Chapter 4 Country Report Sweden
Chapter 4 Country Report Sweden
Chapter 4 Country Report Sweden
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Hellmut Wollmann<br />
Comparing Local Government Reforms<br />
in England, <strong>Sweden</strong>, France and Germany:<br />
Between continuity and change, divergence and convergence<br />
<strong>Chapter</strong> 4<br />
<strong>Country</strong> <strong>Report</strong> <strong>Sweden</strong>*<br />
internet publication www.wuestenrot-stiftung.de/download/local-government<br />
for quotation: Wollmann, H. 2008, Comparing Local Government Reforms in England,<br />
<strong>Sweden</strong>, France and Germany, in: www.wuestenrot-stiftung.de/download/local-government<br />
* The bibliographical references for the country report <strong>Sweden</strong> are contained in the consolidated bibliography<br />
(chapter 7 below pages 482 following)
<strong>Chapter</strong> 4: country report <strong>Sweden</strong> local government<br />
Subchapter 4.1: local government<br />
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1. Development of <strong>Sweden</strong>’s local government system<br />
Modern <strong>Sweden</strong> is a unitary country with a constitutional monarchy based, as confirmed<br />
by the constitutional law of 1974 ("Instrument of Government", Regeringsform), on two<br />
constitutional and political pillars, representative and parliamentary government (representativt<br />
och parlamentariskt statsskick) and local self government (kommunal självstyrelese).<br />
The principle and practice of local self-government is rooted in <strong>Sweden</strong>’s history more<br />
deeply and endurably than in any other European country. In order to properly understand<br />
the salience and function of local self-government in <strong>Sweden</strong>’s modern and most recent<br />
constitutional and political development, a historical account in some detail is required of<br />
the close ties between the evolution of local government institutions and the country’s<br />
constitutional setting at large.<br />
1.1 Historical development until the mid-19 th century<br />
<strong>Sweden</strong>’s local self-government can be traced back to medieval, if not earlier times, when<br />
"free men", that is free peasants or yeomen met in "things" to make collective decisions<br />
(see Petersson 1994: 15). The free peasants in Scandinavian regions survived during<br />
feudalism because feudal landlords and the landed aristocracy remained much less dominant<br />
than in other European countries, and because they enjoyed the geographical protection<br />
of dense forests and vast lands. In the mid-14 th century, King Magnus Eriksson’s<br />
Code – an early constitution – guaranteed free yeomen both personal and economic freedom<br />
and the right to influence the issues of the realm (see Häggroth et al. 1993: 7).<br />
During the early 16 th century, which is regarded as the formative era of the modern Swedish<br />
state, Gustav Vasa, a Swedish nobleman, was appointed regent by a parliament convened<br />
in 1521 – with the support of the free Swedish peasant class. On June 6 th 1523 he<br />
had himself elected and crowned King of <strong>Sweden</strong>, which practically ended the rule of the<br />
Danish king. (Later the 6 th of June became a Swedish national holiday to commemorate<br />
<strong>Sweden</strong>’s independence and statehood, see Cronhult 1994: 31). The national assemblies<br />
held by Gustav Vasa in 1527 and 1544 were important steps towards a fully-fledged parliament<br />
(which, borrowing from Germany, came to be called Riksdag) composed of estates<br />
(stånd) which included the peasants. "The feature that distinguished the Swedish<br />
Parliaments of the Estates in European terms was that the free farmers were represented<br />
in a parliamentary estate of their own" (Petersson 1994: 16). This all but unique degree of<br />
local level autonomy largely persisted during <strong>Sweden</strong>’s rise to great power status in the
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17 th and 18 th century, which was accompanied by the development of a strong state, but<br />
not, except for a brief period, by the emergence of monarchic absolutism.<br />
Following 1718, <strong>Sweden</strong> experience a so-called "Era of Liberty" during which the foundations<br />
of <strong>Sweden</strong>’s modern constitutional system were laid. The Instruments of Goverment<br />
(Regeringsform) of 1719 and 1720 established a legal division of power between the king<br />
and the people. The parliament (Riksdag) was organised into four estates: the nobility, the<br />
clergy, the burghers, and the peasants (the latter two estates evidencing the strength of<br />
the local level). While abandoning its original idea to declare "fundamental laws" to be for<br />
ever unchangeable, parliament in 1766 established the basic rule that, although a fundamental<br />
law can be changed or amended by a simple parliamentary majority, it needs to be<br />
approved by the incumbent parliament as well as by the succeeding parliament. Ever<br />
since, <strong>Sweden</strong> has followed this principle fundamental laws (rather than one formal constitutional<br />
text requiring a qualified majority for amendment). Also in 1766, parliament<br />
passed an unprecedented Freedom of the Press Act, giving it also the elevated status of<br />
fundamental law.<br />
After another short-lived period of monarchic autocracy (1789-1809), parliament adopted<br />
a new Instrument of Government, which, while conceding important government powers<br />
to the king, reassured the influence of parliament.<br />
In the late 18 th century, an institutionalised form of local government was created in rural<br />
areas on the basis of the some 2.500 church parishes, which enjoyed a status confirmed<br />
by royal privileges to the clergy. A parish board (sockenstämma), chaired by the local<br />
vicar, was put in charge not only of church matters but also of poor relief and vagrancy<br />
control and certain other matters, including education (see Strömberg/Westerståhl 1984).<br />
These functions were extended and clarified by ordinances in 1817 and 1843.<br />
1.2 Development from1862 to the 1930s<br />
The ordinances of 1862 laid the legal basis for <strong>Sweden</strong>’s modern local government system.<br />
In the legislative discussion which preceded adoption of the ordinances in 1862, a lively<br />
political and philosophical debate was conducted between conservatives and liberals<br />
about the conceptual and legal form of local government to be institutionalised (see<br />
Gustafsson 1991: 241 ff.). The conservative position perceived the State as supreme and<br />
local communities, in linking the individual with the State, as an integral part of the State<br />
and its structure. By contrast, the liberal position saw communities from a "natural rights"
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perspective as "spontaneous" societal formations which, while based on specific premises<br />
in their own right, were on an equal footing with the State (see Strömberg/Westerståhl<br />
1984: 9 for references, for the contemporary pertinent philosophical discourse see Montin<br />
1993: 10). In the wording of the 1862 legislation, this conceptual ambivalence is apparent<br />
in the contradiction between the view of the newly created local government units as both<br />
legal entities and associations of citizens.<br />
In the institutionalisation of local government the 1862 ordinances broke new ground on<br />
two levels.<br />
On the local level, local government was established on the territorial basis of existing<br />
parishes by endowing the new local government units with a range of responsibilities, including<br />
those hitherto within the purview of the church, such as poor relief (except education<br />
which, at first, remained in the responsibility of the church). The new local government<br />
units in rural areas were called landkommuner. At the same time, existing urban communities<br />
(stad) were turned into local government units. Since at that time <strong>Sweden</strong> still an<br />
"outright peasant society" (Strömberg/Westerståhl 1984: 12), only 11 per cent of the population<br />
lived in towns, the remainder in rural communities ("landkommuner").<br />
Another radical institutional change was effected on the level of the counties (län), the<br />
borders of which date back to 1634. Until the local government legislation of 1862, they<br />
served as regional administrative offices of central government and were headed by a<br />
governor (länshövding) appointed by the king, respectively the Government. After 1862,<br />
counties continued to function as the regional administrative level of central government.<br />
In a major institutional innovation, however, elected county councils were introduced (taking<br />
up the medieval name if not the concept of landsting). Hence, in continuing to serve as<br />
the basis of regional State administration headed by the central government appointed<br />
governor (länshövding) newly endowed with regional self-government, the new arrangement<br />
is reminiscent of the French juxtaposition of State administration headed by a préfet<br />
and local self-government vested in departmental councils, conseils généraux.<br />
All communities were set up as independent legal persons with the power to handle public<br />
order and economic affairs (see Cronhult 1994: 35). The 1862 legislation of stipulated that<br />
an elected council was to be established in only communities with more than 3.000 inhabitants.<br />
Hence, in the overwhelming majority of the 2.500 communities, local residents continued<br />
to convene in town meetings to make local decisions. Suffrage was limited to adult<br />
males and geared to restrictive property criteria.<br />
In addition to local decision-making bodies, be they town meetings or elected councils,<br />
magistrates (in towns, stader) and executive boards (in villages, landkommuner) ap-
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pointed by the councils and town meetings were provided for to prepare and implement<br />
decisions. Poor relief boards and, in some larger cities, special school boards were also<br />
elected. At the end of the 1880s, several new mandatory boards were established, such<br />
as the building board (see Strömberg/Westerståhl 1984: 11). In sum, in giving the executive<br />
a degree of autonomy alongside the elected council, a "dualistic" scheme of local<br />
government was introduced which apparently drew on contemporary Continental European<br />
examples, such as the Prussian Municipal Charter of 1808 (see Strömberg/Westerståhl<br />
1984: 9 Footnote) with their implicit separate of powers.<br />
The 1862 legislation laid down another principle which has become an all but pathdependent<br />
basic rule in Swedish local government by granting local authorities the right to<br />
levy their own taxes.<br />
In what has become another permanent and unique feature of the Swedish local government<br />
system, the 1862 legislation gave all "members" of the community or county the right<br />
(over and above political rights) to file a judicial appeal (kommunalbesvär) against any<br />
decision taken by the community council (or town meeting) or county council.(see Häggroth<br />
et al. 1993: 51). The traditional wording of this provision ("any member of ...") betrays<br />
the ambivalence mentioned above between the community as legal entity and "societal"<br />
community.<br />
Since the beginning of the 19 th century, a permanent debate had been conducted about<br />
reforming the antiquated basic composition of parliament (Riksdag) with its four estates<br />
(Stånd): nobility, clergy, burghers and peasants. It was not until 1866 that the Riksdag of<br />
the four estates was abolished and replaced by a bicameral legislature in which the lower<br />
house was popularly elected, still by restricted suffrage (see Petersson 1994: 22), while<br />
the upper house was indirectly elected by county councils (ländsting), another pointer to<br />
the continuing salience of the local government level in the Swedish intergovernmental<br />
system. This bicameral parliamentary system – with the conspicuous influence of county<br />
councils on the composition of the upper house – was only replaced by the present unicameral<br />
parliament in 1971 (!).<br />
In 1914 and 1917 <strong>Sweden</strong> experienced the most serious constitutional crisis of its modern<br />
history on the issue of who was to determine the composition of the government – the<br />
monarch or the majority of the Riksdag (see Petersson 1994: 25). Finally, the principles of<br />
parliamentary government triumphed. <strong>Sweden</strong> became de facto a genuine parliamentary<br />
democracy with the monarch restricted to all but symbolic functions, while the constitutional<br />
law of 1709 remained on the books, the final textual adjustment to constitutional<br />
reality being made as late as 1974.
