Venezuela: The Life and Times of the Party System - Political ...

national organization, and a constant effort to penetrate, encapsulate, and control organized
social life along party lines—clash increasingly with the existence of a host of groups and
movements that have sprung up throughout the social order, independent of party-controlled
networks. These organizations—ranging from middle-class neighborhood associations,
cooperatives, independent trade unions, and human rights organizations to a host of newly
articulate nongovernmental organizations [NGOs]—no longer need the parties to gain access to
information and acquire means of political action. They operate via networks of FAX and
electronic mail, and have acquired independent access to radio, television, and print media.
Groups like these have been among the foremost supporters of electoral reform. In the wake of
the coup of February 4, 1992, these same organizations began to consolidate in alternative
political organizations. 1
It remains unclear how and to what extent groups like these will be able to consolidate
and form viable political alternatives. It will not be easy, because more is at stake than simply
representing new social forces. The task at hand is not simply to represent but rather to do so in
a way that provides reasonable order and governability to democratic politics. The dilemma, as
yet unresolved, is that governability is desired at the same time that attacks are launched on the
very elements (the parties and central state institutions) that have provided strength, unity, and
governability in the past. Coming generations in Venezuela will have to figure out how to
combine the virtues of decentralization and stimulus of participation with the advantages of
unified leadership and disciplined party structures that have been at the heart of politics since
1958.
Controlling the military may prove to be the hardest of all. The attempted coup of
February 1992 revealed deep divisions in the armed forces, above all a split between younger
officers committed to radical change and those at the ranks of colonel or above who remained
loyal to the system. The coup was engineered by a group of younger officers 2 whose
commitment to an uprising dated back at least ten years with roots in strong nationalism,
opposition to corruption, and the emergence of a new leadership generation. With command of
the army’s elite battalions, they organized a coordinated rising in four major cities (Maracaibo,
1 Examples include Factor Democrático, RED (Respuesta en Democracia), Mesa
Democrática, or Queremos Elegir. Many of these groups are hard to trace or document in
systematic ways, but see the series of articles published in Economía Hoy (Caracas) in July,
August, and September of 1992: “Tras la Intentona de febrero nuevas caras esperan turno al
bate” (July 21, 1992); “La Venezuela posible no es un sueño, es un hecho” (July 29, 1992); “La
participación comienza con una ‘red’ de comunicación” (July 31, 1992); “La sociedad civil no
quiere mas encomenderos” (August 5, 1992); “Los líderes del futuro aguardan su turno” (August
7, 1992); and “Escasez de postulaciones alternativas a los partidos tradicionales” (September 3,
1992). Elias Santana provides an interesting perspective on the nature of these new
organizations (1992); for a general analysis see Levine and Crisp (1992).
2 Known as comacates, for comandantes [lieutenant colonels], capitanes [captains], and
tenientes [lieutenants].