Armor Magazine Counterinsurgency Selected Works - US Army

ers; and the Kufa Mosque, which is second only in religious significance
to the Ali Shrine and is the stronghold of the militia
with more than 600 fighters.
To the north of the Ali Shrine, lies the largest Shia burial ground
in the world. This area was infested with insurgents from the Ali
Shrine and Kufa, and was used as a weapons cache, and as the
task force would later learn, a sensitive site requiring precision
fires.
This article shares lessons learned and methods developed during
the fight in Najaf/Kufa. Although, the fight will never be labeled
a modern 72 Easting, or spearhead into Iraq by the 3d Infantry
Division, the intensity, tempo, and constraints have application
for future employment of armor forces in urban terrain.
Tempo and Campaigning
Understand the complexity of the battlefield. In the case of
Najaf and Kufa, considering political backlash from damaging
holy sites and creating unnecessary collateral damage was paramount
in all planning and execution. Soldiers were well aware
of the cascading effects a hole in the golden dome or a city block
razed during counter fire would have on the Shia population;
in essence, defeating the campaign’s purpose. From the onset,
these constraints became a leader challenge and commanders executed
to perfection. Soldiers adapted engagement techniques
and chose appropriate weapons systems to destroy the threat,
with little or no damage to significant holy sites. The staff identified
holy sites during the military decisionmaking process and
planned around them by using precision fires, nonlethal fires, or
bypassing the site.
Have a plan. On this complex battlefield, tempo is probably the
most important factor a staff and commander consider when developing
the campaign plan. Do not be overzealous; realize you
will lose equipment, soldiers to wounded in action, and energy
as you continue to fight, day after day. Take the end state, and
shape your plan. In Najaf, we focused on three areas, and integrated
these areas into continuous attacks.
We concentrated first on the militia — keep up the pressure,
stay flexible, and remain unpredictable. We focused secondly on
Madhi leaders — target them and choose the right time to attack,
such as at a time when the enemy is depending on public
leadership. The task force conducted spoiling attacks on Fridays
(prayer day) to disrupt al-Sadr’s movement between Najaf
and Kufa. On two such occasions, Sadr was forced to send his
second in charge to speak at Friday prayers in Kufa, and on one
occasion, the task force captured his personal aide. Even when
unsuccessful in capturing high-value targets, the fact the task force
disrupted enemy movement and communications became crucial
for follow-on missions. For example, about two weeks into the
campaign, the task force began targeting Muqtada and his top
three lieutenants. Our end state was capture, but in the process,
we found that we directly affected the enemy’s ability to coordinate,
communicate, and maintain the initiative, which allowed
the task force freedom of maneuver throughout the area of operation.
Finally, we concentrated on weapons caches. We specifically
targeted enemy supply lines and ammunition caches.
In effect, these three areas caused the militia to fight in multiple
directions, and forced him to choose priorities. By forcing
the enemy to make choices, we gained the initiative, forcing the
enemy to consolidate his forces to protect his high payoff targets,
allowing the task force to focus on destroying the militia.
If a commander fails to campaign, the task force can easily become
mired in reactive mode and lose focus on the end state.
Watch your soldiers and equipment. We have the best soldiers
in the world, and they are ‘can do’ all the time. Rely on platoon
leaders and platoon sergeants to gauge soldier effectiveness. We
stared hard and aggressive, and within a week, we were losing the
“We concentrated first on the militia — keep up the pressure, stay flexible, and remain unpredictable.
We focused secondly on Madhi leaders — target them and choose the right time to attack, such as
at a time when the enemy is depending on public leadership. The task force conducted spoiling attacks
on Fridays (prayer day) to disrupt al-Sadr’s movement between Najaf and Kufa. On two such occasions,
Sadr was forced to send his second in charge to speak at Friday prayers in Kufa, and on one occasion,
the task force captured his personal aide.”