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In 1919, universal and equal suffrage was introduced in local elections and, the threshold<br />
for requiring an elected council was lowered to 1.500 inhabitants. As a result, some 40 per<br />
cent of local authorities came to have a council system, while in the others town meetings<br />
were still practised (see Strömberg/Westerståhl 1984: 11).<br />
In demographic and settlement development, <strong>Sweden</strong> continued to be a largely agrarian<br />
country until the end of the 19 th century, when it was stricken by wide spread poverty, triggering<br />
massive emigration, almost one fifth of the population, particularly to the USA. After<br />
the turn of the century, the country entered a process of increasing industrialisation and<br />
urbanisation. The percentage of the population living in urban places rose from 11 per<br />
cent in 1862 to 35 percent in 1920.<br />
While local government functions were still quite limited around 1900, population growth in<br />
urban areas demanded greater local competence with regard to streets, water supply,<br />
sewage, and public transport. Local authority responsibilities in the field of social care in a<br />
broad sense increased prior to 1920. Child care was regulated at the beginning of the<br />
century and temperance care during the First World War ushering in a period of comprehensive<br />
State regulation (see Strömberg/Westerståhl 1984: 13).<br />
1.3 From the mid-1930s to the mid-1980s<br />
From the mid-1930s the development of <strong>Sweden</strong>’s local government system was strongly<br />
shaped by and geared to the construction and unparalleled expansion of what has become<br />
known as the "Swedish Model" of advanced welfare state. While socio-politically<br />
revolving around an all but unique system of conflict resolution through interest representation<br />
and mediation in labour market and industrial policy (see Pierre 1995: 140), inaugurated<br />
by the celebrated Saltsjöbaden Agreement of 1938 (see Petersson 1994: 35), <strong>Sweden</strong>’s<br />
promotion of the welfare state was characterised essentially by a strategic division<br />
and combination of responsibilities between central and local government:<br />
While fundamental policy decisions and concomitant legislation were adopted by parliament<br />
and government, that is, by the Social Democrats who have masterminded and<br />
dominated this policy area since 1936, and who held office without interruption for 40<br />
years, local government was given the task of implementing and, to a significant extent,<br />
financing the unprecedented growth of <strong>Sweden</strong>’s welfare state (see Sterzel 1994: 75) –<br />
which in many regards can be called a local welfare state (see Pierre 1994 who, in this<br />
sense, speaks of <strong>Sweden</strong>’s "local state", den lokala staten). This development was most<br />
dynamic during the 1960s and 1970s.
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- In its policy dimension the build-up of <strong>Sweden</strong>’s welfare state was characterised, from<br />
1945 until the late 1970s, by strong political guidance and comprehensive State control<br />
by the Social Democrat-led central government operating, not least, through compulsory<br />
legislation, long-range planning, detailed regulations, and State grants (see Strömberg/Engen<br />
1996: 246). Conceptually and ideologically, policy design was set on a<br />
comprehensive and universalist welfare state (Esping-Andersen 1990) with the emphasis<br />
on the public sector as the main, if not sole provider of welfare state services. While<br />
in 1960 the size of the Swedish public sector, at about 30 per cent of GNP, was still<br />
close to the OECD average, it surpassed 60 per cent by 1980 (when the OECD average<br />
stood at about 40 per cent) and peaked in 1982 with an unprecedented 67 percent<br />
of GNP (see Premfors 1991: 85, 90). Similarly, measured by the share of public sector<br />
personnel in total employment, <strong>Sweden</strong> has moved from 20 per cent (the OECD average<br />
in the 1960s) to some 30 per cent by 1980.<br />
- In its institutional dimension, the advance of <strong>Sweden</strong>’s welfare state was characterised<br />
by increasing weight, in terms of personnel and expenditure, in the intergovernmental<br />
setting, again unparalleled in any other OECD countries (except the neighbouring Nordic<br />
countries). While in 1960 the shares of the central government employees and local<br />
government employees (municipalities plus counties) in total employment were still almost<br />
equal (at 8 per cent, giving a total of 16 per cent), the local government share rose<br />
to 20 per cent, while central government share remained unchanged (see Premfors<br />
1998: 154). By the same token, the share of local government spending in total public<br />
spending rose dramatically. After standing at 47.6 per cent in 1950, it rose to 71.4 per<br />
cent by 1980 (see Strömberg/Engen 1996: 257).<br />
In the country’s demographic and settlement pattern, this development was accompanied<br />
by and reflected in accelerating urbanisation (see Strömberg/Westerståhl 1984: 12). While<br />
some 66 per cent of the population lived in urbanised areas in 1955, the figure rose to 81<br />
per cent at the end of the 1960s. Nearly 40 per cent of the national population came to live<br />
in the three metropolitan regions of Stockholm, Göteborg and Malmö in southern <strong>Sweden</strong>.<br />
"The regional imbalance became a serious political and social issue" (Khakee 1979: 13).<br />
Mirroring its changed function in <strong>Sweden</strong>’s post-war welfare state, the two-tier local government<br />
system saw deep-reaching institutional changes:<br />
- When, in1974, a new Instrument of Government was adopted as a constitutional law to<br />
replace the (repeatedly amended) Instrument of Government of 1809 (and to finally<br />
adapt written constitutional law to political realities long in force), the country’s local selfgovernment<br />
(kommunal självstyrelse) composed of municipalities (primärkommuner)<br />
and county councils (landstingskommuner) found a prominent mention in the first article
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– on an equal footing with the "representative and parliamentary" institutions (reprsentativt<br />
och parlamentariskt statsskick). 178 At the same time, their right to levy their own<br />
taxes "in order to perform their tasks (för skötseln av sina uppgifter)". 179 Whereas the<br />
constitutional status of local government was thus highlighted (not least by mentioning<br />
local self-government in the same breath as the national parliament), it should be remembered<br />
that the constitutional guarantee is, formally speaking, still precarious as, in<br />
<strong>Sweden</strong>’s constitutional tradition, Parliament can change a constitutional law by a simple<br />
majority (if adopted by the incumbent and succeeding parliaments). Furthermore, it<br />
should be borne in mind that <strong>Sweden</strong> does still not have a constitutional court (although<br />
this was debated during the elaboration of the new Instrument of Government) and that<br />
the local government has no recourse to the courts to defend their rights. So the institutional<br />
guarantee of local government is essentially political, firmly entrenched in the<br />
country’s political history and political culture and institutional "trust".<br />
- In view of the crucial role that local government was intended to shoulder in the build-up<br />
of the country’s post-war welfare state, in glaring contrast to the multitude of (some<br />
2.500) small localities stemming from the local government reform of 1862, the Swedish<br />
government was the first in post-war Europe to put the territorial reform of local government<br />
on the political agenda. In 1946, parliament approved the principles of a municipal<br />
boundary reform which applied only to rural localities (landkomuner). Taking effect<br />
in 1952, it reduced their number from 2.282 to 816 (see Häggroth et al. 1993: 12).<br />
A second round of territorial reforms, now including urban municipalities (stad), started<br />
in the early 1970s. At first relying on voluntary mergers, parliament finally resorted to<br />
compulsory municipal boundary reform, which was completed on January 1, 1974, producing<br />
288 municipalities (with an average size of some 30.000 and a median size of<br />
some 16.000 inhabitants (for details see Häggroth et al. 1993: 14 f., Baldersheim/Stahlberg<br />
1994, Marcou 2004: 49 ff.). At the beginning, the territorial reform drive<br />
of the 1970s was typically inspired by, and imbued with, the "rationalist" planning concepts<br />
rampant in that period. A crucial feature of the merger reform originally was a system<br />
of municipalities of different degrees of "centrality" (see Khakee 1979: 60) designed<br />
to optimise (functional) reach and administrative efficiency for the delivery of essential<br />
services (such as the comprehensive schools that were meant to be put in place) and to<br />
achieve economics of scale.<br />
178 Article 1: "Swedish democracy is founded on the free formation of opinion and on universal and equal<br />
suffrage. It shall be realised through a representative and parliamentary polity and through local selfgovernment".<br />
179 Article 7: "<strong>Sweden</strong> has municipalities and county councils. The decision-making in these local authorities<br />
is exercised by elected assemblies. The local authorities may levy taxes in order to perform their tasks".
