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Noam Chomsky - Turning the Tide U.S. intervention in

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The Race to Destruction<br />

Classics <strong>in</strong> Politics: <strong>Turn<strong>in</strong>g</strong> <strong>the</strong> <strong>Tide</strong> <strong>Noam</strong> <strong>Chomsky</strong><br />

290<br />

<strong>the</strong>re would be “an extremely dangerous possibility” of a nuclear surprise<br />

attack, on <strong>the</strong> assumption that a first strike would so cripple an<br />

adversary that <strong>the</strong> attacker’s defenses could ward off most retaliation.<br />

Without a comprehensive arms control agreement, “as <strong>the</strong> United States<br />

and <strong>the</strong> Soviet Union beg<strong>in</strong> to deploy [ballistic missile defense], each<br />

might easily suspect <strong>the</strong> o<strong>the</strong>r of attempt<strong>in</strong>g to ga<strong>in</strong> military advantage<br />

by seek<strong>in</strong>g <strong>the</strong> ability to destroy most of <strong>the</strong> opponent’s land-based<br />

missiles and <strong>the</strong>n use defenses to keep retaliatory damage to a very low<br />

level,” a perfect recipe for a first strike, <strong>the</strong> study states, add<strong>in</strong>g that “It<br />

is important to note, however, that no one has yet specified just how<br />

such an arms control agreement could be formulated”—while many<br />

have expla<strong>in</strong>ed why it is precluded by SDI. An effective US system might<br />

decrease <strong>the</strong> threat of a preemptive Soviet strike, <strong>the</strong> study argues, but<br />

only with “a considerable degree of Soviet cooperation,” namely,<br />

substantial reduction of Soviet missile forces; exactly <strong>the</strong> opposite of<br />

what is anticipated. Contradict<strong>in</strong>g repeated statements by President<br />

Reagan and his associates about a huge Soviet lead <strong>in</strong> missile defense,<br />

<strong>the</strong> study states that “<strong>in</strong> terms of basic technological capabilities . . . <strong>the</strong><br />

United States rema<strong>in</strong>s ahead of <strong>the</strong> Soviet Union <strong>in</strong> key areas required<br />

for advanced [ballistic missile defense] systems.” Few serious observers<br />

have many doubts on this score. 34<br />

Along with many o<strong>the</strong>rs, Peter Clausen observes that<br />

Through Soviet eyes, however, <strong>the</strong> SDI offers ample grounds for an<br />

alarm<strong>in</strong>g worst-case analysis of <strong>the</strong> U.S. threat. From Moscow’s<br />

vantage po<strong>in</strong>t, a U.S. territorial defense, deployed <strong>in</strong> comb<strong>in</strong>ation<br />

with new hard-target-kill weapons like <strong>the</strong> MX, Trident II, and <strong>the</strong><br />

Persh<strong>in</strong>g II, would look like a first-strike posture. With roughly<br />

two-thirds of its warheads on vulnerable land-based missiles,<br />

Moscow must worry that <strong>the</strong> United States could destroy <strong>the</strong>

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