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Are Patents and Copyrights Morally Justified? - Tom G. Palmer

Are Patents and Copyrights Morally Justified? - Tom G. Palmer

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• 818 HarvardJournal of Law & Public Policy [Vol. 13<br />

differing conclusions. This occurs because liberty <strong>and</strong> property<br />

in this context may be irreconcilable; copyrights <strong>and</strong> patents<br />

seem to be property, but theyalso seem to restrict liberty. One<br />

would be hard-pressed, for example, to find two stronger defenders<br />

ofliberty <strong>and</strong> property in Nineteenth Century America<br />

than the abolitionist Lys<strong>and</strong>er Spooner. <strong>and</strong> the Jacksonian<br />

editorialist William Leggett. Yet on the subject ofintellectual<br />

property rights, they each came to opposite conclusions:<br />

Spooner steadfastly championed intellectual property rights<br />

while Leggett advocated with equal force the unrestricted exchange<br />

of ideas. Although they came to opposite conclusions,<br />

each argued that his beliefs were consistent with his overall<br />

stance in favor of liberty, private property, <strong>and</strong> freedom of<br />

trade. 2<br />

Sometimes the best developed arguments in support ofintellectual<br />

property rights are advanced by relatively marginal authors,<br />

like Spooner for example. This is because the great<br />

pioneers of the philosophy of property rights wrote before<br />

property rights for authors or inventors had become a popular<br />

issue; it remained for lesser figures to mold the arguments for<br />

intellectual property based on the property theories that had<br />

been developed earlier by more prominent thinkers. Consequently,<br />

while Locke, Hume, Kant, Hegel, <strong>and</strong> other philosophers<br />

will figure significantly in this Article, attention will also<br />

be devoted to later interpreters, who applied the ideas ofthese<br />

<strong>and</strong> other great philosophers in new ways.<br />

Intellectual property rights are rights in ideal objects, which<br />

are distinguished from the material substrata in which they are<br />

instantiated. 3 Much of this Article will therefore be concerned<br />

with the ontology of ideal objects. This is because the subject<br />

of intellectual property, indeed, the very idea of exercising<br />

property rights over ideas, processes, poems, <strong>and</strong> the like,<br />

2. See, e.g., Spooner, A Letter to Scientists <strong>and</strong> inventors, on the Science offustice, <strong>and</strong> Their<br />

Right of Perpetual Property in Their Discoveries <strong>and</strong> Inventions, in 3 THE COLLECTED WORKS<br />

OF LYSANDER SPOONER 68 (C. Shively ed. 1971); W. LEOOETF, DEMOCRATICK EDITORS-<br />

AL5: ESSAYS IN JACKSONIAN POLITICAL ECONOMY 397-98 (L. White ed. 1984).<br />

3. This catch-all category covers the subject matter of patents <strong>and</strong> copyrights, including<br />

those for algorithms, computer programs, manufacturing processes, inventions,<br />

musical or literaryworks, pictorial or other kinds of representations, sculptures,<br />

designs, <strong>and</strong> more. The relevant difference between such goods <strong>and</strong> tangible goods is<br />

that the former can be instantiated an indefinite number oftimes, that is, they arenot<br />

scarce in a staticsense, whiletangible goods arespatially circumscribed <strong>and</strong>are scarce<br />

in both the static<strong>and</strong> the dynamic sense of the term.

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