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- The massive and early territorial reform of its municipal level, finally cutting the number<br />
of local authorities from some 2.500 to about 290 (putting <strong>Sweden</strong> with the U.K in the<br />
"North European" country group displaying a radical pattern of local government amalgamation,<br />
see Norton 1994: 37 ff.), provided the territorial basis for the construction of<br />
municipal institutions able to handle rapidly increasing local government responsibilities.<br />
In the absence of administrative structures in most of the previous small localities, this<br />
generally meant that the new organisations had to be put set up from scratch, improving<br />
the chances of a new beginning.<br />
- With the enlargement of local authorities and the expansion of tasks, the newly established<br />
municipalities saw a rapid transition from lay to professional professional administration<br />
(see Häggroth et al. 1993: 14 f.). Well into the 1950s, local services in many<br />
small localities were administered by local councillors working on the traditional, parttime,<br />
voluntary basis (local self-government in the historically genuine sense). Larger<br />
municipalities and rapidly growing tasks imposed professionalisation on local government<br />
firstly with full-time, salaried administrative ("professional") staff, and secondly with<br />
the professionalisation of councils and committees themselves: in order to cope with the<br />
work load, some councillors became full-time, salaried ("professional") local politicians.<br />
During the 1960s, the number of municipal employees grew dramatically, jumping from<br />
some 60.000 in 1965 to 110.000 in 1979 (see Strömberg/Engen 1996: 244). In order to<br />
meet local authority needs for qualified staff, professional schools were established in<br />
the late 1960s, like the schools of social work, which train social workers (see Gynnerstedt/Höjer<br />
2004). In contrast to many other countries, where personnel growth in<br />
the 1960s took place on the basis of existing staff, in local government personnel in<br />
<strong>Sweden</strong> was built up almost from scratch. Entirely new cohorts of freshly trained professionals,<br />
imbued with "modern" ideas were recruited into local administration. Considered<br />
from a generational point of few, <strong>Sweden</strong>’s local administration developed in<br />
the expansive 1960s and 1970s was made up of unusually and promisingly young personnel.<br />
- The development of new municipal organisational structures and personnel fell at a<br />
period in which "rationalist" planning and modernisation concepts (such as planning<br />
techniques, management by objectives etc.) were adopted first by central government<br />
and then at the local level (see Brorström/Rombach 2004). The newly recruited personnel,<br />
fresh from the universities and institutions of higher education, were often eager to<br />
put these "modern" concepts, procedures and instruments to use in municipal practice.<br />
Again, this formative stage in <strong>Sweden</strong>’s local government offered greater and more enduring<br />
potential for innovation and modernisation than in most other European coun-
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tries, where local government was also expanded and reformed during the 1960s and<br />
1970s, but on the basis of old administrative structures and existing staff.<br />
Notwithstanding the expansive, dynamic and modern development of local government<br />
throughout the 1960s and 1970s, it should be borne in mind that this took place under<br />
distinctly centralist, top-down guidance from central government keen to impose a supportive<br />
and instrumental role on local authorities in their social engineering endeavours to<br />
establish <strong>Sweden</strong>’s expansive welfare state. Compared with <strong>Sweden</strong>’s decentralist past,<br />
The post-war era was "a period of relative centralisation" (Pierre 1995: 141).<br />
1.4 Development since the mid-1980s<br />
<strong>Sweden</strong>’s full-blown welfare state – with an expanded public sector and a monopoly of<br />
services implemented by local government under the vigilant guidance of central government<br />
– came under criticism from two different powerful currents. From the early 1980s<br />
the centralist imprint came under fire and decentralisation was called for; and from the late<br />
1980s the country’s mounting economic and budgetary crisis, by, climaxing in 1993, provoked<br />
demands for the welfare state to be downsized and the local delivery of services to<br />
be marketised.<br />
In the late 1970s, the Social Democrats, under the shock of losing power in 1976 after 40<br />
years of uninterrupted rule, began critical reassessment of their universalist, centralist,<br />
public sector-centred model of the welfare state with a view to greater decentralisation,<br />
more participation, and less uniformity. When, in 1982, they returned to power under<br />
Prime Minister Olaf Palme, "the first comprehensive attempt was made to institutionalise<br />
public sector reform in <strong>Sweden</strong>" (Premfors 1991: 87). In inaugurating what was called<br />
"public administration policy" (förvaltingspolitik) (see Petersson/Söderlind 1992), a new<br />
Ministry of Public Administration (Civildepartementet) was created under the reformist<br />
minister Bo Homberg. "Decentralisation" became the leitmotif of the subsequent reform<br />
phase, which aimed essentially at strengthening the role of municipalities, particularly by<br />
enlarging their autonomy and the scope of their responsibilities.<br />
- In 1984, as a programmatic component of the new förvaltingspolitik, a "free commune<br />
experiment" was launched in a number of selected municipalities to "test" the relaxation<br />
of the stringent legislative organisational rules under which local authorities had hitherto<br />
operated (see Strömberg/Engen 1996: 248 ff., Baldersheim 1994, Baldersheim/Stahlberg<br />
1994). This ushered in the new Local Government Act of 1991 which gave municipalities<br />
and county councils more freedom to decide their own organisation and internal<br />
regulation.
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- Detailed provisions in legislation were to replaced by framework legislation (ramlagar) to<br />
broaden the scope of local discretion.<br />
- Within the financial grants which the local authorities receive from central government<br />
(and which make some 30 per cent of local government revenues), the share of general<br />
grants, which local authorities can use largely at their own discretion, were increased,<br />
while that of special grants (with "strings attached") was reduced.<br />
- During the early 1990s, further important responsibilities were transferred to municipalities.<br />
In a development "more radical than any other change within the public administration"<br />
(Montin 1999: 28), responsibility for compulsory and secondary education was<br />
transferred to municipalities in 1991, and in 1992 the Älderreform put municipalities in<br />
charge of further components of care of the elderly, äldreomsorg (for details see chapter<br />
3 of this country report).<br />
Whereas reforms directed at remoulding the welfare state, which gathered momentum<br />
during the early and mid-1980s, largely with the traditional "political" model, another current<br />
of reform (accentuated particularly by the right-of-centre government in office 1991<br />
and 1994 and proclaimed a neo-liberal "system change") sought to introduce "modernisation"<br />
of the new public management (NPM) type, based on managerialist concepts, competition,<br />
and the "market model" (see Montin 1993).<br />
- On the local government level, a significant number of municipal and county councils<br />
have, alongside NPM thinking, adopted such organisational schemes as the "purchaser-provider"<br />
model in exercising their newly acquired organisational powers.<br />
- Furthermore, concepts of competition and marketization have made their entry into local<br />
government activities (such as outsourcing of services, vouchers etc.).<br />
We shall return to this development in greater detail below (see pages 325 following).<br />
2. Intergovernmental setting<br />
This section addresses the "intergovernmental space" of State institutions operating on<br />
the central and regional levels, examining the status of local authorities in this setting. It<br />
goes without saying that this overview is bound to be brief.
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2.1 Government, ministries, agencies<br />
The organisational structure of the Swedish State administration and the distribution of<br />
functions reflects a number of basic features and peculiarities of <strong>Sweden</strong>’s body politic.<br />
A sharp distinction is drawn between policy-making powers and competence for implementing<br />
policy.<br />
A vertical and a horizontal dimension can be discerned in the distribution of functions.<br />
The vertical dimension: although <strong>Sweden</strong> is unitary country where the key policy makers<br />
are parliament and central government, most policy is implemented at the local level, primarily<br />
by municipalities and counties as local self-governments bodies – or in some policy<br />
areas at the regional/county level by county administrative boards (länsstyrelesen) as regional<br />
field offices of the State (see below). This vertical"dimension of the distinction between<br />
central policy-making and decentral implementation is a key element in <strong>Sweden</strong>’s<br />
constitutional history and political practice, as mentioned in the introduction to this chapter.<br />
The horizontal dimension: the separation of policy-making and policy implementation is a<br />
singularity of Swedish constitutional and administrative history. Policy is make by parliament<br />
(Riksdag) and government, that is, government ministries (departement), and implemented<br />
(if not by local governemtn) by so-called agencies (with various name: myndigheter,<br />
ämbetsverk styrelsen)) operating at the national level. The Swedish peculiarity<br />
deeply rooted and entrenched in <strong>Sweden</strong>’s constitutional and administrative history is that,<br />
in line with a principle dating back to the 17 th century, agencies are largely independent in<br />
fulfilling their administrative responsibilities. The government can give agencies general<br />
instructions concerning their policies and activities, but is not allowed to intervene and<br />
give directions in individual cases.<br />
Historical this autonomy dates back to the 17 th century when the agencies were set up.<br />
The independence they were ensured was historically meant as a precaution to create a<br />
counterweight to the power of the king. The principle has survived and has been confirmed<br />
by the Instrument of Government of 1974 (chapter 11, section 11) 180 which, in a<br />
180 "No authority, including parliament and the decision-making bodies within the municipalities may determine<br />
"how a public authority shall make its decision in a particular case concerning the exercise of authority<br />
against a private subject or against a communes, or concerning the application of the law" (Ingen<br />
myndighet, ej heller riksdagen eller kommuns beslutande organ, får bestämma, hur förvaltningsmyndighet<br />
skall i särskilt fall besluta i ärende som rör myndighetsutövning mot enskild eller mot kommun<br />
eller som rör tillämpning av lag).
