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Are Patents and Copyrights Morally Justified? - Tom G. Palmer

Are Patents and Copyrights Morally Justified? - Tom G. Palmer

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832 HarvardJournal of Law & Public Policy [Vol. 13<br />

one’s body, the violation of which constitutes an infringement<br />

of liberty. (2)<br />

[God] gave [the earth] to the Industrious <strong>and</strong> Rational, (<strong>and</strong><br />

Labour was to be his Title to it;) not to the Fancy or Covetousness<br />

of the Quarrelsom <strong>and</strong> Contentious. He that had<br />

as good left for his Improvement, as was already taken up,<br />

needed not complain, ought not to meddle with what was<br />

already improved by another’s Labour: If he did, ‘tis plain he<br />

desired the benefit of another’s Pains, which he had no right<br />

to.... 54<br />

(3)” ‘tis Labour indeed that puts the difference of value on<br />

everything. . . . [T]he improvement of labour makes the far<br />

greater part of the value.” Indeed, “in most of them 99/100 are<br />

wholly to be put on the account of labor.” 55<br />

These three arguments all lend support, each in a different<br />

way, to private property rights in l<strong>and</strong>—Locke’s primary interest<br />

in the chapter on property. They diverge when it comes to<br />

ideal objects, however. Although the second <strong>and</strong> third arguments<br />

lend support to intellectual property rights claims, the<br />

first emphatically does not. For Locke, self-ownership serves<br />

several important functions. First, it is the foundation of liberty;<br />

indeed, it is synonymous with liberty. Second, it allows<br />

Locke to respond effectively to Filmer’s criticism of the consent<br />

theories of property set forth by Grotius <strong>and</strong> Pufendorf. If appropriation<br />

of common property rests on unanimous consent,<br />

Filmer knows of at least one person who would refuse his consent,<br />

thus knocking the struts out from under the entire edifice.<br />

Locke seeks to show “how Men might come to have a property<br />

in several parts of that which God gave to Mankind in common,<br />

<strong>and</strong> that without any express Compact of all the Commoners,”<br />

56 that is, in a way that will avoid Filmer’s otherwise fatal<br />

objection. By beginning with one tangible thing that is so<br />

clearly one’s own that no one else can claim it—one’s own<br />

body—Locke can show how property rights can legitimately<br />

emerge without requiring universal consent, thus sidestepping<br />

Filmer’s objection. 57<br />

54. Id. at 333.<br />

55. Id. at 338.<br />

56. Id. at 327.<br />

57. Though the Earth <strong>and</strong> all inferior Creatures be common to all Men, yet<br />

every Man has a Property in his own Person. This no Body has any Right to<br />

but himself. TheLabourof his Body, <strong>and</strong> the Work of his H<strong>and</strong>s, we may say,<br />

are properly his.

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