Venezuela: The Life and Times of the Party System - Political ...

and now sought accommodation with AD. Within AD itself, leaders now saw that the
overwhelming majorities of the 1940s had created false confidence, making the party ignore the
need to bring others along.
Elite understandings of the trienio were shaped and amplified by the specific character of
the transition to democracy in 1958. From the very beginning the transition was an enterprise
built on coalitions. Political parties cooperated, both underground and through pacts forged
among exile leaders. Business and professional groups joined, as did key elements in the
military and popular organizations linked to the political parties. Bear in mind that although the
dictator was thrown out, the military institution remained intact. Great effort was expended in
1958 and after to woo the officer corps, purging disloyal elements while gradually bringing new
generations along. The need to hold such diverse allies together reinforced dispositions to
prudent compromise. There was broad commitment to free open and elections, a commitment
maintained throughout the year in which the Provisional Government held power. Further, the
1958 elections also demonstrated that AD’s overwhelming majorities were a thing of the past.
Compromise was not thus only desirable, it was also essential to effective rule.
This sort of strategy was by no means inevitable. Many on the Left, for example, hoped
to push for thorough social and economic change, relying more on mass mobilization than
interelite compromise and accommodation. But in 1958 and after, key Venezuelan leaders
correctly believed that without revolution and firm control of armed force, strategies of that kind
were doomed. They also knew that even under the best of circumstances, democracy is not a
likely result of these strategies. Power is either too concentrated in the party running the show
(which thus becomes another dictatorship) or conflict is so exacerbated as to make survival
simply impossible. Having failed with similar approaches in the past, (i.e., dominance in the
trienio), the political class learned from experience and opted this time for caution, conciliation,
compromise and prudence.
Prior to the 1958 elections, the major non-Communist parties (AD, COPEI, and URD)
signed two formal agreements. The first, known as the Pact of Punto Fijo, pledged the
signatories to respect elections whatever the outcome, to maintain a political truce
depersonalizing debate and ensuring interparty consultation on touchy matters, and to share
political responsibility and patronage. The stress on pacts and interparty cooperation was
embodied in a series of coalition governments led by AD. Formal coalition rule lasted for ten
years, with AD’s partners changing but the general orientation to coalition remaining constant.
When explicit coalition rule ended after 1968, a series of agreements known as the Pacto
Institucional ensured that the spirit of political cannibalism would not return. The use of coalitions
extended beyond national politics to all levels of organized activity: trade unions and secondary
associations generally began choosing leaders by proportional representation, with leadership