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remarkable general rule, stipulates that, whenever an individual administrative decision or<br />
"application law" is decided by the responsible public actor or institution, no other institution<br />
("including parliament" – sic! -) is allowed to intervene (by quashing or changing the<br />
decision). From this it follows that the only remedy which the supervising agency has is to<br />
take the matter to the courts. The consequences of this autonomy of administrative decision-making<br />
are far-reaching. The principle applies not only to relations between central<br />
government and a central agency, but also between the central agency and lower level<br />
administrative decision-making units, not least the municipal councils and committees.<br />
The principle permeates the entire administrative system – vertically as well as horizontally<br />
– and finds its application also in the rule that, as we shall see, neither the municipal<br />
council (fullmäktige) nor the powerful executive committee (kommunstryrelse) are allowed<br />
to intervene in single-case decisions taken by an ordinary sectoral council committee.<br />
It should be added, however, that the autonomy principle as laid down in chapter 11, section<br />
11 has not gone unquestioned. On the contrary, one major criticism has been that, in<br />
relations between government and agencies, it calls in doubt any parliamentary accountability<br />
on the part of a minister, especially with regard to the operation of an agency which<br />
reports to him (see Petersson 1994: 100).<br />
Owing to the peculiar separation of functions between the ministries and the agencies in<br />
terms of policy making and implementation, ministries traditionally have a very small staff<br />
(in1991 about some 1.800, see Pierre 1995: 142), while the 80 or so agencies have a total<br />
of about 390.000 employees (see Pierre 1995: 142). The number of agencies has<br />
changed, as many have been repeatedly reorganised (see Montin 1999). While some are<br />
in principle one-man institutions, others is have considerably more personnel. To support<br />
the Ministry of the Environment, for instance, there are six different major central authorities<br />
employing a total of some 1.500 persons (see Boverk 2003a: 1).<br />
Central government agencies are mainly managerial institutions without any major direct<br />
contact with the public (except for the National Labour Market Board. AMS).<br />
In the context of our study, relevant agencies are the following:<br />
- The National Board for Housing and Planning(Boverket),<br />
- the National Board of Health and Welfare (Socialstyrelsen),<br />
- the National Labour Market Board (Arbeitsmarknadstyrelesen, AMS)<br />
- the Agency for Administrative Development (Statskontoret). (see Sterzel 1996: 78 f.)
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The majority of central agencies have a general director (generaldirektör) and are managed<br />
by a board. These boards (a form of collective leadership) were introduced during<br />
the 20 th century when politicians and representatives of organised interests groups were<br />
given access to the decision-making bodies of administrative authorities – in line with<br />
<strong>Sweden</strong>’s familiar "corporatist" formula, but somewhat euphemistically often subscribed<br />
as "lay representation". More recently, stronger influence for the director general has been<br />
demanded, reducing while lay representatives to a more advisory rather than decisionmaking<br />
role (Petersson 1994: 100).<br />
Within their remit, agencies can issue binding regulations or non-binding general advice<br />
(allmäna råd) to the relevant local and regional authorities(see Sterzel 1996: 79). Furthermore,<br />
agencies (as well as county administrative boards, länsstyrelesen, see below)<br />
exercise supervision (tillsynsmakten) over subordinate local authorities, usually municipalities.<br />
The supervisory function implies the power to intervene if errors or omissions are<br />
discovered. Yet, as mentioned before, the principle of autonomy in administrative decision-making<br />
prevents and agency from quashing or change individual decisions; it can<br />
only take the matter to court (see Petersson et al. 1999: 77 ff.).<br />
Apart from the agencies’ administrative autonomy, problematic from the point of view of<br />
political accountability, they have come under criticism for their built-in tendency to focus<br />
too exclusively on their field of responsibility, contributing to the "pillarization" (the metaphor<br />
in Swedish is "stuprör" drainpipe) iof institutions and actors resistant to interorganisational<br />
and inter-level cooperation and coordination.<br />
The disposition to act in sectoral isolation has been further fostered by the fact that<br />
agency staff have typically been merit-based civil servants (ämbetsmanna) embodying<br />
<strong>Sweden</strong>’s career public servant State (ämbatsmannastat) tradition (see Premfors 1998:<br />
156, Petersson 1994: 105).<br />
2.2 County level<br />
Prior to the legislation of 1862 which, as we have seen, "invented" <strong>Sweden</strong>’s modern twotier<br />
local government system, the counties (län), whose borders had been drawn in 1634,<br />
served as the regional level of central government. The governor (länshövding) was appointed<br />
by the king/government as regional representative.<br />
The 1862 legislation endowed the county with a double function reminiscent of the<br />
French dual structure of départements:
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While continuing to serve as institutions of regional State administration, they also became<br />
self-governing territorial under elected county councils (ländstingen) – an institutional<br />
novelty (we will be dealing with county council in greater detail later).<br />
In institutionalising the län, county administrative boards (länsstyrelsen) were established,<br />
collegiate bodies operating as regional State offices, in addition to the governor (länshövding),<br />
who continued to be a prestigious, central-governmentappointee. 181<br />
Until the 1970s, the members of county administrative boards, too, were appointed by<br />
central government, but from then on they were indirectly elected by the county councils<br />
(läns fullmäktige). This reflects a remarkable shift in the perception and understanding of<br />
the role of the counties as administrative units. Whereas originally the counties and county<br />
office holders (governors and board members) were seen first of all as regional representatives<br />
of the State, they have come to be perceived, and to see themselves, also as representatives<br />
and advocates of regional interests vis-à-vis central government<br />
Over the years, the counties as units of regional State administration have been given a<br />
relatively broad and changing repertoire of tasks.<br />
- First, county administrative boards are responsible for a number of administrative tasks<br />
in the "first instance" exercise of which they have direct contact with the public (emergency<br />
services, food control, driving licence registry). These are the rare exceptions to<br />
the rule that such "first instance" responsibilities are handled by local authorities.<br />
- Second, county administrative boards are involved in consulting, monitoring and supervising<br />
self-government activities exercised by municipal and county councils. They<br />
monitor and supervise local social services and participate through the agency of professional<br />
county planners, in municipal council and building committee planning and<br />
development control (see chapter 2 of this country report).<br />
- Third, county administrative boards handle appeals from the public against local authority<br />
decisions. Up to the mid-1970s, they also served as courts of appeal until this competence<br />
was handed over to the county administrative courts (länsrätte). It should be<br />
recalled that, under the aforementioned constitutional principle, laid down in <strong>Chapter</strong><br />
181<br />
The governor of the county Örebro, for instance, still resides in the impressive castle in the middle of the<br />
town.
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11, section 11 of the Regeringsform of 1974, 182 the power of oversight does not extend<br />
to quashing or changing the supervised decision.<br />
- Finally, election of the county administrative board elected by the council council has<br />
stimulated county interest, through the board, in regional economic development. Regional<br />
planning having fallen somewhat into oblivion, regional economic planning is attracting<br />
more and more attention.<br />
In terms of county organisation and personnel, county administrative boards are supported<br />
by administrative units and staff coordinated by a managing director.<br />
3. <strong>Sweden</strong>’s two-tier local government structure<br />
This section attempts to present a coherent picture of two-tier local government structures,<br />
examining the territorial format, tasks, finances, and personnel of municipalities and<br />
counties. The next section (4) focuses on municipalities – leaving aside counties for lack<br />
of space.<br />
3.1 Municipalities<br />
Municipal territorial format<br />
As a result of the territorial reform completed in 1974, <strong>Sweden</strong> has 288 municipalities with<br />
populations varying between 2.600 (Bjurholm) and some 700.000 (Stockholm) – with a<br />
median size of 16.000 and an average size of some 30.000 (see Bäck 2004: 5). In terms<br />
of area, Kiruna is the largest (19.447 qkm) and Sundbyberg the smallest (9 qkm), the median<br />
size being about 7.000 qkm.<br />
Powers and responsibilities of municipalities<br />
Traditionally two types of local government responsibilities are distinguished: general<br />
competencies (allmän kommunal kompetens) and special competencies (speciell kommunal<br />
kompetens). The former follow from the general competence clause under chapter<br />
2, section 2 of the LGA 1991, according to which local authorities "may themselves attend<br />
to matters of general concern (av allmännt intresse) which are connected with the area of<br />
182 See above footnote 180.
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the municipality or county council and which are not attended to solely by the State, another<br />
municipality, another county council or some other body" 183 . They are largely identical<br />
with the so called discretionary tasks of the municipality. The latter are regulated by<br />
special legislation, such as the Social Services Act of 2001, the Planning and Building Act<br />
of 1987 or the Education Act of 1985. Most are classified as mandatory in the sense that<br />
municipalities are legally obliged to perform these tasks.<br />
Mandatory tasks include (see Regeringskansliet 2004: 11),<br />
- a broad repertoire of social services (elderly services, services for disabled people and<br />
individual and family services, including social assistance – bistånd).<br />
- education (pre-school, compulsory and upper secondary education),<br />
- planning and building,<br />
- environmental and public health protection,<br />
- public utilities (water and sewage, waste management).<br />
Discretionary tasks are<br />
- leisure and culture,<br />
- public utilities (such as technical services, energy etc.).<br />
A more substantiated picture of the functional weight and salience of the various functions<br />
can be gained by breaking down municipal spending and personnel by functions.<br />
Municipal expenditures (total 420 billion SEK in 2003 after 346 billion SEK in 1999, see<br />
SCB 2005: 447) broken down by functions (figures for 2002 from SKF/LF 2004b: 9) present<br />
the following picture:<br />
- 29.8 per cent on education (= 18.4% compulsory school + 7.2 % upper secondary<br />
school + 4.2 other educational activities),<br />
- 12 per cent on pre-school activities and care of schoolchildren,<br />
- 20.1 per cent on care of the elderly,<br />
- 9.8 per cent on care of the disabled,<br />
183 Local Government Act of 1991, chapter 2, § 1: "Kommuner och landsting får själva ha hand om sådana<br />
angelägenheter av allmänt intresse som har anknytning till kommunens eller landstingets område eller<br />
deras medlemmar ...".
