jamodenne and Waha.
The 333d (Col. Timothy A. Pedley,
Jr.), last to arrive, assembled north of
Marche in the villages of Baillonville
and Moresée ready to act as cover for
the open right flank of the division–and
army–or as the division reserve.
During the night the regiments
pushed out a combat outpost line,
digging in on the frozen ground some
thousand yards forward of the main
position, which extended from Hogne
on Highway N4 through Marloie and
along the pine-crested ridges southwest
of Hampteau. The division now was in
position forward of the Hotton-Marche
road and that vital link appeared secure.
Earlier in the day the 51st Engineer
roadblocks on the Marche-Bastogne
highway had held long enough to allow
the 7th Armored trains to escape from
La Roche and reach Marche, but at
1930 the tiny engineer detachments were

432
given orders to blow their demolition
charges and fall back to Marche, leaving
the road to Bastogne in German hands.
The main task confronting the 84th
Division as day dawned on the 22d was
to determine the location of the enemy.
All through the day armored cars, light
tanks, and infantry in jeeps and trucks
probed cautiously along highways and
byways east, south, and west. Some of
these vehicles were shot up and the
men came back on foot; others engaged
in brief duels with unseen foes hidden
in villages and wood lots. No German
prisoners were taken, but it was clear
that the enemy also was feeling
his way. At noon an order from the
THE ARDENNES: BATTLE OF THE BULGE
XVIII Airborne Corps instructed Bol-
ling to block all roads east, southeast,
and south of Rochefort (seven and one-
half miles from Marche) until the 3d
Armored could extend its flank to this
area. A rifle company was loaded into
trucks and reached Rochefort in the
late afternoon without trouble.
Shortly after issuing this order Ridg-
way extended the mission of the 84th.
Earlier General Collins had visited the
First Army to express his concern that
the enemy might crowd in south and
west of Marche, thus interdicting the
planned VII Corps concentration. Ridg-
way’s order therefore called for the 84th
to extend a counterreconnaissance
84TH DIVISION MP’s CHECKING VEHICLES AT TRAFFIC CIRCLE near Marche.

THE VII CORPS MOVES TO BLUNT THE SALIENT 433
screen along the line Harsin-Grupont-
Wellin, some ten miles south of Marche,
at the same time sending security forces
southwest to hold the vital crossroad
villages at Rochefort, Wanlin, and
Beauraing, the latter nearly twenty
miles from the division command post
at Marche. It will be recalled, as well,
that Ridgway had ordered the newly
arrived CCA of the 3d Armored Divi-
sion to throw out a screen on the west
bank of the Ourthe between La Roche
and St. Hubert as further protection
for the VII Corps assembly. At noon
a task force from CCA was on
its way but by dark had progressed only
a short distance south of Marche. There
it halted on word that the 335th In-
fantry might need help against tanks
seen moving north toward Marche. Part
of the task force became involved with
enemy armored vehicles near Hargi-
mont and in a short, sharp fight ac-
counted for five of them.
Bolling could free two rifle battalions
and the necessary motors for what he
regarded as the first-priority tasks.
Early in the evening the two battalion
task forces, augmented with tanks and
tank destroyers, started out. The 1st Bat-
talion of the 333d (Lt. Col. Norman
D. Carnes) had orders to secure Wan-
lin and bar the Neufchâteau road to
Dinant on the Meuse; the 3d Battalion
of the 335th (Maj. Gordon A. Bahe)
was to hold Rochefort and cover the
road thence to Marche with detach-
ments at Harsin, Hargimont, and Jem-
elle, the important repeater station.
The task force from the 333d tried the
Rochefort road to Wanlin but ran into
the enemy near Marloie and had to de-
tour back through Marche and round-
about through Haversin, reaching Wan-
lin at daybreak. The battalion of
the 335th bumped into Germans at the
same spot, left an infantry company to
engage the enemy, then swung back
through Marche and Humain, arriving
at Rochefort in the early morning to
find its own I Company in the town
and no sign of the Germans.
Although the enemy obviously was
in front of the 84th Infantry Division
in some strength and had shown signs
of increasing his forces during the 22d,
the assembly of the VII Corps was
moving rapidly. Having turned over his
old sector at Duren and its divisions to
the XIX Corps, General Collins and
some of the corps troops moved during
the day into the new VII Corps area
southwest of Liège. Of the divisions
promised Collins the 84th was in the
line, the “Hell on Wheels” 2d Armored
Division closed to the rear in the area
before midnight, as did the new
75th Infantry Division. The 3d Ar-
mored, of course, was still bitterly
engaged as the right wing of the neigh-
boring XVIII Airborne Corps. General
Collins and his staff could feel at home
in this new sector, for the VII Corps had
driven the German forces out of the
area during the first two weeks of Sep-
tember. Furthermore Collins had visited
Bolling’s command post and was con-
vinced that the 84th had matters well
in hand.
The First Army commander’s deep
concern for his open western flank-
a concern shared by Collins—was very
considerably relieved on the 22d when
Field Marshal Montgomery arrived at
his headquarters with the welcome news
that the British 29th Armored Brigade,
equipped with fifty tanks, had taken
over the defense of the Namur, Dinant,

434 THE ARDENNES: BATTLE OF THE BULGE
and Givet bridges, and would move on
the morrow to reconnoiter the west
flank of the VII Corps assembly area. 6
Because another twenty-four hours
would be needed to deploy Collins’ divi-
sions and get the corps artillery into
position, Montgomery and Hodges
agreed that the VII Corps counterattack
on which so much depended would
commence on Sunday, the 24th. The
new corps front (officially assumed by
the VII Corps at 1630 on 23 December)
would reach from the Ourthe River on
the left to the junction of the Lesse
and Meuse on the right, approximately
fifty miles. The 2d Armored Division
(Maj. Gen. Ernest N. Harmon) was in-
tended to flesh out the right wing of the
corps when the attack began, the 84th
already held the center, and the 3d Ar-
mored Division was expected to fight
its way farther south and become the
left wing. Since the 75th Infantry Divi-
sion was as yet untried, it was to be
kept in reserve.
The 2d Armored Division had small
patrols scouting to the west of Marche
on the 23d, but the bulk of the divi-
sion assembled in three combat com-
mands well to the north of Marche
astride the main road to Huy. Its 70-
mile road march (some units moved
nearly a hundred miles) had been com-
pleted in twenty-two hours despite a
cold rain, hazardous roads, and the de-
lay normal to armored movement in
column at night. All told the division
had suffered some thirty damaged ve-
hicles in traffic mishaps, including eight
tanks. (Later one officer wryly remarked,
“We lost more vehicles on the march
down here than in the subsequent
fighting. ”)
6 Sylvan Diary, appropriate daily entries.
The 2d Armored assembly had been
handled with all possible secrecy and
the entire division was under radio
blackout, for Collins counted heavily on
the combination of surprise and shock in
the forthcoming counterattack. Events,
however, were racing on to shatter the
hope that the VII Corps would be al-
lowed to mount a planned and co-ordi-
nated assault. Harmon was conferring
with his commanders an hour or so be-
fore noon on the 23d, when a message
arrived that one of the armored cars out
on patrol had been shot up at a little
hamlet near Ciney, which was a criti-
cal road center northwest of Marche
from which main highways debouched
for Dinant and Namur. Without
waiting for orders, Harmon dispatched
CCA (Brig. Gen. John Collier) to rush
full speed for Ciney and cut off any
German tanks found there. This proved
to be a false alarm; British armored pa-
trols were in the town and there was
no sign of the enemy.
By now, however, reports of large en-
emy forces moving toward Ciney were
pouring into the corps and division
command posts. There was no longer
any point in trying to hide the iden-
tity of the 2d Armored and it appeared
certain that battle would have to be
given without regard to the planned
corps counterattack. Harmon started his
whole division moving into line west
of the 84th, displaced the 14th and
92d Field Artillery Battalions to sup-
port CCA, and ordered Collier to con-
tinue south on the Ciney-Rochefort
road to seize Buissonville, where twenty
heavy German tanks had been reported.
CCA clanked through the darkness, led
by a task force composed of the 2d Battal-
ion, 66th Armored Regiment, and the

THE VII CORPS MOVES TO BLUNT THE SALIENT 435
2d Battalion, 41st Armored Infantry
Regiment. About 2100 the combat com-
mand became involved in a scrambling
skirmish with some Germans who had
dismounted from half-tracks in the vil-
lage of Leignon, wheeled a few small
guns into position covering the road, and
were now able to halt the Americans
for some little time. By midnight Col-
lier’s advance guard of armored infantry
was again on the move but this time
with a more ambitious mission. The
sortie toward Ciney had become a full-
scale attack to aid the hard-pressed 84th
Infantry Division and relieve those of its
units cut off in Buissonville and Roche-
fort. 7
German Armor Advances
on the VII Corps
When the advance guards of the 2d
Panzer Division seized the bridge over
the southern arm of the Ourthe at Or-
theuville on the 21st, they stood only six-
teen miles by road from Marche and less
than forty from Dinant and the Meuse.
It is difficult to determine whether the
2d Panzer Division and Manteuffel’s
Fifth Panzer Army were abreast of the
German attack schedule or behind it.
Certainly Manteuffel was two or three
days behind the optimistic predictions
generated in Hitler’s headquarters, but
7 The sources for the history of the 2d Armored
are about as informative and complete as is the
case with the average armored division. The
AAR’s compiled by the combat commands contain
the bulk of the story. The diary maintained by the
division artillery commander, Col. Carl I. Hutton,
has been made available to the author. Formal
publications of value are: A History of the Second
United States Armored Division, 1940–1946
(Atlanta: Albert Love Enterprises, 1946), and
History, 67th Armored Regiment (Burnswick,
Germany: Georg Westermann, 1945).
on the other hand few of the lower field
commands had committed themselves to
any fixed march calendar. As of the 21st
there is no evidence in the German
accounts of any pressing concern about
the rate at which the Fifth Panzer Army
attack was proceeding. After all, Sepp
Dietrich’s much-touted Sixth Panzer
Army had bogged down, the Fifth was
well out in front, and German intelli-
gence saw no viable American forces bar-
ring the door to the Meuse that had
opened between Bastogne and the main
valley of the Ourthe.
Manteuffel still had a few problems to
solve before he could make the final
sprint for the Meuse River in force. Fuel
deliveries for his tanks were flagging, his
divisions had been fighting day and
night since 16 December, a part of his
left armored corps was hung up at Bas-
togne, and his armored corps on the right
had been forced to retrace its steps with
some appreciable loss in time. Manteuf-
fel’s first order, sent to the commander
of the XLVII Panzer Corps, was to get
the Panzer Lehr out of the Bastogne
battle. With the 2d Panzer Division, now
free of involvement in the army center,
and with the Panzer Lehr and the 116th
Panzer Divisions coming up on the left
and right, respectively, Manteuffel would
have the armor needed for a full-blooded
blow northwest to the Meuse, and
Dinant. The day of the 22d passed, how-
ever, with little activity on the part of
the 2d Panzer and with little more than
regrouping by Panzer Lehr, which fi-
nally had to start the march with part of
the division still engaged in the fight for
Bastogne.
By the morning of the 23d these two
divisions were on the move, but their
component parts were widely spaced and

436 THE ARDENNES: BATTLE OF THE BULGE
strung out over long miles of road. The
German troops who hit the 84th Divi-
sion outposts and patrols during the day-
light hours and whose appearance west
of Marche brought the 2d Armored Divi-
sion precipitately into action constituted
little more than a screen for the main
body of the XLVII Panzer Corps. By the
late afternoon, however, the advance
guards of the 2d Panzer and Panzer Lehr
had come up to the forward screen and
were ready for attack. So far only the
84th Division had been identified as
being in the way. The 2d Panzer Divi-
sion, its first objective Marche, had the
shortest road to follow but was delayed
for several hours by the demolitions at
the crossroads west of Champlon touched
off by the detachment of the 51st En-
gineers. Not until early afternoon did the
leading battalion of the 304th Panzer
Grenadier Regiment overrun the 4th
Cavalry Group outpost at Harsin, and it
was dark when this battalion fought its
way into Hargimont, there severing the
road from Marche to Rochefort.
Inexplicably the forward momentum
of the 2d Panzer main column ceased
early in the evening. When Luettwitz,
the corps commander, hurried into
Hargimont, he found that the attack had
been halted for the night because Amer-
ican tanks were reported north of the
village. Stopping briefly to tongue-lash
and relieve the colonel in command,
Luettwitz put in a fresh assault detach-
ment which pushed west as far as Buis-
sonville and there bivouacked. The
appearance of this force was responsible
for the reports reaching American head-
quarters shortly before midnight that
Company E of the 333d had been
trapped in Buissonville.
Chief protagonist of the advance on
the VII Corps thus far chronicled has
been the main column of the 2d Panzer
Division, which on the night of 23 De-
cember had its head at Buissonville and
its body snarled in a long traffic jam on
the single road through Hargimont,
Harsin, and Bande. But German ar-
mored cars, tanks, and motorized infan-
try detachments had been encountered
west and southwest of Marche all during
the day. These troops belonged to the
2d Panzer reconnaissance battalion that
during the night was attempting to re-
assemble as a homogeneous striking force
west of Buissonville astride the road to
Dinant. It was the point of this battalion
which Collier’s armored infantry en-
countered at Leignon.
Under the new orders to attack toward
Rochefort, CCA had driven a few miles
south of Leignon when Capt. George E.
Bonney, riding at the head of the
column in a jeep, heard the sound of
motors on the road ahead. Bonney
whirled his jeep and rode back along the
column of American half-tracks, passing
the word to pull off the road and let the
approaching vehicles through. When the
small German column was securely im-
pounded, the Americans cut loose with
the .30-caliber machine guns on the half-
tracks, killing thirty of the enemy and
capturing a like number. Bonney had
his leg almost cut off by slugs from one
of his own tanks farther back in the col-
umn. Since the night was far spent, the
enemy strength and location were un-
certain, and his command had few if any
detailed maps, Collier ordered the CCA
task forces to reorganize and to laager
until dawn. The leading task force by
this time was near the village of Haid,
eight miles from Rochefort.
On the day before (23 December),

THE VII CORPS MOVES TO BLUNT THE SALIENT 437
the Panzer Lehr had been brought for-
ward on the left wing of the 2d Panzer
Division, General Manteuffel himself
leading the march from St. Hubert. The
immediate objective was the road center
at Rochefort, for this town, like Marche,
had to be secure in German hands if a
major assault with all its impedimenta
was to be launched on the roads leading
to Dinant. German gunners had shelled
the town in the late afternoon without
any return fire, and just at dark, scouts
came back from Rochefort to report that
the town was empty. Apparently the
scouts had not entered Rochefort. If they
had, they would have learned that the
84th Division had built up a garrison
there during the past twenty,-four hours.
In fact the Rochefort defense under
Major Bahe consisted of the 3d Battal-
ion (minus Company L) of the 335th;
a platoon each from the 638th Tank
Destroyer Battalion, 309th Engineer
Combat Battalion, and 29th Infantry;
plus two platoons of the regimental anti-
tank company.
The approach to Rochefort by the St.
Hubert road lay along a narrow defile
between two hills. Perhaps General Bay-
erlein’s military intuition told him that
the town was defended and that the
ground and the darkness presented some
hazard, for he gave the order, “Also los,
Augen zu, und hinein!” (“OK, let’s go!
Shut your eyes and go in!”) The leading
battalion of the 902d rushed forward,
only to be hit by cross fire from the hills
and stopped cold by a formidable barri-
cade on the road. The Germans took
heavy casualties. Bayerlein then set to
work in systematic fashion to take Roche-
fort. He brought forward his guns to
pound the hills and the town, and
edged his troops in close as the night
lengthened. He did not forget his main
task, however, and sent a part of the
902d around Rochefort to find a way
across L’Homme River, which looped
the town on the north. These troops
found one bridge intact, giving the
Panzer Lehr access to the Dinant road.
During the night Manteuffel and
Luettwitz discussed the plan to seize
Dinant. They altered the axis of the 2d
Panzer attack to conform with the actual
tactical situation, struck Marche from
the operations map as an immediate
goal, and instructed Lauchert’s armor to
bypass it on the southwest. Rochefort, it
appeared, would have to be taken, but
it was intended that the Panzer Lehr
would reinforce its bridgehead force
promptly and get the attack rolling to-
ward Dinant while battering down the
Rochefort defense. Luettwitz, a bold and
experienced corps commander, was anx-
ious to push on for the Meuse but
worried about his flanks. Marche was an
obvious sally port through which the
Americans could pour onto the exposed
flank of the 2d Panzer Division unless
something was done to cut the road
north of the town and thus interdict re-
inforcement. This task had been assigned
the 116th Panzer Division, whose main
strength was still separated from Luett-
witz’ divisions by the Ourthe River.
Promising that the 116th would come
forward to cover the 2d Panzer flank,
Manteuffel set out by automobile to
give the 116th a little ginger.
The army group commander, Model,
had said that the 9th Panzer Division
would support the 2d Panzer on 24 De-
cember, but neither Manteuffel nor
Luettwitz seems to have counted on its
appearance. While commanding the 2d
Panzer Division in Normandy Luettwitz

438
had learned the hard way about the reli-
ability of flank protection promised by
others. He had already begun to strip
troops from both of his forward divisions
for deployment on the shoulders of the
thrust being readied for Dinant. The
Panzer Lehr had most of one regiment
(the 903d) , as well as its antiaircraft and
engineer battalions, strung all the way
from Moircy (west of Bastogne) to the
area southwest of Rochefort as cover on
the left for the division attack corridor.
Bayerlein had been forced to leave one
regiment in the Bastogne battle; so his
effective assault force on the 24th con-
sisted of the division reconnaissance bat-
talion, some corps and division artillery,
and one reinforced regiment. All of the
2d Panzer Division was available to
Lauchert, but the kampfgruppen of the
division were widely separated and for
every mile forward troops would have to
be dropped off to cover the division
north flank.
When daylight came on the 24th, the
head of the leading kampfgruppe had
advanced well to the northwest of the
Marche-Rochefort road in considerable
strength. In this kampfgruppe were the
reconnaissance battalion, one battalion
of Panthers from the 3d Panzer Regi-
ment, the 304th Panzer Grenadier Regi-
ment, two artillery regiments, a battal-
ion of heavy guns, and two-thirds of the
division flak, the whole extending for
miles. The remainder of the 2d Panzer
remained on the Harsin road southeast
of Marche under orders from Luettwitz
to protect the corps right shoulder.
The Main Battle Is Joined
24 and 25 December
Pitched battles and fumbling skir-
THE ARDENNES: BATTLE OF THE BULGE
mishes flared up all along the VII Corps
front on 24 December. But the VII Corps
front was not a homogeneous line, and
the German drive was not conducted by
division columns whose units were con-
tiguous to each other and flanked by
over-watching screening forces on paral-
lel roads. The opposing commanders by
this time did have a fairly accurate idea
of what formations were on “the enemy
side of the hill,” but neither Americans
nor Germans were too certain as to
where these formations would be en-
countered. The hottest points of combat
on the 24th were Rochefort, Buisson-
ville, and the Bourdon sector east of the
Hotton-Marche road.
At Rochefort the Panzer Lehr com-
mander began his main attack a couple
of hours after midnight, but the de-
fenders held and made a battle of it in
houses and behind garden walls. Com-
panies I and K of the 333d concentrated
in and around a large hotel, dug in a
brace of 57-mm. antitank guns and a sec-
tion of heavy machine guns in front of
the hotel, and so interdicted the town
square. About 0900 on the 24th the 3d
Battalion lost radio contact with the
division, but four hours later one mes-
sage did reach Marche: an order from
General Bolling to withdraw. By this
time a tree burst from a German 88 had
put the antitank guns out of action. TO
disengage from this house-to-house com-
bat would not be easy. Fortunately the
attackers had their eyes fixed on the mar-
ket place in the center of the town,
apparently with the object of seizing the
crossways there so that armored vehicles
could move through from one edge of
the town to the other. So preoccupied,
they neglected to bar all the exits from
Rochefort. Driven back into a small area

THE VII CORPS MOVES TO BLUNT THE SALIENT 439
around the battalion command post
where bullet and mortar fire made the
streets “a living inferno,” the surround-
ed garrison made ready for a break.
Enough vehicles had escaped damage to
mount the battalion headquarters and
Company M. The rest of the force
formed for march on foot.
At 1800 the two groups made a con-
certed dash from the town, firing wildly
as they went and hurling smoke gre-
nades, which masked them, momen-
tarily, from a German tank lurking near-
by. Sgt. J. W. Waldron manned a
machine gun as a line rear guard, was
wounded, but rejoined his company.
(He received the DSC.) The vehicular
column headed west for Givet, and it is
indicative of the widely dispersed and
CAPTURED GERMAN 88-MM. GUN
fragmented nature of the German forces
on this day that the American column
reached the Meuse without being am-
bushed. The foot column, led by Lt.
Leonard R. Carpenter, started north
with the idea of reaching the outposts
of the 3d Armored task force known to
be thereabouts, but here the spoor of
the enemy was very strong and move-
ment was slow. During the night some
trucks were sent east from Givet and
found parts of Companies I and K; two
officers and thirty-three men belonging
to Company I were picked up in an ex-
hausted state by 2d Armored patrols and
brought back to the American lines.
The defense of Rochefort had not
been too costly: fifteen wounded men,
under the care of a volunteer medic,

440 THE ARDENNES: BATTLE OF THE BULGE
were left in the town and another
twenty-five had been killed or captured.
But the Panzer Lehr commander, who
had fought in both engagements, would
later rate the American defense in
Rochefort as comparable in courage and
in significance to that at Bastogne. Sig-
nificantly, the Panzer Lehr Reconnais-
sance Battalion carried the attack for the
Meuse without any help from the rest
of the division until after midnight,
when the 902d finally reached the Buis-
sonville area.
Buissonville had been the primary ob-
jective of the 2d Armored Division when
Harmon first propelled his CCA into
action. True, Rochefort was the goal
when CCA resumed its march on the
morning of the 24th, but Buissonville
first had to be brought under American
control. A glance at the map will show
the reason why.
The village lay in a valley where the
Dinant-Rochefort highway dipped down,
but in addition it controlled the entry
to that highway of a secondary road net
running west from the Marche-Rochefort
road. The hamlet of Humain, four miles
to the east, was the nodal point of this
secondary system.
During the night the Humain-Buis-
sonville road had been jammed with
German columns from the 2d Panzer
reconnaissance battalion and advance
guard. But now the wealth of good,
hard-surfaced roads which characterize
this part of Belgium came into play.
Entering the main highway at Buisson-
ville, the German units had gone north
for about a mile, then made a V-turn
back onto a secondary road running
straight west to Conjoux, a village four
miles south of Ciney. The Belgian tele-
phone operator at Conjoux attempted to
get word of this movement to the Amer-
icans, but the message had to pass sur-
reptitiously through a number of hands
and did not reach the 2d Armored com-
mand post until the afternoon of the
24th. The CCA sortie from Ciney, as a
result, was being made obliquely to the
German axis of advance and would
intersect the enemy line of march at
Buissonville only after the leading
kampfgruppe of the 2d Panzer had passed
on to the west.
This is not to say that Collier’s task
forces encountered no opposition when
CCA resumed the attack on the morn-
ing of the 24th. Flank guard and block-
ing detachments backed by tanks had
been left to screen the 2d Panzer line of
communications on the north and these
had to be disposed of. Furthermore,
CCA had to proceed with some caution,
feeling out to the flanks as it went; in-
deed General Harmon added a recon-
naissance company to Collier’s command
because “the situation is changing all the
time.” The leading American task force
reached Buissonville in early afternoon
and formed for an assault to encircle the
village from the north. By chance the
second task force, advancing in echelon
on the right flank, had run into antitank
fire and, in process of maneuvering onto
a ridge overlooking the German guns,
saw its sister detachment moving into the
attack. An enemy column, coming in
from Havrenne, appeared about the
same time on the opposite side of the
village.
While the American attack swept
through and round Buissonville, the
tank and tank destroyer crews on the
ridge opened fire, laying their guns at
four thousand yards, and directing the
salvos crashing in from the field batteries

THE VII CORPS MOVES TO BLUNT THE SALIENT 441
supporting CCA. The final tally was 38
wheeled vehicles, 4 antitank guns, 6
pieces of medium artillery, 108 prisoners,
and a large but uncounted number of
German dead. After this action a squad-
ron of P–38’s strafed the village, prob-
ably on a mission which had been called
for before the assault, killing one Amer-
ican officer and wounding another be-
fore the airplanes could be diverted.
With Buissonville in hand, Harmon
ordered Col. John MacDonald, whose
4th Cavalry Group had just been at-
tached to the 2d Armored, to take Hu-
main and thus put a stopper in the
narrow channel between his division
and the 84th which led to the west and
the rear of the Marche position. Mac-
Donald had only the 24th Squadron-
his 4th Squadron was deploying in the
west as a screen between CCA and CCB
-and in the early evening he sent Troop
A into Humain. The troopers experi-
enced little opposition. Mines and booby
traps were their greatest hazard, and by
midnight they had full control of the
village.
All through the day messages had
come into the 2d Armored Division
headquarters telling of German tanks in
increasing numbers in and around Cel-
les, a main crossroads village southwest
of Ciney and only four miles from the
Meuse River. During the morning the
British light armored cavalry patrolling
this area had been forced back toward
Dinant. At midday two P–51’s flew over
to take a look at Celles but got an ex-
ceedingly warm reception from flak bat-
teries there and were driven off. Further
evidence of a large German concentra-
tion came in the afternoon when the
Belgian report of enemy columns in Con-
joux finally reached the Americans.
Harmon had not waited for confirma-
tion of the early British reports, the right
and rear of CCA being too exposed for
that. At 1045 he ordered CCB (Brig.
Gen. Isaac D. White) to secure Ciney-
at the moment occupied by some of
Collier’s troops-“as a base for future
operations.” At the same time the divi-
sion artillery commander, Colonel Hut-
ton, sent two battalions of armored ar-
tillery into firing positions north of
Ciney. (Throughout the day artillery
support for both the 2d Armored and the
84th had been rendered under difficult
circumstances. The location of friendly
units was none too certain and a num-
ber of the advanced outpost positions
along the VII Corps front. were beyond
the range of their own guns.)
The eastern flank of the VII Corps was
the third area of hot combat on the 24th.
On the previous night the 116th Panzer
Division finally had begun to build up
a bridgehead on the west bank of the
Ourthe. Perhaps Manteuffel’s visit had
had some effect, or, more likely, the
116th had more troops for the attack
now that reinforcements were arriving
to take on the Americans in the Soy-
Hotton sector. The mission set for Gen-
eral Waldenburg’s division was of criti-
cal importance to the Fifth Panzer
Army attack. First, the 116th Panzer was
to break through the American position
forward of the Hotton-Marche road.
Then, having cleaned out Marche in the
process, the division was to swing north
onto the Baillonville road, which offered
good tank going, drive west through
Pessoux, and make contact with the 2d
Panzer Division in the neighborhood of
Ciney. At that point the two divisions
would provide reciprocal protection for
their inner flanks.

442 THE ARDENNES: BATTLE OF THE BULGE
Waldenburg was low on fuel for his
tanks but attempted to set the ball roll-
ing by sending two rifle companies
through the dark to infiltrate the Amer-
ican lines at the junction point of the
334th and 335th Regiments. The tactic–
penetration along boundary lines–was
a German favorite, attended by success
in the initial days of the offensive. The
two companies (dismounted troops of
the division reconnaissance battalion)
stealthily worked their way forward and
at dawn were to the rear of the 334th.
There they sought cover on a wooded
ridge north of Verdenne. This village,
outposted by the Americans, was the
immediate goal of the attack planned for
the 24th. Commanding the Marche-
Hampteau road–roughly the line held
by the left wing of the 84th Division–it
afforded immediate access via a good
secondary route to Bourdon on the main
Hotton-Marche highway, and its posses-
sion would offer a springboard for the
German armored thrust.
The 116th Panzer Division did not
attack with daylight, for its fuel trucks
had not yet appeared. Instead Walden-
burg sent detachments of the 60th Regi-
ment into the Bois de Chardonne, the
western extrusion of a large wood lot
partially held by the Germans southwest
of Verdenne. Unusual movement in the
Bois was noticed by the Americans dur-
ing the morning, but this came into
really serious light about noon when a
prisoner revealed the presence of the two
companies behind the 334th. General
Bolling gathered the 1st Battalion, 334th,
and three tank platoons of the 771st
Tank Battalion to trap the infiltrators.
It appears that his opponent, General
Waldenburg, had postponed the Ger-
man attack for an hour or so but that
this order did not reach the two forward
companies. When the American tanks
suddenly appeared on the wooded ridge
north of Verdenne, they ran head on into
the enemy just assembling at the wood’s
edge in assault formation. The Germans
broke and fled, some fifty were captured,
and the woods were cleared.
But this was only the first act. An hour
later five enemy tanks and two half-
tracks carrying or covering a hundred or
so grenadiers struck Verdenne from the
south, engaged the second platoon of
Company I in what Waldenburg later
called “a bitter house-to-house battle,”
finally overwhelmed the Americans, and
pushed on to a château a stone’s throw
north of the village. In a last assault at
eventide the attackers drove this wedge
deeper. Companies I and K of the 334th
fell back to a new line barely in front of
the crucial Marche-Hotton road, and
German light artillery moved up to
bring the road under fire.
Christmas Eve in the far western sec-
tor of the Ardennes Bulge found various
shadings of uneasiness in the American
headquarters and a pall of foreboding,
silver-lined by the proximity of the
Meuse, in the German. The attack
planned for the VII Corps had turned
into a defensive battle. On the east wing
the 3d Armored (–CCB) was hard
pressed and some of its troops were sur-
rounded-indeed two regiments of the
75th Infantry Division were en route to
help General Rose. The 84th Division,
so far as then was known, had lost a bat-
talion in Rochefort, might be driven out
of Marche, and stood exposed to an ar-
mored exploitation of the penetration
made at Verdenne. The 2d Armored
Division had had a good day but was not
yet securely linked to the 84th on the

THE VII CORPS MOVES TO BLUNT THE SALIENT 443
left and could only surmise what tank
strength the Germans had accumulated
opposite CCB on the right.
Field Marshal Montgomery, chipper
as always but cautious, had taken steps
during the day to bring the 51st Division
(British) across the Meuse and into
backstop position behind the First Army
in the sector southeast of Liège. Other
British troops were on the move to assist
the 29th Armoured Brigade (British) if
the enemy should hit the bridges at
Givet or Namur. This was good news to
the First Army commander and his staff,
not to mention that some elation was
abroad as the result of Allied air force
activity on this clear day and the reports
of prisoners and booty taken from the
1st SS Panzer Division at La Gleize.
The gloomy side of the picture was all
too readily apparent. The fall of St. Vith
had opened the way for fresh forces and
new pressure against the army center and
right. The 82d Airborne Division was
exposed to entrapment in the Manhay
sector and in the course of the evening
Hodges would order a withdrawal. The
situation as it appeared in the VII Corps
on the army right wing was, as just
described, somewhat of a cliff-hanger.
On the left wing, in the V Corps sector,
the enemy appeared ready to resume
strong offensive operations, and after
their Christmas Eve supper Hodges
and Huebner sat down to plan the evac-
uation of the corps’ heavy equipment in
order to leave the roads free in the event
that withdrawal to the north became
mandatory.
In the higher echelons of German
command the attitude on Der Heilige
Abend became more somber as the
distance between the particular head-
quarters and the 2d Panzer position at
the tip of the Bulge diminished. Rund-
stedt seems to have become reconciled,
with the fatalism and aloofness of the
aged and veteran soldier, to whatever
the fortunes of war now might bring.
Model, the commander of Army Group
B, was outwardly optimistic; his order
for Christmas Day called for the passage
of the Meuse and the capture of Bas-
togne. This official mien of optimism
contrasts sharply with the attitude his
personal staff had noted on 18 December
when, it since has been reported, he
phoned Rundstedt and Jodl to say that
the offensive had failed. Perhaps he saw
in the events of 24 December the possi-
bility that the Meuse at least might be
reached and some degree of tactical suc-
cess east of the river be attained, thus
confirming his earlier opposition to the
Big Solution dictated by Hitler and Jodl.
Manteuffel, as Fifth Panzer Army com-
mander, was the man in the middle. He
was well aware of the exposed and pre-
carious position of the 2d Panzer Divi-
sion. He had traveled the forward roads
at the tip of the salient, and his practiced
eye recognized that the narrow corridor
to the Meuse must be widened if the
last stage of the drive to the river was to
be logistically supported. Doubtless he
recognized the tactical merit of Luett-
witz’ suggestion, probably made late in
the afternoon of the 24th, that the for-
ward columns of the XLVII Panzer
Corps should be withdrawn from their
position of dangerous isolation until
such time as reinforcements arrived. On
the other hand Manteuffel was well
aware of the Fuehrer’s attitude toward
surrendering ground and could not pos-
sibly acquiesce in Luettwitz’ proposal.
During the evening Manteuffel tele-
phoned Jodl with a personal and desper-

444
ate plea for assistance: he argued that his
army, not the Sixth, was carrying the
main effort of the offensive and that the
dions in the OKW reserve earmarked
for Sepp Dietrich should be released at
once to reinforce the attack to the Meuse.
It would appear that Jodl spoke reassuringly
of divisions en route to the Fifth
Panzer Army but this must have brought
THE ARDENNES: BATTLE OF THE BULGE
very cold comfort to Manteuffel. 8
8 The problems facing the Fifth Panzer Army
commander are graphically presented in MSS
ETHINT-45 and 46, and MSS #B-151, B-151a,
all by Manteuffel. The story of the 116th Panzer
Division is recounted by the division commander
(Waldenburg) in MS #A-873. The best of the
fragmentary personal accounts on the history of
the 2d Panzer Division is that by Lt. Col. Ruediger
Weiz in MS #B-456.

CHAPTER XIX
The Battle of Bastogne
The Initial Deployment East
of Bastogne
The one standing order that General
Middleton gave General McAulliff e be-
fore leaving Bastogne on the morning of
19 December was: “Hold Bastogne.” *
Both generals felt that the enemy needed
Bastogne and the entrance it afforded
to a wider complex of roads leading
west. (Map VI) During the night of the
* The most complete story of the siege of
Bastogne is S. L. A. Marshall’s Bastogne: The
First Eight Days (Washington: The Infantry
Journal Press, 1946). The then Colonel Marshall
was on the scene, had complete access to the daily
record entries, and was persona grata to the entire
command, this happy circumstance resulting in
the fine collection of combat interviews which
formed the basis for this interesting and graphic
account. It is worth noting that the authors of
the official history of the foist did not write a
chapter on Bastogne but simply introduced an
abridged version of Marshall’s book. (The present
author has borrowed extensively from Brigadier
General Marshall, but the careful reader will
notice quite different interpretations of the same
actions based on the same source materials.
Marshall, concerned with the heroic story of an
encircled unit, focuses on that unit, in effect look-
ing from Bastogne at the perimeter. The present
author, engaged in presenting the over-all cam-
paign, directs his attention from the periphery
inward.) The G–3 journal of the 101st is rather
cursory. The 501st Summary of Actions is re-
constructed from memory since most of the regi-
mental records were lost; the 502d AAR is slim; the
327th Narrative is terse hut informative; the
506th AAR is the most complete and useful of
any of the regimental reports. See also Scrapbook
506th Parachute Infantry Regiment (Munich,
1945)
18th the two commanders met in the VIII
Corps command post to confer on the un-
certain tactical situation and to give Colo-
nel Ewell, whose regiment would first be
committed, his instructions. The map
spread out before Ewell showed a few
blue-penciled marks east of Bastogne
where the American armored groups
were believed to be fighting at their
original roadblock positions. General
Middleton told Ewell that his job would
be to make contact with these endan-
gered forward posts. Ewell, however, was
interested in the red-penciled lines and
circles which showed the enemy between
Bastogne and the armored roadblocks.
In view of the uncertain situation, he
suggested that he be given “mission-type
orders” which would permit his 50 1st
Parachute Infantry some flexibility of
action. McAuliffe agreed, as did Middle-
ton, but the latter still hoped that the
roadblock defenders at Allerborn, eight
miles to the east on the Bastogne road,
would somehow survive until the 501st
reached them. McAuliffe’s order, then,
was for Ewell to move out at 0600, attack
eastward, and develop the situation.
At the appointed hour on 19 Decem-
ber Ewell’s 501st Parachute Infantry
marched out of the assembly area in col-
umn of battalions. Ewell knew that this
was no time to engage in the all-out,
full-bodied assault tactics to which the
paratroopers were accustomed. He told

BASTOGNE

448 THE ARDENNES: BATTLE OF THE BULGE
his officers to “take it easy,” avoid com-
mitment to an action which would in-
volve their whole force, and deploy to
right and left as soon as they hit resist-
ance so that they would not be easily cut
off and surrounded. 1
Hindsight, of course, bestows a view
of the American and German disposi-
tions at 0600, when the 101st advance
guard marched out, which was denied
Ewell and the corps and division staffs
in Bastogne. The battles already de-
scribed were now coming to a close on
the roads, in the villages, and through
the woods east of the town as the 101st
was taking its stance. During the night
of 18 December the three small task
forces of CCR, 9th Armored Division,
which Middleton had ordered Colonel
Gilbreth to position on and overwatch-
ing the Allerborn-Bastogne road (N12),
were cut to pieces. Some men and ve-
hicles would escape to take a part in the
fight for Bastogne, although some of
Colonel Booth’s command took six days
of dodging the enemy before they
reached the American lines. At Long-
villy, next, and to the west, on the Bas-
togne road, Gilbreth had gathered what
was left of CCR and its attached troops
to fight a rear guard action until the 19th
dawned and an orderly withdrawal
might be effected.
1 Middleton recalls that he directed McAuliffe
to reinforce the 10th ,Armored roadblock on the
Longvilly road. (Ltr, Middleton to Col Marshall,
1 Jul 45.) The S–3 journal of CCB, 10th Armored
Division, notes at 0740 on 19 December that
Ewell’s mission is to relieve “the surrounded
groups” and assist CCB. The 101st AAR simply
states that Ewell was ordered to attack to the
east and “secure Bastogne.” The story as given
in the text is based on Ewell’s recollections (in
a conversation with the author on 22 July 1961)
and squares with information given the author
by Middleton and McAuliffe.
Gilbreth started his guns displacing to
the rear some time before daybreak, but
the main force commenced to defile
through the western exit from Longvilly
about 0800, only to be ambushed and
thrown into disorder when approaching
Mageret, midway between Longvilly and
Bastogne. Team Cherry (Lt. Col. Henry
T. Cherry) of CCB, 10th Armored Divi-
sion, which had been sent along the road
toward Longvilly the previous evening,
found itself involved in a series of dis-
jointed actions as enemy troops cut the
highway. Team Hyduke (1st Lt. Ed-
ward P. Hyduke) was caught up in the
fight east of Mageret, subsequently
losing all its vehicles in a sharp and
aggressive armored action which the 2d
Panzer commander dignified as an Amer-
ican “counterattack.” (Late on the after-
noon of the 19th Lieutenant Hyduke led
his men on foot out of the melee under
orders to rejoin CCB. He was afterward
killed at Bastogne.)
Team Ryerson (Capt. William F.
Ryerson), the main force belonging to
Cherry, had laagered during the night
between Mageret and Longvilly–and
thus would fight an action almost inde-
pendently of the Longvilly column–but
before daybreak Ryerson knew that the
enemy was in Mageret and that he would
have to punch his way back to the west.
Cherry sent orders confirming this with-
drawal about 0830. Ryerson found his
team outnumbered and outgunned by
the Germans holding Mageret, but on
the night of the 19th four squads of his
armored infantry held a narrow foothold
in a few houses on the eastern edge of
the village, waiting there for help prom-
ised from the west. Colonel Cherry had
gone back to Bastogne to see the CCB
commander late on the 18th, returning

THE BATTLE OF BASTOGNE 449
thereafter to his own headquarters out-
side Neffe (a mile and a quarter south-
west of Mageret) with word that the
101st would reinforce his command the
next day. On the road back, however, he
learned that the Germans were in Mag-
eret and his troops were cut off. About
the time Ewell’s paratroopers debouched
on the Bastogne road, Neffe was hit by
tanks and infantry from Panzer Lehr;
some hours later Cherry’s detachment
would pull back to Mont. 2
On the morning of 19 December,
therefore, the job confronting the 501st
was that of developing, fixing, and fight-
ing the German detachments, now in
strength, which stood to the rear of the
erstwhile American blocking positions
and presaged the coming main effort to
crash the panzer columns through or
around Bastogne.
The German High Command was
aware that. the two American airborne
divisions had orders to enter the battle;
in the late afternoon of 18 December
intercepted radio messages to this effect
reached OB WEST. German intelligence
knew that the Americans were moving
by truck and so estimated that none of
these new troops would appear in the
line before noon on the 19th. The Ger-
man staffs believed that the two divi-
sions would be deployed along a front
extending from Bastogne to the north-
east. In any case the German attack plan
was unfolding about as scheduled and
2 On the earlier actions by the armored units
see Chapter XXI and also the documents cited
there. The CCB, 10th Armored, AAR and S–3
journal are among the most valuable of the docu-
ments describing the Bastogne operation. The
personal recollections of the CCB commander
have been incorporated in Nichol’s Impact: The
Battle Story of the Tenth Armored Division.
three German divisions were bearing
down on Bastogne. The 2d Panzer Divi-
sion’s successes during the night of 18
December against the outpost positions
east of Longvilly had netted forty Amer-
ican tanks, and the apparent crumbling
of the last defenses east of Bastogne
promised quick entry to that city on the
19th.
Actually the three German divisions
moving toward Bastogne were not all
maneuvering to attack the city. Lauch-
ert’s 2d Panzer Division had other fish
to fry–its objective was the Meuse
bridges–and when daylight came on the
19th the division advance guard was
working its way to bypass Bastogne in
the north. The 2d Panzer’s end run,
across country and on miserable third-
class roads, collided with Maj. William
R. Desobry’s task force from CCB at
Noville (four miles north of Bastogne),
then blundered into a series of sharp
actions reaching back to Longvilly.
On the left the Panzer Lehr, having
seized Mageret during the night, began
an attack about 0500 on the 19th de-
signed to take Bastogne; it was a part of
this forward detachment of Panzer Lehr
which hit Cherry’s headquarters at
Neffe. Close on the heels of Panzer Lehr,
two regiments of the 26th Volks Gren-
adier Division had made a right wheel
with the intention of circling through
Longvilly and Luzery so as to enter
Bastogne from the north via the Noville
road. Kokott’s grenadiers, who had ac-
complished a truly remarkable feat in
keeping pace with the mechanized col-
umns of the Panzer Lehr, by now were
spent. The regimental trains were far to
the rear and resupply had to be made.
Furthermore the boundaries and attack
plans for the three divisions converging

450 THE ARDENNES: BATTLE OF THE BULGE
on Bastogne were so confused that it
would take some time for the 26th Volks
Grenadier Division (–) to orient and
co-ordinate its attack. On the morning
of the 19th Kokott’s two regiments lay
quiescent and exhausted in the scattered
woods southeast of Longvilly. Only the
advance guard of the Panzer Lehr, there-
fore, was attacking directly toward Bas-
togne when the paratroopers of the 501st
marched on to the Bastogne-Longvilly
road. 3
Ewell had his 1st Battalion (Maj.
Raymond V. Bottomly, Jr.) out as ad-
vance guard. The road was curtained at
intervals by swirling fog and from time
to time rain squalls swept in. Some
2,000 yards out of the city (it now was
about 0820) the battalion ran onto a few
howitzers from the 9th Armored whose
crews were “ready, willing and able,” as
the journals report it, to support the
501st. Less than a thousand yards be-
yond, the advance guard encountered
the enemy near the railroad station at
the edge of Neffe; here was the road-
block which the Panzer Lehr had
wrested from Cherry’s headquarters de-
tachment.
On the previous evening the VIII
Corps commander had sent the 158th
Engineer Combat Battalion (Lt. Col.
Sam Tabets) to establish a line east of
Bastogne between Foy and the Neffe
road, Nearly a thousand antitank mines
had been scraped together from other
corps engineers to aid the 158th, and at
least part of these were laid in front of
3 Generals Kokott and Bayerlein were responsible
for the initial investiture of Bastogne, and their
accounts, basic for “the other side of the hill,”
can be found in eight manuscripts: ETHINT–44,
B–040, and P–32d by Kokott; and A–941 through
A–945 by Bayerlein.
the engineer foxholes during the night.
When the 158th reported about 0200
that its outpost at Mageret had been
overrun, Middleton sent what help he
could–five light tanks taken from ord-
nance repair shops. At daybreak two
enemy rifle companies, led by a few
tanks, hit Company B, whose right flank
touched the Bastogne highway near
Neffe. The engineers succeeded in halt-
ing the advance along the road, although
at a cost of some thirty casualties. Pvt.
Bernard Michin seems to have blocked
the panzers when he put a bazooka round
into the leader at ten yards’ range. Mean-
while Team Cherry had lost its road-
block at the Neffe station but momen-
tarily had stopped the Germans at Neffe
village. Enemy pressure then eased
somewhat; perhaps the German infantry
were waiting for their tanks to break
through at Mageret. The fight had
slackened to a small arms duel when
Ewell’s paratroopers came on the scene. 4
Feeling carefully to the north and
south of the highway, the 1st Battalion
found that the Germans were deployed
in some force and that this was no occa-
sion for a quick knockout blow to handle
a single roadblock. About 0900 Ewell
turned the 2d Battalion (Maj. Sammie
N. Homan) off the road in a maneuver
on the left of the vanguard intended to
seize the higher ground near the village
of Bizory and Hill 510, a fairly substan-
tial rise to the east which overlooked
both Neffe and Bizory. When the 3d
Battalion (Lt. Col. George M. Griswold)
4 S. L. A. Marshall, who interviewed Bayerlein,
says that the Panzer Lehr commander momentarily
lost his nerve on the 19th and failed to prod his
troops forward personally. (Marshall, Bastogne,
pp: 184-86.) Bayerlein admits to his great sur-
prise when he encountered strong armored opposi-
tion east of Bastogne. MS # A–341 (Bayerlein).

THE BATTLE OF BASTOGNE 451
came up, Ewell sent it to the right with
orders to take Mont and the ridge south
of Neffe. By noon the regimental attack
had attained most of its objectives.
(Bizory already was outposted by troops
of the 158th Engineer Combat Battal-
ion.) Hill 510, however, was no easy nut
to crack. The enemy held the position
with automatic weapons sweeping the
bare glacis to west and south-here the
paratroopers made no progress. On the
right one of Griswold’s platoons arrived
in time to give Colonel Cherry a hand
in the fight at the Neffe château com-
mand post and, when the Americans
were burned out, the subsequent with-
drawal to Mont. The 3d Battalion had
not been able to get around Neffe, but
Company I did go as far as Wardin,
southeast of Neffe, where it ambushed a
25-man patrol.
The appearance of the Americans in
this area, little more than a mile south of
Mageret, was interpreted immediately
as a flanking threat to the two grenadier
regiments of the Panzer Lehr which had
wheeled to the right and away from
Bastogne to engage the American col-
umns transfixed on the Mageret-Long-
villy road. Bayerlein detached a part of
his reconnaissance battalion to meet this
threat. The Americans made a fight of
it inside Wardin, retreating from house
to house as the long-barreled self-pro-
pelled guns blasted in the walls. One
paratrooper walked into the street to
confront one of the guns with a bazooka;
he got the gun, then was cut down.
Finally the guns jolted the paratroopers
out of Wardin; they had inflicted thirty-
nine casualties on Company I, all of
whose officers were hit, and killed Capt.
Claude D. Wallace, Jr., the company
commander.
To the west, near the hamlet of Mar-
vie, lay the tanks and armored infantry
of Team O’Hara (Lt. Col. James
O’Hara) holding the right of the three
blocking positions set up by CCB, 10th
Armored, the day before. O’Hara thus
far had seen no Germans. His first warn-
ing that the fight was expanding in his
direction was the “stragglers of airborne
around us” and high velocity shellfire
directed at his left tank platoon. For
some reason the enemy failed to close
with O’Hara, perhaps because of the
low, clinging fog which had reduced visi-
bility to about seventy-five feet. Ordered
to do so by Colonel Roberts, the CCB
commander, O’Hara sent tanks back in-
to Wardin, but the village was empty.
The tanks retired to the Marvie position
as dark came on, and late in the evening
Panzer Lehr occupied Wardin.
A message from McAuliffe ended this
initial day of battle for the 501st and
the regiment dug in where it stood.
Ewell now had a fair picture of the
enemy to his front but no clear idea of
the fate or location of Team Cherry’s
main force, not to mention the CCR
roadblock detachments.
Although the 501st had deployed suc-
cessfully astride the main road east of
Bastogne and had developed a sketchy
outline of the most advanced German
positions, it had not at any time con-
fronted the main German forces. These,
the bulk of Panzer Lehr and the two for-
ward regiments of the 26th Volks Gren-
adier Division, spent most of the day
chopping down the American column
trapped between Mageret and Long-
villy. Kokott apparently had expected to
push his two grenadier regiments un-
opposed through Longvilly, as soon as
they were rested, in a circling march to

452
enter Bastogne from the north, but the
German corps commander, General
Luettwitz, himself took these regiments
out of Kokott’s hand and thrust them
into the battle with the American rear
guard at Longvilly–which held there
longer than expected-and against the
retreating column en route to Mageret.
Suffice it to say that the 501st had been
effectively debarred from the Longvilly
arena by the Panzer Lehr troops holding
Neffe, Hill 510, and the stopper position
at Mageret. By the evening of the 19th
the American troops east of Mageret
were in varying stages of tactical dissolu-
tion-all but Team Ryerson, still clutch-
ing its piece of Mageret village. Luett-
witz was elated by this victory over the
American armor (which as an old tanker
he attributed in large part to the supe-
riority of the Panther tank gun), but he
realized that a precious day had been
lost and with it the chance of an armored
coup de main at Bastogne.
At Noville, the left of the three block-
ing positions, Middleton had assigned
Colonel Roberts and CCB. Here Team
Desobry, organized around fifteen me-
dium tanks, stood athwart the main
paved highway running north from Bas-
togne to Houffalize. This force had been
in position about five hours, reporting
all quiet, when at 0720 on the 19th Ger-
man half-tracks hit the American road-
blocks. Americans and Germans pitched
grenades at each other in the fog and
one or two panzers reached the village
itself. The enemy-probably a patrol
feeling a way in front of Lauchert’s 2d
Panzer– soon pulled out, and the noise
of battle died away.
The VIII Corps commander, much
concerned by the gap which he knew
existed between his southern troops and
THE ARDENNES: BATTLE OF THE BULGE
those of his corps somewhere to the
north, ordered Desobry to investigate
the town of Houffalize. (During the
night, a patrol Desobry had sent in that
direction reported the road open.) Be-
fore anything could be done about the
Houffalize mission, the Germans un-
leashed their artillery against Noville.
Lauchert, intent on regaining the mo-
mentum which the 2d Panzer had lost
in the night fighting around Allerborn
and Longvilly, and determined to get
off the miserable side roads which he
had chosen as a quick way around Bas-
togne, put all the guns that had kept
pace with the forward elements into a
shoot to blast a way through to the west.
At 1000 the fog curtain suddenly parted
revealing a landscape dotted with Ger-
man tanks-at least thirty of them. Four-
teen tanks from the 3d Panzer Regiment
made a try for Noville, coming in from
the north. Several bogged down in a vain
attempt to maneuver off the road; others
were stopped by Desobry’s company of
Sherman tanks and by tank destroyer
fire. On the east the enemy had started
an infantry assault, but the fog lifted
before the first waves reached the village
and, suddenly divested of cover, most of
the attackers turned and ran.
Desobry could not know that Noville
was the focus of the entire 2d Panzer
maneuver, but he did ask for permission
to withdraw. Roberts replied that Deso-
bry should use his own judgment, then
added that more tank destroyers were
on the way from Bastogne (Desobry had
only a platoon from the 609th) and that
the 101st was sending a rifle battalion
within the half hour. Coincident with
Roberts’ message the last of the German
assault force pulled back. Lauchert had
decided that the ground was too poor

THE BATTLE OF BASTOGNE 453
for tank maneuver, that reinforcements
must be brought up for a headlong
plunge. Meanwhile the German cannon-
eers continued to pummel Noville. Deso-
bry had many casualties, but several
ambulances had been wrecked by shell-
fire and it was difficult to get the
wounded out.
The reinforcements reaching Desobry
consisted of a platoon from the 705th
Tank Destroyer Battalion (three com-
panies of which constituted the only
corps reserve Middleton had to give the
101st Airborne) and the 1st Battalion
(Lt. Col. James L. LaPrade) of the
506th Parachute Infantry. Although Mc-
Auliffe assigned the 506th the mission
of covering the northern approaches to
Bastogne, the remaining two battalions
had a string attached as the division re-
serve, and the regimental commander,
Colonel Sink, was under strict orders not
to move them from their positions just
north of Bastogne. As the paratroopers
approached Noville, they came under
heavy, well-aimed artillery fire, twenty
to thirty rounds exploding on the village
every ten minutes. Vehicles and build-
ings were aflame-this was indeed a hot
corner, the village itself practically bare
of life. Desobry’s detachment was de-
ployed south and west of the village; the
Germans were firing from the north and
east, a more comfortable position since
the higher ground encircling Noville
tilted up on the enemy side of the dish.
By 1430 the 1st Battalion was ready
to begin the assault against the enemy-
held high ground. The center company
walked almost immediately into a rain
of barrage fire and was stopped with
heavy losses. The two remaining com-
panies were met with intense small arms
fire but in fifteen minutes worked their
way forward in short spurts to a point
where one last dash would put them on
the crest. As the paratroopers lay here,
a mass of green-clad figures suddenly
erupted over the hill. Later the 1st Bat-
talion estimated this attack was carried
by a rifle battalion backed by sixteen
tanks. The American assault had
smacked headlong into the attack the 2d
Panzer had been readying since mid-
morning. As the fight spread, nearly
thirty-two panzers were counted on the
field. The two antagonists each reported
subsequently that “the enemy counter-
attack halted.” Both probably were cor-
rect-although both continued to suffer
heavy casualties. The German tanks
might have decided the issue, but for
over half an hour they stayed well back
of the rifle line, perhaps fearful lest ba-
zooka teams would reach them in the
smoke and fog billowing up the hill,
perhaps fearful of the bite in the few
Shermans left. When a few of the enemy
tanks finally ventured to approach, the
American tank destroyers south of the
village got on the flank of the panzers
and put away five of them at 1,500-yards
range.
Now as the smoke and fog increased,
only small eddies broke the pall to give
a few minutes of aimed fire. Two of the
airborne companies fell back to the out-
skirts of Noville while the third, on the
hill to the east, waited for darkness to
cover its withdrawal. At one juncture the
1st Battalion was under orders to leave
Noville, but Brig. Gen. Gerald J. Hig-
gins, the assistant division commander
who was acting alter ego for McAuliffe,
told the paratroopers to stay put and
promised assault gun and tank destroyer
support for the morrow.
To the Noville garrison the dark

454 THE ARDENNES: BATTLE OF THE BULGE
hours were a nightmare. Every half hour
a gust of enemy artillery fire shook the
town; one shell crashed near the Amer-
ican command post, killing LaPrade and
wounding Desobry. Maj. Robert F. Har-
wick, a paratrooper, assumed over-all
command, while Maj. Charles L. Hu-
stead replaced Desobry as the armored
team commander. (Desobry, with an
agonizing head wound, was placed in an
ambulance headed for Bastogne, but the
ambulance was captured en route.)
Through the night the panzers prowled
on the edge of the village and the Ger-
man grenadiers came out of their fox-
holes in abortive forays to reach the
streets. But the paratroopers held the
enemy at arm’s length and the enemy
tankers showed little inclination to en-
gage Hustead’s remaining eight Sher-
mans, which had been brought into the
village, in a blindfold duel.
Earlier in the day the 101st command-
er had planned to establish a defensive
line running northwest to southeast in
front of Bastogne from which the 501st,
tied in with Desdbry and Cherry as flank
guards, would launch a counterattack.
The events of the 19th, as it turned out,
showed how little room for maneuver
was left the Americans. Colonel Roberts,
assessing the reports from CCB in the
early evening, advised McAuliffe that
“right now the whole front is flat against
this town [ Bastogne] .” Roberts was
right; nonetheless there remained two
indentations in the fast-forming German
line: the thumb sticking out at Noville
and Team Ryerson’s little enclave on
the east edge of Mageret. The latter,
however, disappeared during the night
hours, for Ryerson, on orders, circled the
enemy troops in Mageret and brought his
depleted command into the lines of the
501st at Bizory. (Ryerson later was killed
at Bastogne.)
General Luettwitz lacked the full Ger-
man corps he craved to throw against
Bastogne on the 20th. The 26th Volks
Grenadier Division could count on only
two of its regiments. Panzer Lehr had a
substantial part of the division immedi-
ately east of Bastogne, but at least one
infantry regiment, much of its artillery,
and the bulk of the division trains were
still toiling along the gummy little roads
–hardly more than trails—climbing west
out of the Wiltz valley. Furthermore,
Luettwitz had ordered Bayerlein to hold
out a reserve for a dash toward Sibret.
The neighboring corps might lend
Luettwitz a hand in the north–after all
its 2d Panzer either had to break through
at Noville or had to retrace its steps-
but the Fifth Panzer Army commander
had reiterated in no uncertain manner
that Lauchert’s goal was the Meuse, not
Bastogne.
The entire artillery complement of
the 2d Panzer was in place to support
the attack at Noville when the 20th
dawned. Lauchert’s armor was in poor
repair after the long and rough march.
A goodly number of tanks had been shot
up in the first day’s action at Noville, and
the combination of muddy terrain and
American antitank fire boded no good
for a headlong armored assault. Lauch-
ert therefore told his panzer grenadiers
to carry the battle in company with small
tank packets.
While the German guns plastered the
village the grenadiers moved in about
0530 on three sides. Smoke and swirling
fog veiled the attackers but the 420th
Armored Field Artillery Battalion, firing
from northwest of Bastogne, laid down a
protective curtain which held the enemy

THE BATTLE OF BASTOGNE 455
at bay for over an hour. The eight Sher-
mans by this time had run out of armor-
piercing ammunition and half a dozen
panzers tried to close in. A fresh platoon
of tank destroyers from the 705th Tank
Destroyer Battalion, sent up by Higgins,
took a hand and broke up this sortie.
In midmorning, when a promised pla-
toon of quad mount antiaircraft failed
to appear, Harwick and Hustead learned
that the enemy had cut the road to the
rear. The two aid stations could handle
no more wounded–most of the medics
and aid men were casualties-and the
enemy grip obviously was tightening.
The word relayed through the artillery
net back to Bastogne told the story: “All
reserves committed. Situation critical.”
McAuliffe and Roberts consulted,
agreed that the Noville force should
withdraw. To free the troops in Noville
would take some doing. General Higgins,
in charge of the northern sector, already
had acted to meet this crisis by sending
the 3d Battalion of the 502d Parachute
Infantry (assembled near Longchamps)
into an attack northeast against the Ger-
mans who had descended on the road
linking Noville and Foy. The latter vil-
lage, 2,500 yards south of Noville on the
Bastogne road, had been occupied by the
3d Battalion of the 506th, which had its
own fight going. Foy lies at the bottom
of a pocket and during the night ele-
ments of the 304th Panzer Grenadier
Regiment had wormed their way onto
the hills overlooking the village from
north, west, and east. With this vantage
the Germans brought their direct fire
weapons to bear and forced the 3d Bat-
talion back onto the high ground south
of the hamlet.
But by noon the 101st had a solid
base for a counterattack. The 2d Bat-
talion of the 506th covered the right
flank of the 3d and was in contact with
the 501st on the east. The battalion sent
from the 502d was in position west of
Foy. Beginning the counterattack at
1400, paratroopers pushed back through
Foy and dug in some 200 yards to the
north where late in the afternoon they
met the column fighting its way back
from Noville. 5
The smoke and fog that run through
all reports of the Noville fight did good
service as cover when the Americans
formed for the march out. The main
German barrier force had arrayed itself
just north of Foy, complete with armor
and self-propelled guns. Four Shermans,
in the van with a few half-tracks, were
put out of action before they could re-
turn fire. While one paratroop company
attacked to open the road, Major Har-
wick sent for two tank destroyers from
the rear of the column. Shells were burst-
ing among the troops crouched by the
roadside, and the clank of tank tracks
could be heard approaching from No-
ville. But the tank destroyers and their
armor-piercing shell did the trick-and
an assist must be credited also to the
Americans in Foy who were now on the
enemy’s rear. By 1700 the column was
back inside the American lines. The
fight at Noville cost the 1st Battalion of
the 506th a total of 13 officers and 199
men killed, wounded, and missing.
Team Desobry has no record of its casu-
alties but they must have been very
heavy, both in men and vehicles. The
506th estimates that the 2d Panzer lost
thirty-one vehicles in the Noville fight
5 For bravery in this action Pfc. Gilbert Van
Every was awarded the DSC.

456 THE ARDENNES: BATTLE OF THE BULGE
and perhaps half a regiment of foot. At
least the first part of this estimate may
be close to the fact, for it is known that
one battalion of the 3d Panzer Regiment
was badly crippled at Noville.
There is an epilogue. In late afternoon,
as his soldiers poked about the
ruins of Noville, Lauchert radioed the
LVIII Panzer Corps commander for permission
to wheel the 2d Panzer into Bastogne.
Krueger’s answer was prompt and
astringent: “Forget Bastogne and head
for the Meuse!”
The attack planned for the 19th east
of Bastogne and carried out by the Panzer
Lehr and 26th Volks Grenadier Divisions
had signally failed of success. The
soft ground had made it impossible for
the German tanks to maneuver easily
off the roads—a factor of great worth to
the defenders. The Americans had at
least five artillery battalions on call in
this sector, whereas neither of the two
enemy divisions had been able to get
any substantial number of guns and
howitzers forward. Also, the pell-mell,
piecemeal deployment east of Bastogne
by the advance guard formations was beginning
to reap a harvest of delay and
tactical confusion. There was some savage
fighting here during the day, but
un-co-ordinated—on the part of the enemy-and
never pressed in force to a
definite conclusion.
On the 20th Luettwitz turned the
78th Volks Grenadier Regiment over to
the Panzer Lehr commander for the
close-in northern hook at Bastogne
planned for execution the previous day.
The immediate goal was Luzery, a suburb
of Bastogne on the Houffalize highway.
The 78th circled north to pass the
village of Bizory, the left wing pin for
the 501st, but fire from Company F
caught the Germans in the flank. This
halted the move and forced the 78th to
swing wide into the cover given by the
woods north of the village. Masked by
the woods the enemy proceeded west as
far as the Bourcy-Bastogne rail line,
then unaccountably stopped. When the
2d Battalion of the 506th came up on the
left of the 501st, its disposition was such
that it faced this German force, plus its
sister regiment the 77th, at the point
where the Foy-Bizory road crossed the
railroad.
Through most of the daylight hours
on the 20th the enemy seemed content
to probe the main line occupied by the
501st. During the evening Bayerlein sent
his own 902d Panzer Grenadier Regi-
ment against Neffe, but a roving patrol
from Team O’Hara happened to spot
the tank detachment of the regiment as
it filed along the Neffe-Wardin road and
brought friendly artillery into play. Be-
tween the American gunners and para-
troopers the 902d took a formidable
beating–very severe casualties were re-
ported by the enemy division comman-
der. A tank destroyer platoon from the
705th used ground flares to sight and
destroy three of the panzers reinforcing
the infantry assault waves.
When the 501st went into position on
the 19th, its southern flank had been
none too solidly anchored by the thin
counterreconnaissance screen operated
by Task Force O’Hara and the tired,
understrength 35th Engineer Combat
Battalion (Lt. Col. Paul H. Symbol).
Enemy pressure around Wardin, al-
though subsequently relaxed, indicated
that here was a gap which had better be
sealed. On the morning of the 20th Mc-
Auliffe sent the 2d Battalion of the 327th
Glider Infantry from the division assem-

THE BATTLE OF BASTOGNE 457
bly area through Bastogne to relieve
Company A of the engineers. 6
The engineers had just climbed out
of their foxhole line west of Marvie and
turned the position over to the 2d Bat-
talion when one of O’Hara’s outposts
saw a German column streaming into
Marvie. This was the advance guard of
the 901st Regiment which had finally
extricated itself from the Wiltz valley.
With only a single rifle company and
four tanks, the Germans never had a
chance. In an hour’s time O’Hara’s me-
diums had accounted for the panzers and
the 2d Battalion had beaten the attackers
back in disorder and occupied Marvie.
The paratroopers waited through the
day for the main attack to come, but the
only evidences of the enemy were a
smoke screen drifting in from the east
and occasional tanks in the distance. Un-
known to the Americans a shift in the
Panzer Lehr’s stance before Bastogne
was taking place.
The inchoate American defense form-
ing at Bastogne was conditioned by a set
of optimistic premises. The first of these
was the promised arrival of the 4th Ar-
mored Division from Patton’s Third
Army in the south. During the night of
19 December the VIII Corps commander,
acting on word from Patton, told Mc-
Auliffe that one combat command from
the 4th Armored was on its way to Bas-
togne and would be attached to the
101st. At noon McAuliffe and Roberts
(who had been promised this initial
4th Armored force) learned that the en-
tire division was to be added to the Bas-
6 It is indicative of the confusion and lack of
precise information then current that the 2d
Battalion journal reports, as if in surprise, that no
casualties were sustained during this move.
togne defense. The certainty of the 4th
Armored’s appearance explains in part
the routine and rather cavalier treat-
ment accorded Capt. Bert Ezell and his
little team from CCB, 4th Armored,
when it arrived in Bastogne shortly after
noon. 7 Quite obviously McAuliffe and
Middleton anticipated the early appear-
ance of the entire armored division.
A second premise–accepted in most
of the 101st planning efforts on 20 De-
cember-was that the VIII Corps still
had viable forces in and around Bastogne
which could be employed in common
with the airborne divisions. This idea,
of course, went hand in hand with the
very real ignorance of enemy forces
and locations which obtained both in
Bastogne and at Middleton’s new head-
quarters in Neufchâteau. Earlier Mc-
Auliffe and his staff had counted on
Roberts’ 10th Armored combat com-
mand to reinforce a counterattack
east by the 101st—a vain expectation, as
it turned out. There remained the 28th
Infantry Division—or at least some part
thereof. In midafternoon McAuliffe sent
a liaison officer to General Cota, whose
headquarters was now at Sibret south-
west of Bastogne, with instructions to
find out the German dispositions and
to ask the question: “Could the 28th at-
tack towards Wiltz in conjunction with
the 101st Airborne tomorrow?”
Cota’s reply is not even recorded in
the 101st Airborne log. After all he
could give only one answer: the 28th
Infantry Division no longer existed
as a division (although two of its regi-
ments would continue in stubborn bat-
7 Ezell’s excursion is treated with the 4th
Armored story in Chapter XXI. The news of
Ezell’s subsequent departure from Bastogne is
reflected only in scant journal notations.

458 THE ARDENNES: BATTLE OF THE BULGE
tle under other commands). The fall
of Wiltz on the night of 19 December
had written finis to the story of the
110th Infantry, Cota’s single remaining
regiment. On the morning of the 20th
Cota had gone into Bastogne, finding
its streets jammed with vehicles, corps
artillery trying to bull a way through,
and a host of stragglers, including many
of the survivors of the 110th Infantry.
General Middleton gave Cota permis-
sion to get his people out of Bastogne
and the latter ordered them out on foot,
abandoning to the traffic jam those ve-
hicles still in their possession. (So im-
pressed was General Cota by the traffic
choking the streets and alleys of Bas-
togne, that he advised the VIII Corps
commander to keep all contingents of
the 4th Armored Division out of the
town.)
Despite McAuliffe’s failure to secure
the immediate assistance which would
make a full-bodied counterattack feas-
ible, it seemed that the tactical problem
facing the 101st on the evening of 20
December remained linear, that is, the
creation of a homogeneous and defen-
sible line barring entrance to Bastogne
from the north and east. The corps let-
ter of instructions reaching McAuliffe
at noon on the 20th was rather more
sweeping in its definition of mission.
“There will be no withdrawal”—this
was clear enough to all concerned. “The
[ 101st Airborne] Division will stabilize
their front lines on the front P798945
[that is, Recht] to St. Vith, south along
a general line east of [Highway] N15
. . . to connect with the 4th Infantry
Division at Breitweiler.” It may be as-
sumed that neither Middleton nor Mc-
Auliffe took this part of the order either
literally or seriously.
There had been a few indications,
and rumors, of enemy activity west of
Bastogne–indeed the 101st had lost
some of its trains in the division assem-
bly area during the previous night–but
thus far all this could be charged to
raiding parties roaming on the loose un-
der cover of night in a fluid and chang-
ing battle. In early evening a report
reached Bastogne that the road north-
west to La Roche and Ortheuville
(where two platoons of the 705th Tank
Destroyer Battalion now attached to the
101st were operating) was free of the
enemy. The roads south to Neufchâteau
and Arlon were still open–and waiting
for traverse by the 4th Armored. So the
situation looked in McAuliffe’s Bastogne
headquarters at 1900 on 20 December.
Across the lines the German com-
mander, Luettwitz, was none too pleased
by the rather dilatory operations of his
corps. He knew by this time that the
American front east of Bastogne had
stiffened and that his troops had been
able to find no holes. On the other hand
the strength of his corps was increasing
by the hour as the two divisions hauled
their tails up on the muddy roads–it
looked as though he had the forces
needed for maneuver. As a last flick of
the hand Luettwitz ordered Bayerlein to
throw the 902d into the night attack
against Neffe. This was at most a diver-
sion, for Luettwitz had decided to envel-
ope Bastogne from the south and west.
He intended to use the bulk of the Pan-
zer Lehr, leaving only one of its grena-
dier regiments to flesh out the eastern
front with the foot elements of Kokott’s
26th Volks Grenadier Division, but in
addition he had in hand the 39th Volks
Grenadier Regiment of the 26th which
had just come up behind the corps’

THE BATTLE OF BASTOGNE 459
south flank. All told there was a sizable
motorized force for this venture: the re-
inforced reconnaissance battalion, the
engineer battalion, and the 902d (as
soon as it could be disengaged) from the
Panzer Lehr; plus the reconnaissance
battalion and 39th from the 26th Volks
Grenadier Division.
The immediate objectives seem to
have been clearly stated. The Panzer
Lehr spearheads were to advance via
Hompré and Sibret to St. Hubert, while
the units of the 26th would start the
attack from an assembly point at Remon-
fosse on the Bastogne-Arlon road with
the intention of stabbing into Bastogne
from the southwest. In fact this night
operation developed into a mad scram-
ble in which the troops from the two
divisions jockeyed for the lead as if they
were in a flat race for high stakes.
Truly the stakes were high. Through-
out this maneuver Luettwitz and his
superior, General Manteuffel, had an
eye single to shaking the armored col-
umns of the XLVII Panzer Corps free
for the dash to the Meuse bridges. Bas-
togne, sitting in the center of the web of
hard-surfaced roads, was important–but
only as a means to a geographically dis-
tant end. Bastogne had failed to fall like
an overripe plum when the bough was
shaken, but it could be clipped off the
branch—or so the German High Com-
mand still reasoned—and without using
Bayerlein’s armor.
The enemy drive across the south
face of Bastogne and on to the west dur-
ing the night of 20 December did not
immediately jolt McAuliffe’s command;
it was rather a disparate series of clashes
with scattered and unsuspecting units of
the VIII Corps. Central to the story at
this point is the fact that by daylight on
the 21st the German infantry following
the armored troops were ensconced on
both the main roads running from Bas-
togne south, while light forces were
running up and down the western
reaches of the Bastogne–St. Hubert high-
way. In the north the circle had been
clamped shut during the night when the
2d Panzer seized Ortheuville on the
Marche road.
Bastogne Is Encircled
Some of the Bastogne defenders re-
call in the saga of the 101st Airborne
Division that their lone fight began on
20 December. “It was on this day, 20
December,” reads the war diary of the
327th Glider Infantry, “that all roads
were cut by the enemy . . . and we were
completely surrounded.” This is only
hindsight. The picture of complete en-
circlement was built up in McAuliffe’s
headquarters only slowly on the 21st, nor
did the ring at first seem to be hermetic
and contracting. Doubtless the word
passed among the regiments very rap-
idly-the 501st journal notes at 1030 that
the last road is cut–but it was late after-
noon before an armored patrol sent out
by CCB affirmed that the way south cer-
tainly was closed.
What were the means available for
defense of the Bastogne perimeter? The
101st Airborne was an elite, veteran
outfit at nearly full strength, and well
acquainted with isolation as a combat
formation. Only five battalions from
McAuliffe’s four regiments had been
seriously engaged in the fight thus far.
Its four artillery battalions were rein-
forced by the 969th and 755th Field
Artillery Battalions, armed with 155-
mm. howitzers whose range was nearly

460 THE ARDENNES: BATTLE OF THE BULGE
three times that of the airborne artillery,
a very important make-weight for the
101st. In addition the 10th Armored
Troops were supported by the 420th
Armored Field Artillery Battalion,
whose mobility and tactics made it espe-
cially useful in a perimeter situation.
Also available were stray gun sections
and pieces from artillery units which
had been decimated during the VIII
Corps’ withdrawal.
Probably CCB, 10th Armored, and
CCR, 9th Armored, had between them
some forty operable medium tanks by
the 21st. 8 To this number of fighting
vehicles should be added the light tanks,
cavalry assault guns, and antiaircraft ar-
tillery automatic weapons carriers—
probably no more than two platoons in
each category. A very heartening addi-
tion to the Bastogne force, of course, was
provided by the 705th Tank Destroyer
Battalion.
The highway nodal position which
made Bastogne so necessary to the Ger-
mans also set up a magnetic field for
the heterogeneous stragglers, broken in-
fantry, and dismounted tankers heading
west. Realizing this fact, Colonel Rob-
berts got permission to gather all
stragglers into his command. Roberts’
force came to be known as Team
SNAFU 9 and served mainly as a reser-
voir from which regular units drew
replacements or from which com-
manders organized task forces for special
assignments.
8 The records of the badly fragmented armor
absorbed in the lines of the 101st Airborne are
so scanty as to give no really precise strength
figures.
9 In the vernacular of the time, SNAFU stood
for: Situation Normal, All Fouled Up. Thus
Team SNAFU was named in a typical soldier
cock of the snoot at adverse fate and the sensi-
bilities of higher command.
It is impossible to reckon accurately
the number and the fighting worth of
those stragglers who reached Bastogne
and stayed there. CCR contributed
about two hundred riflemen; CCB may
have had an equal number; General
Cota culled two or three hundred men
from Team SNAFU to return to his 28th
Division; and one may guess there were
another two or three hundred stragglers
whose identity has been lost. Many of
these men, given a hot meal and forty-
eight hours’ rest, could be used and were
used, but they appear as anonymous
figures in the combat record (thus:
“100 infantry left for Team Browne”) .
McAuliffe now had the advantage of
a clearly defined command structure.
Before the 20th he and Colonel Roberts
had commanded independently, but on
that date Middleton gave McAuliffe the
“say” (as General Cota had advised after
his visit) over all the troops in the
Bastogne sector. 10 The presence of Rob-
erts would prove particularly valuable.
Early in the war he had been the ar-
mored instructor at the Army Command
and General Staff School, where his
humorously illustrated “Do’s” and
“Don’ts” of tank warfare showed a keen
appreciation of the problems posed by
armor and infantry co-operation. The
paratroopers were in particular need of
this advice for they seldom worked with
armor, knew little of its capability, and
even less of its limitations, and–as be-
fitted troops who jumped into thin air–
were a little contemptuous of men who
fought behind plate steel. (During the
Bastogne battle Roberts developed a
formal memorandum on the proper em-
ployment of armor, but this was not
10 General McAuliffe subsequently was given the
DSC for the defense of the town.

THE BATTLE OF BASTOGNE
distributed to the 101st until 28 De-
cember.) On the other hand the tankers
had much to learn from commanders
and troops who were used to fighting
“surrounded.”
McAuliffe’s logistic means were less
substantial than the tactical. The air-
borne division normally carried less sup-
ply than conventional divisions and the
101st had been hurried into Belgium
with ammunition and grenade pouches
not quite full, much individual equip-
ment missing (overshoes, helmets, sleep-
ing bags, and the like), and only a few
truckloads of 105-mm. howitzer shells.
In fact some of the first paratroopers in-
to line had to be supplied with ammu-
nition from the CCB trains. Fortunately
Roberts’ trains were full, and in some
major supply items even had overages,
when they arrived at Bastogne.
The ability of the 101st to sustain it-
self had been severely diminished on the
night of 19 December when German
raiding parties (some reported in civil-
ian garb) surprised and overran the
division service area around Mande-St.
Etienne. Most of the quartermaster and
ordnance troops made their way to the
VIII Corps, but the raiders captured or
killed most of the division medical
company. Only eight officers and forty-
four men escaped. This loss of doctors,
aid men, and medical supplies was one
of the most severe blows dealt the 101st.
A number of transport vehicles also were
lost in this affray, but about a hundred
trucks had been sent to the rear for re-
supply and so escaped. Very few of these
got back to the 101st before the ring
closed.
In addition, Roberts had sent the
CCB trucks back for resupply just be-
fore the roads were closed. There was,
461
of course, a considerable quantity of am-
munition, food, and other supplies in-
side Bastogne which the VIII Corps had
been unable to evacuate. (Officers of
Middleton’s staff bitterly regretted the
loss of the wine and liquors which had
been carefully husbanded for consump-
tion at Christmas and New Year). Bas-
togne was sizable enough to have some
reserve civilian stocks, and the mélange
of armor, engineers, and artillery units
around the city had supplies and ammu-
nition in their own vehicles. (Pancakes
would appear regularly in the rations
served during the siege, these concocted
from the doughnut flour left in a huge
American Red Cross dump.)
Through assiduous scrounging, req-
uisitioning, and an enforced pooling of
unit resources, the G–4 of the 101st
would be able to work minor logistic
miracles-but these alone would not
have insured the survival of the Bas-
togne garrision. The airborne division
had been supplied by air during the
Holland operation, and when, on the
21st, McAuliffe knew that his command
was isolated he asked for aerial re-
supply. Unfortunately no plans had
been worked out in advance for air-
lift support and the supply records of
the Holland campaign-which would
have made logistic calculation and pro-
cedure easier-were back in France. In
the first instance, therefore, the troops
in Bastogne would have to take what
they got whenever they could get it.
Communications would present no
major problem. A corps radio-link ve-
hicle arrived in Bastogne just before the
road to Neufchâteau was severed; so
Middleton and McAuliffe had two-way
phone and teletype at their disposal
throughout the siege. Inside Bastogne

462 THE ARDENNES: BATTLE OF THE BULGE
there were enough armored and artil-
lery units–comparatively rich in signal
equipment-to flesh out a speedy and
fairly reliable command and artillery
net. Tactical communication beyond the
Bastogne perimeter, however, as for ex-
ample with the 4th Armored, had to be
couched in ambiguous-sometimes quite
meaningless-terms.
Mobile forces racing cross-country,
shooting up isolated posts and convoys,
do not necessarily make a battle. The
German dash around Bastogne was pre-
eminently designed to encircle, not con-
strict. The German commanders, well
aware of the fragmentization of their en-
veloping forces, did not consider that
Bastogne had been surrounded until the
evening of the 21st. The major enemy
impact on this date, therefore, came as
in previous days against the east face of
Bastogne. The American perimeter,
then taking form, represents basically a
reaction to the original German inten-
tions with only slight concessions to the
appearance of the enemy in the south
and west. The 502d held the northern
sector of the American line in the Long-
champs and Sonne-Fontaine area. North-
east of Bastogne the 506th was deployed
with one foot in Foy and the other
next to the Bourcy-Bastogne rail line.
To the right of this regiment the
501st faced east-one flank at the rail line
and the other south of Neffe. The 2d
Battalion, 327th, held the Marvie posi-
tion with an open flank abutting on the
Bastogne-Arlon highway.
The American deployment on
through the south and west quadrants
could not yet be called a line. In the
early afternoon McAuliffe took the 1st
Battalion of the 327th (then attached to
the 501st) and sent it due south of Bas-
togne; here tenuous contact was estab-
lished with the division engineer battal-
ion-the 326th-strung thinly across the
Neufchâteau road and on to the west.
(The airborne engineers were not well
equipped with demolition matériel and
this road had to be blocked; McAuliffe
phoned the VIII Corps for assistance
and in the early dark a detachment from
the 35th Engineer Combat Battalion
came north and did the job.)
Directly west of Bastogne lay the rem-
nants of the division trains and service
companies. Defense here would devolve
initially on the 420th Armored Field
Artillery Battalion (Lt. Col. Barry D.
Browne) , which was gathering infantry
and tank destroyers and finally would
be known as Task Force Browne. The
last link in the perimeter was the 3d
Battalion of the 327th, holding on a
front northwest of Bastogne which ex-
tended from the Marche-Bastogne high-
way to Champs.
The dispositions just described repre-
sent the more or less static formations
in the Bastogne force, the beef for
sustained holding operations. Equally
important were the mobile, counter-
punching elements provided by the ar-
mor, assault guns, and tank destroyers.
These units, with constantly changing
task force names and composition, would
have a ubiquitous, fluid, and highly im-
portant role in maintaining the Bastog-
ne perimeter against the German con-
centric attack. Their tactical agility on
the interior line would be greatly en-
hanced by the big freeze which set in on
the 21st.
All through the night of 20 December
the troops of the 506th in Foy had been

THE BATTLE OF BASTOGNE
buffeted by German artillery. At dawn
the enemy advanced on the village, and
the Americans, as they had done earlier,
retired to the better ground south of
Foy and Recogne. This early effort was
not followed up because the 2d Panzer
was on its way west and had no further
concern in this sector save to neutralize
a possible American foray against its
rear.
The primary attack of the day came
along the Bourcy-Bastogne rail line,
right at the seam between the 506th and
501st. During the previous night Kokott
had built up the concentration of his
26th Volks Grenadier Division in the
woods east of the railroad to include
much of the rifle strength of the 77th
and 78th Regiments. The two Amer-
ican regiments had failed to make a
firm commitment as to tactical respon-
sibility and, indeed, the left flank of the
501st was nearly a thousand yards to
the rear of the 506th. At 0830 a 506th
patrol chanced upon some Germans in
the woods behind the regiment’s right
flank. Companies D and F attacked
promptly to seal the gap at the rail line
while the 501st turned its weapons to
deny any movement on its side.
Enough of the enemy had infiltrated
for McAuliffe to ask Colonel Sink to
send in his 1st Battalion, which had been
badly hurt at Noville, as a cauterizing
force. It took three hours of musketry
and, at several points, bayonet work to
liquidate the Germans in the pocket;
the battalion killed about 50, took pris-
oner 85, and drove a large number into
the hands of the 501st. This hot sec-
tor of the front cooled off during the
afternoon. The 26th Volks Grenadier
Division was realigning and extending
to take over the ground vacated by
463
Panzer Lehr, and Kokott could not af-
ford two regiments in attack at the rail
line.
Through most of 21 December the
Germans lashed out at the 501st with
artillery and sporadic infantry assaults.
On the American left flank Kokott’s
77th carried the ball but the main effort
was made by the 902d, attacking from
an assembly area at Neffe against the
3d Battalion. The records of this bat-
talion were lost in later fighting, but
participants in the action speak of a
“determined” attack by two German
rifle battalions and “vicious close-in
fighting.” Although Colonel Ewell ex-
pected a second all-out assault when day-
light ended, this never came. The 902d
had its orders to catch up with the Pan-
zer Lehr van in the west and during the
night assembled for the march to rejoin
General Bayerlein.
South of the 501st positions the enemy
seemed content to sit back and shell
the headquarters of the 2d Battalion,
327th, at Marvie. The 2d Battalion re-
cords no other action than the appear-
ance of some tanks and infantry along
the Arlon road forcing a flank exten-
sion across the road. German evidence,
however, speaks of attacks by the 901st
in this sector which “miscarried.” 11 If
discretion in this particular instance
proved the better part of valor, it prob-
ably was induced by the CCB tanks
which had taken position on the Arlon
road.
Farther west the enemy was more ag-
gressive. Having played havoc with the
11 Both the German and American records for
the Ardennes contain, from time to time, reports
of “attacks” which in fact were never noticed by
the alleged targets and which probably were no
more than dutiful commotion in response to the
promptings of higher authority.

464 THE ARDENNES: BATTLE OF THE BULGE
VIII Corps’ artillery and trains assem-
bled outside Sibret, Kumpfgruppe
Kunkel turned north in the late morn-
ing toward Senonchamps, a village of
some importance since it controlled the
secondary road leading onto the Marche-
Bastogne highway. The immediate prize
before Kunkel, but probably unknown
to him, was the American artillery
groupment consisting of the 755th and
969th Field Artillery Battalions, em-
placed with their 155-mm. howitzers
near Villeroux, a crossroads some 2,500
yards south of Senonchamps.
At Senonchamps the 420th Armored
Field Artillery Battalion under Colonel
Browne was busily engaged in firing
against the enemy east and north of Bas-
togne, but Browne had been able to take
some steps to secure his gun positions
with a scratch force of infantry and
light tanks raised by CCB. Around Vil-
leroux, however, all was confusion and
no single officer seemed to be respon-
sible for defense of this sector. As Kun-
kel sped north from Sibret toward Vil-
leroux he met the 771st Field Artillery
Battalion, which abandoned its guns and
fled. About this time Team Pyle (a de-
tachment formed from the remnants of
CCR and numbering fourteen tanks and
a couple of hundred stray riflemen)
came south on the Neufchâteau road.
Kunkel hit the point of this force east
of Villeroux and drove the Americans
back in the direction of Senonchamps.
The brief respite given the Villeroux
defenders by this encounter enabled the
two medium howitzer battalions to
“march order” their batteries and head
for Senonchamps. German infantry in
half-tracks closed on Villeroux before
the last howitzers could displace, but
visibility by this time had dwindled to
a couple of hundred yards and Battery
A of the 755th alongside the headquar-
ters battery of the 969th laid down a
hail of machine gun fire which momen-
tarily halted the enemy. This small rear
guard force itself was saved by the ap-
pearance of two American tanks that
casually wandered into the fight and out
again. Only one howitzer was lost dur-
ing the displacement to Senonchamps,
and it was disabled by a mortar shell.
At the edge of Senonchamps Team
Pyle made a stand, for the German drive
threatened to strike the 420th Ar-
mored Field Artillery Battalion (Team
Browne) and the two battalions of 155’s
from the rear. When the enemy infantry
formed to join their tanks in an assault
on the village they came directly under
the eyes of Battery B of the 796th Anti-
aircraft Artillery Battalion, whose .50-
caliber “meat choppers” quickly ended
this threat. Kunkel decided to delay an
attempt for conclusion until the mor-
row.
North and northwest of Bastogne the
day passed quietly, although small Ger-
man detachments did make a few sorties
on the Marche road. The company of
the 3d Battalion, 327th, which had been
sent on a lone mission to aid the sur-
vivors of the division medical company,
was attacked and momentarily cut off but
succeeded in rejoining the battalion.
The Enemy Begins a Concentric
Attack
The evening situation report that
reached OB WEST on the 21st made
good reading. Rundstedt was convinced
that the time was ripe for a concentric
attack to crush Bastogne and make this
road center available for the build-up re-

THE BATTLE OF BASTOGNE
quired to support the Fifth Panzer Army
at or over the Meuse. His order to Man-
teuffel made the seizure of Bastogne a
must, but at the same time stressed
the paramount necessity of retaining
momentum in the drive west. Manteuf-
fel had anticipated the OB WEST
command and during the evening visited
the XLVII Panzer Corps’ command
post to make certain that Luettwitz
would start the squeeze on Bastogne the
next day-but without involving the
mobile armored columns of the Panzer
Lehr.
Manteuffel, Luettwitz, and Kokott,
who was now made directly responsible
for the conduct of the Bastogne opera-
tion, were optimistic. For one thing the
fight could be made without looking
over the shoulder toward the south
(where the Luftwaffe had reported
heavy American traffic moving from
Metz through Luxembourg City), be-
cause the right wing of the Seventh
Army finally had shouldered its way
west and seemed ready to take over the
prearranged blocking line facing Neuf-
château, Arlon, and the American rein-
forcements predicted from Patton’s
Third Army. The advance guard of the
5th Parachute Division already had
crossed the Arlon road north of Marte-
lange. General Brandenberger, the Sev-
enth Army commander, himself came to
Luettwitz’ command post during the
evening to promise that all three regi-
ments of the division would take their
allotted positions.
Kokott apparently was promised rein-
forcement for the attack à outrance on
Bastogne but he had to begin the bat-
tle with those troops on the spot: his
own 26th Volks Grenadier Division, the
901st Kampfgruppe (which had been
465
detached from Panzer Lehr), an extra
fifteen Panther tanks, and some artil-
lery battalions. What the 5th Parachute
Division could put into the pot depend-
ed, of course, on the Americans to the
south.
It would take some time to relieve
those troops pulling out and redress the
alignment of the 26th Volks Grenadier
Division’s battalions. There was little
point to attacking the 101st Airborne in
the eastern sector where its strength
had been demonstrated, but west of Bas-
togne the Panzer Lehr and Kokott’s own
reconnaissance troops had encountered
only weak and disorganized opposition.
The first blow of the new series designed
to bore into Bastogne would be de-
livered here in the western sector,
accompanied by systematic shelling to
bring that town down around the
defender’s ears.
The battle on the 22d, therefore,
largely centered along an arc rather
roughly delimited by Villeroux and the
Neufchâteau highway at one end and
Mande-St. Etienne, just north of the
Marche highway, at the other. One can-
not speak of battle lines in this sector:
the two antagonists were mixed higgledy-
piggledy and for much of the time
with no certain knowledge of who was in
what village or at what crossroads. It
is indicative of the confusion prevailing
that the 501st tried to evacuate its regi-
mental baggage train-which had suf-
fered from enemy shelling-through Si-
bret after Kampfgruppe Kunkel had cut
the road north of the town by the dash
into Villeroux. (The 501st lost fifteen
trucks and nearly all its bed rolls.)
The arena in question earlier had
been the 101st service area and con-
tained in addition a good deal of the

466 THE ARDENNES: BATTLE OF THE BULGE
VIII Corps’ artillery and trains. Much of
the fighting on the 22d revolved around
two battalions of armored field artillery:
Colonel Paton’s 58th Armored Field
Artillery Battalion, which had emplaced
near Tillet–af ter the Longvilly battle–
to support the 101st Airborne; and
Browne’s 420th, now operating as a com-
bined arms team on a 4,000-yard perim-
eter in the neighborhood of Senon-
champs. Tillet lay about six miles west
of Senonchamps. Much of the interven-
ing countryside was in the hands of
roving patrols from Panzer Lehr, one of
which had erected a strong roadblock
midway between the two villages.
On the night of the 21st the Germans
encircled Tillet, where Paton, hard
pressed, radioed the VIII Corps for help.
Middleton relayed this SOS to Bastogne
but Browne, himself under attack by
Kunkel’s 26th Volks Grenadier Division
reconnaissance battalion, was forced to
say that the 58th would have to get back
to Senonchamps under its own power.
Nevertheless, Team Yantis (one me-
dium tank, two light tanks, and a couple
of rifle squads) moved forward to the
German roadblock, expecting to give
the 58th a hand when day broke. 12
Paton and his gunners never reached
Team Browne, 13 which had had its
hands full. Browne’s force not only had
to defend a section of the Bastogne per-
imeter and bar the Senonchamps entry,
but also had to serve the eighteen 105-
12 Team Yantis (1st Lt. Ray J. Yantis) was sent
back on the night of 22 December to find a way
through the enemy and bring back badly needed
artillery ammunition from Neufchâteau. The team
was ambushed and shot up near Pinsamont and
had to abandon its vehicles. Special AAR, Com.
pany C, 55th Armored Engineer Battalion.
13 See above, Chapter XIV, pages 328–29, for
the rest of the story of the 58th Armored Field
Artillery.
mm. howitzers which, from battery posi-
tions east and south of Senonchamps,
provided round-the-clock fire support for
friendly infantry five to eight miles dis-
tant. Close-in defense was provided by
a platoon of thirty stragglers who had
been rounded up by an airborne officer
and deployed three hundred yards south
of the gun positions. (This platoon held
for two days until all were killed or
captured.) Browne’s main weapon
against the German tanks and self-pro-
pelled guns was not his howitzers but
the seventeen Sherman tanks brought up
by Team Pyle and Team Van Kleef the
day before. These were disposed with
nine tanks facing a series of wood lots
west of the battery positions, four firing
south, and the remaining four placed
on the road to Villeroux.
At daybreak the first task was to clear
the enemy from the woods which lay un-
comfortably near the firing batteries.
Pyle’s scratch force of riflemen entered
the woods but found only a few Ger-
mans. Off to the northwest came the
sound of firing from the area known to
be occupied by a battalion of the 327th
Glider Infantry; so Browne reported to
Colonel Roberts that his team would join
this fight as soon as the woods were clear.
Before the sortie could be organized, a
detachment from Kampfgruppe Kunkel
struck out from Villeroux against the
American flank. Direct tank fire chased
the enemy away, but this was only the
opener. During the afternoon the enemy
made three separate assaults from the
woods that earlier had been reported
cleared, and again the tanks made short
work of the Germans (Van Kleef report-
ed eighteen enemy tanks destroyed dur-
ing the day).
As the afternoon wore on fog and snow

THE BATTLE OF BASTOGNE 467
clouded the scene and the tank gunners
began to lose their targets. The Ameri-
can howitzer batteries, however, pro-
vided a static and by this time a well-
defined target for enemy counterbattery
fire. At twilight Colonel Browne radioed
CCB that his heterogeneous team was
taking “terrible casualties.” Earlier he
had asked for more troops, and McAu-
liffe had sent Company C of the 327th
and Team Watts (about a hundred men,
under Maj. Eugene A. Watts) from Team
SNAFU. At dark the howitzer positions
had a fairly substantial screen of infantry
around them, although the enemy guns
continued to pound away through the
night.
The airdrop laid on for the 22d never
reached Bastogne–bad flying weather
continued as in the days past. All that
the Third Army air liaison staff could do
was to send a message that “the 101st
Airborne situation is known and appre-
ciated.” Artillery ammunition was run-
ning very low. The large number of
wounded congregated inside Bastogne
presented a special problem: there were
too few medics, not enough surgical
equipment, and blankets had to be gath-
ered up from front-line troops to wrap
the men suffering from wounds and
shock. Nonetheless, morale was high.
Late in the afternoon word was circu-
lated to all the regiments that the 4th
CASUALTIES IN AN IMPROVISED EMERGENCY WARD during the siege of Bastogne.

468 THE ARDENNES: BATTLE OF THE BULGE
Armored and the 7th Armored (so vague
was information inside the perimeter)
were on their way to Bastogne; to the
men in the line this was heartening news.
What may have been the biggest mo-
rale booster came with a reverse twist–
the enemy “ultimatum.” About noon
four Germans under a white flag entered
the lines of the 2d Battalion, 327th.
The terms of the announcement they
carried were simple: “the honorable sur-
render of the encircled town,” this to be
accomplished in two hours on threat of
”annihilation” by the massed fires of
the German artillery. The rest of the
story has become legend: how Gen-
eral McAuliffe disdainfully answered
“Nuts!”; and how Colonel Harper, com-
mander of the 327th, hard pressed to
translate the idiom, compromised on
“Go to Hell!” The ultimatum had been
signed rather ambiguously by “The Ger-
man Commander,” and none of the Ger-
man generals then in the Bastogne sector
seem to have been anxious to claim
authorship. 14 Lt. Col. Paul A Danahy,
G–2 of the 101st, saw to it that the story
was circulated–and appropriately em-
bellished-in the daily periodic report:
“The Commanding General’s answer
was, with a sarcastic air of humorous
tolerance, emphatically negative.” None-
theless the 101st expected that the com-
ing day—the 23d—would be rough.
The morning of 23 December broke
clear and cold. “Visibility unlimited,”
the air-control posts happily reported all
the way from the United Kingdom to
the foxholes on the Ardennes front. To
most of the American soldiery this
14 In a television interview early in 1960 General
von Luettwitz admitted that he was responsible
for the ultimatum to the Bastogne garrison. This
confirms a like statement made to Colonel Marshall
in 1945 but later denied by Luettwitz.
would be a red-letter day–long remem-
bered–because of the bombers and
fighter-bombers once more streaming
overhead like shoals of silver minnows
in the bright winter sun, their sharply
etched contrails making a wake behind
them in the cold air.
In Bastogne, however, all eyes looked
for the squat planes of the Troop Carrier
Command. About 0900 a Pathfinder
team dropped inside the perimeter and
set up the apparatus to guide the C–47’s
over a drop zone between Senon-
champs and Bastogne. The first of the
carriers dropped its six parapacks at
1150, and in little more than four hours
241 planes had been vectored to Bas-
togne. Each plane carried some twelve
hundred pounds, but not all reached the
drop zone nor did all the parapacks fall
where the Americans could recover
them. Nevertheless this day’s drop les-
sened the pinch–as the records of the
101st gratefully acknowledge. On 24 De-
cember a total of 160 planes would take
part in the drop; poor flying weather on
Christmas Day virtually scrubbed all
cargo missions-although eleven gliders
did bring in a team of four surgeons
and some POL badly needed by Roberts’
tanks. The biggest airlift day of the siege
would come on the 26th with 289 planes
flying the Bastogne run. 15
The bulk of the air cargo brought to
Bastogne during the siege was artillery
ammunition. By the 24th the airborne
batteries were down to ten rounds per
tube and the work horse 420th Armored
Field Artillery was expending no more
than five rounds per mission, even on
15 A complete listing of the Bastogne airdrop
missions, carrier losses, weather conditions, and
similar information can be found in Thompson’s
MS, Air Supply to Isolated Units, pp. 64–135.

SUPPLY BY AIR. Pathfinder unit (above) sets up radar equipment. Medical supplies (be-
low) are dragged by hand from drop Zone.

470 THE ARDENNES: BATTLE OF THE BULGE
very lucrative targets. This battalion,
covering a 360-degree front, would in
fact be forced to make its original 1,400
rounds last for five days. The two 155-
mm. howitzer battalions were really
pawing at the bottom of the barrel. The
969th fired thirty-nine rounds on 24 De-
cember and two days later could allow
its gunners only twenty-seven rounds,
one-sixth the number of rounds ex-
pended per day when the battle began.
The airdrop on the 23d brought a div-
idend for the troops defending Bastogne.
The cargo planes were all overwatched
by fighters who, their protective mission
accomplished, turned to hammer the
Germans in the Bastogne ring. During
the day eighty-two P–47’s lashed out at
this enemy with general-purpose and
fragmentation bombs, napalm, and
machine gun fire. The 101st reported
to Middleton, whose staff was han-
dling these air strikes for the division,
that “air and artillery is having a field
day around Bastogne.”
The German attack on the 23d was
mounted by the 26th Volks Grenadier
Division and the attached regiment left
behind by Panzer Lehr. Lacking the
men and tanks for an assault around
the entire perimeter, General Kokott
elected to continue the fight at Senon-
champs while attacking in two sectors
diametrically opposite each other, the
Marvie area in the southeast and the
Flamierge area in the northwest. By the
happenstance of its late and piecemeal
deployment the 327th Glider Infantry
stood in front of the enemy at both these
critical points.
The 5th Parachute Division, now bad-
ly fought out and with gaping ranks,
could be of little help at Bastogne. Ac-
tually this division was scattered on a
front of eighteen miles, reaching from
Neufchâteau clear back to the Sauer
crossings. Indeed, during the day the
26th Yolks Grenadier Division had to
take over the portion of the 5th Para-
chute line between Clochimont and
Hompré because the American forces
from the south threatened to pierce this
very thinly occupied segment of the
blocking line. Kokott, then, could em-
ploy only two regiments and his recon-
naissance battalion in the assault, while
maintaining what pressure the remain-
ing two regiments might have along the
balance of the American perimeter.
The enemy tactics on this and the fol-
lowing days reflect the manner in
which Kokott had to husband his re-
sources. Extensive preparatory fires by
artillery and Werfers opened the show
while the infantry wormed in as close to
the American foxhole line as possible.
By this time the new-fallen snow had
put every dark object in full relief; the
grenadiers now donned white snow
capes and the panzers were painted
white. (The Americans replied in kind
with wholesale raids on Belgian bed
linen and with whitewash for their ar-
mored vehicles.) The assault would be
led by a tank platoon–normally four or
five panzers–followed by fifty to a hun-
dred infantry. If this first wave failed,
a second or third–seldom larger than
the initial wave–would be thrown in.
It is clear, however, that the German
commander and his troops were chary
of massed tactics at this stage of the
game.
The 39th Volks Grenadier Regiment,
freshest in Kokott’s division, was assem-
bled to the west and northwest opposite
Team Browne and the 3d Battalion of
the 327th. The latter had maintained

THE BATTLE OF BASTOGNE 471
an observation post at Flamierge and
a string of roadblocks along the Flam-
ierge road well in front of the battalion
position. Here the enemy dealt the first
blow of the day and got into Flamierge,
only to be chased out by a counterat-
tack. Next, the enemy gathered south of
Company C—positioned astride the
Marche highway–and tried to shoot the
Americans out with tank fire. In early
evening the Germans moved in for the
assault and at one point it was reported
that Company C had been lost. This was
far from fact for the American artillery
beat off the attackers; the 3d Battalion,
however, pulled back closer to Bastogne.
This enemy effort also extended to em-
brace Team Browne. More infantry
were hurried to Senonchamps on light
tanks, and at 1830 McAuliffe sent one
half of his mobile reserve (Team
Cherry) to give a hand against the Ger-
man tanks. But the American tanks,
tank destroyers, and artillery already on
the scene were able to handle the pan-
zers without additional help–and even
while this fight was on the cannoneers
around Senonchamps turned their
pieces to lob shells across the perimeter
in support of the hard-driven paratroop-
ers and tankers at Marvie.
During the hours of light the 901st
made no move to carry out its scheduled
attack between Marvie and the Arlon
road. Quite possibly the activity of the
American fighter-bombers, once more in
the skies, made it necessary to wait for
nightfall. Through the afternoon the en-
emy shelled the 2d Battalion, 327th, and
its command post in Marvie. As night
came on the barrage increased in inten-
sity, sweeping along the battalion front
and onto its northern flank–beyond
Marvie—where Team O’Hara stood
with its tanks.
At 1845 the 901st (with at least two
tank companies in support) commenced
a co-ordinated attack delivered by pla-
toons and companies against the front
manned by the 2d Battalion and Team
O’Hara. 16 One quick rush put an enemy
detachment on a hill south of Marvie
which overlooked this village. The pla-
toon of paratroopers on the hill was
surrounded and destroyed, but when a
half-track and a brace of tanks tried to
move down the hill into Marvie a lucky
shot or a mine disabled the half-track,
leaving no way past for the tanks. On
the Bastogne-Arlon road a group of tanks
(twelve were counted) started north to-
ward the right flank of the 2d Battalion.
Here Company F later reported that the
tanks “made repeated attempts to over-
run our positions but were halted.” It is
probable that the three medium tanks
from Team O’Hara and the three tank
destroyers from the 609th Tank De-
stroyer Battalion which stood astride the
road (not to mention the darkness and
artillery fire) had a more chastening
effect on the panzers than the small arms
fire of the paratroopers.
The Germans seem to have had the
village of Marvie as their main objective
for by midnight the fight had died down
all along the line except at Marvie,
where it burst out with fresh virulence.
It is estimated that at least one rifle
battalion and some fifteen tanks were
thrown against Company E (now rein-
forced by an understrength company of
airborne engineers) and Team O’Hara.
16 The official records credit Pfc. N. A. Osterberg,
a bazooka man of headquarters company, with
driving back the German tanks that assaulted the
2d Battalion positions. Private Osterberg was
wounded during the three-hour fight. He was
awarded the DSC.

