Armor Magazine Counterinsurgency Selected Works - US Army

study and conquer. Comparing the western and nonwestern
worlds is an unfair distinction between civilizations. The fact is:
historical analysis and proof show that whether the insurgency
occurs in the west or the far east, they use similar methods to
fight and defeat a stronger enemy.
We need to understand the intricate parts of an insurgency and
counterinsurgency. Goliath needs to understand what effects
technology and outside interference by other nation states have
on this type of conflict. Western countries need not go far to
study these conflicts because many of these countries have, at
one time or another, participated in one. They are not glorious
or even highly intensive conflicts, but they have shaped our world
today.
The current insurgent warfare in Iraq and Afghanistan exemplify
all characteristics of insurgent intellectual and instructional
thought. These two current insurgencies were not specifically
mentioned in this article because military history provides many
examples of these conflicts. The west’s refusal to grasp this type
of conflict intellectually or instructionally, prior to the conflict
occurring or even during strategic planning, has led to the situation
we find ourselves in today.
Notes
1Professor Dennis Showalter, “Total War,” Introduction to Military History, Lecture, Week 9,
Colorado College.
2Robert Tabor, War of the Flea, Potomac Books, Washington, D.C., 2002, p. VIII.
3Dennis Showalter, “State of the Discipline,” Introduction to Military History, Lecture, Week 10,
Colorado College.
4Tabor, War of the Flea, p. IX.
5Ibid., p. X.
6Abraham Maslow, “The Hierarchy of Needs,” Thinkers, Chartered Management Institute, 28
July 2005, available online at http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Maslow’s_hierarchy_of_needs.
Recovery Operations from Page 27
in their vehicles or tankers should bring
extra shovels since they have room to carry
more equipment.
Scanning at night with defective thermal
receiving units (TRU):
Observation: When a tank commander’s
TRU overheated, his wingman expanded
his sector of fire while the tank commander’s
TRU cooled down.
Discussion: Loaders and tank commanders
used their NVGs to provide additional
observation. As expected, drivers also
continued to use their enhanced night-vision
sights to scan the tank’s frontage.
After continuous night operations, TRUs
would eventually overheat and require a
minimum of 5 minutes “cool down” time
to once again receive a clear image.
Recommendation: Thermal receiving
units should be inspected and tested prior
to any type of night operation. Critical
items, such as TRUs, should be readily
available rather than waiting for a tank to
be deadlined before the part is ordered.
The supply system is not being circumvented
to expedite delivery times; in-
stead, having readily available critical fire
system components, prevents cannibalization,
and ultimately saves lives.
Notes
1Department of Defense, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of
Staff Instruction (CJCSI) 3270.01A, Personnel Recovery Within
the Department of Defense, U.S. Government Printing Office
(GPO), Washington, DC, 1 July 2003.
2U.S. Army Field Manual (FM) 3-50.1, Army Personnel Recovery,
GPO, Washington DC, 25 September 1996.
3Richard S. Lowry, Marines in the Garden of Eden: The True
Story of Seven Bloody Days in Iraq, Berkley Publishing, New
York, 2006, p. 94.
4Ibid., p. 97.
5Ibid., p. 98.
6Rick Bragg, I am a Soldier Too: The Jessica Lynch Story,
Knopf, New York, 2003, p. 9.
7Lowry, p. 88.
8Ibid., p. 107.
9Ibid., pp. 113-14.
10Bragg, p. 66.
11Lowry, p. 130.
12Bragg, p. 12.
13Lowry, pp. 391-93.
14 “Leave No Comrades Behind,” article available online at
http://gipsverband.free.fr/jlyncheg.htm.
15Lowry, p. 371.
16Ibid., p. 374.
17Bragg, p. 129.
18 “Leave No Comrades Behind.”
19Lowry, p. 379.
7 Wikipedia Internet Encyclopedia, available online at http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Hezbollah.