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- 4.4 percent on individuals & family (including social assistance, bistånd),<br />
- 5.9 percent on business activities and<br />
- 15.6 percent on other activities.<br />
Municipal personnel broken down by functions (total 782.000 municipal employees in<br />
2003 after 753.000 in 1997, see SCB 2005: 311), is distributed as follows (data for 2003<br />
from SKF/LF 2004b: 10):<br />
- 36 per cent in care services,<br />
- 23 per cent in pre-school,<br />
- 16 per cent in pre-school,<br />
- 13 per cent in technical services<br />
- 9 per cent in administration and<br />
- 3 per cent in recreation and culture.<br />
Thus, the breakdown by expenditure and by personnel evidences the focus that the functional<br />
profile of the municipalities has in the fields of education (compulsory, secondary<br />
and pre-school) and social services. The personnel intensity of these activities shows in<br />
the fact that almost 60 per cent of all municipal spending is on personnel. 184<br />
Another traditional field of extended municipal operations is public utilities (water, sewage,<br />
waste treatment, energy, etc.). This sector is less apparent in expenditure and personnel<br />
data, since are often autonomous, municipally owned corporations whose staff are not<br />
treated as direct municipal employees for statistical purposes. Furthermore, they operate<br />
independently in economic and budgetary terms (we shall return to this later).<br />
184<br />
Breakdown of the municipal expenditures by cost type, in percent (see SKV/KF 2004: 9)<br />
- 57.5 per cent on personnel,<br />
- 12.2 per cent on purchase of activities,<br />
- 5.7 per cent grants and transfers,<br />
- 7.8 per cent on external goods,<br />
- 3.9 per cent on hire of non-municipal premises,<br />
- 5.9 per cent on calculated cost of capital.
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3.2 Counties<br />
3.2.1 Territorial format<br />
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As we have seen, the 1862 legislation established peculiar institutional arrangements for<br />
the then 24 counties (län), whose present boundaries go back to 1634. Reminiscent of the<br />
dual functions of France’s départements, counties continued to serve as the territorial basis<br />
of regional State administration with a governor (ländshövding) appointed by central<br />
government and a county administrative board (länsstyrelsen). As regional field offices of<br />
the State, counties have, in the course of time, come to assume a broad repertoire of responsibilities<br />
comprising a number of ("first instance") administrative tasks in direct contact<br />
with the public, as well as monitoring and supervisory functions (with regard to municipal<br />
and county self-government activities). More recently, they have resumed responsibilities<br />
in regional economic development, often acting as advocates of regional interests<br />
vis-à-vis the State.<br />
In exercising their self-government functions, counties have, as the Swedish welfare state<br />
has developed, been required essentially to run and finance the country’s public health<br />
system under the responsibility of the county councils (landsting) (see below).<br />
Notwithstanding the enormous transformation that <strong>Sweden</strong>’s demographic and settlement<br />
structures have undergone since the mid-1850s, the territorial format of the counties, remarkably<br />
enough, remained unchanged until the 1990s. While the municipal level experieced<br />
waves of massive territorial reform in the early 1950s and early 1970s, the<br />
county level was left entirely unaffected until recently. It might arguably be assumed that<br />
the historical boundaries dating back to the 15 th century were respected as a timehonoured<br />
barrier to territorial change.<br />
The territorial format of counties having remained unchanged despitemomentous demographic<br />
and settlement shifts, disparities between counties in population have grown.<br />
While the largest county (Stockholm) has more than 1.850.000 inhabitants, the smallest<br />
(Jämtland) has 130.000. 12 counties have between 200.000 and 300.000. Yet, in the<br />
course of this development, municipal and county self-government functions have in three<br />
cases been merged in in a type of local government entity called "unitary local authority"<br />
(formerly "county borough") in the U. K. and "kreisfreie Stadt" ("county-free city/town") in<br />
the German/Austrian local government tradition. Municipal and county functions have<br />
been merged to form "city counties" in Göteborg and Malmö, the country’s largest cities<br />
beside the capital Stockholm, and Gotland, <strong>Sweden</strong>’s largest island.
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3.2.2 Responsibilities of the counties<br />
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The traditional distinction between general competencies (allmän kommunal kompetens)<br />
and special competencies (speciell kommunal kompetens) laid down in chapter 2, section<br />
2 of the LGA 1991, 185 also applies to counties. But in the course of constructing <strong>Sweden</strong>’s<br />
welfare state, the focus of county responsibility has been on mandatory tasks in the health<br />
sector, particularly health and medical care. Discretionary tasks have included culture,<br />
education and tourism.<br />
This task profile centring around the health sector is evidenced by the expenditure pattern<br />
and staff composition of counties as self-government units. Nevertheless regional development,<br />
traffic and infrastructure have also been major functional areas.<br />
Of total expenditure of 190.5 billion SEK in 2002 (see SCB 2005: 443):<br />
- 73 per cent were on health care (= 44 % specialist somatic care + 20 % primary health<br />
care + 9% other health and medical care<br />
- 9 per cent on specialist psychiatric care<br />
- 4 per cent on dental care<br />
- 7 per cent on regional development<br />
- 4 per cent on traffic and infrastructure<br />
- 2 per cent on education and culture<br />
This task profile is also reflected in the composition of county personnel (see SKF/LF<br />
2004: 14) of whom:<br />
- 76 per cent are in the health sector (= 53 per cent in health and medical care, 10 per<br />
cent physicians, 7 per cent paramedical staff and 6 per cent dental care)<br />
- 15 per cent in administration<br />
- 5 per cent in catering and transport<br />
- 4 per cent others<br />
185 See above footnote 183.
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3.3 Regionalisation<br />
3.3.1 Emergent regionalisation<br />
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Regional issues have become increasingly important since <strong>Sweden</strong> became a member of<br />
the EU in 1995. Responsibility for regional development has long rested with county administrative<br />
boards (SKF/KF 2004a: 16). The recent debate about regionalisation has<br />
been guided by the idea of strengthening the role of the counties as self-government units<br />
by redrawing their time-honoured boundaries and by territorially and functionally adapting<br />
them to meet the challenges posed by European integration (for an overview see Olsson/Aström<br />
2003).<br />
Since the late 1990s, two currents of change have gained momentum, both originally experimental<br />
in thrust (see Bäck 2004: 6). In 1998, two new regions (one might speak of<br />
"mega-counties") were formed by merging a number of county councils – an unprecedented<br />
move as venerable boundaries dating from in 1634 were redrawn. The new regions<br />
are the Västra Götaland Region, with the former city county of Göteborg as its urban<br />
and metropolitan centre, and the Region Skåne with Malmö as its metropolitan core. (For<br />
a detailed analysis and assessment of regionalisation focusing on the new Västra Götaland<br />
region see Nilsson ed. 2004.) In these two regions, directly elected regional bodies<br />
have taken over the responsibilities of the former county councils (ländsting). As the formation<br />
of the new regions has been accompanied by the transfer to the regional councils<br />
of regional planning and developmental responsibilities hitherto falling within the remit of<br />
county administrative boards (länsstyrelesen) as regional State agencies, this implies a<br />
notable decentralisation of State functions to regional self-government. Originally designed<br />
as a field experiment, it has meanwhile been decided to retain the two new regions.<br />
Another institutional approach, also started on an experimental basis, was introduced in<br />
the county of Kalmar on the south-eastern coast where a joint "cooperative body" (samversksansorgan)<br />
was formed by the county and municipalities to take over the responsibility<br />
for regional development planning from the county administrative boards. From 1<br />
January 2003, central government has taken the "Kalmar model" as the future general<br />
pattern of regionalised, intercommunal cooperation (see Bäck 2004). This means that in<br />
counties where all municipalities and the county council are willing to form such "a regional<br />
cooperative body" (regionalt samverksansorgan), central government is willing to<br />
devolve decision-making powers on regional planning, infrastructure and economic development<br />
policy. These new associations of local authorities have been implemented in<br />
many, but far from all counties. In the end, this means that the organisational structures of<br />
<strong>Sweden</strong>’s regional level will be rather complex, since counties (landsting kommuner with
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the county council, (landsting fullmäktige) will continue to exist as self-government entities<br />
traditionally responsible for service provision, mainly health care, while the new cooperative<br />
bodies (samverkansorgan), with councils indirectly appointed by the county and municipal<br />
councils involved being responsible for regional planning, infrastructure and economic<br />
development, competencies transferred to them from the county administrative<br />
boards (länsstyrelsen). At the same time, the regional State administration entrusted to<br />
county administrative boards (länsstyrelsen) and headed by the county governor (lanshövding),<br />
will continue to perform its previous functions – except in regional planning and<br />
development, now assigned to the cooperative bodies (samverkansorgan). Cooperative<br />
councils have lower legal status and considerably fewer State resources than selfgovernment<br />
bodies (see SKF/LF 2004a: 17).<br />
It seems that central government has, for the time being, shied away from full-fledged,<br />
country-wide regionalisation on a regional self-government formula, arguably because this<br />
would have weakened the regional base of State administration, while municipalities in<br />
<strong>Sweden</strong>’s more peripheral areas prefer to retain relatively influential county State offices<br />
(länsstyrelsen) as regional advocates in the distribution of State grants and European<br />
structural funding.<br />
3.3.2 A new push for regionalisation in the wake of the anverskommittén?<br />
In the meantime, the regionalisation has gained added momentum anfrom the recommendations<br />
recently submitted by the so-called "responsibility committee" (anverskommittén)<br />
(see SOU 2007a, 2007b). Set up in 2002 as a traditional public enquiry commission<br />
(SOU, Statens offentliga utredningar) to address the "innovation capacity for sustainable<br />
welfare" (the official translation for Utvecklilngskraft för hållbar välfärd). As its short name<br />
"responsibility committee" (ansverskommittén) indicates, its main purpose was to inquire<br />
into co-ordination problems caused by the vertical and horizontal division, if not fragmentation<br />
of competencies between levels and actors in <strong>Sweden</strong>’s intergovernmental world<br />
After four years of deliberations (and an interim report in December 2003, see SOU 2003),<br />
the commission finally presented its findings and conclusions in February 2007, recommending<br />
the radical reorganisation of county (län) structure by reducing the 24 counties to<br />
6 to 9 regions with elected regional parliaments and, in succession to the counties, regional<br />
taxing powers. It was proposed that the regions assume country public health functions<br />
and extended regional planning responsibilities. At the same time, municipal responsibilities<br />
were to be extended and strengthened with the focus "on the heavyweight welfare<br />
services and core planning functions" (SOU 2007b: 10). It remains to be seen<br />
whether and to what degree of these radical recommendations will be implemented.