472 THE ARDENNES: BATTLE OF THE BULGE
Using the hill which earlier had been
wrested from Company G as a mounting
block, three German tanks made their
way into the south edge of Marvie, but
O’Hara’s tanks and assault guns stopped
a major penetration from the east by
gunning down the panzers silhouetted
in the glare of burning buildings, thus
enabling the Americans to hold on in
the north half of the village. The threat
of a breach here impelled McAuliffe to
send the remaining half of Team Cherry
to Marvie. Because this switch stripped
Bastogne of its last counterattack force,
Cherry’s detachment, which had gone
west to assist Team Browne, was recalled
to Bastogne. An hour before dawn on
the 24th the battle ended and quiet came
to Marvie. O’Hara’s troops had ac-
counted for eight panzers in this fight,
but the village was still clutched by both
antagonists.
The battle on the 23d had been
viewed in a somewhat somber light in-
side Bastogne. That evening, only a few
minutes after the German attack began
in the Marvie sector, Lt. Col. Harry W.
O. Kinnard (the 101st Airborne Divi-
sion G–3) telephoned his opposite num-
ber at the VIII Corps command post.
The gist of his report, as recorded in the
corps G–3 journal, was this: “In regard
to our situation it is getting pretty
sticky around here. They [the 4th Ar-
mored Division] must keep coming.
The enemy has attacked all along the
south and some tanks are through and
running around in our area. Request
you inform 4th Armored Division of our
situation and ask them to put on all
possible pressure.”
The events of the past hours had
shown that the force under McAuliffe’s
command was overextended at a num-
ber of points. The artillery groupment
west of Bastogne was particularly ex-
posed, and the 327th Glider Infantry
had already been forced to shorten its
lines. Then too the segments of the pe-
rimeter defense were not as well co-
ordinated as they might be. The tankers
of CCB complained that they had no
idea of the airborne positions, and quite
probably the regiments of the 101st
were hazy as to the location of the small
tank and tank destroyer detachments on
their flanks.
Colonel Kinnard, whose sharp tactical
sense was rated highly by all the com-
manders who worked with him during
the siege, drew up on 24 December a
plan to regroup the Bastogne forces. The
plan was put into operation that same
evening. Kinnard’s scheme placed all
four regiments of the 101st Airborne on
the line as combined arms teams. Team
O’Hara and a platoon of the 705th Tank
Destroyer Battalion were attached to the
501st. The 506th, whose sector had been
quiet, got two platoons of the 705th but
no tanks. The 502d was given two pla-
toons from the 705th and Team Ander-
son (it is symptomatic of the shoestring
defense which perforce had evolved at
the perimeter that Captain Anderson’s
“team” consisted of two cavalry as-
sault guns, one tank destroyer, and
two jeeps). The 327th took over the
326th Airborne Engineer Battalion, two
platoons of the 9th Armored Engineer
Battalion (which had won distinction in
the Noville fight), and four platoons of
the 705th. Also attached to the 327th
was the amalgam of infantry, tank de-
stroyers, and tanks which had grown up
around Browne’s 420th Armored Field
Artillery Battalion and which, on the
23d, had been reorganized as Team

THE BATTLE OF BASTOGNE 473
Roberts. (Colonel Browne was wounded
by a shell fragment on the 24th and died
the next day.) 17
This readjustment of the 101st posi-
tions resulted in a taut and tenuous line
of approximately sixteen miles. (Map 4)
That it could not be defended in equal
strength at all points was not only a mili-
tary aphorism but a simple fact dictated
by the troops available and the accidents
17 He received a posthumous award of the DSC.
MAP 4
of the ground. Creation of a tactical reserve
was therefore mandatory, albeit
difficult of accomplishment with the
limited mechanized force at McAuliffe’s
disposal. The 101st reserve, as now organized,
consisted of Roberts’ CCB; that is,
Teams Cherry and Arnsdorf (with perhaps
nine medium and five light tanks
operational at any given time) plus a
part of the original Team SNAFU, put
together by Colonel Roberts from the
remnants of CCR, 9th Armored, and various
waifs and strays. (Colonel Gilbreth,

474 THE ARDENNES: BATTLE OF THE BULGE
the commander of SNAFU, was wounded
on the 22d and then hospitalized.)
This reshuffle stripped CCB of its own
reserve; so Roberts organized a new
formation (Team Palmaccio, com-
manded by 1st Lt. Charles P. Palmaccio)
equipped with four antiaircraft half-
tracks, one tank destroyer, and two light
tanks. Roadblocks at the entrances to Bas-
togne were established, each manned by
two guns from Company C, 609th Tank
Destroyer Battalion. Inside Bastogne it-
self, McAuliffe had a part of Team SNA-
FU as a kind of “interior guard,” backed
up by four self-propelled tank destroyers
and forty men from the 705th. All this
regrouping tightened and strengthened
the rifle line surrounding Bastogne, but
the resources at hand for fire fighting
enemy armored incursions or for quick,
local counterattacks were woefully lim-
ited-as shown by the commitment of
Team Cherry on opposite sides of the
perimeter during 23–24 December.
General Luettwitz, with only a rein-
forced division to use against Bastogne,
was worse off than McAuliffe. He had
been given rather vague promises of re-
inforcement, but no decision was ren-
dered by the High Command until the
23d when Hitler agreed to release two
fresh divisions (the 9th Panzer and 15th
Panzer Grenadier) from the OKW re-
serve. Once these troops were handed
over to Army Group B, Field Marshal
Model decided that they were more
sorely needed to shore up the left flank
of the Fifth Panzer and Seventh Armies
than at Bastogne. One regimental com-
bat team from the 15th Panzer Grena-
dier Division was all he would give
Luettwitz for the Bastogne operation.
On both sides of the line, then, the
daylight hours of the 24th were spent in
regrouping, this punctuated with heavy
gusts of artillery and mortar fire when-
ever the opponent showed signs of move-
ment. Once again, however, a beautiful
flying day gave the Americans an edge.
P–47’s belonging to the 512th, 513th,
and 514th Squadrons of the XIX Tac-
tical Air Command worked around the
Bastogne perimeter, at one point, in the
Noville sector, bombing so close to the
airborne lines that the 101st sent frantic
word to the VIII Corps asking that the
flight leader be told to call off the mis-
sion. The 115th Kampfgruppe from the
15th Panzer Grenadier Division duly
arrived for attachment to Kokott’s divi-
sion and took over a sector in the north-
west between Flamierge and Givry. The
420th Armored Field Artillery Battalion
and the medium howitzer battalions dis-
placed to new firing positions just north
of the Marche road and not more than a
mile and a half from Bastogne. The
Americans abandoned their last road-
block at Mande-St. Etienne—now it was
too far out-and drew in the western line
held by Team Roberts and the 3d Bat-
talion of the 327th. Germans and Amer-
icans both claimed Marvie, a circum-
stance which may have accounted for an
American air strike on Marvie by P–47’s
during the afternoon.
In the headquarters at Bastogne Mc-
Auliffe’s staff had been kept pretty well
abreast of the enemy movements indica-
tive of incoming reinforcement. Team
Anderson, scouting around Champs, re-
ported armor and tracked vehicles mov-
ing into Givry (this was the new 115th
Kampfgruppe) ; other reports noted the
movement of German traffic coming
from the northeast and moving south-
ward across the American front. All this
must have been a headache for the 101st

THE BATTLE OF BASTOGNE 475
G–2, but aside from shortening the lines
and tightening up tactical control there
was little the Americans could do but
wait for the blow to fall.
Early in the afternoon the VIII Corps
relayed a message from General Patton
and the Third Army: “Xmas Eve pres-
ent coming up. Hold on.” But there
were more tangible items to lessen the
nostalgia and depression of the sur-
rounded garrison on Christmas Eve. The
second day of air resupply had been
“a tremendous morale booster”–so re-
ported CCB and most of the regiments.
Allied air activity on the 24th had heart-
ened the men on the ground. When
night fell they could see the fires left as
aftermath of the fighter-bomber strikes
blazing all the way round the perimeter.
(Twice during the night of 24 Decem-
ber, however, the Luftwaffe retaliated
with very damaging and lethal bombing
sorties on Bastogne and the surrounding
area.) Less obtrusive but of considerable
impact was the confidence that the com-
manders and the troops had in each
other; a lesson for future commanders
may be read in the considerable effort
put forth by McAuliffe, Roberts, and the
regimental commanders to apprise all
the troops of the “situation.”
Christmas Eve in the German head-
quarters brought forth some cognac and
a few “Prosits” but in the main was de-
voted to preparations for a major attack
on Christmas Day. As late as the evening
of the 24th Luettwitz hoped to obtain
more troops from the 15th Panzer Gren-
adier Division, but the Fuehrer had
other ideas. Earlier in the day the Fifth
Panzer Army commander posed a ques-
tion which finally reached Jodl and Hit-
ler: should he turn to finish off Bastogne
or continue, with the bulk of his divi-
sions, toward the Meuse and seize the
Marche plateau in an attempt to widen
the German thrust? Hitler’s answer,
finally relayed by Model, was that the
attack to seize the Marche plateau should
be continued with all available forces.
This answer did nothing to relieve Man-
teuffel’s worries about his thin and en-
dangered southern flank. 18 To leave
Bastogne as a sally port onto his left
rear made no military sense to this ex-
perienced soldier-so Manteuffel ordered
that Bastogne be taken on 25 December.
(The attack order read: “Displacement
[in this context a kind of euphemism
for “destruction”] of the enemy at Bas-
togne.”)
The German order of battle on Christ-
mas Eve was this (read from the north
clockwise). The 26th Volks Grenadier
engineer battalion and a few antitank
guns maintained a security screen in the
Foy-Recogne sector. The 78th Fuesiliers,
brought back to strength by a large draft
of replacements, held on a front extend-
ing from Foy to Neffe. The 901st, its
ranks much depleted by the fighting just
ended, continued the circle past Marvie
and to a point west of the Arlon road.
The 39th was deployed on both sides of
the Neufchâteau road. What earlier had
been the “western front”–that is, from
Senonchamps north to the Marche road
18 All of the higher German field commanders
appear to have been in a quandary at this stage
as to Hitler’s intention toward Bastogne. See
Manteuffel’s queries to his superiors as described
in MS #B–151a, and ETHINT–46, Fifth Panzer
Army, Mission of November 1944–January 1945.
In a conference which the author held with
Manteuffel and his chief of staff, Generalmajor
Carl Gustav Wagener, in Karlsruhe on io June
1960, Wagener said that Hitler expressed no
particular interest in Bastogne during the offensive
phase, nor did he insist that his original orders
to capture Bastogne be followed.

476 THE ARDENNES: BATTLE OF THE BULGE
–was occupied by the reconnaissance
battalion of the 26th Volks Grenadier
Division, which had moved onto the
ground left free by the American with-
drawal on the 24th. The regiment from
the incoming 15th Panzer Grenadier
Division (Colonel Deckert) was bivou-
acked west of Flamizoulle. The 77th
Fuesilier Regiment completed the circle,
the bulk of its troops concentrated west
of Champs. Uneasy about the ability of
the 5th Parachute Division to cover his
back, Kokott was forced to strip a few
companies from his own division and the
901st to form a subsidiary front facing
south.
The attack plan for the 25th turned
on the fresh strength provided by the
15th Panzer Grenadier (–). The main
effort would be made in the northwest
between the Marche road and Champs,
the latter point included as an initial
objective. It was known that the Amer-
ican hold in this sector was weak, the
frozen ground gave good tank going and
observation for the artillery, and there
were no large villages or woods to hold
up the assault. To open a way for the
main effort Kokott quietly assembled the
major part of his division artillery
around Flamierge and Givry. The plan
included a heavy blow by the Luftwaffe
against Bastogne itself (this eventuated
in the two bombing attacks during the
A BASTOGNE STREET AFTER LUFTWAFFE BOMBARDMENT

THE BATTLE OF BASTOGNE 477
night of 24 December which killed a
Belgian nurse and a score of wounded
paratroopers) .
The original time schedule was ex-
ceedingly optimistic: to put in the in-
fantry assault at 0400; to break through
the American rifle line by 0600, at which
time the artillery could see to fire on
targets of opportunity and the tanks
would be able to move with speed; and
to rush an armored group from the 15th
Panzer Grenadier into Bastogne be-
tween 0800 and 0900 hours before the
American fighter-bombers took to the
air.
The optimism breathed by this sched-
ule must have expired shortly after it
was put on paper although the plan re-
mained. Kokott has recorded his shock
and surprise at the weak state of the
reinforcements brought in by Deckert:
the 115th Regiment (three battalions of
fusiliers) , the reconnaissance battalion
and two armored field artillery battal-
ions of the 15th Panzer Grenadier Divi-
sion, a company of tank destroyers, and
seventeen tanks belonging to the 115th
Panzer Battalion. Hitler’s failure to
name Bastogne as the primary objective
had been reflected in the dilatory and
contradictory orders issued by the higher
commanders for the employment of
Deckert’s division. True, the second of
Deckert’s regiments (the 104th) finally
had been given to the XLVII Panzer
Corps, but on Christmas Eve it was toil-
ing slowly toward the east side of Bas-
togne and would not arrive in time to
join the battle. Col. Wolfgang Maucke,
commander of the 115th, objected–as
strongly as a colonel would dare—when
he received his orders toward dusk on
the 24th. He had been given no time for
reconnaissance; no co-ordination had
been arranged with the tanks supposed
to support the 115th. Maucke’s supe-
riors simply pointed out the tremendous
advantage that would accrue to a sur-
prise attack on Christmas Day—he had
his orders. 19
The main assault, handed the ele-
ments of the 15th Panzer Grenadier, was
to be a straight thrust over Flamizoulle
into Bastogne with the right wing guid-
ing on the Marche highway, a distance of
about four miles. For this Maucke put
two battalions in line and one in reserve.
The 1st Battalion, with tanks carrying
some of the infantry, was to pass through
Flamizoulle; the 2d Battalion, supported
by the tank destroyer company, would
circle Flamizoulle to the north and strike
for the northern edge of Bastogne. To
the left of Maucke’s kampfgruppe the
77th Grenadier Regiment was ordered
to attack along the secondary road run-
ning through Champs and Hemroulle
into Bastogne. Here the 1st Battalion
had the job of seizing Champs and open-
ing the way while the 2d Battalion,
following to the left and rear, would be
prepared to leapfrog forward as Champs
fell, the two making the final push into
Bastogne abreast. The reconnaissance
battalion of the 26th Volks Grenadier
Division, south of Maucke’s force, had a
special mission: to attack from Senon-
champs and pierce the new American
position by seizing Isle-la-Hesse, a ham-
let standing where the Senonchamps
road fed into the Marche highway. Al-
though nearly all the German units sur-
19
The history of the 15th Panzer Grenadier
Division is related by the commander of the
detachments at Bastogne in MS # P–032c,
Ardennes Project: Report on the 15th Panzer
Grenadier Division, 16 December 1944–2 February
1945 (Maucke) .

478 THE ARDENNES: BATTLE OF THE BULGE
rounding Bastogne had some diversion-
ary mission during the Christmas Day
assault, only the 39th Grenadier Regi-
ment had a major attack assigned in
support of the effort in the northwest,
this to be an advance astride the Neuf-
château-Bastogne highway (which was
never carried out).
The Battle on Christmas Day
About 0300 a few German planes
droned over the 502d lines and dropped
bombs indiscriminately around Rolle,
the regimental command post. This
seems to have been the Luftwaffe sup-
port promised Kokott. A few minutes
later the German gunners and mortar
crews started to work, their target the
American positions at Champs. Here
Company A of the 502d was deployed
on the northwest edge of the village, its
right flank joining the 2d Battalion in a
large wood lot midway between Champs
and Longchamps. Clad in white snow
suits the first German assault party, some
fifty grenadiers from the 77th, crept for-
ward under the waning moon toward
Champs. At 0400 this group dashed into
the village and the German attack be-
gan. More of the enemy moved through
the woods against the left flank of the
2d Battalion, and within the hour a full
German battalion had joined the fight.
Company B moved up as a backstop if
its sister company should be engulfed or
pushed aside, but the confused melee
around Champs in the predawn darkness
pinned the Germans down.
Meanwhile the two assault battalions
of the 15th Panzer Grenadier Division
were moving against the 3d Battalion of
the 327th. The tank group on the right
of the German line drew ahead of its
marching partner and an hour and a
quarter after the advance began reported
to Kokott that the only evidence of
American reaction was some tank or
tank destroyer fire coming in from the
south. Thirty minutes later a brief and
optimistic radio message flashed to the
rear: the tanks and the infantry battal-
ion festooned thereon had reached the
western edge of Bastogne. But elation at
the German command post was short
lived: word that the German tanks were
in the streets of Bastogne never came.
The commander of the 115th sent a
liaison officer forward to find the battal-
ion or its tanks, but without success.
German forward observers were alerted
to listen for the sound of German tank
fire-but all they could hear was the
crash of artillery fire and the crump of
exploding mortar shells.
The story of the lost tank group is
soon told. The eighteen Mark IV’s and
the riding grenadiers had broken
through the positions held by Compan-
ies A and B of the 327th Glider Infantry
before dawn and got as far as the battal-
ion command post. Several of the enemy
tanks passed straight through battery
positions of the 755th Field Artillery
Battalion, whose gunners opened up
with machine guns as soon as they dis-
cerned the distinctive German muzzle-
brakes. But the 155-mm. howitzers could
not be brought to bear at such close
range and the Germans rolled on un-
scathed. Just west of Hemroulle about
half the German tanks wheeled left, de-
filing along a cart path which led to the
road between Champs and Bastogne. As
they approached the road the panzers
formed in line abreast, now bearing
straight toward Companies B and C of
the 502d, which were on the march to

THE BATTLE OF BASTOGNE 479
help the paratroopers in Champs.
Colonel Chappuis had a few minutes
to face his companies toward the on-
coming tanks, but the initial shock was
absorbed by two tank destroyers from
Company B of the 705th Tank Destroyer
Battalion which were knocked out as
they fell back toward the Champs road. 20
As the panzers rolled forward, Company
C made an orderly withdrawal to the
edge of a large wood lot midway be-
tween Champs and Hemroulle. Now it
was the paratroopers’ turn. They
showered the tanks with lead, and the
German infantry clinging to the decks
and sides fell to the snow. The tank
detachment again wheeled into column,
this time turning toward Champs. Two
of the 705th tank destroyers, which were
backing up Company C, caught the col-
umn in process of turning and put away
three of the panzers; the paratroopers’
bazookas accounted for two more.
The half of the enemy tank-infantry
formation which had kept on toward
Hemroulle after knifing through the
327th foxhole line received its coup de
grâce in a fury of cross fire laid down by
four of the 705th tank destroyers, tanks
from Team Roberts, the 463d Parachute
Field Artillery Battalion, and bazookas
handled by the glider infantry. As re-
counted by Col. s. L. A. Marshall after
the battle: “The German tanks were
fired at from so many directions and with
such a mixture of fire that it was not
possible to see or say how each tank met
its doom.” The survivors of those pan-
zer grenadiers of the 1st Battalion who
had ridden into battle on the tanks
found themselves surrounded and alone,
for the American rifle line had sealed
20 Colonel Chappuis later was awarded the DSC.
itself after the initial armored punctures.
About fifty German riflemen who had
hidden in a stream bed were captured by
cannoneers from the 755th. At noon
General Kokott wrote the tanks and the
accompanying infantry from the 1st
Battalion of the 115th off as lost—why
and where remained a mystery to the
German headquarters.
The 2d Battalion of the 115th seems to
have made good use of the rupture
created in the 327th positions west of
Hemroulle, advancing almost unper-
ceived and unopposed until daybreak
when it was brought under fire by Com-
pany C, the 3d Battalion reserve. At first
light the American artillery and mor-
tars took on the German infantry starkly
outlined against the snow-covered slopes
west of Hemroulle. The panzer grena-
diers tried digging in but the ground
was too hard frozen; so they lay in the
snow and took their losses. The regimen-
tal commander, Colonel Maucke, began
in midmorning to re-form his remaining
troops, pulling what was left of the 1st
Battalion back to a hill southeast of
Flamizoulle (where it took a merciless
pounding from Allied fighter-bombers)
and sending his reserve battalion into
the woods north of the 1st to cover its
flank. When night fell Maucke ordered
the remnants of the 1st Battalion to
sideslip south across the gap left by the
disappearance of the tank group. Of the
battalion staff all were dead or wounded
and the battalion commander was a
young lieutenant from one of the rifle
companies. Maucke himself went for-
ward to find his lost tanks but was
stopped by machine gun fire.
At Champs, where the battle had be-
gun, most of the Germans left the village
in the middle of the morning to let their

480 THE ARDENNES: BATTLE OF THE BULGE
gunners blast the paratroopers out of the
houses and surrounding woods. The
commander of the 77th, apprehensive of
a continued house-to-house battle, asked
for and received permission to circle
around the village, but the new attack
up the slopes toward Hemroulle was
shot to pieces. In the early afternoon
General Kokott called the German attack
to a halt, planning to resume the battle
under cover of the night.
This last “desperate effort,” as Kokott
himself termed it, took long to organize
and did not get under way until the
morning hours of the 26th. Using the
German salient at the Isle-la-Hesse road
fork as his base, Kokott sent a small as-
sault group from his own division and
ten mobile tank destroyers northeast in
the direction of Hemroulle with the in-
tention of circling through Savy into
Bastogne. This force wedged its way be-
tween the two right flank companies of
the 327th but was caught in the open by
the howitzers massed west of Bastogne
which literally blew the infantry assault
apart. Four armored tank destroyers con-
tinued toward Hemroulle but were
finally brought to a halt by a large ditch.
Here, while maneuvering, all were put
out of action by artillery and tank de-
stroyer fire at close range.
In midafternoon more bad news
reached Kokott’s command post. He had
counted on the 5th Parachute Division
to keep Patton’s armor at bay in the
south, and to make doubly certain had
faced parts of the 901st and 39th away
from Bastogne in support of the para-
troopers. Now word came that the 5th
Parachute Division had broken and
that the 39th Regiment was under at-
tack. Kokott had little to give the
39th, only five or six tanks which
had just been repaired, and he did not
dare put these on the road until dark-
ness sent the American fighter-bombers
home. Both Kokott and the corps com-
mander, Luettwitz, still expected the
main battle to be fought on the Arlon or
Neufchâteau road, but in the late after-
noon the commander of the 39th radioed
that American tanks had broken through
farther to the west at Assenois. Kokott
asked Luettwitz for help, but the latter
had empty hands. Late that night new
orders came from Field Marshall Model:
the 26th Volks Grenadier Division
would hold the defenders inside the
Bastogne perimeter until the tanks of
the Fuehrer Begleit Brigade could arrive
to sever the narrow corridor opened to
the defenders that afternoon by the
American armor.
The siege of Bastogne, for purposes of
historic record, may be considered ended
at 1645 on 26 December when the 326th
Airborne engineers reported contact
with “three light tanks believed
friendly.” True, the breach in the Ger-
man-held ring opened by the 4th
Armored Division was narrow and pre-
carious, but it would not be closed de-
spite the most strenuous enemy efforts
in coming days. The staunch defense of
Bastogne had impeded the Fifth Panzer
Army drive to the west, just as the des-
perate rear guard battle by the 7th
Armored at St. Vith had slowed the ad-
vance of the Sixth, demonstrating the
axiom of World War I that no salient
thrust into the defender’s position can
be expanded rapidly and successfully if
the shoulders of the salient are firmly
held by the defender. The human cost
of the Bastogne battle, therefore, prob-
ably was not out of proportion to the
military gains achieved. The 101st Air-

THE BATTLE OF BASTOGNE 481
borne Division suffered battle casualties
numbering 105 officers and 1,536 men.
CCB of the 10th Armored Division had
approximately 25 officers and 478 men
as battle casualties. There is no means of
numbering the killed, wounded, and
missing in the miscellany of unrecorded
tankers, gunners, infantry, and others
who shared in the defense of Bastogne.
Nor can any casualty roster now be com-
piled of those units which fought east of
Bastogne prior to 19 December and gave
the 101st Airborne Division the time
and the tactical opportunity to array it-
self in the defense of that town.

CHAPTER XX
The XII Corps Attacks the
Southern Shoulder
The End of the Defensive Battle,
22 December
Intercepted radio messages, a most
fruitful source for German intelligence,
had clearly indicated by 19 December
that the Americans were moving rein-
forcements in large numbers toward the
Bulge. The OB WEST staff reasoned
that the bulk of these new divisions
would be committed in the west in de-
fense of the Meuse River or along the
north side of the salient. Thus far there
was no cause to be concerned about the
southern flank. The weak Seventh Army
had made progress, although not so much
as Hitler wished, and there were no
signs of change in the defensive attitude
shown by the Americans in this sector.
Late in the evening of the 19th, Army
Group G reported that the U.S. Third
Army was giving ground on the Saar
front, but the American move was inter-
preted as a readjustment which could
not bring Third Army reinforcements to
the Ardennes before 22 December. The
German intelligence staffs again agreed
that there was no immediate threat to
the Seventh Army, and that the west-
ward advance by the Fifth Panzer Army
would necessarily force the Americans to
strengthen the battle line there and pro-
hibit any thrust into the deep southern
flank.
Although the Seventh Army was in the
process of going over to the defensive, it
had pushed its right wing forward, ac-
cording to plan, and on 20 December
re-established contact with its northern
neighbor, the Fifth Panzer Army. In
effect the right wing of the Seventh
Army had wheeled to face south, while
at the same time elongating the shoulder
of the Fifth. This extension had widened
the gap between the LXXXV Corps, in
the Ettelbruck sector, and the LXXX
Corps, west of Echternach, but as yet
the higher German headquarters were
unconcerned about the thinning line.
(See Map V.)
The division and corps commanders of
the Seventh Army were less sanguine. By
intuition, or through the natural appre-
hension induced by heavy losses, they
already flinched mentally from the re-
taliatory blow. Concerned with their
own weakness, rather than the strength
and successes of the panzer armies, it
seemed logical to them that the Ameri-
cans would seek to exploit such weak-
ness. 1 Across the lines, as it happened,
1 The German sources of greatest use are: the
OB WEST/IC-Tagesmeldungen for this period;
MSS ETHINT–34 (Buecks) ; ETHINT–40, LXXXV
Infantry Corps in the Ardennes Offensive (General
der Infanterie Baptist Kniess) ; ETHINT–51
(Jodl); ETHINT–54, Seventh Army, Ardennes
(Generalmajor Rudolf Freiherr von Gersdorff) ;
MSS # A-876 (Brandenberger) ; A–330 and A–931

THE XII CORPS ATTACKS THE SOUTHERN SHOULDER 483
plans were in process for a counterattack
against the German southern flank, but
General Patton, charged with this opera-
tion, would not have his troops in readi-
ness before 22 December and feared that
in the interim the enemy would launch
a spoiling attack from the Echternach
area.
With the main weight of the Seventh
Army echeloned forward on its right
(western) wing, pressure to regain con-
tact and to grapple with the 109th
Infantry was stepped up during the night
of 20 December. The 352d Volks Grena-
dier Division pushed through Ettelbruck
and probed cautiously in the dark,
searching to the west and south for the
outlines of the 109th’s new position.
This advance onto the ridge rising in
the triangle formed by the Wark Creek
and Alzette River had a limited object.
Luxembourg, an appetizing target, lay
only fifteen miles south of Ettelbruck
and on a good road, but the orders re-
ceived by the 352d aimed solely at the
quick acquisition of a good blocking
position against any American riposte
from the south. The objective of the
352d, therefore, was a line based on the
villages of Bettborn and Bissen that
would cut the main roads running north
and northeast from Luxembourg and
Arlon, respectively. Parts of two regi-
ments, the 914th and 916th, went up
against the outpost positions of
the 109th Infantry on 21 Decem-
ber, gaining ground on both of
the open flanks. For the Americans the
fight was one to gain time (they per-
(Sensfuss); B–029. LIII Corps, 8 December 1944-
21 January 1945 (General der Kavallerie Edwin
Graf Rothkirch); B–030 (Kniess) ; B–067
(Schmidt) ; B–073 (Sensfuss) ; B–081 (Beyer) ; P-
032f (Dempwolff).
mitted no serious penetration of the
ridge position overlooking the Wark
valley) until, on the morning of 22 De-
cember, troops of the incoming 80th
Infantry Division headed north through
their positions.
To the south and east the 276th Volks
Grenadier Division, now some distance
from the 352d, re-formed its two leading
regiments on a common front and
worked feverishly to bring artillery am-
munition and supplies forward from
bridges which at long last were in opera-
tion. It appears that the new division
commander of the 276th had ordered a
limited attack for 21 December, intended
to carry from Waldbillig to Christnach
and the more readily defended creek line
there. Late on the previous day a few
assault guns, probably no more than five
or six, had arrived west of the river.
These weapons, it was hoped, would
lend the tired German infantry the
necessary punch.
In the 9th Armored Division (-)
sector plans were under way to retake
Waldbillig, using Task Force Chamber-
lain of the 10th Armored Division, which
had been reorganized with a strength of
thirteen medium tanks and two much
understrength armored infantry com-
panies (total: 130 men). Before the
German attack got under way on 21
December Task Force Chamberlain at-
tacked toward Waldbillig. The Sher-
mans, protected by tank destroyers over-
watching on the flanks, negotiated the
dangerous skyline crossing on the ridge
between Christnach and Waldbillig and
by noon were in Waldbillig.
Reports that the enemy had with-
drawn proved erroneous the moment
that the supporting infantry started to
move up with the tanks. Mortar and rifle

484 THE ARDENNES: BATTLE OF THE BULGE
fire burst from the village, while Werfers
in the neighboring woods joined in.
Although the infantry support had a
bad time, the tanks were little concerned
by this enemy action. Their presence
inside the village had some effect: a
hundred prisoners were taken from the
988th. About midnight the American
artillery laid on a brief, sharp concentra-
tion and the few tanks still in Waldbillig
made a rapid withdrawal. Then Ameri-
cans and Germans both shelled the
village, by now a kind of no man’s land.
To the east, opposite the weakest
portion of the 4th Infantry Division line,
the 212th Volks Grenadier Division
made still another effort to reach its
original objective–the good defensive
terrain and blocking position in the
Consdorf-Scheidgen-Michelshof area. In
the afternoon of 21 December the 212th
Fuesilier Battalion moved along the
main Echternach-Luxembourg road
through Lauterborn, which the Ameri-
cans earlier had abandoned. Just ahead
lay Hill 313, overlooking the road south.
Here a part of Company C, 159th Engi-
neer Combat Battalion, was stationed,
with Company B occupying a smaller
hill just to the west. There was no pro-
tection for the engineer flanks. About
1300 the Germans started a 30-minute
shelling, covering their advance through
the draws fringing the American-held
heights.
Company B caught the full force of
the first assault, the grenadiers erupting
from the draws, firing their burp guns,
and shouting in broken English, “Kill
the sons of bitches.” Two platoons fell
back from Company B onto Company
C, which in turn came under attack by
Germans who had worked around Hill
313 and threatened to cut the road back
to Scheidgen. The engineers had no
working radios and did not know that
reinforcements in the shape of a hundred
or so men from the division headquarters
company were on the way. Actually this
relief party had to fight its way forward
as the engineers struggled to clear a path
back, and darkness was coming when the
two bodies made contact. Almost out of
ammunition, the engineers fell back to
Scheidgen, but the Germans made no
move to follow.
While the fusilier battalion was gain-
ing ground in its drive toward Scheidgen,
other troops of the 212th Volks Grena-
dier Division were trying, albeit with
less success, to make headway to the east
and west. Assembling in the woods near
Rodenhof, the 320th Grenadier Regi-
ment launched an attack to take Os-
weiler, but ran into two companies of
the 2d Battalion, 22d Infantry, en route
to clean out the woods. Neither side was
able to advance and the Americans dug
in for the night a few hundred yards
south of Rodenhof. On the left flank of
the 12th Infantry sector a sharp fight
flared up in midafternoon when two
companies of the 423d Grenadier Regi-
ment tried to take Consdorf. The Amer-
ican tanks and infantry held their fire
until the enemy assault formation had
cleared its assembly area in the woods
and was fully deployed on the bare slope
before the town. Then they cut loose.
Some sixty Germans were killed and the
rest withdrew.
The 212th Volks Grenadier Division
made a last attempt to expand the gains
achieved in the Scheidgen sector on 22
December, the date on which the
American counterattack finally began. A
stealthy advance through the draws be-
tween the Americans occupying the

THE XII CORPS ATTACKS THE SOUTHERN SHOULDER 485
villages of Scheidgen and Michelshof
during the early afternoon was perceived
and handily checked by shellfire. At dusk
the Germans tried again, debouching
from the central ravine in a wedge for-
mation. This effort was suicidal. Tanks,
tank destroyers, artillery, engineers,
and infantry were all in position and
watching the draw like hungry cats in
front of a mouse hole. The German
point was only a hundred yards from the
American foxholes when the first Ameri-
can fired. When the fusillade ended, 142
dead and dying Germans were left on
the snow, still in their wedge formation.
One lone grenadier, with five bullet
holes in him, came forward with his
hands held shakily over his head.
This bootless enemy effort on 22
December was no more than a counter-
attack to cover a general withdrawal
which the 212th had begun the night
before on corps orders. The defensive
period for Americans in the Sauer sector
in fact had closed with darkness on 21
December. This six-day battle had given
adequate proof of General Barton’s
dictum, “The best way to handle these
Heinies is to fight ’em.” It was a battle
fought off the cuff in a situation which
mimeographed periodic reports would
call “fluid” but which, for the most,
could better be described as “obscure”
seen from either side of the
The XII Corps Moues to
Luxembourg
Three days before the beginning of
the German thrust into the Ardennes,
2 See Chapter X, passim, and the American rec-
ords cited therein. 1st Lt. Edgar C. Heist, Com-
pany D, 70th Tank Battalion, so distinguished
himself that he was awarded the DSC. He was
killed on 22 December.
General Patton and Maj. Gen. Hoyt S.
Vandenberg met to discuss plans for a
combined air and ground attack to
smash through the German West Wall-
target date, 19 December. After three or
four days of intense bombing by the
Ninth Air Force and the Royal Air
Force, Maj. Gen. Manton S. Eddy’s XII
Corps would attack from the Saar River
to penetrate the West Wall and start the
Third Army, stymied by mud, reinforced
GENERAL EDDY
concrete, and the wasting effect of the
past battles of attrition, once again on the
way to the Rhine. Patton was jubilant
at the prospect of the biggest blitz (so he
fondly referred to the planned air as-
sault) in the Third Army’s history. Gen-
eral Eisenhower, however, did not con-
ceive of the attack in the Saar sector as
the major Allied effort and had decided
“regardless of [the] results,” to transfer
divisions from this sector, once the attack
had been made, to the north for the

486 THE ARDENNES: BATTLE OF THE BULGE
major assault against the Rhine and
Germany itself.
Meanwhile the XII Corps had the task
of cleaning out the German positions in
the small forests and wood lots between
the Saar and the West Wall so that no
entanglement in these outworks would
dull the full shock of the hard blow
which was being readied. For this mis-
sion General Eddy employed two infan-
try divisions, the new 87th and the
veteran 35th, their attack to begin on 16
December.
The fighting was extremely bitter, and
the enemy made the Americans pay
dearly for each yard gained toward the
West Wall. The superiority of the at-
tacker in men and materiel, however, as
usual was clearing the field, a fact of
battlefield life that was all too evident to
the German defenders. On the night of
16 December the commander of the XC
Corps, facing Eddy’s divisions, warned
his superiors that the German line was
so thin and ragged that if the Americans
decided on an all-out attack neither the
existing battle line nor the West Wall
could be held. But in this instance the
calculated risk assumed by Hitler in
stripping the Army Group G sector to
feed troops and weapons into Army
Group B paid off. It turned out that the
battered and weakened German divi-
sions in front of the XII Corps had done
their job, had held long enough.
To take the pressure off the XII Corps
infantry Patton was preparing to bolster
the attack with the 6th Armored Division
when General Bradley informed the
Third Army commander of the day’s
happenings on the VIII Corps front. The
army group commander ordered that
the 10th Armored be dispatched to Mid-
dleton forthwith, this move from the
Third Army to begin on the 17th. Gen-
eral Morris started his division north,
and Patton canceled the 6th Armored
attack which had been poised in front of
Forbach–one of the few occasions on
which the Third Army commander
called off an attack that he personally
had ordered. So far as the Third Army
staff knew at this stage, however, the
German blow in the Ardennes presented
no dire threat and the attack on the 19th
would go as scheduled.
But on 18 December Bradley called
Patton to his Luxembourg headquarters,
and there Patton learned for the first
time of the grave situation faced by the
First Army. When asked what help he
could give, the Third Army commander
replied that he could intervene in the
battle with three divisions “very shortly.”
He telephoned the Third Army chief of
staff to stop the XII Corps attack form-
ing for the following day and to prepare
the 4th Armored and 80th Infantry Divi-
sions for immediate transfer to Luxem-
bourg. The 87th Division halted its slow
advance, as did the 35th. On the move
out of rest area for assembly in prepara-
tion for the XII Corps’ attack, the 4th
Armored and 80th likewise stopped.
When it became apparent by nightfall
of the 18th that the situation on the First
Army front had deteriorated beyond
expectation, General Bradley decided
upon immediate use of the Third Army’s
resources. Patton had returned to his
command post at Nancy when, a couple
of hours before midnight, Bradley called
with word that conditions on the VIII
Corps front were much worse, that the
troops promised by the Third Army had
to move at once, and that Patton was to
attend a meeting with the Supreme Com-
mander the following morning at Ver-

THE XII CORPS ATTACKS THE SOUTHERN SHOULDER 487
dun. By midnight one combat command
of the 4th Armored Division was on its
way north to Longwy; at dawn on the
19th the 80th Infantry Division had
started for Luxembourg City. And
through the night before the Verdun
meeting the Third Army staff worked
feverishly to draft plans for the inter-
vention of all or any part of Patton's
forces in the battle raging in the north,
for Bradley had intimated that Patton
was to take command of the VIII Corps
and other forces moving to its assistance.
Bradley already had directed that the
III Corps headquarters would be moved
from Metz to take command of an attack
to be mounted somewhere north of
Luxembourg City. Patton's general staff,
GENERAL PATTON
therefore, prepared three plans for a
counterattack: on the axes Neufchâteau
–St. Hubert; Arlon-Bastogne; and Lux-
embourg-Diekirch–St. Vith. The final
attack selected would, as Patton then
saw it, be delivered by the VIII and III
Corps. When Patton arrived at Verdun
on the morning of the 19th, Eisenhower
asked how soon the III Corps could
launch its counterattack. Patton replied
that he could start a piecemeal attack in
three days, a co-ordinated attack in six.
The Supreme Commander, who seems
to have felt that Patton was a bit too
confident, subsequently informed Field
Marshal Montgomery that the counter-
attack from the south would be made on
the 23d or 24th. 3
The master plan outlined by Eisen-
hower in the Verdun meeting of the 19th
turned on a major effort to plug the
holes developing in the north and the
launching of a co-ordinated attack from
the south. To free the force needed for
this initial counterattack, Eisenhower
ordered all offensive operations south of
the Moselle to be halted forthwith and
turned over the entire Third Army sec-
tor (except for that occupied by Maj.
Gem. Walton H. Walker's XX Corps on
the border of the Saar) to General
Devers' 6th Army Group. This north-
ward extension of Devers' command
would spread the American forces in
Alsace and Lorraine rather thin, but
Devers (who was present at the Verdun
meeting on the 19th) was promised some
of the Third Army divisions and artil-
lery.
It was now clear that Patton would
be responsible for a major effort to knife
into the German southern flank, that he
would have at least two of the three
Third Army corps, six of its divisions,
3 See below, Chapter XXI, note 2, for documen-
tary sources relating to Patton and the Third
Army.

488 THE ARDENNES: BATTLE OF THE BULGE
and the bulk of the army troops for the
task. (On 20 December, however, after
a visit to Middleton’s command post,
Patton found that the VIII Corps was in
such shape that it could not be used
offensively and that the two Third Army
corps would have to carry the ball.) A
telephone call from Verdun, using a
simple code which had been arranged
before Patton left Nancy, informed the
Third Army chief of staff (Brig. Gen.
Hobart R. Gay) that the XII Corps was
to disengage at once, that the command
post of Eddy’s corps and an advance
command post for the Third Army were
to transfer to Luxembourg City, that the
26th Infantry Division was to start north
on the following morning, and that the
35th Infantry Division–which had been
in the line for 160 consecutive days–was
to be relieved as quickly as possible and
be sent to Metz for much needed re-
habilitation en route to the Ardennes
battle. At midnight of the 20th, the XIII
Corps front was taken over by its south-
ern neighbor, Maj. Gen. Wade H. Hais-
lip’s XV Corps. The 4th Armored and
80th Infantry Divisions had that day
passed to the command of the III Corps
in the Arlon sector south of Bastogne.
The next morning General Eddy and
his immediate staff departed for Luxem-
bourg with a new mission: to assume
command of the American troops north
and east of Luxembourg City who had
Held so tenaciously along the southern
shoulder of the original German pene-
tration. General Eddy’s new command,
aside from corps troops, consisted of
those units already in the area and the
5th Infantry Division, which had been
added to the roster of Third Army for-
mations rolling northward. It moved in
piecemeal as it was relieved from the
XX Corps’ bridgehead at Saarlautern. 4
The troops in the line when Eddy took
over were the 4th Infantry Division, the
10th Armored Division (less CCB),
CCA of the 9th Armored Division, the
109th Infantry, and other smaller units
of the 28th Infantry Division. (Map IX)
When the XII Corps took control of
its new zone on the 21st, the German
thrust into eastern Luxembourg had
been pretty well checked. The three
German divisions which the Seventh
Army had thrown into the initial attack
were drastically depleted by then and
apprehensive that the Americans might
undertake a counterattack in such force
as to penetrate this part of the Seventh
Army’s blocking position on the south-
ern flank of the German salient. The
Americans likewise were concerned lest
the enemy make a last major try for a
breakthrough before the promised rein-
forcement arrived from the Third Army.
There was, however, a fairly continu-
ous-although jagged–line of defense
confronting the enemy. The new corps’
front, facing east and north, reached
from Dickweiler, near the west bank of
the Sauer River, to Schieren, on the Al-
zette River, due north of Luxembourg
City. The eastern wing was defended
by the 4th Infantry Division and task
forces from the 10th Armored Division.
The northern wing was held by the
109th Infantry and CCA, 9th Armored
Division, backed by detachments from
the 10th Armored. This wing, at its
4 The combat interviews with the XII Corps
provide an enlightening account of the problems
encountered in the Third Army ninety-degree
wheel to the north. See also the XII Corps AAR
and G–3 journal. The semiofficial history of the
XII Corps is Lt. Col. George Dyer’s XII Corps:
Spearhead of Patton’s Third Army (Baton Rouge:
Military Press of Louisiana, n.d.), ch. 11, passim.

THE XII CORPS ATTACKS THE SOUTHERN SHOULDER
western tip, had been wide open. But
the 80th Infantry Division of the III
Corps was moving in to establish an ex-
tension of the American line beyond the
Alzette and on the 22d deployed to
envelop the enemy bridgehead west of
Ettelbruck.
General Patton intended to give Gen-
eral Eddy two infantry divisions from
the old Third Army front, the 5th and
35th. The latter had seen very rough
fighting; it would need some refitting
and for this reason had been ordered to
Metz to reorganize before rejoining the
XII Corps. Maj. Gen. S. LeRoy Irwin’s
5th Infantry Division was in good condi-
tion. Introduced into Walker’s XX
Corps bridgehead at Saarlautern to re-
lieve the 95th Division, two of Irwin’s
regiments had attacked on 18 and 19
December to widen the breach made ear-
lier in the main bunker lines of the
forward West Wall position. General
Irwin, however, had some inkling that
his division might soon leave the bridge-
head for on the night of the 19th the
corps commander warned that the attack
was to be held up, that the situation in
the north was very much confused and
that the 5th Division might be moved in
that direction. The 10th Infantry divi-
sion reserve was put on one-hour alert to
move “in any direction.”
General Walker arrived at Irwin’s
command post toward noon of the fol-
lowing day. He told Irwin that one reg-
iment of the 95th would relieve the 5th
Division in the bridgehead and that the
XX Corps was pulling back across the
Saar except in one small bridgehead. As
to the future employment of the 5th Di-
vision he had no word. More precise
directions shortly came from the corps
headquarters, moving the 10th Infantry,
489
the 8 18th Tank Destroyer Battalion, and
the 735th Tank Battalion toward Thi-
onville on the Luxembourg road. The
next order bade Irwin bring his 11th
Infantry out of the bridgehead during
the night.
The withdrawal of the tank and tank
destroyer battalions, each of which had
two companies west of the river, went
forward by ferry in full daylight; by 1700
these battalions were on the road to
Luxembourg. The relief of the 11th In-
fantry, by an extension of the 2d Infantry
sector, began as soon as darkness settled.
It went well also, only two casualties
being incurred. By 1000 the next morn-
ing the entire regiment was in trucks en
route to Thionville. The enemy was
neither in strength nor in frame of mind
able to interfere with the American
withdrawal, although the 2d Infantry
attempt to hide the reduction of the line
by increased fire fooled the Germans not
one whit. Relieved on the night of 21
December by troops of the 95th Division,
the 2d Infantry was already rolling to
join its sister regiments when the morn-
ing fog blew away.
The XII Corps’ Counterattack
That same morning the 10th Infantry
initiated the 5th Division fight on a new
battleground. 5 Despite confusion, frag-
The 5th Infantry Division, as one would expect
of an old line outfit, maintained very good records.
General Irwin also made his personal diary avail-
able to the author. All three of the infantry
regiments published official accounts: History of
the Second Infantry Regiment, History of the
Tenth Infantry Regiment, History of the Eleventh
Infantry Regiment (All Baton Rouge: Army and
Navy Publishing Company, 1946). The journals
maintained by each of the rifle battalions are
particularly useful.

490 THE ARDENNES: BATTLE OF THE BULGE
mentary orders, and a general sense that
the leading columns of the division were
moving toward an unknown destination
and enemy, the 10th Infantry (Col.
Robert P. Bell) transfer to Luxembourg
had been accomplished in good time.
Two officers of Irwin’s staff reached the
Third Army headquarters in Luxem-
bourg at 1730 on 20 December and there
received an assembly area for the regi-
ment and some maps. Hurrying back
down the Thionville road the staff of-
ficers met the column, blacked out but
moving at a good clip. In the early
evening the column rolled through the
streets of Luxembourg City, and an hour
or so after midnight the first trucks drove
into the assembly area near Rammel-
dange. Then the column closed, the in-
fantry shivering out the rest of the night
in the trucks. 6
The mission of the 5th Infantry Di-
vision had not yet been defined, but it
was clear that it had moved from one
battle to another. A series of meetings in
Luxembourg during the morning of the
2 1st resulted in the decision to place the
5th Division north of the city in the sec-
tor briefly occupied by the 80th Division.
6 Combat interview and General Irwin’s diary.
The move of the 10th Infantry seems to have
gone according to plan only in its first stages. Lt.
Col. Donald W. Thackeray, the division G–2,
and Lt. Col. George K. Moody, assistant G–3,
were told by the Third Army staff that the
regiment would go into assembly area in the
vicinity of Rammeldange but that the 10th
Armored would provide guides and prepare
billets at the bivouac point. Apparently the 10th
Armored did not get the word, and the skeleton
staff in Luxembourg made no plans for the re-
ception of the 10th Infantry until an officer from
the 5th Division literally stumbled upon the 10th
Armored forward command post. As a result the
incoming infantry were put on the road to
Rammeldange but no billets were provided. See
Ltr, Maj Gen William M. Breckenridge to OCMH,
30 Nov 60.
Further, the XII Corps commander
told General Irwin to be prepared to
attack north or northeast, or to counter-
attack in the southeast. Later General
Eddy warned that the 10th Infantry
might have to go into the line that very
afternoon to help the 12th Infantry re-
store the American positions south of
Echternach. The 10th did move forward
to Ernzen, but no counterattack order
was forthcoming.
In the meantime the 11th Infantry
arrived in Luxembourg City, its mis-
sion to take over the 80th Division posi-
tion north of the city between Ernzen
and Reuland and cover the deployment
of the XII Corps-a rather large order
for a regimental combat team. However
the regimental commander, Col. Paul J.
Black, was forced to halt his column
when the 80th Division commander gave
him a direct order to keep off the road
net then being used by the 80th for a
shift west into the III Corps’ sector. The
regimental S-3 later reported that the
80th Division had used the roads only
intermittently during the afternoon and
that the 11th Infantry could have moved
north without difficulty. But on the other
hand Maj. Gen. Horace L. McBride had
orders to attack the next morning, and
the Third Army commander, as he very
well knew, would brook no delay. In any
case the halt of the 111th Infantry on the
north edge of the city did create a mam-
moth road jam.
During the evening General Eddy met
his commanders at the 4th Division com-
mand post. Reports coming in from the
12 th Infantry, holding the weakest sec-
tion of the 4th Division front, were dis-
couraging, for that afternoon the 212th
Volks Grenadier Division had made
substantial progress in an attack along

THE XII CORPS ATTACKS THE SOUTHERN SHOULDER 491
5TH INFANTRY DIVISION TROOPS MNG TOWARD THE FRONT
the main road leading from Echternach
toward Luxembourg City. Although the
12th Infantry line had hardened and
now held near Scheidgen, General Bar-
ton expected that the enemy would try
another punch down the road. But, even
while the American commanders were
meeting, the German LXXX Corps staff
was drafting orders for a piecemeal with-
drawal by the 212th Yolks Grenadier
Division to begin that very night.
The enemy gains on 21 December
marked the high tide of the advance over
the Sauer begun six days before, a fact
that could not yet be appreciated by the
little group of commanders gathered in
the 4th Division command post. General
Irwin probably summed up what all
were thinking: “Situation on whole front
from east of us to north varies from fluid
to no front at all. Information is very
scanty and the situation changes hourly.”
Under these circumstances General Eddy
decided that the 10th Infantry should be
placed under tactical control of the 4th
Division and attack around noon the
following day to restore the situation on
the 12th Infantry front.
Admittedly this was the kind of par-
tial solution frowned upon by the field
service regulations. General Irwin noted,
“I anticipate too much. piecemeal action
for a while to get any tangible results.”
But the 4th Division had undergone six

492 THE ARDENNES: BATTLE OF THE BULGE
days of heavy fighting, its last reserves
had been used up, and the events of the
day just ended seemed to presage a hard-
ening of the enemy’s resolve.
The critical section of the main line
of resistance was that marked by the vil-
lages of Scheidgen, Michelshof, and Os-
weiler. Here the line was defended by
elements of the 1st and 3d Battalions,
12th Infantry, the regimental antitank
company, and part of the 159th Engineer
Battalion. During the afternoon of the
21st the 212th Volks Grenadier Division
had used one rifle regiment and the divi-
sional fusilier battalion (both at low
strength) in the attempt to take the
three villages and the commanding
ground on which they stood, ground that
represented the final objective of
the 212th. General Barton, therefore,
planned to meet the German threat by
sending the 10th Infantry into attack
astride the road from Michelshof to
Echternach, the two attack battalions
jumping off at noon from the crossroad
Scheidgen-Michelshof. This line of de-
parture was occupied by two rifle com-
panies, four tanks, and five platoons of
engineers.
Through the morning of the 22d en-
emy batteries busily shelled the area just
behind the American positions. The
attack by the 1st and 2d Battalions of the
10th Infantry never really got going. The
2d Battalion on the left of the road de-
ployed some three hundred yards behind
the assigned line of departure and
started forward just as the Germans be-
gan an assault against the small force
dug in on the line. German guns sup-
porting the grenadiers made any
movement in formation impossible. As it
was, the bulk of the two fresh companies
reached the line about the same time
that the German assault waves struck.
The troops on the line were able to beat
the enemy back, but not before the 2d
Battalion troops had been deflected to
the right and left by the enemy onrush.
Considerably disorganized, the two com-
panies hurriedly dug in just to the south
of the original American covering force.
On the right of the road the 1st Bat-
talion was faced with thick woods and
very rough ground. During the morning
reconnaissance parties had come forward
to look over the route of advance but
had been foiled by a thick ground fog
and alert enemy gunners. When the bat-
talion deployed for the advance to the
line of departure it ran into trouble, for
the company next to the road came un-
der the artillery concentration laid down
in support of the German assault just
described and suffered a number of
casualties. Control in woods and ravines
was difficult and the company drifted
across the road behind the 2d Battalion.
It was growing dark when the 1st Battal-
ion finally reorganized and dug in, still
short of the line of departure. The in-
tense artillery and Werfer fire by enemy
gunners throughout the day, together
with the infantry assault of the after-
noon, had been designed to cover the
212th Volks Grenadier Division while it
withdrew from the exposed position in
the Scheidgen salient. Fresh American
reinforcements had been held in check;
the German withdrawal had been
successful.
General Eddy telephoned General
Irwin during the evening to say that he
planned to use the 5th Division as part
of a corps attack to drive the Germans
back over the Sauer in the angle formed
by the Sauer and Moselle Rivers. Irwin’s
whole division was in Luxembourg but

THE XII CORPS ATTACKS THE SOUTHERN SHOULDER 493
somewhat dispersed. The 11th Infantry
had taken over the reserve battle posi-
tions north of Luxembourg City for-
merly occupied by the 80th Division.
The 2d Infantry, having left the XX
Corps’ bridgehead with only minor inci-
dent,’ was assembled around Junglinster,
ready with trucks and attached tank
destroyers for use as the corps’ mobile
reserve. Given time to assemble, the
fresh 5th Division could take over from
Barton’s battle-weary 4th. That night
Irwin and his staff pored over maps and
march orders for the attack to clear the
enemy from the near side of the Sauer,
an attack scheduled for the morning of
24 December.
In the interim the two battalions of
the 10th Infantry began their second day
of action, a clear day but bitter cold with
snow underfoot. On the right the 1st Bat-
talion made some progress, but one
company lost its way in the heavy woods
and a gap opened between the battalions.
The main difficulty encountered by both
battalions was that of negotiating the
heavy belt of timber which lay to the
front and in which a relatively small
number of the enemy could put up a
fight out of all relation to their actual
strength. Further, the American advance
followed a series of parallel ridge lines:
screened by the woods the Germans
could and did filter along the draws
separating the American companies and
take them on individually.
The 2d Battalion had a particularly
rough time. Company F, which entered
the forest northeast of Michelshof, at
first killed or captured a number of Ger-
mans in snow-covered foxholes just in-
7 The enemy pitched a couple of smoke grenades
into a crowded cellar, causing quick spread of the
rumor that gas warfare had begun.
side the woods. Then the German shells
began to burst through the trees. The
company broke into little groups, turn-
ing this way and that to avoid the fire-
many were scooped up by Germans who
had been waiting in their foxholes.
When the company withdrew it num-
bered forty-six men, but later a large
number of stragglers appeared at Mich-
elshof. On the left Company E advanced
until it came under fire from a cross-
grained ridge just ahead. As the com-
pany deployed for the assault a large
force of German infantry erupted from
the draw on its flank, preceded, as it
moved, by a curtain of bursting shells.
There was plenty of American artillery
on call for such an emergency-six bat-
talions were supporting the 10th Infan-
try attack-and the Germans were dis-
persed. A few tough enemy riflemen dug
in as best they could on the frozen
ground and held their place, forcing
Company E to “infiltrate” back to its
take-off position. This day, then, had
been only moderately successful for the
10th Infantry, in part because it was
working without the support of its own
5th Division artillery, but the reserve
battalion had not been committed and
the division stood waiting to expand to
attack.
The final field order issued by the
XII Corps called for an attack at 1100
hours on the 24th to seize and hold the
line of the Sauer and Moselle Rivers with
such enemy crossings as might remain
intact. The main effort was delegated to
the 5th Infantry Division and the 10th
Armored Division, the latter having ex-
tracted much of its strength from the
line on the left of the 4th Division to
form a counterattack reserve. The 4th
Infantry Division was to hold in place as

494 THE ARDENNES: BATTLE OF THE BULGE
the 5th passed through, supporting the
5th’s attack by fire wherever possible.
Finally, the 2d Cavalry Group (rein-
forced), which was just moving into the
new XII Corps area from the old, would
take over the extended Moselle flank on
the right of the corps. This had been a
constant concern to General Barton dur-
ing the 4th Division battles and had
absorbed battalions of the 22d Infantry
badly needed on the fighting line. The
artillery support planned for the attack
included fifteen battalions of corps ar-
tillery plus the organic battalions in the
divisions. The mechanized units avail-
able represented considerable strength:
two combat commands of the 10th Ar-
mored Division with CCA of the 9th
Armored Division attached; two sep-
arate tank battalions; five tank destroyer
battalions, of which three were self-
propelled; and two cavalry squadrons.
The German LXXX Corps faced the
XII Corps with two divisions in the line
anchored on the Sauer and no corps re-
serve. The deep valley of the Schwarz
Erntz remained the boundary between
these divisions, constituting as it had in
earlier fighting an ever present physical
obstacle to a homogeneous corps front
and co-ordinated maneuver. On the
right the 276th Volks Grenadier Divi-
sion was engaged in small-scale attacks
near Savelborn and Christnach. The ex-
treme left or eastern wing of this divi-
sion was not solidly anchored, and all
attempts to break out of the Schwarz
Erntz gorge and bring the left forward
in conformity with the advance of the
neighboring division had been thwarted.
The result was that the 212th Volks
Grenadier Division, on the right, occu-
pied a south-facing line stepped forward
of the 276th and precariously open at its
western end. To cover this gap the 423d
Regiment had spread thin, so thin that
its main line of resistance was little more
than a series of smallish strongpoints. As
a result the LXXX Corps’ order short-
ening the 212th line by withdrawal on
the night of 21 December was issued
with the intention of contracting the
423d to give more body to absorb the
American punches when they came.
The Echternach bridgehead, ex-
panded toward Michelshof, was de-
fended by the 320th Infantry and the
division fusilier battalion. The far left
wing of the division and corps was tied
to the Sauer by the 999th Penal Battal-
ion. On paper, General Sensfuss’ 212th
Volks Grenadier Division had a third
regiment, the 316th, but although this
unit had helped establish the bridgehead
it was the Seventh Army reserve and not
even the corps commander could use it
freely. The field replacement battalions
belonging to the LXXX Corps were al-
most completely drained by the heavy
losses incurred in the infantry regiments.
The rifle companies of the two line divi-
sions numbered about forty men apiece.
Each division had only one light and one
medium field artillery battalion in direct
support; the corps had perhaps five bat-
talions, plus one Werfer brigade. Prob-
ably the bulk of this firepower had
displaced across the river to positions di-
rectly behind the divisions. The infantry
companies had fought during the first
days without the aid of assault guns, but
a few of these and two companies of
antitank guns reached the LXXX Corps
just before the American attack on the
24th.
The Seventh Army, and more partic-
ularly Beyer’s corps, began the Ardennes
battle as the kitchen maid in the scullery

THE XII CORPS ATTACKS THE SOUTHERN SHOULDER 495
and would end it in the same status.
Replacements, artillery, armor, and sup-
plies by this stage of the German coun-
teroffensive went first to the two panzer
armies. Since there was inadequate trans-
port for resupply in the main battle area,
Brandenberger could hardly expect that
additional trucks and critical items
would reach the tactical backwater
where his army was stranded. The Ger-
man commanders on the Sauer front had
recognized as early as the 21st and 22d
that the bolt had been shot; they and
their weary troops knew that the coming
battle already was lost. The ground to
be held, however, generally favored the
defense, just as it had favored the Amer-
icans in the first phase.
There was one notable exception-the
natural corridor of the Schwarz Erntz.
This corridor could be used to split the
two German divisions. Moreover, it led
directly to the main corps’ bridge at
Bollendorf and this bridge, if lost, would
leave the bulk of the 276th Volks Gren-
adier Division stranded on the west bank
of the Sauer. So seriously was this threat
regarded that on 22 December the
Seventh Army started work on a heavy
bridge at Dillingen to the rear of the
276th.
The morning of the 24th broke clear
and cold, bringing a mixed blessing. The
thermometer stood below 20º F, and the
American foot sloggers would suffer
(trench foot was commencing to
appear), but the gunners and fighter-
bomber pilots could rejoice. With two
fire direction centers handling the corps
artillery and with perfect visibility at
the observation posts, the battalions fired
salvo after salvo for interdiction and
destruction. A few woods and villages
got special treatment-TOT’S with
white phosphorus, a killing device for
which General Patton had built up some
attachment among troops of the Third
Army. It seemed to the Americans that
the good shooting by enemy gunners in
the forty-eight hours past required an
answer; so counterbattery work began
the moment the infantry jumped off in
the attack. During the day and night the
XII Corps artillery would fire 21,173
shells to support the attack on a ten-mile
front. The 5th Division artillery fired
5,813 rounds, exceeding the daily ex-
penditure during the bitter September
battle in the Arnaville bridgehead. Gen-
eral Weyland’s XIX Tactical Air Com-
mand, old friend of the 5th Division,
made good use of beautiful flying weath-
er, but there were many targets to divert
the fighter-bombers beyond the XII
Corps zone. The 405th Fighter Group
flew eight missions during the day, drop-
ping fragmentation and napalm bombs
at points along the Sauer, then strafing
and bombing the roads east of the river.
At 1100 the ground attack com-
menced. There must have been an
uneasy feeling that the enemy had
plenty of fight left because the
corps commander told Irwin that
should he feel the attack was prov-
ing too costly it would be called off. Cau-
tion, it may be said, had become less
opprobrious in the Third Army since
16 December. The XII Corps G–2, who
like many other intelligence officers had
miscalculated the German ability to re-
sist during the optimistic days of early
September, now estimated that the en-
emy reserves in front of the corps
equaled one infantry and one armored
division. At the same time the American
staffs had an uncertain feeling that the
extremely tenuous connection between

496 THE ARDENNES: BATTLE OF THE BULGE
A WHITE PHOSPHOROUS BURST during bombardment of German emplacements.
the XII and XX Corps along the Mo-
selle would attract German attention.
The 5th Division began the attack
with three regiments in line on an 8-
mile front reaching from Savelborn on
the west to Osweiler on the east. From
the line of departure, generally in the
rear of the main line of resistance, Irwin
would feed his battalions into the 10th
Armored line on the left and the 4th
Division line on the right, eventually re-
lieving the latter by extending the 5th
Division wing, lengthened by the 2d
Cavalry Group, to the Sauer. Task forces
of the 10th Armored Division were to
attack on a northern thrust line, clearing
the villages on the south banks of the
Sauer as they went. The main effort by
the 5th Division, also looking north,
aimed in its early stages at high ground
overlooking the Echternach bridgehead:
Hill 313 southwest of Lauterborn, the
scene of much bitter fighting when first
the Germans pushed down the road from
Echternach; the ridge south of Berdorf
commanding the Schwarz Erntz gorge:
and, in the old 9th Armored sector north
of the gorge, the plateau and village of
Haller.
On the right of the division the two
battalions of the 10th Infantry continued
their attack north of Michelshof. Along
the thickly wooded ridges to their front
the 320th Infantry, supported by most
of the 212th Volks Grenadier Division
artillery, was concentrated to block the
way to Echternach. The 1st Battalion,
advancing to the right of the Michelshof-

THE XII CORPS ATTACKS THE SOUTHERN SHOULDER 497
Echternach highway, once again found
the combination of heavy woods, Ger-
mans in well-disguised foxholes, and
accurate shellfire too much. Two hours
after the attack began the enemy retal-
iated with a counterattack, assault guns
paving a way for the infantry. The
American gunners quickly disposed of
this. The 2d Battalion, to the west, had
eight medium tanks belonging to the
737th Tank Battalion and less difficult
ground. Four tanks and two platoons of
Company G started along the main road,
covered by other troops advancing on the
ridges to either side of the draw. Shell
bursts on the road and bullet fire soon
drove the troops to the cover of the trees
lining the draw, where others of the bat-
talion were ferreting German riflemen
out of camouflaged foxholes. Smoke fired
to cover the attack gave added momen-
tum; then the tanks destroyed a pair of
machine gun nests on Hill 313. Momen-
tarily, however, the attack wavered when
a part of Company G turned west toward
a hill mass it mistook for its objective.
Brought back, the infantry followed the
tanks to the proper objective. The Ger-
mans there decided not to engage the
Shermans, and by dark the battalion had
Hill 313.
The 2d Infantry sector, in the division
center, extended from the Scheidgen
draw west to the Mullerthal (Schwarz
Erntz) . Immediately to the north lay the
thick forest and rugged ground of the
Kalkesbach, an unsavory obstacle. Col.
A. Worrell Roffe, the 2d Infantry com-
mander, decided to risk a flanking thrust
along the Mullerthal with his 2d Battal-
ion and to use his 3d Battalion in a fron-
tal attack against the Kalkesbach. For the
final punch a tank company and the 1st
Battalion lay waiting in Colbet. If all
went well the regiment would swing on-
to the Berdorf plateau and face eastward
above the Sauer River.
To gain entrance to the Mullerthal
was no simple task. It required an attack
due west down into the draw, where ar-
tillery could be of no help. Companies
F and G undertook the task, and the
fight became a manhunt, rifleman against
rifleman, stalking one another in crev-
ices, on cliffs, from tree to tree. The
quarry, skillfully hidden, had the best
of it. Company F ran against a strong-
point on a cliff and was the loser in a
fire fight. Company G lost direction sev-
eral times in the maze of cross corridors,
but at every point drew sharp fire. At
dark the two companies dug in against
bullets seemingly whistling in from
every direction. It was evident that the
tree-covered and rocky floor of the gorge
was no place for further attack, and Colo-
nel Roffe ordered the two companies to
fight their way out of the gorge at day-
break. The battalion was then to gather
in an attack on Doster Farm, which over-
looked the road to Berdorf.
The 3d Battalion, north of Scheidgen,
also had hard fighting and a slow ad-
vance. The terrain over which the attack
was made consisted of alternating draws
and ridges, cleared ground and timber.
Advance by ridge line or draw termi-
nated in cross corridors, natural glacis
for the enemy riflemen firing down the
slope. At one point Company L suddenly
was swept by rifle and machine gun fire,
suffered thirty casualties, lost two com-
pany commanders in the space of min-
utes, and became disorganized and un-
able to move. Lt. Col. Robert E.
Connor, the battalion commander, got
the division artillery to work on the
ridge line confronting the company, sent

498 THE ARDENNES: BATTLE OF THE BULGE
his S–3, Capt. Frederic C. Thompson, up
to sort out the demoralized soldiers and
replace the platoon and squad leaders
who were hors de combat, then put his
reserve, Company K, in to flank the
German position. The reserve company
made its way to the head of a draw from
which the enemy could be taken in en-
filade. While this flanking fire swept
the German line, Company L (reorgan-
ized in two platoons of twenty-five men
each) attacked with marching fire. The
ridge was gained and most of the de-
fenders killed, but this time the attackers
lost only three men. Company I, advanc-
ing along a draw on which Werfers were
directed, took many losses during the
day. All told the 2d Infantry had made
only a few hundred yards gain by the
close of 24 December.
The 3d Battalion commander re-
ported that the action had been like try-
ing to catch a rat in a maze. The Ger-
SCHEIDGEN
mans, familiar with the ground, had
run back and forth through the draws,
popping up in new and unexpected posi-
tions. The Americans had lost direction
and found maneuver difficult in the
dense woods and jagged terrain, while
their advance along the more direct
paths offered by the draws had given
the German batteries easy targets. After
the untoward events of this first day the
regimental commander instructed his
battalions to avoid the draws as much as
possible and work along the higher
ground by short flanking attacks in which
control could be retained.
The 11 th Infantry took its attack po-
sitions during the night of the 23d in the
rear of the 10th Armored screen, the
3d Battalion on the left at Larochette
(Fels) and the 1st Battalion southeast
of Christnach. Colonel Black had been
ordered to put his main effort on the
right in an attack up the draws in sup-

THE XII CORPS ATTACKS THE SOUTHERN SHOULDER 499
port of the 2d but decided to throw his
weight on the left. The left battalion,
draped in white sheets and supported
by tanks, made its advance in column
of companies on a narrow thrust line
bearing north in the direction of Haller
and hit squarely between the battalions
of the 988th Regiment. Whenever the
enemy stood his ground, artillery
and tank fire was brought to bear,
quickly followed by infantry assault
paced with machine gun fire. Following
a level ridge line the 3d Battalion made
good time. By midafternoon it held its
objective, a wooded rise less than a
thousand yards southwest of Haller.
The 1st Battalion had as its objective
the wooded table which arose above the
Schwarz Erntz northeast of Christnach-
the scene of bitter fighting and bloody
losses for the Americans when the en-
emy had held the initiative. Company
A, sent down into the Müllerthal gorge
while the remainder of the battalion
threw in a holding attack on the left,
moved slowly but steadily, until after
some three hours it was opposite the vil-
lage of Mullerthal. Here the Germans
had dug in, checking the advance with
machine gun and mortar fire into the
gorge from Waldbillig. Company B
came in to help against Waldbillig,
moving northwest through one of the
cross corridors. As soon as the troops
left the cover of the draw they encoun-
tered direct fire, and it looked as though
the 1st Battalion would find it tough to
continue a frontal attack.
The rapid advance by the 3d Battal-
ion on the left appeared a solution to
this tactical problem. Colonel Black pre-
pared to alter the 11th Infantry scheme
of maneuver on the 25th. The 3d Bat-
talion was to be relieved by the repi-
mental reserve, then wheel to the right,
bypass south of Haller, and seize the
two hill objectives, the Hardthof and
Hohwald, in front of the 1st Battalion.
During the night 1st Battalion patrols
worked to the edge of Waldbillig, found
little indication of enemy strength and
by daylight the battalion had a company
in the village.
This first day of the 5th Division at-
tack had netted rather limited gains ex-
cept on the extreme left flank and in the
10th Infantry sector at Hill 313. The
six American battalions engaged had
lost about two hundred dead and wound-
ed. The enemy generally had held the
attackers at arm’s length (only nineteen
prisoners went through the 5th Division
cage) and probably had fewer casual-
ties. The German artillery had been very
active and effective, despite heavy coun-
terbattery fire, while the tortuous na-
ture of the ground had robbed the gun-
ners supporting the 5th Division of much
good shooting. But something had been
accomplished. The 4th Infantry Divi-
sion at last had been relieved (although
it proved difficult to find and make phys-
ical contact with some isolated outposts
of the 4th Division line), and Col.
Charles H. Reed’s 2d Cavalry Group took
over the quiet portion of the line on the
right of the 5th Division.
At the close of day, there were indica-
tions at several points that the enemy
was pulling away. A German withdraw-
al actually did take place during the
night. The 2d Infantry battle along the
floor and sides of the Schwarz Erntz,
viewed so pessimistically by those en-
gaged, had convinced General Sensfuss,
the 212th Volks Grenadier Division
commander, that his extended right
flank soon would be pierced or turned.

500 THE ARDENNES: BATTLE OF THE BULGE
WHITE-CLAD 11TH INFANTRY TROOPS ATTACK TOWAD HALLER
To form a shorter and thicker line, Sens-
fuss drew in both flanks and gave up
ground at his center, creating a new posi-
tion which reached from Berdorf
across the hills flanking the entrance to
Echternach (only 2,500 yards from the
center of that town) and west to the
Sauer. Meanwhile the miscellaneous
troops covering the flank of the 212th
west of the river withdrew behind the
Sauer, leaving only small outposts be-
hind.
The 10th Armored Division, to which
were attached the 109th Infantry and
CCA, 9th Armored, put two task forces
into the attack on 24 December, their
mission to clear the enemy from the
Ermsdorf-Gilsdorf road. In keeping
with the 5th Division attack on the right,
the axis of advance generally ran north-
east. Task Force Standish, on the right,
was weighted with tanks and armored
infantry backed by two armored field
artillery battalions. One of its two teams
advanced with little opposition, ending
the day just northwest of Eppeldorf. The
second team came under the German
guns while moving across open ground
west of Eppeldorf; the first reports said
half the team was lost to shellfire and
rockets. Driven back to the cover of a
wood lot the team reorganized, took on
reinforcements, and returned to the at-
tack, this time swinging wide of the
town to join the companion team. Later
a task force from CCX (as CCA, 9th

THE XII CORPS ATTACKS THE SOUTHERN SHOULDER 501
Armored Division, now was named)
seized the high ground west of Eppel-
dorf.
Task Force Rudder, composed of two
battalions (less than half strength) of
the 109th Infantry, most of the 90th
Cavalry Reconnaissance Squadron, and
a company of tank destroyers, found the
Germans decamping from the narrow
strip they had held south of the Sure
River. Most of the fighting involved en-
emy on the north bank from Ettelbruck
to the east. The tank destroyers claimed
to have caught and destroyed numerous
vehicles and one horse-drawn battery.
In Gilsdorf the German rear guard suc-
ceeded in gaining a little time, but
the attack continued eastward until
nightfall, when Rudder’s troops paused
on the hill west of Moestroff.
While this advance was sweeping the
near bank of the Sure the enemy de-
stroyed his foot and ponton bridges. The
10th Armored attack and the deep thrust
achieved by the left wing of the 5th Di-
vision in the Haller sector was rapidly
crowding the 276th Volks Grenadier Di-
vision back on Wallendorf and Dillin-
gen, the crossings over which the divi-
sion had come on 16 December. On
Christmas Eve Colonel Dempwolff
moved the command posts of his divi-
sion and regiments closer to the river–a
sign of things to come. By this time there
was no real tactical connection between
the 276th and the 212th Volks Grena-
dier Divisions; each had been com-
pressed into the area of its original
bridgehead.
Since the river line in the 10th Ar-
mored Division zone had been reached
on the first day of the XII Corps’ at-
tack, Christmas passed quietly on the
Ettelbruck - Moestroff - Eppeldorf line
except for sounds of the tank destroy-
ers sporadically blasting at German
traffic across the Sure on the Diekirch-
Bettendorf road. But for the 5th Infan-
try Division Christmas was no day of cel-
ebration. At 0730 the infantry crawled
out of their frozen foxholes and moved
into the attack. During the first hours
they encountered few of the enemy, for
the 212th had given up considerable
ground during the night withdrawal, but
the German assault guns and artillery
quickly made their presence known. Al-
though the 10th Infantry right slammed
against the new enemy line in the Hardt
woods before the day was through,
it succeeded in lining up with the 22d
Infantry to the east.
The 3d Battalion, which had taken
over Hill 313 during the night, found
that the Germans had fallen back a few
hundred yards to the far side of a fine
natural barrier, the Leimerdelt draw.
This ravine was some two hundred feet
deep and five hundred yards across; its
sides were virtually cliffs. Attempts to
work around the draw by way of trib-
utary cross corridors failed because the
enemy had blocked these routes with
machine guns. Lt. Col. Alden Shipley,
the battalion commander, asked permis-
sion to sideslip westward and flank the
draw from higher ground, but the 2d
Infantry was engaged in the area Ship-
ley needed for this maneuver and the
request had to be denied.
North of Scheidgen, on the 3d Bat-
talion, 2d Infantry, front, American ar-
tillery had pounded the enemy all
through the night in preparation for the
attack, some batteries using the new
POZIT fuze. Soon after the infantry
started forward, reports came back that
much damage had been done the enemy,

502 THE ARDENNES: BATTLE OF THE BULGE
that his line was softening. By afternoon
the battalion had advanced well into the
Friemholz woods, but not until the tank-
ers had shelled the enemy out of a fox-
hole line at the timber’s edge. The 2d
Battalion, after a rugged night for its
main force in the Mullerthal gorge, set
about extricating the two companies
there in preparation for the attack
against Doster Farm. This was no easy
task. Rather than work its way the length
of one of the exit draws in which
Company G had settled during the
night, this company attacked up and
over the bank, firing and taking its losses.
Company F had a hard time disengag-
ing, but got out along the path taken
by Company G.
MULLERTHAL
The battalion finally re-formed on
Company E, and the three serviceable
tanks left in the attached platoon then
prepared to attack Doster Farm, a small
collection of stone buildings on an open
rise. The German infantry had en-
trenched here, while in the woods
to the north a section of antitank
guns covered the clearing. One of
the enemy guns knocked out a tank but
in so doing enabled American ob-
servers to direct accurate fire on
the gun positions. Once the guns
were stilled the tanks and infantry took
the farm by assault, then pushed to with-
in a thousand yards of Berdorf.
West of the Mullerthal the 11th In-
fantry set out on the wheeling move-

THE XII CORPS ATTACKS THE SOUTHERN SHOULDER 503
ment planned the night before to re-
duce the stubborn resistance in front of
its right flank. Company A of the gist
Chemical Battalion smoked Haller
while the 3d Battalion, reinforced by ten
Jumbo tanks from the 737th Tank Bat-
talion, crossed the southern face of the
village and attacked toward the Hardt-
hof rise. After this rapid and success-
ful advance, the tanks withdrew to help
the 1st Battalion drive the enemy off
the Hohwald northeast of Waldbillig.
Haller itself fell to the reserve battalion,
which at twilight sent a rifle company
and tank platoon against the village.
Nearly two hundred prisoners were
rounded up from the 988th, the center
regiment of the 276th Yolks Grenadier
Division.
The 5th Division rate of advance had
accelerated appreciably during the sec-
ond day of action, particularly at those
points where tanks were brought into
action. Difficult terrain, however, denied
rapid exploitation and a clear break-
chrough to the Sauer. Then, too, trench
foot showed an alarming incidence
among the attacking infantry, who
found it impossible to keep their feet
dry in this attack across the snow-fed
streams in the bottom of the draws. The
5th Division, like other veteran divi-
sions, was filled with troops who had
returned to duty after evacuation for
wounds or sickness, and these “RTD’s”
were much more susceptible to trench
foot than other troops. Still, it was obvi-
ous that the enemy was in bad shape and
lacked the rifle strength or the heavy
weapons to stand for long against tank-
infantry assault. General Eddy and Gen-
eral Irwin agreed that the attack was
profitable and should continue, al-
though both were anxious to get their
troops under cover.
The LXXX Corps could hardly be
said to have a line of defense in either of
its division bridgeheads on the 26th.
Rather there remained an unevenly
linked chain of small troop concentra-
tions defending wood lots, hills, or
villages–in effect a series of bridgeheads
within the two main bridgehead areas.
The 212th Volks Grenadier Division was
in a particularly hazardous position,
for the attack by the 3d Battalion in the
2d Infantry sector had carried to within
sight of the Sauer, thus separating the
German centers of defense at Berdorf
and Echternach. In fact the enemy in-
fantry to the front of the 3d Battalion
had been forced to swim the chilly river
on the night of the 25th.
The 1st Battalion, 10th Infantry,
emerged from the Hardt woods and ad-
vanced astride the ridge lines leading
north to Echternach. German Teller
mines linked with trip wires dotted the
trails and the ridge crests, slowing the
advance, but by dark the battalion was
only a half-mile from the town. The 3d
Battalion, stopped the previous day at
the Leimerdelt draw, renewed its ad-
vance about 0300 with a stealthy de-
scent into the draw, Company L mov-
ing on the right to the bend where the
draw turned north toward Echternach.
Company I, on the left, attacked at day-
break through two tributary draws lead-
ing out to the north, each rifleman
weighed down with three bandoleers
of ammunition. Attacking boldly, fir-
ing at every possible enemy hiding place,
and never halting for cover, the company
killed the Germans in their foxholes or
drove them back in flight toward the
river. A small detachment of the enemy
made a brief stand at Melick Farm,

504 THE ARDENNES: BATTLE OF THE BULGE
then gave way to artillery shelling and
assault by Company L. Company I drove
on to the ridge overlooking Echternach
and the Sauer, while tanks shelled the
woods and draw on the flank.
From this vantage point the artillery
observer accompanying the riflemen
could see little groups of the enemy pad-
dling across the river in rubber boats.
A few were swimming, others were run-
ning across a small wooden bridge. Time
after time the forward artillery observer
called for battalion concentrations,
watching the bursts with the POZIT
fuze thirty feet over the heads of the
fleeing Germans and the murderous ef-
fects therefrom. For a while the enemy
persisted in using the crossing site, then
broke, fleeing into Echternach or along
the road to Berdorf. That night patrols
entered Echternach but could find no
signs of the enemy or of Company E,
12th Infantry, which, it was hoped,
still would be holed up somewhere in
the town.
In the 5th Division center the 2d In-
fantry struck at Berdorf and the hill
mass next to the Sauer, two companies
of the 2d Battalion closing on Berdorf
at dawn. There in the half-light Com-
pany G, marching on the left, saw troops
standing in formation along the main
village street while an officer pointed to
various houses, apparently disposing his
men. The American commander thought
that Company E might have come in
from the right, but when he called out,
“Is that Easy Company?” a gruff voice
answered “Yah, das ist Easy Company.”
The surprised Americans recovered in
time to shoot down or capture a num-
ber of the enemy, but enough reached
the houses to organize a stubborn de-
fense. Nevertheless by dark the 2d Bat-
talion had captured half the town, a few
prisoners, a number of decorated Christ-
mas trees, and the cold leftovers of
Christmas dinner.
Early in the fight Colonel Roffe de-
cided to employ his reserve, the 1st Bat-
talion, in a drive for the final regimental
objective, the woods near Hamm Farm
on the ridge north of Berdorf. The re-
serve battalion marched in column to-
ward Berdorf, expecting to pass through
the 2d Battalion, but found a bitter
fight in progress and the surrounding
area plastered with shellfire. When the
1st Battalion tried to sideslip to the west
it ran into a group of Germans in the
draw on its left flank and very heavy
artillery fire. Company C alone lost
thirty-two men while deploying to
attack. Not until the morning of 27 De-
cember did the final collapse of the Ber-
dorf defense enable the 1st Battalion
to reach the woods at Hamm Farm. The
3d Battalion had meanwhile come for-
ward to the east of Berdorf and reached
Birkelt Farm, overlooking the river.
All that remained were small rear guard
detachments, but these put up a real
fight in the woods and stone farmhouses.
That night many Germans withdrew
and swam the river to reach the West
Wall lines.
The operations of the 11th Infantry
on Christmas Day had forced consider-
able retraction in the southern flank of
the 276th Volks Grenadier Division.
Colonel Black ordered the attack con-
tinued on the 26th, sending two bat-
talions against what was left of the
987th and 988th Regiments. Before
daybreak the 2d Battalion wheeled
right and began an attack along
the road running from Haller to
Beaufort. The leading company en-

THE XII CORPS ATTACKS THE SOUTHERN SHOULDER
countered the first of the enemy
in the wooded ravine of the Hallerbach,
well camouflaged in unorthodox posi-
tions facing both sides of the ravine so
that the attackers found themselves re-
ceiving mortar, Werfer, and bullet fire
from front and rear.
About 1000 Maj. John N. Acuff, the
battalion commander, withdrew his in-
fantry a short distance to see what a mor-
tar barrage could do. The woods were
thick, visibility was poor, and mortar
fire proved not very effective. When the
Americans resumed the assault they in
turn were hit by a counterattack. It was
dusk when the enemy finally gave way
and the 2d Battalion reached the woods
north of the ravine. Ordered by Colonel
Black to continue the attack through the
night, the battalion converged shortly
after midnight in a pincers move on
BERDORF
505
the town of Beaufort, located on com-
manding ground and controlling one of
the main exit roads leading to the Dillin-
gen bridge. The enemy held for awhile
in the north edge of Beaufort but
by daybreak had abandoned the town
to the 2d Battalion.
During the morning of 26 December
the 3d Battalion had attacked almost
without opposition, crossing the Haller-
bach ravine and gaining the high ground
to the east of Beaufort and overlooking
the road to Dillingen. But when the
first appetizing target appeared, a col-
umn of a hundred or more vehicles
heading for the Dillingen bridge, the
artillery radios failed to function and
a hasty barrage laid on the road by mor-
tars and machine guns caught only the
tail of the column. By noon patrols were
in position on the river bank to observe

506 THE ARDENNES: BATTLE OF THE BULGE
the Dillingen bridge site. Calls for ar-
tillery fire this time got through to the
batteries, but the gunners had difficulty
in directing fire into the deep river Val-
ley. The division air support party vec-
tored a flight of P–47’s over the bridge,
but three separate passes failed to gain
a hit. Later in the day the artillery ob-
servers succeeded in getting high-angle
fire on the bridge; one hit registered
while the span was crowded with men
and vehicles, but the bridge continued
in use.
At the end of this third day of the
5th Division attack General Eddy and
General Irwin agreed that the mission
assigned was as good as accomplished.
The west bank of the Sauer had been
gained at several points, and the enemy
was hastening to recross the river and
gain the protection of the West Wall.
The Americans had taken over five hun-
dred prisoners in the period of 24–26
December and had recovered much
American materiel, lost in the first days
of the German advance. There still re-
mained some necessary mopping up in
those pockets where the German rear
guard held on to cover the withdrawal
of the last units of the LXXX Corps as
these made their way to safety.
Although the 212th completed its
withdrawal over the Bollendorf bridge
during the night of 26 December, rov-
ing patrols continued to operate on the
American side of the river well into
January. The 276th Yolks Grenadier
Division held in some force for another
twenty-four hours under specific Seventh
Army orders to do so in keeping
with the larger army mission of
containment. For the 11th Infantry,
therefore, there was one last round of
fighting, fighting which cost the 1st Bat-
talion dear in attacks against Bigelbach
on the 27th. German artillery and
Werfers, emplaced on the east bank of
the river, made good practice, while the
worn grenadiers fought stubbornly
wherever they were assailed.
There was one exit through which
the German rear guard could hope to
escape with minimum loss of men and
equipment once its delaying stint was
completed-the Dillingen bridge, built
by the Seventh Army engineers for just
this purpose. American fighter-bombers
made a second effort against the span on
27 December, but reported near mis-
ses. Colonel Dempwolff has said that he
was much worried about the bridge dur-
ing the daylight hours of the 27th. Dra-
matically, the real danger to the division
came after dark just as the final with-
drawal commenced. Perhaps the law of
averages was working, or it may be that
an American gunner put some partic-
ularly potent spell on this one shell;
in any case, a direct hit blasted a gap
of about fifteen yards in the bridge
structure. When the German engineers
hastened to repair the span, they came
under small arms fire from American pa-
trols working down toward the river.
Then, about 0200, shellfire suddenly in-
creased to feverish intensity and the en-
gineers were driven off the bridge. This
shelling finally slackened, the span was
repaired, the assault guns, flak, and ve-
hicles filed across, and just after day-
break the Germans blew the bridge.
From 22 December, when the 10th In-
fantry launched the 5th Division attack
toward the Sauer, until 28 December,
when the last formal resistance ended,
the division took over 800 prisoners. Es-
timates by burial parties set the num-
ber of Germans killed at about the same

THE XII CORPS ATTACKS THE SOUTHERN SHOULDER 507
figure. Losses in the 5th Division totaled
46 officers and 899 men as battle cas-
ualties; 22 officers and 598 men were
nonbattle casualties–a high ratio but
understandable in terms of the contin-
ued 20º cold and the footslogging ad-
vance through countless icy streams.
The 276th Volks Grenadier Division
lost about 2,000 officers and men be-
tween 20 and 28 December, from all
causes, and the original division com-
mander had been killed in the action.
Many of its companies were reduced to
ten-man strength. The average strength
of the rifle companies in the 212th Volks
Grenadier Division, when they returned
to the West Wall, was 25–30 men,
but the figure is derived from losses suf-
fered since 16 December. Although this
division was better trained than the
276th, it generally had engaged in
harder fighting. Its total losses, as esti-
mated by the division commander, were
about 4,000 officers and men. The only
exact casualty report extant is that of
the 988th Regiment, which on 15 De-
cember had been at its full strength of
1,868 officers and men. By 28 December
the regiment had suffered losses as fol-
lows: 190 known killed, 561 missing in
action, 411 hospitalized as sick or
wounded.
The terrain on which the 4th Infan-
try Division had defended and over
which the 5th Infantry Division had
attacked proved to bees difficult as any
on which military operations were con-
ducted in the course of the Ardennes
campaign. For this reason the battle at
the south shoulder of the Bulge merits
perusal by the student of tactics. Amer-
ican superiority in heavy supporting
weapons, tanks, and tank destroyers
never had the full tactical effectiveness
on this broken ground which normally
would be the case. The military stu-
dent, however, will have noticed that
the psychological effect of American
tanks and tank destroyers on an enemy
who had no tanks and very few anti-
tank guns was considerable. For this bat-
tle German commanders all make much
of those periods during the initial Amer-
ican defense and the ultimate coun-
terattack when tanks, even in platoon
strength, were employed against them.
The relative immobility of the two Ger-
man divisions, whose flexibility in at-
tack and defense depended almost
entirely on the leg power of tired in-
fantry, gave both General Barton and
General Irwin a considerable advan-
tage in timing, whether it was in mov-
ing troops to counter a thrust or in ex-
ploiting weaknesses in the enemy line.
The use of artillery on both sides of
the line is one of the features of the
XII Corps operations at the Sauer, and
in numerous actions German use of the
rocket launcher proved particularly
disquieting to the Americans. This
weapon, whose total weight was only
some 1,200 pounds, but which could dis-
charge 450 pounds of high explosive in
ten seconds, more than made up for the
limited number of conventional artil-
lery tubes that the LXXX Corps had in
the bridgehead, and its ease of move-
ment and small silhouette were admir-
ably suited to the broken ground west
of the Sauer. The rate and weight of
rocket projector fire, plus the fact that
the limited German artillery could con-
centrate to cover well-defined and de-
limited paths of advance, led the veter-
an 5th Division to claim that it had been
more heavily shelled during these days
than in any battle it had sustained.

508 THE ARDENNES: BATTLE OF THE BULGE
The artillery support furnished the 5th
Division, however, had been very effec-
tive; German records note it with con-
siderable distaste. As might be expected
of this pockmarked and tortuous ground,
both sides speak with respect of the
enemy’s mortars.
By 26 December, the last day of full-
fledged attack by the XII Corps against
the Sauer salient, the Third Army was
fully oriented on its new axis. With the
6th Armored Division en route from
the south to join the XII Corps, it was
possible to relieve the armor already in
the zone and effect a general regrouping
calculated to restore some organizational
unity. CCA, 9th Armored, there-
fore, was ordered to Arlon and
III Corps control; the 109th Infantry
was restored to the 28th Infantry
Division, still with the VIII Corps;
the 10th Armored Division was directed
to hand over its sector to the 6th Ar-
mored Division on 27 December and
rejoin the XX Corps at Metz. General
Patton, wishing to integrate his northern
front a little better, redrafted the bound-
ary between the III and XII Corps so
that the 80th Infantry Division passed
in place to the latter. This new inter-
corps boundary would originate in the
north near Wiltz, run south toward Hei-
derscheid, and continue to a point be-
low Merzig.
Neither Patton nor Eddy had a defi-
nite plan for the employment of the
XII Corps once its immediate mission
was accomplished and the anchor posi-
tion of the Third Army opposite the
German shoulder was secured. When it
became apparent that the fight on the
near bank of the Sauer was nearly fin-
ished, the corps commander made a ten-
tative plan–probably at Patton’s instiga-
tion-for an attack north over the Sure
River and on toward Bitburg using his
new armored division and the 10th In-
fantry. In addition Eddy asked Irwin’s
opinion on a river crossing by the 5th
Infantry Division. General Irwin agreed
that such a follow-up was “worth a
thought,” reasoning that “the West Wall
line in front is weak and we have de-
stroyed much of the garrison.”
The Third Army commander finally
decided that the 5th and 80th Infantry
Divisions would hold the existing line
while the 6th Armored moved west to
the Bastogne sector and there attacked
northward on the left of the 4th Ar-
mored Division. The corps front was
duly re-formed, the 5th Division edging
to the left to join the 80th and the 4th
Infantry Division (now commanded by
Brig. Gen. Harold W. Blakeley because
General Barton had been evacuated
by reason of illness) taking over
a wider sector on the right. The corps
commander did not immediately dismiss
the idea of an attack east across the Sauer
River and through the West Wall. This
project was on-again-off-again until, on
2 January, Patton ordered that plans be
made for a corps attack northward. The
XII Corps front, however, would re-
main quiet until 18 January.

CHAPTER XXI
The III Corps’ Counterattack
The Verdun meeting on 19 December
set in chain the first of a series of actions
which the Allies would take to wrest the
initiative from the enemy. Nonetheless a
few momentous, nerve-shaking days had
to elapse before the first gun of the
counterattack could be fired. To gain
time and save troops the Supreme Com-
mander was willing to let the Allied
forces fall back as far as necessary–al-
though it was tacitly understood that the
Meuse River must be the limit for any
withdrawal. On the 20th General Strong,
the SHAEF chief of intelligence, ad-
vised General Eisenhower that it looked
as if the German command had com-
mitted everything it had to the offensive.
Flying weather was poor and there was
a chance that the Allies now could re-
group for a concerted counterattack both
north and south without these troop
movements being discovered from the
air. On this date, therefore, Eisenhower
gave Bradley and Montgomery their
orders for a counteroffensive against the
German salient, to be undertaken as soon
as possible.
Air Chief Marshal Tedder, the Dep-
uty Supreme Allied Commander, and a
number of others on the SHAEF staff
feared that the impetuous Patton would
persuade Bradley to let him start the
counterattack from the south with only
Toward Bastogne
a couple of divisions and that it then
would develop piecemeal, as had the
German counterattack in Normandy,
without a solid tactical base or concrete
result. The Supreme Commander himself
was well aware of the Third Army
commander’s penchant for cut and
thrust tactics and probably needed little
urging to take some action calculated to
hold Patton within the constraints of
“the big picture.” On the other hand
Eisenhower recognized that the continued
occupation of Bastogne, the key
to the entire road net on the south side
of the German Bulge, was essential to
future offensive operations. Patton, as
the SHAEF staff saw it, would make the
narrow thrust on the Arlon-Bastogne
axis, but any more ambitious plans
would have to be subordinated to the
larger strategy. 1 Eisenhower, therefore,
told Bradley that the American counterattack
via Bastogne should be held in
check and not allowed to spread, that it
was, after all, only a steppingstone for
the “main counteroffensive.”
Preparations for the Attack
Possibly the “lucky” commander
needed some curb. on his inherent opti-
1 The Robb Notes are the source of the Supreme
Commander’s views.

510 THE ARDENNES: BATTLE OF THE BULGE
mism, but regardless of any pose which
Patton may have assumed in the war
council at Verdun he and his staff went
about the business of mounting this first
counterattack coolly and methodically. 2
The direction of attack already had been
set by General Eisenhower, that is,
north from an assembly area around
Arlon. The immediate mission, assigned
by the higher command after the Verdun
meeting, was the “relief” of Bastogne
and the use of its road net as a sally port
for a drive by the Third Army to St.
Vith in the larger Allied offensive. D-
day for the counterattack was 22 Decem-
ber. It must be added that the Third
Army order issued the day before the
attack was rather ambitious, containing
a typical Patton flourish in the prescrip-
tion of an eventual wheel to the north-
east and seizure of the Rhine crossings
“in zone.” The forces to be employed
had been earmarked as early as the night
of 18 December when Bradley and Pat-
ton agreed to move the new III Corps
headquarters (as yet inexperienced and
untried) from Metz to Arlon. The divi-
sions given Maj. Gen. John Millikin (the
26th Infantry Division, 80th Infantry Di-
vision, and 4th Armored Division) all
had been out of the line or in a quiet
sector when the Third Army was or-
2 The operations of the Third Army in the
Bastogne counterattack are the subject of a special
journal prepared by the TUSA G–3 staff (in
the author’s possession). In addition the TUSA
chief of staff, General Gay, kept an official Third
Army diary (referred to hereafter as Gay Diary),
a copy of which was used by the author. The
personal data on General Patton is interesting
but adds little to the official records. See also
George S. Patton, Jr., War As I Knew It (Boston:
Houghton Mifflin Company, 1947) and Harry
H. Semmes, Portrait of Patton (New York: Apple-
ton-Century-Crofts, Inc., 1955) .
GENERAL MILLIKIN
dered north, and thus were selected al-
most automatically. 3
The area chosen for the III Corps
counterattack extended from the Alzette
River on the east to Neufchateau in the
west, a front of some thirty miles. Actu-
ally these points were not on formal
boundaries but rather represent the
limits within which the III Corps opera-
tion finally developed. This zone, the
eastern part lying in Luxembourg, the
western in Belgium, contains some of the
most rugged ground in the Ardennes.
East of the Arlon-Bastogne axis two
deeply eroded corridors, cut by the Sure
and Wiltz Rivers, form effective barriers
to mechanized or motorized advance
from the south. The entire area is criss-
crossed with rivers and streams, but those
of the tableland west of Bastogne lack
the gorgelike beds found to the east.
Here, as in other parts of the Ardennes,
3 III Corps AAR; G–2 and G–3 Jnls.

