Venezuela: The Life and Times of the Party System - Political ...

of this reform was to increase the powers of the voters vis-à-vis the party organizations (Molina
1991b). In all, 269 mayors were chosen throughout the country. Of these, AD won 151, COPEI
105, MAS 10, Causa R 2, with an independent group of voters from the state of Falcón winning 1
(Table 9). In these elections, 38.4 percent of the candidates ran under the banner of a multiparty
coalition. Alliance politics were decisive in only two cases for AD, but for COPEI the coalition
option was critical to victory in twenty-five races, seventeen of which saw alliances between
COPEI and MAS. 1 Even though the government party once again proved victorious in these
contests, alliance politics within the opposition functioned smoothly and demonstrated their
capacity to generate support, thus undoubtedly strengthening the practice of interparty accords in
the future.
In the December 1989 elections for municipal councilors, 24.5 percent were chosen by
preference voting and 75.5 percent through the traditional party-list method. (Only 14 percent of
voters made use of the new electoral option.) Of the 481 councilors elected by nominal voting,
41.2 percent gained office through the effects of preference voting (10 percent of the total number
of councilors elected). 2 Though underutilized by the electorate, the capacity of nominal voting to
modify the positions of candidates on party lists altered the final outcome significantly.
Both voter abstention and the underutilization of preference voting are cause for some
reflection on the implications of recent electoral reforms. Why did these elections, and the new
electoral system on which they are based, not awaken the ‘civic enthusiasm’ hoped for? Were
such expectations justified in the first place? 3 Numerous opinion polls have shown that the
public was not well informed about the issues and had no clear image of what was at stake in
these political and electoral reforms. 4 Furthermore, when one considers that the last elections
took place a mere 10 months after the violence of 27-F (Kornblith 1989), it is perhaps even more
remarkable that the government party was able to get an electoral majority in the first place, and
that abstention did not climb higher still. The lack of adequate publicity about the new system,
combined with the overall atmosphere of social unrest, political decay, and economic decline,
suggests that expectations of greater electoral participation and interest in the December
elections were unfounded.
1 Data are from CSE (1989c). See also Carrasquero and Welsch (1989c).
2 Data are from CSE (1990a). According to Molina, the number of voters using the preference
voting system reached 30 percent and 24 percent of municipal councilors were elected by
preference voting (see Molina 1991b, 225 ff.).
3 For an argument that the question of preference voting was given exaggerated importance in
debates over electoral reform, see Guzmán (1989a).
4 A review of press coverage between May and November 1988 shows that electoral reform
was not an issue of great importance, and further, that it faded as the campaign got underway.
This is consistent with the low level of information in the general public about issues of electoral
reform. See CSE (1990c; also 1989b).