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3.4 Local government finances<br />
- 280 -<br />
One of the outstanding features of <strong>Sweden</strong>’s local government has traditionally been the<br />
right of municipalities and county councils to levy their own taxes. This key principle was<br />
introduced when the modern Swedish local government system was established in 1862<br />
and ever since has been the financial backbone of Swedish local government and its remarkable<br />
degree of continuing autonomy. It was confirmed by the Instrument of Government<br />
of 1974 (chapter 1, section), which stipulates that municipalities and county councils<br />
may "levy taxes in order to carry out their tasks". 186<br />
The unique role that the taxing power exercised by local government has played in the<br />
operation and financing of <strong>Sweden</strong>’s advanced welfare state is evidenced by the fact that<br />
- the country’s welfare state services (public health system, schools, social services etc.)<br />
have been provided and largely financed by the two tiers of local government,<br />
- around 70 per cent of local government revenues covering these expenditures stem<br />
from locally levied taxes,<br />
- the Swedish citizens pay an average 30 per cent income tax to local government, which<br />
constitutes the greater part of the local revenues.<br />
Local government receives the following revenues:<br />
Counties<br />
County revenues in 2002 (190 billion SEK after 123 billion in 1997, see 2005: 443) came<br />
from the following sources (see Regeringskansliet 2004: 14):<br />
- 70 per cent from taxes<br />
- 14 per cent from grants, including specifically assigned State grants<br />
- 6 per cent gfrom eneral State grants<br />
- 5 per cent from sales of services and activities<br />
- 3 per cent from patient charges<br />
186 "Kommuner får rtaga ut skatt för skötseln av sina uppgifter".
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- 2 per cent from others<br />
- 3 per cent sale of services<br />
- 281 -<br />
The average rate of county taxes (in 2004) was 10.71 (see SCB 2005: 440 with overview<br />
on all counties).<br />
Municipalities<br />
From total revenues of municipalities (416.2 billion SEK in 2003 after 356 billion in 1999,<br />
see SCB 2005: 447),<br />
- 69.5 per cent were municipal taxes<br />
- 9 per cent other local revenues<br />
- 8.6 per cent general government grants<br />
- 7 per cent tariffs & fees<br />
- 4.4 per cent specified government grants (figures from SKF/LF 2004: 10).<br />
The rate of the municipal taxes was 20.80 per cent on the national average (see SCB<br />
2005: 440, for municipality-specific data see SCB 2005: 435 ff.<br />
In view of the socio-economic disparities between municipalities and counties (and the<br />
consequent differences in the taxable collective local income), central government introduced<br />
an equalisation system in 1996 to redistribute revenues between more and less<br />
affluent municipalities. The equalisation logic and mechanism operates through a State<br />
grant to needy municipalities and counties financed by an equalisation charge on better<br />
off municipalities and county councils (see Regeringskansliet 2004a: 16, for a detailed<br />
overview of give and take between municipalities, see SCB 2005: 441 ff.).<br />
Since the 1990s, there has been a significant shift in State grants, which constitute 20 per<br />
cent of county revenues and 13 per cent of municipal revenues, in the ratio of general<br />
government grants, which local authorities may spent at their discretion, and earmarked<br />
grants. In pursuit of the strategy embarked upon by central government in the late 1980s<br />
to devolve responsibilities to local government, particularly to municipalities, and to<br />
enlarge their autonomy, a shift was made from special grants to general grants. Of State<br />
grants to municipalities, only one third are earmarked, while two thirds are, at least formally,<br />
discretionary.
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As to the re-financing of municipal activities and services through charges and fees to be<br />
paid by the recipient of such services, it is interesting to note the differences in rates: (data<br />
for 2003 from SKF/LF 2004b: 10).<br />
- 32.2 pre-school<br />
- 24.8 care of the elderly<br />
- 23.1 per cent infrastructure & civil defence<br />
- 8.7 per cent cultural & leisure activities<br />
- 3.8 per cent education<br />
- 2.8 per cent care of disabled<br />
The refinancing rate is higher for preschool and services for the elderly and for infrastructure<br />
(technical services), but marginal for education and cultural activities etc.<br />
While the long-standing taxation powers of local government is a key feature of Swedish<br />
local government (unique among contemporary local government systems), some reservations<br />
need to be made.<br />
- On the revenue side, the State can significantly influence the exercise of local taxation<br />
powers since central government defines the bases for levying local taxes. Since the<br />
early 1990s, the local governments have been able to tax earned income. This income<br />
mainly comprises wage income, but also includes pensions and payments from sickness<br />
insurance and unemployment insurance (see Regeringskansliet 2004b: 15).<br />
- Notwithstanding the constitutional guarantee of local government taxing powers, central<br />
government imposed a temporary tax freeze and related sanctions in the to cap locally<br />
levied taxes. Since the mid-1990s central government has, however, refrained from repeating<br />
such restrictions.<br />
- On the expenditure side, the lion’s share of the expenditure-intensive local authority<br />
tasks are mandatory and often rather tightly regulated (it has been estimated that up to<br />
80 per cent of municipal tasks and expenditures are thus closely tied down), so that local<br />
authority budgetary autonomy, even with regard to general State grants, is liable to<br />
be quite limited.
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3.5 Summary of <strong>Sweden</strong>’s intergovernmental functional model<br />
Finally, we consider three dimensions of the extraordinarily high degree to which <strong>Sweden</strong>,<br />
although a unitary country, is functionally decentralised.<br />
By internationally standards, the two tiers of local government in <strong>Sweden</strong> are functionally<br />
and largely financially for an unusually broad range of public tasks, while central government<br />
performs a rather limited repertoire of tasks, including national defence, police, taxation,<br />
higher education and economic/employment policy. The implementation and financing<br />
of the country’s still comprehensive welfare state lies almost entirely with municipalities<br />
and, with regard to health, with counties. With a very few exceptions, central government<br />
has no regional or local field offices to perform executive functions involving direct<br />
contact with the public.<br />
Hence, while the wide scope of <strong>Sweden</strong>’s welfare state and public sector shows in the<br />
continuously high share of public sector personnel in total employment, local government<br />
employees represent no less than 80 per cent of public employees. Most central government<br />
personnel are in central government agencies.<br />
Public sector in 2003 (see SCB 2005: 310, 311)<br />
State employment: 234.000 18<br />
Municipal 782.000 60<br />
County council 224.000 17<br />
total number per cent total number per cent<br />
Total public employ 1.329.000 100 1.328.000 34<br />
Private sector employment 2.494.000 66<br />
Total employment 3.826.000 100
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This pattern is also evidenced in the distribution of public spending which, reflecting the<br />
build-up of <strong>Sweden</strong>’s welfare state, has shown an increasing share of the local government<br />
in comparison to GNP (see Premfors 1998: 158, Häggroth et al. 1993: 32).<br />
state local (municipalities<br />
plus counties)<br />
1960 8 8<br />
1980 8 20<br />
1991 9 19<br />
4. Local government in municipalities<br />
The following considerations focus on local government at the municipal level. Where useful,<br />
reference will also be made to county councils.<br />
4.1 Local democracy<br />
4.1.1 From town meetings to local elections<br />
As we have seen, <strong>Sweden</strong>’s local government has a town-meeting tradition reaching far<br />
back to medieval times and beyond, when decisions were made locally in "tings", local<br />
gatherings of "free men" or "free yeomen". Town meetings were still the general practice,<br />
except in larger municipalities, in 1919 when universal suffrage, including female suffrage,<br />
was introduced. In fact town meetings, as a form of direct local democracy, persisted well<br />
into the 1970s, when they became defunct and were also formally abolished upon the<br />
largescale merger and both territorial and population enlargement of local government<br />
entities of 1974. Article 7 of the Instrument of Government (Regeringsform) of 1974 introduced<br />
representative democracy with elected assemblies (välda förmsamlingar), 187 replacing<br />
the direct democratic participation of local citizens through the exercise of their<br />
electoral rights.<br />
187 "<strong>Sweden</strong> has municipalities and county councils. The decision-making power in these local authorities is<br />
exercised by elected assemblies" (Beslutanderätten i kommunerna utövas av valda församlingar).