THE III CORPS’ COUNTERATTACK TOWARD BASTOGNE 511
dense woods alternate with rolling fields
and clearings. The land is veined with
roads, but of varying quality; at their
interlacings are found the single farm-
house or the village of a half-dozen
dwellings, all promising the phenome-
non common to military operations in
the Ardennes–the fight for the cross-
road. Bastogne, with seven entrant roads,
naturally dominates the road complex in
this area whether movement be from east
to west, as attempted by the XLYII
Panzer Corps, or from south to north, as
planned for the American III Corps. But
in addition to the south-to-north highway
from Arlon to Bastogne, there are main
roads branching from Arlon to the north-
east and northwest, thus offering some
flexibility of maneuver. Only one main
road south of Bastogne runs east and
west, that from Luxembourg City
through Arlon to Neufchateau. This
road would form the base of operations
for the III Corps. (See Map IX.)
The enemy situation on the new III
Corps front was obscure. The Bastogne
garrison knew little of the German de-
ployment beyond the encircling units in
direct contact, while the VIII Corps’
screen, behind which the III Corps was
forming, had been too weak to fight for
information. The situation along most of
the tenuous and sketchy VIII Corps line
was indeed so confused that the location
of friendly roadblocks or outposts could
hardly be plotted. On the day before the
counterattack it was known that the
German columns had carried to and be-
yond Bastogne. It was presumed that the
Arlon-Bastogne road had been cut, but
this was not certain. Elements of four
German divisions were supposed to be in
the line opposite the III Corps: the 5th
Parachute and the 212th, 276th, and
352d Yolks Grenadier Divisions. All
but the 5th Parachute had been identi-
fied days earlier as belonging to the
Seventh Army. What these enemy divi-
sions could do and what they intended
to do quite literally was any man’s guess.
The III Corps attack would have to push
off through a fragmentary screen of
friendly troops whose positions were un-
certain, against an enemy whose exact
location was unknown, over terrain
which had not been scouted by the
Third Army.
The enemy was equally in the dark as
to the III Corps capabilities and inten-
tions. The 26th Infantry Division could
not be located by German intelligence
after it left Metz and would not be iden-
tified as present in its new sector until
two days after the American drive com-
menced. The enemy traced the 80th into
Luxembourg, but on 22 December be-
lieved it was reinforcing “remnants” of
the 4th Infantry Division in a purely de-
fensive role.
When General Millikin and his staff
settled into the Arlon headquarters on
20 December, with only two days to go
before the counterattack target date, the
divisions that made up the attack force
were either still on the move or were
barely completing their shift. The 26th
Infantry Division was en route from
Metz to Arlon; the 80th Division had
just closed into an assembly area near
Luxembourg City after a march of 150
miles; the 4th Armored Division had
reached Arlon and was trying to find its
assembly area on the Arlon-Neufchateau
road. Nor were the three divisions
equally ready for return to the fray.
The 26th Division (Maj. Gen. Willard
S. Paul) was full of rifle replacements,
mostly inexperienced and lacking recent

512 THE ARDENNES: BATTLE OF THE BULGE
infantry training. This division had seen
its first combat in October and had lost
almost 3,000 men during bitter fighting
in Lorraine. Withdrawn in early Decem-
ber to take over the Third Army “rein-
forcement” training program at Metz,
the 26th Division had just received 2,585
men as replacements and, on 18 Decem-
ber, was beginning its program (sched-
uled for thirty days) when the German
counteroffensive canceled its role as a
training division. The “trainees,” men
taken from headquarters, antitank sec-
tions, and the like, at once were pre-
empted to fill the ranks left gaping by
the Lorraine battles. Knowing only that
an undefined combat mission lay ahead,
the division rolled north to Arlon, com-
pleting its move shortly before midnight
of the 20th. Not until the next day did
General Paul learn that his division was
to attack on the early morning of the 22d.
The 80th Division (General Mc-
Bride) was in good condition. As one of
the units being primed by the Third
Army for the forthcoming attack against
the West Wall, the 80th had been
granted priority on replacements, had
been rested at St. Avold, and on 18
December was on its way into the line
near Zweibrücken when General Patton
ordered the move to Luxembourg.
There the 80th found itself under the
control of the III Corps, its only orders
to take up a reserve battle position in
the 4th Infantry Division zone. On 21
December McBride first learned that his
division would attack the following
morning.
The 4th Armored Division (Maj. Gen.
Hugh J. Gaffey) had come north under
hurried and contradictory orders, the
result of the usual time lag between a
command decision reached in personal
conferences by the top commanders and
the receipt of this decision in the lower
tactical units. CCB, for example, oper-
ated for two days under VIII Corps
while the rest of the division was en
route to III Corps-a fact that has bear-
ing on the subsequent story of Bastogne.
On the night of 18 December General
Bradley had told Patton, “I understand
from General Ike you are to take over
the VIII Corps.” That same night CCB,
4th Armored, started for Longwy and the
road to Luxembourg. The next day the
rest of the division followed, under
verbal orders from Patton attaching the
4th Armored Division to the III Corps.
These orders were countermanded, then
reaffirmed by the 12th Army Group in
the course of the 19th.
The advance party of CCB arrived
meanwhile at Arlon, and found that the
VIII Corps was the only corps operating
in the area, the III Corps headquarters
not yet having appeared on the scene.
Brig. Gen. Holmes E. Dager reported to
the commander of the VIII Corps,
which was officially under the First Army
and would be until noon on 20 Decem-
ber, although all concerned knew that it
was to pass to the Third Army. General
Middleton perforce had command of
this Third Army unit before the antici-
pated change, whereas Third Army
records continued to show the entire 4th
Armored Division as assigned to the III
Corps. At Dager’s request the corps
commander agreed to keep CCB to-
gether as a tactical unit instead of
parceling it out along the front.
The 4th Armored Division had won a
brilliant reputation during the autumn
battles in Lorraine. It was a favorite of
the Third Army commander; so, when
its leader, Maj. Gen. John S. Wood, was

THE III CORPS’ COUNTERATTACK TOWARD BASTOGNE 513
returned to the United States for rest
and recuperation, General Patton named
his own chief of staff as Wood’s successor.
On 10 December the 4th Armored Divi-
sion came out of the line after five
months of incessant fighting. The last
phase of combat, the attack in the Saar
mud, had been particularly trying and
costly. Replacements, both men and
matériel, were not to be had; trained
tank crews could not be found in the
conventional replacement centers–in
fact these specialists no longer were
trained in any number in the United
States. When the division started for
Luxembourg it was short 713 men and
19 officers in the tank and infantry bat-
talions and the cavalry squadron.
The state of materiel was much
poorer, for there was a shortage of
medium tanks throughout the European
theater. The division could replace only
a few of its actual losses and was short
twenty-one Shermans when ordered
north; worse, ordnance could not ex-
change worn and battle-damaged tanks
for new. Tanks issued in the United
Kingdom in the spring of 1944 were still
operating, many of them after several
major repair jobs, and all with mileage
records beyond named life expectancy.
Some could be run only at medium
speed. Others had turrets whose electri-
cal traverse no longer functioned and
had to be cranked around by hand.
Tracks and motors were worn badly:
the 8th Tank Battalion alone had thirty-
three tanks drop out because of mechan-
ical failure in the 160-mile rush to the
Ardennes. But even with battle-weary
tanks and a large admixture of green
tankers and armored infantry the 4th
Armored Division, on its record, could
be counted an asset in any operation re-
quiring initiative and battle know-how.
The Ezell Task Force
It is obvious that the Third Army
could never have put troops into the
Luxembourg area as quickly as it did
without a wholesale scuttling of “paper
work” and “channels”; that improvisa-
tion and reliance on the field telephone
as a medium for attaining clear under-
standing have inherent dangers is
equally clear. A bizarre adventure that
befell CCB of the 4th Armored in its
peregrinations typifies the period of
“piecemeal reaction,” as some of the
participants style it, when Middleton’s
VIII Corps was trying to plug the yawn-
ing gaps in its front with rifle platoons of
engineers and mechanics, and before an
American riposte could be made in force.
Bradley had told the VIII Corps com-
mander on the night of 18 December
that reinforcements were coming up
from the Third Army. Sometime later
Middleton learned that the 4th Armored
Division was heading northward, led by
CCB and apparently under attachment
to his dwindling command. Another
tank command from the Third Army
(CCB, 10th Armored Division) had just
arrived on the scene, but this Middleton
had committed at once to shore up the
crumbling defenses between Bastogne
and Wiltz. At noon on the 19th (before
the VIII Corps had passed to the Third
Army) General Middleton telephoned
the First Army commander and asked if
he might use CCB of the 4th Armored
on its arrival. Uncertain of the command
situation Hodges referred the request to
Bradley, who told the VIII Corps com-
mander that he could employ CCB but
only if necessary to hold his position.

514 THE ARDENNES: BATTLE OF THE BULGE
By midnight CCB had ended its 150-
mile ride and closed in villages on the
east side of Vaux-lez-Rosihres; all the
journal sergeant could enter at this hour
was “mission unknown.” But by the
morning of the 20th the status and duties
of Dager’s command were really con-
fused, for the III Corps had opened its
command post at Arlon and proceeded
to give orders on the assumption that
the 4th Armored Division in its entirety
was reporting to General Millikin. The
VIII Corps had ordered Dager to send
an officer to Bastogne at daylight on the
20th to determine the exact situation
there, but about 0500 that morning
someone on the VIII Corps G–9 staff-
who it was cannot be determined–or-
dered Dager to send a tank company, an
armored infantry company, and a bat-
tery of self-propelled artillery into
Bastogne.
Although Dager argued against this
fragmentization of his force, at 1030 the
small team was on its way, led by Capt.
Bert Ezell, executive officer of the 8th
Tank Battalion, who earlier had been
named the liaison officer to the 101st
Airborne. The only mission specified was
“to aid CCB of the 10th Armored Divi-
sion.” Since CCB had bivouacked close
to the Neufchâteau-Bastogne road this
route was used. There had been rumors
that the Germans had cut the road, but
nobody seemed to know for certain and
American reconnaissance was woefully
lacking in this sector. En route the team
received–or heard–a little small arms
fire. In Bastogne Ezell reported to the
101st chief of staff, who turned him over
to the division G–3, who passed him on
to General McAuliffe, who assigned him
to Colonel Roberts, commanding CCB
of the 10th Armored. Roberts ordered
Ezell to assemble his task force at
Villeroux two and a half miles southwest
of Bastogne and gave him a number of
missions.
About 1400 a radio message from CCB
rescinded Ezell’s original orders and told
him to return to Nives, the 8th Tank
Battalion bivouack. This is what had
happened. Telephone connection be-
tween CCB and General Gaffey’s 4th
Armored command post had opened,
giving Dager an opportunity to express
his concern over the way in which his
command was being whittled away piece-
meal. Gaffey immediately ordered Dager
to recall the task force at Bastogne and to
move CCB into assembly with the rest of
the division northwest of Arlon.
Figuring that someone higher in
authority would inform Roberts or
McAuliffe, Ezell and his team started for
home. On the way into Bastogne the task
force had noticed two battalions of field
artillery beside the road, the pieces and
prime movers jammed together, equip-
ment scattered, and most of the gunners
fleeing along the road to the south. This
time the task force stopped, found one
dead man lying by his prime mover, shot
in the head, and an artillery captain
singlehandedly trying to hitch up the
guns and move them to the road. Lieu-
tenant Kiley, who commanded the tank
company, hitched three of the pieces to
his tanks and left a few of his men to
help the anonymous captain. Seven hours
after the team set out it was back with
CCB. Ezell had counted only three ar-
tillery rounds during the trip and had
seen signal men calmly laying wire along
the highway. At dusk on the 20th, then,
the Neufchâteau-Bastogne road still was
in friendly hands. Why was CCB as a
unit not put in to hold this corridor

THE III CORPS’ COUNTERATTACK TOWARD BASTOGNE 515
open? There is no certain answer. The
episode of Ezell’s task force can be read
only through the fog of war as this
is generated by the failure of communi-
cations, the complexity and unwieldi-
ness of field command, and the natural,
human proclivity for overrating (or
underrating) the accomplishments of
the enemy. 4
“Drive Like Hell”
General Patton inspected the III
Corps dispositions and divisions on 20
December, concluded that the corps con-
centration was proceeding satisfactorily,
and the following day gave the order
for attack at 0600 on the 22d. The corps
scheme of maneuver, issued to the divi-
sions in the early afternoon, was simple.
The III Corps would advance north in
the direction of St. Vith. The 80th
Infantry Division, on the right, would
maintain contact during its advance with
the left wing of the XII Corps. The
26th Division would form the center.
The 4th Armored Division would ad-
vance on the left–Bastogne lay in its
zone.
The last of the eleven field artillery
battalions which had been taken from
active engagement on the old Third
Army front to form the corps artillery
arrived during the day. They had
wheeled north at an average twenty-
mile-per-hour clip. In addition the infan-
try divisions each had a tank battalion
and a self-propelled tank destroyer bat-
talion attached. To eke out some cover
on the open west flank, Task Force
Lyon, consisting of the 178th Engineer
4 Ezell’s adventure was carefully checked at the
time and is the subject of a special series of com-
bat interviews.
Combat Battalion with reinforcements,
was assigned the task of erecting road-
blocks and preparing bridges for dem-
olition.
The Third Army commander’s last
instruction to his commanders reflected
the admonition against a dribbling at-
tack given by General Eisenhower: he
(General Patton) favored an attack in
column of regiments, “or in any case
lots of depth.” As usual Patton was
optimistic. He felt certain that the
enemy was unaware of the storm about
to break, that German intelligence had
not spotted the appearance of the 26th
Division in the area, and that it did not
know the exact location of the other
two divisions. “Drive like hell,” said
Patton.
The 80th Division Advance
Despite hurried preparations the III
Corps attack got off at the appointed
hour on the 22d. The 80th Division,
whose regiments earlier had assembled
north of Luxembourg for the defense of
that city, had as line of departure the
Mersch-Arlon road on a front of five and
a half miles. 5 During the night it was
learned that the 109th Infantry of the
dispersed 28th Division still was facing
the enemy near Vichten, five miles to
the north. This would give some cover
for the development of the 80th Divi-
sion attack; so McBride ordered his
left wing regiment to pass through the
5 Very detailed
coverage of the 80th Division
operation will be found in the combat interviews.
The division records are less useful than the
AAR’s and journals of the three infantry regi-
ments. See also, Capt. Roy T. McGrann, The
610th Tank Destroyer Battalion (Pittsburgh, Pa.;
Geyer Printing Company, 1946).

516 THE ARDENNES: BATTLE OF THE BULGE
109th Infantry, relieving it in place.
There was no artillery preparation (nor
were there any certain targets) for the
surprise attack.
The two assault regiments, the
319th Infantry on the left and the 318th
Infantry on the right, went forward fast
on this cold cloudy morning, tramping
over a light blanket of snow which
had fallen during the night. In two hours
the 319th Infantry (Col. William N.
Taylor) reached Vichten and relieved
the 109th; as the regiment moved on
toward Merzig the first few rounds of
small arms fire came in. The 318th In-
fantry (Col. Lansing McVickar) headed
for Ettelbruck, constricted to column
formation by the Alzette River on the
east and a high ridge on the west. South
of the bridgehead town enemy shellfire
briefly stopped the advance until the
German guns were quieted by counter-
battery from the 314th Field Artillery
Battalion.
The cannonading was brought on by
a peculiar circumstance. The 352d Volks
Grenadier Division (General Schmidt)
on this morning was advancing along
the Diekirch-Ettelbruck-Merzig highway
in front of but at a right angle to the
American advance from the south.
Schmidt was under the impression that
his division had broken through the
American line and was now marching
through undefended, unoccupied coun-
try. The 914th Regiment had just
entered Ettelbruck when the 318th
Infantry appeared. It was the artillery
regiment of the 352d, bringing up the
tail of the division east of the town,
which ran afoul of the Americans.
Quite obviously the Germans did not
expect an attack from this direction.
The 914th faced left and deployed
hurriedly, using the town as a base, but
in the process lost its heavy metal, for
the German batteries were in no posi-
tion to engage in an artillery duel, and
fell back to Diekirch.
Farther west the rear of the 915th
Regiment column was moving directly
across the 319th Infantry line of march.
To their amazement, troops of the 3d
Battalion suddenly saw the Germans
filing past, only a few hundred yards
away and oblivious of any danger. Tanks,
tank destroyers, and the 57-mm. anti-
tank guns of the 1st Battalion ended
this serene promenade. Many Germans
were killed, a gun battery was blown
to pieces, and numerous trucks and
horse-drawn weapons were destroyed.
The 319th Infantry had knifed between
head and tail of the 352d. It now swung
right onto the Ettelbruck road and
that afternoon reached the villages of
Oberfeulen and Niederfeulen. Merzig,
however, remained in German hands.
At sundown the 80th Division could
look back on a highly successful day.
Extensive gains had been the story along
the entire III Corps front and Patton
was very much pleased. This was, he
told General Millikin, a chance to win
the war: the attack must be kept rolling
through the night. The 319th Infantry
put its 2d Battalion, the reserve, into
trucks as far as Oberfeulen. There the
battalion dismounted about midnight
and under a full moon began an advance
to take Heiderscheid. The 318th Infan-
try, which had found it difficult to ma-
neuver on the constricted southern ap-
proach to Ettelbruck or to bring its tanks
and tank destroyers to bear against the
town, at nightfall began a series of suc-
cessful assaults to gain the hills which
looked down upon Ettelbruck from the

THE III CORPS’ COUNTERATTACK TOWARD BASTOGNE 517
west. Company B moved with such speed
that it reached the houses at the western
edge of the town. Although its command-
er was wounded during the assault his
company held on alone. The 80th Divi-
sion would have to do some bitter fight-
ing before this bridgehead over the Sure
and Alzette was cleared of the enemy,
but the division had cut one of the
main supply routes of the German
Seventh Army.
One lone rifle company holding a few
houses hardly made for a hand-hold on
Ettelbruck. In and around the town the
enemy had a grenadier regiment and
many direct-fire heavy weapons. Because
the bluffs surrounding the town pre-
cluded much maneuver in attack, assault
on the west, or American, bank of the
Alzette had to be made frontally. Lt.
Col. A. S. Tosi had brought the two
other rifle companies of his 1st Bat-
talion close to the edge of the town
when daylight came on the 24th (B
Company still held inside), but three
separate attempts to reach the town
failed, and with severe casualties. In the
afternoon a few tanks were maneu-
vered into the van, and with their
help the 1st Battalion reached the houses
and took fifty or sixty prisoners. By this
time the battalion had lost the equiva-
lent of a full company, Colonel Tosi
had been seriously wounded, and all
company leaders had been killed or
wounded. One tank reached the streets
but found them cluttered with debris
and impassable. The division com-
mander decided to call off the attack;
at dusk all of the companies withdrew
while artillery plastered Ettelbruck.
This second day had voided the bright
promises of the first, for the 80th Divi-
sion finally was in contact with the main
German forces, well entrenched in towns
and villages which could be attacked
only over broken and difficult terrain.
In the course of the afternoon General
McBride decided to keep the attack roll-
ing by introducing his reserve regiment,
the 317th, between the two attacking
regiments. The 317th Infantry (Lt. Col.
Henry G. Fisher), which had been
following the 318th Infantry, was given
the mission of clearing the ridge which
ran north to Welscheid. Once beyond
this town Fisher’s troops were to turn
east toward the Sure River, thus cutting
to the rear of Ettelbruck. When night
fell the regiment was on its way, the
2d Battalion in the lead and the 1st
Battalion a thousand yards to its rear.
Nearing Welscheid sometime after mid-
night, the forward battalion started into
the assault over a series of rough slopes
where each man was outlined by the
bright moonlight reflecting from the
glazed field of snow. The enemy, wait-
ing with machine guns on the reverse
slopes, had all the best of it. The Ameri-
can tanks tried but could not maneuver
over the broken ground. The battalion
commander therefore sent two of his
companies to make a wide detour
through a deep gorge, their place in the
line being taken by the 1st Battalion.
But too much time was consumed by
this movement, and day broke on the
24th with the two battalions out in the
open and dangerously exposed to Ger-
man fire. The attack had to be aban-
doned; new plans were made for
bypassing the town and striking directly
at Bourscheid and the Sure River.
The 319th Infantry had continued its
battle by sending the 2d Battalion
against Heiderscheid, which lay on the
Ettelbruck-Bastogne route and from

518 THE ARDENNES: BATTLE OF THE BULGE
which a secondary road ran laterally
west to Martelange across the 26th
Division zone of advance. Just north of
Heiderscheid were several crossing points
on the Sure River, the chief natural
obstacle to be surmounted by the 80th
Division in its march northward. The
2d Battalion (Lt. Col. Paul Bandy)
reached Heiderscheid about 0230 on the
morning of the 23d, but when two rifle
companies neared the edge of the village
they were stopped by assault gun fire
and machine guns firing tracers to
point the targets for the gun crews. Infan-
trymen with submachine guns worked
close enough to fire bursts into the posi-
tions from which the orange line of
the tracers came but could not deal with
the German assault guns. Two American
tanks belonging to the 702d Tank Bat-
talion came forward only to be checked
by a mine field at a crossroad. A
German gun took a shot at the tanks but
in so doing gave away its own location,
and a quick return shot set the assault
gun afire. Guided by the light from the
blazing gun carriage the American rifle-
men rushed the gendarmerie, took it,
and there barricaded themselves. About
this time the explosion of a German
shell detonated the mine field, and the
tanks ground forward to the village. An
hour or so before noon the last of the
stubborn defenders had been routed
out and the 2d Battalion was north of
the village.
The fight was not finished, for at noon
two enemy companies converged in a
yelling assault on Heiderscheid. Some
of the 2d Battalion broke but the rest
stood firm, killed the German infantry
commander, and wrote quietus to this
threat. 6 Then affairs took a more serious
6 Colonel Bandy was awarded the DSC for
turn as eleven enemy tanks hove in sight,
decks and cupolas packed with snow for
camouflage. While a hurried call was
dispatched for armored aid, bazooka
teams crawled forward to try their luck.
Two of the enemy tanks fell prey to
the bazooka teams, led by 2d Lt.
Michael Hritsik, 7 whereupon the others
showed themselves loath to close in.
Friendly tank destroyers appeared in
time to account for four more German
tanks, and an American tank knocked
out a fifth.
By the time the 3d Battalion (Lt.
Col. Elliott B. Cheston) came hurry-
ing up the battle was ended. Cheston’s
battalion, having spent most of the morn-
ing rounding up a large enemy detach-
ment in Merzig, now turned northeast
from Heiderscheid and marched through
a deep defile to reach and take the
hamlet of Tadler on the Sure. The
Germans blew the nearby bridge, then
sat back on the far bank to pound the
battalion with rocket salvos. About dark
the regimental commander ordered a
company to move west along the river
and outpost Heiderscheidergrund; ad-
mittedly this was poaching in the
zone of the 26th Division, but the bridge
there was needed. The company found
the bridge intact and a stream of German
vehicles running back and forth. Organ-
izing an ambush, the company spent the
night picking off unwary travelers.
On the eastern flank the 1st Battalion
and its tank support spent most of the
23d negotiating the rough ground,
dense woods, and deep snow in an ad-
vance from Feulen toward Kehmen.
From a hill south of Kehmen the advance
courageous leadership in the fighting on this day.
7 Lieutenant Hritsik was awarded the DSC.

THE III CORPS’ COUNTERATTACK TOWARD BASTOGNE 519
guard counted twenty-four tanks rolling
toward the village from the east, ap-
parently on their way to retake Heider-
scheid. Word already had gone back for
more tanks, but those with infantry,
plus a few tank destroyers, got in the
first fire, immobilized two of the leaders,
and so surprised the rest that they turned
tail and hurried back to Bourscheid-
which the 905th Field Artillery Bat-
talion promptly took under fire. Dis-
cerning at least a tank platoon backing
the grenadiers inside Kehmen, the 1st
Battalion waited until after dark for
reinforcements-ten tanks formerly at-
tached to the 28th Infantry Division.
HEIDERSHEIDERGRUND BRIDGE
With their help, the battalion delivered
a sharp assault, destroying three
German tanks and freeing the village.
The night battles had shown clearly
that the 80th Infantry Division faced
hard going as the 24th dawned. The
advance had carried north to a point
where it impinged on the Seventh Army
communications leading to the Bastogne
battleground. The main fight for the
III Corps was that flaring farther west.
Henceforth McBride’s operation would
be subsidiary to the attack by the corps’
left and center, an operation designed
to interdict the movement of reinforce-
ments heading for Bastogne and to

520 THE ARDENNES: BATTLE OF THE BULGE
contain the enemy in the Ettelbruck and
Bourscheid sectors. Orders from General
Millikin, received at the 80th Division
command post early on the 24th, under-
lined the shift of gravity westward:
McBride was to send two battalions
of the 318th Infantry from Ettelbruck
to assist the 4th Armored Division, and
at once.
The 26th Infantry Division Attack
The 26th Division advance in the
center of the III Corps zone began under
circumstances similar to those in the
sector of the 80th Division. 8 Before dawn
on 22 December the 104th Infantry and
the 328th Infantry moved from their
assembly areas east of Arlon to the line
of departure at the Attert River. A very
large number of men in the rifle companies
had yet to see their first German,
many of them were replacements whose
only recent experience with a rifle consisted
of a day or two at the Metz training
ground. All had heard the current
rumors of atrocities perpetrated by the
German SS troops and paratroopers: all
were steeled, according to the capacity
of the individual, to meet a ruthless
enemy.
The general axis of advance was Arlon-
Wiltz; but there was no main road from
the Attert north to Wiltz–indeed the
advance would have to reach Eschdorf,
8 The combat interviews are fragmentary for the
26th Division and the historian must rely on the
regimental records. The 26th Division AAR is
fairly complete, but the account of the action is
very terse. The only publications of value are
S/Sgt. Jerome J. Theise, ed., History of the Three
Hundred Twenty-Eight Infantry Regiment, From
Reactivation, 12 February 1943, to VE Duy, 9 May
1945 (Wels: Verlagsdruckerei, 1945; and The
History of the 26th Yankee Division (Salem, 1955).
seven air miles away, before it could
follow a main thoroughfare. There were
numerous secondary roads and trails
going north, and the attack would fan
out over these. But this network became
increasingly difficult to traverse as it
descended into the ravines and through
the forests leading to the gorges of the
Sure River. The ground between the
Sure trench and the valley of the Wiltz
was equally rugged. Since little was
known of the enemy, the division plan
simply called for the troops to expand
over roads and trails, eliminating
German resistance wherever found.
While the 26th Reconnaissance Troop
rolled out as a screen several thousand
yards to the fore, the 104th Infantry
(Lt. Col. Ralph A. Palladino) on the
right and the 328th Infantry (Col. Ben
R. Jacobs) on the left marched through
dense woods and over slushy, muddy
trails, finally coming out onto open, roll-
ing fields near the village of Pratz, about
three miles by road from the Attert.
Unaware of the fact, the Americans were
nearing the advance guard of the 915th
Regiment, marching out from Ettel-
bruck. (It was this column of the 352d
Volks Grenadier Division whose tail the
80th Division pinched near Merzig.)
The 104th Infantry continued north,
assailed only by scattered small arms
fire and machine gun bursts fired at
long range. A mile farther on a small
detachment of enemy tanks and infantry
essayed an attack but were repelled by
mortar fire.
The first real test of strength came
when the leading company was a couple
of miles southeast of Grosbous, from
which town a road led north to Eschdorf.
Here the advance battalion of the
915th Regiment struck so suddenly and

THE III CORPS' COUNTERATTACK TOWARD BASTOGNE 521
with such force that the lead company
fell back for at least half a mile. The
guns supporting the 104th Infantry were
in position, however, and finally bent
back the counterattack. In the mean-
time a handful of riflemen from the
109th Infantry, 28th Division, who had
been waging a long battle in Grosbous
until driven out by four German tanks,
made their way back to the 104th. As
it turned out the body of the 352d Volks
Grenadier Division was not present
here but was in the 80th Division zone.
The 915th Regiment consisting of troops
now split off from their trains, artillery,
and the bulk of the division by the
wedge which the 80th had thrust for-
ward west of Ettelbruck, withdrew to
make a stand in the neighborhood of
Grosbous. Colonel Palladino left Com-
pany E to hold in check some Germans
who had taken to the nearby woods,
while the rest of the 104th Infantry
continued tramping north along the road
to Grosbous. The village itself was taken
a couple of hours after midnight in a
surprise attack by a combat patrol from
Company G.
The series of blocks thrown against
the 352d Volks Grenadier Division by
the 80th Division and the 104th Infantry
gave the western wing of the 26th Divi-
sion a clear field. By the middle of the
afternoon the 328th had covered nearly
six miles without firing or receiving a
shot. The advance guard was nearing
the village of Arsdorf, from which a
series of small roads and trails radiated
through ravines and along ridges to the
Sure, when a few rounds came in from
self-propelled guns firing from a hill to
the north. Concurrently reports arrived
from the 26th Reconnaissance Troop
that there was a strong German force in
Rambrouch on the left flank? Night
was near and the true strength of the
enemy unknown; so the regiment halted
while scouts worked their way to the
front and flanks.
Who were these German troops? Since
it was known that the 352d Volks Grena-
dier Division could not have reached
this point the first guess was that the
5th Parachute Division, believed to be
farther north, had pushed down into
the area. Actually the 328th Infantry
had run into the Fuehrer Grenadier
Brigade, which the Seventh Army had
borrowed from the OKW reserve, rush-
ing it across the front to bolster this
south flank. At first the brigade had
been sent in to hold the Sure River line,
but the Seventh Army then decided to
expand its blocking position well to the
south of the river, and so turned the
brigade through Bourscheid and Esch-
dorf to the neighborhood of Arsdorf.
This unit contained a battalion of forty
Mark IV and Panther tanks, one bat-
talion of mobile infantry, and one of
foot, but thus far only a few tanks and
the rifle battalion in personnel carriers
were on the scene.
The new turn of events caused
General Paul some concern about his
left flank. The 4th Armored attack had
carried abreast of the line held by the
328th Infantry but there remained a
gap of three miles, densely wooded, be-
tween the two. As a temporary expedient
a small task force, organized around
Company K, 101st Infantry, and Com-
pany A, 735th Tank Battalion, deployed
to screen the open left flank of the 26th
9 The American 'cavalry was greatly outnum-
bered at Rambrouch and forced to withdraw.
Sgt. Lawrence L. Hatfield, whose platoon covered
the withdrawal, was given the DSC.

522 THE ARDENNES: BATTLE OF THE BULGE
Division. Meanwhile Paul’s two regi-
ments prepared to continue the attack
through the night as the army and corps
commanders had ordered. The objective
was Wiltz, once the command post of
the American 28th Infantry Division,
and now the headquarters of the German
Seventh Army and the concentration
point for enemy troops feeding in from
the northeast.
While the 104th moved forward to
hit the enemy congregated at Grosbous,
the 328th Infantry reorganized to keep
the drive going, under somewhat opti-
mistic orders to seize crossings on the
Wiltz River. At midnight the 1st and
3d Battalions jumped off to take Grevils-
Brésil, from which a fairly good ridge
road ran north to Eschdorf. The village
was garrisoned by two companies of the
Fuehrer Grenadier Brigade, reinforced
by several Panthers from the Seventh
Army reserve. Unshaken by a half-hour
shelling, the Germans held tenaciously
to the village all night long.
When daylight came on 23 December
the 26th Division had little to show for
its night attack. The 104th Infantry held
Grosbous, but the 328th was checked
at Grevils-Brésil by a company of stub-
born German infantry backed up with
a few tanks. In the woods south of
Grosbous the men of Company E, 104th
Infantry, had taken on more than they
had bargained for: a couple of hundred
riflemen from the 915th Regiment led
in person by the regimental commander.
(The American regimental command-
er had to throw in Company I, but even
so this pocket was not wiped out until
Christmas Eve.)
Although the right wing of the
26th Division was driving along the
boundary between the isolated forward
regiment of the 352d Volks Grenadier
Division and the incoming Fuehrer
Grenadier Brigade, only a small part
of the new brigade was in contact with
the forward American battalions early
on the 23d. The German brigade com-
mander had been seriously wounded by
a shell fragment while reconnoitering
on the previous evening, the hurried
march to action had prevented unified
commitment, and the heavy woods south
of the Sure made control very difficult.
Also there were troubles with fuel.
The LXXXV Corps hoped to repel
the American attack by means of a co-
ordinated counterattack south of the
Sure which would develop as a pincers
movement, grappling the American
troops who had penetrated into the dense
forest north of the Ettelbruck-Grosbous
road. For this maneuver, set to open
on the 23d, the new 79th Volks Grena-
dier Division was to attack toward
Niederfeulen, secure the Wark River,
and hook to the northwest. On its right
the Fuehrer Grenadier Brigade would
attack in a southeastern direction from
Heiderscheid and Eschdorf with Gros-
bous and union with the 915th Regi-
ment as the immediate objective. This
German scheme was slow to come into
operation and only a part of the Fuehrer
Grenadier Brigade was brought against
the 26th Division during the 23d, and
then mostly in small packets of infantry
supported by a platoon or less of tanks.
The two attacking regiments of the
26th Division continued to fan out over
secondary roads and trails, moving very
cautiausly for fear of ambush as the
woods thickened and pressed closer to
the roadways. Here the supporting
weapons came into play. Detachments of
the 390th Antiaircraft Artillery Auto-

THE III CORPS' COUNTERATTACK TOWARD BASTOGNE 523
matic Weapons Battalion, moving close
behind the infantry point, blasted at
wood lines, hedges, haystacks, and farm
buildings. Their .50-caliber machine
guns and the 37-mm. cannon mounted
on half-tracks pinned the German infan-
try down until supporting artillery
could be brought to bear, then shifted
to a new position before the German
gunners could get on target.
The American cannoneers wheeled
their pieces from position to position so
as to give the closest support possible.
At one point the commanding officer
of the 102d Field Artillery Battalion,
Lt. Col. R. W. Kinney, went forward
alone under direct enemy fire to pick
out the targets for his guns. (Kinney
was awarded the DSC.) When an enemy
pocket was discovered in some corner
of the woods the self-propelled tank
destroyers went into action, spraying
the enemy with high explosive. Thus
a platoon of the 818th Tank Destroyer
Battalion ultimately blasted the lost bat-
talion of the 913th Regiment out of the
woods near Grosbous.
It was no more than natural that the
26th Division, full of green troops,
wanted the comforting presence of
friendly tanks or guns. The 735th Tank
Battalion after action report says that the
104th Infantry would not enter Dellen
ahead of the tanks. The 328th Infantry
also was slow in moving without tanks
ahead. Since through all this day the
Americans had little or no idea of the
enemy strength that lay ahead or per-
haps lurked on the flanks, the lack of
swashbuckling haste was not abnormal.
The corps commander shared the feel-
ing that caution was due. At dark he
ordered General Paul to keep pushing
with small patrols but enjoined him to
keep the mass of the two regiments
(the third was corps reserve) from get-
ting too far forward. Patrols, Millikin
advised, should try to get to the Sure
River bridges before daylight of the
24th. As things now stood, the 80th Divi-
sion had pushed a salient ahead on the
right of the 26th Division in the Keh-
men sector and was waiting for the cen-
ter division to come abreast. On the left
there remained a fair-sized gap be-
tween the 4th Armored Division and
the 26th, only partially screened by very
small detachments at roadblock posi-
tions. Thus far the enemy had failed to
recognize or exploit this gap.
The 4th Armored Division Attack
On 21 December the 4th Armored
Division, then assembled in the Leglise-
Arlon area, learned what its mission
would be when the III Corps attacked
on the 22d: advance north and relieve
Bastogne. 10 Martelange, an outpost of
the VIII Corps engineer barrier line
on the Sure River, was twelve miles on
a hard-surfaced highway from the
center of Bastogne. A Sherman tank
could make it from Martelange to
Bastogne in a half hour–if the road was
10 With the exception of those conducted with
the 101st Airborne Division, the combat inter-
views with the 4th Armored Division are the most
informative of all those bearing on the battle
at Bastogne. The 4th Armored AAR and G–3
journal provide little exact or detailed information.
The combat command AARs and journals remedy
this lack. Each battalion has either an AAR or
unit journal. See also K. A. Koyen, The Fourth
Armored Division (Munich, 1945); Lt. Col. D. M.
Oden, 4th Armored Division-Relief of the 101st
Airborne Division, Bastogne, Pamphlet Series,
Command and General Staff College, 1947; History
of the Ninety-Fourth Armored Field Artillery
Battalion (n.d., n.p.); and The Armored School
MS, Armor at Bastogne (May 1949).

524 THE ARDENNES: BATTLE OF THE BULGE
passable and if the enemy confined his
opposition to loosing rifle and machine
gun bursts. The task at hand, however,
was to “destroy the enemy in zone” and
cover the open west flank of the corps.
Of the three divisions aligned to jump
off in the III Corps counterattack, the
4th Armored would come under the
closest scrutiny by the Third Army com-
mander. Its mission was dramatic. It
was also definite, geographically speak-
ing, and so lent itself the more readily
to assessment on the map in terms of
success or failure. Furthermore, the rep-
utation of the 4th Armored as a slash-
ing, wheeling outfit would naturally
attract attention, even though its maté-
riel was not up to par, either in amount
or mechanical fitness, and many green
troops were riding in its tanks and infan-
try half-tracks. To all this must be added
a less tangible item in evaluating readi-
ness for battle. General Gaffey, the
division commander, was a relative new-
comer to this veteran and closely knit
fighting team; he had as yet to lead the
entire division in combat. CCA likewise
had a commander who was a stranger
to the division, Brig. Gen. Herbert L.
Earnest. It might be expected, therefore,
that the 4th Armored would take some
little time in growing accustomed to the
new leaders and their ways of conduct-
ing battle.
Theoretically the VIII Corps covered
the western flank of the III Corps, but
on 22 December the situation in Middle-
ton’s area was so fluid and his forces
were so weak that no definite boundary
or contact existed between the VIII and
III Corps. The actual zone of operations
for the 4th Armored Division, therefore,
proved to be an area delimited by Bigon-
ville on the east and Neufchâteau on
the west, a front of over fifteen miles.
The mission assigned the 4th Armored,
rather than zones and boundaries, deter-
mined the commitment of the division
and the routes it would employ.
Bastogne could be reached from the
south by two main approaches, on the
right the Arlon-Bastogne road, on
the left the Neufchâteau-Bastogne road.
General Millikin and the III Corps staff
preferred the Arlon route, at whose en-
trance the 4th Armored already was
poised. General Middleton, whose VIII
Corps nominally controlled the troops
in Bastogne, favored a broad thrust to
employ both routes but with the weight
placed on the Neufchâteau road. The
Arlon-Bastogne road was the shortest by
a few miles and on the most direct line
from the III Corps assembly area. To
control the Arlon approach would block
the reinforcement of the enemy troops
already south of Bastogne. Attack on
this axis also would allow the left and
center divisions of the III Corps to main-
tain a somewhat closer contact with
each other. The Neufchâteau-Bastogne
route, on the other hand, was less tightly
controlled by the enemy, although there
was some evidence that German strength
was building up in that direction.
The problem facing the III Corps
was not the simple one of gaining access
to Bastogne or of restoring physical con-
tact with the forces therein, contact
which had existed as late as 20 Decem-
ber. The problem was: (a) to restore
and maintain a permanent corridor into
the city; and (b) to jar the surrounding
enemy loose so that Bastogne and its
road net could be used by the Third
Army as a base for further operations
to the north and northeast. The problem
was well understood by the 4th

THE III CORPS’ COUNTERATTACK TOWARD BASTOGNE 525
Armored Division. General Gaffey’s
letter of instructions to General Dager,
commanding CCB, said, “ . . . you will
drive in, relieve the force, and proceed
[italics supplied] from Bastogne to the
NE. . . .” The impression held by 4th
Armored commanders and staff was that
an independent tank column could cut
its way through to the city (“at any
time,” said Dager), but that the open-
ing of a corridor equivalent to the width
of the road bed would be self-sealing
once the thin-skinned or light armored
columns started north to resupply and
reinforce the heavy armor which reached
Bastogne. The mission set the 4th
Armored would require the co-ordinated
efforts of the entire division, nor could
it be fulfilled by a dramatic ride to the
rescue of the Bastogne garrison,
although this may have been what Gen-
eral Patton had in mind.
The Third Army commander, veteran
tanker, himself prescribed the tactics to
be used by Gaffey and the 4th Armored.
The attack should lead off with the
tanks, artillery, tank destroyers, and
armored engineers in the van. The main
body of armored infantry should be
kept back. When stiff resistance was
encountered, envelopment tactics should
be used: no close-in envelopment
should be attempted; all envelopments
should be started a mile or a mile and
a half mile back and be made at right
angles. Patton, whose experience against
the Panther tank during the Lorraine
campaign had made him keenly aware
of its superiority over the American
Sherman in gun and armor, ordered
that the new, modified Sherman with
heavier armor (the so-called Jumbo)
should be put in the lead when available.
But there were very few of the Jumbos
in the Third Army.
At 0600 on 22 December (H-hour for
the III Corps counterattack) two combat
commands stood ready behind a line of
departure which stretched from Habay-
la-Neuve east to Niedercolpach. General
Gaffey planned to send CCA and CCB
into the attack abreast, CCA working
along the main Arlon-Bastogne road
while CCB advanced on secondary roads
to the west. In effect the two commands
would be traversing parallel ridge lines.
Although the full extent of damage done
the roads and bridges during the VIII
Corps withdrawal was not yet clear, it
was known that the Sure bridges at
Martelange had been blown. In the
event that CCA was delayed unduly at
the Sure crossing CCB might be switched
east and take the lead on the main
road. In any case CCB was scheduled
to lead the 4th Armored Division into
Bastogne.
On the right CCA (General Earnest)
moved out behind A Troop of the 25th
Cavalry Squadron in two task forces of
battalion size. Visibility was poor, the
ground was snow-covered, but the
tracked vehicles were able to move with-
out difficulty over the frozen terrain-
without difficulty, that is, until the east-
ern task force commenced to encounter
demolitions executed earlier by the VIII
Corps engineers. The upshot was that
both task forces converged on the main
Arlon road and proceeded as a single
column. Near Martelange a large crater
delayed the column for some time. Short-
ly after noon it was bridged and the
advance guard became embroiled in a
fire fight with a rifle company of the
15th Regiment (5th Parachute Divi-
sion) guarding the bridges, now de-
molished, at Martelange. The town,

526 THE ARDENNES: BATTLE OF THE BULGE
sprawling on a series of terraces rising
from the river, was too large for effective
artillery fire and the enemy riflemen
held on until about 0300 the next morn-
ing when, unaccountably, they allowed a
company of armored infantry to cross
on one of the broken spans. Most of
the 23d was spent in bridging the Sure.
The width and depth of the cut through
which the stream flowed forbade the
use of either ponton or treadway. Corps
engineers came up to fabricate a 90-foot
Bailey bridge, but it was afternoon be-
fore the tanks could start moving. De-
lays, however, had not dimmed the
general impression that CCA could cut
its way through to Bastogne in short
order, and at 1500 the III Corps sent
word to Middleton that contact with
the 101st was expected “by tonight.”
On the lesser roads to the west,
General Dager’s CCB, which had started
out at 0430, also was delayed by demoli-
tions. Nonetheless at noon of the 22d
the 8th Tank Battalion was in sight of
Burnon, only seven miles from Bastogne,
nor was there evidence that the enemy
could make a stand. Here orders came
from General Patton: the advance was
to be continued through the night “to
relieve Bastogne.” 11 Then ensued the
usual delay: still another bridge de-
stroyed during the withdrawal had to be
replaced, and it was past midnight when
light tanks and infantry cleared a small
German rear guard from Burnon itself.
Wary of German bazookas in this
wooded country, tanks and cavalry jeeps
moved cautiously over the frozen ground
toward Chaumont, the next sizable vil-
11 Patton, in his book, War As I Knew It (page
201), admits that his order for day and night
attack by the armor was an error.
lage. Thus far the column had been sub-
ject only to small arms fire, although
a couple of jeeps had been lost to Ger-
man bazookas. But when the cavalry and
light tanks neared Chaumont antitank
guns knocked out one of the tanks and
the advance guard withdrew to the main
body, deployed on a ridge south of the
village. Daylight was near. CCB had
covered only about a quarter of a mile
during the night, but because Chaumont
appeared to be guarded by German guns
on the flanking hills a formal, time-
consuming, co-ordinated attack seemed
necessary.
During the morning the 10th Armored
Infantry Battalion and the twenty-two
Shermans of the 8th Tank Battalion that
were in fighting condition organized for
a sweep around Chaumont to west and
north, coupled with a direct punch to
drive the enemy out of the village. To
keep the enemy occupied, an armored
field artillery battalion shelled the
houses. Then, as the morning fog cleared
away, fighter-bombers from the XIX
Tactical Air Command (a trusted friend
of the 4th Armored Division) detoured
from their main mission of covering the
cargo planes flying supplies to Bastogne
and hammered Chaumont, pausing
briefly for a dogfight with Luftwaffe
intruders as tankers and infantry be-
low formed a spellbound audience.
While CCB paused south of Chau-
mont and CCA waited for the Marte-
lange bridge to be finished, the Third
Army commander fretted at the delay.
He telephoned the III Corps headquar-
ters: “There is too much piddling
around. Bypass these towns and clear
them up later. Tanks can operate on this
ground now.” It was clear to all that
General Patton’s eye was on the 4th

THE III CORPS’ COUNTERATTACK TOWARD BASTOGNE 527
WATCHING A DOGFIGHT BETWEEN AMERICAN AND LUFTWAFFE PLANES
Armored Division and his erstwhile
chief of staff, General Gaffey, and that
he counted on the 4th Armored to cut
its way into Bastogne.
At Chaumont the ground assault came
about 1330 on the heels of a particularly
telling strike by friendly fighter-bombers.
German artillery had begun to come
alive an hour or so earlier, but with
the Jubos in the sky the enemy gunners
were quiet. Two rifle platoons mounted
on tanks made a dash into the village,
where more of the armored infantry
soon arrived on foot. Even so, the lunge
to envelop Chaumont on the west failed
of its intent for the fields were thawing
in the afternoon sun and the Shermans
were left churning in the mud. A com-
pany of the 14th Regiment, 5th Para-
chute Division, tried to fight it out in
the houses, but after a couple of hours
nearly all the enemy had been rounded
up. Then the scene changed with some
abruptness.
During the night a liaison officer carry-
ing the CCB attack orders had taken
the wrong turning and driven into the
German lines. Perhaps the enemy had
seized the orders before they could be
destroyed. Perhaps the cavalry foray in
the early morning had given advance
warning. In any case General Kokott,

528 THE ARDENNES: BATTLE OF THE BULGE
commanding the 26th Volks Grenadier
Division responsible for the Chaumont-
Martelange sector, had taken steps to
reply to the attack on Chaumont. This
village lies at the bottom of a bowl
whose sides are formed by hills and
connecting ridges. The rim to the north-
east is densely wooded but is tapped
by a trail leading on to the north. Along
this trail, screened by the woods, the
Germans brought up the 11th Assault
Gun Brigade, numbering ten to fifteen
remodeled Mark III carriages. bearing
75-mm. guns and with riflemen clinging
to their decks and sides. Rolling down
the slope behind an artillery smoke
screen, the German assault guns knocked
out those American tanks they could
sight and discharged their gray-clad
passengers into the village.
The American riflemen (Lt. Col.
Harold Cohen’s 10th Armored Infantry
Battalion) battled beside the crippled
and mired tanks in what Maj. Albin
Irzyk, the veteran commander of the
9th Tank Battalion, called the bitterest
fighting his battalion ever had encoun-
tered. The forward artillery observer
was dead and there was no quick means
of bringing fire on the enemy assault
guns, which simply stood off and blasted
a road for the German infantry. Com-
4TH ARMORED DIVISION ROLLING TOWARD CHAUMONT past the bodies of American
soldiers.

THE III CORPS’ COUNTERATTACK TOWARD BASTOGNE 529
pany A, 10th Armored Infantry Bat-
talion, which had led the original assault
against Chaumont, lost some sixty-five
men. The battle soon ended. 12 In small
groups the Americans fell back through
the dusk to their original positions, leav-
ing eleven Shermans as victims of the as-
sault guns and the mud. The only officer
of Company A left alive, 1st Lt. Charles
R. Gniot, stayed behind to cover the
withdrawal until he too was killed. Gniot
was awarded the DSC, posthumously.
At the hour when the CCB assault
first reached Chaumont, the eastern com-
bat command had started moving across
the Martelange bridge. Since it would
take a long while for the whole column
to close up and cross, General Earnest
ordered Lt. Col. Delk Oden, commander
of the 35th Tank Battalion, to forge
ahead with his task force in a bid to
reach Bastogne. The road ahead climbed
out of the valley and onto a chain of
ridges, these ridges closely flanked by
higher ground so that the pavement ran
through a series of cuts that limited
maneuver off the road. The cavalry point
had just gained the ridge line when, at a
sharp bend, the Germans opened fire.
Fortunately the tank company following
was able to leave the highway and find
cover behind the rise to the west of the
pavement. For half an hour artillery
worked over the enemy location, and
then the artillery observer with the tanks
“walked” the fire along the successive
ridges while the tanks moved north in
defilade. At the same time the half-tracks
12 The story of this fight at Chaumont is con-
fused. As many as twenty-two “tanks” were
reported by the Americans, and these are alleged
to have swept in from west, north, and east. See
combat interviews; CCB S–2 Jnl; and MS # B–023
(Heilmann) .
of Company G, 51st Armored Infantry
Battalion, clanked forward along the
pavement.
It was growing dark. Oden brought
his light tank company and assault guns
(used throughout the Bastogne relief
as medium tanks) abreast of the medium
tank company with orders to continue
the advance through the night. The head
of the task force now was close
to the village of Warnach, which lay to
the east of the main road. The light
tanks had just come in sight of the village
when the company of armored infantry
appeared around a bend in the main
road. The Germans in Warnach, ap-
parently waiting for such a thin-skinned
target, knocked out the first two half-
tracks. To bypass the village at night
was out of the question. While the as-
sault guns shelled the houses a light
tank platoon and a rifle platoon went in.
Only one of the tanks got out, although
most of the foot troops finally straggled
back. Shortly after midnight a company
of Shermans tried to get into Warnach
but were stopped by antitank fire. Mean-
while tanks and infantry of the task
force pushed on to the north, clearing
the woods on either side of the main
highway (the leading tank company
ended up in a marsh).
It was daylight when tanks and infan-
try resumed the assault at Warnach,
driving in from three sides with the
riflemen clinging to the tanks. The bat-
tle which ensued was the most bitter
fought by CCA during the whole
Bastogne operation. Heilmann, com-
manding the 5th Parachute Division,
had reasoned that the sector he held
south of Bastogne was far too wide for
a connected linear defense, and so had
concentrated the 15th Parachute Regi-

530 THE ARDENNES: BATTLE OF THE BULGE
ment along the Martelange-Bastogne
road. Warnach was the regimental com-
mand post and there was at least one
rifle battalion in the village, reinforced
by a battery of self-propelled tank
destroyers. Two American artillery bat-
talions kept this enemy force down, firing
with speed and accuracy as the Shermans
swept in, but once the artillery lifted,
a house-to-house battle royal commenced
in earnest. Four Shermans were de-
stroyed by tank destroyer fire at close
range. The enemy infantry fought des-
perately, filtering back into houses
which had been cleared, organizing
short, savage rushes to retake lost build-
ings, and showing little taste for sur-
render. But try as they might the Ger-
man paratroopers could not get past the
American armored infantry and at the
tanks-only one was knocked out by Ger-
man bazooka fire. The result was slow
to be seen but none the less certain. At
noon, when the battle ended, the Amer-
icans had killed one hundred and thirty-
five Germans and taken an equal num-
ber of prisoners. The little village cost
them sixty-eight officers and men, dead
and wounded.
Chaumont, on the 23d, and Warnach,
on the 24th, are tabbed in the journals
of the 4th Armored as “hot spots” on
the march to Bastogne. Quite unexpect-
edly, however, a third developed at
Bigonville, a village some two and a
half miles east of the Bastogne highway
close to the boundary between the 4th
Armored and the 26th Infantry Division.
The gap between these divisions, only
partially screened by light forces, sud-
denly became a matter of more than
normal concern on the Eight of 22 De-
cember with reports that a large body of
German armor was moving in (actually
the advance guard of the Fuehrer
Grenadier Brigade which had appeared
in front of the left wing of the 26th
Division). To protect CCA’s open right
flank, Gaffey ordered Col. Wendell
Blanchard to form the Reserve Combat
Command as a balanced task force (using
the 53d Armored Infantry Battalion and
37th Tank Battalion) and advance to-
ward Bigonville. Early on 23 December
CCR left Quatre-Vents, followed the
main road nearly to Martelange, then
turned right onto a secondary road which
angled northeast. This road was “sheer
ice” and much time was consumed
moving the column forward.
About noon the advance guard came
under fire from a small plot of woods
near a crossroads at which point CCR
would have to turn due north. The
accompanying artillery battalion went
into action, pouring high explosive into
the woods for nearly an hour. One rifle
company then dismounted and went in
to clean out the survivors. The company
found no serious resistance, returned to
the road, and was just mounting its half-
tracks when a fusillade of bullets burst
from the little wood. Apparently the
enemy had withdrawn during the shell-
ing, only to return at the heels of the
departing Americans. Tanks were now
sent toward the crossroad but were
stopped by mines. All this had been
time-consuming. Bigonville was still a
mile away, and Blanchard ordered a
halt. The enemy in the woods continued
to inflict casualties on the troops halted
beside the road. Even the tankers were
not immune-nearly all of the tank com-
manders of one company were picked
off by rifle fire.
In the course of the night the Germans
left the wood and fell back to the shelter

THE III CORPS’ COUNTERATTACK TOWARD BASTOGNE 531
of the stone houses in Bigonville. The
assault on the morning of the 24th fol-
lowed what had become standard tactics
with the 4th Armored. First came a short
concentration fired by the artillery.
There followed an advance into the vil-
lage by two teams, each composed of one
tank and one infantry company working
closely together. As at Chaumont and
Warnach there was little trouble from
the enemy artillery, for by this time the
5th Parachute Division was rationed to
only seven rounds per howitzer a day.
Mostly the German infantry held their
fire until the Americans were in the
streets, then cut loose with their bazoo-
kas, light mortars, and small arms. While
the two assault companies of the 53d
advanced from house to house the tanks
of the 37th blasted the buildings ahead,
machine-gunned the Germans when they
broke into the open, and set barns and
out-buildings afire with tracer bullets.
One team burst through to the northern
exit road and the garrison was trapped.
By 1100 the village was clear. Most of
the 328 prisoners taken here were from
the 13th Parachute Regiment, which had
just been released from its flank guard
positions farther to the east on Heil-
mann’s insistence that the 5th Parachute
Division could not possibly block the
American drive north with only two of
its regiments in hand.
The pitched battles at Bigonville and
Warnach on 24 December made a con-
siderable dent in the front line fighting
strength of the 5th Parachute Division
but failed to bring CCR and CCA
appreciably closer to Bastogne. CCB, the
most advanced of the combat commands,
had only two platoons of medium tanks
left after the affair at Chaumont and
had spent the day quietly waiting for
replacement tanks from the repair
echelons and for the rest of the division
to draw abreast. Meanwhile the Ameri-
can paratroopers and their heterogene-
ous comrades inside the Bastogne perim-
eter fought and waited, confining their
radio messages to oblique hints that the
4th Armored should get a move on.
Thus, at the close of the 23d McAuliffe
sent the message: “Sorry I did not get
to shake hands today. I was disap-
pointed.” A less formal exhortation from
one of his staff reached the 4th Armored
command post at midnight: “There is
only one more shopping day before
Christmas!”
Perhaps a few of the armored officers
still believed that a hell-for-leather tank
attack could cleave a way to Bastogne.
But by the evening of 24 December it
seemed to both Gaffey and Millikin that
tanks were bound to meet tough going
in frontal attack on the hard-surfaced
roads to which they were confined and
that the operation would demand more
use of the foot-slogger, particularly since
the German infantry showed a marked
proclivity for stealing back into the vil-
lages nominally “taken” by the tankers.
Attack around the clock, enjoined by
General Patton, had not been notably
successful so far as the tank arm was
concerned. From commander down, the
4th Armored was opposed to further
use of the weakened tank battalions in
hours of darkness. Further, night attacks
by the two infantry divisions had failed
to achieve any unusual gains and the
troops were tiring.
The corps commander therefore
ordered that his divisions hold during
the night of the 24th in preparation for
attack early on Christmas day. Two bat-
talions of the 318th Infantry were join-

532
ing the 4th Armored to give the needed
infantry strength in the corps’ main
effort. Reinforcement by the fighter-
bombers had been requested (Gaffey
asked the corps for high-priority flights
over the 4th Armored as a Christmas
present), and good flying weather
seemed likely. On the debit side there
were indications that reinforcements
were arriving to bolster the German line
facing the III Corps.
Thus far the Third Army counter-
attack had tended to be a slugging
match with frontal assault and little
maneuver. General Patton’s insistence
on bypassing centers of resistance had
been negated by the terrain, the weather,
and the wide-reaching impact of the
earlier VIII Corps demolitions scheme.
Perhaps the pace could be speeded up
by maneuver, now that the enemy had
been drawn into the defense of the
Arlon-Bastogne approach. At Gaffey’s
request the III Corps commander
shifted the boundary between the 4th
Armored and the 26th Division, making
the infantry division responsible for the
Bigonville sector and releasing CCR,
on the night of the 24th, for employ-
ment on the open west flank of the
corps with entry into Bastogne as its
primary mission.
The 80th Division Battle in the Woods
24–26 December
On the morning of 24 December the
80th Division lost the two battalions
pre-empted by the corps commander as
infantry reinforcement for the 4th
Armored Division. This diminution in
its rifle strength and successive collisions
with German units crossing the front
en route to the Bastogne sector in the
THE ARDENNES: BATTLE OF THE BULGE
west constituted the closest link the 80th
Division would have with the dramatic
effort being made to reach the en-
circled 101st Airborne. From this time
forward the 80th Division attack would
be related to the fighting farther west
only in that it was blocking the efforts
of the Seventh Army to move its reserves
into the Bastogne area.
For the next three days the division
would wage a lone battle to reach and
cross the Sure River, the scene of action
being limited to the wedge formed on
the north by the Sure and on the east
by the Sauer River with a base rep-
resented by the Ettelbruck–Heider-
scheidergrund road. This area the 80th
came to know as the Bourscheid triangle.
Within this frame lay thick forests,
deep ravines, and masked ridges, the
whole a checkerboard of little terrain
compartments. Control of a force larger
than the battalion would be most diffi-
cult, artillery support-except at clear-
ings and villages-would be ineffective,
and the maintenance of an interlocking,
impervious front nigh impossible. Once
a battalion cleared a compartment and
advanced to the next the enemy could
be counted on to seep back to his original
position. Unobserved fire and loss of
direction in the deep woods, down the
blind draws, and along the twisting
ridges made each American unit a poten-
tial threat to its neighbors, often forcing
the use of a single battalion at a time.
The infantryman would be duly thank-
ful when tanks, tank destroyers, or
artillery could give a hand or at least
encourage by their presence, but the
battle in woods and ravines was his own.
On the 23d the enemy forces facing
the 80th Division were so weak and so
disorganized that the Seventh Army

THE III CORPS’ COUNTERATTACK TOWARD BASTOGNE
commander, Brandenberger, had feared
that the 80th Division would drive
across the Sure during the course of the
night and sever the main line of com-
munications leading to the west. By the
morning of the 24th, however, rein-
forcements had arrived and the threat
of a clean, quick American penetration
was on the wane. The LXXXV Corps
(Kniess) thus far had faced the Ameri-
can III Corps with only two divisions,
the 5th Parachute and the 352d. De-
spite the Seventh Army apprehension
that two divisions would not possibly
hold the long blocking line from Ettel-
bruck to Vaux-lez-Rosihres and despite
daily requests that OKW release addi-
tional divisions to the army to strengthen
this line, the German High Command
was slow to dip into its strategic reserve.
The two larger units earmarked
for employment by the Seventh Army
were the Fuehrer Grenadier Brigade
and the 79th Volks Grenadier Division.
Both were a considerable distance to the
rear and both were equipped with the
conglomeration of makeshift, battle-
weary vehicles that was the lot of those
divisions not scheduled to join in the
original breakthrough and penetration.
Even when they were released from the
OKW Reserve, it would be a matter
of days-not hours-before the mass of
either unit could be placed in the front
lines. When OKW finally responded to
the pleas of the Seventh Army, the most
optimistic estimates placed the Fuehrer
Grenadier Brigade and the 79th Volks
Grenadier Division in the LXXXV
Corps area on the morning of 23 Decem-
ber.
Neither of these two formations was
rated as having a high combat value.
Theoretically the Fuehrer Grenadier
533
Brigade, a younger brother of the elite
Grossdeutschland Panzer Division and
like it charged with guarding Hitler’s
headquarters (albeit as the outer guard),
should have been one of the first of the
Wehrmacht formations. In fact this bri-
gade was of very recent vintage, had
suffered intense losses in East Prussia
during its single commitment as a unit,
and was not fully refitted when finally
sent marching to the west. Replacements,
drawn from the same pool as those for
the Grossdeutschland and the Fuehrer
Begleit Brigade, were handpicked
from the younger classes but had little
training. The Fuehrer Grenadier Bri-
gade numbered some six thousand men,
had a rifle regiment mounted on ar-
mored half-tracks and 1½-ton trucks, a
reconnaissance battalion, an assault gun
battalion, and a mixed tank battalion
made up of Mark IV’s and Panthers.
The 79th Volks Grenadier Division pos-
sessed an old Wehrmacht number but,
as it stood at the time of its commit-
ment in the Ardennes, was a green divi-
sion the bulk of whose riflemen had
been combed out of headquarters troops
in early December. Woefully under-
strength in both transportation and sup-
porting weapons, it had neither a flak
battalion nor an assault gun battalion
and would be forced to lean heavily on
its artillery regiment.
The Fuehrer Grenadier Brigade, the
first to start for the battle front, was
ordered to take the road from Ettelbruck
to Martelange and there deploy in sup-
port of the 5th Parachute Division. 13 Its
13 The history of the Fuehrer Grenadier Brigade
is included in Die . Geschichte Des Panzerkorps
Grossdeutschland, II, pp. 735ff. For other German
units facing the XII Corps see MSS # B–023
(Heilmann) ; B–067 (Schmidt); B–030 (Kniess) ;

534 THE ARDENNES: BATTLE OF THE BULGE
mission, assigned before the Third
Army began its counterattack, was
changed on the evening of 21 December,
and so was its route, now menaced by
the 80th Division advance on Ettelbruck.
Trying to cross the Our River at the
Roth bridges, the brigade ran into
trouble. The bridges had been damaged
by attack from the air, and traffic was
backed up for miles on both sides of
the river. Untrained drivers and mechan-
ical failures further delayed the brigade
as its columns entered the icy, narrow,
twisting roads of the Ardennes, but by
23 December the reconnaissance bat-
talion, a rifle battalion in armored
carriers, and two tank companies had
reached Eschdorf and Heiderscheid.
Gravely concerned by the rate of the
American advance, the Seventh Army
commander sidetracked these troops
short of the Bastogne sector to restore
the gap which was opening between the
5th Parachute Division and the 352d
Volks Grenadier Division, and, as al-
ready noted, the main body went in on
on the 23d to stop the 80th Division at
Heiderscheid. A part of the battalion of
armored infantry marched south from
Eschdorf and succeeded in getting cut
off by the 26th Division night attack at
Grevels-Bresil.
The heavy losses suffered by the green
brigade in its first hours of battle had
a marked adverse impact on the morale
of the entire command. Many times, in
subsequent days of battle, higher com-
manders would comment on the damage
done the brigade by piecemeal commit-
ment and defeat in its baptism of fire.
The loss of the brigade commander,
and the German Seventh Army B.T.O., Taetig-
keitsbericht, 2. Halbjahr, 1944.
Col. Hans-Joachim Kahler, further de-
moralized the Fuehrer Grenadier. For
successive days the command changed
hands as new elements of the brigade
arrived under more senior officers; this
lack of leadership hardly was calculated
to restore the shaken confidence of
young, inexperienced troops. Yet despite
these early reverses in the counterattack
role the young soldiers of the brigade
would prove tough and tenacious on the
defensive.
On the morning of the 24th the
Fuehrer Grenadier Brigade, still with-
out artillery and with half of its tanks
and infantry still east of the Our River,
stood opposite the inner wings of the
American 26th and 80th Divisions. The
force of perhaps two rifle companies
which had been cut off by the 26th
Division south of Eschdorf was known
to be fighting its way out to the east.
The LXXXV Corps commander there-
fore decided to use his incoming rein-
forcements-infantry of the 79th Volks
Grenadier Division–in a counterattack
to regain contact with the lost companies
somewhere around Eschdorf. This
would be followed by a pivot to the
east, intended to strike the Americans
in the flank at Heiderscheid. For this
maneuver Col. Alois Weber, command-
ing the 79th, had available one regiment,
the 208th, and a single battalion of the
212th. His division, like the Fuehrer
Grenadier Brigade, had encountered the
traffic jam at the Our River and while
crossing on the Gentingen bridge had
been further delayed by American
fighter-bombers. The assault gun bat-
talion and tanks from the Fuehrer
Grenadier were at Weber's disposal,
but his artillery regiment was missing,
entangled someplace on the road east

THE III CORPS’ COUNTERATTACK TOWARD BASTOGNE 535
of the Our. By chance the 79th found
an artillery battalion, belonging to the
5th Parachute Division, which had been
left behind when its prime movers broke
down, and these guns were impressed to
support the counterattack toward Hei-
derscheid.
There remained to the LXXXV Corps
the 352d Volks Grenadier Division, by
this time reduced to two battered regi-
ments huddled north and east of Ettel-
bruck. These regiments were needed
where they stood for not only did they
guard the Ettelbruck bridgehead, cover-
ing the flank of the Sauer crossings in
the LXXXV Corps sector, but they also
represented the only cohesive defense
on the north bank of the river in the
event that the American XII Corps de-
cided to turn in that direction. The
bulk of the 915th Regiment of the 352d,
cut off by the American advance on
23 December, could no longer be reck-
oned with. (The major portion of these
troops finally escaped through the thick
woods, but would not reach the lines
of the 352d until 25 December and then
minus most of their equipment.) The
fight to bring the American 80th Divi-
sion to a halt south of the Sure, or at
the river itself, would have to be waged
by the half-strength 79th Volks Grena-
dier Division. The battleground, be it
said, favored the defender so long as he
retained sufficient strength to seal off
all penetrations. Whether he could do so
remained to be seen.
General McBride continued the attack
on 24 December with the 317th and
3 19th, whose forward battalions had
been engaged with the enemy all through
the previous night. After the loss of the
two battalions from the 3 18th to the 4th
Armored Division, the 219th had simply
bypassed Ettelbruck, and the 3d Bat-
talion of the 318th was left to harass
the enemy therein with artillery and
mortar fire. The immediate division
mission remained the same: to root
out the enemy south of the Sure River
and close in the north along the Sauer.
The 319th, on the left, was in posses-
sion of the road net at Heiderscheid and
had only a mile to cover before the regi-
ment was on the Sure. Indeed, two com-
panies had spent the night within sight
of the river at Heiderscheid although
this was in the zone of the 26th Division.
The 317th had farther to go because the
Sure looped away to the north in its
sector. Furthermore the regiment was
advancing with its right flank exposed
to any riposte coming from east of the
Sauer River. Advance northward would
have to be made under the eyes of
German observers atop two dominating
hill masses, one close to the Sure at
Ringel, the other rising on the west
bank of the Sauer near the bridgehead
village of Bourscheid, the initial as-
sembly area of the 79th Volks Grena-
dier Division. Fortunately for the Ameri-
cans the 79th lacked the artillery to make
full use of such commanding ground,
but the German gunners proved to be
very accurate.
For the past twenty-four hours the
317th Infantry had been attacking to
reach Bourscheid and the high ground
there. Although the 2d Battalion lunged
ahead as far as Welscheid during the
night, it failed to take the village and
spent all the daylight hours of the 24th
waiting for two companies to extricate
themselves from the ridge on whose slope
they lay pinned by German fire. (The
regimental commander would later re-
mark on the excellent musketry training

536 THE ARDENNES: BATTLE OF THE BULGE
and first-rate small arms practice of this
German unit.)
The 1st Battalion, meanwhile, tried
to hook around to the northeast and
gain entrance to Bourscheid along the
main road. This advance brought the
battalion onto open ground where
the enemy assault guns spotted farther
north could get to work. Then the bat-
talion came under flanking fire from the
Germans around Kehmen, in the zone
of the neighboring regiment. Mercilessly
pounded from front and flank the bat-
talion fell back for half a mile; its casual-
ties numbered 197, mostly wounded. At
this point each of the three battalions
had taken a crack at punching a way
through to Bourscheid. At the close of
the 24th the 3 17th Infantry could report
severe losses but no progress and the
German tanks and assault guns were
raking the Americans wherever they
concentrated, even laying with accuracy
on the battalion command posts.
While the 317th was being held in
check by well-directed gunfire, the 3 19th
attack collided with the enemy counter-
attack aimed at Eschdorf and Heider-
scheid. For this the 79th seems to have
assembled at least two battalions of
infantry, as well as tanks, assault guns,
and armored cars from the Fuehrer
Grenadier Brigade. The 3 19th occupied
a triangular position: at the apex the
3d Battalion held Tadler, overlooking
the Sure: to the right and rear the 1st
Battalion had bivouacked in Kehmen
on the Bourscheid road; the 2d Bat-
talion (less its two companies near the
Heiderscheidergrund crossing) was sta-
tioned as the left wing anchor at Heider-
scheid. Colonel Taylor, the regimental
commander, wished to bring his right
forward to the river. In the dark, on
the morning of the 24th, the 1st Bat-
talion (Lt. Col. Hiram D. Ives)
marched west out of Kehmen intending
to turn north at the next crossroad, two
miles away, and push for Ringel on
the river.
Daylight was breaking when the head
of the column came in sight of the cross-
road. About that time two things hap-
pened. A German detachment rushed
into Kehmen, which the 1st Battalion
had just left, while a German tank
suddenly opened fire from a masked
position near the crossroad and knocked
out two Sherman tanks with the advance
guard. The remaining American tanks
hastily reversed to the cover of a nearby
draw and the infantry deployed along
the road. About 0930 one of the attached
self-propelled tank destroyers sneaked
forward and gave the coup de grace to
the German tank. New orders, however,
left the battalion standing at the cross-
road, for the 2d Battalion at Heider-
scheid was hard hit by the main force of
the German counterattack and needed
protection on the east. Ultimately fire
from the 1st Battalion did contribute to
halting an enemy attempt at encircling
Heiderscheid.
Colonel Bandy had held his 2d Bat-
talion in Heiderscheid during the night
of 23 December while awaiting the re-
turn of the two companies that had been
sent down to the river. An hour or so
before daylight the first German shells
came in. After ten minutes of this prepa-
ration the enemy, on trucks, armored
half-tracks and armored cars, suddenly
appeared at the southwest corner of the
village. This was the main counterattack
of the day for the 79th Volks Grenadier
Division, launched as planned, from
Eschdorf. The single American tank in

THE III CORPS’ COUNTERATTACK TOWARD BASTOGNE 537
the way was surprised and put out of
action, but strangely enough the German
armored vehicles, mostly light flak tanks
with 20-mm. guns, did not risk a precip-
itate dash into the village, contenting
themselves with racing up and down the
road which passed on the south, firing
madly at the houses. The Americans, for
their part, clustered at the windows and
returned the fire with every weapon they
could lay hand on.
One tank destroyer was in position to
enfilade the road but by a curious chance
it had been in the path of a bomb
dropped by a stray German plane during
the night and the firing mechanism was
damaged. The tank destroyer com-
mander tracked his gun on the passing
targets, jumped up and down on the
firing treadle, swore volubly, and banged
the firing mechanism with a hammer but
to no avail. Twice the German grena-
diers got close enough to pitch grenades
through windows. Finally one American
tank worked its way around to get clear
aim and did destroy four of the enemy
armored vehicles. Eventually the enemy
foot troops made their way into the
streets. With this the forward observer
for the 315th Field Artillery Battalion
took over, calling for his 155-mm.
howitzers to shell the village. For half
an hour shells exploded, killing and
lacerating the unprotected enemy. When
the Germans retired they left 76 dead
and 26 badly wounded: their Red Cross
had removed many more during the
fight.
By midafternoon firing died down all
along the 319th front. The hastily organ-
ized 79th Volks Grenadier Division
counterattack had failed in its larger
purpose although it had led Colonel
Taylor to recall his advance battalion
from its position of vantage close to the
Sure. On the whole the 80th Division
had been through a hard day’s fight, and
McBride was more than willing to accept
the corps commander’s orders to hold up
the attack until the following morning.
Across the lines the Seventh Army
was bringing in a new, provisional
headquarters to assume direction of the
battle around Bastogne. The boundary,
to be effective on Christmas Day, ran
between Eschdorf and Heiderscheid, ap-
proximating that between the Ameri-
can 26th and 80th Infantry Divisions.
The Fuehrer Grenadier Brigade now
passed to the new Corps Rothkirch but
would continue to oppose the 26th Di-
vision just as the major part of its
strength had done on 24 December. The
LXXXV Corps was left with the 79th
and 352d. On Christmas Eve the last
troops of the 352d left Ettelbruck,
shelled out by high explosive and white
phosphorus. The German line north and
east of the city hereafter would rest on
the far bank of the Sauer.
Kniess was not yet ready to with-
draw his right wing to the protection
of the river barrier, nor would the
Seventh Army commander permit it,
for the high ground in the Bourscheid
bridgehead could still be used to observe
and interdict any crossing of the Sauer
farther south and at the same time act
as an anchor at the eastern end of the
Sure. Because the 79th Volks Grenadier
Division still lacked much of its infan-
try and nearly all of its heavy weapons,
the corps commander ordered Colonel
Weber to defend the bridgehead by con-
centrating in the heavy woods around
Kehmen and Welscheid. With the limit-
ed rifle strength at his disposal. Weber
was able to man the Burden ridge, his

538 THE ARDENNES: BATTLE OF THE BULGE
left flank thus adhering to the Sauer,
but in the north the right flank of the
79th consisted only of a thin outpost
line extending to Ringel Hill and the
Sure.
Early on Christmas morning in the
bitter cold the 80th Division returned
to the attack, its main thrust aimed at
Bourscheid. Colonel Fisher sent the 1st
and 3d Battalions of the 317th Infantry
toward Kehmen and Scheidel, hoping
to open the road east into Bour-
scheid. At Scheidel the attack surprised
the enemy infantry; one platoon cap-
tured the hamlet and a large number
of prisoners. But when the two battalions
turned north toward Kehmen the
enemy (a battalion of the 266th Regi-
ment) was ready and waiting. Each as-
sault, made across open ground, was re-
pelled by deadly fire from the village
and the woods to the north. When Gen-
eral McBride finally intervened to end
the attack the assault battalions had lost
nearly two hundred officers and men.
Kehmen once again had proved a hard
nut to crack. 14
While the 317th Infantry hit head on
against the main position held by the
79th Volks Grenadier Division, the 319th
Infantry moved north into the gap on
the German right flank. The 3d Bat-
talion, which had withdrawn from its
location close to the Sure in order to
back up the other battalions in the fight-
ing around Heiderscheid on the pre-
vious day, simply marched back into
Tadler. Since General McBride had or-
dered the regiment to close up to the
Sure but eschew any crossing attempt,
14 Capt. Robert W. Smith, commanding Company
K, was awarded the DSC for bravery and leader-
ship displayed in the fight at Kehmen.
the battalion was content to outpost
along the river. From Tadler small
groups of the enemy could be seen mov-
ing about on Ringel Hill, farther to the
east. The 90th Field Artillery Battalion
dropped a few shells into the village
atop the hill; then the 2d Battalion oc-
cupied the area with little trouble. The
hill position seriously endangered the
German bridgehead, but the 79th was
too far understrength to mount any
sizable counterattack on this flank.
During the afternoon an American
outpost saw a small German detachment
marching in column of twos up a draw
east of Ringel. The men at the outpost
could not believe their eyes; they could
only conclude that the approaching Ger-
mans were coming to surrender. When
challenged the little column kept on
coming, until a light machine gun put
an end to this “counterattack.” An hour
before midnight more figures were seen
approaching from the same direction.
What had happened was that the
Seventh Army commander had inter-
vened personally to order that Ringel
Hill be retaken. Not only was its posses-
sion necessary to the defense of the 79th
Volks Grenadier Division bridgehead
but Brandenberger needed the serv-
ices of an army engineer brigade that
had been committed as infantry on the
north bank of the Sure, in the sector
overlooked by the hill. If this high
ground could be retaken and some com-
mand of this stretch of the Sure retained,
the engineers could be employed else-
where.
Since the fight with the 317th Infan-
try had died down some hours earlier,
Colonel Weber was able to gather a sub-
stantial force for the counterattack, but
there was little ammunition for the few

THE III CORPS’ COUNTERATTACK TOWARD BASTOGNE
guns supporting the 79th. The Amer-
icans, on the other hand, were wired
in to their division artillery and by now
had a prearranged pattern of fire: four
battalions answered the 2d Battalion
call for help. A few of the attackers got
close to Ringel, only to meet the whis-
tling ricochet of armor-piercing shells
fired by a single tank destroyer that
rushed around the village like a man
stamping out a lawn fire.
Christmas Day witnessed the most ar-
tillery activity of the entire division ad-
vance; the guns were well forward, the
infantry held good ground for obser-
vation, and the fighting now surged at
many points out of the woods and in-
to the open.15 The total number of
rounds fired by the 80th Division artillery
was large when assessed against the ter-
rain: 3,878 rounds and 142 missions. The
80th Division advance ended the day
after Christmas, with the 3 19th Infantry
chasing the enemy out of the woods on
the near bank of the Sure, the 317th dig-
ging in opposite the Bourscheid bridge-
head, and the lone battalion of the 3 18th
exchanging fire with the Germans
across the Sauer, in the course of which
the commander of the 352d was severe-
ly wounded.
General Patton was in the process
of strengthening the Third Army attack
with more divisions. One of these, the
35th Division, was assembling in the
rear before joining the III Corps. Gen-
eral McBride’s division, as a result, trans-
ferred to the XII Corps on 26 December
15 Pfc. J. O. Bird, of Company G, 319th Infantry,
was awarded the DSC for gallantry in the Ringel
action. When his company was pinned down by
an enemy machine gun, Private Bird went forward
alone, under direct fire, and shot the crew; he
accounted for fifteen Germans with his rifle.
539
without a change of ground. In the days
that followed battalions rotated between
the deep snow of the outpost lines and
the relative warmth of shell-torn vil-
lages, waiting while General Patton de-
bated giving the XII Corps the go sign
for an attack across the chill, swollen
courses of the Sure and the Sauer. In
the corresponding German headquar-
ters other plans were under considera-
tion, plans to use the Bourscheid bridge-
head as a springboard from which to
throw a spoiling attack against the flank
of the American forces congregated
around Bastogne. But neither Branden-
berger nor Kniess could scrape up the
men, guns, and shells for such an am-
bitious adventure. The 79th Volks Gren-
adier Division did what it could with
what it had in almost daily counterat-
tacks of small compass, only to be beaten
off each time by the American howitzers.
Ringel Hill continued as the chief ob-
jective in these fruitless and costly at-
tempts, and here the 79th made its last
full-blown effort in a predawn attack
on 30 December. The previous evening
Company E, 319th Infantry, at that time
forming the Ringel garrison, learned
from prisoners taken on patrol that the
attack would be made. The American
division arranged for nine battalions of
field artillery to give protective fire and
the men in the garrison strengthened
their outposts. The enemy made the as-
sault, as promised, but with such speed
and skill as to enter the village before
a single salvo could be fired. One group
of Germans penetrated as far as the bat-
talion command post, but Pfc. W. J,
McKenzie drove them off, killing the
leaders, then taking sixteen prisoners.
(McKenzie was awarded the DSC.)
Their surprise tactics failed to save the

540 THE ARDENNES: BATTLE OF THE BULGE
attackers. Concentration after concentra-
tion poured in on the buildings that shel-
tered the garrison troops, killing, maim-
ing, and demoralizing the grenadiers.
Those of the enemy who could not es-
cape surrendered in groups to the first
Americans they could find.
When the 80th Division got its orders
on 5 January to resume the attack, it
could look back on a record of impor-
tant accomplishment. It had contained
and badly mauled two German divi-
sions, had helped delay and cripple the
Fuehrer Grenadier Brigade, on its way
to enter the Bastogne battle, and had
advanced sixteen miles and erased the
Ettelbruck bridgehead, so important in
the communications system of the Sev-
enth Army.
The 26th Division Fight for a
Bridgehead on the Sure
24-27 December
The 26th Division had not yet been
able to push patrols through the woods
to the Sure River when morning dawned
on 24 December. Two companies of
the 80th Division had crossed into the
division zone and were waiting on the
river near Heiderscheidergrund, but the
foremost troops of the 26th Division
were at Dellen, three and a half miles
away, while the main force still was
around Grosbous. Although small
pockets of German riflemen fought stub-
bornly in the woods there seemed to
be no cohesive, planned resistance by
the enemy. To get the attack rolling
and out of the woods, however, the
Americans had to open the main road to
the Sure. And to open the road they had
to capture the town of Eschdorf.
There are many trails and byroads
leading to the Sure but they become lost
in deep, twisting ravines or run blindly
through dense timber. All at this time
were clogged by snow and ice. The road
to Eschdorf follows a well-defined ridge
and for much of its length gives a clear
field of vision on both sides. Eschdorf,
a town with perhaps two thousand peo-
ple, is built on three hills which rise
well above the surrounding countryside
and give excellent observation over open
ground for a half-mile to a mile in every
direction. The ascent to the town is
made across ridge folds. The main road
coming in from the south turns away
east to Heiderscheid and the Sauer cross-
ing at Bourscheid, but other roads, three
in all, continue north to the Sure River,
one leading to the bridge at Heider-
scheidergrund.
The road net centering at Eschdorf
was very important in the German plans
to hold the Seventh Army blocking posi-
tion south of the Sure. Originally Bran-
denberger hoped to use the town as
a concentration point for a counterat-
tack by the Fuehrer Grenadier Brigade
along the road to Martelange. The bri-
gade, as recounted earlier, had started
this move by piecemeal commitment
while the main body still was on the
march to the front, but when the 26th
Division banged into the Fuehrer Gren-
adier advance guard southwest of Esch-
dorf a part of the leading battalion
was cut off and the way to Martelange
effectively barred. The staff of the
LXXXV Corps therefore drew new plans
on the night of the 23d to conform with
Brandenberger’s order that the Amer-
ican attack must be checked south of
the Sure. The idea was that the Fuehrer
Grenadier Brigade, on the west, and the
79th Volks Grenadier Division, from the

THE III CORPS’ COUNTERATTACK TOWARD BASTOGNE 541
east, should launch a concentric drive,
pinching off the most forward units in
the American advance. Although much
of the heavy weapon strength of the bri-
gade was loaned to the 79th, the bri-
gade itself was expected to hold back
the Americans south of Eschdorf, at the
same time striking in strength east from
that town to retake Heiderscheid. But
whether the operation ordered for 24
December fared well or ill, the Seventh
Army commander was adamant on one
point: Eschdorf was to be held.
General Paul was equally convinced
of the importance attaching to the com-
mand of Eschdorf and its radial roads.
As early as the night of the 22d, when
the III Corps optimistically prescribed
the capture of Wiltz as the next step to
be taken by the 26th Division, Paul or-
dered that a task force be created to
leapfrog ahead of the 104th Infantry,
capture Eschdorf, and chisel a groove to
the Sure. Unwilling to expend his divi-
sion reserve, Paul took the 2d Battalion,
328th Infantry, as the task force nu-
cleus and turned it over to an officer with
the division staff, Lt. Col. Paul Hamil-
ton. A few tanks and tank destroyers
were added, but through confusion in
orders the engineer company supposed
to be attached never joined the task
force.
In the first hour of the 23d, Task
Force Hamilton left Hostert in trucks.
As the column turned north it found
the 104th Infantry busy along the road-
side with small groups of German in-
fantry who were holding out in the
woods. North of Grosbous two German
tanks lay in wait just off the road, but
were dispatched summarily by an as-
sault gun. The column dismounted
about a mile and a half south of Esch-
dorf, sent back the trucks, and put out
pickets for the night. By this time Ger-
mans had appeared in some numbers
east and west of the task force and their
tanks had opened fire, but the 104th
was coming up and by agreement was
to cover Hamilton’s flanks.
At daylight on the 24th scouts on the
hills to the front reported much activity
around Eschdorf, with vehicles dashing
in and out of the town. The Fuehrer
Grenadier attack against the 80th
Division garrison in Heiderscheid was
in full swing, although hardly develop-
ing according to plan. The road to Esch-
dorf, now ahead of Task Force Hamil-
ton, rose and dipped to conform with
the ridge folds reaching back to the
hills on either side. The leading com-
pany had just climbed to the crest of
one of these wooded folds when a storm
of bullet and tank fire raked into its
flank, coming down the length of the
main ridge. The second company at-
tempted to swing wide and to the van: it
too found the ridge a bullet conductor.
About this time the rear of the column
came under direct and rapid shellfire
from a hill on the right. Boxed in on
front and rear, Task Force Hamilton
spent most of the day trying to maneu-
ver off the road and across the wooded
nose ahead. The 81-mm. mortars got a
real workout, churning the woods until
they had fired four times their normal
load of shells.
Toward sundown help came in the
air. P-47’s of the 379th Squadron
(362d Fighter Group), out on their last
mission of the day, swept low over the
pine stands on the ridge, dropping frag-
mentation bombs and strafing. For some
fifty Germans, well and wounded, this
was the finishing touch; they came strag-

542 THE ARDENNES: BATTLE OF THE BULGE
gling out of the woods, hands high.
Now that bullet fire no longer shaved
the ridge like a razor Task Force Ham-
ilton could move. It took the hamlet
of Hierheck, where the woods gave way
to the open ground leading up to Esch-
dorf, and then Hamilton gave orders
to dig in for the night-orders which
were countermanded almost at once by
the division commander, who wanted
Eschdorf that night.
While Task Force Hamilton was
pinned down, General Paul had notified
the III Corps that the 104th Infantry was
taking over the task force. In early eve-
ning the 104th Infantry received orders
for the 1st Battalion (Maj. Leon D.
Gladding) to take Eschdorf, while
Hamilton went on to secure the Sure
crossing. Later the division ordered the
1st Battalion, 104th Infantry, to make
the Sure crossing and Hamilton to take
Eschdorf. Taking Eschdorf would not
be an easy job. When a small group
of Hamilton’s men started forward to
set up an observation post, they encoun-
tered enemy fire before they had moved
twenty-five yards from their foxholes.
The Germans in Eschdorf were alert
and waiting.
Colonel Hamilton and Maj. Albert
Friedman, the 2d Battalion commander,
worked as rapidly as they could to de-
vise a plan of attack and bring the task
force into assault position, but it was
midnight before all was ready. Two
companies, E and F, were to lead the
attack, moving on either side of Esch-
dorf with their inner flanks touching,
but they were not to enter the village.
Company G, with tank support, would
follow the assault companies and clear
the village. This plan had been adopted
in deference to the ground, since Esch-
dorf rose well above the undulating
ridges and there was no higher ground
to lend itself to a wider flanking move-
ment.
Forty-five minutes after midnight the
two rifle companies started to climb the
highest of the three hills on which the
town stands, this being the south side.
The night was cold and clear, and a
full moon was out. As the attackers
tramped forward, long, grotesque black
shadows followed on the glittering
snow. For the first few minutes all was
quiet, ominously lovely and peaceful;
then, as the first line reached the crest,
all hell broke loose. The German rifle
line lay along the reverse slope, the
grenadiers in white capes and sheets
blending unobtrusively with the pano-
rama of snow. Burp guns and rifles
cut loose at the splendid targets the
Americans provided. In face of such a
fusillade the attack wavered, then fell
back. Three tanks, all that Hamilton
had, churned to the fore through the
snow but were checked by a little creek,
extended by an antitank ditch, about
300 yards from the nearest building.
A hurried call by Hamilton, who
wanted reinforcements to cover his
flanks, brought no reply from the divi-
sion headquarters except “Take Esch-
dorf.” There was little choice but to
continue with frontal tactics. At 0400 a
second assault started, this time with
the tanks and Company G forming the
center under orders to drive straight in-
to Eschdorf without pause. Company G
got only as far as the crest; the tanks
went as far as before, and no farther.
But the Germans facing the center were
kept occupied long enough to start the
wing companies moving. Firing as they
went the two companies reached the vil-

THE III CORPS’ COUNTERATTACK TOWARD BASTOGNE 543
lage. Instead of marching past and
around, the men closest to the buildings
drifted inward, seeking the shadows and
some kind of cover, dragging the two
companies in with them.
What then happened cannot be re-
corded with any certainty. The story of
Christmas Day inside Eschdorf was one
of confusion at the time and recrimina-
tion later. Members of the 104th In-
fantry subsequently claimed to have cap-
tured Eschdorf and believed that no part
of Task Force Hamilton held on in the
town. Officers and men of the task force,
somewhat closer to the scene, have a dif-
ferent story. 16 The men of the two com-
panies that had reached Eschdorf on
Christmas Eve were stranded there in
the houses while German armored ve-
hicles jockeyed about, firing at doors and
windows. In the meantime the bulk of
the enemy infantry gathered in the
southeastern corner to meet any attempt
to reinforce the attackers. When day
came the commander of Company E,
Capt. Vaughn Swift, took his chances in
the gauntlet of bullets and ran out to
the American tanks. By some miracle
he reached the Shermans alive and led
them into Eschdorf. Two were knocked
out there, but not before they had
quieted the enemy armored vehicles.
(Captain Swift was given the DSC.)
16 The Eschdorf fight is well covered in the
combat interviews held shortly after the event.
The orders and counterorders given Hamilton are
found in the 26th Division G–3 journal and the
104th Infantry journal. The journal of the 104th
records that Company F was driven out of
Eschdorf (at 0835 on 25 December) and seems to
have been interpreted as meaning that none of
Hamilton’s force was in the town. However, no
part of the 1st Battalion, 104th Infantry, was
committed in this fight until after the air strike
on the afternoon of 25 December.
As the day went on the two company
commanders tried to sort out their men
and resume the drive to cut through to
the roads entering Eschdorf from the
north. Whether this was accomplished
remains a matter of debate. Finally, in
the late afternoon, the division head-
quarters responded to Hamilton’s urg-
ing and instructed the 104th Infantry to
send its 1st Battalion and envelop Esch-
dorf. The instructions were followed.
Company C entered the village an hour
or so after daylight on 26 December
and by 0800 reported Eschdorf clear of
the enemy.
Throughout Christmas Day corps and
division artillery beat the northern ap-
proaches to Eschdorf, hoping to isolate
the uncertain dogfight within the town.
As it turned out, the Fuehrer Grena-
dier Brigade had no intention of inter-
vening there but was slipping north
through the woods and ravines, while
a few rear guard detachments fought on
to form a new bulwark to defend the
Sure River line. As early as the after-
noon of 24 December the 3d Battalion,
104th Infantry (Lt. Col. Howard C. Del-
lert) , had reached Heiderscheid, there
secured guides from the 319th, and had
gone on to relieve the two companies of
the 319th on the river at Heider-
scheidergrund. 17
While the 104th put troops along the
river, its sister regiment made a march
of three and a half miles over rough
17 There seems to have been some initial con-
fusion as to the exact status of the troops already
in that village, for in one of the rare changes
made in an official periodic report that of the
III Corps was amended to read that the 26th
Division “relieved two companies of the 80th
Division” in place of “liberated two companies of
the 80th Division.”

544 THE ARDENNES: BATTLE OF THE BULGE
country but against little opposition and
by nightfall of the 24th was near the
bridge site at Bonnal. On the extreme
left flank at Bilsdorf, Company C of the
249th Engineer Combat Battalion was
on reconnaissance when it was struck by
a much larger enemy force deployed in
the village. The company commander,
Capt. A. J. Cissna, elected to stay
behind and cover his men as they with-
drew from Bilsdorf; he fought alone un-
til he was killed. Cissna was awarded
the DSC posthumously. The 1st Battal-
ion of the 328th (Lt. Col. W. A.
Callanan), aided by the 2d Battalion,
101st Infantry, found a rear guard group
of the Fuehrer Grenadier Brigade holed
up in Arsdorf, near the division west
boundary, and spent the night of the
24th digging the grenadiers out of attics
and cellars. By midmorning Arsdorf was
in hand and the left flank of the 26th
Division was fairly secure except for
Bigonville, three miles northwest, which
now passed into the division zone as
CCR, 4th Armored Division, left that
village to play a new role on the western
flank of the corps.
But the main mission of the 26th Divi-
sion, to make a crossing at the Sure
River, had yet to be accomplished when
Task Force Hamilton started the fight at
Eschdorf on the night of 24 December.
General Paul, beset by incessant urging
from the III Corps commander, passed
the word to his two forward regiments
that the attack must get into high gear,
then sent a message to General Millikin
that he hoped to seize the Sure crossing
before daylight on Christmas Day.
Pitched battles at Eschdorf and Arsdorf
so entangled the division that the idea of
a general movement forward had to be
abandoned, particularly when on Christ-
mas Day an additional battalion had to
be committed at both of these towns.
Although troops of the two attacking
regiments were within sight of the river
on Christmas Eve they found that there
would be no surprise crossing. In the
zone of the 104th Infantry the enemy,
alerted by the presence of the two companies
of the 319th, had strengthened
his position at the opposite end of the
Heiderscheidergrund bridge and it was
apparent that a crossing site would have
to be sought elsewhere. On the left the
3d Battalion of the 328th Infantry (Lt.
Col. Arthur C. Tillison) reached the
bare hill above Bonnal on Christmas
morning, just in time to see the last
German half-track cross the bridge before
it was blown.
The corps commander now released
the 101st Infantry from reserve and ordered
General Paul to “keep going” and
get to Wiltz, four miles the other side
of the Sure. Paul planned to relieve the
328th with his reserve regiment, but
while arrangements were being made,
on the night of the 25th, word flashed
back that a bridge had been captured
and that the 3d Battalion was crossing.
This episode of the Bonnal bridge is an
apt–and instructive–example of the
“fog of war.” The bridge actually had
been destroyed eight to ten hours earlier,
but it was nearly midnight before the
328th Infantry was able to ascertain that
none of its troops had got across the
river. Bad news never comes singly. The
104th Infantry had to report that the
Germans had blown up one span of the
bridge at Heiderscheidergrund.
The Sure River is in itself not too
difficult an obstacle, at its widest point
no more than twenty-five yards across.
The current is not swift, and there are

THE III CORPS’ COUNTERATTACK TOWARD BASTOGNE 545
many places where it is possible to wade
across. (Plans actually were made for
sending an assault party through the
bitter cold stream, then wrapping the
troops in blankets and thawing them out
on the far bank.) The problem is to get
down to the river and to get up the
steep cliffs to the north bank. So twisting
and tortuous is the river course and so
blind are its bends that great care must
be exercised in choosing a crossing point
lest one have to cross the river twice. The
approaches to the river, the meanderings
of the river bed, and the exits on the
north bank combined therefore to dic-
tate where the 26th Division might cross.
Whether the enemy was strong
enough to dictate how the division had
to cross remained to be seen. The lay of
the ground gave three potential crossing
sites in the 26th Division zone: from
east to west, Heiderscheidergrund, Esch-
sur-Sure, and Bonnal. All had stone arch
bridges of solid construction–or did
prior to 25 December 1944. Heider-
scheidergrund normally would present
the most attractive of the three crossings
because it gave entrance to the main
Wiltz road. But the fight for Eschdorf
had slowed down the 104th Infantry and
prevented a thoroughgoing exploitation
of the 3 19th toehold at Heiderscheider-
grund. Furthermore the enemy had first
concentrated to defend this, the most
obvious of the three crossings. What he
was set to do to defend Esch-sur-Sure and
Bonnal remained to be tested.
The fragmented commitment of the
Fuehrer Grenadier Brigade had resulted
in heavy losses and blunted the fighting
edge of this “elite” unit. By the very
nature of its dispersed and staggered
commitment the brigade had succeeded
in creating a picture of strength quite
out of keeping with reality. The 1st Bat-
talion of the brigade, for example, had
first appeared in front of the west wing
of the 26th Division headed southwest,
then had been turned around, had
bumped back across the front of the
328th–fighting here and there in the
woods as it went–and then had taken
a hand against the 104th. Furthermore
the Fuehrer Grenadier Brigade was an
amorphous organization which accorded
with none of the tables carried in the
American handbook on German order of
battle. Since its numbering and unit
names fitted much of the description of
the elder formation, the Grossdeutsch-
land Panzer Division, the brigade had
been first identified as the division. It
would take much time and numerous
prisoners before the 26th Division order
of battle team could complete the true
picture of the brigade.
When the Seventh Army commander
ordered the Fuehrer Grenadier Brigade
to withdraw to the Sure on 25 December,
he intended the defense to continue on
the south bank of the river. But the
brigade’s rifle regiment, much under-
strength as the consequence of the rough
handling received at Arsdorf, Eschdorf,
and in the counterattack at Heider-
scheid, could no longer provide the nec-
essary infantry. The bulk of the brigade
had apparently crossed to the north side
of the river by the morning of 26 Decem-
ber, forming a line–or what passed for
a line–east and west of Esch-sur-Sure.
The only German reserve in this sector
was the army engineer brigade at
Nothum, a 2½-mile march north of the
Bonnal crossing. But General Branden-
berger was loath to employ any of his
small engineer complement in the firing
line except under the direst of circum-

546 THE ARDENNES: BATTLE OF THE BULGE
stances. There was little artillery to de-
fend the line of the Sure; most of the
guns and Werfers which had good prime
movers and could be hauled along the
crowded roads west of the Our were at
work around Bastogne or firing in de-
fense of the Bourscheid bridgehead. One
advantage the defenders did have: good
observation from the heights overlook-
ing the separate crossing sites.
The morning of 26 December dawned
bright and clear with the promise of air
support for the 26th Division at the river.
On the left the 101st Infantry had re-
lieved the 328th and stood ready to
attempt the crossing. The 101st was
fresh and its ranks were full. After its
first effort to reach the piers of the stone
bridge at Bonnal was met by rifle fire,
a patrol discovered a good site farther
to the west where a river loop curled to
the American side. Engineer assault
craft reached the 3d Battalion (Lt. Col.
James N. Peale) shortly before noon,
but a rumor had circulated that the
enemy was lying in wait on the opposite
bank and the troops showed some re-
luctance to move. Col. Walter T. Scott,
the regimental commander, took a single
bodyguard and crossed the river in a
rubber boat, returning without mishap,
The battalion then crossed, the silence
broken only by the sound of the paddles,
an occasional hoarse-voiced command,
and a few rifle shots. The 1st Battalion
(Maj. Albert L. Gramm), closer to
Bonnal, likewise made an uneventful
crossing. The enemy, no more than a
few stray pickets, did not loiter. Engi-
neers started a Bailey bridge, using the
supports of the stone bridge at Bonnal,
while the two battalions, tired by their
scramble up the steep banks, dug in
along the edge of the bluffs. The few
enemy planes that tried to strafe along
the river were destroyed or driven off
by alert fighter-bombers and the 390th
Antiaircraft Automatic Weapons Battal-
ion. Nor did a small German counter-
attack during the evening have any
effect.
The eyes of the Fuehrer Grenadier
Brigade were fixed on Heiderscheider-
grund where the German fighting ve-
hicles and riflemen waited for the main
American effort. Although one span of
the stone bridge had been blown as a
precautionary measure, the enemy threw
a trestle over the gap, preserving the
the bridge as a sally port to the south
bank. Twice German tanks and assault
guns made a bid to recross and counter-
attack the 104th Infantry. The first
attempt was stopped short of the bridge
by rapid shellfire. The second was more
successful: four tanks and an assault gun
rammed across the bridge but were aban-
doned by their crews when American
guns and howitzers brought salvo after
salvo of white phosphorus to sear the
near bank. During the 26th, patrols
operating in the 104th Infantry sector
put their glasses on Esch-sur-Sure. They
reported that there was no sign of the
enemy in the village, but Colonel Palla-
dino could not risk an immediate cross-
ing on his left while the Germans
opposite his right held a bridge and still
seemed willing to carry the fight back
to the American side of the river.
The troops in the attenuated 101st
bridgehead easily repulsed a minor
counterattack on the morning of 27 De-
cember. As yet there was nothing to
indicate an enemy shift to meet this
threat to the Sure River position. By
midmorning the Bailey bridge was open
and tanks and tank destroyers crossed to

THE III CORPS’ COUNTERATTACK TOWARD BASTOGNE 547
support the 3d Battalion as it climbed
on up the bluffs to Liefrange. Since the
two bridges at Esch-sur-Sure had been
demolished, the commander of the 104th
Infantry arranged for his left battalion
to borrow the Bonnal Bailey. As the
right battalion put on a demonstration
with much firing at Heiderscheider-
grund, the left crossed, then swung back
toward Kaundorf as if to command the
road climbing from Esch-sur-Sure. While
this maneuver was in process the engi-
neers constructed a treadway bridge at
Esch and tank destroyers were put across
to reinforce Palladino’s battalion on the
ESCH-SUR-SURE
far bank. By the close of the day it could
be said that the Sure bridgehead was
firm and the way open to recapture
Wiltz. 18
The 4th Armored Division
Reaches Bastogne
Christmas Day came and went leaving
the 4th Armored Division toiling slowly
toward Bastogne. The left wing of the
III Corps now conformed to the slow,
18 The 26th Division fight on the far bank of
the Sure is described in Chapter XXIV.

