Armor Magazine Counterinsurgency Selected Works - US Army

Counterinsurgency
and Core Competencies
by BG Donald M. Campbell, Jr., Commanding General, U.S. Army Armor Center
“On 25 July 2008, Command Sergeant
Major (CSM) Otis Smith, relinquished his
position as the Armor Center’s 20th Command
Sergeant Major after 34 years of
dedicated service to our Nation and our
Army. During his time at the Armor Center,
CSM Smith proved to be an exceptional
leader who cares about soldiers. His
departure is certainly a loss to our force;
however, through his leadership and guidance,
he leaves our force and its soldiers
better prepared to meet the challenges of
the battlefield both today and in the future.
As a warrior, he led, trained, taught,
inspired, coached, mentored, and instilled
loyalty and a fraternal brotherhood within
the entire Armor community. Thank
you, Otis, for keeping our mounted force
on the cutting edge of the battlefield, for
caring about soldiers, and for the many
challenges you faced and conquered for
the greater good of the Armor Force.”
As we dedicate this current issue of AR-
MOR to the counterinsurgent fight, I must
remind the force of its need to maintain a
balance between what we know as the current
counterinsurgency fight and what we
foresee as a future of persistent conflict.
This issue compiles lessons learned from
current operations in Iraq and Afghanistan
and past operations in Vietnam. However,
as we learned, specifically, from the
lessons of the Israelis during their battle
with Hezbollah in Southern Lebanon, we
must not lose sight of what the armored
force brings to the battlefield during highintensity
operations. In short, we must
strike a balance between counterinsurgency
training and our core competencies.
The term “core competencies” refers to
all the tasks our armored systems, of
which the tanker and the scout are an integral
part, conduct during high-intensity
operations. It also includes the tasks our
armored formations must conduct to support
our armored systems, which center
on the protection provided by our armor,
the firepower our weapons systems bring
to bear, and the maneuverability of our
systems. Our core competencies include
operations, such as long-range precision
gunnery; platoon, company, and battal-
ion maneuver; logistics operations; maintenance,
and command and supply discipline,
which have been the cornerstone
of armor for decades. Alas, we must concede
that these competencies are slowly
declining as we concentrate solely on
counterinsurgency operations focused on
the will of the people and not the destruction
of an enemy.
While there’s clearly nothing wrong with
focusing on the current fight, I am concerned
that the majority of our tank commanders
have never qualified Tank Table
VIII and that brigade commanders are reporting
weaknesses in maintenance management,
particularly services and property
accountability, at the company level.
It is very difficult to meet everyday requirements
that increase soldier survivability
and our chances of success on the
battlefield, but we can achieve a healthy
balance much easier than one might realize.
First and foremost, the Armor School
provides its Soldiers with tough, wellrounded
courses that focus on full-spectrum
conflicts. Each of the Armor School’s
courses provides the skill-level appropriate
training on tasks necessary to win the
fight during counterinsurgencies and major
combat operations. For example, the
Master Gunner Course teaches noncommissioned
officers how to identify and
cor rect for deficiencies in the M1’s fire
control system, and assists company commanders
and battalion S3s in planning
gunnery training for their units; the Scout
Leader Course teaches scout leaders, from
staff sergeant to lieutenant, how to be
proficient in reconnaissance operations
across the spectrum of conflict; and the
Maneuver Captain’s Career Course trains
6 out of 8 modules on conducting operations
in a major combat environment. But
the Armor School’s training efforts do
not stop there, we must train to standard
everywhere and we are currently working
with TRADOC to bring mobile training
teams to our Soldiers in the field.
We are also developing new doctrine
that spans the spectrum. Prior to the re-
lease of U.S Army Field Manual (FM)
3-0, Operations, we were reviewing our
doctrine, and later this year, we will release
FM 3-20.21, the Heavy Brigade
Combat Team (HBCT) Gunnery Manual.
We are also in the process of staffing FM
3-90.1, The Tank and Mechanized Infantry
Company/Team, and FM 3-20.98, Reconnaissance
and Scout Platoon.
Further, we are consistently working to
improve our armored systems, such as the
Abrams tank, which enable us to remain
the premier armored force well into the
fu ture. We also continue to explore upgrades
to sights, armor packages, and ammunition
to maintain our systems’ lethality.
We are working to improve target identification
and prevent fratricide through
our work in combat identification.
Finally, we have been directed to holistically
review our force design updates to
ensure the survivability, lethality, and capabilities
of our reconnaissance formations
and ensure they have the right balance.
We have learned from our operations
in Iraq and Afghanistan that armor
and cavalry, whether it be Abrams, Bradley,
or HMMWV mounted, will always be
relevant and we must continue to make
improvements in these systems to maintain
our overmatch.
As most of us realize, the current fight
will eventually end; however, there is
great concern that the force’s institutional
knowledge base on CMETL tasks have
atrophied. Therefore, it is important that
we maintain balance and ensure our core
tasks do not get lost to the tasks of the
day. I am certain the armored force will
need these skills in the future to remain
the “combat arm of decision.”
Forge the Thunderbolt!
4 — September-October 2008