Lawyers Manual - Unified Court System
Lawyers Manual - Unified Court System Lawyers Manual - Unified Court System
124 Mary Rothwell Davis child, and determine a period for the duration of the temporary order.” 16 Accordingly, the Bronx IDV court held a telephone conversation, which was transcribed by a court stenographer, with the judge in the Dominican Republic who had issued the original custody decree. DRL § 75-i requires that such communications be recorded, and that the parties be given an opportunity to participate or present facts and argument concerning jurisdiction. The end result was that the Dominican court declined to reassert jurisdiction, allowing that New York was the better forum upon the assumption that both parents were now domiciled in New York. The court also stated that it understood the parties’ custody agreement to allow custody to revert to the mother once she was settled in the United States. Determining Residence Although the father attempted to argue that he was still domiciled in the Dominican Republic, the IDV court determined — based on the statements that he had made to probation authorities when seeking release on his own recognizance in the criminal matter — that the father had claimed in that proceeding to be a businessman who had resided in New York City for the previous two years. Demonstrating how an integrated court prevents parties from presenting different faces to different courts, the IDV court declined to credit the father’s subsequent contradiction of those assertions as part of his bid to have jurisdiction remain in the Dominican Republic. Thus, the IDV court could assume modification jurisdiction because “a court of this state or a court of the other state determines that the child, [and] the child’s parents . . . do not presently reside in the other state.” 17 The Bronx Court found additional, independently sufficient reasons why it was appropriate to assume modification jurisdiction. The UCCJEA permits assumption of jurisdiction if “the court of the other state determines it no longer has exclusive, continuing jurisdiction.” 18 The Dominican judge had indicated that, according to an original custody agreement, the parties intended that custody revert to the mother once she settled in the United States, as she now had, and the court gave its express consent to transfer of the matter to New York. Notably, the determination that a child no longer has a “significant connection” with the home state can only be made by the original court; another court cannot determine that issue for it. 19 Thus it was only for the Dominican court, and not New York, to come to that important conclusion. Either the original or new court, however, may determine that the child and the child’s parents do not presently reside in the original home state. 20
Safety Issues UCCJEA and Domestic Violence: A Case Study 125 Even when the foreign court refuses to relinquish jurisdiction, a concerned New York court can take significant steps to ensure that domestic violence is addressed by the foreign court. In Matter of Noel D. v Gladys D., 21 the New York court, deeply troubled by a default award of custody in Illinois to a parent with an extensive history of mental instability and violence that was unknown to the Illinois court, retained temporary emergency jurisdiction until such time as it could be assured that Illinois would address the significant safety issues, even though the Illinois court refused to give up continuing, exclusive jurisdiction. Like the court in Noel D., the Bronx IDV court was presented with a default order of custody granted without adequate knowledge on the part of the original court about the history of domestic violence in the home. In both cases, the courts had concerns about the capacity or willingness of the originating court to protect the safety of the parties before it. The Noel D. court determined to hold on to the case until the Illinois court could assure the safety of the mother and child. The Bronx IDV court, in Hector G., examined whether the court in the Dominican Republic would ever be in a position to protect this mother and her children, since the UCCJEA permits a court to assume jurisdiction if foreign proceedings do not conform to our basic jurisdictional standards. 22 It cited the Department of State Country Report on Human Rights Practices for the Dominican Republic, 23 noting that the Dominican Republic had no laws against domestic violence until 1997, that domestic violence was “widespread,” affecting 40% of the country’s women and children, and that there were no shelters for battered women there, as of March 2003. 24 Logistical Concerns and Determination of “Convenient Forum” Whether there are sufficient resources for the family in the other jurisdiction is a factor to be considered under the analysis of “convenient forum.” 25 Even where a court can take jurisdiction — as when the originating judge agrees to it — the new court may nevertheless consider whether it should take jurisdiction, based on assessment of whether it is an “inconvenient forum” and another forum may be more appropriate. Here the court must consider multiple factors: 1. whether domestic violence or mistreatment or abuse of a child or sibling has occurred and is likely to continue in the future and which state could best protect the parties and the child; 2. the length of time the child has resided outside this state;
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124 Mary Rothwell Davis<br />
child, and determine a period for the duration of the temporary order.” 16<br />
Accordingly, the Bronx IDV court held a telephone conversation, which was<br />
transcribed by a court stenographer, with the judge in the Dominican Republic<br />
who had issued the original custody decree. DRL § 75-i requires that such<br />
communications be recorded, and that the parties be given an opportunity to<br />
participate or present facts and argument concerning jurisdiction. The end result<br />
was that the Dominican court declined to reassert jurisdiction, allowing that<br />
New York was the better forum upon the assumption that both parents were now<br />
domiciled in New York. The court also stated that it understood the parties’<br />
custody agreement to allow custody to revert to the mother once she was settled<br />
in the United States.<br />
Determining Residence<br />
Although the father attempted to argue that he was still domiciled in the<br />
Dominican Republic, the IDV court determined — based on the statements<br />
that he had made to probation authorities when seeking release on his own<br />
recognizance in the criminal matter — that the father had claimed in that<br />
proceeding to be a businessman who had resided in New York City for the<br />
previous two years. Demonstrating how an integrated court prevents parties<br />
from presenting different faces to different courts, the IDV court declined to<br />
credit the father’s subsequent contradiction of those assertions as part of his<br />
bid to have jurisdiction remain in the Dominican Republic. Thus, the IDV<br />
court could assume modification jurisdiction because “a court of this state or a<br />
court of the other state determines that the child, [and] the child’s parents . . .<br />
do not presently reside in the other state.” 17<br />
The Bronx <strong>Court</strong> found additional, independently sufficient reasons why it<br />
was appropriate to assume modification jurisdiction. The UCCJEA permits<br />
assumption of jurisdiction if “the court of the other state determines it no longer<br />
has exclusive, continuing jurisdiction.” 18 The Dominican judge had indicated<br />
that, according to an original custody agreement, the parties intended that<br />
custody revert to the mother once she settled in the United States, as she now<br />
had, and the court gave its express consent to transfer of the matter to New<br />
York. Notably, the determination that a child no longer has a “significant<br />
connection” with the home state can only be made by the original court; another<br />
court cannot determine that issue for it. 19 Thus it was only for the Dominican<br />
court, and not New York, to come to that important conclusion. Either the<br />
original or new court, however, may determine that the child and the child’s<br />
parents do not presently reside in the original home state. 20