548 THE ARDENNES: BATTLE OF THE BULGE
foot-slogging pace of the divisions on the
right and in the center. Both CCA and
CCB had an additional rifle battalion
when the attack resumed on the 25th,
for the 1st and 2d Battalions of the 318th
Infantry had reported to General Gaffey
late on Christmas Eve after a cold, miser-
able, six-hour truck ride from the 80th
Division sector. Both battalions, the 1st
attached to CCA and the 2d to CCB,
were considerably understrength after
the bloody engagements at Ettelbruck.
The 1st Battalion, whose officer losses
had been very high, had a new com-
mander and so did all of its companies.
During the fight at Warnach a few
tanks from CCA had tried to drive on to
Tintange but had bogged down. Gen-
eral Gaffey therefore decided to employ
a part of his infantry reinforcement with
the general mission of attacking to reach
Bastogne, and the more immediate job
of taking. Tintange. After a freezing
night bivouacked in the snow, Maj.
George W. Connaughton’s 1st Battalion,
3 18th, set off for a line of departure south
of the village that was shown on the
map as a small creek.
Gaffey had said that the battalion
would have to fight for its line of de-
parture. He was right. The two assault
companies reached the creek only to dis-
cover that they faced a deep gorge, with
Germans arrayed to defend it. Somehow
the infantry scrambled down and up
again while their opponents pitched in
hand grenades. Emerging south of the
village the attackers came under con-
tinuous rifle fire, but what stopped them
cold was a single large-caliber assault
gun whose shells burst wherever the
Americans turned. The support, Com-
pany B (Capt. Reid McAllister), was
given very special attention by the Ger-
man gunners. Tired of taking losses
where it lay, the company asked per-
mission to take the burden of the assault
on its own shoulders. Two platoons
advanced through the forward compa-
nies and the enemy infantry inside the
village immediately opened fire. In so
doing the Germans gave away their
locations to the third platoon, which had
circled in from the east. Return fire
coming in from the east momentarily
silenced the garrison; galled by its losses
Company B rushed the village, captured
the maddening assault gun as its crew
sought to escape, and took 161 prisoners.
This action must be credited to the in-
fantry, but it should be added that eight
fighter-bombers from the 377th Squad-
ron had hit Tintange on call, blasting
with bombs and rockets just before the
riflemen moved in. During the day the
5 1st Armored Infantry Battalion carried
the advance on the west side of the
Arlon-Bastogne highway as far as Hol-
lange, pausing here with night coming
on and the enemy showing his first in-
tention of making a stand. CCA now
had cleared another-stretch of woods and
villages flanking the Bastogne highway-
but the streets of Bastogne still were
seven miles away.
The 2d Battalion, 318th Infantry (Lt.
Col. Glenn H. Gardner), did its chore
of woods clearing and village fighting on
Christmas Day alongside the armored in-
fantry and tanks of CCB. Chaumont,
scene of the bitter action two days
earlier, remained the immediate objec-
tive. This time the enemy was deeply
dug in, all through the woods south of
the village. While tanks from the 8th
Tank Battalion edged around the woods
firing indiscriminately into the pines, the
foot troops routed out the German

THE III CORPS’ COUNTERATTACK TOWARD BASTOGNE 549
AMERICAN TROOPS IN TINTANGE JUST AFTER ITS CAPTURE
infantry from holes and log-covered
trenches where they sought shelter from
the tankers’ shells. This was a slow, pre-
carious business. Some of the enemy
paratroopers could be persuaded that
surrender was the better part of valor,
but many had to be finished off with
grenades and even bayonets. In this
manner the 2d Battalion worked
through three successive wood lots, meet-
ing strong rifle and automatic weapons
fire in each. Here Sgt. Paul J. Wiedorfer
made a lone charge against two German
machine guns. He killed the crew serv-
ing the first weapon and forced the crew
of the second to surrender. (He was
awarded the Medal of Honor.)
Chaumont village was less of a prob-
lem. Prisoners had reported that a large
number of panzers had come in during
the night, but in fact there were no tanks,
except the derelict Shermans left on the
23d. The American light tanks moved
in with the infantry and by dark the
village was in American hands–most of
the enemy had withdrawn farther north
after the struggle in the woods. The 2d
Battalion saw nearly a hundred of its
men evacuated for bullet wounds, mostly
suffered inside the woods. Both here and
at Tintange the 5th Parachute troopers
had been forced to rely on their small
arms; the 318th as a result sustained
more casualties from bullet fire than at
any time since its frontal attack at the
Moselle River in early .September.
Artillery and large numbers of fighter-
bombers belabored the 5th Parachute

550 THE ARDENNES: BATTLE OF THE BULGE
Division on 26 December. The advanc-
ing Americans of the two combat com-
mands and the attached infantry found
that more and more of the enemy were
willing to lay down their arms after
honor had been satisfied by token re-
sistance, but for each point where the
combination of American fighter-
bombers, artillery, tanks, and infantry
won quick surrender there was a cross-
road, a patch of woods, or a tiny
collection of houses to which a tough
young officer and a few men clung
fiercely. Bravery was matched with brav-
ery. Pfc. O. M. Laughlin of the 318th
broke up one German position with
grenades after he had been hit in the
shoulder and could not use his rifle. (He
received the DSC.) 19
Spread across a wide front, CCA and
CCB could maintain little contact: nor
could the rifle battalions and tank-infan-
try teams. Much of the American combat
19 The battles on 26 December elicited numerous
deeds of heroism. DSC’s were subsequently
awarded to Capt. James H. Leach and 2d Lt. John
A. Whitehill of the 4th Armored Division; Capt.
Gabriel R. Martinez and Pfc. A. G. Means of the
318th Infantry; and 2d Lt. Frederick Rau of the
274th Armored Field Artillery Battalion.
GERMAN PRISONERS CARRYING ONE OF THEIR WOUNDED IN A BLANKET

THE III CORPS’ COUNTERATTACK TOWARD BASTOGNE
strength had to be diverted to screen
the flanks of the individual detachments
or to circle back to stamp out resistance
flaring up unexpectedly in areas sup-
posed to be free of the enemy. (CCA,
for example, captured a battalion head-
quarters and a large number of pris-
oners in a fight at Hollange, south of
Chaumont, which had been taken by
CCB the day before.) Mines also made
for delay. There were more in the path
of the advance than ever before, but they
had been laid hastily, were not well con-
cealed, and often lacked fuzes. Again the
most lethal and in numerous cases the
sole German weapons were the rifle,
machine gun, or machine pistol. These
served the enemy well, and gaps in the
ranks of the attackers widened even as
the prisoner bag swelled. Captured para-
troopers complained that they no longer
had artillery support, that morale was
cracking when friendly guns could not
be seen or heard; nonetheless the dwin-
dling strength of the 318th and the
armored infantry battalions bore witness
that the enemy still was in a fighting
mood.
Despite all this the lines of the 101st
Airborne Division were appreciably
closer. By dark the 2d Battalion, 318th
Infantry, after bitter battle and very
heavy casualties, had reached the woods
near Hompré, some 4,000 yards from the
Bastogne perimeter. Using green and
red light signals, learned from prisoners
in the past two days, 1st Lt. Walter P.
Carr and a four-man patrol stole through
the German lines, reaching the Bastogne
outposts at 0430. The return trip, with
a situation map marked by the 101st Air-
borne G–3, wrote finis to a daring and
successful mission. But other Americans
had beaten Carr to Bastogne.
551
On Christmas Eve, when it was appar-
ent that no quick breakthrough could
be expected on the Arlon-Bastogne high-
way, the 4th Armored Division com-
mander could look to two possible means
of levering the slowing attack into high
gear. The two battalions of the 318th
were ready to add more riflemen to what
had become a slow-paced infantry bat-
tle; perhaps this extra weight would tell
and punch a hole through which the
tanks of CCA and CCB could start
rolling again. But General Gaffey was a
veteran and convinced armored officer,
serving a commander whose name was
everywhere attached to feats of speed
and daring in mechanized warfare and
whose doctrine was simple: if the ground
and the enemy combined to thwart the
tanks in the area originally selected for
attack, then find some other spot where
the enemy might be less well situated
to face a mechanized thrust.
The command had caught a cat nap
by 1100, fuel tanks were filled, com-
manders were briefed, an artillery plane
had oriented the gunners–and the drive
began. The light tanks and a platoon of
tank destroyers from the 704th Tank
Destroyer Battalion led off, followed by
paired teams of tank and armored in-
fantry companies. The scattered German
outposts, members of a replacement en-
gineer battalion, dived for cover as the
tanks raced along the road, then hastily
surrendered to the infantry following.
Beyond Vaux-lez-Rosieres the column
left the pavement and headed northeast
on a secondary road, hoping to find it
ill-defended. Thus far the teams had
leapfrogged, taking turns in dealing
with the little villages away from the
main route. About 1400 the advance
guard was checked at a small creek near

552 THE ARDENNES: BATTLE OF THE BULGE
Cobreville where the only bridge had
just been blown. Abrams called for the
battalion bulldozer, always kept close to
the headquarters tank in the column. It
took an hour for the bulldozer to de-
molish a stone wall and push the debris
into the creek–then on went the column.
CCR of the 4th Armored Division had
just taken Bigonville on the division east
flank, and was counting its prisoners,
waiting for orders, and making plans for
feeding its troops a big Christmas dinner
when Colonel Blanchard heard from the
division commander. The order given
was brief: move to Neufchateau at once.
Starting an hour after midnight, the
combat command was near Neufchâteau
when it received other and more de-
tailed orders–attack toward Bastogne to
assist the advance of CCB (then south
of Chaumont) and to protect the left
flank of the division and corps.
For this task CCR had the 37th Tank
Battalion (Lt. Col. Creighton W.
Abrams) , the 53d Armored Infantry
Battalion (Lt. Col. George Jaques) ,
the self-propelled 94th Armored Field
Artillery Battalion, and a battery of 155-
mm. howitzers from the 177th Field
Artillery Battalion. Although CCR nor-
mally was not employed as an integral
tactical unit in 4th Armored practice,
the tank and rifle companies of the two
battalions had teamed together in many
a fight.
Colonel Blanchard had selected his
own route (to avoid blown bridges) and
an assembly area southwest of Bercheux
village on the Neufchâteau-Bastogne
road. Here the column closed shortly be-
fore dawn on Christmas Day. Almost
nothing was known about the German
strength or dispositions along the twelve-
mile stretch of road that lay ahead. In-
side of Bercheux was a company of First
Army engineers, which, as part of the
VIII Corps barrier line, was preparing
to make a stand. Thus far, however, the
Germans had shown little disposition to
push much beyond Vaux-lez-Rosieres, a
mile and a half farther up the road, from
which the 28th Division headquarters
had been driven on the night of the 22d.
Remonville was next. Perhaps some
sixth sense warned that it was full of
Germans; maybe a spotter plane had
seen movement there or a frightened
prisoner had talked. Whatever the rea-
son, Remonville got the treatment. A
company of Shermans lined up on the
high ground outside the village with
their guns trained on the houses. Four
battalions of artillery, emplaced close
enough to reach the target, opened rapid
fire with high explosive and the tanks
joined in. For five to ten minutes, long
enough for the A Team to race to the
village, shells rained down. In the streets
the tank crews worked their machine
guns until they were hot, while the in-
fantry leaped from their half-tracks and
sprinted from building to building. The
German garrison, the 3d Battalion, 14th
Parachute Regiment, had remained hid-
den up to this point. Some now emerged
-but it was too late. Tank gunners and
riflemen cut them down from every side.
Hand grenades tossed through cellar
windows and down cellar stairs quickly
brought the recalcitrant–and living-to
the surface. By dusk the job was finished.
CCR had taken 327 prisoners.
The light tanks in the advance guard
moved on, but only for a few hundred
yards. A large crater pitting the road
where a small creek made a detour im-
possible brought the column to a halt
as the day ended. CCR had come abreast

THE III CORPS’ COUNTERATTACK TOWARD BASTOGNE 553
of CCB, in fact was fearful of using its
artillery against any targets to the east.
Gaffey still expected CCB to make the
breakthrough now that its west flank was
protected. To this end General Taylor,
impatient to reach his division in Bas-
togne, had joined General Dager’s com-
mand post, bringing the first word Dager
had that CCR had come up on his left.
Even so the general mission for all of
the 4th Armored Division remained the
relief of the 101st Airborne.
On Christmas night Colonel Blanch-
ard and his officers huddled over a map
which had just arrived by liaison plane.
This map showed the American disposi-
tion in the Bastogne perimeter, only six
miles away, and a somewhat hypothetical
scheme of the German order of battle
as it faced in toward Bastogne and out
toward the 4th Armored. The red-
penciled symbols representing the en-
emy were most numerous and precise
where they faced north; by now the 101st
had had ample opportunity to gauge the
German strength and dispositions hem-
ming it in. The red figures farther south
were few and accompanied by question
marks.
Basing it on this rather sketchy infor-
mation, Blanchard gave his plan for
attack on 26 December. This called for
an advance through Remichampagne, a
mile and a half away, and Clochimont.
Then the combat command would turn
northwest to Sibret, thus returning to the
Neufchâteau-Bastogne road. At Sibret,
which air reconnaissance had reported
to be full of troops, the main fight would
apparently be made. Fighter-bomber
support had been promised for the morn-
ing of the 26th, and CCR had seen the
sky full of American planes over Bas-
togne. The four firing batteries with
CCR would displace from Juseret to new
positions south of Cobreville, but be-
cause the exact location of CCB was
unknown the howitzers would not be
laid on Remichampagne. Immediate
targets would be two: a large block of
woods west of Remichampagne, for
which CCR could spare none of its lim-
ited armored infantry; and the road
from Morhet, leading east of the Neuf-
château-Bastogne highway, on which
spotter planes had observed German
tanks.
When CCR started for Remicham-
pagne on the morning of 26 December,
the ground was frozen, and tank going
was even better than it had been during
the summer pursuit across France. The
column had just gotten under way when
suddenly a number of P–47’s appeared.
Although the 362d Fighter Group was
slated to give CCR a hand, these par-
ticular planes, probably from the 362d,
had not been called for. Bombing only
a few hundred yards in front of the lead-
ing tanks, the P–47’s shook all ideas of
resistance out of the few Germans left
in the village or the woods.
Next was Clochimont. CCR was reach-
ing the point where a collision with the
enemy main line of resistance could be
expected or a strong counterattack be
suffered. Carefully then, CCR deployed
near Clochimont, moving its teams out
to cover the flanks. Colonel Abrams dis-
patched one tank company northward
hoping to uncover the next enemy posi-
tion or draw fire from Assenois, straight
to the fore, or Sibret, the objective on
the Bastogne highway. It was about 1500
when these dispositions were completed.
Orders called for the attack to be con-
tinued toward Sibret, over to the north-
west, but this town was probably well

554 THE ARDENNES: BATTLE OF THE BULGE
defended and German tanks, more likely
than not, would be found guarding the
main road. The 37th Tank Battalion had
lost tanks here and there along the way
and had no more than twenty Shermans
in operation. The 53d Armored Infantry
Battalion, weak to begin with, now was
short 230 men. The two battalion com-
manders, Abrams and Jaques, stood by
the road discussing the next move and
watching what looked like hundreds of
cargo planes flying overhead en route to
drop supplies to the 101st when Abrams
suggested that they try a dash through
Assenois straight into Bastogne. It was
true that Sibret was next on the CCR
itinerary, but it was known to be strongly
held and Bastogne was the 4th Armored
Division objective. Jaques agreed.
Abrams radioed Capt. William
Dwight, the battalion S–3, to bring the
C Team forward. It was now about 1520.
Another message, this time through the
artillery liaison officer, gave the plan to
the 94th Armored Field Artillery Battal-
ion and asked that the 101st Airborne be
told that the armor was coming in. The
94th already was registered to fire on
Assenois, but there was little time in
which to transmit data to the division
artillery or arrange a fire plan. CCR
alone among the combat commands had
no telephone wire in. Continuous wave
radio could not be counted on. Fre-
quency modulation was working fairly
well, but all messages would have to be
relayed. Despite these handicaps, in
fifteen minutes three artillery battalions
borrowed from CCB (the 22d, 253d, and
776th) were tied in to make the shoot
at Assenois when the call came.
Colonel Abrams had entrusted Cap-
tain Dwight with the shock troops (Com-
pany C of the 37th Tank Battalion and
Company C of the 53d Armored Infantry
Battalion), telling him: “It’s the push!”
By 1620 all was ready and the team
moved out, Shermans leading and half-
tracks behind. Abrams stayed glued to
his radio. At 1634 he checked with the
94th Field Artillery Battalion and asked
if he could get the concentration on
Assenois at a minute’s notice. Exactly
one minute later the tank company com-
mander, 1st Lt. Charles Boggess, called
from the lead tank. Colonel Abrams
passed the word to the artillery, “Con-
centration Number Nine, play it soft and
sweet.” A TOT could hardly be expected
with existing communications, but the
thirteen batteries (an unlucky number
for the enemy) sent ten volleys crashing
onto Assenois.
Eight antitank guns were sited around
the village; here and there a gun crew
fired a wild shot before a shell blasted
the piece or the furious fire of the Sher-
man machine guns drove the cannoneers
to their holes. At the dip in the road on
the village edge Lieutenant Boggess
called for the artillery to lift, then
plunged ahead without waiting to see
whether the 94th had his message. So
close did the attack follow the artillery
that not a hostile shot was fired as the
tanks raced into the streets. The center
of the village was almost as dark as
night, the sun shut out by smoke and
dust. Two tanks made a wrong turn. One
infantry half-track got into the tank col-
umn; another was knocked out when an
American shell exploded nearby. The
initial fire plan had called for the battery
of 155’s to plaster the center of the town,
and these shells still were coming in
when the infantry half-tracks entered
the streets. Far more vulnerable to the
rain of shell fragments than the tankers,

THE III CORPS’ COUNTERATTACK TOWARD BASTOGNE 555
the armored infantrymen leaped from
their vehicles for the nearest doorway or
wall. In the smoke and confusion the
German garrison, a mixed group from
the 5th Parachute and 26th Volks Gren-
adier Divisions, poured out of the cel-
lars. The ensuing shooting, clubbing,
stabbing melee was all that the armored
infantry could handle and the C Team
tanks rolled on to glory alone.
The “relief column” heading out of
Assenois for the Bastogne perimeter now
consisted of the three Sherman tanks
commanded by Lieutenant Boggess, the
one half-track which had blundered into
the tank column, and two more Sher-
mans bringing up the rear. Boggess
moved fast, liberally spraying the tree
line beside the highway with machine
gun fire. But a 300-yard gap developed
between the first three vehicles and the
last three, giving the enemy just time
to throw a few Teller mines out on the
road before the half-track appeared. The
half-track rolled over the first mine and
exploded. Captain Dwight then ran his
tow tanks onto the shoulder, the crews
removed the mines, and the tanks rushed
on to catch up with Boggess. At 1650
(the time is indelibly recorded in the
4th Armored Division record) Boggess
saw some engineers in friendly uniform
preparing to assault a pillbox near the
highway. These were men from the
326th Airborne Engineer Battalion-
contact with the Bastogne garrison had
been made. Twenty minutes later Colo-
nel Abrams (subsequently awarded the
DSC for the action at Assenois) shook
hands with General McAuliffe, who had
come to the outpost line to welcome the
relieving force.
Colonel Jaques and the 53d Armored
Infantry Battalion missed this dramatic
moment; they were involved in a scram-
bling fight for possession of Assenois-
strictly an infantry battle now that the
artillery no longer could intervene. This
battle continued into the night, the 53d
capturing some five hundred prisoners
in and around the town. One American,
S./Sgt. James R. Hendrix, took on the
crews of the two 88-mm. guns with only
his rifle, adding crews and guns to the
bag in Assenois. (Hendrix was awarded
the Medal of Honor). More Germans
filtered in along the dense woods which
lined the east side of the Bastogne road
north of Assenois. Here Company A of
the 53d was put in to dig the Germans
out, the company commander, Capt.
Frank Kutak, directing the fight from
his jeep for he had been wounded in
both legs. (For bravery here and in other
actions Kutak was awarded the DSC.)
An hour or so after midnight enough
of the enemy had been killed or cap-
tured to give relatively safe passage along
the Bastogne road. Over 200 vehicles had
been gathered at Rossignol waiting for
the road to open, and during the night
the light tank company of the 37th Tank
Battalion escorted forty trucks and sev-
enty ambulances into Bastogne.

CHAPTER XXII
The Battle Before the Meuse
The Meuse River Line
Across the western edge of the Ar-
dennes massif runs the Meuse River.
This river, throughout history, has been
the natural line of resistance against an
enemy advancing from east to west over
the Belgian highlands. Actually, of
course, the river channel changes direc-
tion as it passes through Belgium, run-
ning south to north between Maastricht
and Liege, generally following an east-
west line between Liege and Namur,
and bending sharply at Namur to as-
sume a south to north orientation. Al-
though rather shallow, the Meuse aver-
ages a width of 120 yards in its main
course and is fed by so many streams that
its current is unusually rapid, particu-
larly in the winter season. There are
some fairly level approaches to the
Meuse crossing sites; there also are long
stretches of steep banks bordering the
channel, some of them are cliffs nearly
three hundred feet high. As a comple-
ment to the natural strength of this
barrier the Belgian Government, before
World War II, had limited the number
of bridges spanning the Meuse. The
events of 1940, however, demonstrated
that modern armies could cross the
Meuse speedily, either by surprise or by
an overwhelming concentration of force.
Within forty-eight hours of the launch-
ing of the 1944 attack the Allied high
command diagnosed the enemy intent as
that of driving to the Meuse in the vicin-
ity of Liege. But there could be no cer-
tainty in the early phases of the German
counteroffensive that such a diagnosis
was correct. It was quite possible that
the enemy might swerve south at the
Meuse, following the historical invasion
route past Sedan and on to Paris instead
of turning north toward Liege and Ant-
werp. General Middleton and the VIII
Corps staff were concerned particularly
with the possibility that the enemy plan
might unfold into a thrust southward
through the Meuse valley.
Busy with plans and troop movements
designed to bolster the threatened sector
of the First Army front and harden the
shoulders of the corridor through which
the German divisions were crowding,
SHAEF took its first steps to defend the
line of the Meuse (with anything more
than local security measures) on 18
December. Late that day General Eisen-
hower ordered the 17th Airborne and
11th Armored Divisions, both training
in the United Kingdom, to move to the
Continent without delay. These two
divisions were intended for use north
and west of the Meuse, but they could
not be expected for some days. From
Reims, which was designated as concen-
tration area for the airborne division,
the airborne could be moved to the west
bank; the armored division was slated

THE BATTLE BEFORE THE MEUSE
for use on the north bank. On the 20th,
however, the 11th Armored Division was
ordered to assemble north of Reims. At
the same time SHAEF instructed the 6th
Airborne Division (British) to move at
once by sea to the 21 Army Group area
as a preliminary to strengthening the de-
fense on the north bank of the Meuse.
In the meantime the 1st SS Panzer
Division was drawing uncomfortably
close to the Huy-Dinant sector of the
Meuse and the Fifth Panzer Army had
ruptured the VIII Corps center. If the
German forces continued to hold their
pace westward the reinforcements from
the United Kingdom would arrive at
the Meuse too late. On 19 December,
therefore, Field Marshal Montgomery on
his own initiative started troops moving
south from the 21 Army Group. The
British commander had been in process
of shifting the weight of his forces to the
north in preparation for an offensive in
the Rhineland when the Germans un-
leashed the attack in the Ardennes;
indeed Montgomery’s southernmost
command, the 30 Corps, already had
started its advance parties moving north
to the Canadian front. But at 1730 on
19 December the 21 Army Group com-
mander ordered General Horrocks to
move his 30 Corps from Boxtel, Holland,
into the area between Liège and Brus-
sels and gave him the Guards Armoured
Division and the 43d, 51st, and 53d
Infantry Divisions, as well as three ar-
mored brigades.
Because the situation late on the 19th
“remained unpleasantly vague,” to use
Montgomery’s own phrase, the British
commander undertook emergency meas-
ures to bar the Meuse crossings between
Liège and Givet while the 30 Corps
made its move. Reconnaissance attach-
557
ments hastily organized from Special Air
Services (British) and tank replacement
center troops joined the American Com-
munications Zone personnel to set up
cover parties at the bridges between
Liège and Givet. British armored cars
patrolled the north bank of the river be-
tween Liège and Namur. The 29th
Armoured Brigade, then refitting
with new tanks in western Belgium, was
ordered to pick up its old tanks
and hurry to defend the Namur-
Dinant sector. Reports from the First
Army at the close of the 19th
led Montgomery to believe that there
was “little to prevent German armoured
cars and reconnaissance elements [from]
bounding the Meuse and advancing on
Brussels.” That night British troops
erected barriers and deployed roadblock
detachments to protect the capital city,
which had been liberated by the Guards
Armoured Division on 3 September. 1
The rapid deployment of the British
screen between Liège and Givet de-
creased considerably the chance of a sur-
prise crossing on this stretch of the
Meuse, and the concentration of the 30
Corps would be accomplished in time to
provide a strong counterattack force in
the event that the enemy did win a
bridgehead. The 120-mile stretch of
river from Givet (terminal point of the
British line) to Verdun was far less
strongly defended than that in the north.
It would take approximately a week to
bring the 17th Airborne and 11th
Armored Divisions from the United
Kingdom into the line. Reinforcements
moving from the Third and Ninth
1 Montgomery, Normandy to the Baltic, p. 28off.;
The Memoirs of Field-Marshal Montgomery, p.
276. The latter touches on the Ardennes campaign
only lightly.

558 THE ARDENNES: BATTLE OF THE BULGE
BRITISH TANK PATROLLING THE MEUSE AT NAMUR
Armies were already tagged for stiffen-
ing the First Army line of battle in the
Ardennes. In these first critical days,
then, the southern line of the Meuse
would have to be guarded on a catch-as-
catch-can basis by troops brought up
from the depots, supply dumps, adminis-
trative installations, and headquarters
in France and western Belgium. As late
as the 22d there were bridges with no
organized defense whatever.
The initial danger, or so it seemed,
was posed by saboteurs, parachutists, or
small motorized detachments masquer-
ading as Americans or Belgian civilians.
The bits of tactical intelligence accumu-
lating as prisoners and documents came
into the forward headquarters indicated
clearly enough that the enemy had
trained and committed special forces to
seize the Meuse crossings. Parachutists
captured behind the forward lines in the
first hours of the battle told lurid tales
of the plans to capture General Eisen-
hower, blow up ammunition dumps, and
destroy radio and telephone installations
and POL pipelines. When a few bona
fide Germans were captured complete
with American uniforms, dog tags, and
jeeps, the word spread through the battle
area and raced from mouth to mouth
back into France.
Rumors, grossly elaborated from the
few bits of fact, quickly jammed the

THE BATTLE BEFORE THE MEUSE 559
roads to Paris and Liège with hundreds
of jeeps carrying enemy saboteurs or
raiding parties in American uniform.
Belgian or French café keepers who for
weeks had been selling vin ordinaire,
watered cognac, and sour champagne to
the GI’s suddenly were elevated by
rumor, suspicion, and hysteria to captaincies
in the Waffen-SS. Ladies of no
certain virtue who so far forgot themselves
as to use some Teutonic phrase
picked up from their clients during the
years of German occupation found themselves
explaining this linguistic lapse to
the military police or Counterintelligence
Corps agents with far more earnestness
than they had ever shown in
justifying a moral lapse to agent or flic.
The American officer who had the misfortune
to appear on the heels of the
most recent rumor in some headquarters
where he was unknown stood a good
chance of being welcomed with a cocked
pistol leveled at his belt buckle. Jeep
drivers who had forgotten their grade
school geography quickly brushed up on
the list of the forty-eight state capitals
after having been stopped six or seven
times by guards who thrust the muzzle of
an M1 into the driver’s seat with a gruff
demand for a quick identification of the
capital of Alabama or Oregon. Field
grade officers tried once to “rank” their
way past a barricade, then resigned
themselves to singing the first bars of
“Mairzy Doats” for the edification of an
adamant young private. And the heavily
wrapped, pregnant farm wife who
wished to cross any bridge found her
delicate condition a cause of considerable
embarrassment both to herself and the
suspicious bridge guards. 2
2 For a Belgian view of the German offensive,
see Paul Levy, Les Heures Rouges des Ardennes
In the first days of the German ad-
vance, security measures along the Meuse
had been handled by the commanders
of installations in the army rear areas.
By the 20th this responsibility, particu-
larly along the Meuse south of Givet,
had been largely handed over to the
Communications Zone and its com-
mander, Lt. Gen. John C. H. Lee.
General Lee’s responsibility of course
reached far west of the Meuse. Guards
had to be provided for the great supply
dumps and headquarters cities, so also
for rail lines, pipelines, supply roads, and
the French telephone and telegraph sys-
tem. Far to the west in Normandy supply
troops went on the alert against a pos-
sible raid by the German garrisons of the
Channel Islands. In Paris, the GI’s
Mecca, soldiers on leave were rounded
up and started back to their units; those
who remained in the City of Light found
night life drastically curtailed by a rig-
idly enforced curfew.
Four engineer general service regi-
ments could be assembled for the Meuse
line but would require some time to
make the move. The commander of the
Oise Intermediate Section of the Com-
munications Zone, Brig. Gen. Charles O.
Thrasher, had two locally available
engineer units, the 354th and 1313th
Engineer General Service Regiments,
and these were organized as Task Force
Thrasher on 20 December, beginning at
once the work of preparing the Meuse
rail and road bridges for demolition.
Shortly afterward General Thrasher was
authorized to blow these bridges if their
(Bruxelles, 1946). It may be added that not a
single act of sabotage at the Meuse crossings
was reported during the entire Ardennes campaign.
Headquarters Advance Section, G–3, History of
Operations: December 1943–1 July 1945.

560 THE ARDENNES: BATTLE OF THE BULGE
capture appeared imminent. 3 Earlier
this decision had rested with the tactical
commands. One can only speculate as to
what would have happened if a German
armored column had kept to schedule
and reached one of the important bridges
before the bridge guards received au-
thority to destroy the span.
On 22 and 23 December, the 342d,
392d, 366th, and 1308th Engineer Regi-
ments took up positions along the Meuse,
reinforced by a field artillery battalion,
a regimental antitank company, and six
French light infantry battalions provided
by the military governor of Metz. These
recently organized French troops were
poorly equipped with a motley collection
of small arms and a few trucks but they
proved very useful in screening the
military and civilian traffic along the
roads leading to the Meuse, both east
and west of the river. All of these troops
and the responsibility for the sector
Givet to Verdun were handed over to the
VIII Corps on the 23d by orders of the
Third Army commander, who by now
had command on the south side of the
Bulge.
Even at this late date Middleton and
Patton had some apprehension that the
enemy columns might make a left wheel
on the east or west bank of the Meuse
and drive for Sedan. There was no
definition of the VIII Corps rear bound-
ary; as the corps commander saw his
responsibility, “a vast area was in-
volved.” Not only were the corps west
flank and rear open to a German turning
3 The more general impact of the Ardennes on
the American supply bases and logistical system
is treated in Roland G. Ruppenthal, Logistical
Support of the Armies, UNITED STATES ARMY
IN WORLD WAR II (Washington, 1959). vol. II,
pp. 181–87.
movement but the main corps supply
line, over which Middleton’s troops were
being re-equipped, could be cut by raids
directed against the Semois and Chiers
Rivers, eastern tributaries of the Meuse.
Corps engineers were stationed at cross-
ings as far west as Bouillon, and the
Semois bridges west of Bouillon that had
not been destroyed by the Germans
during the September retreat were
blown.
The enemy did not turn against the
VIII Corps east-west line, and the added
burden of defending the Meuse between
Givet and Semois, accorded Middleton
on the 23d, rested more lightly when
a part of the 11th Armored Division
reached the west bank on the following
day. This division, moving by forced
marches from Normandy, closed on the
25th; its commander, Brig. Gen. Charles
S. Kilburn, took charge of all troops in
the sector. The 17th Airborne Division,
ordered from the United Kingdom at
the same time as the 11th Armored, was
delayed by bad weather which grounded
its carrier planes. It finally closed at
Charleville on 27 December, by which
date the threat south of Givet had faded.
The German panzer forces, had actu-
ally aimed at crossing the Meuse be-
tween Givet and Liège. Montgomery
had reacted promptly to the danger
posed by the onrushing 1st SS Panzer
Division, but with his 21 Army Group
caught off balance in the middle of its
shift from south to north the plans and
orders of the 19th could be implemented
but slowly and in sketchy form. The
American Communications Zone person-
nel and the few British troops who took
over the bridges were hardly enough to
prepare demolitions, screen the traffic
passing back and forth over the river in

THE BATTLE BEFORE THE MEUSE 561
the large bridgehead cities, and main-
tain patrols, much less make an adequate
defense against any crossing attempt in
force.
As of noon, 21 December, Brig. Gen.
Ewart C. Plank reported that the vital
crossings at Liège, Huy, Namur, and
Givet were guarded only by the 29th
Infantry (a separate regiment assigned
to line of communications duty), two
antiaircraft gun battalions, two antitank
guns, four British scout cars, and a Brit-
ish reconnaissance force of 300 men. The
great bridgehead city of Liège had as
crossing guards only two rifle companies
and two cannon company platoons.
The bridges at Liège and other
nearby points presented a special prob-
lem. The V-bomb barrage directed into
the area and German bombing planes
made any installation of demolition
charges on the bridge structures a haz-
ardous business. Fearful that these im-
portant spans would be prematurely
destroyed by sympathetic explosion, the
engineers could do no more than collect
explosives and detonating devices in the
vicinity of, but not on, the bridges in
question.
Although the crossings north of the
bend in the Meuse still were weakly held
on the 21st, the danger of a successful
enemy penetration beyond the river had
lessened. The movement of the 30 Corps,
begun late on the 19th, was not designed
to erect a linear defense for every yard
of the Meuse line but instead was the
first phase of Field Marshal Montgom-
ery’s plan to create a counterattack force
capable of dealing with any German
columns which might reach and cross the
river. By the afternoon of the 20th the
British 43d Division and an attached
tank brigade were west of Maastricht,
poised to roll up the flank of any pene-
tration across the Meuse.
Next day the new disposition of the
30 Corps was completed. The 29th Ar-
moured Brigade had returned to its
battle-worn tanks and armored cars and
was established along the river between
Namur and Givet. The 2d Household
Cavalry Regiment, already on the river
line for the past twenty-four hours,
crossed the Meuse and pushed reconnais-
sance as far as Marche and Rochefort,
meeting American patrols but no enemy.
By the close of the day, General Horrocks
could decide and did that now it was
possible to hold the enemy at the Meuse
line. The British responsibility, be it
remembered, extended only as far south
as Givet and did not include the actual
defense of the bridges at Liège.
On the night of 23 December a jeep
load of Germans dressed as Americans
appeared at Dinant, one of the few
actual materializations of the oft-
rumored saboteur parties. The jeep and
its crew were captured by a British post.
It was a little late for such tactics. By
this time each of the main crossings–
Givet, Dinant, and Namur–was guarded
by an armored regiment and a rifle
company, and it is a fair assumption that
the opportunity for a German coup de
main in the British-held sector was gone
by the 23d. 4 In the VIII Corps sector
south of Givet the possibility of a sur-
prise stroke still existed on this date, for
there remained a number of weak links
in the Meuse chain, but the odds were
increasing that the defender could at
4 On 23 December Montgomery ordered all
demolition charges removed from the bridges in
the British sector. SHAEF SGS 38 ½ Germany,
German Counter Offensive, vol. I.

562
least enforce delay at the Meuse. There
remained, of course, the possibility that
German armor might reach the Meuse
somewhere along its length in sufficient
strength to gain by force what no longer
could be won easily by stealth or surprise.
The Meuse Seems Within Reach
By Christmas Eve the German coun-
teroffensive showed signs of losing co-
hesion. The outlines of the over-all
strategic plan still were discernible, but
the higher field commands had begun
to extemporize: in a word the German
armies had commenced to “react” to the
moves made by the enemy or in supposi-
THE ARDENNES: BATTLE OF THE BULGE
REFUGEES AT THE DINANT BRIDGE
tion of what those moves might be. True,
some German troops were very close to
the Meuse and the advance to the west
still had considerable momentum, but
the initiative was gradually slipping
from German fingers and could not be
regained unless the German armies held
the Marche plateau as a wider base for
the final drive to and over the Meuse.
A résumé of decisions made in the
higher German headquarters between
22 December and the night of the 24th
will show what was happening. On the
22d OB WEST prepared for Jodl an in-
telligence appreciation which said that a
major Allied counterattack from the
north and south by reserves from the

THE BATTLE BEFORE THE MEUSE 563
U.S. Third and Seventh Armies was un-
likely before 1 January, and that a
“limited” intervention against the flanks
of the Bulge probably could not be
attempted before 28 December. OB
WEST did recognize that the Allies
might assemble a strong force northwest
of the Meuse and assumed that they
would be able to defend the Meuse in
considerable force by 30 December. It
appeared from this analysis that time
still was on the side of the German
armies, time to interject armor from the
Sixth Panzer Army into the columns
driving for the Meuse and to give the
depth to the forces in the van which
Rundstedt now regarded as absolutely
essential. On the 23d a report that the
advance guard of the 2d Panzer Division
was only nine kilometers from the Meuse
flashed to Model, Rundstedt–and Hitler.
MARCHE
The Fuehrer replied with congratula-
tions and, more to the point, released
the 9th Panzer and 15th Panzer Grena-
dier Divisions for free use by OB WEST.
That same evening Model phoned Rund-
stedt to tell of a strong American
counterattack forming to relieve Bas-
togne which must be expected to strike
on 24 December; he, Model, would have
to retain a kampfgruppe of the 15th
Panzer Grenadier for the expanding
battle at Bastogne, but the remainder of
this division and the new 9th Panzer
would be rushed westward to assist the
2d Panzer.
On the morning of the 24th a note of
urgency appeared in the orders coming
out of Model’s command post: the Fifth
Panzer Army must take Bastogne at once
and “lance this boil” in the southern
flank. For this purpose Manteuffel would

564 THE ARDENNES: BATTLE OF THE BULGE
retain a kampfgruppe of the 9th Panzer
southeast of Bastogne as a link with the
Seventh Army, now hard pressed by the
American counterattack from the south.
The sense of urgency heightened as the
day wore on-it can almost be plotted
like a fever chart in the exchanges be-
tween Rundstedt and Model: Rundstedt
demanding that the Sixth Panzer Army
get its armored divisions forward and
alongside Manteuffel’s spearhead before
the Allies can counterattack from both
south and north; Rundstedt ordering
that the Allied forces be destroyed east
of the Meuse before they can organize a
major countereffort; Model telling
Rundstedt that the 2d Panzer has run
short of motor fuel and that he has
ordered the advance guard to march for
the Meuse on foot. (One has the impres-
sion–it can never be verified–that as
tension mounted Model commenced to
turn to the older and more experienced
field marshal for moral support.)
General Manteuffel faced a military
and political dilemma as day drew to a
close on 24 December. Janus-like, his
Fifth Panzer Army faced toward the
Marche plateau and the road to Dinant
and toward Bastogne. Manteuffel later
would say that he saw no opportunity
for a successful battle west of the Meuse
(although he still hoped for military
success east of the river) , but the decision
as to which direction the Fifth Panzer
would throw its weight obviously had
to be made by Hitler himself. This ap-
peal to the highest German authority
was made through various channels by
Manteuffel and his chief of staff,
Wagener, on the 24th and 25th. Hitler’s
order, as relayed to the Fifth Panzer
headquarters by Jodl early on the 25th,
told Manteuffel to put all available forces
into the battle for control of the Marche
plateau. Manteuffel could hardly disen-
gage from Bastogne and turn the fight
over to the Seventh Army (indeed, this
was not the Fuehrer’s intention), but
it was crystal Clear that the 2d Panzer
Division advance guard had to be rein-
forced and the narrow wedge it had
driven toward the Meuse had to be ex-
panded into a pile driver blow to cross
that river. 5
Manteuffel’s immediate tactical prob-
lem had four parts: the road to the
isolated 2d Panzer advance guard must
be reopened, 6 both for tank fuel and
reinforcements; the northern flank of
the salient reaching toward Dinant
would have to be covered at once and in
considerable strength; in the southwest
where signs of an American concentra-
tion were appearing the southern side of
the corridor toward the Meuse must be
barricaded, perhaps as far back as Bas-
togne; finally, the assault front in the
center required greater width and depth
on the Marche plateau. The solution of
this problem demanded more strength
than the Fifth Panzer Army, with its
tail caught in the crack at Bastogne,
could amass.
Manteuffel had been promised at least
three more divisions, Jodl had assured
him that the II SS Panzer Corps was
being rushed forward by the Sixth
Panzer Army to take over the fight on
his right wing east of the Ourthe River,
and he had reason to expect that the
9th Panzer Division would arrive in time
to take part in the attack planned for
5 Manteuffel’s recollections of this period are
very vivid: see MS # B-151a.
6 See Chapter XVIII for the earlier story of the
2d Panzer advance guard.

THE BATTLE BEFORE THE MEUSE 565
Christmas Day. For this attack, pri-
marily designed to reach the “extended
index finger” (as one German report
calls it) formed by the advance detach-
ment of the 2d Panzer in the woods
around Foy–Notre Dame, Manteuffel
counted on a drive by the bulk of the
2d Panzer to reach its cut-off troops while
the Panzer Lehr attacked Humain and
Buissonville to reopen the line of com-
munication.
In addition the Fifth Panzer Army
commander had plans to employ the
divisions already in this northwestern
sector as the vertebrae on which a full-
bodied and integrated salient could be
developed reaching to and overlapping
the Meuse. The right shoulder of the ex-
panding salient would, in Manteuffel’s
plan, be formed by the 116th Panzer
Division. This unit was now in full force
on the west bank of the Ourthe, had
penetrated the American line at Ver-
denne, and was in position to bring
artillery fire on the Hotton-Marche road.
The objective given the 116th Panzer,
therefore, was the town of Baillonville
(north of Marche), from where it could
block an Allied attack southward along
the highway from Liège to Marche. The
9th Panzer Division, upon arrival, was
ticketed to take position on the right of
the Panzer Lehr, thus beefing up the 2d
Panzer attack in the center. This was the
German plan for 25 December.
The Celles Pocket
Although the VII Corps had become
involved in a defensive battle, General
Collins still expected to launch the
corps counterattack which would signal
the beginning of aggressive operations
against the north flank of the Bulge. In
midafternoon on 24 December General
Harmon telephoned the VII Corps
command post and asked permission
to throw another combat command
of his 2d Armored Division against
elements of the 2d Panzer which had
been identified in the neighborhood of
Ciney and Celles. (See Map VIII.) The
corps commander was away from the
command post visiting his divisions; so
the call was taken by the corps artillery
commander, Brig. Gen. Williston B.
Palmer. Palmer knew that the First
Army had attached strings to any whole-
sale commitment of Harmon’s division
and that Hodges’ consent and probably
Montgomery’s would be needed before
more of the 2d Armored was unleashed.
He therefore told Harmon to wait–it
was too late in the day to launch an
attack in any case-until the corps com-
mander reached the 2d Armored com-
mand post. Harmon was persistent and
called again asking for “immediate au-
thority.” Palmer, sorely tempted to give
Harmon the permission he needed, re-
luctantly steeled himself and told Har-
mon to await Collins’ appearance at the
2d Armored command post.
A few minutes later Palmer had a call
from the First Army chief of staff,
General Kean, who said that Collins was
authorized to use all his corps and could
change his defensive line. In guarded
words Kean asked Palmer if he saw “a
town A and a town H” on the map and
then mentioned a “pivoting move.”
Palmer, imbued with Collins’ attack
philosphy and eager to give the green
light to the 2d Armored, looked hastily
at the map spread before him, picked out
two villages southwest of Ciney and
forward of the 2d Armored positions:
Achêne and (Le) Houisse. This looked

566 THE ARDENNES: BATTLE OF THE BULGE
like the go signal for the VII Corps and
an attack to advance its western wing.
Because the wire line to the 2d Armored
command post had gone out, Palmer
sent his aide with a message for Collins
giving his own optimistic interpretation
of the conversation with Kean.
The aide had just departed when
Kean called again. On further reflection,
he said (perhaps Kean had caught a tone
of exultation in Palmer’s voice), he
doubted whether Palmer had under-
stood him correctly. Then came the cold
water douche: “Now get this. I’m only
going to say it once. Roll with the
punch.” Palmer’s glance flicked over the
map, this time to the north; there, thirty
miles to the rear of the villages he had
selected earlier were the towns of An-
denne and Huy. Palmer remembers that
this was the only moment in the war
when he was “ill with disapproval.”
Out went a second messenger with an
explanation of Palmer’s mistake and an
urgent request for Collins to come home.
Collins, who had received the first mes-
sage at Harmon’s command post, was just
giving the finishing touches to an attack
plan for the entire 2d Armored when the
second messenger appeared. Telling
Harmon to “hold everything” but mak-
ing clear that the 2d Armored was to go
ahead with plans for the attack on
Christmas morning, Collins hurried back
to his own headquarters. He arrived
there about 1830 but nothing more could
be done until a liaison officer, promised
by Kean, came in from the First Army.
Two hours later the First Army staff
officer (Col. R. F. Akers) appeared and
confirmed the bad news. Montgomery
and Hodges had agreed to shorten the
First Army line in order to halt the
German advance. The VII corps, there-
fore, was to go on the defensive and its
commander was “authorized” on his
own judgment to drop back to the line
Andenne-Hotton-Manhay. In any case
the VII Corps was to retain a firm con-
tact with the XVIII Airborne Corps,
which that evening was withdrawing to
the Manhay position.
Although General Collins courteously
asked the senior members of his corps
staff to give their opinions on the action
now to be taken by the corps, neither he
nor any of his officers considered giving
over the attack planned for the 2d Ar-
mored. During the day Harmon’s tanks
had inflicted very severe damage on the
German columns; the 84th Division had
experienced some reverses but seemed to
be holding its own. On balance the pic-
ture as seen from the VII Corps’ point of
view was far less gloomy than that ap-
parently prevailing in higher headquar-
ters. Collins recognized that a retrograde
move would strengthen the defenses of
Huy and Liège. He also knew that such
a move would expose Namur and the
major Meuse crossings south of that city,
for example, those at Dinant. The final
decision, made by the corps commander
himself, probably could have been pre-
dicted: on 25 December the 2d Armored
Division would advance as planned; the
corps then would continue with limited
objective attacks to break up any danger-
ous concentration of enemy forces on its
front. 7
The boundary between the VII Corps
and the XVIII Airborne Corps lay
generally along the direct road from
Bastogne to Liège, but this was essen-
7 General Collins had a detailed memorandum
on these events prepared by his staff and later
kindly provided a photostat copy to the author.

THE BATTLE BEFORE THE MEUSE 567
tially an artificial division and coincided
neither with the compartmentalization
of the terrain, naturally divided as it was
by the Ourthe River, nor with the man-
ner in which the German attack was
developing. 8 The ebb and flow of the
battle on Christmas Day may best be
understood by tracing the movements of
three German divisions: the 2d Panzer,
the Panzer Lehr, and the 116th Panzer.
Perhaps it would be more accurate to say
the attempted movements, for the day
came bright and clear, bringing the
American and British air forces into the
skies over the Bulge in one of the greatest
demonstrations of tactical ground sup-
port ever witnessed by American troops.
By the morning of the 25th the ad-
vance kampfgruppe of the 2d Panzer had
been split in two, in part by a loss of
direction during the night march toward
Dinant, in part by the activity of Ameri-
can tank patrols operating out of Ciney,
where CCB of the 2d Armored had
established its base for future operations.
The 2d Panzer reconnaissance battalion
and a part of the German artillery col-
umn had bivouacked near Foy–Notre
Dame, only four or five miles from the
bridges at Dinant. Major Cochenhausen,
who commanded the main column, in-
cluding a tank battalion and a regiment
of panzer grenadiers, halted at daylight
in the woods southwest of Conneaux–
perhaps 5,000 meters behind the detach-
ment in Foy–Notre Dame.
Lauchert, the division commander,
8 The present chapter will be concerned only
with the battles fought by those troops of the
VII Corps which were west of Hotton on 25
December. The next chapter will deal with the
remaining combat elements of Collins’ corps as
these played their part in the XVIII Airborne
Corps’ fight farther east.
was acutely aware of the perilous situa-
tion confronting his forward troops and
knew they had to be reinforced and
resupplied at once. His orders, however,
were to use the rest of his division to
protect the right flank of Luettwitz’
XLVII Panzer Corps in the Marche sec-
tor until the incoming 9th Panzer
Division could take over the task. Since
the Americans in and around Marche
seemed quiet, Lauchert proposed to
Luettwitz that he be relieved of this
security mission. While Panzer Lehr
attacked west of Marche to reopen the
road, Lauchert wanted to switch the
main body of his division back through
Rochefort, then push northwest to the
troops in what German reports already
were calling the Conneaux Pocket. At
first Luettwitz would not listen to the
importunate Lauchert. Probably the re-
fusal made no difference. As Lauchert
himself admits, the air was so thick with
Allied Jabos that his tactical units could
not move during the daylight hours, nor
was there a German interceptor plane
to be seen this far to the west.
In the early afternoon Manteuffel and
his chief of staff visited General Luett-
witz. The latter once more proposed that
the forward echelons of the 2d Panzer
be withdrawn-although he was well
aware that such a decision was beyond
the power of the Fifth Army commander
-and once again was refused. Something
might be done, however. Since a kampf-
gruppe of the 9th Panzer was finally at
hand and could be used to relieve
Lauchert in the Hargimont sector facing
Marche, the 2d Panzer commander re-
ceived permission to carry out his relief
operation. All day long radio reports
from Cochenhausen had told of bitter
fighting, heavy losses at the hands of

568 THE ARDENNES: BATTLE OF THE BULGE
Allied planes and tanks, dwindling am-
munition, and no fuel. Now, just as
Lauchert had his orders in hand, he
heard that radio contact with the force
cut off at Foy—Notre Dame had ceased.
The attack mapped out by Collins and
Harmon late the previous afternoon was
launched by CCB at 0800 on Christmas
Day, the idea a double-pronged sweep to
capture Celles and annihilate the Ger-
man armor believed to be thereabouts. 9
For this maneuver General White di-
vided his command into two task forces.
Task Force A (Lt. Col. Harry Hillyard)
had its line of departure on the Achene
road and orders to take the Bois de
Geauvelant, a large wood some thousand
meters across, which lay midway between
Achene and Celles. It was to assemble
for the final assault on high ground
northwest of Celles. Task Force B (Maj.
Clifton B. Batchelder) , starting its
move near Leignon, was to make the
main envelopment and cut off Celles on
the southeast. The 82d Armored Recon-
naissance Battalion went in on the open
right flank of the attack to screen toward
the west and as far forward as the Lesse
River, south of Celles. CCB would be
supported by artillery emplaced west of
Ciney and by both American and British
fighter-bombers.
Task Force A, medium tanks to the
front, went through the Bois de Geauve-
lant with almost no opposition. As it
debouched it came under fire from a
little farm near Foy–Notre Dame and
9 For the American sources used in this chapter
see the bibliographical notes included in the foot-
notes to Chapter XVIII. There are a number of
combat interviews covering the 2d Armored Divi-
sion during this period. General Harmon’s own
story is told in an article entitled, “We Gambled
in the Battle of the Bulge,” The Saturday Eve-
ning Post (October 2, 1948).
lost three half-tracks. The 370th Fighter
Group of the IX Tactical Air Command,
flying in support of CCB, then flushed
out four Panther tanks and put them
out of action, at least temporarily. The
column again drew fire near Boisselles,
but two platoons of the 67th Armored
Regiment moved in and destroyed three
Panthers doing the shooting. By the
middle of the afternoon Task Force A
reached the high ground overlooking
Celles, blocking the roads to the west
and southwest. Task Force B had a brief
battle at Conjoux, then rushed on–
knocking out isolated tanks and guns–
until it arrived on the ridge 1,300 yards
southeast of Celles.
The British 29th Armoured Brigade
was conducting its own private battle
west of Foy–Notre Dame while pushing
reconnaissance toward the Lesse River.
The British knocked out three Panthers
and some infantry near Sorinne, then
shot up more German vehicles and took
prisoners around Foy–Notre Dame. In
the skirmish near Boisselles a few tanks
of the British 3d Royal Tank Regiment
and some British gunners gave a hand to
Task Force A. 10
Meanwhile the 82d Reconnaissance
Battalion had run into the remnants of
the 2d Panzer reconnaissance battalion
at Foy–Notre Dame (part of this group
had escaped eastward to rejoin the main
force huddled in the woods northeast of
Celles) . These Germans intended to
make a fight of it, though at first sight
Foy–Notre Dame seemed a peaceful
farming village-nothing more. When a
10 British participation is acknowledged in the
CCB AAR, 25 December 1944. See also MS, 30
Corps, Operations during the German Attack in
the Ardennes, December 1944–January 1945 in
Hist Div ETOUSA files.

THE BATTLE BEFORE THE MEUSE 569
platoon from the 82d moved in, the
enemy began a fusillade of antitank and
machine gun fire from hidden positions.
Worse, four Panthers on high ground
just south of the village took a hand.
The American cavalry suffered some
casualties, but Sergeant Rogers used
his assault gun to charge a German
antitank gun in the middle of the village
and the mop-up began. The four Pan-
thers were brought under fire by Brit-
ish gunners, then finally destroyed by
air attack. (Probably these were the
tanks which had struck Task Force A
near the Bois de Geauvelant.) This
skirmish marked the end of the German
reconnaissance battalion: the com-
mander and 147 others were captured,
and much of its remaining equipment
was taken.
When General White’s two task forces
finally sent tanks into Celles they met
little resistance. At first it seemed empty
except for the townspeople who had
gathered in the church; later some 200
dispirited prisoners were rounded up in
and near the town. With the capture of
Celles the string was drawn on the bag
in the forest between that town and
Conjoux. Harmon ordered CCB to turn
back the next morning and give the
coup de grâce to the trapped enemy.
Although Christmas Day had brought
much sporadic action and occasional
flare-ups like the fight at Foy–Notre
Dame the main German pocket simply
had been bypassed. It is known that
Cochenhausen’s tanks had very little
gasoline, probably not enough to permit
any appreciable skirmishing or tactical
movement, but the German sluggishness
in the pocket may be credited to the
gunners supporting CCB, the army pilots
in their “flying OP’s,” and the close co-
ordination between the artillery and the
fighter-bombers of the 370th Fighter
Group and Royal Air Force 83 Group.
At noon, for example, a spotter plane
picked up a column of seven enemy
tanks north of Celles–all were destroyed
by artillery fire. Twelve P–38’s and an
unknown number of British Typhoons,
taking time out only to replenish fuel
tanks and ammunition racks, worked
over the woods where lay Cochen-
hausen’s command and strafed roads and
trails whenever vehicles showed signs of
making a break for it.
What of the German efforts to reach
Cochenhausen’s force? Two small forays
were attempted during the day by the
Panzer Lehr, whose commander had
dispatched tanks along the Custinne
road toward Celles, but these efforts
were foiled by the ubiquitous Allied
planes. That night the kampfgruppe
with which the 2d Panzer had been
blocking in the Hargimont sector was
relieved by the 9th Panzer, and Lauchert
finally was free to attempt Cochen-
hausen’s relief. The force which he led
from the Rochefort road through the
Bois de Famenne and Ciergnon was not
likely to give much confidence of suc-
cess: a company or two of tanks, a bat-
talion of armored infantry, a light
artillery battalion, two companies of
engineers, and part of a flak battalion.
The Germans had neared the twin
villages of Petite and Grande Trisogne,
little more than a mile from Celles, when
they saw the ridge ahead “crawling with
tanks.” (These may have been British
tanks because the 29th Armoured Bri-
gade was blocking behind the CCB
lines.) 11 The 2d Panzer never got to
11 CCB AAR, 26 Dec 44.

570 THE ARDENNES: BATTLE OF THE BULGE
launch an attack, for the American guns
opened “a hellish fire” (their targets
spotted-as Lauchert later recalled-by
five artillery planes). Then to top this
came the P–38’s and Typhoons. On
nearby roads more Allied tanks hove in
sight but made no concerted attack.
Lauchert’s group was saved by an order
radioed from the XLVII Panzer Corps:
he was to return to Rochefort at once;
the troops in the pocket would have to
destroy their vehicles, leave their
wounded, and get out on foot. A Panzer
Lehr attempt to reach the pocket via
Custinne on 26 December was equally
futile, and for the same reasons. Bayer-
lein’s kampfgruppe–at no time in the
battles on the Marche front did the
Panzer Lehr commander have his entire
division in hand-also was ordered back
to Rochefort during the night of 26
December.
The story of the 2d Panzer pocket is
quickly told. CCB spent two days clear-
ing the thick woods and dense under-
brush between Celles and Conjoux. The
procedure was simple and effective: first,
heavy shelling on a given area, then a
slow, methodical advance by the infantry
line backed with the tanks. In an exten-
sion of the Bois de Geauvelant, where
tanks could operate with some freedom,
an armored sweep was made which
killed about 150 of the enemy. In the
main forest near Celles a final squeeze
produced 200 prisoners, 12 guns, and 80
vehicles of various types to add to the
larger bag. Nonetheless many of the
German troops did succeed in escaping
on foot. Major von Cochenhausen and
nearly 600 of his men ultimately reached
Rochefort, but all the equipment of the
reconnaissance battalion, the 304th Pan-
zer Grenadier Regiment, the 2d Battal-
ion of the 3d Panzer Regiment, three
artillery battalions, and two-thirds of the
division flak battalion had to be left
behind. 12
The Fight at Humain
The 2d Armored Division’s “limited
objective” attack, so carefully planned
for Christmas Day, included a drive by
CCA straight south from Buissonville on
the paved highway to Rochefort, there to
relieve the battalion of the 84th Division.
This move never was carried through,
although Harmon did not learn that the
Rochefort troops had escaped until early
afternoon. Instead CCA and the 4th
Cavalry Group were caught up in a quite
unexpected battle whose focal point was
Humain, east of Buissonville. During
the night of 24 December Troop A of
the 24th Cavalry Squadron occupied
Humain as an outpost for the CCA
assembly area at Buissonville. But the
troopers had short tenure in Humain,
for across the lines the Panzer Lehr was
gathering its few tanks to break the
American stranglehold on the throat of
the 2d Panzer spearhead. Bayerlein di-
vided his Panthers into two assault
groups: a platoon, supported by a rifle
company, to seize Humain; a company,
reinforced by an understrength rifle bat-
talion, to drive on the left for Havrenne,
then Buissonville.
The German blow struck Humain at
first light, driving the cavalry out of
town. The attack to the west rolled past
the burned-out relics of the American
12 The dramatic end of the hopes nourished for
the 2d Panzer and Panzer Lehr find expression in
very detailed recollections by Lauchert; Bayerlein,
MSS # A-941, A-943, and A-944; and Luettwitz,
MSS # A-938 and A-940.

THE BATTLE BEFORE THE MEUSE 571
successes of the day before– 2d Panzer
trucks, many armored cars, half-tracks,
and, near Havrenne, the guns of an
entire artillery battalion. Havrenne be-
ing empty, the German column moved
on toward Buissonville, Here a ruse was
tried and worked. A German officer in
American uniform went forward to the
two Sherman tanks guarding the bridge
over which the Havrenne road entered
Buissonville; so effective an actor was he
that the tank crews obeyed without ques-
tion his order that they return to their
bivouac. Four of the German tanks actu-
ally crossed the bridge at daylight, but
were driven out by fire from the CCA
tanks’ guns. On the heels of this skirm-
ish, the leading CCA task force started
down the road for Rochefort. Near
Havrenne the Panther company at-
tempted to make a stand but was out-
gunned and lost five tanks. Havrenne
fell to the Americans, but CCA discon-
tinued the advance toward Rochefort
for by this time it was known that the
friendly infantry there had escaped.
Meanwhile a considerable threat was
looming on the exposed flank at Hu-
main.
Col. John C. MacDonald’s 4th Cavalry
Group had set about retaking Humain,
but his light tanks and tank destroyers
were no match for the heavier German
Panthers; nor could the American assault
guns get a direct shot at them, shielded
as they were behind the stone walls of
the village. MacDonald tried a dis-
mounted assault, but this failed. Artil-
lery was unable to dislodge the enemy.
Late in the afternoon Harmon sent a
company of medium tanks to assist the
24th Cavalry Squadron. One last attack
was made in the waning daylight-this,
too, made no headway. At midnight
General Collier, on his own cognizance,
ordered the American cavalry to with-
draw, blocking the roads to the north and
east lest the enemy erupt toward Marche.
When the 26th dawned the defenders
had a fresh force in the town. Panzer
Lehr, it will be remembered, had been
relieved during the night by the 9th
Panzer to engage in the sortie toward
Celles. The 9th Panzer Division (Brig.
Gen. Elverfeldt) had been brought from
Holland on 22 December. In view of its
exposure to air attack and delays while
it waited along the road for tank fuel the
division had made very good time, albeit
arriving in the battle line a day behind
schedule. A veteran of the Arnhem and
Aachen battles (it had opposed the 84th
Infantry Division at Geronsweiler in the
north), the 9th Panzer may have had as
many as 90 tanks and 35 self-propelled
assault guns or tank destroyers. Appar-
ently the division artillery regiment did
not arrive until three or four days later.
When the first march column reached
the line on the afternoon of the 25th it
deployed south of Marche, there taking
over the Marloie-Hedree blocking posi-
tion held by the 2d Panzer.
As more troops arrived the 9th Panzer
extended westward, thus including
Humain in its bailiwick, but Elverfeldt’s
fresh division had more than a defensive
mission. Although Luettwitz intended to
employ this new armor to nourish the
drive westward, it is questionable
whether the XLVII Panzer Corps com-
mander had anything more in mind than
the defeat of the American armor east
of the Meuse when he gave the 9th
Panzer its orders on the night of 25
December: attack from the Humain sec-
tor and take Buissonville.
About 0700 the cavalry observation

572
posts north of Humain saw tanks defiling
from the town onto the Havrenne-Buis-
sonville road. This word was flashed to
the 2d Armored command post where
Harmon ordered Col. Carl Hutton, the
division artillery commander, to fire a
“serenade” (a TOT) on Humain with
all the 155-mm. and 8-inch battalions in
range “right away.” The avalanche of
heavy shells falling in Humain did not
disrupt the German attack formation en
route to Havrenne but may have pre-
vented its prompt reinforcement. The
engagement at Havrenne began within
a half-hour, carried by fifteen Panther
tanks and a battalion of grenadiers from
the 10th Panzer Grenadier riding in
armored half-tracks. At the edge of the
village the German infantry took over
the initial assault, only to be beaten off
by tank guns, tank destroyers, and artil-
lery. Company I of the 66th Armored
Regiment, with its attached platoons of
infantry and tank destroyers, met and
threw back three separate attacks during
the day. The job was made easier by the
capture of the German attack plan and
the warm attention paid Humain–the
German sally port–by Hutton’s artillery
and MacDonald’s light armor, the latter
engaged in shooting up the thin-skinned
half-tracks bringing reinforcements into
Humain.
It may seem strange that the 9th Pan-
zer, with fresh troops and close to its full
tank complement, did not press the at-
tack against CCA. But the 9th, like the
2d Panzer and Panzer Lehr before it,
was fighting with one arm behind its
back. Luettwitz, gravely concerned that
the Americans might break through west
of Bastogne and surge north to cut off the
divisions in the salient beyond Roche-
fort, turned the blocking position at
THE ARDENNES: BATTLE OF THE BULGE
Rochefort over to the 9th Panzer, leaving
that division with its line bent at a right
angle.
All through the night of 26 December
the medium and heavy calibers of the 2d
Armored Division artillery blasted away
at the Germans in Humain. The town
had to be retaken, for it presented a con-
tinuing point of entry into the left flank
of the 2d Armored. But as part of the
larger VII Corps’ scheme, Harmon had
the task of carrying forward the Ameri-
can front to the east-west line of the
L’Homme and Lesse Rivers. For this
general advance Harmon brought up
CCR (Col. Sidney R. Hinds), which had
been waiting at Hogne since Christmas
Day, and attached it to Collier’s CCA.
Collier ordered CCR to take on the
Panthers in Humain and sent CCA to
clear the large forested area and the
roads running south to Rochefort and
L’Homme. CCB was thus left in the west
to eradicate the last remnants of the
Celles pocket while extending patrols,
in co-operation with the British 29th
Armoured Brigade–all of its troops now
east of the Meuse–to the line of the
Lesse River.
To trap the Humain garrison, Colonel
Hinds made his attack on the morning
of the 27th with tanks circling south,
east, and west of the town, and the ar-
mored infantry moving in from the
north. The 2d Battalion (Lt. Col. Lem-
uel E. Pope) of the 67th Armored Regi-
ment had isolated Humain by 1015 but
found the Panthers missing, driven out
during the night by the artillery bom-
bardment. There remained considerable
bite in the Humain defenders and
they momentarily halted the Amer-
ican tank column led by Pope.
Pope went to the head of the column,

THE BATTLE BEFORE THE MEUSE 573
2D ARMORED DIVISION INFANTRYMEN MOVING TO NEW POSITIONS durng the fight
for Humain.
reorganized the formation under in-
tense fire, and started the attack
moving again. (Colonel Pope was
awarded the DSC.) By noon CCR was
in Humain, where it took another ten
hours to clear the houses of the 150
grenadiers who had been left behind.
Even while this fight was in progress
Harmon telephoned Collier to “go to the
river with abandon.”
This was not quite the end of the
three-day battle. An artillery spotter
plane flying over Hargimont in the early
afternoon saw a column of German ve-
hicles gathering for a march down the
Humain road. It seems rather appropri-
ate that this last effort against the 2d
Armored should have been dealt with
by the fighter-bombers whose co-opera-
tion had contributed in striking measure
to the 2d Armored successes before the
Meuse. Fourteen P–38’s from the 379th
Fighter Group struck Hargimont and,
as a cavalry outpost happily reported,
“gave them everything they had.” Two
more flights were vectored in: “much
flame and smoke observed.” As a final
and fitting gesture of Allied co-operation
it may be noted that CCR, faced with a
stubborn hold-out detachment in a large
château east of Humain, called on the
flame-throwing Crocodile tanks of the

574 THE ARDENNES: BATTLE OF THE BULGE
Scottish Fife and Forfar Yeomanry to
apply the finishing touch to the fight for
Humain. 13
The ill-fated battle of the XLVII
Panzer Corps in front of Dinant was
ended. Luettwitz had new orders: his
corps must make one final, all-out effort
to take Bastogne, leaving a minimum
force in the Rochefort area to guard its
back. Across the lines, on 28 December,
the 83d Infantry Division and the Brit-
ish 53d Division began to replace the 2d
Armored Division combat commands. 14
By 31 December the 2d Armored was in
billets, belatedly eating its Christmas
dinner. During the brief operation east
of the Meuse the 2d Armored Division
had racked up a considerable tally: 1,213
prisoners taken, 82 tanks, 83 guns, and
441 vehicles captured or destroyed. The
American losses in armor were light: 5
light tanks and 22 mediums. The fight
had cost the 2d Armored Division and its
attached units 17 killed, 26 missing, and
201 wounded-an illuminating commen-
tary on the use by a veteran formation of
the combined arms, the impossibility of
striking power inherent in the piecemeal
tactics employed by the enemy, the lack
of a strong German artillery to counter
the weight of metal always available to
the Americans, and the complete absence
of German attack planes in skies ruled
by the American and British fighter-
bombers.
13 CCR AAR, 27 Dec 44.
14 The 2d Armored still was in contact with the
enemy on 28 December. Pvt. C. W. Dilling-
ham was given the DSC for bravery in breaking
through a defended roadblock with his tank; Pfc.
F. S. Rose was given the DSC for crawling with a
broken leg for one and a half miles through snow
and cold to bring aid to his mortally, wounded
scout section leader after their jeep had hit a
double Teller mine.
The Fight at Verdenne
On the night of 24 December the 84th
Infantry Division was deployed along an
arc of some twelve miles reaching from
Hogne, northwest of Marche, through
Waha, south of Marche, thence bowing
back to the northeast in front of the
Marche-Hotton road. 15 On the right, the
4th Cavalry Group formed a screen mask-
ing the infantry line. The center at the
moment was quiet, but on the left the
116th Panzer Division had broken
through the outpost line and despite the
successful American counterattack made
late in the afternoon still held an en-
trant position at Verdenne.
The 116th Panzer faced a lone battle
as it prepared to carry out the Fifth
Panzer Army orders for attack westward.
Thus far the fighting on its right in the
sector east of the Ourthe River had not
gone too well; neither the 2d SS Panzer
nor the 560th Volks Grenadier Division
managing to gain ground on the 24th.
To the left the attention of the 2d Pan-
zer was centered on Foy–Notre Dame
and Celles far to the west. Nonetheless
so long as Luettwitz’ armor had any
chance of breaking through to the Meuse
the 116th had to continue its attack to
breach the American defenses north of
Marche and press forward as a covering
shell for the drive to Dinant.
General Bolling knew that some Ger-
mans still were around Verdenne on the
night of 24 December, but the 84th Di-
vision was unaware that the enemy had
slipped on into the woods between
Verdenne and Bourdon until a lucky
fluke revealed the new threat. About
15 Sources used in this section are the same as
those cited in Chapter XVIII.

THE BATTLE BEFORE THE MEUSE 575
midnight Companies A and K of the
334th Infantry and Company L, 333d
Infantry, started along the woods trails
and byroads to converge in a night as-
sault against Verdenne. Moving in from
the west, Company K took a wrong turn
and suddenly bumped into a column of
six or eight tanks. Sgt. Donald Phelps,
marching at the point, went forward to
check the lead tank. Suddenly a figure
leaning out of the tank shouted, “Halt!”
Phelps, recognizing the German accent,
took a snap shot at the figure who
screamed as the bullet struck. The
German tanks opened fire with not only
their machine guns but their main arma-
ment, and the American infantry file hit
the dirt. Severely lacerated before it
could break away, the remaining forty
men of Company K joined the main as-
sault against Verdenne an hour later.
The Germans inside Verdenne had
been softened by an intense preparatory
shelling and the American infantry suc-
ceeded in getting clear through the
village–although fighting resumed in
daylight with the dangerous task of house
clearing. One enemy tank showed up
during the night, but Sgt. E. T. Rein-
eke killed the tank commander with
a rifle ball, then tossed a grenade into the
open turret. More American infantry
arrived in the morning, and by the end
of Christmas Day 289 Germans had
surrendered.
The seizure of Verdenne cast a loop
around the German tanks and infantry
in the woods north of the village. At
noon on Christmas Day a tank company
from the 16th Panzer Regiment tried an
assault in staggered formation against
Verdenne but found Company B of the
771st Tank Battalion waiting and lost
nine tanks–its entire complement.
Waldenburg still had hopes that the de-
tachment in the woods could be saved,
for during the day the Fuehrer Begleit
Brigade came in on his right, freeing
the troops he had deployed to watch
Hampteau and the Hotton approaches.
More than this, Waldenburg apparently
expected to use the wedge which would
be created in reaching the pocket as a
means of splitting the Marche-Hotton
line and starting the major advance west-
ward.
The area in which the Germans were
hemmed posed a very neat problem in
minor tactics. It was about 800 yards by
300, densely wooded, and shaped with
an inner declivity somewhat like a serv-
ing platter. Guns beyond the rim could
not bring direct fire on the targets inside,
and tanks rolling down into the pocket
would be exposed before they could
train their weapons. Tanks inside the
pocket would be in the same position if
they moved up and over the edge. As-
sault by infantry could be met with tank
fire whether the assault went into or
came out of the pocket.
Just such an assault was the first tried
by the 333d Infantry, which put Com-
panies A and B into a predawn attack
on 26 December. The American skir-
mish line, its movements given away by
the snow crackling under foot, took a
number of casualties and was beaten
back, but it gave some test of the enemy
strength, now estimated to be two rifle
companies and five tanks. Actually most
of the Germans in the 1st Battalion, 60th
Panzer Grenadier Regiment, took part in
the fighting at the pocket or in attempted
infiltration through the woods to join
their comrades there. One such relief
party, led by a tank platoon, did cut its
way in on the morning of the 26th. Now

576 THE ARDENNES: BATTLE OF THE BULGE
that the enemy had been reinforced the
333d Infantry decided to try the artillery,
although not before Colonel Pedley had
been given brass-bound assurance that
the gunners would lay their pieces with
such minute precision as to miss the
friendly infantry edging the pocket.
Through the rest of the day an 8-inch
howitzer battalion and a battalion of
155’s hammered the target area, intent
on jarring the panzers loose, while a
chemical mortar company tried to burn
them out.
On 27 December patrols edged their
way into the pocket, to find nothing but
abandoned tanks. The previous evening
General Waldenburg heard that the
Fuehrer Begleit Brigade was being taken
away from his right flank and that he
must go over to the defensive at once.
Still in radio contact with the pocket,
Waldenburg ordered the troops there to
come out, synchronizing their move with
an attack at dusk which would be made
toward Ménil, northeast of Verdenne.
Perhaps the feint at Ménil served its
purpose-in any event most of the gren-
adiers made their escape, riding out on
the tanks still capable of movement.
Although this last sortie against Ménil
was only a ruse, Ménil and the surround-
ing area had been the scene of bitter
fighting and stubborn German attacks
on 26 December. Krueger, the LVIII
Panzer Corps commander, saw in the
newly arrived Fuehrer Begleit an oppor-
tunity to carve the Hotton garrison,
which had been so effectively barring
his advance over the Ourthe, down to
size. The villages of Hotton, Hampteau,
and Ménil form a triangle, Hampteau
being the apex of the triangle, if this is
pictured as projecting toward the
German lines. Krueger’s plan was to
smash through Hampteau, grab the
ridge running back to the west where it
overlooked Hotton and Ménil, and take
Hotton by attack from the rear, that is,
the west bank of the river. Success at
Hotton would permit the 116th Panzer
to peel the American flank back from the
Marche road.
The first contingent from the Fuehrer
Begleit came into the line opposite
Hampteau at noon, deployed, and at
1400 hit Company G of the 334th Infan-
try, which was guarding the Hampteau
bridge site. This attack seems to have
been poorly organized (prisoners said
that the attack formation had been
wrecked in the assembly area by artillery
fire). In any event it crumbled under
the shells of tank destroyers and the 84th
Division artillery. This proved to be the
single pinch-hit performance of the
Fuehrer Begleit, for later in the after-
noon it was ordered out of the line and
sent marching for Bastogne.
At 1830 the German attack shifted
toward Ménil, conducted as an envelop-
ment on the east and west by infantry
and tanks of the 116th Panzer. The
western blade of the scissors ran into
trouble when the tanks leading the at-
tacking column were forced off the road
by a daisy-chain of antitank mines. While
attempting to re-form, the tanks were
suddenly assailed by salvo fire from three
field artillery battalions. Six tanks fell
prey to the American cannoneers and the
attack collapsed. Later the enemy made
a demonstration here as part of Walden-
burg’s feint. On the east side of the town
the assault had to be made across 500
yards of bare ground. The enemy fusil-
iers bravely attempted the passage, at-
tempted it several times during the
course of two hours, but unprotected

THE BATTLE BEFORE THE MEUSE
flesh and blood were no match for the
2,000 rounds of high explosive which
the 326th Field Artillery Battalion
poured down on this killing ground.
By the morning of 27 December the
whole Marche-Hotton front had quieted.
In the enemy lines the crippled and
demoralized 116th Panzer licked its
wounds and dug defensive works while
its neighbor on the left, the XLVII Pan-
zer Corps, retired to a shortened position
in order to free men and tanks for the
577
new fight brewing at Bastogne. The
84th Infantry Division sent out patrols
and counted its prisoners—592 for the
Verdenne engagement. The entire oper-
ation as part of the VII Corps cost the
84th Division 112 killed, 122 missing,
and 348 wounded. On New Year’s Day
the 84th was relieved by the British 53d
Division and moved north, prepared to
team once again with the 2d Armored
Division–but this time for the offensive.

CHAPTER XXIII
The Battle Between the Salm
and the Ourthe
24 December - 2 January
The Sixth Panzer Army had begun the
Ardennes counteroffensive with two dis-
tinct missions in hand: the first, to cross
the Meuse River between Liège and
Huy as a prelude to the seizure of Ant-
werp; the second, to wheel a cordon of
divisions onto a blocking line extending
due east of Liège to cover the depth of
the advancing army and to deny incom-
ing Allied reinforcements the use of the
highway complex southeast of Liège.
Constricted by the American grip on the
Elsenborn Ridge “door post” (as the
German High Command called this PO-
sition), the Sixth Panzer Army had
bumped and jostled some of its divisions
past Elsenborn and on toward the west,
but had failed to achieve the momentum
and maneuver room requisite to the as-
signed missions. The armored gallop for
the Meuse had foundered on the north
bank of the Amblève River when Pei-
per’s mobile task force from the 1st SS
Panzer Division had run squarely against
the 30th Infantry Division. The 12th SS
Panzer Division, supposed originally to
be running mate with the 1st SS Panzer,
had become involved in a costly and
time-consuming fight to budge the Amer-
ican “door post,” failing thereby to keep
its place in the German scheme of ma-
neuver. Therefore, the task-and glory
–of leading the drive across the Meuse
had passed to the Fifth Panzer Army.
But General Sepp Dietrich’s SS forma-
tions had failed quite as signally to
achieve the second mission-to create the
blocking line east of Liège. Left free to
deploy along the proliferating highway
system southeast of Liège, the Americans
had been able to throw two fresh corps
into defensive array along the Salm, the
Ourthe, the Lesse, and L’Homme Riv-
ers, thus still further obstructing the ad-
vance of the Sixth Panzer and, more im-
portant, endangering the exposed right
flank of the Fifth Panzer as it maneu-
vered before the Meuse. (See Map
VIII.)
By 24 December the westernmost
armored columns of the Fifth Panzer
Army had been slowed to a walk quite
literally, for the OB WEST orders on
that date called for the advance toward
the Meuse “to proceed on foot.” In part
the loss of momentum arose from sup-
ply failure, but basically the slowing
process stemmed from the failure of the
Sixth Panzer Army to form a protected
corridor for its neighbor to the south

THE BATTLE BETWEEN THE SALM AND THE OURTHE 579
and so to cover the flank, the rear, and
the line of communications for Man-
teuffel’s salient.
It was apparent by the 24th to all of
the higher German commanders that the
advance must be strengthened in depth
and-if possible-enlarged by pushing
out the northern flank on the Marche
plateau. German intelligence sources
now estimated that the Allies were in
the process of bringing a total of four
armored and seven infantry divisions
against the northern flank between the
Salm and Meuse Rivers. The Sixth Pan-
zer Army had to transfer its weight to
the west. Hitler, who had been adamant
that Sepp Dietrich should drive the
Americans back from the Elsenborn posi-
tion, finally granted permission on 24
December to give over the battle there
and move in second-line divisions ca-
pable only of defensive action. Rund-
stedt already had gone on record that it
was “useless” to keep five divisions in the
Elsenborn sector. Neither Rundstedt nor
Model had completely given up hope
that the point of the Sixth Panzer Army
might shake free and start moving again,
for the German successes in the Vielsalm
area at the expense of the American
XVIII Airborne Corps promised much
if Dietrich could reinforce his troops on
this western flank. Nonetheless, the main
play still would be given the Fifth Pan-
zer Army.
The orders passed to Dietrich for 24
December were that his attack forces in
the Salm River sector should push hard
toward the northwest to seize the high
ground extending from the swampy
plateau of the Hohes Venn southwest
across the Ourthe River. In the opinion
of Rundstedt’s staff the Fifth Panzer
Army was at tactical disadvantage be-
cause its westernmost divisions, which
had followed the level path of the Fam-
enne Depression at Marche and Roche-
fort, were under attack from American
forces holding command of the high
ground on the Marche plateau to the
north. It therefore seemed essential for
the Sixth Panzer to establish itself on the
same high ground if it was to relieve the
pressure on Manteuffel’s open and en-
dangered north flank. In theory the
strategic objectives of the Sixth Panzer
were Liège and Eupen, but the German
war diaries show clearly that Rundstedt
(and probably Model) hoped only that
Dietrich could wheel his forward divi-
sions into a good position on defensible
ground from which the Fifth Panzer
Army could be covered and supported. 1
On the morning of 24 December the
Sixth Panzer Army was deployed in an
uneven stairstep line descending south-
west from the boundary with the Fif-
teenth Army (near Monschau) to the
Ourthe River, newly designated as the
dividing line between the Fifth and
Sixth. In the Monschau-Höfen sector the
LXVII Corps held a north-south line,
the corps’ front then bending at a right
1 Model’s suicide, later in the war, permits in-
terpretations by his superiors and subordinates
which may or may not be in accord with the
facts. Even so, the OB WEST KTB does provide
a reasonable guide to Model’s conduct of the
Ardennes operation in these last days of the
offensive. Also, the OB WEST/IC-Tagesmeldungen
reveal what information on the Allied dispositions
and intentions was available to Model. A further
check is provided by a series of postwar interro-
gations involving Rundstedt and Jodl. For the
former see CSDIC (U.K.) # GRGG330, SRGG
1332 and SRGG 1334 (these interrogations date
from July and August 1945). Jodl was interro-
gated by the USFET Historical Division before
his execution: MS ETHINT–51 (Jodl). See also
the testimony of Jodl’s aide in MS ETHINT–34
(Buecks) .

580 THE ARDENNES: BATTLE OF THE BULGE
angle past the Elsenborn ridge line. This
corps front coincided almost exactly with
that of the American V Corps. The I SS
Panzer Corps continued the German line
west along the Amblève River where
it faced the reinforced 30th Infantry
Division, but at the juncture of the
Amblève and the Salm the line bent
south at a sharp angle, following the east
bank of the latter river as far as Vielsalm.
This section of the German line opposite
the 82d Airborne Division was poorly
manned. The 1st SS Panzer Division
(the only division available to the
corps) had put troops across both the
Amblève and Salm, but by the 24th the
1st SS, already badly beaten, was able to
do little more than patrol its corner
position.
The fall of St. Vith had opened the
way for the westernmost corps of the
Sixth Panzer Army to form a base of
attack running generally west from Viel-
salm and the Salm River to the cross-
roads at Baraque de Fraiture (Parker’s
Crossroads). This corps, the II SS Pan-
zer, had relieved the 560th Volks Gren-
adier Division of its attack against the
south front of the 82d Airborne and 3d
Armored Divisions, the 560th sideslip-
ping further west to take over the front,
facing elements of the 3d Armored Divi-
sion between the Aisne and Ourthe
Rivers. The diagonal course of the Our-
the valley and the broken nature of the
ground lying east of it posed an organ-
ization and command problem for both
Germans and Americans. Those ele-
ments of the 3d Armored east of the
Ourthe, though belonging to Collins’
VII Corps, were actors in the story of
the XVIII Airborne Corps. The same
lack of neat accord between battle roles
and order of battle listings was reflected
on the German side of the line. There
the LVIII Panzer Corps, forming the
right wing tip of the Fifth Panzer Army,
lay astride the Ourthe with its armor
(the 116th Panzer) on the west bank
and the bulk of its infantry (the 560th
Yolks Grenadier Division) on the east
bank, echeloned in front of the incoming
II SS Panzer Corps.
When, on the night of 22 December,
the advance guard of Bittrich’s II SS
Panzer Corps first descended on the
American-held crossroads at Baraque de
Fraiture, General Bittrich had only one
regiment of the 2d SS Panzer Division
available for mounting this new Sixth
Panzer Army attack. On 23 December,
when the Americans at the crossroads
finally succumbed to superior numbers,
Bittrich had nearly all of the 2d SS at his
disposal and the advance guard of his
9th SS Panzer Division was nearing the
east bank of the Salm. Field Marshal
Model had just wheeled the two infantry
divisions of the LXVI Corps northward
with orders to attack astride the Salm
valley, thus bolstering Bittrich’s right
flank, now insecurely held by the deci-
mated 1st SS Panzer Division.
General Bittrich had been promised
still more forces for his attack to the
northwest. The Fuehrer Begleit Brigade,
re-forming after its battles in the St. Vith
sector, was en route to join the 2d SS
Panzer at the Baraque de Fraiture cross-
roads. The 12th SS Panzer Division, so
Bittrich was told, would be relieved in
the Elsenborn sector and hurried to the
new Sixth Panzer front. Finally, Hitler
himself would order the 3d Panzer Gren-
adier Division moved from the Elsen-
born battle to the fight looming between
the Salm and the Ourthe. Bittrich has
not recorded any gloomy suspicion of

THE BATTLE BETWEEN THE SALM AND THE OURTHE 581
this potential plethora of riches, but as
a veteran commander he no doubt rec-
ognized the many slips possible between
cup and lip: the increasing poverty of
POL, Allied air strikes against any and
all moving columns, the poor state of
the few roads leading back through the
narrow Sixth Panzer zone of communi-
cations, and, finally, the pressing and
probably overriding demands of the
Fifth Panzer Army with one foot en-
tangled at Bastogne and the other poised
only a few miles from the Meuse.
The German attack plans, formulated
during the night of 23 December as the
2d SS Panzer mopped up the last of the
defenders around the Baraque de Frait-
ure crossroads, called for a continuation
of the 2d SS Panzer attack northwest,
astride the Liège highway on the 24th.
The immediate objective was the Man-
hay crossroads five miles away. Once at
Manhay the attack could either peel off
along the road west to Hotton, there
freeing the Fifth Panzer Army forma-
tions hung up at the Hotton-Marche
road, or swing northwest to gain the
main Ourthe bridge site at Durbuy. The
II SS Panzer Corps attack base on the
Salmchâteau-La Roche road seemed se-
cure enough. On the left the 560th had
driven a salient clear to Soy, a distance
of eleven miles. On the right American
stragglers from St. Vith were fighting to
escape northward through or around
Salmchâteau. The 82d Airborne Divi-
sion still had an outpost line covering
much of the road west of Salmchâteau,
but the Fuehrer Begleit Brigade was in
position to roll back the Americans in
this sector. In any case the 9th SS Panzer
Division would, in a matter of hours,
cross the Salm River in the Vielsalm-
Salmchâteau area and swing northwest
to march forward at the right shoulder
of the 2d SS Panzer. This was the out-
line plan for 24 December.
On the morning of 24 December the
American troops between the Salm and
Ourthe Rivers were deployed on a front,
if so it can be called, of over thirty miles.
This, of course, was no flankless and
integrated position. On the west wing in
particular the American line consisted of
small task forces from the 3d Armored,
each defending or attacking a hill or
hamlet in what were almost independent
operations. In the Salm sector the 82d
Airborne Division faced north, east, and
south, this disposition reflecting the
topsy-turvy condition encountered when
the division first came in to cover the
deployment of the XVIII Airborne
Corps. The 504th Parachute Infantry
(Cor. Reuben H. Tucker), on the divi-
sion north flank, was bent at an angle
reaching west and south from the con-
fluence of the Amblève and Salm Rivers,
a position assumed while Kampfgruppe
Peiper was on the rampage west of
Stavelot. The 505th Parachute Infantry
(Col. William E. Ekman) over-watched
the Salm from positions on the west
bank extending from Trois Ponts south
past Grand Halleux. The 508th Para-
chute Infantry (Col. Roy E. Lindquist)
held a series of bluffs and ridges which
faced the bridge sites at Vielsalm and
Salmchâteau, then extended westward
overlooking the La Roche highway. The
325th Glider Infantry (Col. Charles
Billingslea) held the division right flank
and continued the westward line along
the ridges looking down on the La Roche
road; its wing was affixed to the village
of Fraiture just northeast of the cross-
roads where the 2d SS Panzer had begun

582 THE ARDENNES: BATTLE OF THE BULGE
its penetration.
From Fraiture west to the Ourthe the
American “line” was difficult to trace.
Here elements of the 3d Armored Divi-
sion and two parachute infantry battal-
ions were attempting to hold an exten-
sion of the American line west of
Baraque de Fraiture, none too solidly
anchored at Lamorménil and Freyneux. 2
At the same time the Americans’ exposed
right wing was counterattacking to erase
2 The term “elements of the 3d Armored Divi-
sion” is used advisedly for CCB was operating
with the 30th Division in the La Gleize sector,
while Task Force Doan (Lt. Col. Leander L. Doan)
was with the 84th Division west of the Ourthe.
For the preceding action of these elements, see
Chapter XXII.
the German penetration which had
driven as far north as the Soy-Hotton
road and threatened to engulf Task
Force Orr, standing alone and vulner-
able at Amonines on the west bank of
the Aisne River. Two regimental com-
bat teams from the as yet untried 75th
Infantry Division were en route to help
shore up the ragged 3d Armored (–)
front but probably would not reach Gen-
eral Rose until the evening of the 24th.
There were some additional troops
immediately at hand to throw in against
the II SS Panzer Corps. All through the
afternoon and evening of the 23d the
St. Vith defenders poured through the
American lines. When the last column,
PRIME MOVER TOWING AN 8-INCH HOWITZER ALONG A ROAD NEAR MANHAY

THE BATTLE BETWEEN THE SALM AND THE OURTHE 583
led by Colonel Nelson of the 112th In-
fantry, reached the paratroopers, some
15,000 men and about a hundred usable
tanks had been added to Ridgway’s force
west of the Salm. Aware of the increasing
enemy strength south of Manhay, Gen-
eral Ridgway sent troops of the 7th
Armored and the remnants of the 106th
Division to extend and reinforce the
right flank of the 82d Airborne. At the
same time, he ordered CCB, 9th Ar-
mored, to assemble as a mobile reserve
around Malempré, east of the Manhay
road, and to back up the American
blocking position just north of the Bara-
que de Fraiture. Ridgway, however,
recognized that the 7th Armored was
much below strength and that the
rugged, forested terrain on his front was
poor for armor; so, on 24 December, he
asked Hodges to give him an infantry
division.
The Battle at the Manhay
Crossroads
By dawn on 24 December General-
leutnant Heinz Lammerding, comman-
der of the 2d SS Panzer, had brought his
two armored infantry regiments into
line north of the Baraque de Fraiture
crossroads. The zone on the west side of
the road to Manhay was given over to
the 3d Panzer Grenadier, that east of
the road to the 4th Panzer Grenadier.
Both groups possessed small panzer de-
tachments, but the bulk of Lammer-
ding’s tanks were left bivouacked in
wood lots to the rear. The terrain ahead
was tactically negotiable only by small
packets of armor, and in the past twenty-
four hours the amount of POL reaching
the westernmost German columns had
been gravely reduced. Lammerding had
to husband his fuel for a short, direct
thrust.
The assault, however, was initiated by
the right wing of the 560th Volks Gren-
adier Division, which had provided the
cover for the 2d SS Panzer assembly.
During the previous night the 1130th
Regiment, now reduced to fewer than
500 men, had slipped between the 3d
Armored outposts manned by Task
Force Kane at Odeigne and Freyneux.
The American outpost in Odeigne hav-
ing been withdrawn, a German assault
gun platoon supported by a company or
two of grenadiers moved into the open
to attack Freyneux. About a dozen Amer-
ican tanks, half of them light, remained
quiet in their camouflaged positions in-
side Freyneux. The German infantry en-
tered the village while the assault guns
closed in to give support; this was what
the short-barreled Shermans needed.
They destroyed or crippled over half
the guns, an American tank destroyer
shelled the enemy infantry out of the
houses, and the skirmish abruptly ended.
A second German force meanwhile
had made a pass at the third of Kane’s
roadblock positions here in the valley,
Lamorménil, just west of Freyneux. In
this case the enemy first perched up on
the heights, trying to soften the Amer-
ican detachment with long-range as-
sault gun fire, but when the guns moved
down into the village for the kill the
American tankers promptly knocked out
the leaders. At twilight further enemy
adventures in this sector were abandoned
since the possession of Odeigne opened
the way for a flanking thrust at the Man-
hay crossroads and the seizure of Grand-
ménil on the road to Hotton and the
Ourthe. In any case the 1130th had sus-
tained such severe losses during the day

584 THE ARDENNES: BATTLE OF THE BULGE
that it was temporarily out of action.
Kane’s task force was not hit again and
withdrew to the north under cover of
fog and artificial smoke on the 26th.
It will be recalled that Task Force
Brewster had established a roadblock
position athwart the Manhay road late
on the 23d. During the night German
infantry had filtered into and through
the surrounding woods, taking posses-
sion of Odeigne—only 1,200 yards to the
west–in the process, but Brewster’s tanks
and guns were deployed with enough in-
fantry to hold the enemy riflemen at
arm’s length. For any one of a number
of reasons General Lammerding did not
essay a tank assault in force to oust Brew-
ster from the highway. The Americans
in part were masked from direct obser-
vation, the ground was poor, the Ger-
man main force needed a wider corri-
dor than possession of twenty-two feet
MANHAY CROSSROADS
of pavement would provide, the Amer-
ican fighter-bombers were exceedingly
busy–whatever his reason Lammerding
did no more during the morning than
to probe at Brewster’s position while
waiting for elbow room to be won a
mile or two on either side of the
highway.
Remer’s Fuehrer Begleit Brigade,
which had the task of driving the Amer-
icans back and giving free play to the
east wing of the 2d SS Panzer, moved
up past Salmchâteau in the early morn-
ing and struck through the village of
Regné, where a platoon of paratroopers
and three 57-mm. antitank guns proved
no match for the panzers. Possession of
Regné opened the way into the Lienne
River valley, thus endangering the 82d
Airborne flank and line of supply. More
immediately, the German coup de main
at Regné opened the way for the 4th

THE BATTLE BETWEEN THE SALM AND THE OURTHE 585
Panzer Grenadier to initiate a pincers
attack against the 2d Battalion of the
325th Glider Infantry at Fraiture, the
western corner post of the 82d Airborne
defenses. Hard on the heels of the Ger-
man infantry, the point of the Fuehrer
Begleit swung to take a hand against
Fraiture. Here the 2d Battalion, “tired
of attempting to stop armor with tired
men and thin air,” received permission
about noon to withdraw a half-mile to
the northeast. The battalion fell back
with almost no loss, although it had to
take on one of the flanking detachments
from the 4th Panzer Grenadier en route.
While this rear guard action was in
progress, the reserve company of the
325th and a medium tank company from
the 14th Tank Battalion counter-
attacked at Regné and wrested it from
the tank detachment left there by Re-
mer. This village no longer had a place
in the Fuehrer Begleit scheme. The bri-
gade was shifting to Fraiture, and even
before its columns could close new or-
ders arrived from Marshal Model which
would send Remer and his panzers
hurrying posthaste to join the Fifth
Panzer Army farther west.
During the morning of the 24th a se-
ries of somewhat un-co-ordinated and
disconnected steps had been taken by the
American commanders facing the threat
posed by the II SS Panzer Corps. Gen-
eral Ridgway had no direct authority
over the 3d Armored Division troops,
who belonged to the VII Corps, and the
units which had just come out of the
St. Vith salient were scattered hither
and yon without much regard to tactical
unity or proper integration in the wire
and radio command net earlier estab-
lished for the XVIII Corps formations
west of the Salm. On the night of the
23d Ridgway had ordered Hasbrouck to
collect a force from the 7th Armored
sufficient to hold the Manhay junction
and to tie this force to the 82d Airborne
positions. Hasbrouck selected Colonel
Rosebaum’s CCA, which had come
through the withdrawal from St. Vith
in fair shape. The first part of the 7th
Armored mission was carried out in the
early morning of the 24th when a task
force outposted Manhay and its radial
roads, but a reconnaissance detachment
sent southeast to contact the 82d Air-
borne was halted by a blown bridge.
There remained a gap, therefore, be-
tween the 7th Armored advance task
force, which was assembling at noon in
the vicinity of Malempré, southeast of
Manhay, and the new 82d Airborne
flank being formed north of Fraiture.
On the west wing co-ordination be-
tween the 7th Armored and the 3d Ar-
mored task forces would prove to be
very complicated indeed. That portion
of General Rose’s division east of the
Ourthe River by now was fighting two
separate battles, one in the Hotton-Soy
sector where the 560th Volks Grenadier
penetration had occurred, and the other
along the series of blocking positions
that reached from Task Force Brewster’s
handhold on the Manhay road, through
Freyneux and Lamorménil, and north-
west to Orr’s position at Amonines on
the Aisne River. To give cohesion to the
3d Armored defensive battle east
of the Aisne, General Rose recalled
Brig. Gen. Doyle Hickey, his CCA
commander, from the 84th Divi-
sion sector and placed him in command
there. Early in the afternoon Hickey
met Colonel Rosebaum, who had just
brought the main force of CCA, 7th
Armored Division, into Manhay, and

586
THE ARDENNES: BATTLE OF THE BULGE
ELEMENTS OF THE 3D ARMORED DIION ADVANCING NEAR MANHAY
the two worked out a plan to co-ordinate
the efforts of their respective commands.
The 7th Armored troops would deploy
on the high ground south of Manhay and
extend their line across the highway
and along the ridge leading east to Ma-
lempré. Thereafter Task Force Brew-
ster would attempt to withdraw from
its beleaguered roadblock position, re-
tire through the 7th Armored line, and
swing westward to bolster the 3d Ar-
mored outposts in the Lamorménil-Frey-
neux sector.
Colonel Rosebaum’s command took
the rest of the daylight hours to carry
out the planned deployment, but be-
fore Task Force Brewster could begin
its retirement new orders arrived from
the XVIII Airborne Corps. Field Mar-
shal Montgomery had visited Ridgway’s
headquarters in midmorning and had
decided at once that the American front
between the Ourthe and the Salm was
too full of holes and overextended. 3 Fur-
thermore he was concerned with the in-
creasing German pressure on the west-
ern flank of the First Army as this was
represented by movement against the
3 See Msg, Montgomery to Eisenhower, 25 Dec
44, SHAEF Msg file. Montgomery appears to have
been kept fully apprised of the Manhay fight by
the Phantom service. See Hills, Phantom Was
There. See also Sylvan Diary and XVIII Airborne
Corps G–3 Jnl.

THE BATTLE BETWEEN THE SALM AND THE OURTHE 587
VII Corps flank at Ciney. He told the
First Army commander, therefore, that
the XVIII Airborne Corps must be with-
drawn to a shorter, straighter line and
that the VII Corps could be released
from “all offensive missions.” General
Collins might, on his own volition, draw
the left wing of the VII Corps back on
the line Hotton-Manhay, conforming to
Ridgway’s regroupment. 4
The American line to be formed dur-
ing the night of 24 December was in-
tended to have a new look. The 82d
Airborne would pull back to a much
shorter front extending diagonally from
Trois Ponts southwest to Vaux Chav-
anne, just short of Manhay. CCA of the
7th Armored would withdraw to the
low hills north of Manhay and Grand-
ménil (although Colonel Rosebaum pro-
tested that the high ground now occu-
pied by his command south and south-
east of Manhay was tactically superior)
and retain a combat outpost in the valley
at Manhay itself. The 3d Armored task
forces had been promised support in the
form of the 289th Infantry, due to ar-
rive on Christmas Eve; so Hickey
mapped his new position to rest on the
Aisne River with its east flank tied to
Grandménil and its west resting on
Amonines. Since the 289th, a green reg-
iment, would be put into an attack on
the morning of the 25th to clear the
Germans out of the woods near Grand-
ménil, Hickey decided that Task Force
Kane would have to remain in its
covering position at Freyneux and
Lamorménil while the 289th assembled,
and that Task Force Brewster—thus far
exposed only to desultory attack-would
have to hold on at the Manhay road
4 Collins’ decision is described in Chapter XXII.
until the 7th Armored had redressed
its lines.
A glance at the map will show how
difficult the series of American maneu-
vers begun on Christmas Eve would be
and how tricky to co-ordinate, particu-
larly in the Manhay sector. Yet it was
precisely in this part of the front that
communications had not been thorough-
ly established and that tactical cohesion
had not as yet been secured. As shown
by later events, communication be-
tween the 3d Armored and the 7th Ar-
mored commanders and staffs failed
miserably. There had been so many re-
visions of plans, orders, and counteror-
ders during the 24th that Colonel Rose-
baum did not receive word of his new
retrograde mission until 1800. The with-
drawal of CCA, 7th Armored, and the
elements of CCB, 9th Armored, south
and southeast of Manhay was scheduled
to begin at 2230-and most of these
troops and parts of the 3d Armored
would have to pass through Manhay.
Toward Manhay, on the night of 24
December, the main body of the 2d SS
Panzer Division was moving. The sei-
zure of Odeigne the night before had
opened a narrow sally port facing
Grandménil and Manhay, but there was
no road capable of handling a large
armored column between Odeigne and
the 2d SS Panzer assembly areas
south of the Baraque de Fraiture. On
the 24th the commander of the 3d Pan-
zer Grenadier Regiment secured Gen-
eral Lammerding’s approval to postpone
a further advance until the German en-
gineers could build a road through the
woods to Odeigne. By nightfall on
Christmas Eve this road was ready-and
the Allied fighter-bombers had returned
to their bases. The 3d Panzer Gren-

588 THE ARDENNES: BATTLE OF THE BULGE
TROOPS OF THE 84TH INFANTRY DIVISION DIGGIG IN
adier now gathered in attack formation
in the woods around Odeigne, while
tanks of the 2d Panzer Regiment formed
in column along the new road, To
the east the 4th Panzer Grenadier sent
a rifle battalion moving quietly from
Fraiture through the woods toward Ma-
lempré. By 2100, the hour set for the
German attack, the column at Odeigne
was ready. Christmas Eve had brought
a beautifully clear moonlit night, the
glistening snow was hard-packed, tank-
going good.
About the time the German column
started forward, the subordinate com-
manders of CCA, 7th Armored, received
word by radio to report in Manhay,
there to be given new orders-the orders,
that is, for the general withdrawal north.
The commander of the 7th Armored
position north of Odeigne (held by a
company of the 40th Tank Battalion
and a company of the 48th Armored In-
fantry Battalion) had just started for
Manhay when he saw a tank column
coming up the road toward his position.
A call to battalion headquarters failed to
identify these tanks, but since the leader
showed the typical blue exhaust of the
Sherman, it was decided that this must
be a detachment from the 3d Armored.
Suddenly a German bazooka blasted

THE BATTLE BETWEEN THE SALM AND THE OURTHE 589
from the woods where the Americans
were deployed; German infantry had
crept in close to the American tanks
and their covering infantry. Four of
the Shermans fell to the enemy bazooka
men in short order and two were crip-
pled, but the crippled tanks and one
still intact managed to wheel about and
head for Manhay. The armored infantry
company asked for permission to with-
draw, got no answer, and finally broke-
the survivors turning toward Manhay.
A thousand yards or so farther north
stood another 7th Armored roadblock,
defended by an understrength rifle com-
pany and ten medium tanks which had
been dug in to give hull defilade.
Again the Americans were deceived by
the Judas Goat Sherman leading the en-
emy column. When almost upon the im-
mobile American tanks the Germans cut
loose with flares. Blinded and unable
to move, the ten Shermans were so many
sitting ducks; most were hit by tank
fire and all were evacuated by their
crews. The American infantry in turn
fell prey to the grenadiers moving
through the woods bordering the road
and fell back in small groups toward
Manhay.
It was now a little after 2230, the
hour set for the 7th Armored move to
the new position north of Manhay. The
covering elements of the 3d Armored
had already withdrawn, but without
notifying CCA of the 7th. 5 The light
tank detachment from Malempré had
left that village (the grenadier battal-
ion from the 4th Regiment moving in
5 This failure is confirmed in the XVIII Air-
borne Corps Inspector General Report of Investi-
gation, CCA, 7th Armored, Manhay, 24–25
December 1944, dated 6 January 1945.
on the tankers’ heels), the support eche-
lon of CCB, 9th Armored, already had
passed through Manhay, and the head-
quarters column of CCA, 7th Armored,
was just on its way out of Manhay when
the American tanks that had escaped
from the first roadblock position burst
into the latter village. Thus far the
headquarters in Manhay knew nothing
of the German advance–although a
quarter of an hour earlier the enemy
gunners had shelled the village. A pla-
toon commander attempted to get two
of his medium tanks into firing posi-
tion at the crossroads itself, but the
situation quickly degenerated into a
suave qui peut when the leading pan-
zers stuck their snouts into Manhay.
In a last exchange of shots the Amer-
icans accounted for two of the panzers
but lost five of their own tanks at the
rear of the CCA column. Thus Manhay
passed into German hands.
The medium tanks and armored in-
fantry that had started to follow the
light tank detachment out of Malempré
circled around Manhay when they
heard the firing. Working their way
north, the road-bound tanks ended up
at Werbomont while the riflemen moved
cross-country to reach friendly lines
about two thousand yards north of Man-
hay. There Colonel Rhea, commanding
the 23d Armored Infantry Battalion,
had formed a defense on the hills bor-
dering the highway to Werbomont and
Liège. All this while Major Brewster
and the task force astride the highway
south of Manhay had been under fire,
but the enemy had refused to close for
a final assault. It soon became apparent,
however, that this small American
force was on its own and that the Ger-
mans were in strength to the rear. Brew-

590
ster radioed for permission to pull out;
when it was granted he turned east
toward Malempré, hoping to find this
spot still in friendly hands. The Ger-
man battalion which had come up from
Fraiture met Brewster’s column at Ma-
lempré and shot out his two lead tanks.
Since there was no other road, Brew-
ster ordered his vehicles abandoned and
released his men to reach the American
lines on their own–most of his com-
mand made it.
Although the 2d SS Panzer had pre-
empted a piece of the new American
line, General Lammerding was none too
pleased by the results of the Christmas
Eve attack. His tanks had bitten only
a small piece from the tail of the “long
American column” reported fleeing
Manhay. (Their inability to do better
his officers ascribed to the difficulty at-
tendant on bringing more than one or
two tanks into firing position on the nar-
row roads.) The accompanying infan-
try formations had failed to co-ordinate
their advance with that of the armored
assault from Odeigne and to seize, as
planned, the wooded heights northwest
of Manhay and Grandménil. Lammerd-
ing and the II SS Panzer Corps com-
mander, General Bittrich, agreed that
the 1st SS Panzer should continue the
battle with shock tactics aimed at secur-
ing an enlarged maneuver space east
and west of Manhay. The 9th SS Panzer
(which had crossed the Salm River be-
hind the withdrawing 82d Airborne)
was to align itself as rapidly as might
be with Lammerding’s division in an
advance up the Lienne valley toward
Bras, commanding the high ground
northeast of Manhay.
The fall of Manhay roused consider-
able apprehension in the American
THE ARDENNES: BATTLE OF THE BULGE
headquarters. General Ridgway saw that
his new corps defense might be split
in the center before it could properly
solidify. General Hodges sent message
after message to the XVIII Airborne
Corps insisting that Manhay must be
retaken, for it was all too clear that
if the Sixth Panzer Army could rein-
force the Manhay salient, Liège and
the Meuse bridgehead would be in grave
danger. 6 In addition, he pressed Field
Marshal Montgomery for more divisions
to backstop the threatened sector be-
tween the Salm and the Ourthe.
By daylight on the 25th Colonel Rhea
had amassed a sizable force on the hills
north of Manhay, his own armored in-
fantry battalion, reinforced by the 2d
Battalion of the 424th Infantry, plus
the tanks and stragglers that had worked
their way past the enemy in Manhay.
The Germans scouted this position,
then broke contact–probably discour-
aged by twelve P–47’s from the 389th
Squadron who claimed ten tank kills
on this mission. To the east General
Gavin sent the 1st Battalion of Billings-
lea’s glider infantry to secure his divi-
sion’s right flank at Tri-le-Cheslaing,
a tiny collection of houses in the valley
about 2,000 yards east of Manhay. For
some reason, perhaps the lack of co-or-
dination which had bothered Lammer-
ding, the 4th Panzer Grenadier had
not pushed forward and the village was
unoccupied. Thus far the 82d Airborne
had had no physical contact with CCA
of the 7th Armored, but Gavin was
apprised by radio that his western neigh-
bor was in position on the Werbomont-
Liège highway.
6 Sylvan Diary; XVIII Airborne G–3 Jnl, 25
Dec 44.

