Lawyers Manual - Unified Court System
Lawyers Manual - Unified Court System Lawyers Manual - Unified Court System
134 Betsy Tsai To establish that custody rights were actually being exercised at the time of removal requires very little evidence on the part of the party with the custody rights. In fact, the Convention assumes that the person with rights of custody was exercising them, and places the burden of proof on the alleged abductor to show that custody rights were not actually being exercised at the time of removal. Defenses and Exceptions to the Return Remedy The Hague Convention provides various defenses and exceptions to the requirement that an abducted child be returned. First, if more than one year has passed since the allegedly wrongful removal and the child is well settled in the new environment, the court may decline to return the child. 9 Second, if the party requesting that the child be returned was not actually exercising rights of custody at the time of removal or had consented to the removal, return of the child is not mandated. 10 Third, a court may not return an abducted child if there is a “grave risk” that such a return “would expose the child to physical or psychological harm or otherwise place the child in an intolerable situation.” 11 Fourth, if the child objects to returning to the country of habitual residence and the child is of sufficient age and maturity, the child’s views may be taken into account to oppose return. 12 Finally, courts may refuse to return a child if doing so would not comport with “the fundamental principles of the requested State relating to the protection of human rights and fundamental freedoms.” 13 These exceptions are intended to be narrowly construed. Using the Hague Convention Exceptions on Behalf of Battered Women The Hague Convention can pose serious problems for abused women who flee to the United States seeking safety. Because the various exceptions are designed to be narrowly construed and may be difficult to establish, lawyers representing abused women should first explore other avenues of relief, such as arguing that the child was not wrongfully taken from the country of origin. If necessary, however, exceptions to the Hague Convention may be successfully litigated. The Article 13(b) grave risk of harm exception is the most commonly litigated exception in Hague Convention cases and potentially useful for women fleeing abusive partners, although it has traditionally been a difficult exception to establish. The 13(b) exception allows courts to circumvent their obligation to return the child to the country of habitual residence if the opposing party can demonstrate that “there is a grave risk that [the child’s] return would expose the child to physical or psychological harm or otherwise place the child in an
Civil Aspects of International Child Abduction and Abused Mothers 135 intolerable situation.” The party opposing the return has the burden of proof and must demonstrate the applicability of the 13(b) exception by clear and convincing evidence. Because the Hague Convention does not provide a definition for what constitutes “grave risk,” it is important to examine judicial interpretation of the 13(b) exception. Traditionally, US courts have interpreted the 13(b) exception very narrowly. The Second Circuit has stated: A “grave risk” exists in only two situations: (1) where returning the child means sending him to “a zone of war, famine, or disease”; or (2) “in cases of serious abuse or neglect, or extraordinary emotional dependence, when the court in the country of habitual residence, for whatever reason, may be incapable or unwilling to give the child adequate protection.” 14 Recently, however, despite the traditionally narrow interpretation of the 13(b) exception, the Second Circuit, has found grave risk in a number of cases in which mothers have fled abusive partners. In Blondin v. Dubois, a leading case that resulted in four published decisions, 15 Marthe Dubois fled from France to the United States with her two children, Marie-Eline (age eight) and Francois (age four), to escape her abusive husband, Felix Blondin. The district court found that Blondin had repeatedly abused Dubois throughout the course of their relationship and had also beat Marie-Eline, twisted an electrical cord around her neck, and threatened to kill her. On two other occasions, Dubois had attempted to leave Blondin, fleeing to a battered women’s shelter for a total of approximately nine months. The district court held that the 13(b) grave risk exception applied and denied return of the children because return “would present a ‘grave risk’ that they would be exposed to ‘physical or psychological harm’ or that they would otherwise be placed in an ‘intolerable situation.’ ” 16 On appeal, the Second Circuit, although in agreement with the district court’s finding of grave risk, remanded for consideration of “whether other options are indeed available under French law — options that may allow the courts of the United States to comply both with the Convention’s mandate to deliver abducted children to the jurisdiction of the courts of their home countries and with the Convention’s command that children be protected from the ‘grave risk’ of harm.” 17 On remand, the district court not only considered and rejected other options by which the children could be safely returned to France, but also relied on uncontroverted expert testimony from a child psychologist that returning the children to France would likely trigger severe symptoms of post-
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134 Betsy Tsai<br />
To establish that custody rights were actually being exercised at the time of<br />
removal requires very little evidence on the part of the party with the custody<br />
rights. In fact, the Convention assumes that the person with rights of custody was<br />
exercising them, and places the burden of proof on the alleged abductor to show<br />
that custody rights were not actually being exercised at the time of removal.<br />
Defenses and Exceptions to the Return Remedy<br />
The Hague Convention provides various defenses and exceptions to the<br />
requirement that an abducted child be returned. First, if more than one year has<br />
passed since the allegedly wrongful removal and the child is well settled in the<br />
new environment, the court may decline to return the child. 9 Second, if the party<br />
requesting that the child be returned was not actually exercising rights of<br />
custody at the time of removal or had consented to the removal, return of the<br />
child is not mandated. 10 Third, a court may not return an abducted child if there<br />
is a “grave risk” that such a return “would expose the child to physical or<br />
psychological harm or otherwise place the child in an intolerable situation.” 11<br />
Fourth, if the child objects to returning to the country of habitual residence and<br />
the child is of sufficient age and maturity, the child’s views may be taken into<br />
account to oppose return. 12 Finally, courts may refuse to return a child if doing<br />
so would not comport with “the fundamental principles of the requested State<br />
relating to the protection of human rights and fundamental freedoms.” 13 These<br />
exceptions are intended to be narrowly construed.<br />
Using the Hague Convention Exceptions on Behalf of<br />
Battered Women<br />
The Hague Convention can pose serious problems for abused women who flee<br />
to the United States seeking safety. Because the various exceptions are designed to<br />
be narrowly construed and may be difficult to establish, lawyers representing<br />
abused women should first explore other avenues of relief, such as arguing that the<br />
child was not wrongfully taken from the country of origin. If necessary, however,<br />
exceptions to the Hague Convention may be successfully litigated.<br />
The Article 13(b) grave risk of harm exception is the most commonly<br />
litigated exception in Hague Convention cases and potentially useful for women<br />
fleeing abusive partners, although it has traditionally been a difficult exception<br />
to establish. The 13(b) exception allows courts to circumvent their obligation to<br />
return the child to the country of habitual residence if the opposing party can<br />
demonstrate that “there is a grave risk that [the child’s] return would expose the<br />
child to physical or psychological harm or otherwise place the child in an