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integral to conversation. Thus, conversation could be conceived of as both co- operative yet not wholly rational. Following on from Grice's conversational maxims, discourse theorists such Lakoff (1973,1979) and Leech (1983) have attempted to follow the (conversational maxim' approach (Fraser 1990) to account specifically for one particular discourse phenomenon - that of politeness. Lakoff (11973) for example identified two basic'pragmatic rules' - essentially opposed to each other which operate in conversational interaction - namely be clear (where the content of the message is a primary concern), and be polite (where the relationship between the speaker and hearer is a primary concern). In addition, three sub-maxims or rules of politeness were also identified, namely, don't impose (by displaying of deference), give options (the maintenance of distance), and make [one's interlocutor] fee/ good (the display of camaraderie) for example by generally being friendly and making one's interlocutor feel wanted or like a friend (see Lakoff 1973,296). What these maxims formally accounted for was the observation that conversationalists routinely employed language not only to convey meaning, but to consider the feelings and rights of interlocutors strengthen interpersonal relations and generally reduce friction in interaction. Importantly, Lakoff noted that politeness usually superseded clarity in conversation. Thus for example, an orientation to be polite may well cause a speaker to breach to some degree the need to be clear, as interpersonal concerns superseded ideational ones. Similarly drawing on, and seeking to append Grice's cooperative principle, Leech (1983) outlined what he termed a 'politeness principle' and developed a comprehensive set of maxims and sub-maxims, set out under the general rubric of 'interpersonal rhetoric'. Pragmatic discourse, that is, discourse where speakers seek to achieve some conversational 'goal', was seen to be guided by maxims of tact (minimize cost to other, maximize benefit to other); generosity (minimize benefit to self; maximize cost to selý; approbation (minimize dispraise of other, maximize praise of other); modesty (minimize praise of self, maximize dispraise of selo; agreement (minimize disagreement between self and other, maximize agreement between self and other); and sympathy (minimize antipathy between self and other; maximize sympathy 24
etween self and other). Conversation was thus seen to normatively proceed under a general 'minimise impoliteness - maximise politeness' ethos. Again, as with Grice and Lakoff, Leech attempted to formally account for the contingencies of talk with a specific set of maxims, ones which in effect accorded primacy to politeness over directness in talk. Both Lakoff and Leech base their approaches to of politeness on an essentially other-oriented stance then. By engaging in activity such as 'being friendly', displaying camaraderie, showing interest, or displaying tact, one is able to go about ones conversational work'politely', and take the feelings and interpersonal needs of others into account. Rather than relying on the rather fuzzy notion of others' feelings, Brown and Levinson (1987) sought to more formally conceptualise interlocutor interpersonal needs. To do this, as had Goffman earlier, Brown and Levinson employed the concept of face to allow for a reading of politenes as facework. In order to formally account for the face needs of persons, Brown and Levinson employed the construct of what they term the'model person' (henceforth NIP') to refer to any competent member of a given society. This universal construct was presented as possessing certain fundamental and irreducible qualities. First, he / she must be conceived of as a rational agent, that is, interested in achieving conversational goals in the most rational and effective way; and second he / she must be conceived of as possessing certain fundamental and irreducible 'face wants'. Drawing on Durkheim's earlier work on negative and positive rites in tribal societies, these wants or needs were subsumed under two general conceptual headings, namely, negative face (essentially the want or need to be unimpeded in one's actions and have one's autonomy of action preserved and respected, and be treated as an autonomous agent) and positive face (essentially the want to be approved of, valued, and included on the basis of similarity to one's interlocutors) (see fig 1.3). 25
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integral to conversation. Thus, conversation could be conceived <strong>of</strong> as both co-<br />
operative yet not wholly rational.<br />
Following on from Grice's conversational maxims, discourse theorists<br />
such Lak<strong>of</strong>f (1973,1979) and Leech (1983) have attempted to follow the<br />
(conversational maxim' approach (Fraser 1990) to account specifically for one<br />
particular discourse phenomenon - that <strong>of</strong> politeness. Lak<strong>of</strong>f (11973) for example<br />
identified two basic'pragmatic rules' - essentially opposed to each other which<br />
operate in conversational interaction - namely be clear (where the content <strong>of</strong> the<br />
message is a primary concern), and be polite (where the relationship between<br />
the speaker and hearer is a primary concern). In addition, three sub-maxims or<br />
rules <strong>of</strong> politeness were also identified, namely, don't impose (by displaying <strong>of</strong><br />
deference), give options (the maintenance <strong>of</strong> distance), and make [one's<br />
interlocutor] fee/ good (the display <strong>of</strong> camaraderie) for example by generally<br />
being friendly and making one's interlocutor feel wanted or like a friend (see<br />
Lak<strong>of</strong>f 1973,296). What these maxims formally accounted for was the<br />
observation that conversationalists routinely employed language not only to<br />
convey meaning, but to consider the feelings and rights <strong>of</strong> interlocutors<br />
strengthen interpersonal relations and generally reduce friction in interaction.<br />
Importantly, Lak<strong>of</strong>f noted that politeness usually superseded clarity in<br />
conversation. Thus for example, an orientation to be polite may well cause a<br />
speaker to breach to some degree the need to be clear, as interpersonal<br />
concerns superseded ideational ones.<br />
Similarly drawing on, and seeking to append Grice's cooperative<br />
principle, Leech (1983) outlined what he termed a 'politeness principle' and<br />
developed a comprehensive set <strong>of</strong> maxims and sub-maxims, set out under the<br />
general rubric <strong>of</strong> 'interpersonal rhetoric'. Pragmatic discourse, that is, discourse<br />
where speakers seek to achieve some conversational 'goal', was seen to be<br />
guided by maxims <strong>of</strong> tact (minimize cost to other, maximize benefit to other);<br />
generosity (minimize benefit to self; maximize cost to selý; approbation<br />
(minimize dispraise <strong>of</strong> other, maximize praise <strong>of</strong> other); modesty (minimize<br />
praise <strong>of</strong> self, maximize dispraise <strong>of</strong> selo; agreement (minimize disagreement<br />
between self and other, maximize agreement between self and other); and<br />
sympathy (minimize antipathy between self and other; maximize sympathy<br />
24