THE BATTLE BETWEEN THE SALM AND THE OURTHE 591
General Bittrich had no intention of
pushing the 2d SS Panzer north toward
Liège. Although the time at which the
II SS Panzer Corps commander received
his orders is uncertain, it is known
that by the small hours of 25 December
Bittrich was embarked on a new mis-
sion assigned by General Kraemer, the
Sixth Panzer Army chief of staff. The
2d SS Panzer now was to turn west
from Manhay, drive along the lateral
road to Erezée on the Aisne River,
then pivot northwest to seize the Ourthe
bridgehead at Durbuy, all this as a ma-
neuver to strike the American VII
Corps in the flank and break the dead-
ly ,grasp Collins and Harmon had on the
throat of the Fifth Panzer armored col-
umns in the Celles-Marche sector.
For such a change of axis the Ger-
mans needed turning room, and they
could best gain it by seizing the road
center at Grandménil just west of the
Manhay crossroads. As a result, then,
the major part of the 2d SS Panzer
would turn away from the 7th Armored
to engage General Hickey’s troops from
the 3d Armored. Richardson’s task
force, really little more than a light
tank platoon, had fallen back from
Manhay to Task Force Kane’s roadblock
at Grandmenil. Here Kane had his
trains and a platoon of tank destroyers.
The Panthers, followed by the German
infantry, pursued the Americans into
Grandmenil. The American tank de-
stroyers attempted a fight from the high
ground west of the village but had no
infantry in support and, as the grena-
diers close in, withdrew westward along
the road to Erezée. By 0300 on 25 De-
cember, then, the Germans held Grand-
ménil and were poised on the way west.
It will be remembered that the new
289th Infantry (Col. Douglas B. Smith)
had come into assembly areas west of
Grandménil on Christmas Eve in prep-
aration for a dawn attack to drive the
enemy off the wooded hills southwest
of Grandménil. 7 The lead battalion, the
3d, actually had started forward from
its bivouac in Fanzel when it encoun-
tered some 3d Armored tanks (the lat-
ter supposed to be screening the 289th
deployment) hurrying to the west.
About this time the battalion received
orders from Hickey that it should dig
in to bar the two roads running west
and northwest from Grandmenil. De-
ploying as rapidly as possible in the
deep snow, the battalion outposted the
main west road to Erezée. The Germans
negotiated this forward roadblock with-
out a fight, the ubiquitous and deceptive
Sherman tank again providing the ticket.
When the panzers, some eight of
them, arrived at the main foxhole line
the German tankers swiveled their gun
turrets facing north and south to blast
the battalion into two halves. One un-
known soldier in Company K was un-
daunted by this fusillade: he held his
ground and put a bazooka round into
the spot but he had stopped the enemy
column cold in its tracks, for here the
road edged a high cliff and the remain-
ing panzers could not pass their stricken
mate. Apparently the Panther detach-
7 Like nearly all green divisions the 75th In-
fantry Division failed to keep or transmit really
complete and useful historical records during its
first combat operations. The bulk of the detailed
information on the regimental actions of this
division comes from the 3d Armored units to
which the formations of the 75th were attached
and from the combat interviews with the former.
For the 289th Infantry, however, there exists the
written recollections of the regimental communica-
tions officer, Capt. Walter G. Runte’s study in the
Advanced Infantry Officers’ Course, Class No. I.

592 THE ARDENNES: BATTLE OF THE BULGE
ment had outrun its infantry support or
was apprehensive of a close engagement
in the dark, for the German tanks backed
off and returned to Grandménil.
It took some time to reorganize the
3d Battalion of the 289th, but about
0800 the battalion set off on its assigned
task of clearing the woods southwest of
Grandménil. At the same time the rest
of the regiment, on the right, moved
into an attack to push the outposts
of the 560th Volks Grenadier Division
back from the Aisne River. General
Hickey, however, needed more help
than a green infantry regiment could
give if the 3d Armored was to halt
the 2d SS Panzer and restore the block-
ing position at Grandménil. His plea
for assistance was carried by General
Rose up the echelons of command, and
finally CCB was released from attach-
ment to the 30th Division in the La
Gleize sector to give the needed ar-
mored punch.
Early in the afternoon Task Force
McGeorge (a company each of armored
infantry and Sherman tanks) arrived
west of Grandménil. The task force was
moving into the attack when disaster
struck. Eleven P–38’s of the 430th Squa-
dron, which were being vectored onto
their targets by the 7th Armored Divi-
sion, mistook McGeorge’s troops for
Germans and made a bombing run over
the wooded assembly area. CCB later re-
ported that 3 officers and 36 men were
killed by the American bombs. Here
again the failure of communications be-
tween the 3d and 7th Armored Divi-
sions had cost dear. 8 A new attack was
8 CCB, S–3 Jnl and AAR. The 474th Squadron
Operations report of 25 December 1944, says
that the vehicles attacked were displaying orange
panels. By this date, however, some German units
mounted at 2000, McGeorge’s armored
infantry and a company from the 289th
preceding the American tanks in the
dark. Within an hour five tanks
and a small detachment of the armored
infantry in half-tracks were in Grand-
ménil, but the enemy promptly coun-
terattacked and restored his hold on the
village.
The 2d SS Panzer had nevertheless
failed on 25 December to enlarge the
turning radius it needed around the
Grandménil pivot. The German records
show clearly what had stopped the ad-
vance. Every time that the 3d Panzer
Grenadier formed an assault detach-
ment to break out through the woods
south and west of Grandménil, the
American artillery observers located on
the high ground to the north brought
salvo after salvo crashing down. All
movement along the roads seemed to be
a signal for the Allied fighter-bombers
to swoop down for the kill. 9 To make
matters worse, the 9th SS Panzer had
failed to close up on the 2d SS Panzer
Division’s right. General Lammerding
dared not swing his entire division in-
to the drive westward and thus leave
an open flank facing the American ar-
mor known to be north of Manhay.
Although General Ridgway had
were using the distinctive U.S. orange insignia.
The IX TAC operations summary of 25 December
notes that the 7th Armored had set the co-ordinate
P–5388 as the “no-bomb” line; everything to the
east, therefore, was fair game. McGeorge’s assem-
bly area was almost exactly on the co-ordinates
given.
9 At 1345 on the 25th, General Kean, First Army
chief of staff, called the IX TAC and said that
the first priority air mission for the entire First
Army was the enemy penetration at the junction
of the XVIII Airborne and VII Corps. IX TAC,
A–2 Jnl.

THE BATTLE BETWEEN THE SALM AND THE OURTHE 593
ordered the 7th Armored to recapture
Manhay “by dark tonight,” the means at
Hasbrouck’s disposal on the 25th were
meager. CCA, which had been employed
earlier because it had come out of the
St. Vith fight with the fewest wounds,
now was in poor shape indeed, having
lost nearly two medium tank companies
and much of its tank destroyer comple-
ment. CCB had not yet been reorganized
(and in any case it was very much below
strength in men and vehicles) but it
could furnish two understrength tank
companies and one company of armored
infantry. The main road into Manhay
from the north, intended as the avenue
of Hasbrouck’s advance, would take some
hours to clear, for the retreating tankers
had littered it with felled trees during
the night withdrawal. To get at grips
with the enemy from this direction the
2d Battalion of the 424th Infantry was
added to the attack; the whole operation
would, or so it was hoped, mesh with
the 3d Armored advance on Grandménil
from the west.
The abatis on the Manhay road
effectively stopped the 7th Armored
tanks. When a company of six tanks
lined up for a charge into Manhay from
the east, half of them were knocked
out; General Hasbrouck, who was on
the scene, ordered the remaining tanks
to retire. The battalion from the 424th
did succeed in nearing the village but
paid a heavy toll for the few hundred
yards crossed-later estimated as some
35 percent casualties-and at dark was
ordered back to the north.
The Fight in the Aisne Valley
While the 2d SS Panzer was struggling
to shake itself loose for the drive
west along the Erezée-Soy road, the
battle-weary and depleted 560th Volks
Grenadier Division fought to gain con-
trol of the western section of the same
road between Soy and Hotton. Having
driven a salient north in the Aisne valley,
the left wing of this division set up a
night attack on Christmas Eve intended
to dislodge Task Force Orr from the
Aisne bridgehead at Amonines. This
small American task force held a three-
mile front-little more than a chain of
pickets-with no support on the flanks
and no troops to cover its rear. When
evening came, crisp and clear, the enemy
guns and rocket launchers set to work.
Probably the Germans used a battalion
of infantry, making twelve separate at-
tempts to break through Orr’s line. At
one point they were near success: Orr
said later, “If they’d have had three
more riflemen they’d probably have over-
run our positions.” But the attacker
lacked the “three more riflemen” and
Task Force Orr retained control of
Amonines.
While the enemy hammered futilely
at Task Force Orr on the night of 24
December, Hogan’s encircled task force
far to the south at Marcouray finally
made a break to reach the American
lines. 10 All the operable vehicles were
destroyed or damaged, and the wounded
were left in the charge of volunteer
medical aid men. Guiding on the stars
and compass, Hogan’s men moved
stealthily through the enemy positions.
At one point a German sentry gave a
challenge, but a sergeant got to him
with a bayonet before he could spread
the alarm. Most members of the task
10 The early story of Hogan’s task force is told
in Chapter XV.

594 THE ARDENNES: BATTLE OF THE BULGE
force reached their comrades by
Christmas morning.
The appearance of the 75th Infantry
Division (Maj. Gen. Fay B. Prickett) in
the 3d Armored sector promised the
needed rifle strength to establish a solid
defense in the rugged country east of
Hotton and along the bluffs of the Aisne
River. To establish a homogeneous line
the Americans would have to seize the
high, wooded, and difficult ground south
of the Soy-Hotton road, and at the
same time push forward on the left to
close up to the banks of the Aisne over
the tortuous terrain south of the Erezée-
Grandmenil road. With the two regi-
ments of the 75th attached to the 3d
Armored (the 289th Infantry and the
290th Infantry), General Rose ordered
a drive to cement the CCA wing in the
west,
The units of the 75th had been scat-
tered in widely separated areas after
their arrival in Belgium. A smooth-
running supply system had not yet been
set up, and to concentrate and support
the rifle battalions would prove difficult.
But the 290th (Col. Carl F. Duffner),
which had been moving into a defensive
position around Petit Han, north of Hot-
ton, received orders at 1600 on the 24th
to assemble at Ny for an attack to begin
two hours later. There ensued much
confusion, with orders and counter-
orders, and finally the attack was re-
scheduled for a half-hour before mid-
night. The regiment had no idea of the
ground over which it was to fight but did
know that the line of departure was then
held by a battalion or less of the 517th
Parachute Infantry Regiment deployed
along the Soy-Hotton road. The 2d and
3d Battalions of the 290th were chosen
for this first battle, their objective the
wooded ridge south of the road.
About midnight on the 24th the battalions
started their assault companies
forward, crossing a small stream and
ravine, then halting to reorganize at a
tree line which edged a broad meadow
over which the assault had to be carried.
Here all was confusion and the companies
were not straightened out until
dawn. Finally the assault began, straight
across the open, snow-covered meadow
beyond which lay the ridge line objective.
Losses among these green troops
were severe and most of the officers were
killed or wounded. Despite this harsh
baptism of fire the troops reached the
wood cover at the foot of the ridge
and held on. In midafternoon more
infantry came up (probably from the
517th), plus a platoon of tank destroyers,
and a fresh assault was now
organized. This carried through the
woods and onto the ridge. Participants
in the action later estimated that the
3d Battalion, 290th Infantry, alone suffered
250 casualties, but this figure
probably is exaggerated 11 .
Farther east the 289th Infantry also
had a rough introduction to battle on
rugged terrain far more difficult than
any training ground in the States. On
the night of 24 December the regiment
moved by truck to Fanzel, north of
Erezée, there receiving orders to attack
at 0800 the next morning and seize the
high ground north of the Aisne. Early
on Christmas morning, as already related,
the 3d Battalion was hastily thrown
into the fight being waged by the 3d
Armored troops west of Grandménil.
By the hour set for the 289th to attack,
11 Capt. David C. Clagett, Study for the Advanced
Infantry Officers Course, class 1.

THE BATTLE BETWEEN THE SALM AND THE OURTHE 595
however, a part of the 3d Battalion
could be freed to move into the regi-
mental advance. The 560th Volks Grena-
dier Division had only a thin screen
facing the 289th and by dusk the 3d
Battalion was on its objective, the hill
mass southwest of Grandmenil. On the
right flank the 1st Battalion reached the
line of the Aisne, but in the center the
2d Battalion lost its direction in the
maze of wooded hills and ravines. By
midnight of the 25th it had gravitated
into and around La Fosse, a village
southwest of Grandmenil, leaving a wide
gap between itself and the 1st Battalion.
The next day, under a new commander,
the 2d Battalion deployed along the
Aisne but still had no contact with the
1st. 12
The 2d SS Panzer Is Halted
Although the 2d SS Panzer Division
still held Grandmenil and Manhay on
the morning of 26 December, it had
lost much of its bite and dash. The two
grenadier regiments had been whittled
down considerably; the 4th Panzer
Grenadier had lost heavily, particularly
in officers, during the fight for the
Baraque de Fraiture. Across the lines
thirteen battalions of field artillery were
firing into the German positions between
the Aisne and the Lienne, and the II SS
Panzer Corps had been unable to bring
forward enough artillery and ammuni-
tion to engage in any counterbattery
12 The price for the intial commitment of the
two regiments from the 75th was relatively high.
The total losses of CCA, 3d Armored, during
the fighting from 22 to 31 December were 70
killed, 376 wounded, and 218 missing. Of this
total the attached 289th Infantry alone lost 37
killed, 208 wounded, and 79 missing. 289th Inf
AAR, Dec 44.
duels, So heavy was the traffic on the
meager Sixth Panzer Army line of com-
munications, and moving as it did by
fits and starts under the watchful eyes
of Allied air, that only one battalion of
corps artillery and one corps Werfer
battalion succeeded in crossing to the
west bank of the Salm. Ammunition
resupply from the rear was almost non-
existent. On Christmas Eve the corps
had taken matters in its hands and dis-
patched its own trucks to the ammu-
nition dumps back at Bonn, but each
round trip would take three to four
nights because the daylight movement
of thin-skinned vehicles carrying high
explosive was almost certain suicide.
Finally, the 9th SS Panzer had failed
to keep to schedule and probably would
not come abreast of the 2d SS until the
night of 26 December.
But General Lammerding could not
delay his bid for a breakout until rein-
forcements arrived. On the morning of
the 26th he ordered the 4th Panzer
Grenadier to attack northward, using
Manhay and the forest to the east as a
line of departure. The 3d Panzer Grena-
dier would have to make the main
effort, forcing its way out of Grandmenil
and along the road west to Erezée.
The enemy attempt to shake loose
and break into the clear proved abortive.
On the right the 4th Panzer Grenadier
sent a battalion from the woods east of
Manhay into an early morning attack
that collided with Billingslea’s glider
infantry in Tri-le-Cheslaing. In the pre-
dawn darkness some of the grenadiers
sneaked in on the battalion command
post, only to be driven off by a reserve
platoon. A move to encircle the village
from the east was beaten back almost
singlehandedly by a stray Sherman tank

596 THE ARDENNES: BATTLE OF THE BULGE
which the glider infantry had com-
mandeered during the 7th Armored
withdrawal. When daylight came the
enemy assault force was in full retreat,
back to the woods. Plans for a second
attack north from Manhay died aborn-
ing, for by that time the Americans had
the initiative.
The German advance out of Grand-
ménil was planned as a double-pronged
assault: one column thrusting straight
west on the Erezée road; the other
heading off to the northwest along a
narrow, precipitous road which would
bring it to Mormont and a flanking
position vis-à-vis Erezée. The westward
move began at false dawn, by chance
coinciding with Task Force McGeorge’s
renewal of its attack to enter Grand-
ménil. Again the road limited the action
to a head-on tank duel. McGeorge’s
Shermans were outgunned by the Pan-
thers, and when the shooting died down
the American detachment had only two
medium tanks in going condition.
Sometime after this skirmish one of
the American tanks which had reached
the edge of the village during the
attack of the previous evening suddenly
came alive and roared out to join the
task force. What had happened was one
of the oddities born of night fighting.
Captain Jordan of the 1st Battalion, 33d
Armored Regiment, had led five tanks
into Grandménil, but during the earlier
fight four had been hit or abandoned
by their crews. Jordan and his crew sat
through the night in the midst of the
dead tanks, unmolested by the enemy.
When the captain reported to his head-
quarters, he told of seeing a German
column, at least twelve Panthers,
rumbling out of Grandménil in a north-
erly direction. The 3d Armored put up
a liaison plane to find the enemy tanks,
but to no avail. It is known that Com-
pany L of the 289th Infantry knocked
out a Panther leading a vehicular col-
umn through a narrow gorge on the
Mormont road and took a number of
casualties during a scrambling fight be-
tween bazookas and tank weapons. The
German accounts say that this road was
blocked by fallen timber and that in-
tense American artillery fire halted all
movement north of Grandmenil. What-
ever the reason, this group of tanks
made no further effort to force the Mor-
mont road. 13
Task Force McGeorge received six-
teen additional Shermans at noon and
a couple of hours later, on the heels
of a three-battalion artillery shoot, burst
through to retake Grandmenil. The
pounding meted out by the 3d Armored
gunners apparently drove most of the
grenadiers in flight from the village;
by dark the 3d Battalion of the 289th
had occupied half of the village and held
the road to Manhay.
There remains to tell of the 7th
Armored’s attempt to recapture
Manhay. To visualize the 7th Armored
as a ready combat division at this time
would be to distort reality. By the
26th its three armored infantry bat-
talions were woefully understrength, and
less than 40 percent of its tanks and
tank destroyers were operable. Even this
very reduced capability could not be
13 The man who stopped the lead tank may
have been T/Sgt. Stephen G. Andromidas of Com-
pany L (Ltr, Maj. C. W. Anderson to Maj. Gen.
William F. Train, 13 Dec 60). It is also possible
that these German tanks were checked by a tank
destroyer of the 629th Tank Destroyer Battalion.
Sgt. Oscar M. Mullins and Pfc. Edwin W. Metz
were awarded the DSC (both posthumously) for
stopping an attack of “fourteen” enemy tanks on
this date.

THE BATTLE BETWEEN THE SALM AND THE OURTHE 597
employed with full effect against the
enemy. It was only a matter of hours
since the 7th Armored had been driven
from St. Vith, and the officers, men, and
vehicles of most of its units were spread
about helter-skelter from village to vil-
lage just as they had arrived back in the
American lines after the disorganization
attendant on the withdrawal across the
Salm. The problem of combat morale
is more difficult for the historian, writing
long after the event, to analyze. Has-
brouck’s division had made a fight of
it at St. Vith, more than meriting the
eulogy of Field Marshal Montgomery’s
retreat order, “They come back in all
honor”; but it was too much to expect
of human flesh and blood, mind and
heart, that the 7th Armored should
continue, only hours after the retreat,
to demonstrate the same high order of
combat efficiency seen in the defense
of St. Vith.
General Hasbrouck had no plans for
retaking Manhay on the morning of the
26th; he counted rather on a few hours
to regroup his command. But about 0900
General Collins called from the VII
Corps to ask that Ridgway put the 7th
Armored into an attack at Manhay as
an assist for the 3d Armored drive
against the twin village of Grandménil.
DESTRUCTION AT GRANDMÉNIL, including a damaged Panzerkampfwagen V (Panther).

598 THE ARDENNES: BATTLE OF THE BULGE
Within the hour the First Army Com-
mander had General Ridgway on the
telephone, insisting that the 7th Ar-
mored must attack-and that forthwith.
Ridgway could do no more than tell
Hasbrouck to retake Manhay “as soon
as possible.” The 7th Armored com-
mander put the few tanks he could scrape
together into a march toward the road
linking Manhay and Grandménil, but
this move was slow in starting and the
3d Armored troops entered Grandménil
while the 7th Armored tanks still were
several hundred yards to the north.
About this time the 7th Armored de-
tachment came under accurate direct
fire from some German tanks dug in
north of the connecting road and the
Americans halted.
Meanwhile Allied fighter-bombers
had been vectored over Manhay to soften
up the defenders, and General Ridgway
decided to use the fresh 3d Battalion of
the 517th Parachute Infantry, which had
just come down from helping the 30th
Division in the La Gleize operation, for
a night assault at Manhay. This attack,
made an hour or so after midnight and
preceded by an eight-battalion artillery
concentration fired for twenty minutes,
gained quick success. By 0400 on 27
December the paratroopers had cleared
the village, at a cost of ten killed and
fourteen wounded. By dawn airborne
engineers had cleared the fallen trees
from the road back to Werbomont, and
a platoon of medium tanks moved in
to cover the approaches to the village.
Some clue to the ease with which the
paratroopers took Manhay–not forget-
ting, of course, the weight of metal
thrown into the town by the American
cannoneers–may be found in the
German account of events on the 26th.
It would appear that the 7th Armored
tank detachment which had neared the
Grandménil-Manhay road had convinced
the commander of the 3d Panzer Grena-
dier that his battalion in Manhay was
in danger of being surrounded (partic-
ularly since Billingslea’s paratroopers to
the east had driven back the 4th Grena-
diers) and that he had ordered the
Manhay garrison to withdraw under
cover of night, leaving its wounded be-
hind.
The loss of Manhay ended the 2d
SS Panzer battle in this sector, and the
German corps and division commanders
agreed that there seemed little chance
of starting the attack rolling again. On
the morning of the 27th orders from
Sepp Dietrich told General Lammerding
that his division would be relieved by
the 9th SS Panzer Division and that the
2d SS Panzer would move west to join
the 560th Volks Grenadier Division and
the newly arrived 12th SS Panzer Divi-
sion in a new Sixth Panzer Army attack
directed at the Hotton-Soy-Erezée line.
The 82d Airborne Withdraws From
the Salm River Line
When the XVIII Airborne Corps
commander ordered the defense of St.
Vith abandoned on 23 December, one
of his chief concerns was the mounting
enemy strength which threatened to out-
flank and overrun the small detach-
ments of the 82d Airborne Division,
plus the 3d Battalion, 112th Infantry,
deployed to hold the bridgeheads at
Salmchâteau and Vielsalm through
which the St. Vith garrison had to with-
draw. The 82d, it will be remembered,
was forced to hurry troops from its north
flank, where they had been involved in

THE BATTLE BETWEEN THE SALM AND THE OURTHE 599
hard battle with the 1st SS Panzer Divi-
sion around Trois Ponts and Cheneux,
in order to reinforce the opposite flank
of the division, which extended from
Salmchâteau west to Fraiture, at Frai-
ture dangling in the air. The danger
now was that the German armor already
on the west side of the Salm River would
speed to turn this open flank and crush
the 82d Airborne back against the Salm,
or at the least make a powerful jab
straight along the west bank to dislodge
the American hold on the two bridge-
head towns. Kampfgruppe Krag, as al-
ready recounted, did succeed in doing
exactly that at Salmchâteau late on the
23d and entrapped part of Task Force
Jones and the last column of the
112th Infantry on their way back from
St. Vith.
The 9th SS Panzer Division, charged
in the enemy scheme with breaking
across the river at Salmchâteau and
Vielsalm and here rolling up the 82d
Airborne south wing, failed to arrive
at the Salm on schedule. As a result
General Gavin was faced with one
major threat against his position, on the
night of 23 December posed by the
2d SS Panzer and the Fuehrer Begleit
Brigade at Fraiture, rather than two as
the II SS Panzer Corps had hoped. By
midday on the 24th, however, the
Germans had patrols across the river
at Vielsalm. This covering force came
from the 19th Panzer Grenadier Regi-
ment, recruited from Germans living in
the Black Sea area, and it had earned
a reputation as the élite regiment of
the 9th SS Panzer Division. The rest of
the 9th SS Panzer either had been de-
tached on other missions or was strag-
gling to the east–indeed, the divisional
tank regiment did not reach the Salm
sector until the first days of January.
American identification of this new
armored division, however, added to the
list of factors that resulted in the de-
cision to withdraw the 82d Airborne
and shorten the XVIII Airborne Corps
line.
Early on Christmas Eve General
Gavin met with some of his officers in
the command post of Ekman’s 505th.
He knew that his division was faced
by elements of at least three German
divisions, his right was overextended,
the support which might be expected
from his right wing neighbor was
problematical, and a large German force
(the remnants of Kampfgruppe Peiper)
was actually in his rear somewhere
near Trois Ponts. Gavin now had to
decide whether he should divert some
of his troops to hunt out and fight the
enemy in his rear or proceed with the
planned withdrawal. The main problem,
Gavin concluded, was to put his division
in an organized position, dug in with
wire and mines in place, to confront
the attack of “several” panzer divisions
on the morning of the 25th. He held,
then, to his plan for withdrawing the
82d Airborne. 14
Gavin’s plan was to bring back the
bulk of his regiments under cover of
night; he would leave small detach-
ments from each as covering shells until
the early morning. About 2100 the divi-
sion moved out for the new Trois Ponts
–Manhay line. Christmas Eve was
crystal clear and the moonlight on the
14
For this phase of the action, the most useful
materials are W. G. Lord, History of the 508th
Parachute Infantry (Washington, 1948); 82d Abn
Div, Chronology, Dec 44; 82d Abn Div, The Story
of the Bulge: The Division Commander’s Report;
and especially the combat interviews.

600 THE ARDENNES: BATTLE OF THE BULGE
snow made it easy to follow the routes
assigned. (Overhead the buzzbombs
could be traced on their flight to
Antwerp.) At only two points did the
enemy interfere with the marching col-
umns of the 82d Airborne, and at only
one of these by design. After the de-
bacle at La Gleize, Colonel Peiper and
some 800 of his kampfgruppe had taken
refuge in the densely wooded and broken
ground north of Trois Ponts, waiting
for an opportunity to cross the Salm and
rejoin their comrades of the 1st SS Pan-
zer. The hour chosen by Peiper coin-
cided with the move made by the 505th
Parachute Infantry as it pivoted on
Trois Ponts back from the river. The
two forces, both attempting to with-
draw, brushed against each other and
one company of the 505th got into a
brief but hot fire with Peiper’s men.
Colonel Ekman, however, had a mission
to complete before day dawned and with
General Gavin’s permission the 505th
let Peiper go.
The second action this night was no
accident. It involved the covering force
of the 508th, led by Lt. Col. Thomas
Shanley, in what the regiment later re-
corded as “one of the best pieces of
fighting in the 508th’s history.” The
main body started on the seven-mile trek
to its new line with no sign of the
enemy and by 0415 was in position. Some
time around midnight the covering pla-
toons near the Vielsalm bridge site (one
each from Companies A and B) heard
much noise and hammering coming from
the direction of the bridge, which the
airborne engineers had partially de-
molished. Suddenly artillery and mortar
shells erupted around the American fox-
hole line, a barrage followed by smoke
shells. Out of the smoke rose dark figures,
whooping and yelling as they charged
the paratroopers. The platoon from
Company B had a few moments to get
set and then stopped the grenadiers with
machine gun fire before they could reach
the position. The Company A platoon,
closer to the river’s edge, had a worse
time of it. Here a few of the enemy
got into the American position, while
others blocked the withdrawal route
to the west. At one point the 508th
wrote this platoon off as lost; but skill-
fully led by 1st Lt. George D. Lamm
the paratroopers fought their way
through the enemy and back to their
own lines.
The 19th Regiment, which had hit
the paratroopers at Vielsalm, followed
the American spoor doggedly, despite
the laggard pace of the rest of the divi-
sion, and in the early afternoon of 25
December was observed in Odrimont, a
couple of miles from the 508th outpost
line. That night the 19th hit the regi-
mental left, with perhaps two bat-
talions making the assault, but was beat-
en back after a three-hour fire fight. Two
nights later the 19th struck again, this
time driving on a narrow front against
the right wing of the 508th. Company
G was driven out of the twin villages
of Erria and Villettes where it was
bivouacked, but this penetration came
to an abrupt halt when two artillery
battalions went to work. The following
morning the commander of the 3d
Battalion (Lt. Col. Louis G. Mendez)
organized a counterattack which swept
through Erria (catching a number of the
tired grenadiers still asleep in captured
bedrolls) and restored the line. The
American gunners had done much to
take the sting out of the enemy force-
over 100 German dead were counted

THE BATTLE BETWEEN THE SALM AND THE OURTHE 601
around the village crossroad (the
German account relates that the 1st Bat-
talion of the 19th was “cut to pieces”
here) .
“The Sad Suck Affair”
As the year came to a close the Sixth
Panzer Army made one last effort to
breach the American defenses between
the Salm and the Ourthe. This battle
took place in and around the hamlet
of Sadzot (so tiny that it does not appear
on most of the Belgian maps). Sadzot
lay on a small creek 400 yards south
of Briscol, a village on the main road
between Grandménil and Erezée. The
engagement at Sadzot was fought by
squads and platoons, and so may be
appropriately called a “soldiers’ battle”;
with equal propriety the name coined
by the GI’s for this confused action is
used here: “The Sad Sack Affair.” 15
Having given up the fight for Manhay
and Grandménil, the 2d SS Panzer began
to parcel out its troops. Some were left
to cover the deployment of the 9th
SS Panzer as it extended its position in
front of the 82d Airborne to take over
the onetime 2d SS Panzer sector. Other
units shifted west to join the incoming
12th SS Panzer in what was planned
as a major attack to cross the Trois Ponts
–Hotton road in the vicinity of Erezée
and regain momentum for the drive to
the northwest. Once again, however, the
forces actually available to the II SS
Panzer Corps were considerably fewer
15 The German account of this action will be
found in MS # P–032E. The best American
account is that given in Spearhead In the West.
See also journals of the 289th Infantry and CCA,
3d Armored Division. The paratroopers took the
main losses in this fight: 120 casualties.
than planned. The march west by the
12th SS Panzer Division had taken much
longer than reckoned, for the slow-
moving 9th SS Panzer had jammed the
roads in front of the 12th SS Panzer,
there had been a series of fuel failures,
Allied air attacks had cut most of the
march to night movement, and just as
the division was nearing the Aisne
River OB WEST had seized the rear-
ward columns for use at Bastogne. All
that the 12th SS Panzer could employ on
27 December, the date set by the army
commander for the new attack, was the
25th Panzer Grenadier Regiment, most
of which was already in the line facing
the 3d Armored. The 2d SS Panzer con-
tribution perforce was limited: its re-
connaissance battalion, a battalion of
mobile guns, and two rifle companies,
a task force commanded by the same
Major Krag who had raised such havoc
at Salmchâteau. The time for the attack
was midnight.
During the 27th the lines of General
Hickey’s command had been redressed.
In the process the 1st Battalion of the
289th Infantry had tied in with Task
Force Orr on the Aisne River while the
2d Battalion, having finally straightened
itself out, continued the 3d Armored
line through the woods southwest of
Grandménil. Unknown at the time,
a 1,000-yard gap had developed south of
Sadzot and Briscol between these two
battalions.
At zero hour the German assault
force started forward through the deep
woods; the night was dark, the ground
pathless, steep, and broken. The grena-
diers made good progress, but radio
failed in the thick woods and it would
appear that a part of the attackers
became disoriented. At least two com-

602
panies from the 25th Panzer Grenadier
Regiment did manage to find their way
through the gap between the battalions
of the 289th and followed the creek into
Sadzot, where they struck about two
hours after the jump-off.
The course of battle as it developed
in the early morning hours of 28 De-
cember is extremely confused. The first
report of the German appearance in
Sadzot was relayed to higher headquar-
ters at 0200 by artillery observers belong-
ing to the 54th Armored Field Artillery
Battalion, whose howitzers were em-
placed north of the village. The two
American rifle battalions, when queried,
reported no sign of the enemy. Inside
Sadzot were bivouacked Company C of
the 87th Chemical Battalion and a tank
destroyer platoon; these troops rapidly
recovered from their surprise and during
the melee established a firm hold on
the north side of the village. General
Hickey immediately alerted the 509th
Parachute Infantry Battalion near
Erezée to make an envelopment of
Sadzot from west and east, but no sooner
had the paratroopers deployed than they
ran into Krag’s kampfgruppe.
This meeting engagement in the dark-
ness seems to have been a catch-as-catch-
can affair. The American radios, like
the German, failed to function in this
terrain (the 3d Armored communi-
cations throughout the battle were most-
ly by wire and runner); the Germans
were confused and put mortar fire on
their own neighboring platoons; and
the fight on both sides was carried by
squads and platoons firing at whatever
moved. When daylight came the para-
troopers got artillery support, which
far outweighed the single battalion be-
hind the enemy assault force, and
THE ARDENNES: BATTLE OF THE BULGE
moved forward. By 1100 the 509th had
clicked the trap shut on the Germans
inside Sadzot.
There remained the task of closing
the gap between the two battalions of
the 289th. General Hickey put in the
2d Battalion of the 112th Infantry at
dark on the 28th, but this outfit, hastily
summoned to the fight, lost its direction
and failed to seal the gap. Early on the
morning of the 29th Hickey, believing
that the 112th had made the line of
departure secure, sent the 509th and
six light tanks to attack toward the
southeast. But the enemy had reorgan-
ized in the meantime, put in what
probably was a fresh battalion, and be-
gun a new march on Sadzot. In the
collision that followed, a section of
German 75-mm. antitank guns destroyed
three of the light tanks and the para-
troopers recoiled; but so did the enemy.
During the morning the 2d Battalion,
112th Infantry, got its bearings—or so
it was believed—and set out to push a
bar across the corridor from the west,
where contact with the 1st Battalion of
the 289th was firm, to the east and the
socket provided the 2d Battalion, 289th.
Across the deep ravines and rugged hills
American troops were sighted, and be-
lieving these to be the 2d Battalion
the troops from the 112th veered toward
them. What had been seen, however,
proved to be the paratroopers of the
509th. After this misadventure and the
jolt suffered by the paratroopers, Hickey
and the battalion commanders con-
cerned worked out a co-ordinated attack.
First the paratroopers put in a twilight
assault which forced the Germans back.
Then the 2d Battalion of the 112th made
a night attack with marching fire, guid-
ing this time on 60-mm. illuminating

THE BATTLE BETWEEN THE SALM AND THE OURTHE 603
mortar shells fired by the 2d Battalion of
the 289th. Crossing through deep ravines
the infantrymen of the 112th drove
the enemy from their path. At dawn on
the 29th the gap finally was closed.
The German failure to penetrate
through the Erezée section on 28–29
December was the last serious bid by
the Sixth Panzer Army in an offensive
role. On that day Field Marshal Model
ordered Sepp Dietrich to go over to the
defensive and began stripping the Sixth
of its armor. The German commanders
left facing the VII and XVIII Airborne
Corps east of the Ourthe record a
number of attacks ordered between 29
December and 2 January, the units in-
volved including infantry detachments
from the 9th SS Panzer Division and
the 18th and 62d Volks Grenadier Divi-
sions. But to order these weak and
tired units into the attack when the
German foot soldier knew that the
great offensive was ended was one thing,
to press the assault itself was quite
another. The American divisions in this
sector note only at the turn of the year:
“front quiet,” or “routine patrolling.”
The initiative had clearly passed to
the Americans. General Ridgway, who
had been champing at the bit to go over
to the offensive even when his corps
was not hard pressed, sought per-
mission to start an attack on the last
day of the year with the XVIII Air-
borne, but Field Marshal Montgomery
already had decided that the Allied
offensive on the north flank would be
initiated farther to the west by Collins’
corps and had set the date–3 January
1945.
The Elsenborn Shoulder
The four infantry divisions of the V
Corps by 24 December formed a firm
barrier along the northern shoulder of
the deepening German salient. This
front, extending from Monschau to
Waimes, relapsed into relative inactivity.
The Sixth Panzer Army had tried to
widen the road west by levering at the
American linchpin in the Monschau
area, by cutting toward the Elsenborn
Ridge via Krinkelt-Rocherath, and by
chopping at Butgenbach in an attempt
to roll back the V Corps’ west flank, but
the entire effort had been fruitless and
its cost dear. Having failed to free the
right wing of the Sixth Panzer Army, the
higher German commands gave the ball
to the Fifth Panzer Army and perforce
accepted the narrow zone of advance in
the Sixth Panzer Army sector which gave
two instead of the originally scheduled
four main roads for its drive west. Be
it added that the northernmost of the
two remaining roads was under Ameri-
can artillery fire for most of its length.
It cannot be said that the Sixth Panzer
Army clearly had written off the possi-
bility of overrunning the Elsenborn
Ridge. The attacks by the German right
wing had dwindled away by 24 De-
cember because of sheer fatigue, heavy
losses, the withdrawal of most of the
German armor, the feeling on the part
of the army staff that it would be best
to wait for further successes in the south
before going out on a limb, and the
desire to withhold sufficient strength to
meet any American counterattack di-
rected from the Elsenborn area against
the shoulder of the salient. Furthermore,
on 24 or 25 December, Hitler dropped
the plan for the secondary attack by the
Fifteenth Army toward Maastricht and
Heerlen, which had been intended to
assist the Sixth Panzer drive after the

604 THE ARDENNES: BATTLE OF THE BULGE
latter got rolling.
But there still were five German divi-
sions in this sector under Hitzfeld’s
LXVII Corps, the corps maintaining a
front whose boundaries coincided al-
most exactly with those of the American
V Corps. There could be no further
thought of a drive to Eupen and the
establishment of a blocking cordon west
of that point; this mission had been
scrubbed when the last attacks at
Monschau collapsed. Nor was there hope
that the right wing of the Sixth Panzer
Army could be set in motion at this
date, the armor already having been
shifted to beef up the advance on the
left. Hitzfeld’s task was to defend, to
hold the shoulder; but his line, bent in
a sharp right angle near Wirtzfeld, was
expensive in manpower and tactically
poor. On Model’s order Hitzfeld and
his division commanders ran a map
exercise on 26 December whose solution
was this: the angle at Wirtzfeld must
be straightened and the line shortened.
The powerful groupment of American
artillery on Elsenborn Ridge constituted
an ever-present threat; therefore this
ground should be taken. Four divi-
sions, it was planned, would attack to
achieve this solution.
Meanwhile the main German advance
was having trouble. The Bastogne road
center continued in American hands,
greatly hampering the development of
the Fifth Panzer Army attack. The for-
ward wing of the Sixth Panzer Army
had collided with the American defenses
along the line of the Ambléve and
Salm Rivers but had failed to gain
maneuver room and was proceeding on
a dangerously narrow front. Every mo-
bile or semimobile unit which could be
found would have to be thrown into
the main advance. The Army Group B
commander, acting on Hitler’s order,
took the 3d Panzer Grenadier Division
out of the LXVII Corps and told Hitz-
feld to abandon his planned attack
against the strong Elsenborn Ridge posi-
tion. The corps was left a limited task,
to iron out the Wirtzfeld angle.
Finally, on 28 December, Hitzfeld
was ready, but his assault force now rep-
resented only parts of two divisions,
the 12th Volks Grenadier Division and
the 246th. Early that morning two bat-
talions of the 352d Regiment (246th
Volks Grenadier Division) moved out
of the woods near Rocherath against
the forward lines of the 99th Infantry
Division on the Elsenborn Ridge. This
attack was blown to pieces by accurate
shelling from the batteries on the ridge.
A battalion of the 48th Regiment (12th
Volks Grenadier Division) met an
identical fate when it started toward
the 2d Infantry Division position north-
west of Wirtzfeld. Two battalions from
the 27th Regiment (12th Volks Grena-
dier Division) took a crack at the 1st
Infantry Division front in the Butgen-
bach sector, but intense rocket fire and
shellfire failed to shake the defenders
and left their supporting artillery un-
scathed. The German assault battal-
ions had not even deployed from ap-
proach march formation when a rain of
bursting shells scattered them in every
direction. A handful of riflemen and
engineers reached a draw leading to the
American foxhole line only to be cap-
tured or driven off. This was the last
attack against the American forces ar-
rayed on the north shoulder. Hitzfeld
was left to hold what he could of his
lengthy front with a force which by the
close of December had dwindled to

THE BATTLE BETWEEN THE SALM AND THE OURTHE 605
three understrength divisions.
The German High Command and the
troops of the Sixth Panzer Army now
waited apprehensively and hopelessly
for the retaliatory blow to fall. That
the American attack would come in a
matter of hours or a very few days was
clear to all. Where it would be delivered
along the length of the north flank of the
Ardennes salient was a good deal less
certain. A few of the German leaders
seem to have anticipated originally that
the Allied counterattack would come
from north and south against the base
of the salient, but by the end of De-
cember intelligence reports definitely
ruled out any Allied build-up at the
shoulders of the salient. The Sixth Pan-
zer Army staff, acutely aware of the
weakened condition of the German
troops in the Malmédy sector, was appre-
hensive that the Allied effort would be
made there in a drive through to St.
Vith, and set two ordnance companies
scrambling to re-create a single opera-
tional tank company from the armored
debris the 1st SS Panzer Division had
brought out of the La Gleize debacle.
What Rundstedt and Model expected
of their adversary can never be known,
although their respective staffs seem to
have read into Patton’s battle around
Bastogne a strong indication that the
poised Allied pincers would close some-
where in the vicinity of Houffalize. It
is known, however, how Rundstedt re-
garded the Allied strategy which on 3
January sent the American divisions at-
tacking from north and south to snip
off the tip of the salient at Houffalize:
this was, says the OB WEST War Diary,
“the small solution.”

CHAPTER XXIV
The Third Army Offensive
Widening the Bastogne Corridor
When the 4th Armored tanks reached
the Bastogne perimeter on 26 December,
the contact between McAuliffe’s
command and the Third Army was
dramatic and satisfying but none too
secure 1 . The road now opened from
Assenois to Bastogne could be traversed
under armed convoy, and for the moment
the Germans in this sector were
too demoralized by the speed and sharpness
of the blow to react in any aggressive
manner. The two main highways
east and west of the Assenois corridor,
however, still were barred by the
Seventh Army and such small detachments
as could be hurriedly stripped
from the German circle around Bastogne.
Continued access to Bastogne
would have to be insured by widening
the breach and securing the Arlon highway-and
perhaps that from Neufchâteau
as well-before the enemy could
react to seal the puncture with his
armor. (Map X)
The main weight of Gaffey’s 4th
Armored, it will be recalled, lay to the
east of Assenois on the Arlon-Bastogne
axis. On the right of the 4th Armored
the 26th Infantry Division was echeloned
to the southeast and on 26 December
had put troops over the Sure River,
1 The 4th Armored attack toward Bastogne is
described in Chapter XXI, pp. 523–32, 547–55.
but the only direct tactical effect this
division could have on the fight south of
Bastogne would be to threaten the
Seventh Army line of communications
and divert German reserves. 2 The gap
between the 26th Infantry and the 4th
Armored Divisions, rather tenuously
screened by the 6th Cavalry Squadron,
would be filled by the 35th Infantry
Division (Maj. Gen. Paul Baade) , which
had just come up from Metz and had
orders to attack across the Sure on 27
December. 3 If all went well this attack
would break out to the Lutrebois-Har-
lange road, which fed into the Arlon
highway, and proceed thence abreast of
the 4th Armored.
West of the Assenois corridor the left
wing of Gaffey’s command was screened,
2 The earlier operations of the 26th Division on
the right flank of the III Corps are discussed in
Chapter XXI. pp. 540–47.
3 The 35th Division had suffered heavily in the
Lorraine battles (for which see Cole, The Lorraine
Campaign, ch. XII, passim) and General Gay
persuaded Patton not to throw the division into
the Ardennes fight until other Third Army divi-
sions in better condition had been committed.
(The AAR’s of the 35th Division in the early
phases of the Ardennes are so abbreviated as to
be practically useless. Fortunately the story is
told in considerable detail in the combat inter-
views. The published histories of the division’s
activities are very good. See Miltonberger and
Huston, 134th Infantry Regiment: Combat History
of World War II (Washington, n.d.); Combat
History of the 134th Infantry Regiment (Baton
Rouge, 1946); and The 35th Infantry Division in
World War II (Atlanta, n.d.).

THE THIRD ARMY OFFENSIVE 607
but rather lightly, by scratch forces that
General Middleton had gathered from
his VIII Corps troops and what remained
of Cota’s 28th Division. On the after-
noon of 26 December General Patton
assigned CCA, 9th Armored, which was
near Luxembourg City, to the III
Corps with orders that it be attached
to the 4th Armored and attack on the
left to open the Neufchâteau-Bastogne
highway. The 9th Armored Division’s
CCA was relieved that same afternoon
by CCA of Maj. Gen. Robert W. Grow’s
6th Armored Division.
Although the enemy troops around
Assenois had been broken and scattered
by the lightning thrust on the 26th,
the III Corps’ attack on the following
day met some opposition. The 35th
Division, its ultimate objective the Long-
villy-Bastogne road, had more trouble
with terrain and weather than with
Germans, for the enemy had elected to
make a stand on a series of hills some
five thousand yards beyond the Sure.
On the left the 137th Infantry (Col.
William S. Murray) trucked through
the 4th Armored, crossed the tankers’
bridge at Tintange, and moved out cross-
country in snow six inches deep. The
2d Battalion drove off the German out-
post at the crossroads village of Surré,
but to the west the 3d Battalion, de-
filing along a draw near Livarchamps,
came suddenly under fire from a pillbox
which checked further movement. The
320th Infantry (Col. Bernard A. Byrne)
had to make its own crossings at the
Sure, one company wading the icy river,
but Boulaide and Baschleiden, on the
single road in the regimental zone, were
occupied without a casualty. Thence the
3d Battalion pushed on toward the north.
In the 4th Armored zone CCR
shepherded trucks on the Assenois road
while CCB and CCA continued the foot-
slogging pace north toward Bastogne.
The armored infantry and the two rifle
battalions of the 3 18th marched through
the snow, fighting in those woods and
hamlets where the German grenadiers
and paratroopers–now with virtually no
artillery to back them up–decided to
make a stand. CCB made its attack from
west of Hompré against troops of the
15th Panzer Grenadier Division, here
faced about from Bastogne; by nightfall
its patrols had reached the 101st Air-
borne perimeter. CCA, farther from
the point of impact on 26 December,
had a rougher time although the com-
manders of the two battalions from the
15th Parachute Regiment confronting
the Americans had been captured in
battle the previous day. When the 51st
Armored Infantry Battalion moved to-
ward the village of Sainlez, perched on
a hill to the front, the enemy para-
troopers made such good use of their
commanding position that the Shermans
had to enter the action and partially
destroy the village before the German
hold was broken. The defenders flushed
from Sainlez moved east and struck the
1st Battalion of the 318th, which had
cleared Livarchamps, in the rear, start-
ing a fire fight that lasted into the
night. American battle casualties in this
sector were high on the 27th, and about
an equal number of frost bite cases
plagued the infantrymen who had now
spent six days in the snow and wet.
While the 4th Armored and its at-
tached troops pressed forward to touch
hands with the Bastogne garrison, the
perimeter itself remained in unwonted
quiet. General Taylor went into the
city to congratulate McAuliffe and re-

SUPPLIES MOVING THROUGH BASTOGNE

THE THIRD ARMY OFFENSIVE
sume command of his division. 4 Supply
trucks and replacements for the 101st
rolled through the shell-torn streets. A
medical collecting company arrived to
move the casualties back to corps hospi-
tals and by noon of the 28th the last
stretcher case had left the city. Perhaps
the most depressing burden the defense
had had to bear during the siege was
the large number of seriously wounded
and the lack of medical facilities for
their care. As early as 21 December the
division surgeon had estimated the
101st casualty list as about thirteen hun-
dred, of whom a hundred and fifty were
seriously wounded and required sur-
gery. As this situation worsened the
Third Army chief of staff, General Gay,
made plans on his own responsibility
to move surgeons into Bastogne under
a white flag, but the successful flight of
the Third Army surgeons sent in by
liaison plane on the 25th and by glider
on the 26th changed the plans and did
much to alleviate the suffering in the
cellar hospitals of Bastogne. The casual-
ties finally evacuated numbered 964;
about 700 German prisoners were also
sent out of the city.
Uncertainty as to the tenure of the
ground corridor resulted in a contin-
uation of the airlift on the 27th. This
time 130 cargo planes and 32 gliders
essayed the mission, but by now the
German ack-ack was alert and zeroed
in on the paths of approach. Most of
the gliders landed safely, but the cargo
planes carrying parapacks suffered heavi-
ly on the turnaround over the perimeter;
of thirteen C–47’s sent out by the 440th
Troop Carrier Group only four returned
to their base.
4 Cf. Chapter XIX.
609
During the morning of 28 December
it became apparent that the German
units in front of the III Corps were
stiffening. The 35th Division gained very
little ground, particularly on the right.
On the left the 137th Infantry made
slow going over broken ground and
through underbrush, the bushes and
scrub trees detonating percussion mis-
siles before they could land on the Ger-
man positions. The 3d Battalion, pinned
down in the ravine in column of com-
panies, took nearly all day to work
around the irritating pillbox, which fi-
nally was destroyed. Thus far the 35th
Division, filled with untrained replace-
ments, was attacking without its usual
supporting battalion of tanks, for these
had been taken away while the division
was refitting at Metz.
Meanwhile General Earnest, com-
manding CCA of the 4th Armored, had
become concerned with the failure of
the 35th to draw abreast on his open
east flank, particularly since the rifle bat-
talion borrowed from the 80th Division
was under orders to rejoin its parent
formation. He therefore asked that the
reserve regiment of the 35th (134th
Infantry) be put into the attack on his
right, with the object of taking
Lutrebois, a village east of the Arlon
highway. During the night of the 28th
the 134th Infantry (Col. Butler B.
Miltonberger) relieved the tired troops
from the 8oth, taking attack positions
east of Hompré. The orders were to
push any German resistance to the right
(that is, away from the Arlon road);
thus insensibly the 35th Division was
turning to face northeast instead of north
with the 320th behind the 137th and
the 137th falling into position behind
the 134th. This columnar array would

610
have considerable effect on the conduct
of the ensuing battle.
The Opposing Grand Tactics
By Christmas Day it was apparent in
both the Allied and German head-
quarters that the Ardennes battle had
entered a new phase and that events
now afoot required a fresh look at the
grand tactics to be applied as the year
drew to its close.
The Allied commanders had from the
very first agreed in principle that the
ultimate objective was to seize the in-
itiative, erase the German salient, and
set an offensive in motion to cross the
Rhine. There was division in the
Allied camp, however, as to when a
counteroffensive should be launched and
where it should strike into the salient.
Beyond this, of course, lay the old argu-
ment as to whether the final attack across
the Rhine should be on a wide or
narrow front, in the British or in the
American sector. 5
On 25 December the commanders of
the two army groups whose troops faced
the Germans in the Ardennes met
at Montgomery’s Belgian headquarters.
General Bradley, whose divisions already
were counterattacking, felt that the
5 This controversy as to Allied strategy is well
treated in Pogue, The Supreme Command, pp.
312–17. Montgomery’s strategy has had a number
of defenders, but in the main they have produced
more heat than light. One of the ablest is
Reginald William Thompson whose The Battle
for the Rhineland (London: Hutchinson, 1958)
advances the thesis that Montgomery’s attitude
throughout the Ardennes campaign was governed
by the military principle of the “maintenance of
the objective,” that is, the retention of forces
(British and Canadian) in a posture which would
permit a rapid resumption of the battle for the
Rhineland.
THE ARDENNES: BATTLE OF THE BULGE
German drive had lost its momentum
and that now was the moment to lash
back at the attackers, from the north as
well as the south. Field Marshal Mont-
gomery was a good deal less optimistic.
In his view the enemy still retained the
capability to breach the First Army front
(a view shared by the First Army G–
2, who was concerned with two fresh
German armored divisions believed to
be moving into the Malmédy sector);
the American infantry divisions were
woefully understrength; tank losses had
been very high; in sum, as Montgomery
saw it, the First Army was very tired
and incapable of offensive action.
Bradley was distressed by Montgomery’s
attitude and the very next day wrote a
personal letter to his old friend, the
First Army commander, carefully under-
scoring the field marshal’s authority over
Hodges’ army but making crystal clear
that he, Bradley, did not view the sit-
uation “in as grave a light as Marshal
Montgomery.” As Bradley saw it the
German losses had been very high and
“if we could seize the initiative, I be-
lieve he would have to get out in a
hurry.” The advice to Hodges, then,
was to study the battle with an eye to
pushing the enemy back “as soon as
the situation seems to warrant.”
Perhaps, after Bradley’s visit, the field
marshal felt that he should set the
record straight at SHAEF. After a long
visit with Hodges on the 26th, he sent
a message to Eisenhower saying that
“at present” he could not pass to the
offensive, that the west flank of the
First Army continued under pressure,
and that more troops would be needed
to wrest the initiative from the Germans.
At the moment, however, the Supreme
Commander was concerned more with

THE THIRD ARMY OFFENSIVE
the slowness of the Third Army drive
(earlier General Patton had called twice
to apologize for the delay in reaching
Bastogne) than with an enlargement of
the Allied counterattack. In the daily
SHAEF staff meeting on the morning of
the 26th Eisenhower ruled that
General Devers would have to redress
the lines of his 6th Army Group by a
general withdrawal to the Vosges, there-
after joining his flank to the French
north of Colmar. Such regrouping, dis-
tasteful as it was, would free two or
three American divisions for use in the
Ardennes. (It would seem that the
SHAEF staff approved the withdrawal
of Devers’ forces-all save Air Marshal
Tedder who did not think the with-
drawal justified and argued that Mont-
gomery had British and Canadian divi-
sions which could be freed to provide
the needed SHAEF reserve.) 6
The lower echelon of Allied com-
manders was meanwhile stirring restive-
ly. Having reached Bastogne late on the
26th, Patton set his staff to work on
plans for a prompt redirection of the
Third Army attack. On the 27th
General Collins arrived at the First
Army command post with three plans
for an attack led by the VII Corps,
two aimed at a junction with Patton
in the Bastogne sector, one with St. Vith,
deeper in the salient, as the objective.
Collins’ proposals posed the problem
of grand tactics now at issue-should
the German salient be pushed back from
the tip or should it be cut off close to
the shoulders-but it remained for
Patton, the diligent student of mili-
tary history, to state in forthright terms
6 Robb Notes; Bradley, A Soldier’s Story, p. 480;
Hq 12th Army Group, Military Objectives, file
371.3, vol. IV.
611
the classic but venturesome solution.
Arguing from the experiences of World
War I, the Third Army commander held
that the Ardennes salient should be cut
off and the German armies engulfed
therein by a vise closing from north
and south against the shoulders of the
Bulge. Thus the Third Army would
move northeast from Luxembourg City
toward Bitburg and Prüm along what
the Third Army staff called the “Honey-
moon Trail.” General Smith, the
SHAEF chief of staff, was in agreement
with this solution, as were Hodges,
Gerow, and Collins-in principle. The
salient at its shoulders was forty miles
across, however, and a successful amputa-
tion would necessitate rapid action by
strong armored forces moving fast along
a good road net. The First Army com-
manders, as a result, had to give
over this solution because the road
complex southeast of the Elsenborn
Ridge, which would be the natural First
Army axis for a cleaving blow at the
German shoulder, could not sustain a
large attack force heavy in armor-
hence Collins’ compromise suggestion
for an attack from a point north of
Malmédy toward St. Vith. 7
How would the two army group com-
manders react to the pressures being
brought to bear by their subordinates?
Bradley was concerned with the vagaries
of the winter weather, which could
slow any counterattack to a walk, and
by the lack of reserves. He may also
have been uncertain of his air support.
Bad flying weather was a distinct possi-
bility, and the Eighth Air Force-a
rather independent command–was in-
creasingly disenchanted with its battle-
7 Sylvan Diary; Gay Diary; Robb Notes.

612
field missions over the Ardennes (in-
deed, on 27 December the Eighth Air
Force had stated its intention of scrub-
bing the battle zone targets and going
after the Leipzig oil depots, weather per-
mitting) . Bradley decided therefore to
settle for half a loaf and on the 27th
briefed the Supreme Commander on a
new Third Army attack to be mounted
from the Bastogne area and to drive
northeast toward St. Vith. Bradley was
careful to add that this plan was not
Patton’s concept of a drive against the
south shoulder.
There remained Montgomery’s deci-
sion. By the 27th he was ready to con-
sider definite counterattack plans. When
this word was relayed to Eisenhower at
his daily staff meeting it elicited from
him a heartfelt “Praise God from Whom
all blessings flow!” and the Supreme
Commander set off at once to meet the
field marshal in Brussels. Hodges, Col-
lins, and Ridgway did their best in the
meantime to convince Montgomery that
the First Army attack should be initi-
ated not around Celles, as the field mar-
shal had first proposed, but farther to
the east. On the evening of 28 December
Eisenhower phoned General Smith from
Brussels and told him that he saw great
possibilities in a thrust through the
Bastogne-Houffalize area. As it turned
out, this would be the maneuver ulti-
mately adopted. Perhaps the field mar-
shal had given Eisenhower reason to
think that the First Army would make
its play in a drive on Houffalize; per-
haps-and this seems more likely-Mont-
gomery still had not made any final
decision as to the place where the coun-
terattack would be delivered. Certainly
no time had been set although 4 and 5
January had been discussed as possible
THE ARDENNES: BATTLE OF THE BULGE
target dates. Hodges and Collins con-
tinued to press for a decision to get the
attack from the north flank rolling–the
prospects for which brightened when the
British offered the loan of two hundred
medium tanks. Meanwhile the new
Third Army attack against the south
flank commenced. On the last day of
December, the serious prospect of bad
weather outweighed by the fact that the
Germans were thinning the First Army
front to face the Third, Montgomery
gave his decision and Hodges consented:
the VII Corps, followed by the XVIII
Airborne Corps, would attack toward
Houffalize and St. Vith respectively on
3 January. 8
Eisenhower’s telephone call from
Brussels on the 28th released the 11th
Armored and 87th Infantry Divisions
from the SHAEF reserve for use by
Bradley. That night Patton met with
the VIII and III Corps command-
ers to lay out the new plan for contin-
uation of the Third Army attack. Mid-
dleton’s VIII Corps would jump off
from the Bastogne area on the morning
of 30 December, its objective the high
ground and road nexus just south of
Houffalize. Millikin’s III Corps would
move into the attack on 31 December,
driving in the direction of St. Vith. The
initial pressure on the salient would
be exerted much farther to the west
than Patton wished. Bradley made dou-
bly sure that the Third Army would in-
deed place its weight as planned by
telling Patton that the two fresh divi-
sions could be employed only by the
VIII Corps. But the Third Army com-
8 Manteuffel argues that the American counter-
attack began prematurely; see Freidin and Richard-
son, eds., Fatal Decisions, p. 290.

THE THIRD ARMY OFFENSIVE 613
mander put his cherished concept into
the army operations order by means of
a paragraph which called for the XII
Corps to be prepared for an attack
across the Sauer River and northeast
through the Prüm valley-ultimate ob-
jective the Rhine River crossings at
Bonn as the entire Third Army swung
northeast.
On Christmas Day the German com-
manders sensed, as their opponents
across the line had done, that they were
at a turning point in the Ardennes bat-
tle. How should the higher command-
ers now intervene to influence the
course of battle, or, more accurately,
could they intervene? Manteuffel’s plan
was to make the suit fit the cloth: put
enough new troops in to take Bastogne,
then swing the left flank of the Fifth
Panzer Army toward the Meuse and
fight the Allies east of the river–the
old Small Solution. Field Marshal Mo-
del agreed that Bastogne must be taken
and that additional troops would be
needed for the task, but the only ar-
mor immediately available was the Fueh-
rer Begleit Brigade and he had just
extricated this unit from the Manhay
fight to give added weight to the Fifth
Panzer Army drive against the Ameri-
can line on the Ourthe River. As it
turned out, Remer’s brigade arrived in
the Ourthe sector only a few hours be-
fore the Americans broke through to
Bastogne. It had time to put in only
one probing assault when Model, on the
late afternoon of the 26th, sent the
Fuehrer Begleit again on its travels,
this time countermarching to seal the
gap in the Bastogne ring with a riposte
between Sibret and Hompré.
Model and Rundstedt seem to have
agreed on a plan of action which may
or may not have had the Fuehrer’s ap-
proval (there is no record). The Fifth
and Sixth would seek to destroy the
Allied forces east of the Meuse while
the Seventh held on as best it could; as
a first step an attack would be made to
eradicate the Americans in the Bastogne
area. 9 Obviously the German lines
would have to be shortened somewhere,
and Model, directly under Hitler’s
baleful eye, dare not surrender ground.
This responsibility fell to the Fifth Pan-
zer Army commander, who on 26 De-
cember (with tacit approval from Model
at every step) set about creating a
defensive front in the west roughly fol-
lowing the triangular outline Bastogne-
Rochefort-Amonines. The battered 2d
Panzer Division was brought back
through the Rochefort bridgehead and
troops from the 9th Panzer took over
from Panzer Lehr in the Rochefort area,
the latter sidestepping toward the south-
east so that one flank finally would
lie on the Lesse River with the other
9 The German sources contributing most directly
to this chapter are MSS # B–23, 5th Parachute
Division, 1 December 1944–12 January 1945
(Generalmajor Ludwig Heilmann) ; # B–041,
167th Volks Grenadier Division, 24 December
1944–February 1945, Corps Hoecker, 2–10 March
1945 and 59th Infantry Division, 20 March–24
April 1945 (Generalleutnant Hans Hoecker) ; #
B–068, 3d Panzer Grenadier Division, Ardennes
(Generalmajor Walter Denkert) ; # B–151, Fifth
Panzer Army, Ardennes Offensive (General der
Panzertruppen Hasso von Manteuffel) ; # B–151a,
sequel to MS # B–151 (General der Panzertruppen
Hasso von Manteuffel); # B–235, Fifth Panzer
Army, 2 November 1944–16 January 1945 (General-
major Carl Wagener); # B–465, 3d Panzer
Grenadier Division, 16–28 December 1944 (Gen-
eralmajor Walter Denkert) ; # B–592, Fuehrer
Begleit Brigade, 16 December 1944–26 January
1945 (Generalmajor Otto Remer); # B–701, Army
Group E, 15 October 1944–1945 (Col Guenther
Reichhelm); # B–799. LXXXIX Corps, 24 Janu-
ary–8 March 1945 (Lt Col Kurt Reschke).

614 THE ARDENNES: BATTLE OF THE BULGE
fixed at Remagne, five miles west of
the Neufchâteau-Bastogne highway. The
LVIII Panzer Corps, possibly as a sop
to Hitler, was allowed to continue its
fruitless attacks in the Ourthe sector,
but with the Fuehrer Begleit out of the
picture these quickly dwindled away.
Manteuffel made his old comrade Luet-
twitz responsible for the defensive west-
ern front and took a new corps
headquarters, which had been sent up
from the OKW reserve, to handle the
Bastogne operation. This, the XXXIX
Panzer Corps, was commanded by Gen-
eralleutnant Karl Decker, a very experi-
enced officer with a reputation for
prudence combined with determination.
Decker, despite protests by Luettwitz,
was placed under the latter, and for a
few days the German order of battle
would show an “Army Group Luett-
witz.”
Manteuffel counted on the Fuehrer
Begleit to carry the main burden of the
counterattack south of Bastogne. The
brigade had about forty Mark IV tanks
plus an assault gun brigade of thirty
tubes, and its infantry had not been bled
white as in the rest of the armored
formations. In addition, Manteuffel had
been promised the beat-up 1st SS Pan-
zer Division, the 3d Panzer Grenadier
Division, and the Fuehrer Grenadier
Brigade, parts of these formations being
scheduled to reach Decker on 28 De-
cember. Advance elements of the Fueh-
rer Begleit did arrive that morning,
taking station in the Bois de Herbai-
mont north of the Marche-Bastogne
road, but the Allied Jabos were in full
cry over the battlefield and Remer could
not bring all his troops forward or issue
from the forest cover. Time was running
out for the Germans. As early as the
night of the 27th Rundstedt’s staff be-
lieved that unless Remer could make a
successful attack at once it was “question-
able” whether the Bastogne gap could
be sealed. Manteuffel later would say
that this job could have been done only
by counterattacking within forty-eight
hours.
On both sides of the hill, then, the
troops were being moved for a set
piece attack on 30 December. Would
either opponent anticipate the ensuing
collision? German intelligence officers
did predict that the 6th Armored Di-
vision soon would appear between the
III and XII Corps. The OB WEST
report of 27 December reads: “It is ex-
pected that the units of the Third Army
under the energetic leadership of Gen-
eral Patton will make strong attacks
against our south flank.” Within twenty-
four hours this view altered: The First
Army was said to be having difficulty re-
grouping and still showed defensive ten-
dencies; therefore, even though the
Third Army was in position to attack,
it probably would not attack alone. 10
The American intelligence agencies
had practically no knowledge of any
German units except those immediately
in contact. Of course some kind of
counterattack was expected, but this, it
was believed, would come when bad
weather cut down friendly air activity.
The weather did turn foul late on the
28th and the word went out in the
American camp: Prepare for an ar-
mored counterattack, enemy tanks are in
movement around Bastogne.
10 The German estimate of the opposing forces
and Allied reserves moving into the Ardennes
may be traced in the daily Ic. Feindlagekarten
attached to the OB WEST KTB.

THE THIRD ARMY OFFENSIVE
The Sibret-Villeroux Actions
While the Fuehrer Begleit Brigade
was assembling, General Kokott did
what he could to gather troops and guns
in the sector west of Assenois and there
make some kind of a stand to prevent
the tear in the Bastogne noose from un-
raveling further. The key villages in
his original defense plans were Sibret
and Villeroux, overwatching as they
did the Neufchâteau-Bastogne highway.
Kokott could expect no help from the
5th Parachute Division, originally en-
trusted with the blocking line in this
area, for on the night of 26 December
an officer patrol reported that not a sin-
gle paratrooper could be found between
Sibret and Assenois. Kokott’s own divi-
sion, the 26th Volks Grenadier, and its
attached battalions from the 15th Pan-
zer Grenadier had taken very heavy
losses during the western attack against
the 101st Airborne on Christmas Day.
The rifle companies were down to twenty
or thirty men; most of the regimental
and battalion commanders and executive
officers were dead or wounded; a num-
ber of heavy mortars and antitank guns
had been sent back to the divisional
trains because there was no more am-
munition; and the only rifle replace-
ments now consisted of what Kokott
called “lost clumps” of wandering infan-
try.
When CCA of the 9th Armored Di-
vision (Col. Thomas L. Harrold) got its
orders on the 26th to come forward on
the left flank of the 4th Armored and
attack toward Sibret, there was more at
stake than defending the corridor just
opened through the German lines.
General Middleton was already busy
with plans for his VIII Corps to join
615
the Third Army attack beyond Bastogne
and, with the memories of the traffic
congestion there early in the fight still
fresh in mind, was most unwilling to
drag the VIII Corps through the Bas-
togne knothole in the forthcoming ad-
vance. Middleton convinced Bradley
and Patton that the VIII Corps should
make its drive from a line of departure
west of Bastogne, and for this the Neuf-
château road first had to be opened and
the enemy driven back to the north-
west.
When CCA started down the Neuf-
château road on the morning of the 27th,
it faced a catch-as-catch-can fight; no
one knew where the enemy might be
found or in what strength. Task Force
Collins (Lt. Col. Kenneth W. Collins),
in the lead, was held up some hours
by mines which had been laid north
of Vaux-lez-Rosières during the VIII
Corps’ withdrawal; so Task Force Kar-
steter (Lt. Col. Burton W. Karsteter)
circled to head for Villeroux, leaving
Task Force Collins to take Sibret. Kar-
steter, who had two medium tank com-
panies, got into Villeroux, but night was
coming and the tanks were not risked
inside the village. Collins sent his single
company of Shermans into Sibret, firing
at everything in sight. The Americans
could not be said to hold the village,
however, for a small detachment of the
104th Panzer Grenadier Regiment was
determined to make a fight of it and
did. It took all night to drive the Ger-
man grenadiers out of the cellars and
ruined houses.
During the night of 27 December
the Germans put more men into Ville-
roux (the 39th Regiment was slowly
building up a semblance of a front)
but to no avail. American artillery and

616 THE ARDENNES: BATTLE OF THE BULGE
Allied fighter-bombers shattered the vil-
lage, and Karsteter finished the job with
his tanks. Task Force Collins was de-
layed on the 28th by a formidable
ground haze which lingered around
Sibret all morning. Halfway to its next
objective, the crossroads at Chenogne
north of Sibret, the American column
came under enfilading fire from a
small wood lot close to the road. The
tank company turned to deal with this
menace and finally suppressed the Ger-
man fire, but light was fading and the
column laagered where it was.
In the meantime General Kokott had
gathered a counterattack force, a com-
pany of the division Pioneers, to retake
Sibret. While at breakfast on the 29th
eating K rations on the tank decks and
in foxholes beside the road, Collins’
troops suddenly saw a body of men
march out of the nearby woods. An
American captain shouted out and the
leading figure replied, “Good morning”
-in German. The Americans cut loose
with every weapon, to such effect that
some fifty dead Germans were counted,
lying in column formation as they had
fallen. Late in the day, however, the
fortunes of war turned against the Amer-
icans. Collins’ tanks had moved through
the village square in Chenogne and
were approaching a road junction when
high velocity shells knocked out the
two lead tanks. Then, in a sharp ex-
change of shots, the enemy gunners
accounted for two more of the Shermans,
and the Americans withdrew. They
could not discover the exact enemy lo-
cations in the twilight but were sure
they were facing tanks. That night, the
VIII Corps artillery reported, it “blew
Chenogne apart.”
While Task Force Collins was en-
gaged on the road to Chenogne, Task
Force Karsteter also was moving north,
its objective Senonchamps, the scene of
hard fighting in previous days and a
sally port onto the main road running
west from Bastogne to Marche. Here
Task Force Karsteter was unwittingly
threatening the assembly area of the
Fuehrer Begleit which lay in the woods
north of the highway, none too securely
screened by remnants of the 3d Bat-
talion of the 104th Panzer Grenadier
around Chenogne. Remer’s brigade al-
ready had taken some share in the action
against CCA and one of his 105-mm.
flak pieces was responsible for holding
up Task Force Collins in the fight at
the roadside woods, continuing in ac-
tion until it was rammed by a Sherman
tank.
Not far out of Villeroux, Task Force
Karsteter came under hot and heavy fire
from the Bois de Fragotte, lying over
to the northwest. What the Americans
had run into was the main body of the
3d Panzer Grenadier Division. Losses
among the armored infantry were very
high, and that night a liaison officer
reported that the task force front was
“disorganized.” Four of Karsteter’s tanks
ran the gauntlet of fire from the woods
and entered Senonchamps, but the in-
fantry failed to follow. The cumulative
losses sustained by CCA in the three-
day operation had been severe and it
was down to a company and a half of
infantry, although 21 medium and 17
light tanks still were operable. 11
11 During this battle Sgt. T. J. Dawson, Com-
pany C. 19th Tank Battalion, was killed by a direct
artillery hit while attempting to rescue the crew
members from his burning tank. He was awarded
the DSC posthumously.

THE THIRD ARMY OFFENSIVE
The Two Attacks Collide
The grand tactics of the two oppo-
nents had been solved–at least on the
planning maps–by set-piece attacks in
the Bastogne sector which were sched-
uled to commence on or about 30 De-
cember. This date was firm insofar as
the American Third Army was con-
cerned. In the German camp the date
was contingent on the caprices of the
weather, traffic congestion on the roads
running into the area, the damage which
might be inflicted by the Allied fighter-
bombers, and the uncertainty attached
to the arrival of fuel trucks coming for-
ward from the Rhine dumps. The two
attacks nevertheless would be launched
on 30 December.
The Forces and the Plans
Middleton’s VIII Corps, scheduled to
provide the American curtain-raiser
thrust on the left wing of Patton’s army,
took control of the 101st Airborne Di-
vision and the 9th Armored Division the
evening before the attack began. Al-
though General Taylor’s paratroopers
and glider infantry would play no offen-
sive role in the first stages of the Third
Army operation, they had to hold the
pivot position at Bastogne and provide
couverture as the scheme of maneuver
unfolded. Of the 9th Armored com-
mands only CCA, already committed,
could be used at the onset of the VIII
Corps advance toward Houffalize. On
the morning of the 30th, then, the corps
order of battle (east to west) would be
the 101st, CCA of the 9th Armored, the
11th Armored Division, and the 87th In-
fantry Division, with these last two
617
divisions designated to make the main
effort.
The 11th Armored (General Kil-
burn) had been hurried from training
in the United Kingdom to shore up the
Meuse River line if needed and had
some cavalry patrolling on the east bank
when Eisenhower turned the division
over to Bradley. Late on the evening
of the 28th General Kilburn received
orders from Middleton to move his di-
vision to the Neufchâteau area, and two
hours after midnight the 11th Armored
began a forced march, the distance
about eighty-five miles. The heavy col-
umns were slowed by snow, ice, and the
limited-capacity bridge used to cross the
Meuse, but CCA, in the van, reached
the new assembly area a couple of hours
before receiving the corps attack or-
der issued at 1800. CCB and the remain-
der of the division were still on the
road. Some units of this green division
would have to go directly from the
march column into the attack, set for
0730 the next morning. There was no
time for reconnaissance and the division
assault plan had to be blocked out with
only the hastily issued maps as guid-
ance.
The general mission given the 11th
Armored–and the 87th as well–was to
swing west around Bastogne, capture
the heights south of Houffalize, and se-
cure the Ourthe River line. The first
phase, however, was a power play to
drive the enemy back to the north in an
assault, set in motion from the Neufchâ-
teau-Bastogne road, which would sweep
forward on the left of CCA, 9th Ar-
mored. General Kilburn wanted to
attack with combat commands solidly
abreast, but the VIII Corps commander,
concerned by the thought of exposing

618 THE ARDENNES: BATTLE OF THE BULGE
11TH ARMORED DIVISION HALF-TRACKS MASSED on the outskirts of Bastogne.
the relatively untested 87th without tank
support, ordered Kilburn to divide his
force so as to place one combat com-
mand close to the new infantry division.
Thus the 11th Armored would make its
initial drive with CCB (Col. Wesley W.
Yale) passing east of a large woods-the
Bois des Haies de Magery–and CCA
(Brig. Gen. Willard A. Holbrook, Jr.)
circling west of the same. The 87th In-
fantry Division (Brig. Gen. Frank L.
Culin, Jr.) had arrived on the Continent
in early December and been briefly em-
ployed as part of the Third Army in the
Saar offensive. Ordered into the SHAEF
reserve at Reims on 24 December, the
division was at full combat strength
when, five days later, the order came to
entruck for the 100-mile move to the
VIII Corps. There the 87th assembled
between Bertrix and Libramont in prep-
aration for an advance on the follow-
ing morning to carry the corps left
wing north, cut the Bastogne–St. Hu-
bert road, and seize the high ground
beyond. Middleton’s two-division attack
would be well stiffened by ten battalions
of corps artillery.
Across the lines, on the afternoon of
29 December, General Manteuffel called
his commanders together. Here were
the generals who had carried the Bas-
togne fight thus far and generals of the
divisions moving into the area, now in-
cluding three SS commanders. Manteuf-
fel, it is related, began the conference

THE THIRD ARMY OFFENSIVE 619
with some critical remarks about the
original failure to apprehend the impor-
tance of Bastogne. He then proceeded
to tell the assemblage that the Ardennes
offensive, as planned, was at an end,
that Bastogne had become the “central
problem,” and that the German High
Command viewed the forthcoming
battle as an “opportunity,” an opportun-
ity to win a striking victory or at the least
to chew up the enemy divisions which
would be poured into the fight. The
operation would be in three phases:
first, close the ring once again around
Bastogne; second, push the Americans
back to the south; third, with reinforce-
ments now on the way, take Bastogne
in a final assault.
Army Group Luettwitz would con-
duct the fight to restore the German
circle with the XXXIX and XLVII
Panzer Corps, the first attacking east
to west, the second striking west to east.
A number of the divisions en route to
Bastogne had not yet arrived and the
attack set for the 30th would be neither
as strong nor as co-ordinated as
Manteuffel would wish-but he was
under pressure from his superiors and
could entertain no further delay. The
eastern assault force comprised the much
understrength and crippled 1st SS Pan-
zer and the 167th Volks Grenadier
Divisions; its drive was to be made
via Lutrebois toward Assenois. The at-
tack from the west would be spearhead-
ed by the Fuehrer Begleit advancing
over Sibret and hammering the ring
closed. The 3d Panzer Grenadier Divi-
sion was to advance in echelon to the
left of Remer’s brigade while the rem-
nants of the 26th Volks Grenadier Divi-
sion and 15th Panzer Grenadier Division
screened to the west and north of
Bastogne. The timing for the arrival of
the incoming reinforcements–the 12th
SS Panzer, the 9th SS Panzer, and the
340th Volks Grenadier Divisions–was
problematical .
The Contact
Generalmajor Walter Denkert, com-
manding the 3d Panzer Grenadier Divi-
sion, planned to attack at 0730 on 30
December because of the predisposition
the Germans had noted (and on which
they had capitalized many times) for the
Americans to delay the start of the day’s
operations until about eight or nine
o’clock in the morning. His division ex-
pected to move south through the Bois
de Fragotte (between Chenogne and
Senonchamps) , then swing southeast to
retake Villeroux. The attack plan was
intended to pave the way for Remer’s
brigade (attached to the 3d Panzer
Grenadier Division since Denkert was
the senior commander) to seize Sibret
and permit the combined force to de-
bouch against Assenois and Hompré.
The Americans, as it turned out, were
not as dilatory as had been anticipated-
both their attack divisions were moving
north by 0730. Remer also kept to his
time schedule.
The Fuehrer Begleit advance was
geared for a one-two punch at Sibret.
The battalion of Remer’s panzer gren-
adiers, which had clashed briefly with
Task Force Collins in Chenogne the
previous evening, moved out over the
snow-covered fields to pry an opening
on the north edge of Sibret, while the
Fuehrer Begleit tank group–carrying
a battalion of grenadiers–waited in
Chenogne to move forward on a parallel
trail which passed through Flohimont

620 THE ARDENNES: BATTLE OF THE BULGE
and entered Sibret from the west. A
dense ground fog covered the area for a
few hours, masking the opposing forces
from one another. The grenadier bat-
talion made some progress and drove
Task Force Collins back toward Sibret,
but the battalion commander was killed
and the advance slowed down. Remer’s
tank group was nearing Flohimont when
the fog curtain raised abruptly to reveal
about thirty American tanks.
Colonel Yale had divided CCB of the
11th Armored into a tank force (Task
Force Poker) and an infantry task force
(Task Force Pat). Task Force Pat, es-
sentially the 21st Armored Infantry Bat-
talion, had marked Flohimont on the
map as its line of departure but in the
approach march became confused. Com-
munications failed, and the reconnais-
sance troops in the van of CCB got lost
and fell back on Task Force Pat. Adding
menace to confusion the German artil-
lery began to pound the Jodenville-
Flohimont road along which the attack
was directed. Meanwhile the reinforced
41st Tank Battalion (Task Force Pok-
er), which had picked Lavaselle from
the map as its goal, rolled north with
little opposition and reached its objec-
tive about a mile and a half west of
Chenogne. These were the American
tanks seen by Remer.
Lavaselle turned out to be located in a
hollow, hardly a place for armor, and
the task force commander (Maj. Wray
F. Sagaser) decided to move on to the
villages of Brul and Houmont which
occupied some high ground just to the
north. There was a creek to cross with
a single rickety bridge, but the tanks
made it. The twin hamlets were de-
fended only by a few infantry and fell
easily-then intense rocket and mortar
fire set in. Task Force Poker was on its
own, well in front of the rest of the 11th
Armored, uncertain that its sister task
force would succeed in forging abreast
at Chenogne, and with night coming on.
Remer apparently decided to forgo a
test of strength with the American armor
moving past in the west, his mission
being to attack eastward, but when word
reached him that the Americans had hit
the outpost at Lavaselle he hurried in
person to check the security screen cover-
ing the western flank. Here one of
Remer’s panzer grenadier battalions had
thrown forward an outpost line extend-
ing as far west as Gerimont and backed
by a concentration of flak, assault guns,
and mortars in the Bois des Valets to the
north of and about equidistant from
Houmont and Chenogne. Satisfied that
this groupment could hold the enemy,
Remer returned to Chenogne. He found
that the village had been bombarded by
planes and guns till it was only a heap of
stones with a handful of grenadiers
garrisoning the rubble. Remer instantly
sent a radio SOS to the commander of
the 3d Panzer Grenadier, then set out to
find his tank group.
When the bombardment started at
Chenogne, the German tanks still there
simply had pulled out of the village.
About the same time, Task Force Pat
resumed its march on Chenogne, Com-
pany B of the 22d Tank Battalion lead-
ing and the armored infantry following
in their half-tracks. Near the village, in
a lowering fog, the German armor sur-
prised the company of Shermans and shot
out seven of them. The enemy allowed
the American aid men to carry away the
surviving tankers and both sides fell
back. As dusk came Remer set about
pulling his command together, and the

THE THIRD ARMY OFFENSIVE
3d Panzer Grenadier-heeding his call
for assistance-moved troops into the
ruins of Chenogne. 12 This division had
taken little part in the day’s activity,
probably because of the intense shelling
directed on its assembly area in the Bois
de Fragotte by the 4th Armored and
corps artillery, the cross fire laid down
from Villeroux by the tanks of Task
Force Karsteter, and the uncertainty of
Remer’s situation.
The western advance on 30 December
by CCA of the 11th Armored met almost
no resistance during the first few hours,
in part because the 28th Cavalry
Squadron had driven the German out-
post line back on Remagne. The imme-
diate objective, Remagne, was the an-
chor position for the left wing of the
new and attenuated Panzer Lehr posi-
tion, but this division had just completed
its shift eastward and had only small
foreposts here. One of these, in the ham-
let of Rondu about a mile and a half
south of Remagne, seems to have flashed
back warning of the American approach.
In any case the 63d Armored Infantry
Battalion, leading the march as Task
Force White, had just come onto the
crest of the ridge beyond Rondu when,
as the men on the receiving end vividly
recall, “All hell broke loose.” The two
tanks at the point of the column were
hit in one, two order. The armored in-
fantry took a hundred casualties in
thirty minutes while digging madly in
the frozen ground. Task Force Blue (the
42d Tank Battalion) was shielded by
the ridge and received little fire. Since
the 87th Division had not yet come up
12 Remer’s operations west of Bastogne are de-
scribed by Remer and some of his officers in MS
# B–592 (Remer) and Die Geschichte Des
Panrerkorps Grossdeutschland, vol. II.
621
on the left, the 41st Cavalry Reconnais-
sance Squadron moved around to the
west flank in anticipation of a German
counterthrust.
It was midafternoon. German high
velocity guns were sweeping the ridge,
and there was no room for maneuver:
the Ourthe lay to the west and the Bois
des Haies de Magery spread to the east,
separating CCA and CCB. General Kil-
burn asked the corps commander to as-
sign Remagne to the 87th and let CCA
sideslip to rejoin CCB east of the woods.
Middleton agreed and a new maneuver
was evolved for 31 December in which
all three combat commands of the 11th
Armored would attack to concentrate at
the head of the Rechrival valley, thus
following up the drive made by Task
Force Poker. An hour before midnight
CCA began its withdrawal.
On the left wing of the VIII Corps
the assault units of the 87th Division
were trucked northward on the morning
of 30 December to the line of departure,
in the neighborhood of Bras, held by the
109th Infantry. 13 Since the first major
objective was to sever the German supply
route along the St. Hubert–Bastogne
road the attack was weighted on the
right, with the 345th Infantry (Col.
13 Since-the 87th Division and the 11th Armored
fought side by side during this operation, their
journals and histories should be used together.
The 87th Division AAR is of little value but
those prepared by the regiments are quite de-
tailed. See Also A Historical and Pictorial Record
of the 87th Infantry Division in World War II
(Baton Rouge: Army and Navy Publishing Com-
pany, 1946). The records of the 11th Armored
are surprisingly complete for an armored outfit
in its first operations. See also Hal D. Steward,
Thunderbolt (Washington: 11th Armored Division
Association, 1948). . The combat interviews are
very comprehensive in coverage of the 11th
Armored but have virtually nothing on the 87th
Division.

622
Douglas Sugg) aiming for a sharp jog
in the road where stood the village of
Pironpré. On the left the 346th Infantry
(Col. Richard B. Wheeler) had a more
restricted task, that is, to block the roads
coming into St. Hubert from the south.
Earlier the Panzer Lehr had outposted
Highway N26, the 345th route of ad-
vance, but apparently these roadblock
detachments had been called in and
Sugg’s combat team marched the first
five miles without meeting the enemy.
The advance guard, formed by the 1st
Battalion (Lt. Col. Frank L. Bock),
was within sight of the crossroads village
of Moircy and less than two miles from
the objective when a pair of enemy burp
guns began to chatter. This was only
outpost fire, and the leading rifle com-
pany moved on until, some five hundred
yards short of Moircy, the enemy fire
suddenly thickened across the open,
snow-covered fields, causing many casual-
ties and halting the Americans. The
accompanying cannoneers (the 334th
Field Artillery) went into action, the
mortar crews started to work, and both
Companies A and B deployed for the
assault. Short rushes brought the rifle
line forward, though very slowly. By
1400 the Americans were on the edge of
Moircy, but the two companies had lost
most of their officers and their ranks were
riddled.
Colonel Bock ordered his reserve com-
pany to circle west of the village and
take the next hamlet, Jenneville. While
moving over a little rise outside Jenne-
ville, the leading platoon met a fusillade
of bullets that claimed twenty casualties
in two minutes. Nevertheless the 2d Pla-
toon of Company C reached the edge of
the village. At this moment two enemy
tanks appeared, stopped as if to survey
THE ARDENNES,: BATTLE OF THE BULGE
the scene, then began to work their
machine guns. The artillery forward ob-
server crawled toward the panzers to
take a look, and was shot. The Company
C commander then called for the artil-
lery, bringing the exploding shells with-
in fifty yards of his own men. The
German tanks still refused to budge.
Two men crept forward with bazookas,
only to be killed by the tank machine
guns, but this episode apparently shook
the tank crews, who now pulled out of
range. Meanwhile Moircy had been
taken and the battalion commander told
Company C to fall back.
The expected German counterattack
at Moircy came about three hours before
midnight. Tanks pacing the assault set
fire to the houses with tracer bullets, and
the two battalion antitank guns were
abandoned. Although Colonel Sugg
ordered the battalion out, the company
radios failed and in the confusion only
Companies A and B left the village.
Some of the machine gunners, a platoon
of Company B, and most of Company
C stayed on, taking to the cellars when
the American artillery–including a bat-
tery of 240-mm. howitzers–started to
shell Moircy. By midnight the Germans
had had enough and evacuated the vil-
lage. Bock then ordered the remaining
defenders out. This day of sharp fighting
cost the 1st Battalion seven officers and
125 men. Most of the wounded were
evacuated, however; during the night
battle in Moircy one aid man had twice
moved the twelve wounded in his charge
from burning buildings.
The much touted Fuehrer Begleit
attack failed on the 30th to dent the
Bastogne corridor-indeed it can be said
that it never started. What of the eastern

THE THIRD ARMY OFFENSIVE 623
jaw of the hastily constructed German
vise–the 1st SS Panzer attack?
The 1st SS Panzer was still licking its
wounds after the disastrous fight as
advance guard of the Sixth Panzer Army,
when Model ordered the division to
move south, beginning 26 December.
Most of its tanks were in the repair shops,
fuel was short, and some units did not
leave for Bastogne until the afternoon
of the 29th. This march was across the
grain of the German communications
net and became badly snarled in the
streets of Houffalize, where Allied air
attacks had caused a major traffic jam,
that forced tank units to move only in
small groups. It is probable that fewer
than fifty tanks reached the Bastogne
area in time to take part in the 30 De-
cember attack.
The appearance of this SS unit was
greeted by something less than popular
acclaim. The regular Army troops dis-
liked the publicity Goebbels had
lavished on the feats of the SS divisions,
and the old line commanders considered
them insubordinate. Worse still, the 1st
SS Panzer Division came into the sector
next to the 14th Parachute Regiment:
the SS regarded themselves-or at least
were regarded-as Himmler’s troops,
whereas the parachute divisions were the
personal creation of Goering. (It is not
surprising that after the attack on the
30th the 1st SS Panzer tried to bring the
officers of the 14th before a Nazi field
court.) 14
The 167th Yolks Grenadier Division
(Generalleutnant Hans-Kurt Hoecker) ,
ordered to join the 1st SS Panzer
in the attack, was looked upon by
Manteuffel and others with more favor.
14 See MSS # A–932 (Gersdorff); B–041
(Hoecker) ; and B–799 (Reschke) .
This was a veteran division which had
distinguished itself on the Soviet front,
The 167th had been refitting and train-
ing replacements from the 17th Luft-
waffe Feld Division when orders reached
its Hungarian casernes to entrain for the
west. On 24 December the division ar-
rived at Gerolstein on the Rhine; though
some units had to detrain east of the
river, Hoecker’s command was at full
strength when it began the march to
Bastogne. A third of the division were
veterans of the Russian battles, and in
addition there were two hundred picked
men who had been officer candidates
before the December comb-out. Hoecker
had no mechanized heavy weapons, how-
ever, and the division transport consisted
of worn-out Italian trucks for which
there were no spare parts.
The 167th and the kampfgruppe from
the 1st SS Panzer (be it remembered the
entire division was not present on the
30th) were supposed to be reinforced by
the 14th Parachute Regiment and the
901st of the Panzer Lehr. Both of these
regiments were already in the line south-
east of Bastogne, but were fought-out
and woefully understrength. The first
plan of attack had been based on a con-
certed effort to drive straight through the
American lines and cut the corridor be-
tween Assenois and Hompré. Just before
the attack this plan was modified to make
the Martelange-Bastogne highway the
initial objective. The line of contact on
the 30th extended from Neffe south into
the woods east of Marvie, then followed
the forest line and the Lutrebois-Lutre-
mange road south to Villers-la-Bonne-
Eau. The boundary between the 167th
and the 1st SS Panzer ran through Lutre-
bois. The 167th, lined up in the north
along the Bras-Bastogne road, would

624 THE ARDENNES: BATTLE OF THE BULGE
aim its assault at the Remonfosse sector
of the highway. The 1st SS Panzer, sup-
ported on the left by the 14th Parachute
Regiment, intended to sally out of Lu-
trebois and Villers-la-Bonne-Eau. Lutre-
bois, however, was captured late in the
evening of the 29th by the 3d Battalion
of the 134th Infantry. A map picked
up there by the Americans showed the
boundaries and dispositions of the Ger-
man assault forces, but either the map
legend was unspecific or the word failed
to get back to higher authority for the
German blow on the morning of 30 De-
cember did achieve a marked measure of
tactical surprise.
The 35th Infantry Division stood
directly in the path of the German at-
tack, having gradually turned from a
column of regiments to face northeast.
The northernmost regiment, the 134th
Infantry, had come in from reserve to
capture Lutrebois at the request of CCA,
4th Armored, but it had only two bat-
talions in the line. The 137th Infantry
was deployed near Villers-la-Bonne-Eau,
and on the night of the 29th Companies
K and L forced their way into the village,
radioing back that they needed bazooka
ammunition. (It seems likely that the
Americans shared Villers with a com-
pany of German Pioneers.) In the south
the 320th Infantry had become involved
in a bitter fight around a farmstead out-
35TH INFANTRY DIVISION MACHINE GUN POSITION south of Bastogne.

THE THIRD ARMY OFFENSIVE
side of Harlange–the German attack
would pass obliquely across its front but
without impact.
During the night of 29 December the
tank column of the 1st SS Panzer moved
up along the road linking Tarchamps
and Lutremange. The usable road net
was very sparse in this sector. Once
through Lutremange, however, the Ger-
man column could deploy in two ar-
mored assault forces, one moving
through Villers-la-Bonne-Eau, the other
angling northwest through Lutrebois.
Before dawn the leading tank companies
rumbled toward these two villages. At
Villers-la-Bonne-Eau Companies K and
L, 137th Infantry, came under attack by
seven tanks heavily supported by in-
fantry. The panzers moved in close,
blasting the stone houses and setting the
village ablaze. At 0845 a radio message
reached the command post of the 137th
asking for the artillery to lay down a
barrage of smoke and high explosive,
but before the gunners could get a
sensing the radio went dead. Only one
of the 169 men inside the village got
out, Sgt. Webster Phillips, who earlier
had run through the rifle fire to warn
the reserve company of the battalion west
of Villers.
The battle in and around Lutrebois
was then and remains to this day
jumbled and confused. There is no co-
herent account from the German side,
and it is quite possible that the forma-
tions involved in the fight did not, for
the reasons discussed earlier, co-operate
as planned. The American troops who
were drawn into the action found them-
selves in a melee which defied exact de-
scription and in which platoons and
companies engaged enemy units without
being aware that other American soldiers
625
and weapons had taken the same
German unit under fire. It is not sur-
prising, then, that two or three units
would claim to have destroyed what on
later examination proves to have been
the same enemy tank detachment and
that a cumulative listing of these claims
–some fifty-odd German tanks destroyed
–probably gives more panzers put out of
action than the 1st SS Panzer brought
into the field.
It is unfortunate that the historical
reproduction of the Lutrebois fight in
the von Rankian sense (“exactly as
it was”) is impossible, for the American
use of the combined arms in this action
was so outstanding as to merit careful
analysis by the professional soldier and
student. The 4th Armored Division ar-
tillery, for example, simultaneously en-
gaged the 1st SS Panzer in the east and
the 3d Panzer Grenadier in the west.
Weyland’s fighter-bombers from the
XIX Tactical Air Command intervened
at precisely the right time to blunt the
main German armored thrust and set up
better targets for engagement by the
ground forces. American tanks and tank
destroyers co-operated to whipsaw the
enemy assault units. The infantry action,
as will be seen, had a decisive effect at
numerous points in the battle. Two cir-
cumstances in particular would color the
events of 30 December: because of
CCA’s earlier interest in Lutrebois, radio
and wire communications between the
4th Armored and the 35th Division were
unusually good in this sector; although
the 35th had started the drive north with-
out the normal attachment of a separate
tank battalion, the close proximity of the
veteran 4th Armored more than com-
pensated for this lack of an organic
tank-killing capability.

626 THE ARDENNES: BATTLE OF THE BULGE
Lutrebois, two and a half miles east
of the German objective at Assenois, had
most of its houses built along a 1,000-
yard stretch of road which runs more
or less east and west across an open plain
and is bordered at either end by an ex-
tensive wooded rise. On the morning of
the 30th the 3d Battalion of the 134th
Infantry (Lt. Col. W. C. Wood) was
deployed in and around the village:
Company L was inside Lutrebois; Com-
panies I and K had dug in during the
previous evening along the road east of
the village; the battalion heavy machine
guns covered the road west of the vil-
lage. To the right, disposed in a thin
line fronting on the valley, was the 2d
Battalion (Maj. C. F. McDannel).
About 0445–the hour is uncertain-
the enemy started his move toward
Lutrebois with tanks and infantry, and
at the same time more infantry crossed
the valley and slipped through the lines
of the 2d Battalion. As the first assault
force crossed the opening east of Lutre-
bois, the American cannoneers went into
action with such effect as to stop this
detachment in its tracks. The next
German sortie came in a hook around
the north side of Lutrebois. Company L
used up all of its bazooka rounds, then
was engulfed. The German grenadiers
moved on along the western road but
were checked there for at least an hour
by the heavy machine guns. During this
midmorning phase seven enemy tanks
were spotted north of Lutrebois. A pla-
toon of the 654th Tank Destroyer Bat-
talion accounted for four, two were put
out of action by artillery high explosive,
and one was immobilized by a mine.
News of the attack reached CCA of
the 4th Armored at 0635, and General
Earnest promptly turned his command
to face east in support of the 35th Divi-
sion. By 1000 General Dager was re-
shuffling CCB to take over the CCA
positions. The first reinforcement dis-
patched by CCA was the 51st Armored
Infantry Battalion, which hurried in its
half-tracks to back up the thin line of the
2d Battalion. Here the combination of
fog and woods resulted in a very con-
fused fight, but the 2d Battalion con-
tinued to hold in its position while the
enemy panzer grenadiers, probably from
the 2d Regiment of the 1st SS Panzer,
seeped into the woods to its rear. The
headquarters and heavy weapons crews
of the 3d Battalion had meanwhile
fallen back to the battalion command
post in the Losange château southwest of
Lutrebois. There the 51st Armored In-
fantry Battalion gave a hand, fighting
from half-tracks and spraying the clear-
ing around the château with .50-caliber
slugs. After a little of this treatment the
German infantry gave up and retired
into the woods.
During the morning the advance
guard of the 167th Volks Grenadiers,
attacking in a column of battalions be-
cause of the constricted road net, crossed
the Martelange-Bastogne road and
reached the edge of the woods southeast
of Assenois. Here the grenadiers en-
countered the 51st. Each German
attempt to break into the open was
stopped with heavy losses. General
Hoecker says the lead battalion was “cut
to pieces” and that the attack by the
167th was brought to nought by the
Jabos and the “tree smasher” shells
crashing in from the American batteries.
(Hoecker could not know that the 35th
Division artillery was trying out the new
POZIT fuze and that his division was
providing the target for one of the most

THE THIRD ARMY OFFENSIVE 627
lethal of World War II weapons.)
The main body of the 1st SS Panzer
kampfgruppe appeared an hour or so
before noon moving along the Lutre-
mange-Lutrebois road; some twenty-five
tanks were counted in all. It took two
hours to bring the fighter-bombers into
the fray, but they arrived just in time to
cripple or destroy seven tanks and turn
back the bulk of the panzers. Companies
I and K still were in their foxholes along
the road during the air bombing and
would recall that, lacking bazookas, the
green soldiers “popped off” at the tanks
with their rifles and that some of the
German tanks turned aside into the
woods. Later the two companies came
back across the valley, on orders, and
jointed the defense line forming near the
château.
Thirteen German tanks, which may
have debouched from the road before
the air attack, reached the woods south-
west of Lutrebois, but a 4th Armored
artillery observer in a cub plane spotted
them and dropped a message to Com-
pany B of the 35th Tank Battalion. Lt.
John A. Kingsley, the company com-
mander, who had six Sherman tanks and
a platoon from the 701st Tank Destroyer
Battalion, formed an ambush near a
slight ridge that provided his own tanks
with hull defilade and waited. The lead-
ing German company (or platoon),
which had six panzers, happened to see
Company A of the 35th as the fog briefly
lifted, and turned, with flank exposed, in
that direction. The first shot from
Kingsley’s covert put away the German
commander’s tank and the other tanks
milled about until all had been knocked
out. Six more German tanks came along
and all were destroyed or disabled. In
the meantime the American tank de-
stroyers took on some accompanying as-
sault guns, shot up three of them, and
dispersed the neighboring grenadiers.
At the close of day the enemy had
taken Lutrebois and Villers-la-Bonne-
Eau plus the bag of three American
rifle companies, but the eastern counter-
attack, like that in the west, had failed.
Any future attempts to break through to
Assenois and Hompré in this sector
would face an alert and co-ordinated
American defense.
The III Corps Joins the Attack
Despite the events of the 30th there
was no thought in the mind of General
Patton that Millikin’s III Corps would
give over its attack toward St. Vith,
scheduled to flesh out the Third Army
offensive begun by Middleton. General
Millikin would nonetheless have to alter
his plans somewhat. It had been in-
tended that the 6th Armored Division,
coming in from the XII Corps, would
pass through the 4th Armored (which
now had only forty-two operable tanks)
and set off the attack on 31 December
with a drive northeast from the Bastogne
perimeter. The 35th Division was to
parallel this drive by advancing in the
center on a northeast axis, while the 26th
Division, on the corps’ right wing, would
turn its attack in a northwesterly direc-
tion. The 4th Armored expected to pass
to Middleton’s corps, but the latter
agreed on the night of the 30th that
Gaffey’s command should continue its
support of the 35th Division. Whether
the 35th could shake itself free and take
the offensive was questionable, but Gen-
eral Baade had orders to try. The 26th
Division was now deployed in its en-
tirety on the north side of the Sure

628
River and its center regiment was almost
in sight of the highway linking Wiltz
and Bastogne (the next phase line).
Both flanks of the division were uncov-
ered, however, and German tanks were
observed moving into the area on the
30th.
One thing the III Corps commander
sought to impress on his infantry divi-
sions as H-hour loomed–they must keep
out of time-consuming and indecisive
village fights. This, after all, was an
order which had echoed up and down
the chain of command on both sides of
the line, but neither German nor Ameri-
can commanders could alter the tactical
necessities imposed by the Ardennes
geography or prevent freezing troops
from gravitating toward the shelter, no
matter how miserable, promised by some
wrecked crossroads hamlet.
Admittedly the battle which had
flared up on the left wing of the III
Corps was serious, but General Millikin
expected (or at least hoped) that the
6th Armored Division attack would im-
prove the situation. 15 While deployed on
the Ettelbruck front with the XII Corps,
General Grow’s troops had not been
closely engaged, and the division would
enter the Bastogne fight with only a
single tank less than prescribed by the
T/O&E. Its orders to move west were
given the division at 0230 on the 29th.
Although the distance involved was not
too great, the movement would be com-
plicated by the necessity of using a road
15 The battle fought by the 6th Armored Divi-
sion east of Bastogne received very detailed treat-
ment in the combat interviews. The journals of
the division were collected after the war and
published under the title, Combat Record of the
Sixth Armored Division (Aschaffenburg, n.d.) .
General Grow has provided excerpts from his
personal diary for the author’s use.
THE ARDENNES: BATTLE OF THE BULGE
net already saturated in the support of
two corps. The push planned for 31
December turned on the employment of
two combat commands abreast and for
this reason the march north to Bastogne
was organized so that CCA, ordered to
attack on the right, would use the Arlon-
Bastogne highway while CCB, ticketed
for the left wing, would pass through
the VIII Corps zone by way of the Neuf-
château-Bastogne road.
During the night of 30 December
CCA (Col. John L. Hines, Jr.) rolled
along the icy highway, where the 4th
Armored had accorded running rights to
the newcomers, and through the city;
the advance guard, however, took the
secondary road through Assenois be-
cause of the German threat to the main
route. By daylight CCA was in forward
assembly positions behind the 101st
Airborne line southeast of Bastogne.
CCB failed to make its appearance as
scheduled. What had happened was a
fouling of the military machine which is
common in all large-scale operations and
which may leave bitterness and recrim-
ination long after the event. The 6th
Armored commander believed he had
cleared CCB’s use of the Neufchâteau
road with both the VIII Corps and the
11th Armored, but when Col. George
Read moved out with his column he
found the highway not only treacher-
ously iced but encumbered with 11th
Armored tanks and vehicles. What Read
had encountered was the switch bringing
the 11th Armored force from the west
around to the right wing. The 11th Ar-
mored had not expected the 6th
Armored column to appear before mid-
night of the 31st. An attempt to run the
two columns abreast failed because the
tanks were slipping all over the road.

