the Equinox - The Hermetic Library

the Equinox - The Hermetic Library the Equinox - The Hermetic Library

24.03.2013 Views

132 THE EQUINOX or Soul; and a Selecting Power, which however is strenuously denied by the rigid law of Cause and Effect. However the mental eyes of the vast majority of his followers were not so clear as to pierce far into the darkness of metaphysical philosophy, and so it happened that, where the idealism of the Venânta had failed the realism of Buddhism succeeded.* This denial of a Universal Âtman, and a personal Âtman, soon brought the ethical and philosophical arguments of Gotama up against a brick wall (Kan’t “à priori”). As we have seen he could not prop up a fictitious beginning by the supposition of the former, and he dared not use Nibbâna as such, though in truth the Beginning is just as incomprehenisble with or without at Âtman. But, in spite of his having denied the latter, he had to account for Causality and the transmission of his Good and Evil (Karma) by some means or another. Now, according to Nâgasena, the Blessed One refused to answer any such questions as “Is the universe everlasting?” “Is it not everlasting?” “Has it an end?” ”Has it not an end?” “Is it both ending and unending?” ”It is neither the one nor the other?” And further all such questions as “Are the soul and the body the same thing?” ”Is the soul distinct from the body?” “Does a Tathâgata exist after death?” “Does he not exist after death?” “Does * In spite of the fact that Buddhism urges that “the whole world is under the Law of Causation,” it commands its followers to lead pure and noble lives, in place of dishonourable ones, in spite of their having no freedom of choice between good and evil. “Let us not lose ourselves in vain speculations of profitless subtleties,” says the Dhammapada, “let us surrender self and all selfishness, and as all things are fixed by causation, let us practice good so that good may result from our actions.” Just as if it could possibly be done if “all things are fixed.” The Buddhist, in theory having postulated that all fowls lay hardboiled eggs, adds, the ideal man is he who can only make omlettes.

THE TEMPLE OF SOLOMON THE KING he both exist and not exist after death?” “Do he neither exist nor not exist after death?” . . . Because “the Blessed Buddhas lift not up their voice without a reason and without an object.”* But in spite of their being no soul “in the highest sense,”† Gotama had to postulate some vehicle which would transmit the sorrow of one generation to another, of one instant of time to the next; and, not being able to use the familiar idea of Âtman, he instead made that of Karma do a double duty. “He does not die until that evil Karma is exhausted,” says Nâgasena.‡ Now this brings us to an extraordinary complex question, namely the practical difference between the Karma minus Âtman of the Buddhists and the Karma plus Âtman of the later Vedântists? The Brahman’s idea, at first, was one of complete whole, this, as the comment supplanted the text, got frayed into innumerable units or Âtmans, which, on account of Karma, were born again and again until Karma was used up and the individual Âtman went back to the universal Âtman. Buddha, erasing the Âtman, though he refused to discuss the Beginning, postulated Nibbâna as the end, which fact conversely also postulates the Beginning as Nibbâna. Therefore we have all things originating from an x sign, Âtman, Nibbâna, God, Ain or First Cause, and eventually returning to this primordial Equilibrium. The difficulty which now remains is the bridging over of this divided middle. To Gotama there is no unit, and existence per se is Ignorance caused as it were by a bad dream in the head of the undefinable Nibbâna; which itself, however, * “The Questions of King Milinda,” iv, 2, 5. † Ibid., iii, 5, 6. ‡ Ibid., iii, 4, 4. 133

THE TEMPLE OF SOLOMON THE KING<br />

he both exist and not exist after death?” “Do he nei<strong>the</strong>r<br />

exist nor not exist after death?” . . . Because “<strong>the</strong> Blessed<br />

Buddhas lift not up <strong>the</strong>ir voice without a reason and without<br />

an object.”* But in spite of <strong>the</strong>ir being no soul “in <strong>the</strong><br />

highest sense,Ӡ Gotama had to postulate some vehicle which<br />

would transmit <strong>the</strong> sorrow of one generation to ano<strong>the</strong>r, of<br />

one instant of time to <strong>the</strong> next; and, not being able to use <strong>the</strong><br />

familiar idea of Âtman, he instead made that of Karma do a<br />

double duty. “He does not die until that evil Karma is<br />

exhausted,” says Nâgasena.‡<br />

Now this brings us to an extraordinary complex question,<br />

namely <strong>the</strong> practical difference between <strong>the</strong> Karma minus<br />

Âtman of <strong>the</strong> Buddhists and <strong>the</strong> Karma plus Âtman of <strong>the</strong><br />

later Vedântists?<br />

<strong>The</strong> Brahman’s idea, at first, was one of complete whole,<br />

this, as <strong>the</strong> comment supplanted <strong>the</strong> text, got frayed into<br />

innumerable units or Âtmans, which, on account of Karma,<br />

were born again and again until Karma was used up and <strong>the</strong><br />

individual Âtman went back to <strong>the</strong> universal Âtman. Buddha,<br />

erasing <strong>the</strong> Âtman, though he refused to discuss <strong>the</strong> Beginning,<br />

postulated Nibbâna as <strong>the</strong> end, which fact conversely<br />

also postulates <strong>the</strong> Beginning as Nibbâna. <strong>The</strong>refore we have<br />

all things originating from an x sign, Âtman, Nibbâna, God,<br />

Ain or First Cause, and eventually returning to this primordial<br />

Equilibrium. <strong>The</strong> difficulty which now remains is <strong>the</strong> bridging<br />

over of this divided middle. To Gotama <strong>the</strong>re is no unit, and<br />

existence per se is Ignorance caused as it were by a bad dream<br />

in <strong>the</strong> head of <strong>the</strong> undefinable Nibbâna; which itself, however,<br />

* “<strong>The</strong> Questions of King Milinda,” iv, 2, 5. † Ibid., iii, 5, 6.<br />

‡ Ibid., iii, 4, 4.<br />

133

Hooray! Your file is uploaded and ready to be published.

Saved successfully!

Ooh no, something went wrong!