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Noam Chomsky - Turning the Tide U.S. intervention in

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The Race to Destruction<br />

Classics <strong>in</strong> Politics: <strong>Turn<strong>in</strong>g</strong> <strong>the</strong> <strong>Tide</strong> <strong>Noam</strong> <strong>Chomsky</strong><br />

299<br />

attempt its military conquest. In <strong>the</strong> early Cold War years, <strong>the</strong>re was<br />

nearly universal agreement that <strong>the</strong> Soviets, while eager to expand <strong>the</strong>ir<br />

<strong>in</strong>fluence, desired to avoid a military engagement.” 47 “American military<br />

analysts were most impressed with Soviet weaknesses and<br />

vulnerabilities,” and estimated that it would take 15 years for <strong>the</strong> USSR<br />

to overcome wartime losses <strong>in</strong> manpower and <strong>in</strong>dustry. Even with<br />

“Herculean efforts,” American <strong>in</strong>telligence did not expect <strong>the</strong> USSR to<br />

reach <strong>the</strong> pre-World War II levels of <strong>the</strong> US with<strong>in</strong> 15 to 20 years. As<br />

Cold War conflicts <strong>in</strong>tensified, US military officials anticipated “hostile<br />

and defensive Soviet reactions” to American <strong>in</strong>itiatives such as fortify<strong>in</strong>g<br />

Turkey as an offensive base aga<strong>in</strong>st <strong>the</strong> USSR or dur<strong>in</strong>g <strong>the</strong> Berl<strong>in</strong> crisis,<br />

attributed by US army planners to “actions on <strong>the</strong> part of <strong>the</strong> Western<br />

Powers” (<strong>the</strong>ir phrase, <strong>in</strong> a report to Eisenhower).<br />

The fear on <strong>the</strong> part of US planners of “los<strong>in</strong>g control of Eurasia” lay<br />

“less <strong>in</strong> American assessments of Soviet military capabilities and shortterm<br />

military <strong>in</strong>tentions than <strong>in</strong> appraisals of economic and political<br />

conditions throughout Europe and Asia,” Leffler concludes. The CIA<br />

warned <strong>in</strong> 1947 that “The greatest danger to <strong>the</strong> security of <strong>the</strong> United<br />

States is <strong>the</strong> possibility of economic collapse <strong>in</strong> Western Europe and <strong>the</strong><br />

consequent accession to power of Communist elements.” Assistant<br />

Secretary of War Howard Peterson urged “emphasis on streng<strong>the</strong>n<strong>in</strong>g<br />

<strong>the</strong> economic and social dikes aga<strong>in</strong>st Soviet communism” ra<strong>the</strong>r than<br />

preparation for war. We have already noted Dean Acheson’s expressed<br />

concern over <strong>the</strong> dangers of democratic politics <strong>in</strong> France and Italy, as<br />

he browbeat congressional leaders <strong>in</strong>to accept<strong>in</strong>g <strong>the</strong> Truman Doctr<strong>in</strong>e<br />

<strong>in</strong> 1947. In 1948, <strong>the</strong> National Security Council reiterated <strong>the</strong><br />

longstand<strong>in</strong>g estimate that <strong>the</strong> USSR was unlikely to resort to war, while<br />

warn<strong>in</strong>g that “Soviet dom<strong>in</strong>ation of <strong>the</strong> potential power of Eurasia,<br />

whe<strong>the</strong>r achieved by armed aggression or by political and subversive

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