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Are Patents and Copyrights Morally Justified? - Tom G. Palmer

Are Patents and Copyrights Morally Justified? - Tom G. Palmer

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No. 3] <strong>Are</strong> <strong>Patents</strong> <strong>and</strong> <strong>Copyrights</strong> <strong>Morally</strong> <strong>Justified</strong>? 887<br />

A superficially similar, but in reality very different argument<br />

based on personality, is offered by Hegel in his Philosophy of<br />

Right. 78 Unlike von Humboldt’s appeal to the development of<br />

personality, the Hegelian argument sees property not only as a<br />

necessary condition for this development, but as the manifestation<br />

of this development itself. In the Phenomenology of Spirit,<br />

Hegel emphasized that it is through work that the spirit comes<br />

to know itself. 79 In the Philosophy of Right, a treatise on law,<br />

property fills the role of work. Notably, the discussion ofproperty<br />

culminates in patents <strong>and</strong> copyrights. For Hegel, personality<br />

forms the foundation of any system of rights: “Personality<br />

essentially involves the capacity for rights <strong>and</strong> constitutes the<br />

concept <strong>and</strong> the basis (itselfabstract) of the system ofabstract<br />

<strong>and</strong> therefore formal right. Hence the imperative of right is:<br />

‘Be a person <strong>and</strong> respect others as persons.’ “80<br />

Personality must be translated from mere potentiality into<br />

actuality, or, in Hegelian terms, from Concept (Begrij) to Idea<br />

(Idee).<br />

A person must translate his freedom into an external<br />

sphere in order to exist as Idea. Personality is the first, still<br />

wholly abstract, determination of the absolute <strong>and</strong> infinite<br />

will, <strong>and</strong> therefore this sphere distinct from the person, the<br />

sphere capable of embodying his freedom, is likewise determined<br />

as what is immediately different <strong>and</strong> separable from<br />

him. 8 ’<br />

Hegel specifically eschews utilitarianjustifications for property,<br />

for “[i}f emphasis is placed on my needs, then the possession<br />

of property appears as a means to their satisfaction, but<br />

the true position is that, from the st<strong>and</strong>point offreedom, property<br />

is the first embodiment of freedom <strong>and</strong> so is in itself a substantive<br />

end,” 82<br />

The metaphysical grounding of this theory of private property<br />

is straightforward: “Since my will, as the will of a person,<br />

78. See G. HECEL, Pnu.osopHv OF RIGHT (F. Knox trans. 1952).<br />

79. See G. HEGEL,, PHENOMENOLOGY OF SPIRIT (A.V. Miller trans. 1977).<br />

80. 0. HEGEL, supra note 78, at 87. Knox points to a similarity in the treatment of<br />

Bildung (loosely translatable as “education” or “spiritual development”) in both von<br />

Humboldt <strong>and</strong> Hegel. See id. at 815 n.58. The differenëeis that whereas von Humboldt<br />

saw the role of the state in the process of Bildung as “negative,” that is, protecting<br />

citizens from violence but otherwisekeeping out of the way, Hegel sees a positive role<br />

for the state in this process. See id.<br />

81. Id. at 40.<br />

82. Id. at 42.

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