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Under article 7 of the Instrument of Government (Regeringsform) of 1974, local selfgovernment<br />
revolves conceptually, around the council whose members (fullmäktige) are<br />
directly elected every four years, since 1967 on the same day as elections to county<br />
councils (landsting) and national parliament (Riksdag). In municipal and county elections,<br />
votes are cast always for party lists, but since the 1998 election, voters have been able to<br />
express their preference for an individual candidate on the list, thereby improving that<br />
candidate’s chances of gaining a seat.<br />
Elections to municipal and county councils are based on a proportionate and party-list<br />
system. Since 1967, the municipal and county elections have been held on the same day<br />
as elections to the national parliament. This doubtless ensures a voter turnout of up to 90<br />
per cent, extremely high by international standards (see Norton 1994: 311).<br />
4.1.2 Local referendums<br />
In reaction to the large-scale territorial reform that put an end to the small municipalities<br />
and their town meeting tradition and reduced the number of municipal councils and councillors,<br />
the introduction of binding local referendums came under discussion to make up<br />
for the loss of participatory rights of local citizens. Notwithstanding the country’s centurylong<br />
history of direct democratic town meetings, the demand for binding local referendums<br />
was rejected by the government in 1976, probably reflecting the then prevailing preference<br />
of the ruling Social Democrats for representative democratic institutions (mirrored<br />
also in the first article of the new Instrument of government of 1974), as well as the underlying<br />
interest in maintaining political party rule (see Montin/Amnå 2000: 16). In the Local<br />
Government Act of 1991 (chapter 5, section 22), local referendums were finally allowed,<br />
but only of an advisory character, leaving elected local councils unchallenged in their decision-making<br />
powers.<br />
4.1.3 City district/neighbourhood councils<br />
In another response to the loss of local citizens’ participatory rights and opportunities effected<br />
by the amalgamation of 1974, the new Local Government Act of 1977 allowed municipal<br />
councils to establish intra-municipal/neighbourhood councils (staddelstryelsen) with<br />
corresponding committees (kommundelsnämder) to carry out municipal tasks in<br />
neighbourhoods (staddel) (see Montin 1993: 49 ff., Montin/Persson 1996: 71). Apart from<br />
the decentralising effect, intended to compensate for the "loss of democracy" inflicted by<br />
the 1974 reform, an important reformist novelty of an "almost revolutionary" nature (Montin/Amnå<br />
2000: 11) was seen in the provision that the neighbourhood would assume the
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local government tasks delegated to them in a "comprehensive", "cross-cutting" manner,<br />
thus overcoming the sectoralisation typical of traditional municipal committees. Members<br />
of neighbourhood councils were to be appointed by the municipal council from among the<br />
relevant social groups of the respective neighbourhood on a proportionate formula; they<br />
were not to be directly elected. 188 After a lively and promising start in the early 1980s (see<br />
Montin 1993, Montin/Amnå 2000), a total of 140 neighbourhood councils had been established<br />
in 14 municipalities by 1993.<br />
In the meantime, this "movement" has largely subsided. One by one, most municipalities<br />
have dissolved their neighbourhood councils. The reason is plausibly not only the disappointingly<br />
little interest citizens manifested in the enhanced participatory opportunities of<br />
neighbourhood councils but also in their apparent administrative inefficiency and tendency<br />
to increase rather than reduce intra-city disparities and inequalities in service provision. All<br />
neighbourhood councils have now been dismantled except in the three largest cities of the<br />
country, Stockholm, Göteborg, and Malmö (see Bäck et al. 2004, for a case study on<br />
Göteborg see Jönsson et al. 1999).<br />
4.1.4 Self-governing organisations, user democracy<br />
Largely inspired experience in Denmark, where "user councils" (bruger = user) have become<br />
a vibrant web of local civic participation and engagement (see Bogason 1998: 339<br />
f., Oppen 1997: 255), Swedish local government has begun to encourage the involvement<br />
of users in the organisation and operation of locally delivered services (see Montin/Persson<br />
1996: 84). The Local Government Act of 1991 (<strong>Chapter</strong> 7, section 18) provides<br />
for "self-run organisations" (självförvaltingsorgan), allowing local councils to introduce<br />
"self-government/administration" (självförvalting) for any activity or organisation in<br />
the field of local social services through boards composed of "users" (nyttjarna) and facility<br />
employees, with user representatives in the majority. 189<br />
In the meantime, about 90 per cent of all Swedish municipalities have introduced user<br />
boards, also in the form of self-run organisations (självförvaltningsorgan) in one or more<br />
188 When, in 1997, a government commission recommended direct elections for neighbourhood councils,<br />
the government rejected the proposal with the argument that "citizen participation could grow in many<br />
other ways" (quoted from Montin/Persson 1996: 77).<br />
189 See chapter 7, section 20: "A self-run body shall consist of representatives of the persons using the<br />
facility or institution and the persons employed there. The users’ representatives shall outnumber the<br />
persons representing the employer". ("Ett självförvaltningsorgan skall bestå av företrädare för dem som<br />
nyttjar anläggningen eller institution och de ansälla där. Företrädarna för nyttjarna skall vara fler än dem<br />
som företräder de anställda".)
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fields of local activity – particularly in compulsory schools, preschool facilities, homes for<br />
the elderly, secondary schools, and homes for the disabled (in that order). In most cases<br />
the boards still have only an advisory function, but 40 per cent of municipalities have also<br />
provided for decision-making boards, particularly in the field of schools (see Jarl 2001).<br />
In sum, the employment of self-run organisations as a form of user democracy can be<br />
considered a robust and remarkable Scandinavian innovation in the field of local participation.<br />
4.1.5 Right of the "members" of the municipality (and the county) to challenge<br />
the legality of local government decisions<br />
Dating back to the introduction of <strong>Sweden</strong>’s modern local government system in 1862 and<br />
as confirmed in the Local Government Act of 1991 (article 10, paragraph 1) 190 , every<br />
member of a municipality or county council (varje medlem av en kommun eller en<br />
landsting) has the right to file a "local appeal" (överklaga) with the county administrative<br />
court for a ruling on whether the municipality or county council has acted "outside the law"<br />
(legality review, laglighetsprövning). The court may quash but not change the decision<br />
(see Häggroth at al. 1993: 51). In order to exercise this right (also called "kommunalbesvär")<br />
the member of the municipality or county council need not be directly affected by the<br />
local government decision in dispute, but is entitled to lodge an appeal abstractly, as it<br />
were, as a form of actio popularis (see Petersson et al. 1999: 70). The term "member of<br />
the municipality" (medlem av en kommun), still employed in the current legislation, refers<br />
to the historical context of the 1860s when, as mentioned earlier, the municipality was not<br />
only for the first time conceived as a legal entity but also as a personal association and<br />
collectivity of local residents, harking back to "pre-modern" times (see Häggroth et al.<br />
1993: 10).<br />
Carried over to today’s constitutional and political setting (in what is just another example<br />
of <strong>Sweden</strong>’s institutional traditionalism), the local appeal can be seen as an additional<br />
safeguard for local citizens to ensure that municipal and county heed the law in their decision-making.<br />
This actio popularis procedure has no equivalent in other countries (see<br />
Häggroth et al. 1993: 10).<br />
190<br />
"Varje medlem av en kommun … har rätt at få lagligheten av kommunens … beslut prövad genom att<br />
överklaga hem hos länsrätten".
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4.2 Local self government by councils and committees<br />
4.2.1 Historical background<br />
As we have seen in the introductory section of this chapter, the idea and practice of local<br />
self-government in the sense that local matters are decided by the local people themselves,<br />
originally in tings and town-meetings, and also administered by them as laymen<br />
can be traced back to medieval times. When the modern form of Swedish local selfgovernment<br />
was institutionalised in 1862 with the creation of 2.500 local government<br />
units, an early distinction was made between a decision-making function to be exercised<br />
by town meeting or elected council and an executive function to be performed by a board<br />
or committee – a "dualistic" scheme which drew on contemporary Continental European<br />
examples (for instance on the German/Prussian "magistrate" form). Throughout the 19 th<br />
century and until well into the 20 th century, responsibilities in both elected councils<br />
(fullmäktige), which increasingly replaced the town meetings, and in executive boards and<br />
committees (nämnder) were typically performed on a part-time and voluntary, non-paid<br />
basis. Hence, both decision-making and executive bodies in Swedish local selfgovernment<br />
were based on a lay principle. At the beginning of the 20 th century, local authorities<br />
around Stockholm began employing clerks to take charge of the increasingly<br />
comprehensive administration of local finances. However, lay administration involving<br />
council committees (nämnder) persisted in many small, rural communities until well into<br />
the 1950s (Strömberg/Westerståhl 1984: 11).<br />
The traditional local government system, operating within the historical boundaries of<br />
2.500 communities, faced growing tasks in coping with burgeoning urbanisation and an<br />
expanding welfare state; underwent important changes. First, statutory committees were<br />
put in place by councils to fulfil the responsibilities mandated by sectoral legislation. In<br />
performing these statutory tasks, statutory committees (building committee, social committee<br />
etc.) acted largely independently of the council – doubtless in keeping with the general<br />
Swedish administrative principle that decisions taken by one body can not be quashed or<br />
changed by another. Second, the larger of the many communities began to build-up an<br />
administrative staff. Until the mid-1970s, staff were organised in unified municipal administrative<br />
units at the disposal of all committees concerned.<br />
During this period, the operation of local government was characterised by a consensual<br />
and "consociational" political culture in which the politicising sense of political party competition<br />
was still largely absent.