THE THIRD ARMY OFFENSIVE
CCB later reported that the 11th Ar-
mored blocked the highway for six
hours, that is, until ten o’clock on the
morning of the 31st. Finally General
Grow ordered Read’s force to branch off
and go into assembly at Clochimont on
the Assenois road.
Colonel Hines intended to postpone
the CCA attack until the running mate
arrived. There was no cover where his
troops were waiting, however, and as the
morning wore on intense enemy fire be-
gan to take serious toll. He and Grow
decided, therefore, to launch a limited
objective attack in which the two CCA
task forces would start from near the
Bastogne-Bras road and thrust northeast.
The armored task force, organized
around the 69th Tank Battalion (Lt.
Col. Chester E. Kennedy), had the task
of capturing Neffe and clearing the en-
emy from the woods to the east; the
infantry task force, basically the 44th
Armored Infantry Battalion (Lt. Col.
Charles E. Brown), was to move abreast
of Kennedy, scour the woods south of
Neffe, and seize the nose of high ground
which overlooked Wardin on the north-
east. The assault, begun shortly after
noon, rolled through Neffe with little
opposition. But snow squalls clouded the
landscape, the fighter-bombers sent to
blast targets in front of CCA could not
get through the overcast, and the ar-
mored infantry made little progress.
CCA’s expectation that the 35th Division
would come abreast on the right was
dashed, for the 35th had its hands full.
Just before dusk small enemy forces
struck at Hines’s exposed flanks, and
CCA halted, leaving the artillery to
maintain a protective barrage through
the night.
The role of the artillery would be of
629
prime importance in all the fighting
done by the 6th Armored in what now
had come to be called “the Bastogne
pocket.” Not only the three organic bat-
talions of the division, but an additional
four battalions belonging to the 193d
Field Artillery Group were moved into
the pocket on the 31st, and the firing
batteries were employed almost on the
perimeter itself. A feature of the battle
would be a counterbattery duel–quite
uncommon at this stage of the Ardennes
Campaign–for the I SS Panzer Corps
had introduced an artillery corps, in-
cluding some long-range 170-mm. batter-
ies, and a Werfer brigade southeast of
Bastogne. Now and later the American
gunners would find it necessary to move
quickly from one alternate position to
another, none too easy a task, for the gun
carriages froze fast and even to turn a
piece required blow torches and pinch
bars.
On the morning of New Year’s Day
CCB finally was in place on the left of
Hines’s combat command. The imme-
diate task in hand was to knife through
the German supply routes, feeding into
and across the Longvilly road, which
permitted north-south movement along
the eastern face of the Bastogne pocket
and were being used to build up the
forces in the Lutrebois sector. CCA
would attempt a further advance to clear
the woods and ridges beyond Neffe.
CCB, working in two task forces, aimed
its attack on Bourcy and Arloncourt with
an eye to the high ground dominating
the German road net. The 6th Armored
Division expected that troops of the
101st Airborne would extend the push
on the left of CCB and drive the enemy
out of the Bois Jacques north of Bizory,
the latter the first objective for CCB’s

630 THE ARDENNES: BATTLE OF THE BULGE
tank force. The previous afternoon the
VIII Corps commander had ordered
General Taylor to use the reserve battal-
ion of the 506th Parachute Infantry for
this purpose, then had countermanded
his order. Apparently General Grow and
his division knew nothing of the change.
Communication between divisions sub-
ordinate to two different corps always is
difficult, but in this case, with an ar-
mored and an airborne division
involved, the situation was even worse.
At this time the only radio contact be-
tween Taylor and Grow was by relay
through an army supply point several
miles south of Bastogne, but the two
generals did meet on 31 December and
the day following.
The morning of the attack, 1 January
1945, was dark with cloud banks and
squalls as the 68th Tank Battalion (Lt.
Col. Harold C. Davall) moved rapidly
along the narrow road to Bizory. The
78th Grenadier Regiment, in this sector
since the first days of the Bastogne siege,
had erected its main line of resistance
farther to the east and Bizory fell easily.
At the same time Davall’s force seized
Hill 510, which earlier had caused the
101st Airborne so much trouble. About
noon the Americans began to receive
heavy fire, including high velocity shells,
from around Mageret on their right
flank. Although doing so involved a
detour, the 68th wheeled to deal with
Mageret, its tanks crashing into the vil-
lage while the assault gun platoon en-
gaged the enemy antitank guns firing
from wood cover nearby. The grenadiers
fought for Mageret and it was midafter-
noon before resistance collapsed. Then
the 69th Tank Battalion from CCA,
which was on call, took over the fight to
drive east from Mageret while its sister
battalion turned back for the planned
thrust at Arloncourt.
By this time the sun had come out,
visibility was good, and the CCB tanks
were making such rapid progress that
the division artillery commander (Col.
Lowell M. Riley) brought his three bat-
talions right up on Davall’s heels. With-
in an hour the 68th was fighting at
Arloncourt, but here it had hit the main
German position. Briefly the Americans
held a piece of Arloncourt, withdrawing
at dark when it became apparent that
the 50th Armored Infantry Battalion
(Lt. Col. Arnold R. Wall), fighting
through the woods to the northwest,
could not come abreast. As it turned out,
the 50th was forced to fall back to the
morning line of departure. It too had
collided with the main enemy defenses
and was hit by a German counterattack–
abruptly checked when the 212th Field
Artillery laid in 500 rounds in twenty
minutes. 16
The brunt of the battle in the CCA
zone was borne by the 44th Armored In-
fantry, continuing doggedly through the
woods southeast of Neffe against deter-
mined and well entrenched German in-
fantry. Whenever the assault came
within fifty yards of the foxhole line, the
grenadiers climbed out with rifle and
machine gun to counterattack. Two or
three times Brown’s battalion was
ejected from the woods, but at close of
day the Americans were deployed per-
haps halfway inside the forest. The 6th
Armored had gotten no assistance from
the 35th Division during the day, and it
16 During the battle in the woods Sgt. George P.
Rimmer of Company A led a series of combat
patrols against the enemy with such daring and
success as to merit the special commendation of
his commander. He received the DSC.

THE THIRD ARMY OFFENSIVE 631
was apparent to General Millikin that
Grow’s division would probably have to
continue its attack alone. He therefore
extended the 6th Armored front to the
right so that on the evening of 1 January
it reached from Bourcy on the north to
Bras in the south. General Grow imme-
diately brought his extra tank battalion
and armored infantry battalion forward
from CCR to beef up the combat com-
mands on the line. Every tank, gun, and
man would be needed.
The new and wider front would bring
the 167th Volks Grenadier Division into
action against the 6th Armored south of
Neffe. But this was not all. At the Fifth
Panzer Army conference on the 29th one
of the SS officers present was General
Priess, commander of the I SS Panzer
Corps. He was there because Manteuffel
expected to re-create this corps, as it had
existed in the first days of the offensive,
by bringing the 12th SS Panzer Division
in from the Sixth Panzer Army and
joining to it the 1st SS Panzer Division,
at the moment moving toward Lutrebois.
The subsequent failure at Lutrebois was
overshadowed by the American threat to
the Panzer Lehr and Fuehrer Begleit
west of Bastogne, and on the last day of
December Manteuffel ordered Priess to
take over in this sector, promising that
the 12th SS Panzer shortly would arrive
to flesh out the new I SS Panzer Corps.
BED SHEETS DONATED BY VILLAGERS camouflage 6th Armored Division vehicles.

632 THE ARDENNES: BATTLE OF THE BULGE
On the afternoon of New Year’s Day
Priess had just finished briefing his three
subordinate commanders for a counter-
attack to be started in the next few
hours when a message arrived from Man-
teuffel: the 12th SS Panzer was detached
from his command and Priess himself
was to report to the army headquarters
pronto. The two generals met about
1800. By this hour the full account of
the 6th Armored attack was available
and the threat to the weakened 26th
Volks Grenadier Division could be as-
sessed. Manteuffel ordered Priess to take
over the fight in the 26th sector at noon
on 2 January, and told him that his corps
would be given the 12th SS Panzer, the
26th Volks Grenadier Division, and the
340th Volks Grenadier Division, which
was en route from Aachen.
The 6th Armored Division would be
given some respite, however. When Field
Marshal Model arrived to look over the
plans for the counterattack, on the after-
noon of the 2d, only a small tank force
had come in from the 12th SS Panzer,
and the main body of the 340th was pro-
gressing so slowly that Model set the
attack date as 4 January. He promised
also to give Priess the 9th SS Panzer
Division for added punch. It must be
said that Manteuffel’s part in these opti-
mistic plans was much against his own
professional judgment.
Faced with a front normally consid-
ered too wide for a linear advance by
armor, General Grow put five task forces
into the attack on 2 January, holding
only one in reserve. The boundary be-
tween CCA and CCB was defined by the
railroad line which once had linked
Bastogne, Benonchamps, and Wiltz.
CCB now had two tank battalions (the
68th and 69th) plus the 50th Armored
Infantry Battalion to throw in on the
north wing; CCA got the two fresh bat-
talions from CCR.
About one o’clock on the morning of
the 2d the Luftwaffe began bombing the
6th Armored area. Although the German
planes had been more conspicuous by
their absence than their presence during
the past days, it seemed that a few could
always be gotten up as a token gesture
when a large German ground attack was
forming. (For example, on 30 December
the Luftwaffe had supported the eastern
and western attacks with great imparti-
ality by dropping its bombs on Bastogne,
the most concentrated air punishment
the town received during the entire bat-
tle. CCB, 10th Armored, was bombed
out of its headquarters, and a large por-
tion of the Belgian population sought
safety in flight.) While the German
planes were droning overhead, dark
shapes, increasing in number, were ob-
served against the snow near Wardin.
These were a battalion of the 167th
Volks Grenadier forming for a counter-
attack. Nine battalions of field artillery
began TOT fire over Wardin, and the
enemy force melted away. Just to the
north, but in the CCB sector, the ad-
vance guard of the 340th Volks Grena-
dier Division made its initial appearance
about 0200 on the 2d, penetrated the
American outpost line, and broke into
Mageret. The skirmish lasted for a
couple of hours, but the Luftwaffe gave
the defenders a hand by bombing its own
German troops.
In midmorning the 68th Tank Battal-
ion sortied from Mageret to climb the
road toward Arloncourt, the objective of
the previous day. The paving was cov-
ered with ice and the slopes were too
slippery and steep for the steel tank

THE THIRD ARMY OFFENSIVE 633
treads; so the armored engineers went to
work scattering straw on all the inclines.
Finally, Company B came within sight
of the village, but the Germans were
ready–Nebelwerfers and assault guns
gave the quietus to eight Shermans. The
enemy guns were camouflaged with
white paint and the snow capes worn by
the gunners, and the supporting infantry
blended discreetly with the landscape.
So successful was the deception that
when a company of Shermans and a com-
pany of light tanks hurried forward to
assist Company B, they were taken under
fire on an arc of 220 degrees. Colonel
Davall radioed for a box barrage and
smoke screen; Riley’s gunners met the
request in a matter of seconds and the
68th got out of the trap.
Farther north, and advancing on a
route almost at a right angle to that
followed by the 68th, the 50th Armored
Infantry Battalion pried a few grena-
diers out of the cellars in Oubourcy and
marched on to Michamps. The reception
was quite different here. As Wall’s in-
fantry entered Michamps the enemy
countered with machine gun bursts
thickened by howitzer and Werfer fire
coming in from the higher ground
around Bourcy. This time twelve artil-
lery battalions joined in to support the
50th. At sunset German tanks could be
seen moving about in Bourcy and Colo-
nel Wall, whose force was out alone on
a limb, abandoned both Michamps and
Oubourcy. (Wall himself was partially
blinded by a Nebelwerfer shell and was
evacuated.) The German tanks, two
companies of the 12th SS Panzer which
had just arrived from west of Bastogne,
followed as far as Oubourcy.
South of the rail line the 15th Tank
Battalion (Lt. Col. Embrey D. Lagrew)
came forward in the morning to pass
through Brown’s 44th Armored Infantry
Battalion, but this march was a long one
from Remichampagne and it was nearly
noon before the 15th attack got under
way. On the right the 9th Armored In-
fantry Battalion (Lt. Col. Frank K.
Britton) came in to take over the fight
the 44th had been waging in the woods
near Wardin. It was planned that the
armored infantry would sweep the en-
emy out of the wooded ridges which
overlooked Wardin from the southwest
and south, whereupon the tank force
would storm the village from the north.
Britton’s battalion was caught in an
artillery barrage during the passage of
lines with Brown, became disorganized,
and did not resume the advance until
noon. Shortly thereafter the 9th was mis-
takenly brought under fire by the 134th
Infantry. There was no radio communi-
cation between Lagrew and Britton,
probably because of the broken terrain,
and Lagrew reasoned that because of his
own delay the infantry attack must have
reached its objective. The tanks of the
15th Tank Battalion gathered in the
woods northwest of Wardin, then struck
for the village, but the German antitank
guns on the surrounding ridges did some
expert shooting and destroyed seven of
Lagrew’s tanks. Nonetheless a platoon
from Company C of the 9th, attached
to Lagrew’s battalion, made its way into
Wardin and remained there most of the
night. All this while the 9th Armored
Infantry Battalion was engaged in a
heartbreaking series of assaults to breast
the machine gun fire sweeping the bar-
ren banks of a small stream bed that
separated the wood lot southwest of
Wardin from another due south. This
indecisive affair cost the 9th one-quarter

634
THE ARDENNES: BATTLE OF THE BULGE
6TH ARMORED DIVISION TANKS IN SNOWSTORM NEAR WARDIN
of its officers and many men.
Despite the heavy losses incurred, the
6th Armored had gained much ground
on 2 January, but it would be another
eight days and the enemy would be in
retreat before these gains would be du-
plicated. The tanks and infantry had
been ably supported by the artillery, but
the division official record is instant in
giving full marks to the fighter-bombers
of the XIX Tactical Air Command, that
old and valued friend which together
with the 6th Armored had patrolled the
long, open flank of the Third Army
weeks before on the Loire.
That night, when it was clear that
Task Force Brown must be thrust back
into the line to assist the 9th, General
Grow reported to the III Corps com-
mander that his entire division was com-
mitted and that his only reserve was the
single company held out by each of the
two combat commands.
By the close of 2 January it could be
said that the III Corps’ attack had been
carried solely by the 6th Armored Divi-
sion. Even though the German effort to
open a path through the left wing of the
35th Infantry Division at Lutrebois had
failed in its intended purpose, it had
achieved an important secondary effect,
becoming, as it did, a true spoiling
attack that put the 35th out of the
running from 31 December on. The
main battle positions held by Baade’s

THE THIRD ARMY OFFENSIVE 635
division (which had nowhere been bro-
ken by the 1st SS Panzer) followed the
trace of a wide, lopsided V, reaching
from Marvie in the northeast to a point
west of Villers-la-Bonne-Eau, then back
southeast to Bavigne. Before the 35th
could regain its stride, it would be neces-
sary to reduce the opposition that had
flared up at three points: Lutrebois,
Villers-la-Bonne-Eau (where the two
companies from the 137th Infantry had
been entrapped), and Harlange.
On the left wing the 2d and 3d Bat-
talions of the 134th watched through the
morning hours of 31 December while
the corps artillery fired TOT’S on Lutre-
bois, then rose from the foxhole line to
renew the assault eastward. As the 2d
Battalion tried to move out across the
valley, it made a perfect target for the
small arms fire sweeping in from
the opposing wooded crest, took ninety
casualties, and fell back. The 3d Bat-
talion made a pass at Lutrebois, but the
fire from the woods covering the high
ground to the northeast barred entrance
to the village.
The entire regiment joined the attack
on 1 January. Now it was going up
against the 167th Volks Grenadier Divi-
sion, which finally had entered the line
in its entirety (relieving the 1st SS Pan-
zer) and was deployed on the right wing
of the LIII Corps opposite Marvie and
Lutremange. On the left the 1st Battal-
ion, separated by three thousand yards
from the neighboring 3d, set out from
Marvie to bring the division flank for-
ward and neutralize the German hold on
the ridges overlooking Lutrebois. The
veteran 167th, however, quickly sensed
the gap in the American line and cut
through to the rear of the 1st; nor did
the 3d have any better luck at Lutrebois.
In the afternoon the 2d Battalion assault
had put Companies E and G across the
valley and into the woods, when a sharp
German riposte struck the two compa-
nies, isolating them completely by night-
fall. Next morning the two American
companies broke loose, and the 3d Bat-
talion again attacked across the open
space west of the village to seize a few
buildings from which to build up the
assault. Finally coming within yards of
the first house, Company K was pinned
down by a machine gun firing from one
of the windows. A platoon leader left
his men, climbed to the roof, and tossed
down a hand grenade. With this build-
ing in hand the American infantry began
methodically to clear Lutrebois (a two-
day task as it turned out) while corps
artillery put more TOT fire on the
sections of the village still occupied by
the enemy.
East of Marvie the 1st Battalion had
to delay its advance in order to dig out
the grenadiers who had settled them-
selves in the woods to the rear. Eventu-
ally the battalion started forward and,
for the first time, made physical contact
with the 6th Armored-after mistakenly
starting a fire fight with Britton’s ar-
mored infantry. By the end of 2 January
the left wing of the 35th Division was
beginning to inch forward, but the ter-
rain features set for seizure by the III
Corps commander-two 510-meter hills
on a thrust line bearing generally north-
east from Lutrebois–would prove to be
days away.
The 137th Infantry had hopes on 31
December that its two rifle companies
still were in Villers-la-Bonne-Eau, but
all attempts at relief were thwarted by
the 14th Parachute Regiment, decimated
though it was, in the surrounding woods.

636 THE ARDENNES: BATTLE OF THE BULGE
MEDICS OF 35TH DIVISION REMOVIG CASUALTIES FROM LUTREBOIS
(Actually Companies K and L already
had surrendered to flame throwers and
tanks.) That night Colonel Murray
wrote off the two companies, but no mat-
ter what the case Villers-la-Bonne-Eau
had to be taken before the road net to
the east could be opened. So it was that
on 1 January the 137th Infantry com-
menced what its official history would
call the roughest battle ever fought by
the regiment–ten days of bloodletting
and frustration. In this the 137th would
have yeoman help from the troopers of
the 6th Cavalry Squadron, fighting dis-
mounted and–the GI’s accolade–“like
infantry.” The understrength 14th Para-
chute Regiment had recovered suffi-
ciently from its disastrous experience at
the hands of the 4th Armored to fight a
tenacious defensive action through the
woods and the deep snow in the fields.
After crossing the Sure River and
taking Baschleiden, the 320th Infantry
had continued the march north along
the road to Harlange, the only negoti-
able avenue of advance here on the right
flank of the 35th Division. On 29 Decem-
ber the 2d Battalion was hit hard by fire
coming from a collection of farm build-
ings (Fuhrman Farm) at a jog in the
road where it ascended a ridge a thou-
sand yards southeast of Harlange. That
night the 320th reported that it was
“locked in a bitter battle” at the farm-
stead and in the neighboring woods. 17
17 Sgt. H. L. Luther was awarded the DSC
for personally killing or capturing the enemy

THE THIRD ARMY OFFENSIVE 637
Here stood the 15th Parachute Regi-
ment, which had come through the
debacle south of Bastogne in good shape
and was, in the opinion of the higher
command, “well in hand.” The German
counterattack leveled against the rest of
the division on 30 December did not ex-
tend to the 320th Infantry, but did re-
sult in delaying a full-bodied American
attempt to break through at Harlange
until the first day of January. At that
time the division commander turned the
reserve battalion of the 320th over to the
137th, leaving Colonel Byrne to fight
the battle with only the 2d and 3d Bat-
talions.
Neither the 320th nor the 15th Para-
chute had tank support; this would be
an infantry battle with infantry weapons
-principally the rifle and the machine
gun. In the afternoon the battle flared
up around Fuhrman Farm but left the
attackers with nothing but their losses.
Another series of assaults the following
day was equally unsuccessful. That night
the 320th got some pleasant news-nine
tanks were on their way to join the
attack. Across the lines the German
corps commander, General von Roth-
kirch, was doing his best to find a few
tanks for the paratroopers. The two
opposing regimental commanders must
have wondered which would be first to
break the infantry deadlock.
The Lone Battle of the 26th Division
The right wing of the III Corps had
been brought forward on 27 December
when General Paul’s 26th Division put
its leading battalions across the Sure
occupants of three dugouts during the affray at
Harlange.
River. Wiltz, the division objective, was
only a little more than four air-line
miles to the north. The immediate
objective remained the Wiltz-Bastogne
highway, which meandered at distances
of two and three miles from the Sure
crossings. The approach to the target
sector of the highway south of Wiltz was
constricted to three poor, narrow roads
that near their entrance were dominated
by the villages of Bavigne, Liefrange,
and Kaundorf respectively–this array
west to east–and which converged in an
apex touching the main highway at
Nothum and a crossroads farmstead
known as Mont Schumann. The battle
commencing on 27 December would
evolve, as the division neared Wiltz, into
a series of pitched fights for blocks of
high ground, which were so sharply
etched by interlacing deep draws and
ravines that a sweep forward on a solid
division front was impossible. 18 Tacti-
cally the 26th Division faced a lone
battle, for its western neighbor, the 35th,
had fed into the III Corps front in a
column of regiments, turning under
German pressure from column into line
on a northwest-southeast axis instead of
forming on the left flank of Paul’s divi-
sion. The tie with the XII Corps on the
right was equally tenuous, for the 80th
Division was forging due north while
the 26th would gravitate toward the
northwest. General Paul’s problem, then,
was to flesh out the III Corps attack
while at the same time guarding both of
his exposed flanks.
18 The reports on this period of battle as found
in the division and regimental AAR’s are very
sparse, but the G–3 and S–3 journals are useful.
The combat interviews give quite extensive cover-
age. See also the 735th Tank Battalion AAR,
December 194.

638
The leading companies of the 101st
Infantry scaled the steep slopes on the
north bank of the Sure during the night
of 26 December, and a couple of hours
after midnight Company I reported that
it held Liefrange, the sally port onto the
center of the three cart roads leading
northward. Apparently the German
Seventh Army had not yet been apprised
of the crossings at the Sure, for in the
early hours of the 27th Major von Cour-
biere, acting commander of the Fuehrer
Grenadier Brigade, was dispatched with
two rifle battalions and a few tanks to
bar a crossing at Liefrange. This Ger-
man foray struck Liefrange at about
0720 and momentarily ruled the field.
But any hope of sweeping the north
bank clear of the Americans evaporated
when a dozen artillery battalions took
the grenadiers under fire, followed less
than two hours later by the Allied
fighter-bombers.
In the meantime the 26th Division
engineers rushed the last sections of a
vehicular bridge into position north of
Bonnal. By 0900 the bridge was ready
and tanks and tank destroyers rumbled
across to support the riflemen. North-
east of Liefrange two companies of the
3d Battalion, 101st, climbed the hill at
Kaundorf, the highest ground in the
area, but were repelled when von Cour-
biere turned his tanks into Kaundorf and
knocked out half the platoon of Sher-
mans accompanying the Americans. 19 At
19 Capts. John J. Christy and Leland R. Dunham,
commanding the two rifle companies in this fight
and the subsequent recapture of Kaundorf, re-
ceived the DSC. During the night of 27 December
Pvt. R. L. Presser of Company K, 104th Infantry,
swam the Sure River under fire carrying a
wounded comrade from a patrol on the north
bank. Presser was awarded the DSC.
THE ARDENNES: BATTLE OF THE BULGE
best, however, the understrength battal-
ions of the Fuehrer Grenadier Brigade
could only inflict delay now that the
American bridges were in operation.
By early afternoon the entire 101st
Infantry was across the river, and when
night fell the bulk of the 104th was on
the north bank taking position to the
right of the 101st on the hills east of
Kaundorf. To make his left wing secure,
General Paul ordered the 101st to take
Bavigne during the night of the 27th
and told the commanders of the two
regiments on the north bank to begin
a co-ordinated attack at 0800 on the 28th.
Company C of the 101st did shoot its
way into Bavigne before midnight but
took most of the next morning to root
out the last of the German grenadiers.
Late on the 27th the 2d Battalion of
the 101st Infantry had forged well ahead
of the other American units, halting for
the night outside Nothum near the apex
of the secondary road net in the division
zone. At this point the battalion encoun-
tered tank fire, and when it moved
forward for the attack on the 28th it
became clear that the German tanks
would have to be destroyed or driven off
before Nothum could be taken. Some
hours passed here while the American
tanks and tank destroyers maneuvered
and dueled with the Germans, but in
the late afternoon the way was clear and
the infantry fought their way into and
through the village. Earlier in the day
the 3d Battalion of the 101st had retaken
Kaundorf and started a drive with its
companies abreast to clear the woods
along the road to Nothum. 20 During the
20 During this advance 2d Lt. G. F. Pennington
of Company E knocked out an enemy armored
car with a rocket although mortally wounded. He
was awarded the DSC posthumously.

THE THIRD ARMY OFFENSIVE 639
morning the leading companies of the
104th Infantry set out to seize Buder-
scheid but came under extremely heavy
fire from enemy dug in on some wooded
heights east of the village. The capture
of Kaundorf, however, permitted a flank-
ing move against this German pocket,
so Companies F and G, accompanied by
tanks, swung west and north, the enemy
decamping as the envelopment of Buder-
scheid became apparent. On the whole
the progress made during the day was
satisfying, but the division came to an
abrupt halt just before midnight with
the word from corps headquarters that
the enemy would launch a counterattack
from the northeast on the morning of
the 29th.
A TOWN EN ROUTE TO KAUNDORF
The anticipated counterattack, prob-
ably conjured up by the inability of
Allied air reconnaissance to function
during bad flying weather late on the
28th, failed to appear. Paul waited until
1015, then telephoned the two regimen-
tal commanders to resume the advance.
There was no longer any possibility of
a full-bodied division attack. With both
division flanks exposed the 328th Infan-
try had to be kept in the division com-
mander’s hand as reserve, and the 101st
and 104th would have to move with
battalions echeloned rearward out to the
wings. Furthermore, visibility on the
ground had dwindled so that visual con-
tact between companies was almost non-
existent.

640 THE ARDENNES: BATTLE OF THE BULGE
But the Wiltz River crossing-and the
town itself–were not so far away. (At
midnight on the 28th the corps and divi-
sion artillery commenced to fire TOT’S
against Wiltz.) Paul ordered the two
regiments to get patrols to the river but
not to descend in strength into the Wiltz
valley. The initial task at hand would be
to clear the enemy pockets from the
wooded high ground to the division
front and cut the highway to Bastogne.
This fight on the hills would be one at
close range with opposing rifle com-
panies and platoons gone to ground and
entrenched only 75 to 150 yards apart.
The 101st began its advance at noon
on the 29th, the immediate goal being
to take the high ground north of Berle
and the Schumann crossroads which
commanded the highway. Here, as else-
where along the division front, the
enemy made up for his lack of riflemen
with constant and accurate fire from dug-
in tanks and Nebelwerfers, reinforced at
likely points by a few 88’s. Despite the
presence of the division 105-mm. howitz-
ers, which had been pushed to within
fifteen hundred yards of the rifle line,
the 101st made little headway. At night-
fall Company A had reached a point five
hundred yards south of Berle, but Com-
pany B had run into serious trouble and
the 2d Battalion had been pinned down
by direct fire not far from Nothum. The
1st and 2d Battalions of the 104th Infan-
try, faced with direct tank fire, made no
substantial progress, although patrols in
front of the attack wave did reach the
woods southwest of Nocher and elements
of the 1st reached a ridge overlooking
the town of Wiltz. 21
21 Sgt. B. R. Eastburn of Company C, 104th
Infantry, was leading a platoon in the attack
which came under intense machine gun fire and
The two-regiment attack on the morn-
ing of 30 December got off to a fast start,
the orders now to “secure Wiltz.” On the
left the 101st Infantry met little but
small arms fire and the 3d Battalion set
up a roadblock on the Wiltz highway.
The regiment gathered 140 prisoners
from the 9th Volks Grenadier Division
in its sweep through the woods north
and west of the highway. The enemy,
however, had no intention of allowing
a parade march down into the Wiltz
valley. An hour before dusk a German
counterattack drove Companies I and K,
the leaders, back onto the hill rising at
the junction of the Wiltz and Roullingen
roads. There followed a period of quiet,
and then in the dark the grenadiers
struck again. This time they were in bat-
talion strength and had three or four
tanks to harden the blow. Companies I
and K took a substantial number of cas-
ualties and were left so disorganized that
the regimental commander asked Paul
to delay the attack scheduled for the next
morning in order to get the 3d Battalion
straightened out.
The 104th Infantry ran into trouble
in the first minutes of its advance on the
30th. Both assault battalions were mov-
ing against enemy troops well established
on the wooded high ground north of
Buderscheid, and both came under an
unusually heavy amount of tank and
Nebelwerfer fire. Clearly enemy resist-
ance in this sector was stiffening. Lt. Col.
could not move forward. Eastburn “borrowed”
another platoon and wiped out the machine gun
nests. He received the DSC. Pfc. S. E. Hull, a
member of the same company, broke up a German
tank attack when he crawled forward with a
bazooka and, at thirty-five yards’ range, destroyed
the lead panzer. Hull put in another rocket
which killed the second tank, and thus ended
the attack. Hull was awarded the DSC.

THE THIRD ARMY OFFENSIVE 641
Calvin A. Heath’s 2d Battalion was
pinned down almost at once at a cross-
road and, under direct tank fire, could
not work its way around the German
pocket. The 1st Battalion briefly gained
control of a crest to its front but then was
driven off by a savage attack which en-
gulfed parts of Companies A and C.
Paul ordered the 3d Battalion of the
328th Infantry up from reserve to back
the 104th, and the Americans regained
some of the ground lost north of Buder-
scheid. When the day ended, however,
the enemy intention to hold this part of
the line was underscored by a sudden
and considerable increase in artillery
fire.
The exposed condition of the 26th
Division salient, as the year ended, is
accurately described in the regimental
orders issued to the 101st Infantry:
“Each Battalion will be prepared to
meet counterattacks from the north,
northwest and northeast.” The first of
these anticipated thrusts came at the
101st roadblock about 0530 on 31 De-
cember, commencing a battle which
embroiled both the 1st and 3d Battalions
and lasted all day long. The main Ger-
man effort seems to have been directed
at the 3d Battalion roadblock southwest
of Roullingen, and as a result Companies
I and K, much weakened by the mauling
received the previous day, took the first
blows. As the German attack gained
momentum, Colonel Scott ordered the
two companies to fall back on the fox-
hole line dug earlier south of the Roul-
lingen road. Light tanks and tank de-
stroyers sent forward to help the 101st
could made no headway, nor could they
maneuver. on the icy roads. The enemy,
however, had no tanks in action, and by
noon the 2d Battalion line was stabi-
lized. Now the 2d Battalion took over
the fight on the left wing of the 101st,
moving forward behind a rolling bar-
rage to clear the woods north of No-
thum. This attack made progress, but
once again as dusk came on the enemy
counterattacked. Company G, which had
entered the woods to support the two
assault companies there, either ran into
the German advance or lost its way and
was encircled; only half the company
escaped.
The 104th Infantry lay on 31 Decem-
ber with its right facing along the Buder-
scheid-Wiltz road and its left facing
north along and overlooking the Roul-
lingen sector of the Bavigne-Wiltz road.
Much of its strength had been diverted
for the long north-south blocking line
which guarded the division–and corps–
east flank, but a battalion of the 328th
Infantry was moving by truck and on
foot to take over this task. Although the
104th Infantry had an attack mission and
did push out a little through the woods
to the north, most of the day was spent in
an inconclusive fire fight.
At the close of the year the 26th Divi-
sion lay in a wedge, the 101st Infantry
at the point around Nothum, the 104th
on the right facing the diagonal formed
by the Buderscheid section of the high-
way, and the 328th (–) on the division
left in the neighborhood of Bavigne.
Both flanks of the division still were ex-
posed and the troops were deployed on a
very wide front, considering the broken
character of the ground.
The old enemy–the Fuehrer Grena-
dier–had withdrawn during the last
nights of December to go into the Sev-
enth Army reserve at Wiltz, its place
being taken by the 9th Volks Grenadier
Division (Colonel Kolb) . The 9th had

642
been formed as one of the first German
Army divisions in 1935 but no longer
bore much resemblance to the formation
that had fought in France and Russia.
Almost completely destroyed during the
withdrawal from Rumania, the 9th
Volks Grenadier was reorganized and
trained in Denmark, whence it was trans-
ferred to the Seventh Army. The very
first battalion to arrive in the Sure area
had been put into action to help the
Fuehrer Grenadier and had been wiped
out, a traumatic experience from which
the rest of the division never seems to
have fully recovered.
With the 6th Armored advance just
getting under way on 1 January and the
35th Division grappled by the enemy in
a seesaw battle, General Millikin gave
orders for the 26th Division to attack on
the 2d and cut the Wiltz-Bastogne high-
way, which was supporting not only the
German Seventh Army but a portion of
the enemy build-up east of Bastogne.
General Paul determined to use his en-
tire division in this operation. The two
flank regiments were intended to make
holding attacks only, leaving it to the
101st–in the center–to thrust northeast
from Nothum and seize Hill 490, the
latter just beyond the wooded junction
where a secondary road from Roullingen
met the main highway winding up from
the Wiltz valley. By this time the 26th
Division had learned the hard way what
an attack over hills and ravines, through
underbrush, tangled woods, and snow-
drifts-with little room for maneuver-
was like. General Paul arranged for the
corps and division artillery to curtain the
advance with a “rolling barrage of high
intensity.” This tactic was made easier
because only one rifle battalion (the 2d,
101st Infantry) would make the assault
THE ARDENNES: BATTLE OF THE BULGE
-and in column of companies–into the
triangle where Hill 490 lay.
The 2d Battalion jumped off in the
attack at daybreak and hit the German
outpost line just north of Mont Schu-
mann. Toward the hill objective, less
than a thousand yards ahead, the ad-
vance could move only at a crawl, for
there was little space for maneuver on
either side of the road. Roadblock fol-
lowed roadblock, and the rifle companies
had to squeeze past each other as the
leader was pinned down by enemy tank
and machine gun fire. A few of the
American tank destroyers were able to
find firing positions from which to en-
gage the forward German tanks but
could not get close enough to blast the
panzers, which had been hidden in
“trench garages” around the crown of
Hill 490. By noon the 2d Battalion had
come to a standstill and was completely
fought out. General Paul ordered up his
division reserve, the 3d Battalion of the
328th, to take a crack at the enemy in
the tough triangle.
This abrupt renewal of activity in
front of Wiltz had a much greater im-
pact on the Seventh Army than a battal-
ion attack normally would occasion.
General Brandenberger and his chief of
staff, General von Gersdorff, had become
gravely concerned lest the American
attacks around Marvie and Harlange
should suddenly break through and trap
the 5th Parachute Division in what the
Germans now were calling “the Har-
lange pocket.” The renewal of the 26th
Division attack on 2 January and the
threat to the Bastogne-Wiltz road in-
creased this apprehension about the
possibly precarious position of the 5th
Parachute and the link it furnished be-
tween the Seventh and Fifth Panzer

THE THIRD ARMY OFFENSIVE
Armies. As a result General Branden-
berger asked Model’s permission to pull
his troops back from Villers-la-Bonne-
Eau and Harlange, but Model gave a
nay, reminding the importunate army
commander that Germany now was
in a battle of attrition by which
the Allies would become enmeshed and
ground down.
The VIII Corps’ Attack Continues
The pitched battle with the 87th Divi-
sion’s 345th Infantry at Moircy on the
night of 30 December had involved the
reserve tanks and infantry supporting
the thin-spread 902d, which was holding
the Panzer Lehr left flank, and during
the next afternoon the 345th captured
Remagne without sustaining the usual
counterattack. For a relatively untried
outfit that had ridden a hundred miles,
crowded in jolting trucks, and had gone
into an attack over unfamiliar terrain
all in the space of less than twenty hours,
the 345th had done well. But it had
taken many casualties, and now that the
fresh 347th Infantry (Col. Sevier R.
Tupper) had come up General Culin
turned the advance on the division right
wing over to the latter. The 346th con-
tinued its blocking mission at St. Hubert
and Vesqueville. (Even the move into
reserve cost the 345th lives and equip-
ment, for the constant traffic uncovered
and exploded German mines which ear-
lier had lain harmless under the deep
snow.)
The morning of 1 January came with
snow, sleet, and bitter cold. The 347th
set out from Moircy and Remagne,
plowing through the drifts, its objective
to cut the Bastogne-St. Hubert road at
Amberloup. The 1st Battalion (Maj.
643
Cecil Chapman) managed to put patrols
across the highway north of Remagne. It
had been advancing with two tanks in
front of each company and the enemy
reaction through the daylight hours was
confined to small arms fire and occasion-
al bursts of artillery. The 347th, how-
ever, was moving against that part of the
902d line which was backed with armor,
for Bayerlein had put his assault guns
in to stiffen the Panzer Lehr western
terminus at St. Hubert and placed his
few remaining tanks as backstop for the
eastern flank. At dusk, when the sky was
empty of the fighter-bombers, the enemy
tanks struck and drove the 1st Battalion
back toward Remagne.
The 3d Battalion (Lt. Col. Richard D.
Sutton) moved north from Moircy along
the road to Pironpré and at noon took
the intermediate village of Jenneville,
where Company C of the 345th had
suffered a bloody head two days before.
When the battalion defiled from Jenne-
ville the German fire stepped up its
cadence, and now the sharp bark of tank
guns could be heard from Pironpré. The
road junction at the latter point was of
considerable concern to General Bayer-
lein. He could spare only a small detach-
ment of grenadiers (probably no more
than thirty were inside Pironpré) , but
he did put a half dozen tanks into the
defense. These tanks were carefully sited
to give maximum fire and were masked
from the road by the piles of lumber
surrounding the local sawmill. The
Americans could not locate this opposi-
tion and halted for the night.
Before daybreak the two battalions
went into attack positions close to the
road which ran diagonally from St. Hu-
bert to Morhet, set as the regimental line
of departure. They left the hornet’s nest

644 THE ARDENNES: BATTLE OF THE BULGE
at Pironpré undisturbed, moving around
it on the right and left. This second day
of the new year the 347th made progress.
The 1st Battalion captured Gerimont
and the 3d Battalion took Bonnerue, in
the process losing four of its attached
tanks to armor-piercing fire (probably
from the panzers hidden in Pironpré).
But by nightfall it was apparent that a
dangerous gap had been created between
the two battalions, and Colonel Tupper
ordered his reserve battalion to clean out
Pironpré and the thick woods beyond.
The 87th Division now could claim that
the Bastogne-St. Hubert road had been
pierced because the seizure of Bonnerue
had put a part of the 347th athwart this
highway.
The 11th Armored Division had re-
grouped during the night of 30 Decem-
ber with the object of consolidating the
entire division for a drive north along
the Rechrival valley. CCA moved over
the icy roads south of the Bois des Haies
de Magery, which had separated it from
the rest of the division, and onto the
Neufchâteau-Bastogne road, where the
columns ran afoul of those of CCB, 6th
Armored. In the morning CCA turned
off the highway and assembled around
Morhet. The new scheme of maneuver
called for CCA to attack in the center
of the valley, erupt from it at Rechrival
and Hubermont, then capture Fla-
mierge. CCR (Col. Virgil Bell) had been
brought up from reserve to cover the
CCA left flank in a sequence of block-
ing positions at Magerotte and Pinsa-
mont where branch roads gave entrance
to the Hubermont road. CCB, still
entangled in the Chenogne fight, had
orders to take that village and proceed
along the east side of the valley—which
would involve clearing the troublesome
Bois des Valets—until it reached its ob-
jective at Mande-St. Etienne. With Fla-
mierge and Mande-St. Etienne held in
force, the German line of communica-
tions west of Bastogne would be effec-
tively blocked.
Now that General Kilburn had his
whole division in hand, he took an
optimistic view of the power play to be
made on the 31st Indeed his staff in-
formed the 101st Airborne Division,
with what was pardonable presumption
when a green division was seeking to
impress the veteran and haughty para-
troopers, that Mande-St. Etienne would
be taken by noon. In midmorning CCA
passed CCB’s Task Force Poker, which
had laagered at Brul and Houmont the
evening before and was waiting for Task
Force Pat to get through Chenogne. Near
Rechrival the march was interrupted by
an enemy screening force that had been
deployed by the 3d Panzer Grenadier
to protect its western flank. This detach-
ment, equipped with antitank and as-
sault guns, was promptly reinforced by
the 115th Regiment of the 15th Panzer
Grenadier (reduced by the bloody attack
west of Bastogne to battalion strength).
Loosing a series of jabs at the head of
the American column, the 115th used the
Panzerfaust to put a number of tanks
hors de combat. The everready fighter-
bombers intervened to help CCA with a
strike on Rechrival, but in any case the
American armor carried the weight
necessary to push back the grenadiers,
and after considerable reorganization the
march resumed. Rechrival was found
empty—apparently the Jabos had done
their work well—and the command out-
posted for the night.
Task Force Pat turned again to as-

THE THIRD ARMY OFFENSIVE 645
sault Chenogne at noon on the 31st
the armored infantry walking through
knee-deep snow. The Sherman tanks
mired in while attempting to cross a
small creek, but the light tanks and a
platoon of antiaircraft half-tracks wield-
ing the dreaded .50-caliber quads gave
sufficient fire power to force entry at
the edge of the village. Inside was a
scratch garrison recruited from the 39th
Fuesilier Regiment (26th Volks Grena-
dier Division), the 3d Panzer Grenadier,
and Remer’s brigade. The mainstay of
the defense in this sector, however, was
a group of twelve to fifteen tank de-
stroyers which had Mark IV carriages
mounting the high-velocity, long-tube
L70 guns. These were brought into ac-
tion late in the day and drove the Amer-
icans out of Chenogne.
CCR carried out the first phase of its
blocking mission with no opposition,
scoured the woods northwest of Mager-
otte, and gained the ridge there. On the
reverse slope some of Remer’s grena-
diers were entrenched, but the Shermans
machine-gunned the way clear and the
attack moved on to put in the next
block at Pinsamont. German mortar
and artillery fire was so intense here
(this was a special groupment of weap-
ons which Remer had positioned to
protect his brigade’s flank) that CCR
withdrew to the Magerotte crest line.
That night Remer’s 3d Grenadier Bat-
talion essayed two fruitless counter-
attacks. This rather minor series of
skirmishes on the 31st cost the 55th Ar-
mored Infantry Battalion over eighty
casualties.
German action on this date was not
solely directed against the 11th Ar-
mored. There was some fighting at
Sibret, although by noontime Field Mar-
shal von Rundstedt’s headquarters had
agreed that any further attempt to break
through the Bastogne corridor via Sib-
ret would have to await success by the
eastern counterattack force. Surprising-
ly the enemy broke the quiet on the
502d Parachute Infantry front with a
foray directed against Champs. 22 Ac-
tually the attackers were trying to get
a foothold in three houses just outside
the village. The paratroopers reported
two hours of “bitter fighting” before
quiet was restored, for the enemy had
been ably supported by artillery fire.
Thirty prisoners were taken from what
the 502d reported as an “assault wave”
of three officers and fifty men. This mi-
nor affair is mentioned here only because
it furnishes a very revealing commen-
tary on the state of the German forma-
tions which had been in the Bastogne
fight through all the recent days: the
“assault wave” was the total strength of
two rifle companies from the 77th Gren-
adier Regiment of the 26th Volks Gren-
adier Division.
If the 11th Armored attack was to
click, the trailing right wing would have
to break through at Chenogne. General
Kilburn ruled that the main effort by
the division on 1 January would be
made by and in support of CCB. This
attack would be co-ordinated with that
of CCA, 9th Armored, which thus far
22
Although the 502d had no offensive mission,
the paratroopers had been involved in continuous
small-scale combat with the enemy in their sector.
During one such affair on 29 December a division
aid man, Pfc. Floyd P. Marquart, went forward un-
der fire to help a paratrooper who had been struck
in the throat by a shell fragment and was slowly
suffocating. Marquart performed an emergency
tracheotomy with his belt knife, then dragged the
wounded man back to a place of safety. He was
given the Silver Star.

646 THE ARDENNES: BATTLE OF THE BULGE
was making no headway at Senonchamps the trees.
to the east. At Chenogne, on the morn- Slow in getting started on 1 January,
ing of the 1st, two medium tank com- CCA had just begun to assemble on the
panies made the assault after all the road when it was surprised by a coundivision
artillery had co-operated in terattack led by Remer. Most of the
working the village over. This time the infantry belonging to the Fuehrer Begvillage
was occupied with ease, although leit and its attached assault gun brigade
a few of the Mark IV tank destroyers were in the line screening the western
had lingered long enough to stick their flank of Denkert’s 3d Panzer Grenadier
long barrels out of hayricks and destroy Division, but on the 31st Remer’s tank
four Shermans. During the night the group and one of his grenadier battalcommander
of the 3d Panzer Grenadier, ions had been relieved for a little rest
apprehensive lest the American thrust in the village of Fosset, northwest of
in the valley crumple his supply lines, Hubermont, there becoming the XLVII
had withdrawn his right, leaving most Panzer Corps reserve, Whether Remer
of the large woods between Chenogne or Luettwitz saw this glittering opportuand
Senonchamps unoccupied and re- nity to take the American columns at
ducing the garrisons in the two villages Rechrival by surprise is uncertain. In
to covering shells.
any case Remer did achieve surprise by
Now for the first time Task Force circling into the Bois des Valets, then
Pat and Task Force Poker could make bursting onto his enemy.
a co-ordinated effort and employ a force Remer’s tanks and assault guns
which was balanced tactically. The CCB knocked out a considerable number of
fusion was aided in its sweep north American tanks, and the battle went on
through the Bois des Valets by thirteen for three hours before CCA, the 11 th Arbattalions
of artillery whose sustained mored artillery, and the fighter-bombers
fire left a great number of the enemy succeeded in crushing the counterattack.
dead in the woods. Colonel Yale be- At 1530 CCA was moving again. The
lieved that his combat command might fight had removed the sting from the
achieve a quick stroke out of the woods German defense and the American tanks
and seize Mande-St. Etienne or at least forged ahead rapidly, reaching Huberits
suburb, Monty. A short distance mont at twilight. Because the armored
north of the Bois des Valets the trail- infantry had not kept pace with the
for it was little more-ran between two tanks and, for all the Americans knew,
wood lots. While passing between the another counterattack might be brewtwo
woods the leading platoon of Sher- ing, CCA retired and set up its lines
mans bogged down. Just such a lapse around Rechrival and Brul.
was what the German bazooka men had That night the VIII Corps commander
been waiting for-they wiped out the visited the 11 th Armored command post
platoon. CCB withdrew into a semicir- at Morhet and ordered the division to
cle following the edge of the Bois des consolidate its positions on the following
Valets, and there the armored infantry, day before it was relieved by the 17th
with no cover overhead, sweated out the Airborne Division. This word was renight
while the German shells burst in layed to the combat commands, but

THE THIRD ARMY OFFENSIVE 647
Colonel Yale, whose CCB was only a
mile or so from its original objective,
Mande-St. Etienne, asked for and was
given permission to take that town on
2 January. Ample artillery was wired in
to support the attack—twelve battalions
fired 3,800 rounds on 120 targets
in and around Monty and Mande-St. Etienne.
For some reason the attack started
in midafternoon, probably too late to
have made a quick and thorough
purge of the German defenders. Both
infantry and armored task forces got
into the town but were forced to fight
street to street and cellar to cellar all
through the night before securing full
possession.
When the 17th Airborne moved in on
3 January to take over from the 11 th Armored
Division, the 11th could look
back at a bitterly contested advance of
six miles in four days. The human cost
had been 220 killed and missing and
441 wounded; the cost in materiel, 42
medium and 12 light tanks.
The failure of the Fifth Panzer Army
to close the gap opened by Patton’s
troops at Bastogne convinced General
Manteuffel that the time had arrived
for the German forces in the Ardennes
to relinquish all thought of continuing
the offensive. Withdrawal in the west
and south to a shortened line was more
in keeping with the true combat capa-
bility of the gravely weakened divisions.
At the end of the year Manteuffel had
advised pulling back to the line Od-
eigne–La Roche–St. Hubert. 23 By 2 Jan-
23 The immediate reason for pulling back from
the exposed tip of the salient was the American
pressure on Rochefort. The 329th Infantry forced
an entry there on 29 December and, although
the regiment failed to gain complete control of the
uary the VIII Corps’ capture of Mande-
St. Etienne so endangered the three
weak divisions in the Rochefort sector
at the tip of the salient that the Fifth
Panzer Army commander went to Model
with a plea for a general withdrawal
by the two panzer armies to the line
Vielsalm-Houffalize-Noville. This pes-
simistic but realistic view of the German
situation was supported by Luettwitz,
commanding in the west, who had
expected as early as 28 December that
the British would mount an attack in the
Rochefort area. His suspicions were con-
firmed on New Year’s Day by the
identification of the British 50th In-
fantry Division in the Allied line.
Model apparently gave tacit profes-
sional agreement to Manteuffel’s views.
But he was, quite literally, the prison-
er of Hitler and the Nazi machine–it
may be said that Model’s life depend-
ed on continuing the fiction that the
Wehrmacht would give no ground. So
the staff at Army Group B continued to
pore over maps and march tables for
still another attack on 4 January to
“erase” Bastogne. One may wonder what
were the private thoughts of the old
soldier Rundstedt as he watched the
Allied divisions coming into array on
the OB WEST situation map, readying
for the kill. Whatever these thoughts,
they remained his own for he no longer
had the power or the prestige to influ-
ence Hitler or the course of the Ar-
dennes battle. The last entry for the year
1944 in the OB WEST War Diary
simply expresses the hope that the Ger-
man initiative now lost in the Ardennes
may be regained in the new offensive
being unleashed that very moment
town on this date, the enemy could not risk
a further defense with his depleted forces.

648 THE ARDENNES: BATTLE OF THE BULGE'
against the American and French forces
in Alsace. This new battle, however,
would have little effect on the German
forces which, on 3 January, faced the
great Allied counteroffensive as it moved
into high gear to flatten the Bulge
and steamroller a path to and over the
Rhine.

The Weather
There is an axiom that weather on
the battlefield is divided equally be-
tween the combatants—but its impact on
military operations is not equal in
amount or direction. The German selec-
tion of a target date for the commence-
ment of the Ardennes offensive turned
on the prediction of poor flying weather.
This type of weather had a useful side
effect during the rupture of the Amer-
ican lines since it veiled the attacker
with fog and mist, a very important fea-
ture of the initial German successes
just as it had been in the great offensives
of 1918. The high pressure system which
came in from the Atlantic on 18 De-
cember, however, worked momentarily
against the attacker. A thaw set in which
slowed his tanks and the erstwhile heavy
ground fog began to show sudden
openings, such as those which exposed
the German tanks and infantry during
the fight at Noville. On the 20th and
21st the higher ground began to freeze
in patches, leaving stretches of the Ar-
dennes roads slippery and muddy. By
the 22d competing weather systems from
Russia and the Atlantic had brought on
a hodgepodge of snow, blizzards, fog,
and rain. In the north the Sixth Panzer
Army was bogged by rain and mud, in
the south the Fifth Panzer Army was
hampered in its swing around Bas-
CHAPTER XXV
Epilogue
togne by fog and snow, and along the
German supply roads back over the Eifel
snow fell continuously.
The dramatic change of the 23d,
brought by cold, dry winds from the
east, stripped the German armies of
their immunity to air attack. But this
was not the whole story. Snow began
to drift in the Eifel hills, bringing traf-
fic on the main supply roads west of the
Rhine almost to a standstill. Horse-
drawn snowplows were few and ineffec-
tive, hastily erected snow fences were
torn down by troops scrounging for
firewood, there was no gravel available,
and a large number of the engineer
construction battalions had been taken
west for employment as infantry. By
the time power snowplows reached the
Eifel the American fighter-bombers were
strafing and bombing every large vehicle
that moved. Engineers were brought
into the Eifel, but their very efforts de-
layed the German truck columns so
urgently needed farther west. 1
For five days the weather favored the
Americans, in the air and on the ground.
Superior numerically in tanks, the
Americans benefited more than the Ger-
mans from the sure footing the big
freeze provided for armor. Then, on 28
1 See description in MS # B–172, Army Group B
Engineers, 1–25 January 1945 (Generalleutnant
Richard Wirtz) .

650 THE ARDENNES: BATTLE OF THE BULGE
December, came clouds and overcast
followed, a day later, by arctic air from
Scandinavia, heavy snows, blizzards, and
greatly reduced visibility at ground
level. Vehicular movement was slow, the
riflemen exhausted themselves wading
through the drifts, and the wounded-
those in a state of shock–died if left
in the snow for half an hour or more.
This was the state of the weather when,
on 3 January, the Allies began their
final counterattack.
The Opposing Troop Strengths
On the morning of 16 December the
American forces in the path of the Ger-
man counteroffensive comprised four
and two-thirds divisions with an effec-
tive strength of about 83,000 men. The
heavy weapons then available numbered
242 Sherman tanks, 182 tank destroyers,
and 394 pieces of corps and divisional
artillery. These troops and weapons
were deployed on a meandering front of
104 miles.
The enemy assault divisions posed to
the east had concentrated behind some
ninety miles of the front manned by
Army Group B, and during the night
of 15 December over 200,000 combat
troops gathered in the forward assembly
area, about three miles in depth. The
German attack, as it developed during
the course of 16 December, was made
on an assault front of sixty miles and
included 5 armored divisions, 12 2/3 in-
fantry divisions, and about 500 medium
tanks, the whole supported by the fire of
1,900 guns and Werfers.
Although it is impossible to measure
the exact number of rifle battalions and
tank battalions committed by the Ger-
mans during the initial breakthrough
attack, it is probable that the over-all
ratio of German infantry to American
was three to one, with a ratio of six
to one at points of concentration. Ger-
man armored superiority was some-
what less pronounced during the first-
day assault, only about two to one in
medium tanks. If the self-propelled guns
employed in a tank role are considered,
the superiority enjoyed by the attacker
was about four to one.
By 2 January 1945, the eve of the
Allied attack to destroy the Ardennes
salient, the Germans had thrown 8 ar-
mored divisions, 20 infantry divisions,
and 2 mechanized brigades into the Bat-
tle of the Bulge. During these eighteen
days the Americans had employed 8 ar-
mored, 16 infantry, and 2 airborne divi-
sions in the line. 2 This tabulation of
the opposing divisions, however, does not
give a true measure of the relative com-
bat strength deployed in what may be
called the German phase of the winter
battle in the Ardennes.
The American rifle division in 1944
was organized at a strength of 14,032
men, and most of the divisions engaged
in this operation entered the fray
at full complement. The personnel
strength of the German infantry divi-
sions varied, at the time of their com-
2 The German order of battle for the period of
16 December–2 January was as follows: 1st SS, 2d
SS, 9th SS, 12th SS Panzer Divisions; Panzer Lehr
and 2d, 9th, 116th Panzer Divisions; 3d and 5th
Parachute Divisions; 3d and 15th Panzer Grenadier
Divisions; 9th, 12th, 18th, 26th, 62d, 79th, 167th,
212th, 246th, 272d, 276th, 277th, 326th, 340th, 352d,
560th Volks Grenadier Divisions; and the Fuehrer-
Grenadier and Fuehrer Begleit Brigades. The
American order of battle for the same period in-
cluded: the 2d, 3d, 4th, 6th, 7th, 9th, 10th, and
11th Armored Divisions; the 82d and 101st Air-
borne Divisions; the 1st, 2d, 4th, 5th, 9th, 26th,
28th, 3oth, 35th, 75th, 80th, 83d, 84th, 87th, 99th,
and 106th Infantry Divisions.

EPILOGUE 651
mitment, between 8,000 and 17,000, the
lower figure representing those divisions
which had been refitted at 80 percent
of the 1944 Volks Grenadier division
table of organization and equipment
and the upper figure, which can be ap-
plied to only three or four divisions, rep-
resenting those, like the 26th Volks
Grenadier Division, which retained the
older, regular infantry division com-
position. The strength of the Ger-
man infantry divisions across the
board probably averaged little more
than 10,000 men. The normal German
rifle regiment numbered 1,868 as con-
trasted with the American infantry reg-
iment of 3,207 officers and men.
The majority of the German panzer
divisions had the same manpower con-
figuration as the two U.S. square ar-
mored divisions (the 2d and 3d), that is,
a little over 14,000. The six remaining
U.S. armored divisions had the new tri-
angular organization with a roster re-
duced to 10,666 officers and men. The
armored weight of the opposing divi-
sions, however, strongly favored the
Americans, for the German panzer divi-
sion brought an average of go to 100
medium tanks into the field whereas
the American triangular division was
equipped with 186 and the two square
divisions had 232 medium tanks in their
organization tables. Hitler personally
attempted to compensate for this dis-
parity by ordering the attachment of
separate Army tank battalions of 40 to
50 Panthers or Tigers to the regular pan-
zer divisions.
The battle area during the period of
16 December through 3 January has to
be measured as a salient in which the
relation between the width of the base
and the depth of the penetration rep-
resents a measure of the adequacy of
the forces employed and their operation-
al mobility. The German failure to
break through on the north shoulder at
Monschau had considerable impact on
the width of the planned assault front,
and by 18 December the base of the
salient had stabilized at a width of forty-
seven air-line miles, narrower than de-
sired. The greatest depth of the Ger-
man penetration, achieved on the tenth
day of the attack, was about sixty air-
line miles. On that date, however, the
average width of the salient had been
reduced to thirty miles and at its tip
measured no more than a five-mile front
facing the Meuse. Indeed, the width of
the assault front proper can be consid-
ered as the range of the 75-mm. guns
on the 2d Panzer tanks. By this time
the Americans had something approach-
ing a co-ordinated and homogeneous line
as a retaining wall north and south of
the salient, with a frontage of nearly
seven miles per division on the north
flank and a little more than thirteen
miles on the southern flank.
The Opposing Weapons
Although winter in the Ardennes
placed severe limitations on the use of
armor, the tank was a major weapon in
the hands of both antagonists. The Sher-
man tank, a medium of the thirty-ton
class, bore the brunt of all American ar-
mored action, while the light tank was
relegated to minor tactical tasks. The
Sherman (M4) was battle tested, and
most of the mechanical bugs had been
removed. Its major weaknesses—tank
gun and armor—by this time were well
appreciated by the user. A new model,
the M4A3, had been equipped with a

652 THE ARDENNES: BATTLE OF THE BULGE
high-velocity, long-barreled 76-mm. gun
to replace the old, short-barreled 75-
mm., but not many of these were in the
European Theater of Operations. Also,
a very few Shermans had been modified
to carry a heavier weight of armor plate
-the so-called Jumbo tanks. The Jum-
bos, which had been tried out during
the autumn fighting, proved so success-
ful that General Patton ordered their
use as lead tanks in the drive to Bas-
togne—but most American tankers
never saw the Jumbo in December 1944.
The Germans had a family of three
main battle tanks. The Mark IV, which
received its first real combat test in
May 1940, weighed twenty-seven tons,
had somewhat less armor than the Sher-
man, about the same maximum road
speed, and a tank gun comparable in
weight of projectile and muzzle veloc-
ity to the 76-mm. American tank gun
but superior to the short-barreled 75-
mm.
The Panther, Mark V, had proved it-
self during 1944 but still was subject to
mechanical failures which were well rec-
ognized but which seemingly could not
be corrected in the hasty German pro-
duction schedules. This tank had a
weight of fifty tons, a superiority in base
armor of one-half to one inch over
the Sherman, good mobility and flota-
tion, greater speed, and a high-velocity
gun superior even to the new American
76-mm. tank gun.
The Tiger, Mark VI, had been de-
veloped as an answer to the heavy Rus-
sian tank but had encountered numerous
production difficulties (it had over 26,-
000 parts) and never reached the field
in the numbers Hitler desired. The
original model weighed fifty-four tons,
had thicker armor than the Panther, in-
cluding heavy top armor as protection
against air attack, was capable of a speed
comparable to the Sherman, and mount-
ed a high-velocity 88-mm. cannon. A still
heavier Mark VI, the King Tiger, had
an added two to four inches of armor
plate. Few of this model ever reached
the Ardennes, although it was com-
monly reported by American troops.
Exact figures on German tank
strength are not available, but it would
appear that of the estimated 1,800 pan-
zers in the Ardennes battle some 250
were Tigers and the balance was divid-
ed equally between the Mark IV and the
Panther. Battle experience in France,
which was confirmed in the Ardennes,
gave the Sherman the edge over the
Mark IV in frontal, flank, and rear
attack. The Panther often had been
beaten by the Sherman during the cam-
paign in France, and would be defeated
on the Ardennes battleground, but
in nearly all cases of a forthright tank
engagement the Panther lost only when
American numerical superiority permit-
ted an M4 to get a shot at flank or tail.
Insofar as the Tiger was concerned,
the Sherman had to get off a lucky
round or the result would be strictly no
contest.
American and German divisional
artillery was very similar, having fol-
lowed the same developmental pattern
during the 1930’s. Differences in corps
artillery were slight, although the Ger-
mans placed more emphasis on long-
range guns in the heavy calibers,
170-mm. and above. The German Army,
as the result of its battles on the Eastern
Front and experiences with the Soviet
rocket artillery, placed great faith in the
Werfer, a multiple-tube rocket launcher.
This weapon was easy to produce and

EPILOGUE 653
could be easily transported, a major
design feature when the production
of heavy trucks and artillery prime
movers began to fall off in the Reich.
The 150-mm. version weighed only 1,200
pounds and could fire a quarter-ton
of high explosives in ten seconds; the
210-mm. model weighed about a ton
and a half and could discharge over
half a ton of high explosives per salvo.
These weapons lacked the accuracy and
fire control features of conventional ar-
tillery, and because of the blast could
be readily spotted, but their mobility
seems to have been a major feature in
carrying German firepower forward
during the Ardennes offensive.
American and German doctrine and
organization for the employment of in-
fantry-support weapons had followed
different paths during the development
cycle between the two World Wars when
the problem of the “infantry-accom-
panying gun” had plagued all armies.
The German Army ultimately opted
for a self-propelled 75-mm. assault gun
designed to help the infantry platoon
forward in the assault and, at the same
time, to provide a real antitank capa-
bility. The concept and the weapon had
proved themselves on the Eastern Front,
but the battle wastage of this weapon,
like that of the assault infantry it sup-
ported, was extraordinarily high. In
December 1944, the German infantry
used a battle drill and tactics “leaning”
on an accompanying weapon which no
longer could be issued in proper num-
bers to even the most favored divisions.
German battle commanders invariably
point to the lack of this weapon in ex-
plaining particular failures of their in-
fantry in battle.
The American approach to this prob-
lem reflected the opposition of the
U.S. Army to dual-purpose weapons,
and as a result the U.S. rifle ,regiment
carried both a cannon company and
an antitank company. On the whole
neither of these units performed
as desired during the Ardennes
battle. The howitzers of the cannon
company seemed to fire effectively only
when tied with the divisional artillery,
the 57-mm. antitank gun lacked the
punch to meet German tanks, and,
what was worse, most division com-
manders looked upon these weapons
companies as providing additional rifle-
men to put into the foxhole line. So it
was on the thinly held American front
of 16 December.
The American self-propelled 90-mm.
tank destroyer and the 88-mm. German
equivalent were much feared, or at the
least highly respected, for they had the
power to penetrate the armor they
faced, they could jockey for position
along the winding Ardennes roads and
defiles, and they were hard to
destroy. Both antagonists used 75-mm.
towed antitank weapons and both
lost these towed weapons and other
towed artillery in large numbers. In
the mud and snow, and under direct fire
and infantry assault, the task of limber-
ing gun to truck or tractor was
difficult and hazardous. Furthermore,
in heavy and close combat the tow
vehicle often was shot up or immobilized
while the gun, dug in, remained
intact. The mobile, tactically agile,
self-propelled, armored field artil-
lery and tank destroyers are clearly
traceable in the Ardennes fighting as
over and over again influencing the
course of battle. Their record should
be pondered in the design of tactics

654 THE ARDENNES: BATTLE OF THE BULGE
and missiles.
The difficult terrain on which the win-
ter campaign was fought, the prevalence
of pitched battles at night and in fog,
the tactical failure of the American 57-
mm. antitank gun, and the paucity of
German assault guns and self-propelled
tank destroyers brought the bazooka in-
to a place of prominence on both sides
of the line. Admittedly the bazooka was
a suicide weapon, but there were always
brave men—mostly platoon and squad
leaders—to risk its use against an enemy
tank. In the autumn of 1944 the Ger-
man Army recognized that it was too
late for building tank destroyers in the
numbers required and that in any case
fuel was lacking for their transport in-
to battle. Therefore the decision was
made to build hand rocket weapons and
rely on the courage of the “single
fighter”-a decision like that made in
1917–1918 when the Kaiser’s army
turned to armor-piercing rifles in the
hands of the single fighter to stop Allied
tanks. In December 1944 both sides
learned that infantry companies armed
with bazookas could not do the work of
tank destroyers.
The success of field artillery as an
antidote to the tank is difficult to assess
quantitatively. American and German
doctrine taught that long-range artil-
lery could be used to break up tank
concentrations before these reached the
infantry zone. In the Ardennes, however,
American artillery groupments not only
performed this interdiction role but on
numerous occasions stopped the tank as-
sault right at the rifle line. Surprisingly
enough, in several of those battles where
causative agents in tank kills could be
determined by postmortem possession of
the battle area, the high explosives fired
by American field artillery accounted for
a large share of the kills made, although
the actual damage inflicted may have
been no more than a broken track or
sprocket wheel.
Mortars, machine guns, and rifles
functioned in a comparable manner on
both sides of the line. Here the design
of the infantry weapon proved less im-
portant in the bloody competition of
the fire fight than the supply of am-
munition, the numbers employed, and
the small unit tactics. The single excep-
tion is the machine pistol, which had
been issued in large numbers to the new
Volks Grenadier divisions and was very
successfully employed by the German
special assault companies formed in each
infantry regiment.
Weapons and fire control turned main-
ly on wire communications, laid forward
to observation posts and back to com-
mand posts. The vulnerability of tele-
phone wire was adequately demonstra-
ted on the morning of 16 December and
throughout the campaign–yet it contin-
ued to be the primary means of tacti-
cal communication. Radio, of the type
used in late 1944, lacked the necessary
range and constantly failed in the woods
and defiles. Both sides engaged in jam-
ming, but for the most part the really
damaging interference came from
friendly transmitters.
Three additional items of equipment
deserve attention in the history of the
December battle: the V-weapon, the
searchlight, and the proximity fuze. The
V-weapon turned out to have no tactical
significance, although the German high
command stepped up the attack on the
Allied depots at Antwerp and Liège dur-
ing the Ardennes offensive, averaging
at least 135 firings a week against Liège

EPILOGUE 655
and 235 against Antwerp. These mostly
were the pilotless aircraft or V-1 type,
bearing 2,240 pounds of explosive. The
military casualties inflicted by this V-
weapons attack were slight, except for
one strike on 16 December which de-
stroyed an Antwerp cinema, killing 296
British soldiers and wounding 194.
Searchlights had been used by the
Allies to illuminate the battlefield dur-
ing the North African and Italian cam-
paigns. However, the six battalions of
tank-mounted searchlights (Canal De-
fense Lights) which the Americans
brought into Normandy had been re-
converted in November for normal ar-
mored use on the grounds that no
“operational requirement” for the Ca-
nal Defense Light existed. The Germans
had produced a large number of search-
lights for use with flak batteries in the
defense of major target centers in the
Reich. In early December OB WEST
ran two tests of searchlights in a ground
role, with and without troops. These
tests showed that an accidented battle-
field could be extensively illuminated
in front of attacking infantry. As a re-
sult some two hundred searchlights were
gathered immediately behind the as-
sault front and, on the morning of 16
December, flicked on to guide the first
waves of infantry and to point targets,
by cloud reflection, during the artillery
preparation. Although very successful
in assisting the assault companies over
the first one or two thousand yards, the
60-cm. lights (with a ground range of
little more than three thousand yards)
could not keep up with the attack, and
a number of German detachments, sup-
posed to guide on the searchlight beams,
wandered away from their objectives.
Some of these smaller lights were
brought forward and appeared in at-
tacks as late as 18 December, but the
ponderous 150- and 200-cm. lights seem
to have been left behind at the original
line of departure. 3
The proximity fuze, a tightly guard-
ed American secret design for detonat-
ing projectiles by external influence in
the close vicinity of a target, without ex-
plosion by contact, got its first battle test
in a ground role during the Ardennes.
This fuze, also known as the VT or
POZIT fuze, had been prepared for
some 210 rounds of artillery am-
munition on the Continent in December.
Most of this stock was antiaircraft artil-
lery ammunition, and the 12th Army
Group had proposed to try it out in
the so-called Liège River Belt, the cor-
don of antiaircraft gun battalions which
was organized to shoot down the V-
weapons in flight to Liège. On 16 De-
cember a few field artillery battalions
in the First Army had small stocks of
the new ammunition, a few had wit-
nessed demonstrations, and a very few
had fired it. Two battalions in the VIII
Corps artillery had been issued some
rounds of VT ammunition, but so far
as can be determined none were fired
on the first day of the German attack.
Actually this highly secret ammunition
was employed on only a few occasions
prior to the Allied counterattack in
early January, and then usually at night
or in poor weather when the American
gunners could not get sensing for nor-
mal time fire missions. The postwar
claims as to the value of the much tout-
3 For the characteristics of this equipment, see
H. A. Koch, Flak: Die Geschichte der Deutschen
Flakartillerie (Bad Nauheim, Germany: Podzuhn-
Verlag, 1954).

656 THE ARDENNES: BATTLE OF THE BULGE
ed VT fuze in halting the German ad-
vance are grossly exaggerated. 4
American records on the causes of
combat wounds and deaths are woefully
inadequate and German records for
this period do not exist. In the Third
Army it is reckoned-in a very broad
manner-that during the period 1 Au-
gust–31 November 1944 the causative
agent for between 27 and 30 percent
of the total wounded admitted to Army
hospitals was the gunshot wound,
while high explosive agents (artillery
shell, mortar shell, bombs, mines, and
the like) accounted for between 50 and
60 percent of the monthly rosters of
wounded. During December these two
causative agents respectively accounted
for 25 percent and 60 percent of the
wounded. There is no accurate account-
ing for the causative agent in the case
of men killed in action.
The Artillery Arm in the
A rdennes
The dramatic and successful offensive
operations of the German Army in the
early years of World War II had fea-
tured the extensive employment of as-
sault aircraft to punch the holes through
which the panzers poured. At the close
of 1944 the Third Reich lacked the
planes which once had provided the air-
borne “artillery” of blitzkrieg. So Hit-
ler, the infantryman of World War I,
4 As an example see Vannevar Bush, Modern
Arms and Free Men (New York: Simon and
Schuster, 1949) : “The proximity fuze may well
have saved Liège,” p. 31. The conclusions reached
in the text above are based on the rigorous
analysis in Royce L. Thompson’s Employment of
VT Fuzes in the Ardennes Campaign (1950). MS
in OCMH files.
turned to the time-tested tactic he knew,
massive artillery preparation for the
ground assault. In many ways the Ger-
man use of the artillery arm on 16 De-
cember was a carbon copy of the artil-
lery preparations for the great offensives
in 1918. But there were some major
differences. Intense counterbattery fire,
a necessary feature of the artillery prep-
arations in 1918, no longer was possible;
Germany lacked the huge ammunition
stocks required. Captive balloons and
observation planes had directed the
movement of artillery fire in 1918. These
auxiliaries were missing in the Ar-
dennes, and ground observation there
normally favored the Americans. Luden-
dorff had been able to mass ninety heavy
caliber guns per kilometer for the
March offensive. Model would have
fewer than twenty tubes for each kilo-
meter of the assault front.
Hitler, looking back to 1918, had
demanded a massive artillery prepara-
tion lasting for two or three hours, and
this in full daylight. Probably at Man-
teuffel’s instigation, he finally agreed
that a short, sharp, predawn artillery
preparation-of the sort conventionally
practiced on the Eastern Front-would
be used in the Ardennes. There seems
to have been no gigantic, homogeneous
artillery fire plan on 16 December, as
had been the practice in 1918. In the
Sixth Panzer Army a go-minute prepara-
tion was fired on villages and deep as-
sembly positions to the rear of the Amer-
ican line, and followed by unobserved
area fire along the main line of resist-
ance. The guns and Werfers in the
Fifth Panzer Army fired forty rounds
per tube in the first twenty minutes
against predesignated targets, then com-
menced a rolling barrage, the old World

EPILOGUE 657
War I Feuerwalze, with sixty rounds at
each piece.
There were deviations from this pattern
in -accordance with the ground and
estimated American strength. The
26th Volks Grenadier Division, for example,
advanced behind a preparation
fired by three hundred tubes which, for
seventeen minutes, worked over targets
illuminated by searchlights. The Seventh
Army, which had a relatively small
number of artillery and Werfer battalions,
was forced to concentrate its fire on
a few selected target areas. The most intensive
preparation fired here was in
support of the two assault regiments of
the 5th Parachute Division: to smooth
its advance seventy-two guns fired ninety
rounds each as fast as the cannoneers
could work their pieces. All three of
the armies relied upon the speed and
shock of the initial assault to overrun
any deep American artillery groupments
which might be in position to menace
the infantry and armored advance.
There is no doubt that the German
artillery helped the assault waves forward
during the rupture of the American
forward defensive positions. It is
equally clear that the German artillery
failed to keep pace with the subsequent
advance, nor did it come forward rapidly
enough to assist substantially in the
reduction of those American points of
resistance which had been left in the
rear of attacking echelons. The relative
immobility of corps and army artillery
may be ascribed to bad roads, the lack
of heavy, fully tracked artillery prime
movers, and traffic congestion. The road
jam at the Our bridges delayed the forward
displacement of the LVIII Panzer
Corps artillery until 19 December, and
then only a few batteries crossed the
river. The switch southward of the
Sixth Panzer Army’s main effort on 17
December blocked the roads on which
Manteuffel was moving the Fifth Panzer
artillery. The artillery corps attached
to the II SS Panzer Corps took five days
to reach firing positions east of Butgen-
bach, just to the rear of the original
American line.
All these delays had a mirror-image
in the transport of ammunition. This
resulted in an early decision by the
artillery officers of the three armies to
leave about half of the guns and Wer-
fers behind. Werfer battalions and bri-
gades were not moved up to share in the
battle until the end of December, and
only a few reached the front lines. In
the main the German assault infantry
were forced to rely on the fire support
given by tanks and assault guns, rather
than massed artillery fire. There were
exceptions, however, and by dint of
great effort the Germans occasionally
were able to create artillery groupments
which, following the practice learned
on the Eastern Front, became artillery
“centers of gravity.” This was done by
the Seventh Army commander in an
attempt to get his flank moving on 19
and 20 December, and a similar group-
ment was prepared by Model and Man-
teuffel to pave the way for the Bastogne
counterattacks at the close of Decem-
ber.
Throughout the exploitation and sta-
bilization phase of the German offensive
the Americans enjoyed an immense su-
periority in the artillery arm. This was
not true, however, during the first hours
of the German attack to rupture the
American defenses. On 16 December the
VIII Corps artillery was caught off bal-
ance, since eight of its nine battalions

658 THE ARDENNES: BATTLE OF THE BULGE
were positioned to support the untried
106th Division. The 99th Division, on
the north flank, had only one battalion
of corps artillery in support. And the
records show only 2,500 rounds shot by
American corps artillery in planned de-
fensive and counterpreparation fires on
the first day of the battle.
There are a number of reasons for
the American failure to apply the full
weight of the artillery arm on 16 De-
cember. The initial enemy shellfire did
severe damage to the U.S. artillery com-
munications net. Even after repairs were
made, intelligence as to the German lo-
cations and intentions moved very slowly
from command post to command post
(the 559th Field Artillery Battalion, for
example, received no warning of the
German force to its front until 1215).
The firing battalions supporting the
106th Division were hampered by “no-
fire” lines earlier established by the
division, and there seems to have been
little or no attempt to lift these restric-
tions as the enemy assault waves swept
forward to grapple the American infan-
try. Corps artillery proved quite as vul-
nerable to a fast-moving ground attack
as the divisional gunners, and as early
as 1035 the VIII Corps artillery was dis-
placing rearward on orders. The towed
battalions, particularly the 155-mm. and
8-in. artillery, took long to limber and
even longer to find a place on the
crowded roads leading west; it is not
surprising that they fell prey quite as
often to German infantry as to panzers.
A large portion of the VIII Corps artil-
lery was forced to displace so often that
two to four days would elapse before the
battalions finally settled long enough to
engage the enemy. Other battalions sim-
ply were whittled away by enemy action
every time they went into firing position
(the 687th Field Artillery Battalion was
overrun in front of Wiltz, in Wiltz, and
west of Wiltz). Observation was very
poor until midafternoon on the 16th, no
artillery planes got up, and unobserved
fire on the German West Wall positions
pounded assembly areas long since left
behind by the enemy moving west.
The artillery fire fight on the first
day of the attack and for most of the
second was carried by the divisional
howitzer battalions, which began to en-
gage observed targets two and a half to
three hours after the start of the Ger-
man preparation. Many of these battal-
ions were firing with only one eye, since
wire to a number of observations posts
went out by 0630, others were systema-
tically engulfed during the morning by
the German assault companies, all mi-
crophones for sound-ranging were out of
operation by the evening of the 16th,
and several of those batteries which
were firing lost their ammunition trucks
in the melee along the roads to the
rear. Many of the forward batteries
were put out of action as soon as the
infantry line to their front broke; others
fired until the evening of the 17th and
still were able to withdraw successfully.
Did the American gunners blunt or
delay the first German thrust? At Mon-
schau the artillery stopped the attack
cold, effectively narrowing the German
assault front. In the 99th Division sec-
tor the division artillery held its ground
until the close of the 17th when the V
Corps artillery groupment at Elsenborn
took over the fight with such a weight
of metal that one infantry battalion was
covered by a defensive barrage of 11,500
rounds during the night of 17 December.
The Fifth Panzer Army, on the con-

EPILOGUE
trary, was little impeded by the scant
collection of American artillery to its
front. On the German left wing the
Seventh Army advance was damaged
considerably by the American howitzers,
for the batteries here retained their
link to the observation posts on the
heights overlooking the Sure River and
succeeded in delaying the German
bridging efforts for many hours.
As the American defense solidified
along the shoulders of the salient or at
strong points, such as St. Vith and
Bastogne, the artillery arm really com-
menced to make its weight felt. Experi-
enced German artillery officers estimate
that their American opponents finally
had a superiority in guns and ammu-
nition of ten to one. This estimate is
far too high: the Americans fired about
1,255,000 artillery rounds during the
fighting covered in this account and by
23 December had brought a total of
4,155 artillery pieces into action. Just as
in 1918, however, the attacker had
driven the defense back upon its artil-
lery base of fire, meanwhile progres-
sively losing his own firepower. The
Germans tend to characterize the
American artillery fire as methodical,
schematic, and wasteful. There is con-
siderable indication that the German
commanders quickly recognized and
made gainful tactical use of the gaps at
division and corps boundaries where the
defenders conventionally failed to pro-
vide overlapping fire between zones. Al-
so, it is probable, as the enemy alleges,
that the American gunners fired a very
considerable weight of ammunition for
each German killed. On the other hand
the record is replete with instances in
which the attacker was diverted from his
axis of advance and his scheme of ma-
659
neuver was destroyed by American ar-
tillery fire, even when he suffered little
physical damage. This phenomenon be-
came even more apparent after the
American spotter planes took to the air.
The German offensive phase of the
Ardennes operation, with its high de-
gree of fluidity and dispersion, may of-
fer profitable suggestions for the future
fluid battlefield. The experience of the
First Army, which generously sent its
medium artillery reserves south to stif-
fen the defense, showed the hazard in
moving isolated and road-bound units
with heavy equipment across the grain
of the enemy advance, even when the at-
tack was believed to be miles away.
Medium and heavy corps artillery units
were quite as vulnerable to enemy
ground attack as the forward divisional
artillery, particularly when the attacker
was moving cross-country and the artil-
lery equipment was difficult to displace
and bound to the road. Displacing single
batteries by leapfrog tactics in order to
maintain unbroken defensive fires failed
repeatedly during the first days of the
Ardennes, largely because of the split-
ting effect of the German ground as-
sault that isolated firing batteries and
crippled control or resupply by the
headquarters battery. Those forward
American batteries which worked their
guns, brought them off, and lived to
fire another day, normally owed their
tactical survival to other arms and weap-
ons. The artillery battalion of 1944
was not organically constructed or
equipped to beat off close-in infantry
or armored assault, but the fortuitous
attachment of antiaircraft weapons sec-
tions, although these no longer did much
service in their primary role, gave the
gunners an antipersonnel weapon which

660 THE ARDENNES: BATTLE OF THE BULGE
proved to be murderously effective. The
attachment of tank destroyers to the ar-
tillery battalions also paid substantial
dividends in the early days of the cam-
paign. The most effective defense of
beleaguered field artillery units, how-
ever, was that provided by prompt
counterattack delivered by neighboring
infantry or tanks, a tactic which turned
on accurate local intelligence, unbroken
communications, and the enemy inabil-
ity to deflect the counterattack force
with heavy supporting weapons or
mines.
The Air Weapon
Postwar estimates of the Luftwaffe
operational strength assigned to support
the ground attack on 16 December set
the number of first-line planes at about
fifteen hundred. 5 But German planes
never, in the course of the campaign,
appeared over the battle area in any such
number. OB WEST records 849 sorties
dispatched to assist the ground attack on
18 December, the largest Luftwaffe at-
tempt to intervene directly in the
Ardennes battle. The tabulation of Ger-
man sorties is somewhat misleading,
however, because a relatively small pro-
portion of these sorties ever reached the
battlefield in a ground support role and
most were engaged by the Allied air
forces far to the east of the ground com-
bat zone. On 24 December, for example,
a day characterized by the IX Tactical
Air Command as the heaviest Luftwaffe
effort since D-day, the Third Army-
whose counterattack obviously invited
retaliation from the air-reported the
5 Office of the Director of Intelligence, U.S.
Strategic Air Forces in Europe, Allied Air Power
and the Ardennes Offensive (n.d.) .
sighting of only one enemy squadron.
During the first ten days of the campaign
the Luftwaffe sorties sent into the air
varied between six and eight hundred
per day. In the last six days of December
the Luftwaffe was driven back to the air
space over the Third Reich and the num-
ber of planes actually reaching the
battlefield numbered between sixty and
eighty a day, most of which struck under
cover of darkness, as in the case of the
73-plane raid over Bastogne on 30 De-
cember.
At no point in the story of the ground
battle can any crippling impact of Ger-
man air attack be discerned. Nor was
the Luftwaffe notably successful in de-
fending the supply lines west of the
Rhine. The German fighters did exact
a heavy toll from the Allied planes ham-
mering at rail yards, bridges, and supply
installations. Thus the 39 1st Bombard-
ment Group, flying Marauders without
escort to attack the Ahrweiler railroad
bridge, was jumped by about seventy-
five German fighters, and lost one-half
of its thirty-six planes, though it did
knock out the bridge.
In the first week of the German ad-
vance the well-established Allied supe-
riority in the air hardly made itself felt
in the battle area, although two fighter-
bomber groups from IX Tactical Air
Command did intervene in the fighting
around Stavelot and Malmédy on 18
December. But the adverse weather
which denied the tactical air forces ac-
cess to the fight on the ground did not
halt the bombers and on 18 December
bombers from the RAF, began an inter-
diction attack seventy-five miles or more
to the east of the battle line. It is diffi-
cult to measure the damage done the
German rail system west of the Rhine

EPILOGUE 661
by Allied bombing during this early
phase because the exorbitant amount of
military traffic moving to support the
attack resulted in severe congestion
which, on a number of feeder lines,
forced troops and equipment to detrain
far to the east of their planned destina-
tion.
When the weather altered on the 23d,
battlefield operations started to take pre-
cedence over the Allied interdiction ef-
fort. The IX, XIX, and XXIX Tacti-
cal Air Commands flew 294 sorties
against targets in the forward edge of
the battlefield, but this effort still rep-
resented only a minor fraction of the
Allied air operations designed to stall
the German advance. The Eighth Air
Force and 9th Bombardment Division
dropped 1,300 tons of bombs on the en-
emy supply lines west of the Rhine,
while the Royal Air Force Bomber Com-
mand hit the Seventh Army railhead at
Trier with 150 planes.
On 24 December The Allied air
forces threw into action the greatest
number of planes employed during the
Ardennes. The Americans flew 1,138 tac-
tical sorties (of which 734 were ground
support missions in the battle zone) and
2,442 bomber sorties. Most of the latter
were aimed at German airfields, but
1,521 tons of bombs were laid on rail
centers and bridges. The 2d Tactical Air
Force (British) flew 1,243 sorties dur-
ing the day. There followed three days
of good flying weather which gave the
American and British fighter-bombers
opportunity for a sustained attack
against German supply movement, road
centers, and armored vehicles. Com-
mencing on 28 December very poor
flying weather intervened to give the
German divisions some respite from air
attack. The Allies put up less than a
hundred battlefield sorties on this and
succeeding days, but even such a limited
effort had an important effect on the
ground battle, as witness the interven-
tion of the 406th Bombardment Group
in the Bastogne fight on the 30th.
The direct damage inflicted on the
German ground formations by the Al-
lied fighter-bombers is difficult to gauge
and, of course, varied greatly. A regi-
mental attack set by the 26th Volks
Grenadier Division on 23 December had
to be postponed until the Jabos quit
for the day; on that same date the en-
tire 116th Panzer Division marched in
broad daylight from Hotton to Marche
without difficulty. Yet there was a very
appreciable increase in night attacks by
the German ground forces as the Jabos’
killing power mounted, beginning on
Christmas Day and culminating in Mo-
del's order on the 26th forbidding major
march movements in daylight.
The Allied tactical air operations in
the main were directed against armored
fighting vehicles, motor transport, and
large troop concentrations. The thin-
skinned supply vehicles which lacked
tracks to carry them off the narrow,
winding roads presented an easy target.
German tanks were another matter. The
IX, XIX, and XXIX Tactical Air Com-
mands and 2d Tactical Air Force (Brit-
ish) claimed the destruction of 413 en-
emy armored vehicles. But a sample
ground count of stricken German armor
sets the number of kills inflicted by air
attack at about a tenth the number
claimed by the fighter-bomber pilots. 6
6 2d Tactical Air Force Operational Research
Section, Report 19, The Contribution of the Air
Forces to the Stemming of the Enemy Thrust in
the Ardennes, 16–26 December 1944 (September
1945).

662
Air attack against the choke points
that developed along the main and sub-
sidiary German supply roads seriously
impeded both tactical and logistic move-
ment, but much of the over-all delay
should be charged to poor German traf-
fic control and road maintenance. Here
again the record of achievement by the
air is uneven. Movement on the Kob-
lenz-Trier autobahn, a major supply
artery for the two southern armies, nev-
er was seriously restricted by Allied air
attack. As might be expected, the over-
all effectiveness of air attacks along the
roads turned on the configuration of
the ground. The 9th Bombardment Di-
vision put 136 tons of high explosive on
St. Vith, which stood in the open with
a wealth of bypass routes around it on
relatively level ground, and stopped the
German traffic not at all. Even when the
RAF dropped 1,140 tons in a carpet
bombing attack at St. Vith, the road cen-
ter was out of commission for only a
day. Yet a mere 150 tons put on La
Roche over a period of two days stopped
all major movement in this sector of
the Ardennes road net. La Roche, be it
noted, lay at the bottom of a gorge with
access only through deep defiles.
The damaging effect of the Allied
air attacks against rail lines, bridges,
and marshaling yards at and west of the
Rhine is quite clear in the history of the
Ardennes campaign, but the time se-
quence between specific rail failures
and the resulting impact on German
front-line operations is difficult to trace.
From 25 December to 2 January the
Eighth Air Force, 9th Bombardment
Division, and Royal Air Force Bomber
Command made daily attacks against
selected railway bridges and marshaling
yards using an average of 1,800 tons of
THE ARDENNES: BATTLE OF THE BULGE
bombs per day. Yet the day before this
bombing campaign began, feeder rail
lines in the Eifel had been so crippled
by air attack that through movement
from the Rhine to the army railheads
was no longer possible and supplies were
being moved by truck and wagon be-
tween the “traffic islands” where rail
movement remained in effect. German
reports indicate that this transshipment
from one mode of transport to another–
and back again–cost at least forty-eight
hours’ delay. By the 26th railway bridges
were out on the vital Ahr and Moselle
lines, supporting the two southern
armies, and the Seventh Army railhead
had been pushed back to Wengerohr,
near Wittlich. On the 28th the rail cen-
ter at Koblenz, supporting the German
left wing, was put out of operation. And
by the close of the year German repair
organizations could do no more than at-
tempt to keep some of the railroad is-
land traffic moving.
In retrospect the German effort to
keep the railroads operating in support
of Army Group B was phenomenal.
Five of the eight railroad bridges across
the Rhine were put out of service tem-
porarily, generally by bomb damage to
the bridge approaches, but all came
back into service. Allied air inflicted
eighty-five breaks on the Army Group
B rail lines west of the Rhine and fifty-
four of these were repaired. But in the
last week before the Allied ground
counteroffensive any hope of main-
taining a satisfactory ratio between
damage and repair had vanished. Of
nine railroad bridges over the Ahr,
Moselle, and Nette Rivers, which were
designated as high priority targets for air
attack, eight were put out of operation
on one or more occasions, while for the

EPILOGUE
six restored the average repair time
was five days per bridge. The cumula-
tive effect of this kind of damage sim-
ply saturated the German capabilities
for rail repair. 7
Despite Allied domination of the air
over the Ardennes, the Eifel, and the
Rhine plain, the battlefield itself and
the German armies therein never were
isolated. Could the isolation of the
battlefield have been accomplished? The
terrain, with its sequence of river bar-
riers and multitude of winding, steep
gradients, was favorable to air interdic-
tion. But the tactical ingredients and
formula to achieve complete success were
missing in late 1944. Sturdy rail bridges,
particularly when defended by ground
to air fire, proved hard to damage and
even harder to destroy. Even the smaller
bridges, such as those attacked in the
Ahr River campaign, took some 250 tons
of high explosive to cripple. Rail cut-
ting attacks caused traffic islands but
never succeeded in rooting out these is-
lands or the movement between them.
Movement by thin-skinned vehicles on
trails, roads, and highways seemed par-
ticularly vulnerable but the physical
blockage of the roads, as distinct from
vehicular destruction, could be achieved
only at particularly favorable points
and for relatively short intervals of time.
Finally, the Allied inability to operate
aircraft in a ground assault role during
the night and the long stretches of bad
7 This section is based on the extensive research
done by Charles V. P. von Luttichau in his
manuscript, German Rail Communications in the
Ardennes Offensive 1944-1945, and Royce L.
Thompson’s equally careful and detailed study,
Tactical Air Phase of the Ardennes Campaign.
Neither of these manuscript studies has been
published, but both should be of great interest
to students of logistics.
663
flying weather provided a built-in guar-
antee that the minimum supply and
reinforcement requirements of the Ger-
man armies would be met.
Although the Allied air forces failed
to isolate the Ardennes battlefield, they
did succeed in these days in dealing the
Luftwaffe a mortal blow, thus making
the task of their comrades on the ground
much easier in 1945, on both the West-
ern and the Eastern Fronts. Generalleut-
nant Adolf Galland, commander of the
Luftwaffe fighter arm, has written the
Luftwaffe epitaph in this manner: “The
Luftwafle received its death blow at
the Ardennes offensive. In unfamiliar
conditions and with insufficient train-
ing and combat experience, our numer-
ical strength had no effect. It was deci-
mated while in transfer, on the ground,
in large air battles, especially during
Christmas, and was finally destroyed.” 8
Logistics
During the years following the in-
vasion of Poland the German munitions
of war had wasted away, so much so
that in December 1944 the German
armies in the Ardennes were fighting a
poor man’s battle. The total stock of
105-mm. gun-howitzer ammunition at
the beginning of November 1944 was
only half the size of the stock available
on 1 September 1939 and the number of
150-mm. rounds was less than a third
the number stocked in Germany at the
beginning of the Polish campaign.
It was still possible even so to gather a
substantial ammunition reserve for the
Ardennes offensive, and after the war
8 Adolf
Galland, The First and The Last (New
York: Henry Holt & Co., 1960), p. 242.

