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Armor Magazine Counterinsurgency Selected Works - US Army

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Evolution takes analysis and relies on the military historian to<br />

provide the analysis and research in any conflict. Conflicts or war<br />

can be grouped or categorized in various ways. My instructional<br />

education has taught me the difference between “total war” and<br />

“limited war.” “Total war,” as described by Dennis Showalter in<br />

Lecture 9 of Introduction to Military History, is “generally understood<br />

as war in which resources, human and materiel, of the<br />

combatants are committed to a conflict, admitting neither rules<br />

nor restraints in military operations, and the outcome of which<br />

places the defeated entirely at the mercy of the victor.” 1 In this<br />

short definition of total war, we see two sides committed to a<br />

particular conflict who will stop at nothing to accomplish their<br />

aims. There is no operational, logistical, or human expense that<br />

will be spared to accomplish either participant’s desired end<br />

state. An example of this particular type of warfare is World War<br />

II. Conflicts, such as Vietnam and the Revolutionary War, take<br />

on many traits of “total war,” but in many ways, it is a contest of<br />

“David vs. Goliath.”<br />

Insurgent warfare is a limited war, a contest of the weak versus<br />

the strong. The struggle is seen as an internal conflict, which involves<br />

a conflict between a government and an opponent who<br />

wants to bring about change in the current political setting through<br />

political or violent means. As Robert Tabor discusses in War of<br />

the Flea: The Classic Study of Guerrilla Warfare, there are four<br />

political aspects that insurgents attempt to challenge during any<br />

particular insurgency: integrity of the borders and composition<br />

of the nation state; the political system; authorities in power;<br />

and the policies that determine who gets what in society. 2 The insurgency<br />

is asymmetrical in nature and the tactics used to bring<br />

about change need to be understood — both sides in this type<br />

of warfare have differing capabilities. Dennis Showalter, in Lecture<br />

10 of Introduction to Military History, describes it as one opponent<br />

trailing the other because it cannot match its enemy in<br />

“In this short definition of total war, we see two sides committed to a particular conflict<br />

and will stop at nothing to accomplish their aims. There is no operational, logistical, or<br />

human expense that will be spared to accomplish either participant’s desired end state.<br />

An example of this particular type of warfare is World War II. Conflicts, such as Vietnam<br />

and the Revolutionary War, take on many traits of “total war,” but in many ways, it is a<br />

contest of ‘David vs. Goliath.’ ”<br />

the areas of technology or instructional learning. 3 This gap must<br />

be bridged; therefore, insurgents must use asymmetric tactics of<br />

terrorism and guerrilla warfare.<br />

More often than not, insurgencies are confused with the tactics<br />

used to further their objectives. Terrorism and guerrilla warfare<br />

tactics are commonly used; insurgents may use both or neither<br />

of these tactics, however, they are not the overarching principle<br />

of the conflict. Terrorism is described as “the threat or use of<br />

physical coercion against noncombatants to create fear to achieve<br />

political objectives;” guerrilla warfare uses hit-and-run tactics<br />

against police, military, and physical infrastructures that support<br />

the legitimate government. 4 The tactical success of an insurgency<br />

depends on the strategic plan of the insurgent, which depends<br />

on five key factors for success. Robert Tabor defines these factors<br />

as the “will to maintain the revolt; the mindset to avoid the<br />

state’s strengths and attack its weaknesses; the metamorphosis<br />

of the protracted armed struggle from the strategic defensive, to<br />

the strategic stalemate, to the strategic offensive; the role the political<br />

organization plays in gaining and maintaining support for<br />

the insurgency; and the government’s counteraction against the<br />

insurgency. Does the government use discriminate force or indiscriminate<br />

force when dealing with the enemy? The center of<br />

gravity, or the civilian populace, that is on the fence could decide<br />

to support the insurgency if the government uses violent means<br />

against them.” 5<br />

The five strategic aspects of this particular struggle show that<br />

the typical insurgent needs to be endeared to the general public<br />

to proliferate. The internal conflict needs to be balanced between<br />

guerrilla, terrorism, and political tactics to be successful. The<br />

ordinary civilian caught in the middle between government and<br />

insurgent forces should be the main objective of insurgent or<br />

counterinsurgent operations. Civilians are the center of gravity<br />

and the aspect of this particular struggle<br />

that can tip the favor from one side to another,<br />

thus enabling insurgents to recruit<br />

local citizens to join the insurgency, and encouraging<br />

the local populace to support the<br />

insurgency by providing a base of operations<br />

or hospitality to the insurgent, as well<br />

as financial and other means of support.<br />

Support is vital to any insurgency, as proven<br />

during the Vietnam War when South<br />

Vietnamese villagers provided support to<br />

the Viet Cong. This insurgent army blended<br />

in with the population, which allowed<br />

them to recruit from within villages and<br />

maintain power, even when they were decisively<br />

engaged by government forces.<br />

Weapons and supplies were easily cached<br />

in villages and stored in intricate cave systems.<br />

In turn, this meant that logistics and<br />

medical support came from these villages,<br />

thereby fueling the insurgency. The fact<br />

that the Viet Cong and North Vietnamese<br />

army won over the center of gravity led<br />

South Vietnamese and U.S. forces to begin<br />

a campaign of clearing villages known<br />

to harbor such insurgents. This campaign<br />

effectively denied the insurgency its center<br />

of gravity.<br />

The center of gravity, or people, support<br />

insurgencies because they see the government<br />

failing them in two key areas: security<br />

and basic services. These two key fac-<br />

40 — September-October 2008

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