8Dr. Antulio J. Echevarria, “The Trouble with History,” Parameters, U.S. Army War College,
Summer 2005, pp. 84-85.
9Tabor, War of the Flea, pp. 29-32.
10Ibid., pp. 14-15.
11Jeffrey Record, Beating Goliath, Why Insurgencies Win, Potomac Books, Washington, D.C.,
2007, pp. 104-107.
12Ibid. 13Ibid., p. 106.
14Ibid., p. 108.
15Ibid., p. 107.
16Professor Dennis Showalter, “Alternate Perspectives,” Introduction to Military History, Lecture,
Week 8, Colorado College.
17Sun Tzu, The Art of War, Translated by Ralph D. Sawyer, Westview Press, Boulder, CO, January
1994, pp. 38-39.
18John Keegan, A History of Warfare, Vintage Books, New York, 1993, p. 380.
19Ibid., pp. 379-381.
20Ibid., p. 347.
21Johann von Ewald, Diary of the American War. A Hessian Journal, Volume I: First and Second
Campaigns, 1776 and 1777, translated and edited by Joseph P. Tustin, Yale University Press, New
Haven, CT, Chapter 1: From the departure from Hesse to the expedition in Chesapeake Bay, Parts
Six, Seven, and Eight; and Supplement: From the beginning of the year 1782 up to the arrival in
Hesse in 1784,” pp. 17-45 and 347-361.
22Keegan, A History of Warfare, pp. 348-349.
23Professor Dennis Showalter, “Industrialization and Military Historiography,” Introduction to
Military History, Lecture, Week 7, Colorado College.
24Record, Beating Goliath, pp. 24-25.
Captain Christopher L. Center is currently an observer controller, Operations
Group (Tarantula Team), National Training Center, Fort Irwin, CA.
He received a B.A. from Norwich University. His military education includes
Armor Captains Career Course, Armor Officer Basic Course, and
Infantry Mortar Leader Course. He has served in various command and
staff positions, including adjutant, 1st Squadron, 71st Cavalry, 1st Brigade,
10th Mountain Division, Fort Drum, NY; squadron maintenance
officer, Headquarters and Headquarters Troop (HHT), 1st Squadron,
11th Armored Cavalry Regiment (ACR), Fort Irwin, CA; XO, D Company,
1/11th ACR, Fort Irwin; tank platoon leader, A Troop, 1/11th ACR, Fort Irwin;
and mortar platoon leader, HHT, 1/11th ACR, Fort Irwin.
20Ibid., p. 377.
21Ibid., pp. 378-80.
22 “Leave No Comrades Behind.”
23Lowry, p. 380.
24Bragg, pp. 133-34.
25Department of the Army, Army Training and Evaluation
Program (ARTEP) 17-237-10, Mission Training Plan for the
Tank Platoon, GPO, Washington DC, 25 September 1996.
Captain Romeo Paolo Cubas is currently serving
as logistics officer, 2d Tank Battalion, 2d
Marine Division, II Marine Expeditionary Force,
Camp Lejeune, NC. He received a B.S. from
the United States Naval Academy, Annapolis,
MD. His military education includes the Maneuver
Captains Career Course, Armor Officer
Basic Course, Ground Supply Officers Course,
and the Marine Air-Ground Task Force Fire Support
Course. He has served in various command
and staff positions, to include headquarters
company commander, logistics officer, and
supply officer, Weapons Training Battalion, Marine
Corps Base Camp Lejeune; platoon commander,
3d Platoon, A Company, 8th Tank Battalion,
Task Force Tarawa, Iraq; aide de camp
to the assistant division commander, 2d Marine
Division, II MEF, Camp Lejeune; executive officer,
D Company, 2d Tank Battalion, 2d Marine
Division, II MEF, Camp Lejeune; and platoon
commander, 3d Platoon, B Company, 2d Tank
Battalion, 2d Marine Division, II MEF, Camp
Lejeune.
46 — September-October 2008