664 THE ARDENNES: BATTLE OF THE BULGE
the supply officers at OKW were able
to say that before the U.S. counterattack
on 3 January 1945 there was no short-
age of artillery ammunition in the field.
This statement merely reflects the
rarefied and isolated view of the high
headquarters, for despite the 100 am-
munition trains of the special Fuehrer
Reserve the troops in the Ardennes op-
eration did suffer from a shortage of
ammunition. 9 This shortage was re-
ported as early as 21 December by the
divisions attacking at Bastogne. There-
after, as the American front solidified,
the Germans consumed ammunition at a
rate of 1,200 tons per day, a rate much
higher than predicted by the OKW
planning staffs but less than the tactical
requirements of the battle. The lack of
ammunition should be charged to trans-
port failure rather than to paucity of
artillery shells at the Rhine dumps. The
Panzer Lehr Division, for example, first
reported that it had run out of gas,
then on 28 December reported a short-
age of ammunition because of the “lack
of transport.”
The American troops, by contrast,
never suffered any notable failure of
ammunition at the guns. In fact, the
only munitions which appear to have
been in short supply during the Ger-
man offensive were antitank mines and
bazooka rounds. The demand for these
items and rifle and machine gun am-
munition was constant, but the supply
line was kept full by calling forward
bazooka rockets and small arms ammu-
9 This reserve was only fifty of the normal
ammunition trains; each had been divided in two
for protection against air attack. On 13 December
the ammunition on hand and in shipment for
Army Group B totaled 15,099 tons, but 5,353 tons
were allocated to the Fifteenth Army, which did
not, as planned, take part in the offensive.
nition from ships in the English Channel
and North Sea. Also, the 12th Army
Group had built up a very sizable re-
serve of artillery ammunition during
the first half of December in prepara-
tion for the Roer River attacks. Most
of the American ammunition stocks
were put on wheels (trucks or railroad
cars) after 19 December. The Third
Army, for example, was able to move
an average of 4,500 tons of ammuni-
tion per day during the last half of De-
cember and consumed, on the average,
only 3,500 tons per day.
German tank losses during the oper-
ation are unknown but appear to have
been very high, probably as much from
mechanical failure as from battle dam-
age. For the 1,700 to 1,800 tanks and
assault guns in Army Group B, there
were only six tank repair companies.
Even worse was the shortage of tank re-
trievers, and, after 23 December, the
few available were extremely hard hit
by air attack. The spare parts situa-
tion was so bad that new German tanks
were cannibalized at a depot west of
Koblenz. Three hundred and forty
new tanks were assigned to the Western
Front during the campaign, but only
125 can be traced as actually reaching
the armored divisions.
The First and Third U.S. Armies had
a full complement of medium tanks
when the Germans struck, that is, 1,882
between them. During the last half of
December the two armies lost a total
of 471 medium tanks. These losses were
partially made up when 21 Army Group
released 351 Shermans which had been
allocated for British use. A few Amer-
ican ordnance companies were overrun
in the first hours of the battle, but
most of the tank maintenance person-

EPILOGUE 665
nel and equipment were moved out
of enemy reach and continued to func-
tion effectively. The losses in divisional
artillery pieces were replaced in part
by a British loan of 100 25-pounders
plus 300,000 rounds of ammunition for
them. The 2,500 machine guns lost dur-
ng the German attack were promptly
replaced from American ordnance
depots.
The problem of transport for supply
and evacuation was one which the Ger-
mans failed to solve in December 1944.
Perhaps the German staffs and com-
manders had been so long on the de-
fensive that they had forgotten the
special transport requirements engen-
dered by offensive operations. In this re-
spect Hitler and Jodl, in their borrow-
ing from 1918, failed to remember Lu-
dendorff who, when preparing to con-
struct the mobile attack divisisions for
the German offensives, stated that the
shortage of horses was the single most
important problem in mounting the
German attacks. Truck wastage through
mechanical failure and combat attrition
had been extremely heavy all through
1944, and it is estimated that the new
trucks coming off the production lines
numbered less than half those destroyed
in the field during the same period.
Not only were there too few trucks but
many divisions were equipped with
poor, worn-out booty vehicles that sim-
ply fell by the wayside along the bad
roads of the Ardennes and had to be
abandoned because there were no re-
pair parts. At one time the German
armies had been able to rely on the
railroad system as the backbone of army
transport. From the beginning of good
flying weather on 23 December this was
no longer possible and by 27 December
it may be concluded that the offensive
in the main was fed and armed by a
road transport system quite unequal to
the load forced upon it.
When it is remembered that some of
the German divisions in the Ardennes
had more horses than the German in-
fantry division of 1918, one has a clearer
picture of the supply problem. Resup-
ply was accomplished over very long
distances, often clear back to the Rhine,
over bad roads which could not be kept
in repair, and with much transport
geared to horsepower which sickened
and died. The heavy snowfalls on
the supply roads over the Eifel,
particularly after 24 December, coupled
with the damage done by Allied air
attack at road centers and against
moving supply columns are reflected
in German estimates that rated road
capacities were reduced in fact by at
least a third. From Christmas on, some
of the supply trains from forward com-
bat units were going back as far as Bonn
for ammunition and supplies. On the
last day of the year the Panzer Lehr
commander ruefully noted that a supply
train he had sent to Merlscheid near St.
Vith, on 25 December had not yet re-
turned.
In some respects the American trans-
port system opposed an enemy system
which had many of the outdated charac-
teristics of 1918. Not only did the Amer-
ican divisions have a very large num-
ber of vehicles and trailers organic to
the unit, but the number of line of com-
munications trucks and trains available
in the forward area was enormous. Per-
haps even more important, the move-
ment of American ground transport
was unaffected by harassment and at-
tack from the air. The First Army moved

666
more than 48,000 vehicles to the battle
zone during the period 17–26 December,
and the XII Corps used only two roads
to move 11,000 vehicles in four days over
a distance of 100 miles. In contrast to
the bitter German experience, the Amer-
ican tactical and supply moves seldom
were beset by road stoppages and traf-
fic jams, except, of course, in the ini-
tial hours of the German penetration.
Although it is manifestly true that the
Germans made good intelligence usage
of the American radio traffic control net,
this was balanced by the speed and cer-
tainty with which American transport
moved.
One may also contrast the tactical
availability of the great American sup-
ply complex which had been built up
east of the Meuse with that prepared
by the Germans east of the Rhine River.
The German offensive forced the Amer-
icans away from the forward truck-
heads, with their limited capacity, back
on the almost unlimited resources avail-
able at railheads. Certainly there was
some danger involved in the mainte-
nance of the great supply depots so close
to the uncertain battle line. Brig. Gen.
Robert M. Littlejohn was ordered on
three occasions to evacuate the big
depots at Liège, but instead simply
brought in more supplies. American
supply officers seem to have learned
something about logistic flexibility as a
result of the pursuit operations across
France in the summer of 1944. Finally,
the much criticized weight of the Amer-
ican logistic “tail” paid off during the
Ardennes, for there always was enough
extra transport to meet unusual de-
mands for supply and troop movement.
Despite the decline in the production
of liquid fuel during 1944, Hitler was
THE ARDENNES: BATTLE OF THE BULGE
able to amass a POL reserve for the
Ardennes offensive which equaled that
available to the German armies on the
eve of the Allied invasion, and the final
figure of the POL allocated to Army
Group B was over four million gallons.
Using the German measure of one “con-
sumption unit” as the amount of fuel
required to move all the vehicles in a
formation a distance of sixty-three miles,
it may be reckoned that of the five con-
sumption units requested by Model only
one and one-half to two were at corps
dumps on 16 December; yet there may
have been as much as nine or ten con-
sumption units available at railheads
near the Rhine River.
The course of the campaign showed
at least three errors in German plan-
ning. POL distribution failed to move
with the same speed as the armored ad-
vance. The bad terrain and weather en-
countered in the Ardennes reduced the
mileage gained from a tankful of fuel
by one-half. And, finally, the expecta-
tion that the spearheads would move
in part on captured gasoline was mis-
takenly optimistic. Army Group B
POL consumption reached a peak of
close to 2,000 cubic meters on 18 De-
cember, but by 23 December the daily
usage rate was about half that figure.
In other words, the supply of liquid
fuel failed to keep pace with the tac-
tical demand.
There are two phases in the history
of German liquid fuel supply during
the Ardennes campaign-the one be-
fore and the one after 23 December
when the Allies took to the air over
the battle zone. During the first phase
the movement of POL was impeded by
bad roads and traffic congestion. Vehi-
cles failed or ran out of fuel and were

EPILOGUE 667
abandoned by the roadside, thus re-
ducing the total transport tonnage for
bringing POL forward. The attempts
to introduce horse-drawn supply or ar-
tillery columns into the stream of mo-
torized traffic during the first days of
the offensive greatly slowed the distri-
bution system. As early as 20 December
the 12th SS Panzer Division, scheduled
as one of the leading formations in the
Sixth Panzer Army advance, was
brought to a halt because there was no
fuel except a few gallons for the mech-
anized reconnaissance battalion. On 21
December the 2d SS Panzer Division
was ordered to relieve the 560th Volks
Grenadier Division in the battle at
Fraiture but was unable to move for
thirty-six hours because there was no
POL. In the Fifth Panzer Army there
were reports as early as 19 December
of a “badly strained” fuel situation.
Three days later Luettwitz, the XLVII
Panzer Corps commander, told Man-
teuffel that the advance of his armor
was “gravely endangered” because of
the failure of fuel supply. During this
phase there seems to have been consid-
erable pirating, in a disorderly manner,
from the forward POL dumps. Eventu-
ally German commanders learned to
send a reconnaissance detail to the
fuel dumps before they committed
their supply trains in a fuel-consuming
trip to what might be a dry supply
point. It can be concluded that the Ger-
man offensive already was seriously
crippled by the failure of transport and
the POL distributing system before the
Allied Jabos entered the fight.
The supply phase after 23 December
is characterized by Allied fighter-
bombers pounding roads and supply
points while snowdrifts stopped the
movement of traffic through the Eifel.
The POL shortage in the Sixth Panzer
Army seems to have assumed drastic
proportions in the period 23 to 25 De-
cember. The Fifth Panzer Army was in
dire straits by 24 December, in part be-
cause of the arrival of armored and
mechanized formations which had
come into the army area without
reserve fuel. Even when bad fly-
ing weather blunted the edge of
the Allied air attack, the sporadic stop-
page of supply movement at the ground
level continued. By the end of Decem-
ber three of the five divisions in the
XLVII Panzer Corps were practically
immobile. All this while, however, the
10th SS Panzer Division of the OKW
Reserve sat in an assembly area just
west of Bonn with a total POL load
of eight consumption units in its train.
Quite obviously the German problem
had been transport rather than an over-
all shortage of fuel.
There is no indication that American
units suffered seriously from the lack
of POL, although, of course, there was
always the tactical difficulty of with-
drawing from contact with the enemy
at night for fuel resupply, partic-
ularly in the more mobile phases of
the campaign. Some American gasoline
was lost to Peiper, but the total amount-
ed to probably no more than 100,000
gallons. It is known that Peiper’s supply
officer had a map of American POL in-
stallations, but this did Peiper little
good. Between 17 and 19 December
American supply troops successfully
evacuated over three million gallons of
POL from the Spa-Stavelot area. The
biggest Allied loss to the enemy was
400,000 gallons of gasoline, destroyed
on 17 December by a V–1 strike at

668 THE ARDENNES: BATTLE OF THE BULGE
Liège.
The Germans “fueled” their horses
with greater ease than their motor ve-
hicles. Straw and hay were plentiful in
the area, although an order had to be
put out forbidding the use of straw as
bedding material for the troops, and
those units which came late into an area
found foraging sparse. Potatoes and live-
stock were taken from the local popula-
tion in large quantities, but the supply
of breadstuff was barely adequate,
chiefly because of troubles in transport-
ing bulk flour to the field bakery units.
It was necessary therefore to reduce the
bread ration to all but front-line troops.
The Americans, as usual, were well fed
during this operation. The only notable
change was the new demand for the
compact K ration in place of the aug-
mented ration, with its fresh meat and
coffee beans, which had been issued
during the slow-moving fighting in the
autumn.
In transporting their wounded, the
Germans experienced grave difficulty.
By the close of December the Fifth
Panzer Army was having to haul its
casualties clear back to Andernach on
the Rhine at the expense of those freshly
wounded in the firing line. The Amer-
icans lost a number of hospitals, med-
ics, and wounded to the German spear-
head formations, but on the whole were
able to maintain a high standard of
medical care, even in this fluid battle.
In accordance with accepted Army prac-
tice both the First and Third Armies
were equipped with hospitals to take
a peak casualty load. On 1 January
1945, there were a total of nearly 9,000
vacant beds in the hospitals of the two
armies.
Despite the fame of the German Army
staff corps as masters of supply and log-
istics, a reputation which dated as far
back as the Franco-Prussian War, the
Ardennes Campaign showed little evi-
dence of this earlier prowess except in
the management of military rail trans-
port and its rapid rehabilitation under
attack. Perhaps the German staff work
in the field was as good as ever, al-
though there is evidence that it had de-
teriorated in the SS formations. But
quite clearly the wishful thinking in
which Hitler and the OKW staff in-
dulged was no substitute for rigorous
logistical analysis and planning, and
these higher personalities, not the field
commanders, dictated the control and
management of the logistic support for
the German armies in the Ardennes.
One must conclude that the German
offensive of December 1944 lacked the
materiel and service support necessary to
achieve any real measure of success and,
furthermore, that Hitler and the OKW
staff understood neither the importance
of supply nor its effective organization.
The Turning Point in the
Ardennes
When did the attacking German ar-
mies lose the initiative in their drive to
cross the Meuse, and why? Surprise, the
first element in successful offensive oper-
ations, had been attained by the attacker
on 16 December. The defense had
been surprised by the speed of the ini-
tial assault, by the weight of the attack,
and, later protestations to the contrary,
the American commands-both high
and low-had been deceived as to the
point of the attack. The German as-
sault forces ruptured the American de-
fenses on the first day of the advance,

EPILOGUE 669
but not quite as planned. In the Sixth
Panzer Army sector the German staffs
had expected that the infantry assault
would penetrate to a depth of three to
five miles by noon, thus assuring a complete
breakthrough within the first
twenty-four hours of the offensive. This
objective was not achieved. On the extreme
north flank the LXVII Corps
made no progress in its drive to reach
the Vesdre River in front of Eupen,
never succeeded in penetrating the
Monschau position, and eventually gave
over this attack to bring the German
north flank infantry screen forward. The
assault to punch a hole at Losheim went
so slowly that the spearhead armor of
the 1st SS Panzer Division was delayed
at its line of departure for at least six
hours longer than anticipated. 10
The first-day attack by the German
center had been predicated on minimal
initial delays for bridge crossings within
three or four hours; the minimum actual
time of construction proved to be
seven to eight hours. Furthermore, no
account had been taken of delays which
might be incurred on the west banks
as the result of American demolitions,
bomb cratering, and the like. On top
of this the German motorized assault,
as it left the river line, was forced onto
exit roads which brought the Germans
squarely against organized American
strongpoints. The adverse impact of
this collection of terrain and tactical
factors is best attested by the experience
of the armored reconnaissance battalions
leading the 26th Volks Grenadier
assault: these formations were delayed
at the river by ineffectual bridge builders,
they were slowed on the Gemünd-
10 For these plans, see the LXVII AK: KTB
Anlagen, 12 Dec 44.
Hosingen road by bomb craters and
abatis, and, when they reached the west-
ern ridge, the American defense of Ho-
singen forced a long halt and ultimate
detour. This episode proved to be only
one of numerous delays on the Fifth
Panzer assault front, and that army, as
a result, did not reach its first-day ob-
jectives until after midnight of 17 De-
cember.
On the German south wing the Sev-
enth Army had even more trouble with
its bridges than the northern neighbor.
The green and ill-equipped 212th Volks
Grenadier Division took forty-eight
hours to throw a 16-ton bridge over the
Sure, and along the entire army front
the infantry elements were forced to
carry the assault for the first three days
without direct heavy weapon support.
The LXXX Corps, fighting to bring
the left wing of the Seventh Army into
a favorable blocking position, did not
reach its first-day objectives until the
evening of 19 December, At the close
of the first day, then, it can be said
that the German attack had ruptured
the American positions at a number of
points but had not done much to widen
the gaps so created and had failed sig-
nally to destroy the tactical continuity of
the defensive positions at the shoulders
of the assault zone.
The exploitation phase of the offen-
sive may be timed from the hour at
which Peiper's armor shook itself loose
from the melee at Losheim and broke
into the open, that is, 0400 on 17 De-
cember. Peiper's progress, therefore, is
a good measure of the speed, planned
and actual, of the German advance. The
1st SS Panzer Division and at least one
other armored division of the Sixth Pan-
zer Army were supposed to be across the

670
rugged plateau of the Hohes Venn by
the close of the second day, with their
leading elements along a north-south
line through Spa and Stavelot. In 1940
a German armored column had covered
this distance in nine hours, albeit with
very slight resistance, and a second col-
umn, following the more circuitous
route now taken by Peiper, consumed
only a day and a half on the road. De-
spite all the delays on the 16th, Peiper
did reach Stavelot on the night of 17
December, but at Stavelot he was forced
to halt-a marked departure from the
German experience of 1940. Recall as
well that the second of the Sixth Panzer
Army’s breakthrough armored divi-
sions, the 12th SS Panzer still was in-
volved in a bitter fight back on the line
of scrimmage at the end of this second
day. The Fifth Panzer Army was in even
worse case: no armored exploitation
was yet in progress by the night of 17
December.
If Hitler and OKW expected the ar-
mored columns to reach the Meuse in
forty-eight hours, as has been reported,
the German offensive was seriously be-
hind schedule at the close of the second
day of combat. If, as the German
Army commanders agree, Model’s own
plan called for the Meuse to be reached
and crossed on the fourth day of the
offensive, then it seems reasonable to
assume-as the Army commanders did
assume-that the lost time could be re-
gained. The immediate problem was to
get armored columns into the open and
into the lead-thus Rundstedt’s order
on the late evening of 17 December
that the armor must at least keep up
with the foot elements.
On the third day of the attack the
German armor began to acquire momen-
THE ARDENNES: BATTLE OF THE BULGE
tum; the greatest gains made by the ar-
mored spearhead columns actually were
achieved during the night of 18 Decem-
ber. With the way west thus clearing,
the German mass maneuver behind
the armored columns picked up speed
on 19 December, this day representing
the most rapid movement of the entire
offensive. Yet even now the bulk of
German armored weight was not for-
ward nor operating with the speed and
mobility expected of armor. For this
reason the Fifth Panzer Army was as-
signed the task of exploitation, in place
of the Sixth, on 20 December.
The offensive had gone out of con-
trol, and now would follow a series of
haphazard improvisations. Why had the
German armored mass failed to come
forward as planned? These reasons seem
paramount:
1. The initial American defense had
been more tenacious than anticipated;
complete and rapid rupture of the de-
fensive positions had not been achieved.
2. Tactical support and logistic trans-
port had not kept pace with the ad-
vance of the combat formations.
3. Close operational control and flu-
idity of movement for the mass of ma-
neuver required free use of the road net
in the salient. This had been denied the
attacker, most notably at Bastogne and
St. Vith but at other points as well.
4. The flanks of the salient had not
been brought forward to keep pace with
the drive in the center; the shoulders of
the salient had jammed.
5. The operational build-up of the
forces in the salient had taken place
so slowly as to deny real depth to the
attack.
6. The tactical reaction of the Amer-
ican forces and their commitment of

EPILOGUE 671
reserves had been more rapid than antic-
ipated.
The German failure to build up the
attacking forces in the salient must be
attributed to Hitler and the OKW staff
since they controlled the operational re-
serves set aside for the Ardennes offen-
sive. Nonetheless, there is some reason
to believe that the German High Com-
mand held back the OKW Reserve divi-
sions because of the physical difficulties
attendant on feeding more troops and
vehicles onto the crowded, tortuous,
muddy roads during the breakdown of
the German transport system in the
first days of the attack.
Rundstedt made his first request for
troops from the OKW Reserve on 17
December, asking for the Fuehrer Beg-
leit Brigade, which was in readiness only
thirty-five miles to the rear. He was
given the 9th SS Panzer Division, which
was seventy miles from the battlefield,
and it required three separate petitions
from Rundstedt to change the Fuehrer’s
mind. Subsequent requests by OB
WEST for the release of two armored
divisions scheduled for early commit-
ment, the 10th SS Panzer and 11th Pan-
zer, produced no result until 23 Decem-
ber when two Volks Grenadier divisions
were brought west in their place. Even
these Volks Grenadier formations had a
string attached by OKW. When, on 26
December, Model asked for a free hand
with all OKW reserves, specifically
mentioning the 10th SS Panzer and 11th
Panzer plus three or four armored divi-
sions from other theaters, he was given
a stone-the two Volks Grenadier divi-
sions brought up on the 23d.
The one thing that a high command
can do in modern war to influence the
battle once it is joined is to allocate re-
serves. Hitler and Jodl repeated in
1944 the mistake made by Ludendorff
during the Amiens battle of 1918 when
the latter failed to throw in the reserves
needed to exploit the unexpected suc-
cess of the Eighteenth Army. Specifi-
cally, Hitler and the OKW staff failed
to recognize that the only real hope of
success, after the Sixth Panzer Army
failure, was to reinforce Manteuffel and
the Fifth.
The story on the American side was
quite different, surprisingly so to Hit-
ler and his entourage who held as an
article of faith that the American com-
manders, for political reasons, would
make no major troop movements, par-
ticularly if these involved the British,
without prior reference to the White
House and Downing Street. This atti-
tude probably explains the German es-
timate that no major units would be
committed by the defense until the
third day and that the Allied build-up
of a counterattack force would be made
west of the Meuse. Not only did the
German planners fail to comprehend
the degree of initiative that training
and tradition have placed in the hands
of American corps and army command-
ers, they also misunderstood the Amer-
ican doctrine, largely unwritten but
universally accepted, that major forma-
tions having no prebattle relationship
may, under fluid conditions, unite on the
field after the battle is joined. Hitler
seems to have made another and impor-
tant personal miscalculation, namely
that the weak German forces holding
the sectors of the Western Front
north and south of the Ardennes still
retained sufficient strength to grapple
the American divisions opposite them,
and that the Allied commanders would

672 THE ARDENNES: BATTLE OF THE BULGE
therefore hesitate to weaken their forces
in these sectors by stripping away divi-
sions to meet the German attack.
When did the German armies lose
the initiative in the Ardennes? As early
as 20 December there are indications
that small clouds of niggling doubt were
present in the minds of some of the
German field commanders, this because
of the Sixth Panzer Army’s failure to
adhere to the offensive timetable. By
24 December the crippling impact of
Allied air attack, resumed the previous
day as the weather broke, was clearly dis-
cernible. Then, too, the course of the
ground battle on that date was equally
adverse. The counterattack by the
Third Army menaced the whole south-
ern flank of the German salient, while
the XLVII Panzer Corps, now leading
the Fifth Panzer drive, was so lone and
exposed that the corps commander rec-
ommended a withdrawal of his forward
elements until such time as the German
flanks at the tip of the salient could
be covered. This combination of threats
in the air and on the ground led the
Fifth Panzer Army commander to con-
clude on 24 December that “the objec-
tive could no longer be attained.” 11
It is a truism that morale is a govern-
ing factor in war. Christmas in the Ar-
dennes, 1944, very clearly is a case in
point. Brig. Gen. S. L. A. Marshall has
graphically described the mood of the
American troops in Bastogne on the
Holy Evening and shown the somber
aspect of nostalgia on the part of men
11 Manteuffel in MS # B-151a, p. 160. It is
significant that the OB WEST G–4, Colonel John,
also picks this date as the turning point in the
German offensive. See Headquarters 12th Army
Group, Consolidated Interrogation Report 1, 12
June 1945.
engaged in the grim business of war,
far from home and loved ones. But in
the German camp the sixth Christmas
of the war seems to have made a truly
indelible impression. The field postmas-
ter for Luettwitz’ corps remarks on
the decline in the amount of Christmas
mail reaching the front-particularly
gift parcels. The German Army news-
paper bitterly features a story on the
Christmas gift presented by a Spanish
restaurateur to Goering–a large supply
of caviar. And the commander of the
276th Volks Grenadier Division, whose
unit fought its hardest battle on Christ-
mas Day, expresses the hope that in the
ultimate withdrawal to the cover of the
West Wall his troops will be able to re-
capture the Christmas spirit.
The German Christmas traditionally
was celebrated on two days, the 25th
and 26th, and at this emotional nadir
of war-weary soldiery the German ar-
mies in the Ardennes sustained a series
of crushing reverses: the left wing of
the Seventh Army was driven back to
the Sauer River, over which it had
crossed ten days before; the German ring
around Bastogne was broken by Patton’s
troops; the 2d Panzer Division received
orders to escape from the Celles pocket;
and throughout the day of the 26th
a developing “crisis” in supply and com-
munications was noted in the journal
at the headquarters of OB WEST. At
1915 on 26 December General Krebs,
Model’s chief of staff, made an apprais-
al of the German situation, “Today a
certain culminating point [has been
reached] .” 12
It may be concluded that by the eve.
ning of 26 December the initiative had
12 Contained in OB WEST: KTB, 26 Dec 44.

EPILOGUE 673
passed from German to American hands.
Before this time the American and Al-
lied forces had reacted to German de.
signs and had abandoned their own.
From this point in time the German
attacker would be off balance and would
take a series of false steps (notably at
Bastogne) which were elicited by the
operations of his opponent and diver-
gent from the assigned larger objective.
Even at the time there was recogni-
tion in both camps that 26 December
had been the day of decision. On the
27th the German press and radio aban-
doned the headline treatment of the
Ardennes to feature news from Greece
and Budapest. This same day the
SHAEF propaganda bureau issued in-
structions that Liège, obviously no
longer in danger, should be shown as
the goal of the German offensive.
There seems to have been a slight
resurgence of forced optimism in the
higher German field headquarters to-
ward the end of December when the
appearance of more troops and guns gave
some flicker of hope that Bastogne finally
might be captured. But this optimism,
if it was anything more than a disci-
plined and soldierly façade, quickly
faded. On the last day of December the
OB WEST journal notes that if Bas-
togne cannot be taken “that is the end
of the offensive operation.” Hitler, no
matter what exhortations he may have
dispatched to Model and Rundstedt,
had turned his attention away from the
Ardennes. On 29 December Rundstedt
received a message that sixty-three new
tanks had come off the assembly line but
that OKW (for which read Hitler)
would decide whether personnel re.
placements and artillery should be sent
OB WEST in their stead-precisely the
first step always taken by the Fuehrer
when abandoning a military venture and
denuding one fighting front to reinforce
another.
The Place of the Ardennes Offensive
in World War II
The German attack in the Ardennes
was to be the last in the long series of
great offensives and military adventures
initiated by Hitler’s Third Reich in
September 1939. The subsequent at-
tempts at counterattacks in Alsace and
on the Lake Balaton front were bloody
military divertissements occasioned by
Hitler, nothing more. There would be
days of stubborn fighting in the
Ardennes during January 1945, but the
roads back over the Eifel led straight to
the decimation and collapse of the Ger-
man armies on the banks of the Oder
River, along the Danube, in the Ruhr
pocket, and, at last, to the bunkers of
Berlin.
What was the true military purpose
of the Ardennes offensive? It has been
alleged by survivors of the German High
Command that this operation was in-
tended to re-establish the military pres-
tige of the Third Reich, carry its people
through the grueling sixth winter of war,
and win a favorable bargaining position
for a suitable and acceptable peace. It
seems more probable, from all that is
known of Hitler’s thought processes in
these last months of his life, that, as in
February 19 18, the German decision was
not between war and peace but between
defense and attack. Are the military and
political reasons set forth by Hitler for
his choice of an offensive on the Western
Front, and in the Ardennes sector, to be
accepted at face value? History will

674
never know. But there is the strong pos-
sibility that Hitler and his top generals
were motivated by the same impulse
which triggered so many of the bloody
and useless offensives of World War I–
to seize the initiative for its own sake
without a viable strategic objective in
view.
In late December German propagan-
dists claimed that the object of the Ar-
dennes offensive had been to cripple the
attack capabilities of the Allied armies
and chew up their divisions east of the
Meuse. There also is considerable evi-
dence that Model, and perhaps Rund-
stedt, accepted this as a reasonable
tactical objective in the operations from
Christmas onward. The attainment of
this goal, to chew up Allied divisions and
dull the cutting edge of the American
armies, was achieved in only limited
fashion. The attack of twenty-nine Ger-
man divisions and brigades destroyed
one American infantry division as a unit,
badly crippled two infantry divisions,
and cut one armored combat command
to pieces. The total of American battle
casualties reported for the period 16
December through 2 January (although
these probably were incomplete returns)
numbered 41,315 officers and men, of
which 4,138 were known to be killed in
action, 20,231 were wounded in action,
and 16,946 were reported missing. Dur-
ing the same period the American forma-
tions in the Ardennes received 31,505
replacements, or “reinforcements” as
these individual soldiers now were
named. The materiel losses inflicted by
German action represented only a tem-
porary diminution in the fighting
strength of a few of the American divi-
sions and normally were replaced within
a fortnight.
THE ARDENNES: BATTLE OF THE BULGE
What all this cost the Wehrmacht is
impossible to say. It is known that
losses in materiel were very high–and
these no longer could be made good.
The only general indication of German
casualties is found in railroad reports
which show that about 67,000 troops
were evacuated from the Army Group
B area by rail during December. This
figure, of course, would include some of
the battle casualties from the earlier
fighting east of Aachen, as well as dis-
ease cases. A number of German division
commanders have made personal esti-
mates of the casualties suffered by their
own divisions during the last half of
December, and in the cases of those
formations continually in the line from
16 or 17 December the average is be-
tween two and three thousand “combat
effectives” lost per division. Whatever
the true number of casualties may have
been on both sides, it is a fair assessment
that over-all, in this particular instance,
the troops on the offensive sustained
heavier losses than those on the
defensive.
Detailed analysis of the ebb and flow
of battle shows that the German armies
in the Ardennes never came close to the
narrow margin between success and fail-
ure. The fortunes of war never were put
in precarious balance as they had been
in the spring of 1918, and it is not sur-
prising that General Eisenhower refused
to issue a “Backs to the Wall” order of
the day like that wrung from Haig on
11 April 1918.
Nevertheless, in December 1944 there
was an early, emotional Allied reaction
to the first speedy triumphs of the Ger-
man armies which conceived of the at-
tack as being another, albeit late,
irruption of the military might which

EPILOGUE 675
had reached out to the Atlantic and the
Caucasus, the Sahara, and the Arctic
Circle. On the other hand, a decade after
the close of World War II, still living
members of the higher German com-
mands would classify the Wehrmacht of
late 1944 as a “paper tiger.” The history
of the Ardennes Campaign, as recounted
in the present volume, shows that
neither one of these extremes was true.
Probably the American war correspond-
ent, Drew Middleton, most closely
approximated the truth when, in the
first days of the Ardennes battle, he
characterized the offensive as “the In-
dian summer” of German military
might.
In the long view of history the deci-
sion to attack in the Ardennes represents
only another-and risky-attempt to
solve the old German dilemma of fight-
ing a major war on two fronts, Hitler
deliberately assumed the risk involved in
weakening the Eastern Front so that a
powerful blow could be struck in the
west. When, on 14 December, he told
his generals that German industry had
been preparing for the Ardennes offen-
sive for months, he meant this quite
literally. Of the total production of ar-
mored fighting vehicles which came out
of German assembly plants in November
and December 1944, the Western Front
received 2,277 while only 919 went to
the East. As late as 5 January 1945 all
the German armies on the Eastern Front
possessed only two-thirds the number of
panzers employed in the Ardennes.
Equally important, of course, was Hit-
ler’s decision on 20 November to shift
the Luftwaffe fighter strength to the
Western Front. This diversion of ma-
teriel to the west (which began as early
as September and included artillery,
Werfers, tractors, machine guns, and
many other items) was accompanied by
a reallocation of military manpower. On
1 December 1944, the total number of
combat effectives under OB WEST com-
mand was 416,713, and one month later
1,322,561 effectives were carried on the
OB WEST rosters. 13
There seems to have been an early
recognition on the part of the higher
German theater commanders that Hit-
ler’s “intuition” had led to a mistaken
choice between operations on the two
major fronts. General Westphal later
alleged that Rundstedt personally ad-
dressed himself to the Fuehrer on 22
December with a plea that the Ardennes
offensive be brought to a halt in order to
reinforce the Eastern Front. 14
Guderian, directly charged with oper-
ations against the Russians, used the
occasion of official visits on Christmas
Eve and New Year’s Day to petition
Hitler for the movement of troops from
the west to the east. It is said that at the
end of December, in the Ardennes head-
quarters, “everybody looked with dis-
may to the east where the big Russian
offensive was about to begin any day.” 15
Hitler stubbornly refused to accede to
all these requests, even after the Allied
counterattack on 3 January began to
collapse the German salient. Inexplic-
ably he waited until 8 January to start
the Sixth Panzer Army moving for the
east-this only four days before the com-
mencement of the Russian winter
offensive.
The proximity in time of the German
Ardennes offensive and the wholesale
13 OKH: Org. Abt. KTB; see also Schramm,
Merkbuch.
14 Heer In Fesseln, p. 283.
15 MS # A-874 (Waldenburg).

676 THE ARDENNES: BATTLE OF THE BULGE
offensive of the Red Armies on 12 Jan-
uary would have untoward results, not
only for the Third Reich, but for the
relations between east and west in the
postwar era. In February 1945, Stalin
issued an order of the day acclaiming the
recent victories on the Oder front and
boasting that “The success of this
[Soviet] drive resulted in breaking the
German attack in the West.” Unfortu-
nately, and unwisely, Winston Churchill
opened the door to this and a flood of
similar Russian propaganda claims by
addressing a telegram to Stalin on 6
January 1945, in which he personally
asked for Soviet help by the prompt be-
ginning of a major offensive. Only a few
years later, representatives of the USSR
engaged in negotiations on American
claims for the repayment of wartime
shipping loans would allege that these
debts had been canceled when the Rus-
sian armies “saved” the American forces
in the Ardennes. Postwar Russian prop-
aganda in this same vein reached a peak
in a series of articles by Col. N. Nikiforov
alleging that the Soviet attack in Jan-
uary 1945 “averted the danger of the
rout of the Anglo-American armies.” 16
Was the risk assumed by Hitler and
his senior military advisers in the Ar-
dennes offensive a valid one? Field Mar-
shals Jodl and Keitel, the artisans but
not the architects of this venture, gave a
joint answer shortly before their execu-
tion: “The criticism whether it would
have been better to have employed our
available reserves in the East rather than
in the West, we submit to the judgment
of history.” 17
16 The USSR Information Bulletin, 12 May 1948,
and Novoye Vremya, No. 18, 18 February 1948.
The most recent of such Soviet claims is that
made by Marshall Grechko in Pravda, 9 May 1960.
17 In answers to a questionnaire submitted by
the Historical Section, USFET, on 20 July 1945,
which answers were signed by both Jodl and Keitel.

U.S. Army
None
General of the Army
General
Lieutenant General
Major General
Brigadier General
None
Colonel
Lieutenant CoIonel
Major
Captain
Captain (Cavalry)
First Lieutenant
Second Lieutenant
Appendix A
Table of Equivalent Ranks
German Army and
Air Force
Reichsmarschall
Generalfeldmarschall
Generaloberst
General der Infanterie
Artillerie
Gebirgstruppen
Kavallerie
Nachrichtentruppen
Panzertruppen
Pioniere
Luftwaffe
Flieger
Fallschirmtruppen
Flakartillerie
Luftnachrichtentruppen
Generalleutnant
Generalmajor
None
Oberst
Oberstleutnant
Major
Hauptmann
Rittmeister
Oberleutnant
Leutnant
German Waffen-SS
None
Reichsfuehrer-SS
Oberstgruppenfuehrer
Obergruppenfuehrer
Gruppenfuehrer
Brigadefuehrer
Oberfuehrer
Standartenfuehrer
Obersturmbannfuehrer
Sturmbannfuehrer
Haupsturmfuehrer
Obersturmfuehrer
Untersturmfuehrer

Appendix B
Recipients of the Distinguished Service Cross
All pertinent Army records have been scrutinized in an effort to include
in the following list the names of every soldier who received the DSC for
his part in the operations recounted in this volume. Inasmuch as no com-
plete listing of DSC awards is maintained in any single Army file, it is possi-
ble that some names may inadvertently have been omitted.
Lt. Col. Creighton W. Abrams
Lt. Col. Paul Bandy
Sgt. James L. Bayliss
Sgt. William J. Bennett
Pfc. J. O. Bird
Lt. Col. Barry D. Browne
Sgt. John Bueno
Cpl. Adam F. Burko
Pfc. Angelo Cestoni
Lt. Col. Steve A. Chappuis
Capt. John J. Christy
Capt. A. J. Cissna
Lt. Col. Derrill M. Daniel
Pvt. Albert A. Darago
Sgt. T. J. Dawson
Pfc. Daniel Del Grippo
Pvt. C. W. Dillingham
Sgt. Eddie Dolenc
Capt. Leland R. Dunham
Sgt. B. R. Eastburn
Capt. Paul F. Gaynor
Pfc. Jack Gebert
1st Lt. Charles R. Gniot
Capt. John W. Hall
Sgt. Lawrence L. Hatfield
1st Lt. Edgar C. Heist
Lt. Col. John M. Hightower
Pfc. S. E. Hull
2d Lt. Michael Hritsik
1st Lt. G. W. Jackman
Pvt. J. W. Jones
Lt. Col. R. W. Kinney
Capt. Frank Kutak
1st Lt. George D. Lamm
Pfc. O. M. Laughlin
Capt. James H. Leach
Pfc. John Leinen
2d Lt. Samuel Leo
2d Lt. S. D. Llewellyn
Sgt. H. L. Luther
Brig. Gen. Anthony C. McAuliffe
Pfc. W. J. McKenzie
2d Lt. W. D. Markin
Capt. Gabriel R. Martinez
Pfc. A. G. Means
Pfc. Edwin W. Metz
Pvt. Bernard Michin
1st Lt. A. L. Mills
Pfc. Richard Mills
1st Lt. Jesse Morrow
Sgt. Oscar M. Mullins
1st Lt. Kenneth R. Nelson
Pfc. N. A. Osterberg
1st Lt. R. A. Parker
2d Lt. G. F. Pennington
Sgt. T. E. Piersall
Lt. Col. Lemuel E. Pope
Pvt. R. L. Presser
2d Lt. Frederick Rau
Sgt. Woodrow W. Reeves
Sgt. George P. Rimmer
Maj. Gen. Walter M. Robertson
Lt. Col. James C. Rosborough
Pfc. F. S. Rose
Pfc. W. S. Rush
Sgt. I. R. Schwartz
Private Seamon
Sgt. M. N. Shay

APPENDIX B
Pfc. R. D. Smith
Capt. Robert W. Smith
T / Sgt. Russell N. Snoad
Cpl. C. E. Statler
Capt. Vaughn Swift
1st Lt. R. H. Thompson
Lt. Col. Paul V. Tuttle, Jr.
T / Sgt. John Van Der Kamp
Pfc. Gilbert Van Every
Sgt. J. W. Waldron
S / Sgt. William Walsh
2d Lt. R. L. Westbrook
2d Lt. John A. Whitehill
Sgt. William J. Widener
1st Sgt. Gervis Willis
Cpl. Edward S. Withee
Pfc. T. J. Zimmerer
679

Two historically valuable books deal-
ing specifically with the Ardennes Cam-
paign are: Robert E. Merriam’s Dark
December (New York: Ziff-Davis Pub-
lishing Company, 1947) and John To-
land’s Battle: The Story of the Bulge
(New York: Random House, 1959).
Merriam’s work subsequently was re-
printed in a paperback edition under
the title The Battle of the Bulge (New
York: Ballantine Books, 1957). These
two interesting and useful books show
quite different approaches to the story.
Merriam, while in the U.S. Army, par-
ticipated in the task of organizing ma-
terials for a future Army history of the
Ardennes Campaign and subsequently
made use of these documents in his own
work. Toland, who wrote his volume on
the basis of extensive interviews with
veterans of the campaign, stresses the
human interest aspects of the battle.
There is a surprising dearth of pub-
lished memoir literature from officers in
a position of command during this oper-
ation. In part this lacuna is filled by the
very large body of unit histories com-
piled by the American divisions, regi-
ments, and even battalions, which fought
in the Battle of the Bulge. Extensive
collection of unit histories will be found
in the New York Public Library, the
Army Library (Washington, D.C.) , and
the Office of the Chief of Military His-
tory, Department of the Army.
The bulk of the American documents
used as source material in the present
volume, as well as microfilm of the
pertinent German documents, are in the
keeping of the National Archives, or in
Bibliographical Note
the Office of the Chief of Military His-
tory. Much of the source material is in
the form of reports made during or after
battle by approximately 1,600 Army
units in the European Theater of Oper-
ations. The story of this monumental
effort in research and acquisition has
been written by Royce L. Thompson,
in his History of the Historical Section,
ETO (May 1947), a manuscript in
OCMH files. The American combat
interviews, on which the author has
drawn so freely, can be found listed in a
manuscript Catalogue of Combat Inter-
views maintained by OCMH.
Most of the historical manuscripts
prepared by German officers who took
part in the Ardennes Campaign are
catalogued in the Guide to Foreign Mili-
tary Studies, 1945–54, published by
Headquarters, U.S. Army, Europe, His-
torical Division, in 1954. Since this
publication, there have been a few addi-
tions to the German manuscript col-
lection and these are catalogued by
OCMH. The history of the early at-
tempts to trace German officers who
served in the Ardennes, transfer them
from prison cells, and elicit their co-
operation as historians makes fascinating
reading. Brig. Gen. S. L. A. Marshall
has given a brief sketch of this venture
in his introduction to The Fatal
Decisions, edited by Seymour Freidin
and William Richardson (New York:
William Sloane Associates, 1956) . A full
and dramatic account of the attempt to
obtain German co-operation has been
written by one of the main actors in this
little-known episode, then Maj. Kenneth

BIBLIOGRAPHICAL NOTE 681
W. Hechler. His manuscript is entitled
The Enemy Side of the Hill: The 1945
Background on the Interrogation of Ger-
man Commanders (Historical Division,
Special Staff, U.S. Army, 30 July 1949).
Finally, any student who delves deeply
into the U.S. Army operations in western
Europe during World War II must come
inevitably to the Order of Battle of the
United States Army, World War II,
European Theater of Operations: Divi-
sions, prepared under the direction of
Capt. Robert J. Greenwald and Chief
Warrant Officer Meyer M. Cahn in the
Office of the Theater Historian, ETO
(Paris, 1945).

Glossary
A-2
Intelligence officer or section of an air staff
AAA Antiaircraft artillery
AAR After action report
Abwehr-Schlacht Im West Defensive Battle in the West
AIB
Armored infantry battalion
Anlage Appendix or annex
Ann.
Annex
AT
Antitank
Aufmarschanweisung Revised outline plan
AW
BAR
Bn
CATOR
CCA
CCB
CCR
Chasseurs Ardenais
Christrose
Aircraft warning; automatic weapons
Browning automatic rifle
Battalion
Combined Air Transport Operations Room
Combat Command A
Combat Command B
Combat Command Reserve
Belgian military unit
One of several code names for the Ardennes offensive
CIC
Counter Intelligence Corps
C-in-C
Commander in Chief
GO
Commanding officer
CP
Command post
DAGGER
Ninth Army operation intended to clear the Germans
from the west bank of the Roer River once
the dams were destroyed.
Div Division
DSC Distinguished Service Cross
Engr Engineer
Ersatzheer Replacement Army
ETO
FA
Feldherr
Festung
Feuerwalze
Flak
Fremde Heere Ost
European Theater of Operations
Field Artillery
Great general
Fortress
Rolling barrage
Fliegerabwehrkanone (antiaircraft artillery gun)
OKH Intelligence Section East
Frontsoldat
Fuehrer Reserve
Fusilier battalion
Front-line fighter
Central officers’ reserve
Separate infantry battalion performing both reconnaissance
and support in German division
FUSA First United States Army
G–2
G–3
Intelligence section of divisional or higher staff
Operations section of divisional or higher staff

GLOSSARY 683
G–4 Supply section of divisional or higher staff
Greif German deception operation in support of the Ardennes
counteroffensive
Herbstne bel Autumn Fog (Army Group B plan)
I and R Intelligence and Reconnaissance
Inf
Infantry
Interv Interview
Jabo
German slang for jagd-bomber (fighter-bomber)
Jnl Journal
Kampfgruppe German combat group of variable size
K-Tag 12 December
KTB Kriegstagebuch (war diary)
L-Tag 13 December
Martin Code name applied to operations plan drawn up by
OR WEST for Wacht am Rhein for submission
to conference at headquarters Army Group B on
27 October 1944
Neb elw erfer Multiple rocket projector
Null Tag D-day (16 December)
Oberquartermeister General staff officer at headquarters of an army (in
charge of supply and administration)
OB WEST Oberbefehlshaber West (Commander in Chief West
or his headquarters)
OKH Oberkommando des Heeres (Army High Com-
mand)
OKL Oberkommando der Luftwaffe (Luftwaffe High
Command)
OKW Oberkommando der Wehrmacht (Armed Forces
High Command)
OMAHA Beach Normandy beach assaulted by troops of US. V
Corps, 6 June 1944
Ord Ordnance
O-Tag D-day (16 December)
Panzerfaust Recoilless German antitank rocket, hand-carried
POL Petrol (gasoline), oil, and lubricants
POW Prisoner of war
RCT Regimental combat team
Regts Regiments
Reichsautobahnen The German superhighway system
Reichsbahn German state railroads
S–2 Intelligence officer or section of regimental or lower
staff
S–3 Operations officer or section of regimental or lower
staff
Sec Section
SHAEF Supreme Headquarters, Allied Expeditionary Force
SHAPE Supreme Headquarters, Allied Powers, Europe
SS Schutzstaffel (Elite guard)

684
THE ARDENNES: BATTLE OF THE BULGE
TAC
Tactical Air Command
TC
Troop carrier
TD
Tank destroyer
T/E
T/O&E
TOT
Tables of equipment
Tables of organization and equipment
Time on target, a method of timing artillery fire
from various points to fall on a given target simultaneously
TUSA Third United States Army
VHF Very high frequency
V-Leute German agents
Volksdeutsche Citizens of a country other than Germany who were
considered Germans racially
Volkssturm A people’s militia, partially organized in one of the
last steps of German mobilization for total war
Wacht am Rhein Watch on the Rhine (Ardennes code name)
Waffen-SS A mechanized Army-type force originally made up
of volunteers from Nazi party organizations
Wehrmacht
WFSt
German Armed Forces
Wehrmachtfuehrungsstab (Armed Forces Operations
Staff)
Werfer Rocket projector
(-)
Understrength

686 THE ARDENNES: BATTLE OF THE BULGE
Size Symbols
The following symbols placed either in boundary lines or
above the rectangle, triangle, or circle inclosing the identifying
arm or service symbol indicate the size of military organization:
EXAMPLES
The letter or number to the left of the symbol indicates the
unit designation; that to the right, the designation of the parent
unit to which it belongs. Letters or numbers above or below
boundary lines designate the units separated by the lines:
Weapons

UNITED STATES ARMY IN WORLD WAR II
The following volumes have been published or are in press:
The War Department
Chief of Staff: Prewar Plans and Preparations
Washington Command Post: The Operations Division
Strategic Planning for Coalition Warfare: 1941-1942
Strategic Planning for Coalition Warfare: 1943-1944
Global Logistics and Strategy: 1940-1943
Global Logistics and Strategy: 1943-1945
The Army and Economic Mobilization
The Army and Industrial Manpower
The Army Ground Forces
The Organization of Ground Combat Troops
The Procurement and Training of Ground Combat Troops
The Army Service Forces
The Organization and Role of the Army Service Forces
The Western Hemisphere
The Framework of Hemisphere Defense
Guarding the United States and Its Outposts
The War in the Pacific
The Fall of the Philippines
Guadalcanal: The First Offensive
Victory in Papua
CARTWHEEL: The Reduction of Rabaul
Seizure of the Gilberts and Marshalls
Campaign in the Marianas
The Approach to the Philippines
Leyte: The Return to the Philippines
Triumph in the Philippines
Okinawa: The Last Battle
Strategy and Command: The First Two Years
The Mediterranean Theater of Operations
Northwest Africa: Seizing the Initiative in the West
Sicily and the Surrender of Italy
Salerno to Cassino
Cassino to the Alps
The European Theater of Operations
Cross-Channel Attack
Breakout and Pursuit
The Lorraine Campaign
The Siegfried Line Campaign
The Ardennes: Battle of the Bulge
The Last Offensive
The Supreme Command

Logistical Support of the Armies, Volume I
Logistical Support of the Armies, Volume II
The Middle East Theater
The Persian Corridor and Aid to Russia
The China-Burma-India Theater
Stilwell’s Mission to China
Stilwell’s Command Problems
Time Runs Out in CBI
The Technical Services
The Chemical Warfare Service: Organizing for War
The Chemical Warfare Service: From Laboratory to Field
The Chemical Warfare Service: Chemicals in Combat
The Corps of Engineers: Troops and Equipment
The Corps of Engineers: The War Against Japan
The Corps of Engineers: The War Against Germany
The Corps of Engineers: Military Construction in the United States
The Medical Department: Hospitalization and Evacuation; Zone of Interior
The Medical Department: Medical Service in the Mediterranean and Minor
Theaters
The Medical Department: Medical Service in the European Theater of Operations
The Ordnance Department: Planning Munitions for War
The Ordnance Department: Procurement and Supply
The Ordnance Department: On Beachhead and Battlefront
The Quartermaster Corps: Organization, Supply, and Services, Volume I
The Quartermaster Corps: Organization, Supply, and Services, Volume II
The Quartermaster Corps: Operations in the War Against Japan
The Quartermaster Corps: Operations in the War Against Germany
The Signal Corps: The Emergency
The Signal Corps: The Test
The Signal Corps: The Outcome
The Transportation Corps: Responsibilities, Organization, and Operations
The Transportation Corps: Movements, Training, and Supply
The Transportation Corps: Operations Overseas
Special Studies
Chronology 1941-1945
Military Relations Between the United States and Canada: 1939-1945
Rearming the French
Three Battles: Arnaville, Altuzzo, and Schmidt
The Women? Army Corps
Civil Affairs: Soldiers Become Governors
Buying Aircraft: Materiel Procurement for the Army AirForces
The Employment of Negro Troops
Manhattan: The U,S. Army and the Atomic Bomb
Pictorial Record
The War Against Germany and Italy: Mediterranean and Adjacent Areas
The War Against Germany: Europe and Adjacent Areas
The War Against Japan

Aachen: 3, 20, 24, 26, 27, 30, 31, 35, 36, 42, 45, 50,
58, 63, 67, 274, 334, 571, 632, 674
Abrams, Lt. Col. Creighton W.: 552–55
Abwehrschlacht im Westen. See Defensive Battle
in the West.
Achêne: 565, 568
Acuff, Maj. John N.: 505
Adams, Col. Andrew J.: 291, 317, 355–57
Afst: 147, 149
Ahr River: 45, 663
Ahr River railroad: 67, 662
Ahrweiler: 660
Air attacks: 4, 5–6, 145, 214, 255–56, 485, 660–63,
665, 667, 672. See also Air support; Air-ground
co-operation; Aircraft; Weather
American-British disagreement on targets: 6, 65
bomb tonnage dropped: 65, 661–63
on bridges: 15, 64–66, 255, 506, 534
against German war production: 4–6, 12, 64–65
on oil production: 65, 612
against Roer River dams: 53
on transportation: 64–67, 255, 660
Air Force, Eighth: 65, 611–12, 661–62
Air Force, Ninth: 240, 268, 377n, 485
Air forces, Allied: 65, 424, 660–61
Air reconnaissance: 17, 51, 61–65, 67, 73, 144, 256,
278, 332, 509
Air superiority: 4, 22, 64–65, 574, 660, 663
Air supply: 95, 172, 387, 407
of Bastogne garrison: 172, 461, 467, 468, 468n,
470, 475, 526, 554, 609
German: 369, 374
promised to Schnee Eifel forces: 166–67, 171,
171n, 172, 289
Air support: 92, 199–202, 268, 276, 277, 337, 366,
371–72, 376, 419, 470, 474–75, 479, 496, 526, 527,
541, 548, 549, 553, 567, 568, 569, 570, 573, 590,
611–12, 614, 616, 623, 625, 626–27, 634, 638,
649, 660–61, 663
bombing and strafing errors: 376, 377, 377n, 441,
474, 592
German: 19, 22, 37–38, 67, 70, 72, 92–93, 102, 142,
175, 178–79, 332, 475, 476, 478, 546, 632, 660.
See also Luftwaffe.
Air warning net: 374
Air-ground co-operation: 62–63, 128, 172, 569. See
also Air support.
Airborne division, organization and employment:
307–08, 413, 460, 461
Airborne Division, 17th: 305, 334, 556–57, 560,
646–47
Index
Airborne Division, 82d: 73
casualties: 367
command and organization: 306, 343, 344
moves to the Ardennes: 269, 289, 291, 305–07,
315, 316, 334, 336, 339, 342–44, 346–47
operations in the Amblève-Salm sector: 344, 346–
47, 351–52, 359, 365–67, 371, 374, 376, 381, 386,
388, 389–92, 395, 397, 400, 401, 409, 412, 415,
416, 418–21, 443, 580–81, 583–85, 587, 590,
598–601
Airborne Division, 101st: 73
casualties: 451, 453, 455, 461, 481, 609
command and organization: 306–09, 459, 460, 553,
608–09, 617
defense of Bastogne: 298, 323, 328, 400, 445n, 448,
449–68, 470–75, 477–80, 514, 551, 553–54, 607,
609, 615, 628–30, 644
loss of medical company and supplies: 461, 464,
609
moves to Bastogne: 289, 303, 305–09, 314–15, 319,
329, 334, 336
Airborne Engineer Battalion, 326th: 462, 472, 480,
555
Airborne operations, German: 269–71, 312, 332, 374
Aircraft. See also Artillery liaison planes.
(C-47’s: 172, 468, 609
fighter-bombers: 61, 92, 202, 268, 332, 337, 424,
471, 475, 479, 496, 527, 534, 548, 549, 569, 584,
597, 614, 616, 625, 626–27, 634, 638, 649, 661,
667
German: 22, 92–93, 271, 332
Marauders: 660
P-38’s: 418, 441, 569–70, 573, 592
P-47’s: 470, 474, 506, 541, 553, 590
P-51’s: 441
P-61’s: 62
Typhoons: 569–70
Aisne River: 353–54, 380, 382–83, 580, 582, 585, 587,
591–95, 601
Akers, Col. R. F.: 566
Albert Canal: 75
Alf valley: 137–38, 154
Allen, Lt. Col. Jack G.: 96–98, 101, 117
Allen, Lt. Col. William H.: 197
Allerborn: 294, 296, 298–99, 304, 445, 452
Alsace: 48, 178, 487, 648, 673
Alzette River: 44, 225–26, 483, 488–89, 510, 516–17
Amberloup: 325, 643
Amblève River: 44, 259–60, 280, 339, 341, 342, 343,
344, 347, 361, 580–81, 604

690 THE ARDENNES: BATTLE OF THE BULGE
Amblève River crossings: 265–68, 279, 335–36, 338,
348, 351–52, 359, 363–64, 366–72, 374, 376–77,
578
Ambulances. See Evacuation.
Ammunition: 153, 518, 468, 664, 665. See also Illu-
minating shell; Proximity fuze; Shortages.
Ammunition, German: 22, 37, 68, 72, 663–64, 664n.
See also Shortages.
Ammunition expenditure: 95, 125, 154, 161, 202–21,
224, 232, 283, 338, 470, 496, 539, 577, 630, 647,
658–59, 664
Amonines: 354, 380–81, 383, 386, 582, 585, 587, 593,
613
Andenne: 174–75, 566
Andernach: 668
Andler: 141–42, 148–51, 156, 162, 164, 177
Andromidas, T/Sgt. Stephen G.: 596n
Anglo-American relations: 6, 12, 17, 65, 423–24, 610,
671
Antiaircraft: 91, 130, 279, 340, 523, 655, 659
Antiaircraft, German: 50, 65, 67–68, 72, 168, 178–79,
293, 367, 609
Antiaircraft Artillery (Automatic Weapons) Bat-
talions
203d: 278–79, 318, 357, 358, 389
390th: 522–23, 546
440th: 286
447th: 184n, 193, 202, 206, 210, 221
482d: 230, 232, 234, 236, 297
486th: 387
634th: 140, 166
796th: 464
Antiaircraft Artillery Gun Battalions
143d: 339
413th: 113, 149
Antiaircraft guns
37-mm: 317
40-mm Bofors: 193, 202, 210
50-mm: 184n, 197, 202, 210, 221, 234, 297, 402,
645
90-mm: 339, 340, 341
Antitank company: 653
Antitank guns
German: 72, 177, 645
37-mm: 379
57-mm: 126, 220, 653, 654
Antwerp: 2, 16, 17, 19, 19n, 20, 22, 23, 25, 26, 27, 28,
31, 75, 176, 556, 578, 654–55
Ardennes: 39–47, 55–56, 59, 138, 141, 265. See also
Eifel: Road nets: Terrain.
Ardennes counteroffensive
compared with 1940 thrust: 18, 20, 38, 40, 46, 48,
72, 269, 556, 663, 670
compared with World War I: 6. 11, 39–40, 46, 48,
656, 665, 671, 674
the German military “Indian summer”: 675
Arlon: 21, 40, 42–46, 212, 238, 322, 458, 465, 483,
488, 508, 510–12, 514, 520, 523
Arlon-Bastogne highway: 314–15, 322, 459, 462, 463,
465, 471, 475, 480, 487, 509–11, 524–25, 532, 548,
551, 606, 609, 628
Arloncourt: 629–30, 632
Armed Forces Operations Staff. See Wehrmacht-
fuehrungsstab ( WFSt).
Armor: 125–27, 258, 269, 365–66, 396, 452, 460, 507.
See also Mechanized forces; Tanks.
difficulties on soggy ground: 115, 129, 243, 370,
384, 409, 456
German/US division organization and weapons:
365, 651
good going on frozen ground: 47, 416, 553, 649
movement rates: 70–71, 264, 275, 299, 357, 669–
70
opposing tank strengths: 73, 260, 649–50, 652
problems with roads and bridges: 176, 189–90,
250, 265, 267, 268, 364, 373, 590
Armored Division, 2d
casualties: 574
command and organization: 434, 651
operations before the Meuse: 427, 433–36, 439–42,
565–66, 570, 572–74, 574n, 577
Armored Division, 3d: 331, 582n
command and organization: 343, 346, 346n, 353–
54, 387, 427, 585, 651
operations before the Bastogne-Liège highway:
346, 346n, 347, 352–54, 356, 358, 359, 377–78,
380–91, 397, 406, 420, 431–34, 439, 442, 580–82,
585–89, 591–94, 596–97, 601–02
Armored Division, 4th: 513
casualties: 530
command and organization: 512, 514, 524
operations in the Bastogne corridor: 457, 458, 462,
467, 472, 480, 486–87, 508, 510–15, 520–21, 523–
32, 535, 547–48, 550n, 551–55, 606–07, 615, 621,
625, 627–28, 636
Armored Division, 5th: 333
Armored Division, 6th: 486, 508, 614
command and organization: 607, 628–29
operations east of Bastogne: 627–35, 642
Armored Division, 7th
casualties: 404–05, 412, 421–22
command and organization: 273–74, 280n, 395,
400, 401, 407, 413
defense of the St. Vith perimeter: 285–91, 339,
351, 356, 358, 359, 366, 369, 381, 389, 393, 395–
402, 480
moves south to the St. Vith sector: 158, 265, 266,
274–80, 329, 332–34
operations west of the Salm: 468, 583, 585–87,
589, 591–93, 596–97
withdrawal from St. Vith sector: 392, 405–22
Armored Division, 8th: 334
Armored Division, 9th: 206, 235n
casualties: 160, 232, 234, 235, 258, 298n, 421, 616
command and organization: 225, 228, 230, 235n,
617

INDEX 691
Armored Division, 9th-Continued
defense of Bastogne: 298n, 450
Sauer River operations: 55, 213, 225–36, 238, 244,
245–46, 248, 252, 255, 256, 257, 483, 496
Armored Division, 10th
casualties: 250, 258, 303, 481
command and organization: 249
moves north to the Ardennes: 206, 208, 244, 249,
314, 331–32, 486
operations on the southern shoulder: 236, 255,
483, 488, 490n, 493–94, 496, 498, 500–501, 508
Armored Division, 11th: 334, 556–57, 612
casualties: 621, 645, 647
command and organization: 560, 617–18
counterattack in Bastogne sector: 617–18, 620–21,
628–29, 644–47
defense of the Meuse River line: 560, 617
Armored division trains, 7th: 287, 291, 315, 317,
318, 353–56, 356n, 358, 382, 393, 397, 399, 400,
412, 431
Armored Divisions. See Combat Commands.
Armored Engineer Battalion, 9th: 233, 313, 472
Armored Engineer Battalion, 23d: 379
Armored Field Artillery Battalions
3d: 228, 232, 235, 236
16th: 160, 279, 285, 291
54th: 385, 387, 602
58th: 296–97, 297n, 298, 325, 328, 466
62d: 88
73d: 294–97
83d: 385
94th: 552, 554
274th: 550n
275th: 139, 141, 149–50, 279, 283, 287, 291, 402,
418–19
400th: 336, 340
420th: 309, 454, 460, 462, 464, 466, 468, 470, 472,
474
434th: 414
440th: 278, 358, 421
755th: 309
Armored Infantry Battalions
9th: 633–35
10th: 526, 528–29
20th: 300
21st: 620
23d: 282, 283, 404–06, 589–90
27th: 159–60, 285, 410
38th: 283, 403–05
44th: 629–30, 633
48th: 286, 408–09, 589–90
50th: 630, 632–33
51st: 529, 548, 607, 626
52d: 294–95, 298
53d: 530, 552, 554–55
55th: 645
60th: 213, 228–33, 235, 258
63d: 621
Armored Infantry Battalions-Continued
526th: 266–67, 337, 539
Armored Infantry Regiment, 41st: 435
Armored Reconnaissance Battalion, 82d: 568–69
Armored Regiments
33d: 596
66th: 434, 572
67th: 568, 572–73
Army, First: 264, 265, 267, 363, 366, 425, 664, 665,
668. See also Hodges, Lt. Gen. Courtney H.
command and organization: 53, 55, 259, 400,
424, 426–27, 512
and defense of St. Vith: 306, 393, 395, 401, 406,
412–13
headquarters command post at Spa: 259, 268–69,
307, 331, 336, 341–42, 343, 349, 393, 424.
headquarters moves from Spa to Chaudfontaine:
344, 424
and counterattack plans for January: 610–12
initial deployment of reinforcements: 266, 274–75,
305, 307, 310, 318, 333, 333n, 334, 376, 423, 427,
556, 557–58
and operations on northwest front: 432, 443,
565–66, 586, 592n, 597, 612, 614
and orders for initial delaying actions: 312, 336,
341, 344, 346, 486, 552
and Schnee Eifel sector battle: 157, 166n, 171,
171n
situation before the counteroffensive: 50, 51, 53,
55, 58, 59, 61, 62, 238, 259, 260, 267
Army, Third: 467, 656, 664, 668. See also Patton,
Lt. Gen. George S., Jr.
command and organization: 14, 255, 400, 424,
487–88, 496, 512–13, 560
counterattacks to and beyond Bastogne: 423–24,
483, 486–88, 490, 496, 508, 509–10, 510n, 512–13,
515–16, 524, 526–27, 532, 534, 539, 605, 606,
606n, 611–15, 617, 627, 647, 672
sends reinforcements to the Ardennes: 244, 249,
315, 327, 332, 333, 457, 465, 482, 486–88, 513,
557, 563
shift toward Luxembourg and Belgium: 255, 306,
480, 488
situation before the counteroffensive: 30, 33, 36,
39, 51, 53, 55, 58, 61, 62, 176, 178, 238, 332, 333,
333n, 334, 485
Army, Seventh: 33, 51, 53, 62, 563
Army, Ninth: 50, 51, 53, 58, 176, 273, 425. See also
Simpson, Lt. Gen. William H.
placed under 21 Army Group control: 424, 427
sends reinforcements to the Ardennes: 158, 269,
274, 275, 305, 308, 317, 332–33, 334, 427, 557
Army Group, 6th: 53, 424, 487, 611
Army Group, 12th: 57–59, 61, 73, 74, 172, 255, 512,
655, 664. See also Bradley, Gen. Omar N.
command and organization: 240, 423–25
and reinforcement of the Ardennes: 157, 274,
331–33

692 TH E ARDENNES: BATTLE OF THE BULGE
Army Group, 21: 17, 51, 53, 423–24, 427, 557, 560,
664. See also Montgomery, Field Marshal Sir
Bernard L.
Army Groups, German. See German units.
Arnhem: 571
Arsdorf: 521, 544–45
Artillery. See also Artillery support.
counterbattery duel: 629
drum fire: 373
fire by map: 216, 243, 309
fire called on own position: 116, 119, 131, 134n,
185
on friendly troops: 106, 112, 168, 170, 247, 251,
418, 633
marching fire: 251
neutralization of 96, 156, 195, 213, 258
precision ranging: 372
prepared concentrations: 82, 139, 173, 181, 656–57
against tanks and tank concentrations: 654
TOT: 496, 572, 632, 635, 640
types of barrages: 283, 380, 414, 633, 642, 656
Artillery liaison planes: 160, 242, 261, 268, 336, 337,
570, 573, 609, 627, 659
Artillery support: 87–88, 110, 115–16, 119, 124–25,
130–33, 141, 160–61, 202, 209, 234, 239, 242,
245–47, 340, 341, 373–74, 385, 387–88, 441, 494,
496, 501, 508, 515, 554, 597, 629
of the Bastogne sector: 309, 323, 327–29, 456, 464,
472, 474, 480
German: 19, 37, 68, 71–72, 77, 82, 87, 111, 143,
152, 173, 178, 181, 195–96, 213–16, 226, 229, 231,
247, 258, 404–05, 470, 507, 574
German/US comparison: 144–45, 157, 650, 652–53,
656–60
of the St. Vith perimeter: 277, 279, 283, 291, 396,
398–402, 417
Assault guns. See Guns, German, SP.
Assenois: 323, 480, 553–55, 606–07, 615, 619, 623,
626–29
Atrocities: 260n, 261, 261n, 262–64, 364, 520
Attacks
concentric: 142, 349, 381
double envelopment: 20, 26, 27, 29, 31–32, 143
“distracting”: 214
flanking: 92, 220–21, 396
frontal: 92
holding: 29–30, 34
Napoleonic carrè: 26
reconnaissance in force: 282
single envelopment: 142, 525
spoiling: 25, 38, 58, 330, 483, 634
Attert: 43
Attert River: 520
Aubange: 425
Auw: 139, 146, 148–51, 155–56, 163, 164, 166, 169
Auw Bleialf road: 140, 141, 155, 164–65, 169
Auw-Schönberg road: 152, 156, 170
Averill, 1st Lt. Denniston: 358
Aywaille: 341
Baade, Maj. Gen. Paul: 606, 627, 634. See also
Infantry Division, 35th.
Baccarat: 20
Bahe, Maj. Gordon A.: 433, 437
Baillonville: 431, 441, 565
Balkan campaign: 16, 72
Bande: 431, 436
Bandy, Lt. Col. Paul: 518, 518n, 536
BAR. See Browning automatic rifles.
Baraque de Fraiture: 44, 353, 357, 359, 381, 383,
385–86, 388–92, 413, 420, 580–83, 587, 595
Barnes, Lt. Col. Hubert D.: 309
Barr, Lt. Col. Andrew: 354
Barrier lines: 267, 287, 313, 316, 318, 320, 322, 326,
327, 329, 355, 356, 382, 429. See also Corps,
VIII; Roadblocks.
Barton, Maj. Gen. Raymond 0.: 55, 238, 239, 241,
243–45, 248, 2501, 251n, 25 85, 491 –
92, 494, 507, 508. See also Infantry Division,
4th.
Baschleiden: 607, 636
Basse-Bodeux: 346
Bastendorf: 217–18, 221, 223, 226
Bastogne: 19, 22, 28, 40, 612, 615. See also Airborne
Division, 101st.
air attacks: 475, 476, 478, 632, 660
air supply operations: 172, 461, 467, 468, 468n,
470, 475, 526, 554, 609
arrival of the 101st Airborne: 289, 307–09, 314–15,
329, 336
artillery support for the perimeter: 309, 323, 327–
29, 456, 464, 472, 474, 480
close air support of defense operations: 470, 474–
75, 479, 661
command headquarters of VIII Corps: 161, 249,
274, 288, 306, 309, 312, 313, 393, 445
defense of: 435, 438, 440, 445, 445n, 448, 449–68,
470–75, 477–80, 537, 539, 540, 546, 572, 577, 581,
604
delaying actions before: 192, 210, 225, 294–306,
312–21, 359, 398, 445
encirclement of: 323, 458–59, 462
enemy ground attacks: 462, 464–68, 470–80, 563–
64, 574, 601, 613–15, 617–19, 622–23, 631, 637,
644, 647, 657, 670, 673
formation of the defense: 205, 291, 307–09, 317,
319, 329, 357, 423, 448, 449–64
German initial attack plans: 174–77, 183n, 194,
206, 210, 294, 298, 303–05, 356, 443, 449, 452,
454, 475n
link-up with relief forces: 480, 551, 555, 606–07,
613, 672
location and tactical importance of: 44, 45, 46, 47,
306, 312, 459, 509
“relief” counterattack from the south: 509–11,

INDEX 693
Bastogne-Continued
513-15, 519, 523-27, 529-32, 547, 551-55, 563,
605, 607, 611, 617, 627-30
traffic control problems: 309, 458, 615
Bastogne “pocket”: 629
Bastogne-La Roche road: 315, 458
Bastogne-Marche highway: 318, 321, 357, 429, 431-
32, 462, 464, 465, 471, 474, 475-77, 614, 616
Bastogne-Martelange highway: 323, 523, 530, 623,
626
Bastogne-Neufchlteau road: 324, 327, 461, 462, 464,
465, 475, 478, 480, 511, 514, 524, 552-53, 606-07,
614, 615, 617, 628, 644
Bastogne-St. Hubert highway: 325, 459, 618, 621,
643-44
Batchelder Maj. Clifton B.: 568
Bates, Lt. Col. Oma R.: 243
Battlefield commissions: 84
Battlefield illumination: 89, 128, 655. See also
Illuminating shell; Searchlights.
Bauvenn: 406, 410
Bavigne: 635, 637-38, 641
Bayerlein, Generalleutnant Fritz: 178, 299, 326n,
329, 437-38, 440, 450n, 451, 454, 456, 458, 463,
570, 643
Bayliss, Sgt. James L.: 116n
Bayonets: 97, 115, 128, 210, 463, 549
Bazookas: 93, 98, 109, 110, 110n, 115, 117, 126, 127,
130-31, 156, 192, 192n, 220, 224, 234, 243, 247,
250, 254, 273, 281, 323, 328, 340,654
Beaufort: 230-32, 234, 236, 504-05
Beauraing: 433
Bech: 257
Beffe: 381, 383-84
Beho: 279, 286, 398, 413, 415-17
Beiler: 204-05
Belchem, Brig. David: 427
Belfort: 51
Bell, Col. Robert P.: 490
Bell, Col. Virgil: 644
Bennett, S/Sgt. William J.: 209n
Benonchamps: 299, 302, 304, 632
Bercheux: 552
Berdorf: 230, 241-42, 245, 247, 247n, 249, 250, 252-
54, 256, 496-97, 500, 502-04
Berens: 233
Berg: 122, 197
Berle: 640
Berlin: 58
Berry, Capt. James D.: 342
Berterath: 81, 147
Bertogne: 317-20, 356
Bertrix: 618
Berwick, Capt. Lee: 153
Bettborn: 483
Bettel: 217
Bettendorf: 217, 223, 501
Beyer, General der Infanterie Franz: 212, 255-56,
494
Bicycles: 154, 178, 20711, 402, 430
Biddle, Pfc. Melvin: 387
Bielefeld: 58
“Big Solution”: 21, 23, 27-29, 70, 75, 173, 443
Bigelbach: 221, 229-30, 506
Bigonville: 524, 530-32, 544, 552
Billingslea, Col. Charles: 390-91, 581, 590, 595, 597
Bilsdorf: 544
Bird, Pfc. J. O.: 539n
Birkelt Farm: 241, 257, 504
Bissen: 226, 483
Bitburg: 45, 59, 177, 226, 228, 256, 508, 611
Bittrich, General der Waffen-SS Willi: 77, 580-81,
590-91
Bizory: 303-04, 313, 450-51, 454, 456, 629-30
Black, Col. Paul J.: 490, 498-99, 504-05
Blakeley, Brig. Gen. Harold W.: 508
Blanchard, Col. Wendell: 530, 552
Bleialf: 25, 141, 143, 145, 151, 152, 154-55, 163-65,
167, 170
Bleialf-Schonberg road: 165, 167-68, 170
Boats, assault: 180, 183, 216, 229, 241, 504, 546
Bock, Lt. Col. Frank A.: 622
Boggess, 1st Lt. Charles: 554-55
Bois de Chardonne: 442
Bois de Famenne: 569
Bois de Fragotte: 616, 619, 621
Bois de Geauvelant: 568-70
Bois de Herbaimont: 614
Bois des Haies de Magery: 618, 621, 644
Bois des Valets: 620, 644, 646
Bois Jacques: 629
Boisselles: 568
Bolden, S/Sgt. Paul: 375
Bollendorf: 55, 215, 229, 235, 236, 240, 495, 506
Bolling, Brig. Gen. Alexander R.: 427-28, 430-33,
438, 442, 574. See also Infantry Division, 84th.
Bombardment Division, IX: 377n, 661-62
Bombardment Group, 391st: 660
Bombardment Group, 406th: 661
Bombing. See Air attacks; Air support.
Bone, Sgt. Otis: 110
Bonn: 45, 50, 51, 64, 69, 140, 595, 613, 665
Bonn-Euskirchen railroad: 67
Bonnal: 544-47, 638
Bonnerue: 644
Bonney, Capt. George E.: 436
Boos, Col. Francis H.: 115-16, 122
Booth, Lt. Col. Robert M.: 298, 448
Borgoumont: 348
Born: 151, 163, 281, 396
Bottomly, Maj. Raymond V., Jr.: 450
Boudinot, Brig. Gen. Truman E.: 348, 376
Bouillon: 326, 560
Boulaide: 607
Bourcy: 299, 629, 631, 633

694 THE ARDENNES: BATTLE OF THE BULGE
Bourcy-Bastogne railroad: 456, 462, 463
Bourcy-Noville road: 299, 304
Bourdon: 438, 442, 574
Bourscheid: 215, 517, 519–21, 535–39, 546
Bourscheid triangle: 532, 539
Bovigny: 267, 413, 418–20
Boxtel: 557
Boyer, Maj. Donald P., Jr.: 273n
Boylan, Lt. Col. Vincent L.: 409, 417
Bradley, Gen. Omar N.: 53, 55, 56, 225, 307, 316
Allied counterattack plans: 509, 512, 610–12, 615,
617
and division of command with Montgomery: 423–
24, 426
and movement of reinforcements to Ardennes:
305–07, 331–34, 486–87, 510, 513
Brandenberger, General der Panzertruppen Erich:
26, 75, 212–13, 226, 232, 236, 240, 465, 495, 533–
34, 538–41, 545, 642–43
Brandenburg: 214, 217, 220
Bras: 346, 590, 621, 631
Bras-Bastogne road: 299, 623, 629
Braunlauf: 415–16
Braunlauf Creek: 272, 285, 406, 410, 414–15
Breitweiler: 245, 249, 458
Bremen: 67
Brewster, Maj. Olin F.: 392, 584, 589–90
Bridges: 66, 92, 325. See also Bridging operations;
Engineers; and river crossings by name of
river.
air and artillery attacks on: 15, 64–66, 255, 506,
534, 660–63
Bailey: 318–20, 526, 546–47, 638
class 70 two-way: 378
destroyed: 83, 208, 224, 226, 244, 252, 260, 268,
284, 317, 318, 320, 322, 338, 343, 351, 356, 363,
371, 373, 419, 420, 501, 518, 525, 544, 546–47,
552, 560, 585
failure to destroy: 206, 207, 266, 320–21, 419
footbridges: 348, 378, 379
German GO-ton: 178, 186, 187
portable infantry: 216
unsuitable for heavy traffic: 268, 343, 370
Bridging operations: 66, 183–84, 186, 198, 221–22,
232, 235, 245, 253, 260, 292, 321, 357, 370, 377,
506, 669
Briscol: 601
British units. See also Army Group, 21; Phantom;
Royal Air Force.
Armored Brigade, 29th: 433, 443, 557, 561, 568–
69, 572
Army, Second: 53
Corps, 30: 176, 426, 557, 561
Division, 6th Airborne: 557
Division, 43d: 557, 561
Division, 50th: 647
Division, 51st: 443, 557
Division, 53d: 557, 574, 577
British units-Continued
Division, Guards Armoured: 557
Regiment, 2d Household Cavalry: 561
Regiment, 3d Royal Tank: 569
Yeomanry, Fife and Fofar: 574
Britton, Lt. Col. Frank K.: 633, 635
Brown, Lt. Col. Charles E.: 629–30, 633
Browne, Lt. Col. Barry D.: 462, 464, 466–67, 472,
473, 473n
Browning automatic rifles: 141
Brul: 620, 644, 646
Brussels: 22, 28, 39, 75, 176, 557, 612
Buchet: 166, 171
Buchholz: 80–81, 84, 90, 94, 182, 184, 186–88
Buchholz Forest: 54
Buderscheid: 639–41
Bueno, Sgt. John: 372n
Buildings, attack and defense of: 190–92, 241–42,
247, 250–51, 256, 303, 324, 349–51, 365
Buissonville: 434–36, 438, 440–41, 565, 570–72
Buhle, Walter: 12
Bulgarian forces: 2
Büllingen: 91–92, 94, 99, 104–05, 108, 111, 113,
128–31, 133, 261
Büllingen-Malmédy road: 80–81, 83, 90, 91, 112–
13, 120, 128
Büllingen–St. Vith road: 163, 403
Burden ridge: 537
Burg Reuland: 160, 195, 196, 272, 279
Burko, Cpl. Adam F.: 372n
Burnenville: 363
Burnon: 526
Burns, Capt. J. H.: 184
Butgenbach: 25, 81, 87, 91, 105, 112, 113, 121–22,
128–30, 134, 332, 603–04, 667
Butler, Lt. Col. McClernand: 87, 119
Buttlar-Brandenfels, Generalmajor Horst Freiherr
Treusch von: 27, 28
Byrne, Col. Bernard A.: 607, 637
“C” Route: 81, 83, 90, 91
Callanan, Lt. Col. W. A.: 544
Camouflage: 50, 67, 70, 87, 144, 470, 478, 499, 505,
633
Camp Elsenborn: 54, 110, 113, 271, 331
Camp Mourmelon: 73, 309
Canadian forces: 17, 19, 611
Canadian Forestry Company, 9th: 318, 318n, 321,
356
Canal Defense Lights: 655
Cannon, Maj. Charles A., Jr.: 276
Cannon company: 653
Carnes, Lt. Col. Norman D.: 433
Carpenter, Lt. Leonard R.: 439
Carr, 1st Lt. Walter P.: 551 .
Casualties: 116, 125, 273, 530, 549, 593, 656. See
also Evacuation; Losses, summary of.
civilian: 262, 364, 376, 377

INDEX 695
Casualties-Continued
German: 37, 89, 97, 120, 127, 132, 147, 184n,
203, 211, 221, 244, 247, 252, 258, 361, 506–07,
570, 595, 615, 668, 674
nonbattle: 123–24, 141, 238, 495, 503, 507, 607
officers: 104, 129, 154, 168, 220, 253, 351, 367, 410,
451, 548, 594
CATOR. See Combined Air Transport Operations
Room (SHAEF) .
Cavalry Groups
2d: 494, 496, 499
4th: 436, 441, 570–72, 574
14th: 55, 80, 81, 85, 90, 136, 136n, 137–41, 144–51,
156, 161–64, 279, 281, 288, 330, 397, 422
102d: 330
Cavalry Reconnaissance Squadrons
4th: 441
6th: 606, 636
18th: 138–39, 145–49, 149n, 150–51, 154, 162, 163,
165–66, 281
24th: 441, 570–71
25th: 525
28th: 621
32d: 91, 139, 148, 150, 162–64, 273, 277, 281
38th: 79, 87–88, 102
41st: 621
87th: 276, 279, 282–83, 358–59, 389, 397, 403–05,
409
89th: 230–32, 234, 273, 284–85, 403n
90th: 236, 300, 501
Cavender, Col. Charles C.: 138, 154, 166–68, 171
Celles: 441, 565, 568–72, 574, 591, 612, 672
Cestoni, Pfc. Angelo: 98n
Chamberlain, Lt. Col. Thomas C.: 249
Champlon crossroads: 429, 436
Champs: 462, 474, 476–79, 645
Chance, Col. Robert H.: 238, 243–44, 254, 257
Chapman, Maj. Cecil: 643
Chappuis, Lt. Col. Steve A.: 307, 479, 479n
Charles XII (Sweden) : 10
Charleville: 212, 560
Chaudfontaine: 344, 427
Chaumont: 526–29, 529n, 530–31, 548–49, 551
Chemical Mortar Battalion, 87th: 602
Chemical Mortar Battalion, 91st: 503
Cheneux: 268, 348, 351–52, 366–67, 599
Chenogne: 325, 616, 619–21, 644–46
Chérain: 395, 397–98, 400
Cherry, Lt. Col. Henry T.: 296, 300–303, 448, 449,
450–51
Cheston, Lt. Col. Elliott B.: 518
Chevron: 268, 343
Chiers River: 560
Chifontaine: 299
Christnach: 230, 236, 483, 494, 498–99
Christrose: 176
Christy, Capt. John J.: 638n
Churchill, Winston: 676
Ciergnon: 569
Cierreux: 418–21
Ciney: 434–35, 440–41, 565, 567–68, 587
Cissna, Capt. A. J.: 544
Civilians: 4, 6, 226, 254, 262, 364, 370, 372, 376, 377
Clarke, Brig. Gen. Bruce: 275–76, 282, 290, 405–07,
409–10, 412, 414, 416–17
Clausewitz: 11
Clay, Lt. Col. Roy Udell: 139, 279
Clerf: 174, 179, 181–85, 187–92, 205, 206, 294–96
Clerf River: 44, 331
Clerf River crossings: 176–79, 181, 185–92, 205–07,
222, 294, 298, 312–13
Clerf-Bastogne highway: 179–81, 183, 183n, 187–88,
189–90, 206, 210, 312–13, 315, 628
Clochimont: 470, 553, 629
Cobreville: 552–53
Cochenhausen, Major von: 567, 569–70
Cohen, Lt. Col. Harold: 528
Colbet: 246, 497
Collier, Brig. Gen. John: 434–36, 440–41, 571–73
Collins, Maj. Gen. J. Lawton: 385, 387, 427, 431–34,
565–66, 566n, 568, 587, 587n, 591, 597, 611–12.
See also Corps, VII.
Collins, Lt. Col. Kenneth W.: 228, 230, 235, 615
Colmar: 51, 611
Cologne: 27, 36, 42, 45, 50, 51, 58–59, 65, 69, 74
Cologne-Düren railroad: 67
Combat Commands of Armored Divisions
CCA, 2d Armored Division: 434–36, 440–41, 570–
72
CCB, 2d Armored Division: 441, 443, 567–70, 572
CCR, 2d Armored Division: 572–73
CCA, 3d Armored Division: 346, 352, 381–82, 384,
385, 433, 585, 594, 601
CCB, 3d Armored Division: 346–49, 352, 359,
374, 376–77, 385, 582n, 592
CCR, 3d Armored Division: 353, 377–79, 381,
382, 384, 386–88
CCA, 4th Armored Division: 524–26, 529–31, 548–
51, 607, 609, 624–26
CCB, 4th Armored Division: 457, 512–14, 525–29,
531, 548–54, 607, 626
CCR, 4th Armored Division: 530–32, 544, 552–55,
607
CCR, 5th Armored Division: 431
CCA, 6th Armored Division: 607, 628–30, 632
CCB, 6th Armored Division: 628–30, 632, 644
CCR, 6th Armored Division: 631–32
CCA, 7th Armored Division: 279, 286, 290, 408–
09, 417–19, 585–89, 589n, 590, 593
CCB, 7th Armored Division: 158, 275, 279, 282,
285, 287, 290–91, 396, 403–06, 408–10, 412, 414–
18, 593
CCR, 7th Armored Division: 274, 278–82, 286,
290, 418–19
CCA, 9th Armored Division: 225, 230, 233–35,
488, 494, 500, 508, 607, 615–17, 645–46

696 THE A RDENNES: BATTLE OF THE BULGE
Combat Commands of Armored Divisions–
Continued
CCB, 9th Armored Division: 157–60, 228, 265,
273, 275, 279, 282, 284–85, 290–92, 331, 392, 393,
395–97, 400, 403, 405–06, 410, 412–16, 418, 421,
583, 587, 589
CCR, 9th Armored Division: 157, 190, 199, 206,
294–304, 311, 313, 315, 316, 331, 448, 460, 464,
473
CCX, 9th Armored Division: 500–501
CCA, 10th Armored Division: 249–52, 254–55,
256–57
CCB, 10th Armored Division: 300, 303, 309, 315,
448, 448n, 449, 451–52, 454, 457, 459–61, 463–64,
467, 468, 472–75, 481, 488, 513–14, 632
CCA, 11th Armored Division: 617–18, 621, 644,
646
CCB, 11th Armored Division: 617–18, 620–21,
644–47
CCR, 11th Armored Division: 644–45
Combat teams. See Task Forces; Teams.
Combined Air Transport Operations Room
(SHAEF) : 171–72
Command. See also Tactical control.
air resupply co-ordination problems: 171–72
in the Bastogne sector: 460, 464, 475
Bradley-Montgomery split of forces: 423–26
confusing and contradictory orders: 117–18, 161,
163–64, 167, 205, 336, 392, 424, 489–90, 490n,
512, 513–15, 587, 630
decision left to “man on the ground”: 28, 161,
162, 166, 225, 289, 420, 452, 671
initial reactions to German attack: 80, 272, 311–
12, 330–33, 333n, 334–35
in the St. Vith perimeter: 288–91, 395, 401, 403,
406–07, 412–13
Commando operations. See Greif (Operation) .
Commanster: 413, 416–17
Communications: 124–25, 249, 401, 424–25, 461–62,
625. See also Radios; Telephone communica-
tions.
German: 231, 240, 252, 269, 322, 337, 368
jamming: 391, 654
problems of: 117–18, 132, 158, 165, 167, 193,
204–06, 240–41, 242–43, 251n, 254, 280, 289,
298, 311–12, 331, 393, 395n, 405, 420, 554, 587,
592, 630, 654, 658
Communications Zone: 172, 305, 557, 559–60
Condor. See Greif (Operation)
Condroz: 42
Congressional Medal of Honor. See Medal of Honor.
Coningham, Air Chief Marshal Sir Arthur: 424
Conjoux: 440–41, 568–70
Connaughton, Maj. George W.: 548
Conneaux: 567
Connor, Lt. Col. Robert E.: 497
Consdorf: 231, 243, 245–47, 249, 254, 257, 313, 484
Consthum: 181–82, 185–86, 192–93, 205–06
Cook, Lt. Col. Julian A.: 367
Corps, III: 327, 489–90. See also Millikin, Maj. Gen.
John
command and organization: 487–88, 508, 510,
512, 514, 539
counterattack toward Bastogne and St. Vith: 487,
510–16, 519–20, 523–26, 532–33, 541–42, 543n,
544, 547, 607, 609, 612, 614, 627–28, 634–35, 637
Corps, V. See also Gerow, Maj. Gen. Leonard T.
command and organization: 53–55, 120, 134, 228,
331, 343
holds the salient north shoulder: 80, 86, 91, 103–
04, 113, 120, 134, 137, 161, 306, 316, 330–32,
335, 337, 345, 426, 431, 443, 580, 603–04, 656
situation before the counteroffensive: 53, 59, 77–
80, 95, 140
Corps, VII: 53, 55, 86, 113, 238, 611–12. See also
Collins, Maj. Gen. J. Lawton.
command and organization: 387, 411n
operations west of the Ourthe: 385, 387, 427–28,
431–34, 436, 438, 441–43, 565–66, 572, 577, 580,
585, 587, 591, 592n, 597, 603
Corps, VIII. See also Middleton, Maj. Gen. Troy H.
command and organization: 55–56, 255, 288, 315,
400, 457, 487, 512–14, 560, 612, 617
counterattack northeast in the Bastogne sector:
612, 615–18, 621, 627–28, 643, 647
and defense of Bastogne: 457, 459, 460–62, 464,
466, 472, 474–75, 511, 512, 514
and defense of St. Vith sector: 273, 275, 289,
393, 395
delaying actions before Bastogne: 206, 210n, 254,
294–95, 307, 329, 346, 359, 377, 400, 513
initial attacks all along the front: 104, 157–58,
161, 163, 184, 187, 274, 305–07, 330–33, 335,
345, 486, 488, 557, 657–58
operations on the southern shoulder: 226, 255,
428, 508, 512–13, 524, 560–61, 607
preparation of barrier lines: 287, 310–15, 318–19,
322–23, 326–27, 359, 423, 429, 523, 525, 532, 552
and the Schnee Eifel sector battle: 161, 170–71,
289
situation before the German attack: 54–56, 59–
63, 73, 78, 137, 139–41, 227–28, 238, 310, 556
Corps, XII. See also Eddy, Maj. Gen. Manton S.
command and organization: 485–86, 488, 539
operations in the Sauer River sector: 488–89,
490, 493–94, 496, 501, 507–08, 515, 535, 539, 613,
614, 627–28, 637, 666
Corps, XIII: 273, 274, 333
Corps, XV: 37, 488
Corps, XVIII (Airborne) : 305, 612. See also Ridg-
way, Maj. Gen. Matthew B.
command and organization: 336, 342–44, 427
operations on First Army northwest front: 344–
46, 346n, 351, 352–54, 356n, 357, 359, 366,
371, 376, 382, 385, 387, 389, 393, 395, 400–
401, 406–07, 411, 413, 422, 426, 427, 428, 431–
33, 566, 579–81, 583, 585–87, 589n, 590, 592n,
598–99, 603

INDEX 697
Corps, XIX: 334, 433
Corps, XX: 487–89, 493, 496, 508
Corps, provisional (Third Army) : 255
Cota, Maj. Gen. Norman D.: 55, 180, 182, 184, 187–
88, 190, 193, 199, 202, 203–06, 208, 210, 217–19,
225, 323–24, 327–28, 457–58, 460. See also In-
fantry Division, 28th.
Counter Intelligence Corps: 240
Courbiere, Major von: 638
Cowan, Pfc. Richard E.: 99n
Craig, Lt. Col. William: 167n
Crete: 270
Croatian forces: 2
Crombach: 407, 409, 414–16
Crossroads, tactical importance of: 43, 388, 511
Culin, Brig. Gen. Frank L., Jr.: 618, 643
Cureton, Capt R. W.: 219
Currey, Pfc. Francis: 362
Custinne: 569–70
“D” Route: 81, 83, 91
Dager, Brig. Gen. Holmes E.: 512, 514, 525–26, 553,
626
DAGGER (Operation) : 273
Dalessandro, Sgt. Peter J.: 134n
Danahy, Lt. Col. Paul A.: 468
Daniel, Lt. Col. Derrill M.: 113, 129, 132, 132n, 133
Darago, Pvt. Albert A.: 340
Dasburg: 34, 174, 178–79, 183–84, 186–87, 198,
204
Daun: 45, 293
Davall, Lt. Col. Harold C.: 630, 633
Davidson, Lt. Col. Henry E., Jr.: 243
Dawson, Sgt. T. J.: 616n
Deception: 27, 50, 64, 67, 70, 73, 91, 98, III, 151–52,
184m, 203, 228, 269–71, 361, 363, 379, 406, 489,
551, 558–59, 561, 571, 588–89. See also Cam-
ouflage; Surprise.
Decker, Generalleutnant Karl: 614
Deckert, Colonel: 476–77
Defense. See also Barrier lines; Obstacles.
blocking position: 107, 115, 175, 212, 229, 248, 369
in depth: I28
linear: 139, 141, 239, 311
perimeter: 165, 166, 193, 336, 380, 390, 409, 418
“scratch forces”: 92, 97, 185, 202, 206, 221, 246,
282, 286–87, 310, 314–15, 322–23, 328, 356, 392,
397, 398, 460, 464, 513, 607
screening operations: 235, 236, 311, 327, 432–33
Defensive Battle in the West: 21, 26, 33, 49
Deifeld: 397–98
Del Grippo, Pfc. Daniel: 367
Dellen: 523, 540
Dellert, Lt. CoI. Howard C.: 543
Demolitions: 235, 250, 253, 254, 256, 316, 318–21,
322, 326, 329, 356, 669
Dempwolff, Col. Hugo: 235–36, 501, 566
Denkert, Generalmajor Walter: 619, 646
Descheneaux, Col. George L., Jr.: 138, 156, 167–68,
171
Deserters: 51, 60
Desobry, Maj. William R.: 449, 452, 454
Devers, Lt. Gen. Jacob L.: 53, 424, 487, 611
Devine, Col. Mark: 136n, 137–39, 147–48, 150–51,
162–63, 281
Dickweiler: 241–45, 248, 251–52, 254, 257, 488
Diekirch: 21, 43, 214, 216–19, 221, 223–27, 234–36,
312–13, 487, 501, 516
Dietrich, Generaloberst der Waffen–SS Josef “Sepp”:
26, 31, 34, 75–77, 112, 120, 121, 262, 270, 435,
444, 578–79, 598, 603
Dillingen: 230, 495, 501, 505–46
Dillingham, Pvt. C. W.: 574n
Dinant: 42, 44, 75, 428, 433–35, 437–38, 440–41, 557,
561, 564, 566–67, 574
Distinguished Service Cross: 85n, 94n, 98n, 101n,
107n, 111, 116n, 117n, 119n, 132n, 149n, 155n,
167n, 198n, 209q 218n, 221, 225n, 234, 234n,
247n, 285n, 300n, 319n, 340, 350, 362, 366, 367,
372n, 375, 419n, 439, 455n, 460n, 471n, 473n,
479n, 485n, 518n, 521n, 523, 529, 538n, 539, 539n,
543, 544, 550, 550n, 555, 573, 574, 574n, 596n,
616n, 630n, 636n, 638n, 640n
Distinguished Unit Citation: 93n, 100, 119n, 125n,
268n, 318n
Divisions. See Airborne Divisions; Armored Divi-
sions; British units; German units; Infantry
Divisions.
Doan, Lt. Col. Leander L.: 582n
Dochamps: 353–54, 358–59, 377, 380–86, 389–90
Dolenc, Sgt. Eddie: 85, 85n
Dom Butgenbach: 113, 128, 130–33
Donnange: 179, 187, 192
Doster Farm: 497, 502
Douglas, Lt. Col. Robert H.: 85
Drauffelt: 181, 186, 207
Duffner, Col. Carl F.: 594
Duggan, Lt. Col. Augustine: 281–82
Dunham, Capt. Leland R.: 638n
Dupuis, Capt. Paul H.: 251, 251n
Dupuy, Col. R. Ernest: 136n
Durbuy: 318, 581, 591
Duren: 26, 42, 58, 62, 433
Dusseldorf: 58, 64
Dwight, Capt. William: 554–55
Earnest, Brig. Gen. Herbert L.: 524–25, 529, 609, 626
Eastburn, Sgt. B. R.: 640n
Eastern Front: 72, 173, 195, 239, 263, 293, 675. See
also Soviet offensives.
Echternach: 19, 44, 212, 213, 228, 240–43, 245, 247–
51, 253–54, 256–57, 332, 482–83, 490, 492, 494,
496–97, 500, 503–04
Echternach-Luxembourg road: 242, 249, 484, 491
Eddy, Maj. Gen. Manton S.: 485–86, 488, 490–92,
496, 503, 506, 508. See also XII Corps.
Edingen: 242, 253

698 THE ARDENNES: BATTLE OF THE BULGE
Eibertingen: 81
Eifel: 20, 39–40, 42–48, 50–51, 62, 64–65, 69, 74,
137, 141, 177, 178, 649. See also Schnee Eifel.
Eigelscheid: 152–53
Eisenborn: 257
Eisenhower, Gen. Dwight D.: 58, 412, 674. See also
Supreme Headquarters, Allied Expeditionary
Forces (SHAEF) .
and Bradley-Montgomery command arrange-
ment: 424, 426
conferences with top commanders: 51, 53, 332,
486–88, 509–10, 611, 612
and constraints on General Patton: 485, 509
and differences with Montgomery on future strat-
egy: 53, 333
and possibility of German counteroffensive: 56
and reinforcements and the SHAEF Reserve:
305–06, 332–34, 556
and rumored German plan for capture of: 270,
558
and Third Army counterattack: 423, 509, 512,
515, 610–12, 617
Ekman, Col. William E.: 351n, 352, 370–71, 581,
599–600
Elcherath: 159–60
Elsenborn: 77, 86, 104–07, 109, 112, 117–18, 120,
122, 126, 128, 270, 580
Elsenborn ridge: 96, 103–04, 109, 112, 113, 115,
120, 122, 125, 133, 134, 374, 578–80, 603–04,
611, 658
Elverfeldt, Brig. Gen.: 571
Engeman, Maj. Leonard E.: 283
Engineer Base Depot Company, 724th: 325
Engineer Combat Battalions
1st: 133
2d: 94
4th: 244–45
35th: 313, 315, 325–26, 456–57, 462
44th: 206–10, 313
51st: 267–68, 268n, 318, 318n, 351, 355, 378, 379,
429–31, 436
81st: 151, 155, 165–66, 273, 403–05
103d: 181–82, 192, 218
105th: 372n
158th: 299, 313, 315, 319, 319n, 321, 325, 355–56,
429, 450–51
159th: 243, 250, 313, 484, 492
168th: 273, 275, 277, 279, 283, 312, 331, 403
178th: 515
202d: 266
249th: 544
254th: 91, 94
291st: 263, 265, 268, 359
299th: 312, 313, 315, 319, 322
309th: 437
324th: 101, 112
1278th: 315, 318–19
Engineer Combat Groups
1102d: 271n, 314
Engineer Combat Groups-Continued
1107th: 271n
1111th: 267
1128th: 271n, 310, 312–13, 317
Engineer General Service Regiments:
341st: 332
342d: 560
354th: 559
366th: 560
392d: 560
1308th: 560
1313th: 559
Engineer Light Equipment Company, 626th: 313
Engineer Light Ponton Company, 527th: 327
Engineers: 123, 186, 267, 310, 327, 329, 329n, 351,
351n, 380, 545, 649. See also Barrier lines;
Bridging.
Epinal: 20
Eppeldorf: 232, 235, 500–501
Erezée: 378, 591, 593–96, 598, 601–03
Erlenbusch, Lt. Col. Robert C.: 406
Ermsdorf: 226, 231–32, 234–35, 500
Esch-sur-Sure: 545–47
Eschdorf: 520–22, 534, 536–37, 540–43, 543n, 544–45,
Ettelbruck: 45, 214, 216, 218–19, 224–27, 236, 482-
83, 489, 501, 516–17, 520–22, 532–35, 537, 540,
548, 628
Eupen: 42, 45, 77, 86–87, 89, 102, 120, 270–71, 274,
278, 335–36, 352, 579, 604, 669
Euskirchen: 45, 62, 64, 65, 67
Euskirchen-Kall-EhrangTrier railroad: 68
Evacuation: 99, 106, 222, 235, 250, 254, 300, 370,
372n, 453, 609, 668, 674
Ewell, Lt. Col. Julian J.: 307, 445–48, 448n, 449–51,
463
Ezell, Capt. Bert: 457, 457n, 514–15, 515n
Fairchild, Lt. Col. John C.: 199–200
Fallschirm Armee Wagen (school) : 270
Famenne Depression: 42, 44, 579
Fanzel: 591, 594
Faymonville: 81, 147, 158
Ferry operations: 66, 215, 219, 253, 489
Feuerwalze: 657
Feulen: 518
Fichtenhain: 26, 36
Fickessen, Maj. Jack W.: 379
Field Artillery Battalions
5th: 130
14th: 434
15th: 109–10, 125
22d: 554
33d: 113, 129
37th: 110
38th: 125
42d: 242, 244
62d: 102
90th: 538
92d: 434

INDEX 699
Field Artillery Battalions–Continued
102d: 523
107th: 214, 218–19, 221, 223, 226
108th: 214, 217–18, 221, 226
109th: 182, 185, 188
113th: 375
118th: 338
176th: 252
177th: 552
188th: 388
196th: 88, 119
197th: 340–41, 365
212th: 630
229th: 194, 196, 199–202, 205
253d: 554
285th: 261
314th: 516
315th: 537
326th: 577
333d: 141n
334th: 622
370th: 97, 98n
371st: 105
559th: 141n, 658
561st: 141n
578th: 141n, 161
589th: 151, 155–56, 164, 166, 389
590th: 151, 164–66, 168
591st: 151, 153–54, 161
592d: 151, 155–56, 164
687th: 193, 206, 209, 209n, 210, 219, 658
740th: 141n, 314
755th: 459, 464, 478-79
770th: 141n, 400
771st: 141n, 324, 464
776th: 554
905th: 519
965th: 141n, 291, 398
969th: 309, 459, 464, 470
991st: 385
Field Artillery Groups
193d: 629
333d: 323
402d: 327
406th: 132
422d: 239
Fighter Command, IX: 171
Fighter Groups
362d: 541, 553
365th: 337
366th: 92, 337
370th: 418-19, 568-69, 573
404th: 337
405th: 496
Fighter Squadrons
377th: 548
379th: 541
389th: 92, 590
390th: 92, 337
Fighter Squadrons-Continued
402d: 419
430th: 592
474th: 592n
485th: 419
506th: 337
512th: 474
513th: 474
514th: 474
Fisher, Lt. Col. Henry G.: 517, 538
Fitzgerald, Lt. Col. Roy G.: 339
Flak. See Antiaircraft, German.
Flame throwers: 187, 197, 573, 636
Flamierge: 470-71, 474, 476, 644
Flamizoulle: 476-77, 479
Flares: 153, 156, 194, 210, 216, 301, 303, 321, 335,
340, 386, 405, 414, 421, 456, 589
Flohimont: 619-20
Fords: 316, 318, 321-22, 325, 356, 363, 369, 371
Forest of Ardennes: 40, 42
Forward observers: 94, 97, 98n, 119, 125, 152, 182,
196, 223, 241, 391
Foxhole lines: 94, 194, 196, 199, 256, 283, 328
Foy: 297, 301, 313, 400, 450, 455-56, 462, 463, 475
Foy-Notre Dame: 565, 567-69, 574
Fraiture: 388, 390-91, 581-82, 585, 588, 590, 599, 667
Francorchamps: 266, 337, 360
Frankland, Lt. Col. Ernest: 337
Fraser, Lt. Col. Harvey R.: 318, 355, 429
Frederick the Great: 9-10
Freesland, Capt. Joseph: 153
French forces: 51, 560
Freyneux: 386, 582, 583, 585-87
Fridline, Maj. Gaylord D.: 168
Friedman, Maj. Albert: 542
Führen: 214, 217-21, 223, 223n
Fuhrman Farm: 636-37
Fuller, Col. Hurley E.: 179, 182, 184-85, 188, 190-91
Fuller, Lt. Col. William H. G.: 283, 403-06
Gaffey, Maj. Gen. Hugh J.: 512, 514, 524-25, 527,
530-32, 548, 551, 553, 627. See also Armored
Division, 4th.
Galhausen: 411, 414–15
Galland, Generalleutnant Adolf: 663
Gardner, Lt. Col. Glenn H.: 548
Garvey, Capt. Jack J.: 116
Gavin, Maj. Gen. James M.: 306-07, 336, 343–44,
352, 367, 371, 390-91, 590, 599-600. See also
Airborne Division, 82d; Corps XVIII
(Airborne).
Gay, Brig. Gen. Hobart R.: 488, 510n, 606n, 609
Gaynor, Capt. Paul F.: 225n
Gebert, Pfc. Jack: 366
Geilenkirchen: 29, 176, 427, 428
Gemiind: 174, 178, 180, 186, 669
Gentingen: 216, 222, 534
Gercke, General der Infanterie Rudolf: 66
Gerimont: 620, 644

