Are Patents and Copyrights Morally Justified? - Tom G. Palmer

No. 3] Are Patents and Copyrights MorallyJust~fied? 831
argue that any form of property limits liberty in some way, Jan
Narveson responds:
This is to talk as though the ‘restrictions’ involved in ownership
were nothing but that. But that’s absurdi The essence of
my having an Apple Macintosh is that I have one, at my disposal
whenand as I wish, which latterof course requires that
you not be able simply to use it any time you like; it’s not that
you can’t have one unless I say so.52
My ownership claim over my computer restricts your access to
that computer, but it is not a blanket restriction on your liberty
to acquire a similar computer, or an abacus, or to count on
your fingers or use pencil and paper. In contrast, to claim a
property right over a process is to claim ablanket right to control
the actions of others. For example, if a property right to
the use of the abacus were to be granted to someone, it would
mean precisely that others could not make an abacus unless
they had the permission of the owner of that right. It would be
a restriction on the liberty of everyone who wanted to make an
abacus with their own labor out ofwood that they legitimately
owned. This is a restriction on action qualitatively different
from the restriction implied in my ownership of a particular
abacus.
The previous paragraph illustrates that intellectual property
rights are not equivalent to other property rights in “restricting
liberty.” Property rights in tangible objects do not restrict liberty
at all—they simply restrain action. Intellectual property
rights, on the other hand, do restrict liberty.
Arguments from self-ownership, including Spooner’s (but
perhaps not Rand’s), hinge upon the idea of liberty. As I argued
above, there is no reason that a number ofdifferent arguments
might not be marshalled in favor of property. Locke’s
argument for labor as the foundation of property has three
principal pillars: (1) Having established the right to property in
oneself, how can we determine when something hai become
“so his, [that is], a part of him, that another can no longer have
any right to it?” 53 The annexation of labor is the relevant point
at which a thing becomes owned and therefore assimilated to
52. J. NARVESON, THE LIBERTARtAN IDEA 77 (1988). For a liberty-basedargument for
property by Narveson, see id~at 62-93. But see Kelly, L~fe~Liberty and Property, in HUMAN
Riosrrs 108.18 (1984).
53. J. LOCKE, supra note 42, at 305. -