700 THE AR DENNES: BATTLE OF THE BULGE
German Air Force. See Luftwaffe.
German Army: 7–8, 13, 675
German General Staff: 6–7, 11, 18–20, 31, 49, 64, 76,
128, 675
German Navy ground troops: 8, 63, 143, 177, 215,
260
German units
Army Groups
B: 21–24, 26, 29, 32–37, 49, 64, 68, 70, 71 ,73,
81, 82, 180, 474, 486, 604, 647, 650, 662
664, 664n, 666, 674
Center: 7
G: 33, 35, 37, 482, 486
H. See Student.
Luettwitz: 614, 619
Student: 27, 33, 34, 37
Armies
Parachute: 208n
Replacement: 7, 37, 63
Reserve: 36
First: 37, 240
Fifth Panzer: 14, 14n, 15, 22, 25–26, 29, 33-
34, 59, 67, 69, 75, 120, 135, 142, 143, 145,
147, 173, 175, 175n, 176, 180, 213, 229, 264,
293n, 316, 317, 320, 323, 327, 356, 401, 428–
29, 435, 441, 443–44, 454, 465, 474–75, 480,
482, 557, 563–65, 567, 574, 578, 580–81, 585,
591, 603–04, 613, 631, 642, 647, 649, 656,
657, 658, 667, 668, 669–72
Sixth SS Panzer: 16, 22, 25, 26, 29, 33, 37, 50,
58–59, 62, 65, 67, 69, 73–77, 80–81, 86–87,
89, 102, 112, 119–20, 123, 128, 130, 134–35,
145–47, 162, 175, 260, 269, 270, 278, 292,
293n, 332, 337, 339, 361, 369, 374, 401, 411,
428, 435, 444, 480, 563–64, 578–81, 590–91,
595, 598, 601, 603-05, 613, 623, 631, 649,
656, 657, 667, 669-72, 675
Seventh: 22, 25, 26, 29, 33-34, 50, 67-70, 75,
175-76, 212-13, 215, 218, 222, 226-27, 229,
231-32, 235, 237, 240, 245, 251, 258, 262n,
327, 465, 474, 482-83, 488, 494-95, 506, 511,
517, 519, 521-22, 532-33, 537, 540, 564, 606,
638, 641–42, 657, 659, 661, 669, 672
Fifteenth: 25, 29, 33-35, 59, 63, 69-71, 75, 579,
603, 664n
Nineteenth: 25, 37
Twenty-fifth (ghost) : 50
Corps
Rothkirch: 537
I SS Panzer: 76, 77, 80-82, 89, 90, 96, 120, 121,
129, 144, 147, 264, 272, 280, 369, 374, 400,
580, 629, 631-32
II SS Panzer: 77, 81, 130, 369, 374, 565, 580-
82, 585, 590-91, 595, 599, 601, 657
XII SS: 29, 32
XVII SS: 176
XXXVII: 356
German Units-Continued
Corps-Continued
XXXIX Panzer: 614, 619
XLVII Panzer: 174, 176-81, 194, 195, 198, 207,
216, 298, 303-05, 317, 320-24, 328, 393, 435-
36, 443, 459, 465, 477, 511, 567, 570-71, 574,
577, 619, 646, 667, 672
XLVIII Panzer: 37
LIII: 635
LVIII Panzer: 174, 194-96, 204, 272, 319-20,
329, 356-57, 359, 378, 380-82, 385, 393, 398,
400, 401, 417, 429, 456, 576, 580, 614, 657
LXVI: 14245, 152, 156-57, 165, 168, 170, 175,
187, 277-78, 283, 284, 292-93, 393, 396, 400-
401, 403-04, 410, 414, 580
LXVII Artillery (Corps Monschau) : 76, 86–
87, 89, 135, 579-80, 604, 669
LXXX: 212, 229, 240, 255-56, 482, 491, 494,
503, 506-07, 669
LXXXV: 181, 207, 212-13, 216, 255, 482, 522,
533-35, 537, 540
766th Volks Artillery: 178
XC: 486
Divisions
Adolf Hitler: 76
Brandenburg: 270n
Grossdeutschland Panzer: 292-93, 401, 533,
545
Panzer Lehr: 37, 39, 174, 174n, 175, 178, 186,
207, 299-304, 320, 323, 325-26, 328-29, 429,
435-38, 440, 449-52, 454, 456-59, 463, 465-
66, 470, 565, 567, 569-70, 570n, 571-72,613,
621-23, 631, 643, 664, 665
1st SS Panzer: 76-77, 82, 90-91, 112, 120, 128,
130, 133, 149n, 150, 175, 260-62, 264-66,
269, 278, 280, 282, 290, 314, 316, 318, 335,
338-39, 347, 359, 363, 366, 368-70, 372-74,
376–77, 393, 397, 443, 557, 560, 578, 580,
590, 599-600, 605, 614, 619, 623-27, 631,
635, 669
2d Panzer: 39, 144, 175, 177-78, 180, 183-84,
186-92, 264, 295, 298-99, 301-04, 317-18,
320-21, 323, 325, 357, 382, 390, 420, 428-30,
435-38, 440-41, 443, 448, 449, 452-55, 463,
563-65, 567-70, 570n, 571-72, 613, 672
2d SS Panzer: 77, 382, 385-86, 388-90, 392,
406, 412, 415, 420, 429, 574, 580-81, 583-84,
587, 590-93, 595, 598-99, 601, 667
3d Panzer Grenadier: 121, 133-35, 580, 604,
614, 616, 619-21, 625, 644-46
3d Parachute: 76, 77, 81-82, 85, 90, 130, 135,
145, 146–47 150, 163, 261, 264, 337, 339,
369, 374
5th Parachute: 186, 207-09, 213-17, 219-23,
322, 324, 327-28, 465, 470, 476, 480, 511,
521, 529, 531, 533-35, 549, 555, 615, 642, 657
9th Panzer: 474, 563-65, 567, 569, 571-72, 613

INDEX 701
German Units-Continued
Divisions-Continued
9th SS Panzer: 74, 77, 290, 374, 393, 409, 418-
19, 580-81, 590, 592, 595, 598-99, 601, 603,
619, 632, 671
9th VG: 640–42
10th SS Panzer: 35, 667, 671
11th Panzer: 671
12th SS Panzer: 74, 76-77, 82, 90-91, 98, 115,
121-22, 125, 129-31, 133-34, 261, 264-65,
369, 374, 578, 580, 598, 601, 619, 631-33,
667, 670
12th VG: 76, 81, 83, 92-93, 122, 130, 135, 260,
604
15th Panzer Grenadier: 474-79, 563, 607, 615,
619, 644
17th Luftwaffe Feld: 623
17th SS Panzer Grenadier: 35
18th Air Force Field: 143
18th VG: 80, 142–45, 150, 152, 154-55, 157,
162-63, 165, 277, 282-84, 292, 396, 403-04,
407-08, 418-19, 603
21st Panzer: 33, 35
26th VG: 145, 177-78, 180-82, 186-87, 191,
207-08, 299, 301-02, 304, 323, 449-51, 454,
456, 458-59, 463, 465-66, 470, 475, 480, 528,
555, 615, 619, 632, 651, 657, 661
49th Infantry: 35
62d VG: 143–45, 152-54, 157, 159-60, 284-85,
292, 396, 402, 403, 407, 410-11, 414-15, 417,
420, 603
79th VG: 522, 533–41
89th Infantry: 35
116th Panzer: 69, 153, 175, 195, 196, 198-202,
204, 291, 317-20, 354, 357-59, 378, 380-85,
395, 397-98, 428-30, 435, 437, 441–42, 565,
567, 574, 577, 580, 661
167th VG: 619, 623, 626, 631-32, 635
212th VG: 213, 229, 239–40, 244-45, 248, 252-
53, 257-58, 484-85, 490-92, 494, 496, 499-
501, 503, 506, 507, 511, 669
246th VG: 35, 76, 87, 604
272d VG: 90, 103
276th VG: 213, 220, 222, 228-29, 231-32, 234-
37, 240, 245, 256, 258, 483, 494-95, 501, 503-
04, 50607, 511, 672
277th VG: 76, 80-83, 87, 94-98, 103, 115, 121,
134, 135
326th VG: 61, 76, 80, 87-89, 102-03, 119-20,
134-35
340th VG: 619, 632
352d VG: 213,215-16,218-20,222,224-27,235,
236, 483, 511, 516, 520-22, 533-35, 537
560th VG: 195-96, 198, 204, 354, 358-59, 380,
382-86, 388-90, 395, 397-98, 574, 580-81,
583, 585, 592-93, 595, 598, 667
Brigades
Fuehrer Begleit: 170, 174, 174n, 175, 278, 292,
293n, 396, 401-04, 407-10, 416–21, 480, 533,
German Units-Continued
Brigades-Continued
575-77, 580-81, 584-85, 599, 613-16, 619–
22, 631, 645-46, 671
Fuehrer Grenadier: 521-22, 530, 533-34, 536-
37, 540-41, 543-46, 614, 638, 641-42
11th Assault Gun: 214, 215, 528
15th Volks Werfer: 178
150th Panzer (Brandenburgei) : 270, 270n,
360-61, 363
Regiments
1st SS Panzer: 90, 105, 260, 339, 368, 377.
See also Kampfgruppe Peiper.
2d SS Panzer Grenadier: 339, 343, 352, 588
3d Panzer: 187, 191-92, 295-96, 386, 438, 452,
456, 570, 583, 587, 592, 595, 597
4th Panzer Grenadier: 390-91, 583, 585-86,
588-90, 595, 597
10th Panzer Grenadier: 572
12th SS Panzer: 131-32
13th Parachute: 215, 222, 531
14th Parachute: 209, 215-16, 219, 222, 328,
527, 552, 623-24, 635-36
15th Parachute: 209,214-17,219,222,525,529,
607, 637
16th Panzer: 358, 575
19th Panzer Grenadier: 599–601
25th Panzer Grenadier: 115, 129, 131, 601-02
26th Panzer Grenadier: 133
27th, 12th VG Division: 83, 85,92, 94, 129, 604
29th Panzer Grenadier: 134
39th, 26th VG Division: 180-82, 186, 207, 323,
458-59, 470, 475, 478, 480, 615, 645
48th, 12th VG Division: 83, 85, 92, 94, 604
60th Panzer Grenadier: 145, 153, 197-98, 358,
380, 442, 575
77th, 26th VG Division: 180-82, 186, 301-02,
304, 456, 463, 476-78, 480, 645
78th, 26th VG Division: 180, 186, 301-02, 304,
456, 463, 475, 630
89th, 12th VG Division: 122
104th Panzer Grenadier: 615-16
115th. See Kampfgruppe 115th.
156th, 116th Panzer Division: 197-99, 380–81
164th, 62d VG Division: 154, 159-60, 284, 292,
397, 414
182d Flak: 178
183d, 62d VG Division: 152-53, 161, 292, 403,
405
190th, 62d VG Division: 152-54, 292, 397, 402,
410, 414
208th, 79th VG Division: 534
212th, 79th VG Division: 534
266th, 79th VG Division: 538
293d, 18th VG Division: 145, 154-55, 165, 168,
292, 404, 418-19
294th 18th VG Division: 80, 145-46, 150,
155-56, 162-63, 165, 277, 283, 292, 404-05

702 THE ARDENNES: BATTLE OF THE BULGE
German Units-Continued
Regiments-Continued
295th, 18th VG Division: 145–46, 150,292,396,
404
304th Panzer Grenadier: 183, 187, 436, 438,
455, 570
316th, 212th VG Division: 240, 245, 251-53,
494
320th, 212th VG Division: 240–44,247–48,251,
253, 484, 494, 496
352d, 246th VG Division: 604
423d, 212th VG Division: 240-43, 245, 254,
256, 484, 494
751st, 326th VG Division: 89, 103
752d, 326th VG Division: 89
753d, 326th VG Division: 89, 119
901st Panzer Grenadier: 206, 304, 457, 463,
465, 471, 475-76, 480, 623
902d Panzer Grenadier: 207,299,304,326,437,
440, 456, 458-59, 463, 643
903d Panzer Grenadier: 438
914th, 352d VG Division: 216, 219-20, 222,
483, 516
915th, 352d VG Division: 216–19,221-22, 225,
516, 520-23, 535
916th, 352d VG Division: 216, 218, 220-22,
225-26,483
986th, 276th VG Division: 229-31, 234
987th, 276th VG Division: 231, 236, 245–46,
252, 504
988th, 276th VG Division: 230, 232, 236, 484,
499, 503-04, 507
989th, 277th VG Division: 96-98, 115-16
990th, 277th VG Division: 82, 96-98, 103, 119
991st, 277th VG Division: 97
1128th, 560th VG Division: 198, 204, 357, 380,
383
1129th, 560th VG Division: 383
1130th, 560th VG Division: 196, 199, 203-04,
386, 398, 583
Kampfgruppen
Bayer: 378, 380, 384
Krag: 420-21, 599, 602
Kunkel: 324-25, 464-66
Peiper: 90-92, 260-61, 261n, 262-64, 264n,
265-69, 307, 318, 335–43, 347-49, 351, 353,
355, 359-60, 363-69, 372-77, 385, 401, 418,
428, 578, 581, 599-600, 669, 670
115th: 474, 477-79, 644
Battalions
3d Grenadier: 645
5th Parachute Engineer: 214-15
12th Fuesilier: 129
18th VG Mobile: 277, 282, 292
18th VG Replacement: 143, 168
23d Festung: 245
26th Reconnaissance: 302, 323-25, 476-77, 669
28th Panzer Engineer Battalion: 183
German Units-Continued
Battalions-Continued
116th Panzer Reconnaissance: 356, 380-81
212th Fuesilier: 257, 484
506th Panzer: 162
519th Heavy Antitank: 393
600th Army Engineer: 178
669th Ost: 168
999th Penal: 494
Detachments
501st SS Panzer: 260
Gerolstein: 623
Gerolstein Forest: 81
Geronsweiler: 571
Gerow, Maj. Gen. Leonard T.: 53-54, 78, 103-04,
120, 134, 330, 335, 339, 611. See also Corps, V.
Gersdorff, Generalmajor Rudolf Freiherr von: 212,
642
Geyershof: 252
Gibb, Col. Frederick W.: 130
Gilbreth, Col. Joseph H.: 295-97, 297n, 448, 473-74
Gilsdorf: 500-501
Ginder, Col. Philip D.: 107
Girst: 245
Givet: 21, 28, 42, 45, 69, 424, 426, 434, 439, 443, 557,
559-61
Givry: 474, 476
Gladding, Maj. Leon D.: 542
Glider Infantry Regiments
325th: 346, 390-91, 581, 585, 590, 595-97
327th: 307, 456, 459, 462-64, 466-68, 470-72, 474,
478-80
401st: 307
Glider operations: 468, 609
Gniot, 1st Lt. Charles R.: 529
Goehbels, Reich Minister Joseph: 8, 8n, 63, 623
Goering, Reichsmarschall Hermann: 1, 72, 208n,
672
Corn, Maj. John W.: 243, 246
GOUVY: 291, 395, 397-99, 401, 406
Gouvy Station: 286, 398-99
Gramm, Maj. Albert L.: 546
Grand Halleux: 370, 373, 581
“Grand Slam”: 20
Grand Trisogne: 569
Grandménil: 381, 386, 583, 587, 590-97, 601
Greece: 2, 269
“Green” troops: 55, 59, 90, 123, 141, 144, 154, 196,
198, 204, 523, 534, 591n, 592, 594
Greif (Operation) : 269-71, 360-61
Grenades: 110, 111, 115, 128, 192, 218n, 224, 236,
253, 256, 303, 362, 367, 371
Grevenmacher: 34
Grevils-Brésil: 522, 534
Grindhausen: 181
Griswold, Lt. Col. George M.: 450-51
Grosbous: 226, 236, 520-23, 540-41
Grosskampenberg: 151, 153

INDEX 703
Grosslangenfeld: 138, 143, 166
Grow, Maj. Gen. Robert W.: 607, 628-32, 634. See
also Armored Division, 6th
Grufflange: 291, 396-97, 402, 403n, 410, 414
Guderian, Generaloberst Heinz: 1, 675
Guns. See Antiaircraft guns; Antitank guns; Artil-
lery; Howitzers; Mortars; Tank destroyers;
Tanks; Weapons
Guns, British: 665
Guns, German
multiple 20-mm: 185
40-mm SP: 386
88-mm: 192, 302, 328, 653
120-mm: 213
170-mm: 629
SP (assault): 71-72, 77, 156, 220, 235, 240, 328,
528, 653
Habay-la-Neuve: 525
Habiemont: 343
Habscheid: 141
Haid: 436
Haig: 674
Haislip, Maj. Gen. Wade H.: 488
Halenfelder Wald: 164
Half-tracks: 184n, 210, 234
Hall, Capt. John W.: 233
Haller: 228-30, 232, 234, 236, 496, 499, 501, 503–44
Hallerbach: 505
Hallschlag: 137, 141
Hamilton, Lt. Col. Paul: 541–43, 543n
Hamm Farm: 504
Hampteau: 378, 431, 575, 577
Han: 382
Hansen, Lt. Col. Harold D.: 361
Hardigny: 298-99
Hardt woods: 501, 503
Hardthof: 499, 503
Hargimont: 433, 436, 567, 569, 573
Harlange: 209, 606, 625, 635-37, 642–43
Harmon, Maj. Gen. Ernest N.: 434, 440–41, 565-66,
568-73, 591. See also Armored Division, 2d.
Harper, Col. Joseph H.: 307, 468
Harper, Lt. Col. Ralph S.: 295-96
Harperscheid: 80
Harrison, Lt. Col. Willard E.: 352
Harrison, Brig. Gen. William K., Jr.: 335, 364-65,
372-73, 376
Harrold, Col. Thomas L.: 230, 233, 615
Harsin: 433, 436, 438
Harspelt: 194, 197, 199, 203
Hartman, Lt. Col. William F.: 309
Harwick, Maj. Robert F.: 454-55
Hasbrouck, Brig. Gen. Robert W.: 273-75, 279, 282,
285-90, 393, 395, 397-98, 400, 406-07, 411-15,
418-21, 585, 593, 597. See also Armored Divi-
sion, 7th.
Hasselt: 426
Hatfield, Sgt. Lawrence L.: 521n
Haute-Bodeux: 346
Haversin: 433
Havrenne: 440, 570-72
Heath, Lt. Col. Calvin A.: 641
Hebronval: 401, 412
Heckhuscheid: 143, 152-54, 157, 159, 161, 197, 284
Hedree: 571
Heerlen: 274, 603
Heiderscheid: 508, 516-19, 522, 534-38, 540–41, 543,
545
Heiderscheidergrund: 518, 532, 536, 540, 543, 543n,
544–47
Heilmann, Col. Ludwig: 207-09, 214-15, 322-23,
327-28, 529, 531
Heinerscheid: 175, 181, 184, 185, 188, 191, 198, 204
Heinsberg: 53
Heist, 1st Lt. Edgar C.: 485n
Hemmeres: 292
Hemroulle: 477-80
Henbest, Lt. Col. Ross C.: 181, 188
Hendrix, S/Sgt. James R.: 555
Herbomont: 307
Herborn: 240, 243, 247–48, 251-52
Herbstnebel (Plan) : 26
Herdrick, 1st Lt. Lorenz: 149
Herlong, Lt. Col. Robert: 341–42, 349
Herresbach: 150, 162
Hertgrund (ravine) : 246
Herve: 42
Heuem: 150, 163, 273, 277
Heydte, Col. Friedrich A. Freiherr von der: 270-71,
271n
Hickey, Brig. Gen. Doyle: 585, 587, 591-92, 601-02
Hierheck: 542
Higgins, Brig. Gen. Gerald J.: 453, 455
High Ardennes: 42–44
Hightower, Lt. Col. John M.: 86, 94, 94n, 95, 105-06
Highway N4: 428, 431
Highway N12: 294-96, 298-99, 445–448
Highway N15: See Liege-Bastogne highway.
Highway N26: 205n, 622
Highway N28: 353-54, 385, 388-89, 413, 581
Highway N46: 319
Hills
313: 243, 247, 250, 254, 257, 484, 496-97, 499, 501
329: 250, 254, 256
402: 229
490: 642
510: 450-52, 630
612: 151
Hillyard, Lt. Col. Harry: 568
Himmler, Heinrich: 7, 263, 623
Hinderhausen: 402, 407, 409, 416–17
Hinds, Col. Sidney R.: 572
Hines, Col. John L., Jr.: 628-29
Hirschfelder, Col. Chester J.: 95, 105, 107
Hitler, Adolf: 9-10, 12-15, 17, 64, 174n, 178, 292-93,
482, 533, 580, 614, 651-52.

704 THE ARDENNES: BATTLE OF THE BULGE
Hitler-Continued
and assassination attempt, July 1944: 6-7, 11,
292n
and capture of Antwerp as final objective: 2, 16-
17, 19, 19n, 20, 22, 27, 28, 31, 75
and the capture of Bastogne: 475, 475n, 477, 564,
613, 647
and counteroffensive planning and timing: 19-24,
26-32, 33-39, 63, 68-72, 75, 135, 142, 173, 175,
195, 212, 435, 443, 486, 579, 603, 604, 656, 665,
666, 668, 670, 671,
decision for counteroffensive in the Ardennes:
1-7, 10-18, 20, 39, 48, 673-75, 676
Fuehrer Conferences: 1-2, En, 13, 21-22, 31
and manpower “comb-out”: 8-9, 15, 63
and Meuse bridgeheads as initial objective: 19, 22,
69, 75, 563
and the 1940 Ardennes thrust: 18, 20, 38n, 40,
269
and the OKW Reserve: 474, 671
and Operation Greif and Skorzeny: 269-70
orders to take no prisoners: 262, 262n
relationship with staff and field commanders:
6-7, 11, 14, 1618, 23-24, 30-32, 33, 35-36, 76,
173, 402, 647, 675
security measures for counteroffensive: 11, 15, 19,
21, 23, 48-51, 58, 61, 66, 70-71
sole commander for counteroffensive: 11, 18, 30,
57
turns attention from Ardennes: 673
and use of paratroops: 269-70
views on American-British co-operation: 12, 17, 18,
671
Hitzfeld, General der Infanterie Otto: 76, 86-87,
604
Hobbs, Maj. Gen. Leland S.: 334-36, 341, 359, 363,
365-66, 371-74, 376, 401. See also Infantry Divi-
sion, 30th.
Hodges, Lt. Gen. Courtney H.: 53, 306, 315, 344,
411n, 424, 426-27, 433-34, 513, 566, 587, 610-12.
See also Army, First.
and deployment of reinforcements: 305, 306, 331,
333, 336, 346, 431, 565, 583
and V Corps request for Wahlerscheid with-
drawal: 103, 104, 330
problems with the fall of Manhay: 590, 597
and St. Vith defense and withdrawal: 395, 406,
412, 413, 443
Hodges, Capt. Preston C.: 378
Hodgson, Lt. Col. Reginald H.:291
Hoecker, Generalleutnant Hans-Kurt: 623, 626
Hofen: 78-79, 87-89, 102-103, 119-20, 133, 134, 579
Hoffmann-Schonborn, Generalmajor: 142, 396
Hogan, Lt. Col. Samuel M.: 353, 387
Hoge, Brig. Gen. William M.: 158-60, 273, 284-85,
290, 392, 400, 406, 410, 412-15
Hogne: 431, 572, 574
Hohes Venn: 42, 44, 46, 76-77, 259, 270, 361, 368,
579, 670
Holies Venn (Operation) : 270-71
Hohwald (hill) : 499, 503
Holbrook, Brig. Gen. Willard A., Jr.: 618
Holdingen: 395, 397
Holland: 29, 48, 176, 274, 305, 334
Hollange: 548, 551
Hollerath: 89, 95-96, 98
Holzheim: 148-51, 162
Holzthum: 181-82, 185-86, 192-93, 207
Homan, Maj. Sammie N.: 450
Homprk: 459, 470, 551, 607, 609, 613, 619, 623, 627
“Honeymoon Trail”: 611
Honsfeld: 81, 83, 90-91, 94, 162, 261
Honsfelder Wald: 93, 106
Hoover, Lt. Col. Phillip F.: 161
Horrocks, Lt. Gen. Brian G.: 426, 557, 561
Horses: 40, 70, 82, 177, 194, 214, 215, 229, 260, 284,
292, 299, 396, 414, 665, 667, 668
Horthy, Admiral Miklós von Nagybánya: 270
Hoscheid: 181, 215, 219-23, 255
Hosdorf: 216, 218
Hosinpen: 175. 180-82. 185-87, 192-93, 205, 207, 669
Hospitals and hospital trains: 61, 223, 668
Hotton: 318, 339, 345–46, 353, 355-56, 371, 377-82,
383-86, 391, 401, 429-31, 566, 575-77, 581,
583, 587, 601. See also Soy-Hotton road.
Hotton-Marche road: 438, 441, 442, 565, 574-75,
581, 661
Houffalize: 296, 306, 307, 312, 315-18, 320, 344, 345,
347, 352, 354, 356-57, 359, 381, 389-90, 393, 397,
401, 452, 605, 612, 617, 623, 647
Houffalize-Bastogne road: 304, 307, 315, 317, 318,
319, 452, 456
Houmont: 620, 644
Howitzers: 149, 164, 202, 204, 218, 221, 232, 251-52,
295, 297-98 387, 658, 659
pack: 308
75-mm: 149
105-mm: 182, 186, 219, 239, 308, 466-67
155-mm: 125, 156, 388, 398, 459-60, 478
8-inch: 161, 281
Howze, Col. Robert L., Jr.: 353, 378, 379, 382, 384
Hoy, Lt. Col. Charles E.: 430
Hritsik, 2d Lt. Michael: 518, 518n
Hubermont: 644, 646
Huddleston, 1st Lt. Jarrett M., Jr.: 159
Huebner, Maj. Gen. Clarence R.: 103, 443
Huldange: 205, 290
Hull, Pfc. S. E.: 640n
Humain: 433, 440–41, 565, 570-74
Hungarian forces: 2
Hunningen: 86, 92-95, 106, 126, 279-80, 282-83, 285,
396, 404, 408
Hürtgen Forest: 26, 30, 42, 53, 55, 129, 179, 238
Hustead, Maj. Charles L.: 454-55
Hutton, Col. Carl I.: 435n, 441, 572

INDEX 705
Hyduke, 1st Lt. Edward P.: 300-302, 448
Huy: 25, 69, 264, 265, 342, 426, 434, 557, 561, 566,
578
Ihren Creek: 151, 167
Illuminating shell: 89, 128, 129, 130, 380, 602-03
Imgenbroich: 102
Infantry: 239, 258
German/American strength ratio: 252, 650-51
German/American support weapons: 653, 654
Infantry Battalion, 99th: 359, 361
Infantry Divisions
1st: 86, 129, 335
casualties: 129, 133
reinforces at Butgenbach: 113, 128, 130, 131,
134, 360, 604
2d: 55, 138-41, 156-57
casualties: 104, 116, 123-24
command and organization: 54, 120
defense of Rocherath-Krinkelt sector: 95, 98,
105-12, 114-18, 120-25, 126-27, 128-29, 270,
604
Wahlerscheid attack and withdrawal: 54, 79-
80, 82, 86, 87, 89, 91, 101-04, 107-12, 113,
158, 330, 335
withdrawal to Elsenborn ridge: 131-34
4th: GO, 73, 458
casualties: 55, 252, 253, 258
command and organization: 55, 238, 508
defense of the Sauer-Moselle sector: 213, 227,
230, 231, 236, 238-58, 313, 484, 488, 490-94,
496, 499, 507-08, 511-12
5th: 489-90, 490n, 492-94, 496-508
8th: 54
9th: 133-34
26th
casualties: 512
command and organization: 488, 510-12
counterattack toward Bastogne: 515, 518,
520-23, 530, 532, 534-35, 537, 540-11, 543n,
544-46, 606, 627, 63742
28th: 59, 73, 137-38, 152, 157-58, 460, 519
casualties: 55, 179, 179n, 192n, 193, 204, 210,
219, 220, 224, 421
command and organization: 55, 179, 214, 290,
309, 508, 522
defense of the Our and Clerf crossings: 176
77, 179-202, 203-06, 208-10, 279, 289, 294,
312-15, 331
defense of the Sauer-Our sector: 213-27, 229,
241, 249, 488, 515, 521
operations in the VIII Corps barrier lines:
322-24, 38-28, 393, 457, 552, 607
30th
casualties: 340, 377
command and organization: 334-35, 342
engagement with Kampfgruppe Peiper north
of the Amblève: 268-69, 335-45, 347-51,
353, 359, 364, 366, 371, 374, 376-77, 401,
Infantry Divisions—Continued
30th—Continued
578, 580, 582n, 592, 597
moves south from Ninth Army area: 130,
269, 289, 333-35,427
35th: 486, 488-89, 539, 606, 606n, 607, 609, 624-27,
629-30, 634-37, 642
66th: 334
75th: 73, 334, 385, 387-88, 427, 433-34, 442, 582,
591n, 594
78th: 54, 103
80th: 225, 483, 486-87, 489-90, 493
casualties: 517, 538, 548-49
command and organization: 490, 508, 510-12,
515-16, 539
counterattack toward Bastogne: 515-21, 523,
532-41, 543n, 548, 609, 637
83d: 55, 238-39, 574
84th: 176, 571
casualties: 428, 577
command and organization: 427, 431
operations on the Ourthe River line: 321,
379, 381, 427-42, 566, 570, 574, 577, 582n,
585
87th: 334, 486, 612, 617-18, 621-22, 643-44
95th: 489
99th: 54-56, 59, 73, 78-81, 126, 137, 138, 260,
330, 658
casualties: 98, 99, 106, 123
command and organization: 77-79
defense of the northern shoulder: 80-102,
104, 105-06, 107, 109, 111-13, 115, 117-20,
129, 131-34, 149, 150, 152, 161, 162, 270.
332, 335, 604
102d: 427
104th: 334
106th
casualties: 166, 168, 421-22, 593
command and organization: 138, 205, 273-74,
395, 401
battle of the Schnee Eifel sector: 136, 136n,
145, 154-57, 161-71, 275, 282-84, 289, 292,
331
initial attack of: 85, 120, 148-50, 152-54,
158-61, 196-97, 272, 274, 330, 658
St. Vith defense and withdrawal: 205, 273,
275-77, 281-84, 288, 290, 312, 331, 357,
389, 392-93, 395, 401-02, 412-13, 583
situation before the counteroffensive: 55, 59,
60, 73, 137-41, 144, 144n, 145, 151-52,
194-95
Infantry Regiments
2d: 489, 493, 497-99, 501, 503-04
8th: 238, 246, 253, 262n
9th: 94-95, 101, 103-04, 106, 107-10, 110n, 115-17,
122-23
10th: 489-90, 490n, 491-93, 496-97, 499, 501-04,
506, 508
11th: 489-90, 493, 498-99, 502-06

706 THE ARDENNES: BATTLE OF THE BULGE
Infantry Regiments—Continued
12th: 213, 230, 238, 240-52, 254, 256-58, 484,
490-92, 504
16th: 130
18th: 133, 134, 335
22d: 238, 244, 248, 251-52, 257, 484, 494, 501
23d: 86, 92-94, 99-101, 104-06, 109, 115, 117, 122,
123, 140
26th: 86, 113, 113n, 128-34, 313
29th: 437, 561
38th: 103, 108-12, 115-18, 122-24
39th: 134
47th: 102, 133, 134
101st: 521, 544, 546-47, 638-42
104th: 520-23, 541-43, 543n, 544-47, 638-41
109th: 179, 180, 185-87, 206, 213-23, 223n, 224-
26, 227, 229, 231, 234, 236, 255, 258, 483, 488,
500-501, 508, 515-16, 521, 621
110th: 177, 179-92, 192n, 193, 195, 198-99, 205,
208-11, 213, 216, 218, 219, 221, 295-96, 304,
327, 458
112th: 153, 154, 158-59, 179, 187-88, 193-202,
20346, 279, 289-90, 393, 395, 398, 407, 417-21,
583, 598-99, 602-03
117th: 335,337-39, 347-48,360, 363-64, 372, 373,
377
119th: 335-36, 339-45, 349-51, 364-65, 372-73
120th: 335-36, 359, 363, 372, 377
134th: 609, 624, 626, 633, 635
137th: 607, 609, 624-25, 635-37
289th: 587, 591-92, 594-96, 601-03
290th: 388, 594
317th: 517,535-36,538-39
318th: 516-17, 520, 531, 535, 539, 548-50, 550n,
551, 607
319th: 516-19, 535-36. 538-39, 539n, 543-54
320th: 607, 609, 624, 636-37
328th: 264n, 520-23, 541, 543-46, 639, 641-42
329th: 647n
333d: 431,433,436,438-39,575-76
334th: 427, 430-31, 442, 575, 577
335th: 431, 433. 437, 442
345th: 621-22, 643
346th: 622, 643
347th: 643-44
393d: 80, 81, 83, 86, 90, 95-98, 98n, 99, 101,
106, 109, 115, 117, 120, 330
394th: 80-86, 90, 92-93, 95, 97-99, 101, 105-06,
117-18, 120, 330
395th: 79-80, 87-89, 95, 101-02, 107, 109, 112,
117-19, 119n 120, 122
422d: 136n, 138, 141, 145, 151-52, 155-56, 161,
164-71, 282, 289
423d: 136n, 138, 145, 151-52, 154-57, 159, 161,
164-71, 282, 284, 289
424th: 136n 138, 140, 145, 151-54, 156, 158-61,
165, 197, 197n, 203, 205, 273, 279, 284, 285,
Infantry Regiments—Continued
424th—Continued
289, 290, 291, 393, 407, 410, 415-16, 418, 421,
590, 593
Infantry-tank-artillery teams: 124-25, 133, 185, 202,
243, 249, 341, 375, 375, 460-61, 503 552, 625.
See also Task Forces; Teams.
Infiltration: 78, 93, 173, 175, 209, 231-32, 269, 290,
297, 331
Infrared: 178
Ingendorf 226
Inspector General investigations: 136n, 166n, 263-
64, 589n
Intelligence: 50, 157, 252, 255, 288, 292, 401, 511, 614
from captured documents: 401, 527, 624, 667
from civilians: 59, 351, 370
concerning German counterattack intentions: 5-6,
56-57, 57n, 58-61, 61n, 62-63, 74, 80, 152, 180,
239, 333, 496, 668
German: 13, 73-74, 112, 176, 216, 240, 255, 346n
511, 515, 562, 579, 614, 614n
from prisoners: 60-61, 332, 343, 374, 401, 406,
442, 539, 558
from radio and telephone intercept: 73-74, 269,
346n, 378, 449, 482, 666
from rail and vehicular activity: 59, 61-62, 144,
144n, 152, 194, 332
International Highway: 80-83, 95
Irwin, Maj. Gen. S. LeRoy: 489-92,496, 503, 506-08.
See also Infantry Division, 5th.
Irzyk, Maj. Albin: 528
Isle-la-Hesse: 477, 480
Italian front: 3
Ives, Lt. Col. Hiram D.: 536
]abos. See Aircraft, fighter-bombers.
Jackman, 1st Lt. G. W.: 98n
Jacobs, Col. Ben R.: 520
Jameson, Capt. Joseph: 97
Jamodenne: 431
Jansbach Creek: 97
Jaques, Lt. Col. George: 552, 554-55
Jemelle: 425, 433
Jenneville: 622, 645
Jodenville: 620
Jodl, Generaloberst Alfred: 1, 11, 12, 15, 23, 69
75n, 444, 475, 562, 564, 671, 676
and planning for the counteroffensive: 16-17, 19-
21, 23, 27-28 33-35, 173, 212, 443, 665
relationship with Hitler: 11, 16-17, 27
John, Generalleutnant Friedrich: 23
Johnson, Col. Walter M. 335, 373
Jones, Maj. Gen. Alan W.: 138, 140. See also
Infantry Division, 106th.
and St. Vith operations and withdrawal: 205, 273,
275, 276, 279, 285, 288, 289, 290, 294, 395, 407,
412, 413

INDEX 707
Jones, Maj. Gen. Alan W.—Continued
and Schnee Eifel operations and withdrawal: 148,
150, 151, 156, 157, 158, 160, 161, 163, 167, 171,
331
Jones Pvt. J .W.: 218n
Jones, Lt. Col. Robert B.: 397-98
Jordan, Capt. John W.: 349, 596
Joubiéval: 420-21
Jülich: 50, 53, 87
Junglinster: 240-41, 244, 493
Juseret: 553
Kahler, Col. Hans-Joachim: 534
Kaiserslautern: 62
Kalborn: 194-95
Kalkesbach: 497
Kall: 68
Kalterherberg: 87, 134
Kane, Lt. Col. Matthew W.: 354
Karsteter, Lt. Col. Burton W.: 615
Kaschner, Generalmajor Erwin: 87, 102, 119, 120
Kassel: 67
Kaundorf: 547 637-39
Kautenbach: 222-23
Kean, Maj. Gen. William G.: 393, 426, 565-66, 592n
Kehmen: 518-19, 523, 536-38
Keitel, Generalfeldmarschall Wilhelm: 1, 11, 12, 19,
19n, 22, 23, 676
Kenan, Lt. Col. Thomas A.: 248
Kennedy Lt. Col. Chester E.: 629
Kennedy, Capt. John J.: 113
Kesselring, Generalfeldmarschall Albert: 3
Kesternich: 54, 87
Kilburn, Brig. Gen. Charles S.: 560, 617-18, 621,
644-45. See also Armored Division, 11th.
Kiley, Lieutenant: 514
Kimbro, T/4 Truman: 111
Kingsley, Lt. John A.: 627
Kinnard, Lt. Col. Harry W. O.: 472
Kinney, Lt. Col. R. W.: 523
Kittel, Generalmajor Frederich: 143, 153
Kjeldseth, Lt. Col. Clarion J.: 206
Kleist: 40
Klinck, Lt. Col. Earl F.: 168
Kluge, Generalfeldmarschall Guenther von: 13, 24
Kniess, General der Infanterie Baptist: 212, 533-34,
537, 539
Knives: 115, 336
Koblenz: 42, 45, 59, 64, 65, 662
Kobscheid: 138, 146, 148-50
Kochem: 45
Kokott, Generalmajor Heinz: 177, 180-81, 186, 301,
323-24, 449-50, 450n, 451-52, 458, 463, 465,
470, 474, 476-80, 527, 615, 616
Kolb, Colonel: 641
Kolinski, Sgt. J. C.: 251
Konz: 68
Konzen station: 87-88
Kraemer, Brigadefuehrer der Waffen-SS Fritz: 591
Krag, Maj. Ernst: 601-02
Krebs, General der Infanterie Hans: 21, 22, 26, 33,
672
Krefeld: 23, 53
Kreipe, General der Flieger Werner: 1
Krewinkel: 76, 81, 89, 138, 145-49, 261
Krinkelt. See Rocherath-Krinkelt.
Krueger, Generaloberst Walter: 174, 175 194, 198,
319, 320, 356, 357, 359, 378, 380, 382, 429,
456, 576-77
Kunkel, Major: 324
Kutak, Capt. Frank: 555
Kyll River: 45, 54
Kyllburg: 176
La Fosse: 595
La Gleize: 268, 336-37, 339, 343, 346-49, 351, 359,
363-64, 366, 368-69, 371-73, 375-77, 443, 582n.
592, 597, GOO, 605
La Neuville: 371
La Roche: 44, 46, 287, 291, 316-18, 344, 346, 353-56,
358, 378, 380-82, 393, 400, 431, 433, 647, 662
La Roche-Salmchlteau road. See Highway N28.
Lagrew, Lt. Col. Embrey D.: 633
Lake Balaton: 673
Lamm, 1st Lt. George D.: 419n GOO
Lammerding Generalleutnant Heinz: 583-84, 587,
590, 592, 595, 598
Lammersdorf: 54
Lamormenil: 383, 386, 582, 583, 585-87
Landrecis: 42
Langhaeuser, Generalmajor Rudolf: 195
Lanzerath: 78, 80, 83, 85, 90, 138, 147-50, 260-61,
368
LaPrade, Lt. Col. James L.: 453-54
Larochette (Fels) : 498
Lascheid: 175
Lauchert Colonel Meinrad von: 177, 180, 191, 295,
298, 299, 302, 304, 317, 321, 382, 429-30, 437-38,
448, 449, 452, 454, 456, 567-70, 570n
Laudesfeld: 164
Lauer, Maj. Gen. Walter E.: 77, 80, 85, 86, 90, 91,
93, 98, 101, 105, 109, 112, 113, 118, 118, 120.
See also Infantry Division, 99th.
Laughlin, Pfc. O. M.: 550
Lausdorn: 194, 204, 205
Lauterhorn: 241-43, 247, 250-51, 254, 257, 484, 496
Lavaselle: 620
Leach, Capt. James H.: 550n
Leake, 1st Lt. John L.: 241, 242, 256
Lee, Lt. Gen. John C. H.: 172, 559
Legler, Maj. Matthew L.: 97, 101
Lkglise: 523
Leidenhorn: 197
Leignon: 435, 568
Leiker, Capt. Victor C.: 232
Leimerdelt draw: 501, 503
Leinen, Pfc. John: 350
Leipzig: 612

708 THE ARDENNES: BATTLE OF THE BULGE
Leithum: 205
Lellingen: 187
Leo, 2d Lt. Samuel: 218n
Leonard, Maj. Gen. John W.: 225-27, 230 236.
See also Armored Division, 9th.
Lesse River: 44, 428, 434, 568, 572, 578, 613
L’Homme River: 44, 428, 437, 572, 578
Liaison planes. See Artillery liaison planes.
Libramont: 45, 315, 322, 325, 326, 328, 618
Liefrange: 547, 637-38
Liege :19, 19n, 25, 27-29, 39, 40, 42, 44, 46, 75, 77,
259, 260, 265, 312, 317, 341, 363, 385, 423, 425,
426, 428, 443, 556-57, 560-61, 565-66, 578-79,
589-90, 654-55, 656n, 666, 668, 673
Liege River Belt: 655
Liège-Bastogne highway (N15) : 268, 345, 352-54,
357, 377, 385, 389, 391-92, 458, 566, 581
Lieler: 187, 194, 196, 204
Lienne Creek: 268, 336, 342, 343, 345, 584, 590, 595
Lierneux: 415
Ligneuville: 261, 264-65, 360-61
Limburg: 77
Lindquist, Col. Roy E.: 581
Lindsey, Capt. Franklin P., Jr.: 415
Lines of communication, German: 272, 292, 339,
342, 348, 351, 367, 369, 373, 393, 422, 517, 519,
533, 540, 595, 606, 644, 662
Lipperscheid: 219
Littlejohn, Brig. Gen. Robert M.: 666
Livarchamps: 607
Llewellyn, 2d Lt. S. D.: 119n
Logistics: 22, 63, 66, 68, 71-73, 661-68, 670. See also
Motor transport: Railroads; Supply.
Lohse, Maj. Leslie A.: 416
Lommersweiler: 285, 292
Longchamps: 455, 462, 478
Longsdorf: 217-18, 220-21, 223
Longvilly: 296304, 313, 315, 317, 328, 448, 449-52,
466
Longvilly-Bastogne road: 297, 450, 451, 607, 629
Longwy: 20, 45, 487, 512
Lopez, Pfc. Jose M.: 100
Lorraine: 37, 178, 487, 512
Losange: 626-27
Losheim: 83, 92, 139, 150, 260-61, 669
Losheim Gap: 45, 55, 78, 137-40, 142, 150, 260
Losheimergraben: 80-81, 83, 85, 90, 92-94, 129
Losses, summary of. See also Casualties.
Allied November offensive: 37, 51, 55
Ardennes counteroffensive: 674
defense of St. Vith: 421-22
defense of the Sauer River sector: 258
German, 1939-1944: 2, 6
initial attack on the northern shoulder: 123-24
matériel: 224, 376-77, 422, 574, 665, 674
Schnee Eifel encirclement: 170
2d Division operations east of the Meuse: 574
Losses, Summary of—Continued
28th Division delaying action before Bastogne:
210-12
Louvain: 426
Lovelady, Lt. Col. William B.: 348
Loveless, Col. Jay B.: 115
Lovio, Capt. Denny J.: 297
Lucht, General der Artillerie Walther: 142-45, 150,
157, 159, 175, 277, 283, 292-93, 396, 401, 404
Luckett, Col. James S.: 246, 253
Ludendorff: 11, 48, 656, 665, 671
Luettwitz, General der Panzertruppen Heinrich
Freiherr von: 174-80, 187, 298, 301, 303-04,
320-21, 323, 429, 436-38, 443, 452, 454, 456,
458-59, 465, 468n, 474-75, 480, 567, 571-72, 574,
614, 6467, 667, 672
Luftwaffe: 1, 18, 19, 22, 63, 64, 72, 142, 178-79,
369, 374, 465, 478, 526, 632, 660, 663, 675
Luftwaffe ground troops: 8, 22, 63, 77, 143, 208,
215, 260
Lullange: 294, 304
Lunéville: 14
Luther, Sgt. H. L.: 636n
Lutrebois: 606, 609, 619, 624-27, 629, 631, 634-35
Lutremange: 623, 625, 627, 635
Lutzkampen: 26, 138, 153, 194-202
Luxembourg: 20, 27, 4346, 238, 249, 257, 425, 488,
490, 512
Luxembourg City: 43-45, 75, 180, 212, 214, 239,
240, 249, 306, 312, 313, 322, 331, 332, 424, 465,
483, 486-90, 493, 511, 515, 607, 611
Luxembourg-Namur highway. See Highway N4.
Luzery: 301, 449, 456
Maastricht: 29, 53, 75, 274, 556, 561, 603
Mabry, Lt. Col. George: 253, 262n
McAllister, Capt. Reid: 548
McAuliffe, Brig. Gen. Anthony C.: 306, 307, 309.
See also Airborne Division, 101st.
command of Bastogne sector: 445, 446n, 451,
453-63, 467-68, 471-74, 514, 531, 555, 606-07
reply to Bastogne surrender ultimatum: 468
McBride, Maj. Gen. Horace L.: 490, 512, 515, 517,
519-20, 535, 537-39. See also Infantry Division,
80th.
McCown, Maj. Hal D.: 343, 365
McCoy, Lt. Col. Jim H.: 214
McDannel, Maj. C. F.: 626
MacDonald, Col. John C.: 441, 571-72
McGarity, Sgt. Vernon: 99n
McGee, Capt. Robert: 106
McGeorge, Maj. K. T.: 348
Machine guns: 88, 128, 141, 224, 273, 408, 436, 665
Machine pistols: 156, 208, 654
Macht, 1st Lt. Walter D.: 340
McIntyre, Capt. Frederick J:: 99
Mackenzie, Col. Alexander J.: 101, 118
McKenzie, Pfc. W. J.: 539

INDEX 709
McKinley, Lt. Col. William D.: 109, 116
McLain, Maj. Gen. Raymond S.: 335
MacSalka, Lt. Col. J. L.: 196
McVickar, Col. Lansing: 516
Mageret: 297, 299-304, 313, 448, 449-52, 454, 630,
632
Magerotte: 644-45
Maisons Lellingen: 251-52
Maldingen: 396, 404, 410, 413, 415
Malempré.: 354, 392, 583, 585-86, 588-90
Malmédy: 42, 44, 45, 130, 163, 260, 261, 264-67,
270, 274, 278, 288, 335-37, 359-61, 363, 369,
374, 376-77, 377n, 395, 401, 413, 605, 610, 611,
660
Malmédy massacre: 260n, 261, 261n, 262-64
Malscheid: 205
Mande-St. Etienne: 307, 461, 465, 474, 644, 646-47
Manderfeld: 90, 139, 141, 145-50, 280, 368
Manderfeld ridge: 139-40, 148-50
Manhay (crossroads) : 344, 34647, 352-54, 381, 383,
390-92, 443, 566, 581, 583-86, 586n, 587-89,
589n, 590-99, 601, 613
Mannerheim: 10
Manpower, German: 6-9, 28, 63. See also Reinforce-
ments.
Manstein, Generalfeldmarschall Fritz Erich von: 18
Manteuffel, General der Panzertruppen Hasso-Ec-
card von: 19n, 26, 135, 380, 465, 612n
and the capture of Bastogne: 475, 475n, 563-64,
613-14, 618-19, 623, 631-32, 647
and the Meuse advance: 293n, 401, 435, 437, 441,
443-44, 454, 459, 564, 564n, 565, 567, 657, 667,
671
and tactical plans for the counteroffensive: 31, 75,
142, 173-76, 178, 180, 269n, 656
Map exercises: 176, 604
Maps: 142, 260, 300
Marche: 42, 45, 321, 378, 379, 382, 427-38, 442,
561, 565, 567, 571, 574-75, 577, 579, 591
Marche plateau: 475, 562, 564, 570, 579
Marche-Hampteau road: 442
Marche-Rochefort road: 176, 436, 438, 440
Marcouray: 381, 384, 387, 593
Markin, 2d Lt. W. D.: 98n
Marloie: 431, 433, 571
Marnach: 181, 183-85, 187-91, 204, 205
Maroney, Maj. William J.: 214
Marquart, Pfc. Floyd P.: 645n
Marshall, General of the Army George C.: 56
Marshall, Brig. Gen. S. L. A.: 445n, 450n, 468n,
479, 672
Martelange: 21, 315, 319, 322-23, 327-28, 465, 518,
523, 525-26, 528-29, 533, 540
Martin (Plan): 23, 25-27, 34
Martinez, Capt. Gabriel R.: 550n
Marvie: 299, 451, 457, 462-63, 470-72, 474-75, 623,
635, 642
Maspelt: 397
Matthews, Col. Church M.: 280, 280n
Maubeuge: 39, 42
Maucke, Col. Wolfgang: 477, 479
Maurer, Capt. Norman G.: 182
Mayen: 45, 69, 178
Mayes, Maj. J. L.: 149, 281
Means, Pfc. A. G.: 550n
Mechanized forces: 40, 46, 59, 72, 173, 175, 551.
See also Armor.
Mechernich: 68
Medal of Honor: 99n, 100, 110n, 111, 131n, 134n,
362, 375, 387, 403n, 549, 555
Medernach: 232, 234
Medical aid: 99, 106, 166, 167, 168, 182, 223, 234n,
439, 455, 461, 467-68, 609, 668
Medical Battalion, 331st: 166
Melick Farm: 503
Mendez, Lt. Col. Louis G.: 600
Ménil: 576-77
Menzerath: 102
Merlscheid: 147, 665
Mersch: 45, 226, 229, 249
Mersch-Arlon road: 515
Merzig: 508, 516, 518, 520
Metz: 20, 30-31, 36-39, 63, 274, 465, 487-89, 508,
510-12, 520, 560, 606
Metz, Pfc. Edwin W.: 596n
Meuse River: 39, 42, 43, 44, 45, 46, 53, 259, 423,
428, 434, 509, 556, 617
German attack toward: 264, 264n, 265-67, 293,
298, 342, 368, 374, 381, 429, 435, 437, 440, 442,
443, 449, 454, 456, 459, 465, 475, 560, 562-64,
574, 578, 581, 590, 613, 651
initial counteroffensive objective: 19, 19n, 22, 25,
27, 28, 31, 38, 69, 75, 77, 149, 174, 176-77,
194-95, 556, 670
planned raids to seize crossings: 269, 360-61, 558,
559n
protection of bridges: 433, 443, 557-61, 561n, 566
strengthening of the defense: 426, 443, 482, 556-
63
Meyerode: 162
Michamps: 633
Michelshof: 484-85, 492-94, 496
Michin, Pvt. Bernard: 319n, 450
Middleton, Drew: 675
Middleton, Maj. Gen. Troy H.: 55-56, 488. See
also Corps, VIII.
concern over possible Meuse valley thrust: 556,
560
and defense of Bastogne: 307, 319, 445-48, 448n,
450, 452, 453, 457-58, 460, 460n, 461, 466, 470,
524, 526
and defense of St. Vith: 205n, 273-75, 288, 290,
400
and delaying actions before Bastogne: 206, 210n,
225, 294-95, 300, 306-07, 309, 512-13
and initial attacks on VIII Corps front: 157, 158,
187, 190, 202, 236, 241, 295, 310, 312, 330-32
and operations and counterattack on the south-

710 THE ARDENNES: BATTLE OF THE BULGE
Middleton, Maj. Gen. Troy H.—Continued
ern shoulder: 243, 244, 249, 250, 607, 615, 617, 621,
627, 630, 646
and preparation of barrier lines: 311-13, 315-17,
322-23, 327, 329
and the Schnee Eifel salient: 140, 161, 167
Mildren, Lt. Col. Frank T.: 109-10
Military police: 275, 292, 307, 411
Miller, Lt. Col. A. A,: 358
Miller, Lt. Victor L.: 100
Millikin, Maj. Gen. John.: 510-11, 514, 516, 520,
523-24, 531-32, 544, 627-28, 631, 634, 642. See
also Corps, III.
Mills, 1st Lt. A. L.: 149n
Mills, Pfc. Richard: 119n
Milton, Maj. Harold F.: 181, 209
Miltonberger, Col. Butler B.: 609
Mine fields: 82, 127, 133, 134, 170, 183, 193, 210,
266, 280, 325-26, 349, 368, 375, 518
Mines: 109, 110, 123, 126-27, 141, 198, 226, 268,
313, 316, 318, 322, 450, 503, 551, 643
Model, Generalfeldmarschall Walter: 15, 292, 293n,
401, 411, 437, 443, 474-75, 480, 579n, 580, 585,
603, 604, 605, 643, 647, 672
as Commander in Chief West: 13, 24
and the Meuse advance: 563-64, 579, 657, 671,
673, 674
and order to capture Bastogne: 563, 613, 623, 632
and planning for the counteroffensive: 13, 26-27,
29-36, 38-39, 49, 74, 77, 135n, 173, 212, 656, 661,
666, 670
relationship with Hitler and Rundstedt: 23-24,
24n, 27, 30-31, 564
saves Monschau from destruction: 86, 86n, 89
and use of paratroops: 214-15, 270
Moderscheid: 261
Moehring, Generalleutnant Kurt: 228-29, 231-32,
234-35
Moestroff: 501
Mohnke, SS-Oberfuehrer Wilhelm: 260, 369-70,
373-74, 376
Moircy: 325-26,438, 622,643
Moltke the Elder: 11, 20
Mompach: 240
Monschau: 19, 29, 42, 43, 45, 54, 64, 74, 76-78,
86-89, 102, 103, 119-21, 133, 134, 271, 273,
330, 332, 579, 603-04, 651, 658, 669
Monschau Forest; 54, 78-79
Mont: 303, 449, 451
Mont Rigi: 271
Mont Schumann: 637, 642
Montbtliard: 20
Montgomery, Field Marshal Sir Bernard L.: 53,
333, 411n, 487. See also Army Group, 21.
command of Allied forces on the north flank:
411, 413n, 423-24, 426-27, 565-66, 586, 586n,
590, 603
Montgomery, Field Marshal Sir Bernard L.—
Continued
and orders for withdrawal of St. Vith defenders:
411-13, 597
and reinforcement of Meuse defense: 433-34, 443,
557-58, 56061, 561n
and resumption of the offensive: 509, 610, 610n,
612
Monty: 646-47
Moody, Lt. Col. George K.: 490n
Moore, Maj. Norman A.: 83
Morale: 141, 193, 250, 406, 467, 597, 672
Morale, German: 4, 6, 235, 240, 551, 672
Moressée: 431
Morhet: 553, 643-44, 646
Mormont: 596
Morris, Maj. Gen. William H. H., Jr.: 225, 249,
255, 258, 486. See also Armored Division, 10th
Morrow, 1st Lt. Jesse: 111
Mortars: 85, 132, 167, 196, 224, 399, 508
4.2-in: 110
60-mm: 128, 131
81-mm: 89, 97, 110, 182, 224, 541
German: 234, 386
Moselle railroad: 67, 662
Moselle River: 40, 42-46, 55, 64, 74, 213, 238, 240,
487, 496, 549
Motor transport: 5, 72, 305, 657, 664-67, 671
Mud: 115, 126, 129, 164, 178, 222, 243, 252, 261,
281, 299, 336, 407, 410, 416, 417, 454, 527
Muesch: 68
Mullerthal: 231-32, 236, 245-48, 250, 252, 253, 257,
497, 499, 502
Mullins, Sgt. Oscar M.: 596n
Mnnchen-Gladbach: 64, 69
Münshausen: 181, 184-85, 188, 190, 192, 207
Murray, Col. William S.: 607, 636
Mürringen: 86, 93-95, 105-06, 117, 122
Mussolini: 270
Mützenich: 77, 87-88, 102
Nagle, Lt. Col. Frederick W.: 154
Namur: 19, 45, 75, 174, 176, 298, 425, 426, 428-29,
433-34, 443, 556-57, 561, 566
Nancy: 20, 486, 488
Napalm: 470
Napoleon: 10
Nazi party: 8, 31, 76, 128, 623
Nebelwerfer. See Rocket projectors.
Neffe: 300-01, 303-04, 313, 326, 449-52, 456, 458,
462, 463, 475, 623, 629-31
Neffe-Wardin road: 456
Negro troops: 210
Nelson, Col. Gustin M.: 193, 199, 202, 203-05, 290,
420, 583
Nelson, 1st. Lt. Kenneth R.: 362
Nette River: 662
Neubrueck: 410, 414

INDEX 711
Neufchâteau: 21, 40, 45, 46, 212, 288, 315, 322, 323,
328, 400, 433, 457, 458, 465, 466n, 470, 487,
510-11, 524, 552, 617. See also Bastogne-Neuf-
château. road.
Neuhof: 80, 82, 93, 144
Nidrum: 81
Nieder-Emmels: 402, 406
Niedercolpach: 525
Niederfeulen: 516, 522
Niederwampach: 299
Niederweiss: 68
Night operations: 50, 61, 70-71, 77, 113, 115, 125-26,
178, 191-92, 194, 219, 228, 296, 309, 357, 410,
434, 531, 601, 661
Nikiforov, Col. N.: 676
Nives: 514
Nocher: 193, 208, 640
Norris, Lt. Col. Jack K.: 117
Norway: 3, 15, 195
“Norwegians.” See Infantry Battalion, 99th.
Nothum: 545, 637-38, 64042
November offensive (Allied) : 30, 36-38, 49-50, 51,
54-55, 57, 68-70
Noville: 141, 299, 304, 309, 317-21, 429, 449, 452-56,
463, 472, 474, 647, 649
Noville-Bastogne road: 301, 449
Nugent, Maj. Gen. Richard E.: 424
Nungesser, Lt. Col. W. L.: 273, 283
“Nuts”: 468
Ny: 594
Ober-Emmels: 396
Oberfeulen: 516
Oberhausen: 196
Oberlascheid: 151, 166-67, 169
Oberwampach: 294, 301
OB WEST: 11, 13, 21, 21n, 22-38, 49, 51, 68, 72-74,
120, 128, 232, 269, 378, 449, 464-65, 482, 562-63,
578, 601, 605, 614, 647, 655, 660, 671-73, 675.
See also Rundstedt, Generalfeldmarschall Gerd
von.
Oberkommando der Luftwaffe (OKL) : 1-2
Oberkommando der Wehrmacht (OKW) : 1, 11, 13,
21, 23-24, 27-29, 33-38, 48, 63, 69, 74, 142,
329, 374, 664, 668, 670. See also OKW Reserve.
Oberkomnkando des Heeres (OKH): 1, 11, 40, 66
O’Brien, Lt. Col. Robert E.: 87
Observation: 46, 144, 218, 221, 247, 331, 379. See
also Farward observers.
Obstacles: 82, 83, 88, 138, 144, 146, 159, 162, 186,
194, 196, 197, 198, 222, 253, 266-67, 316, 321,
322, 325-26, 341, 349, 352, 359, 372, 416, 421,
525, 669
Odeigne: 386, 583-84, 587-88, 590, 647
Oden, Lt. Col. Delk: 529
Odrimont: 600
Officers. See Casualties; Command; Tactical control.
Officers, German: 143, 173, 177, 232, 240, 436. See
also Casualties; German General Staff.
O’Hara, Lt. Col. James: 451
Oise Intermediate Section: 305, 559
OKW Reserve: 15, 22, 27, 69-71, 178, 332, 444, 474,
521, 533, 614, 667, 671
Operation Alsace: 20
Operation Holland: 20
Operation Liège-Aachen: 20
Operation Lorraine: 20
Operation Luxembourg: 20
Order of battle, Allied: 51, 53-56, 213, 650n
Order of battle, German: 7, 9, 33-37, 63, 69-70,
71, 75-77, 81, 145, 174-75, 212-13, 650n
Ordnance Maintenance Battalion, 129th: 291, 317
Ormont: 144
Orr, Lt. Col. William R.: 354, 383
Ortheuville: 44, 318-21, 323, 325, 357, 429, 435, 458
Ortho: 317
Osterberg, Pfc. N. A.: 471n
Osweiler: 241, 243, 245, 248, 251-52, 254, 257, 484,
492, 496
Oubourcy: 633
Ouellette, Maj. Albert A.: 170
Ouffet: 265
Our River: 44, 46, 55, 137, 146, 149, 156, 157, 161,
166-67, 179, 192, 194,272, 289, 331, 356, 398, 546
Our River crossings: 137, 141, 142, 143, 148, 149,
158-60, 166, 174-80, 183, 185, 187, 195-98, 202,
203-04, 213-22, 279, 284, 314, 534-35, 657
Ouren: 174, 195-96, 198-202, 203-04
Ourthe River: 42, 44, 46, 259, 287, 316, 326, 344,
353, 379, 380, 385, 387, 389, 428, 433, 435,
437, 564, 565, 567, 574, 580, 613-14, 621. See
also Salm-Ourthe sector.
Ourthe River crossings: 25, 308, 315, 316-21, 326,
355-57, 371, 378, 380, 382, 429-30, 433, 441, 577-
79, 581, 591, 617
Paderborn: 271
Palatinate: 49, 58
Palladino, Lt. Col. Ralph A,: 520-21, 546-47
Palmaccio, 1st Lt. Charles P.: 474
Palmer, Brig. Gen. Williston B.: 565-66
Panel markers: 592n
Panic: 106, 116, 361, 377, 405
Panther tanks. See Tanks, German.
Panzerfausts: 231, 234, 365, 644. See also Bazookas.
Parachute Field Artillery Battalion, 456th: 370
Parachute Field Artillery Battalion, 463d: 479
Parachute Infantry Battalion, 509th: 385, 392, 602
Parachute Infantry Regiments
501st: 303, 307, 309, 319, 445-48, 449-56, 459,
462-63, 465
502d: 307, 455, 462, 472, 478-79, 645, 645n
504th: 345-46, 351-52, 366-67, 581
505th: 345-46, 351-52, 370-71, 373-74, 397, 581,
599-600
506th: 307, 453, 455-56, 462-63, 472, 630
508th: 346, 419n, 420-21, 581, 600
517th: 379, 381-82, 384-85, 594, 597

712 THE ARDENNES: BATTLE OF THE BULGE
Parapacks: 172, 468, 609
Paratroops, German: 214-15, 264n, 269-71, 271n,
312, 558, 623
Parc Hotel (Berdorf) : 242, 247, 250, 256
Paris: 332, 424, 556, 559
Parker, Maj. Arthur C. 111: 357, 389, 390
Parker, Lt. Harry: 97
Parker, Col. Hugh C.: 431
Parker, 1st Lt. R. A.: 117n
“Parker’s Crossroads.” See Baraque de Fraiture.
Patch, Lt. Gen. Alexander M.: 53
Pathfinder teams: 468
Paton, Lt. Col. Walter J.: 328-29, 466
Patrols: 51, 80, 138, 144, 179, 194, 215, 216, 235,
389, 390
Patton, Lt. Gen. George S., Jr.: 14, 31, 55, 255,
485, 490, 513, 532, 560. See also Army, Third.
and “around the clock” attack to Bastogne: 475,
526, 526n, 531
and request for Third Army assistance: 331, 333,
334, 457, 486-89
and Rhine crossing as objective: 333, 485, 510, 613
and Third Army counterattacks: 327, 509-10,
515-16, 524-26, 539, 606n, 607, 611-12, 614-15,
627, 652
Paul, Lt. Col. Donald: 181, 184
Paul, Maj. Gen. Willard S.: 511-12, 521-23, 541-42,
544, 637-42. See also Infantry Division, 26th.
Peale, Lt. Col. James N.: 546
Pedley, Col. Timothy A., Jr.: 431, 576
Peer, 1st Lt. E. L.: 221
Peiper, Obersturmbannfuehrer Joachim: 90, 260-
61, 261n, 262-69, 337, 339-40, 342, 964, 365,
367, 373, 376, 377, 600, 667
Pennington, 2d Lt. G. F.: 638n
Pessoux: 441
Petit Coo: 375
Petit Han: 594
Petit Thier: 282, 286
Petite Trisogne: 569
Phantom: 411n, 586n
Phelps, Sgt. Donald: 575
Philbeck, Maj. Tommie M.: 233
Phillips, Sgt. Webster: 625
Photo Reconnaissance Group, 10th: 61
Photo Reconnaissance Squadron, 30th: 61
Piburn, Brig. Gen. Edwin W.: 249
Piersall, Sgt. T. E.: 119n
Pillboxes: 199, 203-04
Pinsamont: 466n, 644-45
Pironprk: 643-44
Plank, Brig. Gen. Ewart C.: 561
Plankers, 1st Lt. Dewey: 92-93
Planning, German: 19-36, 38,46, 75, 173-76, 194-95,
212-13, 269-72, 656-57, 665-71. See also Hitler,
Adolf; Strategy; Tactical plans.
Plateau des Tailles: 44
POL (petroleum, oil, and lubricants): 22, 38, 64-65,
68, 72-73, 113, 260, 261, 265, 266-67, 358, 359,
POL (petroleum, oil, and lubricants) —Continued
374, 378, 468, 666-67. See also Shortages.
Pont: 280, 401
Pope, Lt. Col. Lemuel E.: 572-73
Poteau: 279-82, 285-86, 290, 314, 393, 397, 407-09,
418-19
Poteau-Vielsalm highway: 409, 413, 416, 418
POZIT fuze. See Proximity fuze.
Pratz: 520
Presidential citation. See Distinguished Unit Cita-
tion.
Presser, Pvt. R. L.: 638n
Prickett, Maj. Gen. Fay B.: 594
Priess, Generalleutnant der Waffen-SS Herman:
76, 121, 369, 374, 631-32
Prisoners
captured American: 170, 261, 325, 377, 403, 404
captured German: 197, 203, 226, 258, 286. 377,
399, 503, 506, 555, 570, 574, 577, 609
orders to shoot: 261, 261n, 262, 262n, 263-64, 264n
Pronsfeld: 137, 141, 143, 154
Propaganda: 8, 12, 240, 674, 676
Proximity fuze: 361, 363, 375, 501, 504, 626, 654-56,
656n
Prüm: 45, 68, 137, 141, 143, 293, 403, 611
Prüm River: 45, 613
Prümerherg: 405
Puett, Lt. Col. Joseph F.: 156, 165, 167
Putscheid: 215
Quartermaster Truck Company, 3967th: 358
Quatre-Vents: 530
Quesada, Maj. Gen. Elwood R.: 424
Radio Luxembourg: 240
Radios: 89, 96, 101, 117, 147, 154, 181, 184, 209,
221, 240-41, 242-43, 249, 252, 254, 289, 332, 341,
369, 386, 434, 461, 602, 633, 654. See also
Intelligence.
Radscheid: 165, 167
Rahier: 346
Raids. See Sabotage.
Railroads: 5, 40, 4243, 61-62, 64-69, 660-63, 665,
668
Ralingen: 240
Rambrouch: 521, 521n
Rammeldange: 490, 490n
Ramscheid: 97
Rath Hill: 112
Rations: 250, 668. See also Supply.
Rau, 2d Lt. Frederick: 550n
Read, Col. George: 628-29
Rechrival: 621, 644, 646
Recht: 163, 272, 274, 279-81, 283, 285, 291, 339, 359,
369, 393, 397, 407-09, 418, 458
Recogne: 327, 463, 475

INDEX 713
Reconnaissance Troops
4th: 244-45
26th: 520-21
28th: 206
30th: 335
83d: 353
99th: 79, 134
106th: 136n, 138, 151, 165-66
Red Cross: 461, 537
Reed, Col. Charles H.: 499
Reeves, Sgt. Woodrow W.: 149n
Regné.: 584-85
Reichsbahn (German State Railroads). See Rail-
roads.
Reid, Col. Alexander D.: 138, 153, 158-60
Reims: 14, 305, 424, 556-57, 618
Reineke, Sgt. E. T.: 575
Reinforcements: 55, 86, 129, 134, 157, 193, 214, 239,
243,266, 269, 288-89, 312, 327, 332-34, 369, 460,
482, 511-13, 556-57, 674
Reinforcements, German: 22, 37-38, 77, 177-78, 239,
272, 339, 401, 494-95, 533
Reisdorf: 220, 231
Remagen: 67, 69
Remagne: 614, 621, 643
Remer, Col. Otto: 292, 292n, 293, 293n, 396, 402,
404, 407-09, 417, 584-85, 613-14, 619-20, 645-46
Remichampagne: 553, 633
Remonfosse: 459, 624
Remonville: 552
Remouchamps: 336
Rendulic, Generaloberst Dr. Lothar: 3
Replacements. See Reinforcements.
Reserves: 56, 73, 244, 295, 310-11, 313, 331, 332,
405, 420, 424, 427, 670-71. See also SHAEF
Reserve.
Reserves, German: 36, 37, 38, 58, 68, 251, 277, 278,
671. See also OKW Reserve.
Reuland: 490
Reuler: 185, 189-91
Rhea, Lt. Col. Robert L.: 406, 589-90
Rheinbach: 68
Rheydt: 50
Rhine River: 15, 21, 30, 39, 40, 45, 50, 51, 57, 64-68,
255, 333, 485, 486, 510, 557, 610, 613, 648, 662
Rice Maj. Herman R., Jr.: 243
Richardson, Lt. Col. Walter B.: 391, 392
Richthofen: 39-40
Ridge 536: 168
Ridgway, Maj. Gen. Matthew B.: 305-07, 365-66.
See also Corps, XVIII (Airborne).
and operations on northwest front of First Army:
346, 366, 371, 376, 377, 379, 382, 385, 392, 395,
401, 432-33, 583, 585, 590, 592-93, 597, 603,
612
resumes command of XVIII Airborne Corps: 344
and St. Vith withdrawal: 406-07, 412-13
Riggs, Lt. Col. Thomas J.. Jr.: 405
Riley, Col. Don: 80, 86, 95, 105
Riley, Lt. Col. J. R.: 250, 257
Riley, Col. Lowell M.: 630, 632
Rimmer, Sgt. George P.: 630n
Ringel: 536, 538-39
Ringel Hill: 535, 538-39
Ringhuscheid: 180
River crossings. See Bridges; Bridging; Ferry opera-
tions; Fords; rivers by name.
Roadblocks: 235, 253, 265, 266-67, 282, 291, 294-300,
304, 307, 317, 323, 324, 325, 341-42, 348, 354,
356, 359, 360, 361, 364, 382, 389, 392, 397, 408,
432, 445, 451, 452, 462, 466, 474. See also Bar-
rier lines; Obstacles.
Roads and road nets: 42, 45, 51, 78, 80-81, 120-21,
128, 137, 141, 176, 179-80, 187, 194, 258, 260,
261, 267, 272, 280, 292, 306, 378, 389, 403, 407,
411, 412, 440, 445, 459, 509-11, 520, 540-41, 611,
657, 665, 670. See also Ardennes; Mud; Terrain.
Robb, Air Marshal James M.: 424n
Roberts, Cpl. Charles: 110
Roberts, Col. William: 300, 303, 309, 451-52, 454-55,
457, 460-61, 466, 468, 473, 474-75, 514
Robertson, Maj. Gen. Walter M.: 99, 101-04, 107,
107n, 108-09, 112, 118, 120, 125, 139, 140. See
also Infantry Division, 2d.
Robertville: 113
Rochefort: 42, 44, 45, 428, 432-40, 442, 561, 567,
569-72, 574, 579, 613, 647, 647n
Rocherath-Krinkelt: 78-79, 81, 86, 94-96, 98-102,
104-113, 115-29, 131, 133, 134, 270, 369, 603, 604
Rocket projectors: 19, 22, 70-72, 507, 652-53, 657
Rodenhof: 484
Roder: 175
Rodt: 402, 407-09, 412, 416-18
Roer River dams: 53, 63, 78-79, 140, 158, 273-74
Roer River sector: 40, 53, 58, 62, 68, 69, 70, 71, 73,
129, 269, 333, 334, 427, 664
Roermond: 25, 26, 64
Roffe, Col. A. Worrell: 497, 504
Rogers, Sergeant: 569
Rogery: 418-19
Rohren: 87, 89, 119
Rolle: 478
Rollesbroich: 54
Rondu: 621
Rosborough, Lt. Col. James C.: 221
Rose, Pfc. F. S.: 574n
Rose, Capt. L. K.: 295, 296
Rose, Maj. Gen. Maurice: 346, 353-54, 377, 379,
382, 385-88, 390-91, 442, 582, 592. See also
Armored Division, 3d.
Rosebaum, Col. Dwight A.: 286,409,585-87
Rosenthal, Pfc. Paul C.: 153, 197n
Rossignol: 555
Rotation of troops: 238-39
Rötgen: 77, 431
Roth: 137, 138, 141, 143, 146, 148-50, 155, 215, 217,
221, 534

714 THE ARDENNES: BATTLE OF THE BULGE
Rothkirch, General der Kavallerie Edwin Graf von:
328, 637
Roullingen: 640-42
Royal Air Force: 65, 485, 660-62
Group 83: 569
2d Tactical Air Force: 424, 661
“Rubber duck” operation: 73
Rubel, Lt. Col. George K.: 342
Rudder, Lt. Col. James E.: 214, 217-20, 223, 225-26
Ruhr: 12, 17, 18, 21, 25, 36, 49, 53, 58
Rumanian forces: 2
Rumors: 61, 108, 257, 263-64, 280, 296, 316, 320, 327,
345, 356, 363, 374, 377, 493n, 520, 558-59, 561
Rundstedt, Generalfeldmarschall Gerd von: 3, 11,
15, 19n, 21, 58, 443, 605. See also OB WEST.
and fear of Allied air intelligence: 61, 73
order to capture Bastogne: 464-65, 613-14, 647
and the Meuse advance: 563-64, 579, 670, 673, 674
and planning for the counteroffensive: 20, 23-31,
33-38, 49, 57, 69, 74, 135n
recalled as Commander in Chief West: 14, 23-24
relationship with Hitler and German General
Staff: 14, 19-20, 23-24, 24n, 27-31, 33, 564, 647,
671, 675
reputation as a soldier: 23, 57-58
“Rundstedt Offensive”: 20
Rush, Pfc. W. S.: 198n
Ryan, Col. John L., Jr.: 280n, 282, 400, 413
Ryerson, Capt. William F.: 300-303, 448, 454
Saar River sector: 51, 62, 482, 485-87, 489, 513, 618
Saarbrucken: 36
Saarlautern: 488-89
Sabotage: 269, 461, 558-59, 559n, 561
“Sad Sack Affair”: 601
Sadzot: 601-02
Sagaser, Maj. Wray F.: 620
Sainlez: 607
St. Avold: 512
St. Hubert: 319, 321, 322, 325-26, 329, 382, 400, 428,
433, 437, 459, 487, 622, 643, 647
St. Trond: 426
St. Vith: 487, 510, 515, 580, 605, 611-12, 627, 662
accomplishments and losses of the defenders: 422
artillery support: 277, 279, 283, 291, 396, 398-402,
417
capture important to German plans: 142, 143,
152, 175, 272, 277-78, 401-04, 580, 670
capture of and withdrawal operations: 385, 392,
405-13, 417, 421, 443, 581, 582, 585, 593, 597,
598-99
command post of 106th Division: 148, 152, 158,
161, 164, 171, 281, 285, 331
delaying actions before: 160, 163-64, 166, 171, 273,
275, 277, 306, 316, 389
German occupation of: 407, 410-11, 414, 417, 421
initial attack, and perimeter defense: 193, 205,
265, 272-73, 279-92, 306, 329, 366, 371, 393, 395,
396-405, 423, 480
St. Vith—Continued
initial reinforcements sent: 158, 159, 273, 274-79,
288-89, 369
location and tactical importance: 42, 44, 45, 46,
137, 141, 205n, 272, 312, 458
traffic control problems: 158, 164, 275-77, 279,
281, 292
St. Vith–Bastogne highway. See Highway N12.
St. Vith–Diekirch highway: 179, 181-82, 184-85, 188,
192, 219
St. Vith–La Roche highway. See Highway N28.
St. Vith–Schonberg road: 150, 156, 157, 162, 167,
272-73, 275, 277, 279, 283, 292, 332, 396, 403-05
St. Vith–Vielsalm road: 164, 286, 292, 402, 407, 409,
417
Salle: 319, 321
Salm River: 44, 259
Salm River crossings: 267, 268, 336, 344, 347, 352,
367, 369, 370, 373, 376, 377, 401, 407, 409, 412-
13, 415-17, 419-21, 578-79, 581, 590, 595, 597,
599-600, 604
Salm-Ourthe sector: 580-81, 590-91, 599, 601, 603
Salmchlteau: 287, 357, 359, 412, 413, 415-21, 581,
584, 598-99, 601
Sambre River: 428
Samrée: 353-54, 356-59, 377-78, 380-82, 389, 397,
399, 400, 401, 429
Sart-lez-St. Vith: 402
Sauer River: 44, 46, 55, 234, 238, 240, 243, 256, 257,
485, 488, 532, 539
Sauer River crossings: 213, 214, 216, 218, 220, 224,
225, 227, 229-30, 232, 236, 241-42, 245, 249, 252,
258, 470, 491, 495, 500, 504-06, 508, 535, 537-40,
613, 672
Sauer-Moselle sector: 492-508
Sauer-Our triangle sector: 214, 216, 218, 220-22,
227-30
Savelborn: 232-34, 494, 496
Saverne Gap: 37, 50, 53
Savy: 480
Sawmills: 267, 312, 313, 318
Schalles, Capt. John W.: 231n
Scheidel: 538
Scheidgen: 245, 247-52, 254,484-85, 491-92, 497, 501
Schelde estuary: 25
Schieren: 488
Schlammbach: 240
Schlausenbach: 151, 155-56, 166
Schleiden : 68
Schlieffen: 11, 13, 39-40, 170
Schmidt: 193
Schmidt, Generalmajor Erich: 215, 225, 516
Schnee Eifel: 40, 42, 45, 55-56, 136-45, 151, 154-55,
157, 161, 165-66, 168, 170-71, 175, 260, 272, 275,
283, 284, 292, 389, 411
Schonberg: 141-43, 150, 156-59, 162-70, 272, 275,
277, 283, 285, 289, 292

INDEX 715
Schoppen: 81, 91, 133, 261
Schramm, Maj. Percy E.: 16, 20
Schroeder, Lt. Col. Frederic: 393
Schumann crossroads: 640
Schuster, Dr.: 22
Schwartz, Sgt. I. R.: 132n
Schwarz Erntz gorge: 229-32, 245, 249-50, 252-53,
494-97, 499
Scott, Lt. Col. Jean D.: 95, 99
Scott, Maj. W. J.: 278
Scott, Col. Walter T.: 546, 641
Scratch forces. See Defense.
Seamon, Pvt.: 340
Searchlights: 61-62, 82, 89, 96, 126, 156, 159, 195-96,
196n, 199, 209, 225, 245, 301, 654-55, 657
Sedan: 327, 428, 556, 560
Seeley, Lt. Col. George W.: 160
Seitz, Col. John F. R.: 113
Semois River: 21, 42, 44, 75, 327, 560
Senonchamps: 324-25, 464, 466, 468, 470-71, 475,
477, 616, 619, 646
Sensfuss, Generalmajor Franz: 239, 248, 257, 494,
499-500
Seny: 265
Setz: 275, 277, 292
Sevenig: 194-96, 198-99, 398
SHAEF. See Supreme Headquarters, Allied Expedi-
tionary Forces.
SHAEF Reserve: 305-06, 333-34, 336, 611-12, 618
Shanley, Lt. Col. Thomas: 600
Shay, Sgt. M. N.: 300n
Sherburne, Col. Thomas L., Jr.: 307
Sherman tanks. See Tanks, medium.
Shinn, Capt. Roger L.: 231n
Shipley, Lt. Col. Alden: 501
Shortages
ammunition: 141, 166, 168, 184-85, 188, 192, 208-
09, 219, 220, 341, 467
antitank mines: 141, 664
BAR’S: 129
bazooka rounds: 141, 664
gasoline: 208, 224, 384, 387
grenade launchers: 129
medical supplies: 166, 384, 467
medium tanks: 513
rations: 166, 220
replacements: 239, 332, 513
tank crews: 513
Shortages, German
ammunition: 1, 68, 72-73, 258, 369, 531, 595, 664
antitank guns: 72
assault guns: 77, 654
bridging equipment: 222, 226, 235, 258, 357
engineers and equipment: 72, 77
heavy weapons: 1, 215, 247, 258
POL: 63, 64, 72-73, 204, 267, 271, 321, 338-39,
342, 348, 367-69, 390, 420, 429, 435, 442, 564,
568-69, 583, 664, 667
prime movers: 72, 657
Shortages, German—Continued
signal equipment: 72, 215
spare parts: 72, 664
tank retrievers: 72, 664
tanks: 1, 664
transport: 72, 178, 195, 214, 657, 664-67, 671
Sibret: 208-09, 322-25, 327-28, 454, 457, 459, 464,
465, 553-54, 613, 615-16, 619-20, 645
Sierck: 44
Silesia: 12
Simmerath: 25, 77, 90
Simpson, Lt. Gen. William H.: 53, 305, 333-34, 424,
427. See also Army, Ninth.
Sink, Col. Robert F.: 307, 453, 463
Sinzig: 45
Sittard: 28, 29
Skaggs, Col. Leland W.: 123
Skorzeny, Lt. Col. Otto: 270, 270n, 360-61, 363
“Skyline Drive”. See St. Vith–Diekirch highway.
Slayden, Lt. Col. W. M.: 158, 273
Small arms: 128, 197, 210, 224, 242, 350, 379, 551,
654
“Small Solution”: 27-28, 30-31, 38, 613
Smith, Col. Douglas B.: 591
Smith, Pfc. R. D.: 98n
Smith, Capt. Robert W.: 538n
Smith, Lt. Gen. Walter Bedell: 306, 423-24, 611-12
Smoke, tactical use of: 83, 102, 110, 134, 168, 223,
250, 284, 295, 365, 383, 439, 497, 503, 528, 584,
633
Snoad, T/Sgt. Russell N.: 375
Soderman, Pfc. William A.: 110n
Solis, Maj. Paul J.: 266
Sonne: 462
Sorinne: 568
Soviet offensives: 2-3, 7, 12, 38, 57, 675-76
SOY: 353, 378-81, 384-85, 386, 581
Soy-Hotton road: 378-79, 381-84, 386, 441, 582, 585,
593-94, 598
Spa: 42, 44, 259, 260, 265, 268, 307, 331, 336, 341-42,
348, 349, 351, 385, 393, 424, 667, 670
Spaatz, General Carl: 377n
Special Air Services (British) : 557
Special troops: 73
Speer Reich Minister Albert: 4, 5, 9, 13
Spriggs, Capt. Robert E.: 318
Sprimont: 320, 341
SS troops: 75-76, 108, 135, 263-64, 264n, 411, 520,
623, 668
Stadtkyll: 68, 144, 272
Stalin: 676
Standish, Lt. Col. Miles L.: 250
Statler, Cpl. C. E.: 149n
Stavelot: 47, 260, 264-68, 274, 278, 280, 335-39, 347-
48, 351, 359-61, 363-64, 368, 369, 374, 376, 395,
401, 581, 660, 667, 670
Stegen: 226, 234, 236
Steinbach: 315

716 THE ARDENNES: BATTLE OF THE BULGE
Steinebriick: 141-43, 151, 153, 155, 158-60, 279, 284-
85, 292
Stephens, Col. Richard W.: 339, 341
Ster: 372
Stokes, Col. John H., Jr.: 107, 122
Stolzembourg: 177, 213, 215
Stone, Lt. Col. Robert O.: 286, 398-99
Stoumont: 128, 268, 336, 339-43, 346-49, 351, 359,
363-66, 368-69, 371-74, 377
Stoumont Station: 341-42
Stragglers. See Defense, scratch forces.
Strasbourg: 51
Strategy, Allied: 48, 51, 58, 605
bulge containment doctrine: 334, 480, 611
controversy re Rhineland drive: 53, 610, 610n
transportation vs. oil as air targets: 65
Strategy, German: 170. See also Planning.
strategic surprise: 48, 51, 330, 668
war on two fronts: 11-13, 28, 38, 675-76
Strickler, Col. Daniel: 193, 208, 209, 209n
Strong, Maj. Gen. Kenneth W. D.: 423, 509
Student, Generaloberst Kurt: 208
Sugg, Col. Douglas: 622
Supply: 3, 461, 560, 665-66. See also Air supply;
Ammunition; Lines of communication; Logis-
tics; POL; Shortages.
depots and dumps: 113, 152, 259-60, 265, 266,
286, 355-58, 398-99, 666
German: 255-56, 321, 495, 665
rationing: 399-401
resupply problems: 141, 194, 222, 235, 370, 407,
412
Supreme Allied Commander. See Eisenhower, Gen.
Dwight D.
Supreme Headquarters, Allied Expeditionary
Forces (SHAEF): 58, 62, 63, 65, 171-72, 423, 509,
55657, 610-11, 673. See also Eisenhower, Gen.
Dwight D.; SHAEF Reserve.
Sure River: 44, 322, 331, 501, 508, 510, 520
Sure River crossings: 215, 517-18, 521-23, 525-26,
532-33, 535-47, 606-07, 627-28, 636, 637-38, 642,
659, 669
Surprise (tactical) : 19, 143, 145, 176, 180, 182, 195-
96, 241, 242, 248-49, 251, 264-65, 269, 391, 402-
03, 434, 477, 516, 624. See also Strategy,
German.
Surré.: 607
Surrender operations: 149, 166, 168, 170, 192, 193,
257
Surrender ultimatums: 183, 387, 468
Susteren: 29
Sutherland, Col. Edward M.: 336, 339-42
Sutton, Lt. Col. Richard D.: 643
Swift, Capt. Vaughn: 543
Symbol, Lt. Col. Paul H.: 325, 456
Tabets, Lt. Col. Sam: 319, 450
Tactical Air Commands
IX: 61, 171, 337, 424, 568, 592n, 660-61
XIX: 61, 424, 474, 496, 526, 625, 634, 661
XXIX: 337, 424, 661
Tactical control: 91, 99, 111, 117-18, 166, 168, 196,
208-09, 289, 297, 304, 411, 419, 425, 492, 497-98,
589
Tactical plans: 139-40, 385, 423, 427, 487, 493, 509-
12, 515, 611-12, 612n
Tactical plans, German: 86-87, 95-96, 128, 142-45,
152, 156-57, 177-79, 195, 198, 214-15, 229, 240,
292-93, 323-24, 381-82, 401-04, 476-77, 581
Tactical Reconnaissance Group, 67th: 61-62
Tactical Reconnaissance Squadron, 109th : 337
Tactics, German. See also Infiltration; Sabotage.
armored vs. infantry spearheads: 76-77, 81, 122,
177
bypass of defended towns: 175-76, 181, 186, 209,
215, 216, 258
close formation and frontal attacks: 197, 199, 211,
397
disregard for flank security: 175-76, 212-13, 264,
322, 369, 380, 437-38, 475, 578-79
penetration along boundary lines: 198, 330, 388,
442, 659
piecemeal troop employment: 277, 331, 348, 401,
456, 574
Tadler: 518, 536, 538
Tandel: 217-18, 220, 223
Tank Battalions
2d: 190, 294-96, 298n
3d: 300, 303
8th: 513-14, 526, 548
9th: 528
14th: 159-60, 283, 392, 585
15th: 633
17th: 279-80, 291, 406
19th: 230-31, 233, 244, 245, 248, 616n
22d: 620
31st: 282-83, 406
35th: 529, 627
37th: 530, 552, 554-55
40th: 286, 291, 588
41st: 620
42d: 621
68th: 630, 632-33
69th: 629-30, 632
70th: 239, 243, 245-47, 258, 485n
702d: 518
707th: 182, 184-91, 199, 206-08, 217-20, 222, 313
735th: 489, 521, 523
737th: 497, 503
740th: 341-42, 349, 360, 365, 372
741s: 100, 113n, 115-16, 123, 125
743d: 338, 340-41, 363
745th: 113n
771st: 431, 442, 575

INDEX 717
Tank Destroyer Battalions
602d: 327
609th: 452, 471, 474
612th: 87, 91, 113, 115, 119
613th: 133
629th: 596n
630th: 181, 183, 191, 199, 206, 218,221,296, 323-24
634th: 113n, 132
638th: 437
643d: 384, 390
644th: 91, 104. 109, 111, 115, 123, 126
654th: 626
701st: 627
703d: 113n
704th: 551
705th: 308-09, 317-19, 453, 455, 456, 458, 460, 472,
474,479
801st: 91, 94, 113n, 115, 126
802d: 239
803d: 239, 246
811th: 159, 199, 230-31, 283, 298, 301-02
814th: 287, 396-97, 405
818th: 489, 523
820th: 136n, 138, 140, 145, 147, 151, 153, 166, 281
823d: 337, 339-40, 360
893d: 88
Tank Destroyer Group, 7th: 327
Tank destroyers: 119, 153, 321, 379, 396, 405, 453,
455, 660
76-mm SP: 230, 236, 309, 328
German: 645, 654
self-propelled: 126, 132-33, 191, 199, 653
towed: 94, 126, 138, 147, 191, 199, 266, 337, 340,
653
Tanks: 223, 372, 513, 633. See also Armor.
Crocodile (flame-throwing): 573
guns: 652
Jumbo: 503, 525, 652
light: 89, 146, 188, 302
losses: 125, 188, 190, 234, 296, 364, 384, 386, 405,
513, 574, 647, 664
medium: 116, 125-26, 190-91, 192, 239, 283, 296,
302, 341, 405, 408-09, 466, 525, 583, 651-52, 664
tank duels: 100, 125, 190, 193, 302, 366, 409, 652
used for resupply and evacuation: 222, 254, 340
Tanks, German: 71-72, 127, 264, 340, 642, 643. See
also Armor.
flame-thrower: 197
losses: 92, 93, 94, 98, 104, 110, 111, 112, 115-17,
117n, 125-27, 129-30, 131-32, 153, 164-65, 190,
199-200, 203, 209, 261, 268, 283, 302-03, 340, 574,
654, 661, 664
Mark IV: 166, 178, 190, 191-92, 195,260,292, 295-
96, 652
Mark V (Panther): 115, 125-26, 133, 178, 192,
195, 199, 260, 296, 302, 340-42, 396, 405, 409,
417, 452, 525, 651-52
Mark VI (Tiger): 61, 77, 110, 115, 125-26, 162,
223, 260, 268, 328, 337, 339-40, 405, 651-52
Tanks, German—Continued
Mark VI (King Tiger) : 66, 652
Tarchamps: 625
Targnon: 341-42, 349
Task Forces. See also Teams.
A (CCB, 2d Armored Division) : 568-69
B (CCB, 2d Armored Division) : 568
Blue: 621
Booth: 298-99
Boylan: 416-17, 419
Brewster: 392, 584-87, 589-90
Brown: 634
Caraway: 322
Chamberlain: 249, 253, 255, 483
Collins: 615-16, 619-20
Doan: 582n
Erlenbusch: 406,416
Ezell: 457, 514-15
Hall: 233-34
Hamilton: 541-44
Harper: 295-96, 299
Harrison: 364, 372-73, 376
Hogan: 353, 378, 380-81, 384, 387, 593, 59 3n
Jones: 397-400, 406, 417-21, 599
Jordan: 349, 364
Kane: 354, 381, 383-84, 386, 390-91, 583-84, 587,
591
Karsteter: 615-16, 621
Lindsey: 415, 417
Lohse: 416-17
Lovelady: 348, 351, 364, 370, 372, 376
Luckett: 246, 248, 250, 253
Lyon: 515
McGeorge: 348, 364, 373, 592, 592n, 596
Mayes: 149-50, 281
Navaho: 282n
Orr: 354, 377-78, 380-81, 383, 386, 389, 391, 582,
585, 593, 601
Pat: 620, 644, 646
Philbeck: 233
Poker: 620-21, 644, 646
Richardson: 383, 391-92, 591
Riley: 250-51, 253-54, 257
Rose: 295-96, 304, 315
Rudder: 501
Standish: 250, 253-54, 256, 500
Thrasher: 559
Tucker: 353-54, 358
White: 621
Taylor, Maj. Gen. Maxwell D.: 306, 553, 607, 630.
See also Airborne Division, 10lst.
Taylor, Col. William N.: 516, 536-37
Teams
Anderson: 472, 474
Arnsdorf: 473
Browne: 462, 464, 466-67,470-72
Cherry: 296, 300, 303-4, 448, 450, 454, 471, 472-
74

718 THE ARDENNES: BATTLE OF THE BULGE
Teams—Continued
Desobry: 449, 452-53, 455
Hyduke: 30-302, 448
O’Hara: 451, 456-57, 471-72
Palmaccio: 474
Pyle: 464, 466
Roberts: 472-74, 479
Ryerson: 300-303, 448, 452, 454
SNAFU: 460, 460n, 467, 473-74
Van Kleef: 466
Watts: 467
Yantis: 466, 466n
Tedder, Air Chief Marshal Sir Arthur W.: 53, 509,
611
Telephone communications: 74, 83, 96, 101, 140,
147, 152, 154, 181, 221, 229, 288, 321, 425, 654
Templeton, Lt. Col. Clifford: 308
Tenneville: 321, 429
Terrain: 78, 142, 189-90, 194, 241, 249-50, 259-60,
265, 267, 272, 353, 388-89, 428, 507, 510-11. See
also Ardennes; Eifel.
Thackerary, Lt. Col. Donald W.: 490n
Theux: 346
Thionville: 244, 249, 489-90
Thommen: 414
Thompson, Capt. Frederic C.: 498
Thompson, 1st Lt. R. H.: 167n
Thorne, Cpl. Horace M.: 403n
Tiger tanks. See Tanks, German.
Thrasher, Brig. Gen. Charles O.: 559
Tillet: 325, 328-29, 466
Tillison, Lt. Col. Arthur C.: 544
Tintange: 54849, 607
Todt Organization: 128, 222
Toppe, Generalmajor Alfred: 68
Tosi, Lt. Col. A. S.: 517
Towne, Lt. Col. Josiah T.: 171
Traffic and march control: 50, 260, 275, 277, 278,
283, 292, 299, 302, 307, 309, 335, 396, 404, 410-
11, 419, 436, 458, 490, 534, 623, 628-29, 657, 662,
666. See also Withdrawal operations.
Train, Col. William F.: 202, 420
Training: 140, 193, 273, 512, 513
Training, German: 77, 128, 177, 208, 215, 270-71,
271n
Travalini, Sgt. Savino: 84
Trench foot: 123, 141, 238, 258, 495, 503
Tri-le-Cheslaing: 590, 595
Trier: 45, 61-62, 68, 212, 236, 240, 256, 661, 662
Trois Ponts: 25, 259-60, 265, 267, 318, 336, 337,
342-44, 346-18, 351-52, 355, 359, 364, 366, 369-
72, 374, 376, 391, 395, 397, 401, 581, 587, 599-601
Trois Vierges: 157, 199, 205, 294
Troop movements: 50, 61-65, 70-71, 228, 240, 274-
75, 309, 333n, 334, 357, 410, 434, 515, 601, 659,
661, 665-66
Troop Carrier Command IX: 172, 468
Troop Carrier Group, 435th: 172
Troop Carrier Group, 440th: 609
Troop strength, Allied: 1, 25, 55-56, 650, 671, 674
Troop strength, German: 1, 7, 9, 19, 22, 28, 71, 145,
252, 533n 650, 671, 675
Truppner, Lt. Stephen P:: 116
Tucker, Maj. John: 353-54
Tucker, Col. Reuben H., 3d: 352, 367, 581
Tunnels: 66, 67
Tupper, Col. Sevier R.: 643-44
Tuttle, Lt. Col. Paul V., Jr.: 99, 101n
Udenbreth: 77, 95-97
Ulm: 67
Urspelt: 188-91
V-Leute: 255
V-weapons: 19n, 561, 654-55, 667
Van Der Kamp, T/Sgt. John: 362
Van Every, Pfc. Gilbert: 455n
Van Kleef: 466
Vandenberg, Maj. Gen. Hoyt S.: 485
Vandervoort, Lt. Col. Benjamin H.: 370
Vaux Chavanne: 587
Vaux-lez-Rosières: 210, 324, 327-28, 514, 533, 551-
52, 615
Venlo: 20, 25, 27, 29
Verdenne: 442, 565, 574-77
Verdun: 486-88, 509-10, 557, 560
Verschneid: 148
Verviers: 45, 77, 96, 259, 260, 274, 278
Vesdre River: 75, 87, 669
Vesoul: 20
Vesqueville: 643
Vianden: 43, 214-15, 219, 221
Vichten: 515-16
Viebig, Oberst Hans: 95
Vielsalm: 139, 162, 205, 265, 273, 274-82, 285-87,
289-91, 381, 390, 397, 399, 401, 402, 407, 409,
413-21, 579-81, 598-600, 647
Villages and village strongpoints: 42-43, 11 1, 116,
137-38, 182-83, 192-93, 241, 247, 250, 253-54,
256, 258, 272, 286, 324, 337-38, 340, 352, 366-67,
379-80, 408-09, 416, 437-39, 451, 531, 542-43,
552, 628
Villeroux: 309, 464-66, 514, 615-16, 619, 621
Villers-la-Bonne-Eau: 623-25, 627, 635-36, 643
Villettes: 600
Virton: 40, 45
Volksdeutsch: 51, 143
“Volkssturm”: 56
Vosges: 611
VT fuze. See Proximity fuze,
Waal River: 51
Wacht am Rhein: 21-22, 28, 30-32, 34-39
Wagener, Generalmajor Carl Gustav: 475n,564
Waha: 431, 574

lNDEX 719
Wahlerscheid: 78, 86, 90, 101-04, 107-09, 111, 116,
123, 216
Wahlhausen: 180, 182, 186
Waimes: 360, 569, 374, 603
Waizenegger: 74
Waldbillig 230-32, 234-37, 248, 250, 252-53, 255-
57, 483-84, 499, 503
Waldenburg, Generalmajor Siegfried von: 195, 197,
357, 441-42, 575-77
Waldron, Sgt. J. W.: 439
Walker, Maj. Gen. Walton H.: 487, 489
Wall, Lt. Col. Arnold R.: 630, 633
Wallace, Capt. Claude D., Jr.: 451
Wallendorf: 213, 228-29, 232, 235, 501
Wallerode: 163, 167, 264, 277-78, 282-83, 292, 396,
403-04
Walsdorf: 217
Walsh, S/Sgt. William: 367
Wanlin: 433
Wanne: 370
War crimes trials: 260n, 262
War economy, German: 3-6, 8, 8n, 9, 12, 15, 66, 68,
675
Wardin: 325, 451, 456, 629, 632-33
Wark Creek: 227, 483, 522
Warnach: 529-31, 548
Warner, Cpl. Henry F.: 131n
Warren, Lt. Col. Fred M.: 280
Wasserbillig: 21, 43, 44
Watch on the Rhine. See Wacht am Rhein.
Watts, Maj. Eugene A.: 467
Weapons. See also entries by weapon type.
comparison of US and German: 651-56
dual-purpose: 653
towed: 653, 658
Weather: 46-47, 649-50
effect on air operations: 18, 22, 38, 38n, 39, 61, 67,
69, 142, 171, 366, 371-72, 467-68, 495-96, 660,
663
effect on ground operations: 146, 193, 229, 495,
61 1
Weber, Col. Alois : 534, 537-38
Weckerath: 144, 146, 148, 155
Wehrmacht. See German Army.
Wehrmachtfuehiungsstab (WFSt): 11, 11n, 17, 19,
23, 27, 34-35, 128, 381
Weidingen: 207
Weiler: 182-83, 185-86, 192
Weiler-les Putscheid: 181
Weismes: 129-30, 134-35
Weissenhof crossroads: 153-54
Weiswampach: 187, 203, 205, 219, 289
Welchenhausen: 194, 197, 202
Welford: 172
Wellin: 433
Welscheid: 517, 535, 537
Wemple, Lt. Col. John P.: 280-81, 406, 414-16
Wengerohr: 662
Weppler: 160, 167, 284-85
Werbomont: 25, 265, 267-68, 289, 307, 316, 336,
342-43, 345-46, 346n, 347, 351, 378, 589-90, 597
Wereth: 150, 161-63
Werfer. See Rocket projectors.
West Wall: 3, 13-15, 36, 40, 51, 55, 57, 78, 80, 82, 87,
95-96, 101, 103, 108, 137-38, 140, 142, 144, 148,
151, 177, 180, 194-95, 198, 330, 428, 485-86, 489
504, 506, 508, 512,658,672
Westerwald: 40
Westbrook, 2d Lt. R. L.: 285n
Westphal, General der Kavellerie Siegfried: 21-23,
25, 29, 33, 36, 675
Weyland, Brig. Gen. Otto P.: 424, 496, 625
Weywertz: 81
WFSt. See Wehrmachtfuehrungsstab.
Wheeler, Lt. Crawford: 154
Wheeler, Col. Richard B.: 622
White, Brig. Gen. Isaac D.: 441, 568-69
White phosphorus: 129, 296, 340, 399, 496, 546
Whitehill, 2d Lt. John A.: 550n
Whiteley, Maj. Gen. J. F. M.: 423
Widener, Sgt. William J.: 350
Wiedorfer, Sgt. Paul J.: 549
Williams, Lt. Col. Earle: 273
Williams, Lt. Col. H. R.: 214
Williams, Cpl. Hale: 130
Willis, 1st Sgt. Gervis: 247n
Wiltz: 184, 188, 191-93, 206-10, 215, 219, 221-22,
313, 315, 323, 328, 457-58, 508, 513, 520, 522,
541, 545, 547, 628, 632, 637, 640-42
Wiltz River: 44, 206-07, 215, 219, 294, 299, 312, 454,
457, 510, 520, 522, 640, 658
Wiltz-Bastogne highway: 637, 640, 642
Wilwerwiltz: 181, 187, 206, 312-13
Winterscheid: 155
Winterspelt: 151, 152-54, 157-61, 284, 292
Winterspelt-St. Vith highway: 137, 141, 275, 285
Wire. See Obstacles; Telephone communications.
Wirtzfeld: 104-09, 112-13, 115, 117, 120, 122-23, 128,
604
Wischeid: 149
Withdrawal operations: 93, 99-101, 104-06, 107-12,
116, 122-23, 133, 148-50, 160-61, 162-69, 191-
92, 202, 203, 209-10, 223-26, 232, 234-35, 254,
256-57, 297, 297n, 298, 30243, 370, 376, 443,
455, 589, 593, 599-600. See also St. Vith.
Withee, Cpl. Edward S.: 155, 155n
Wittlich: 45, 177
Wolf’s Lair: 1, 15-16, 21, 24, 27, 31
Wollenberg, Pvt. Richard: 130
Wood, Maj. Gen. John S.: 512-13
Wood, Lt. Col. W. C.: 626
Woodruff, Capt. Junior R.: 390
Woods fighting: 78, 230, 234, 290, 402-03, 407, 493,
497-98, 532, 548-49
Woodward, Maj. Walden F.: 196, 203
World War I: 6, 11, 39-40, 46, 48, 64, 480, 611, 649,
654, 656
Wurtich, Lt. Jake: 370

720 THE ARDENNES: BATTLE OF THE BULGE
Yale, Col. Wesley W.: 618, 620, 646-47
Yantis, 1st Lt. Ray J.: 466n
Yates, Maj. Robert B.: 267-68
Yeomans, Lt. Col. Prentice E.: 353-54
Ziegenberg: 23
Zimmerer, Pfc. T. J.: 234n
Zimmermann, Generalleuthant Bobo: 23
Zweibrucken: 512
is U S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE: 1993 333-169

THE SEVENTH ARMY ATTACK
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