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4.2.2 The period between the mid-1970s and the early 1990s<br />
In a development which was significantly accelerated by the massive territorial reform of<br />
1974, the institutional and political setting of local government experienced dramatic<br />
changes in three many fields:<br />
- Prepared by the first round of territorial reforms in 1952 and decisively accentuated by<br />
the reform of 1974, the territorial basis of municipalities was entirely remoulded in organisational<br />
and functional terms.<br />
- The new territorial format of local government proved to be the launching pad for a fast<br />
expansion of municipal tasks and responsibilities.<br />
- The political parties began to enter the local arena and local politics.<br />
The following important changes took shape – in typical overlap and tension between traditional<br />
and new principles:<br />
- Among council committees, the "executive committee" (kommunstyrelse) became the<br />
most influential steering body for local government functions. In line with dualistic<br />
scheme underlying the local government system introduced in 1862, the executive<br />
committee can be seen as a form of local government (in the "cabinet government"<br />
sense), while the council plays the part of local parliament. On the hand, the growing<br />
salience sectoral responsibilities assigned to them by special legislation has increased<br />
the functional importance of statutory committees (nämnder) while council and executive<br />
committee retained their traditional autonomy. Hence, tension has arisen between<br />
the sectoralised autonomy of the nämnder and the executive committee steering rights<br />
(styrelse).<br />
- While, the committee system has in the past been guided by the "consociational" principle<br />
of according proportionate influence to all political groups concerned(in, for instance,<br />
nominating chairmen, etc.), the entry of the political parties in the arena was<br />
bound to change the rules of game and to replace the consociational, consensual mode<br />
by the competitive and majoritarian principle. Consequently, "limited majority rule" and<br />
"kind of parliamentarism" (see Strömberg/Westerståhl 1884: 39, see also Back 2004:<br />
13) have come to prevail with the chairpersons of all committees, the chairman of the<br />
executive committee being elected, in obedience to a majoritiarian logic, from the ranks<br />
of the party or parties forming the government majority coalition on the council. The majoritarian<br />
principle and the political thrust and clout underlying it often makes the majority<br />
leader who takes the position of chairman of the kommunstyrelsen the unquestion-
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able and dominating political leader in the local authority. Although Swedish political<br />
parlance has, perhaps typically, not adopted and popularised any title for this position<br />
(the label "mayor" sometimes used with reference to Swedish local government is a<br />
misnomer; no-one in Swedish local politics would accept a term that, for Swedish taste,<br />
has connotations of monocratic, if not autocratic rule. It is perhaps more appropriate to<br />
speak of the "prime-ministerialisation" of Swedish local politics. Yet, again typical of the<br />
compromises and even explicit or implicit contradictions often at the basis of <strong>Sweden</strong>’s<br />
incrementalist institutional development, "parliamentarisation" does not go all the way,<br />
continuing to compose the executive committee in accordance with the traditional proportional,<br />
consociational logic.<br />
- Thirdly, in order to cope with the enormously grown tasks and responsibilities of local<br />
government, local politics and administration has, particularly since the 1970s, undergone<br />
a sweeping process of professionalisation in a double sense. Local councils have<br />
made key executive committee politicians, depending on the size of the municipality,<br />
full-time, salaried officeholders, called "commissioners" (kommunalråd – or "landstingsråd"<br />
in counties) (see Bäck 2004). If the system is seen as local "cabinet government"<br />
one might speak of the "ministers" and a "prime minister" of local government). They<br />
form the "local government", each responsible for a particular policy field, residing in city<br />
hall, assisted by their staff. Again, however, the compromise character of Swedish local<br />
government innovation and design is apparent in a curious feature: reflecting the particularly<br />
striking persistence of traditional proportional and consociational logic, opposition<br />
parties on the council also have an albeit minor share in full-time positions (see<br />
Strömberg/Westerståhl 1984: 39). In the real world of Swedish local politics, the effect is<br />
that these full-time, salaried local politicians from the opposition are also mostly members<br />
of the executive committee and are also accommodated in city hall. While many<br />
crucial decisions are taken by the majority members of the executive council, probably<br />
in backroom meetings, thus bypassing opposition members, the latter can devote their<br />
time and energy to monitoring and scrutinising the policies of the majority – a creative<br />
and functionally remarkable invention of Swedish institution-building genius.<br />
4.3 Administrative personnel<br />
The other crucial aspect of professionalisation concerns the unprecedented transformation<br />
of Swedish local government administrative structures and staff since the 1950s,<br />
when many small municipalities still managed without any paid staff, and the 1970s and<br />
1980s by which time the local authorities had become the largest employer in town.
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In most other European countries, where local government structures and personnel expanding<br />
during the 1960s and 1970s on the basis of structures and personnel, the buildup<br />
in <strong>Sweden</strong> had to start virtually from scratch, with massive territorial reform breaking<br />
the ground for a largely remoulded territorial basis and format. Reformed university education<br />
and newly established professional schools, such as the schools of social work, responded<br />
to the acute need of qualified personnel (see Gynnerstedt/Höjer 2004).<br />
This unprecedented recruitment of new administrative personnel fell in a period when,<br />
particularly during the late 1960s and 1970s, the new tenets of administrative modernisation<br />
concerning new planning methods (like planning, programming, budgeting and management<br />
by objectives) also made their entry at the local level with its new administrative<br />
fabric and freshly recruited personnel (see Strömberg/Engen 1996: 267). It is very plausible<br />
that this unique constellation of having to recruit almost the entire personnel and the<br />
advent of a freshly tried and highly motivated cohort of new staff imbued with the "modernist"<br />
spirit and mood of the time was likely to instil an almost unique sense of "modernity" in<br />
<strong>Sweden</strong>’s new local political and administrative world. This generational analysis and interpretation<br />
(which seems to be neglected in the available literature) may be helpful in<br />
explaining some of the longterm interest which concepts like management by result (målstyrelse),<br />
monitoring, and evaluation have found, long before the similarly worded concepts<br />
made their appearance or re-appearance in the NPM movement and rhetoric of the<br />
1980s and 1990s (see Brörstrom/Rombach 2004).<br />
Whereas the function of administrative staff was, strictly and formally speaking, purely<br />
supportive and advisory, the lead in professional competence and information resources<br />
that they had over councillors could not fail to redefine (power) relations between professional<br />
administrative personnel, committee, and councillors.<br />
4.4 Administrative organisation<br />
Since the 1970s, municipalities have chosen to assign administrative units and staff (kontoret,<br />
förvaltningsenhet) to each of the operating committees – instead of the previous<br />
unified administrative unit.<br />
4.4.1 Development since 1991<br />
Since the early 1990s, <strong>Sweden</strong>’s local government institutions have experienced another<br />
thrust which, prepared by the "free commune experiments" of the mid-1980s and epitomised<br />
in the Local Government Act of 1991, has been fed by various, partly contradictory
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currents. While, in pursuit of the political decentralisation and democratisation agenda of<br />
the 1980s and 1990s, the Local Government Act aims at strengthening the political profile<br />
and potential of local government, the underlying concept derives from new public management<br />
marketisation tenets (see Häggroth et al. 1993: 35, Montin 1993).<br />
- First, as one of the crucial lessons the new legislation to be drawn from the free commune<br />
experiments, municipal and county councils are given a free hand in organising<br />
their internal work, particularly their own committee system – with the exception of the<br />
executive committee (kommunstyrelsen) and election committee, which each municipality<br />
(and county) is required to have (<strong>Chapter</strong> 3, section 3 LGA 1991). This almost revolutionary<br />
innovation is meant to do away with the organisational ("statutory") rigidity imposed<br />
by previous legislation.<br />
- Second, under the heading "delegation of business within a committee" (delegering av<br />
ärenden inom en nämnd,) each committee is given the power to delegate (uppdra) "a<br />
particular matter or a group of matters" to a select committee, to an individual committee<br />
member, or a municipal employee" (chapter 6, section 33 LGA 1991). 191 This aims<br />
at relieving the committees, as collective decision-making bodies, of some of their dayto-day<br />
operations.<br />
- Third, added by a 1992 amendment to the Local Government Act (see Häggroth et. al.<br />
1993: 66), the municipality may, by decision of the council, "transfer the management of<br />
a local matter to a limited company, trading partnership, an incorporated association, a<br />
non-profit association, a foundation or a private individual" (<strong>Chapter</strong> 3, section 16 LGA<br />
1991). 192 However, such a transfer which pertains to the "exercise of public authority"<br />
(infattar myndighetsutövning) is allowed only if explicitly provided for by legislation. 193<br />
As the related discussion and practice show (see below), this provision was meant to<br />
open the door to outsourcing and marketising social services provision and local government<br />
activities.<br />
When the new Local Government Act of 1991 came into force at the beginning of 1992,<br />
<strong>Sweden</strong>’s municipalities experienced an all but unprecedented wave of organisational and<br />
191<br />
"En nämd få uppdra åt ett utskott, åt en ledamot … eller åt en anställd hos kommunen … att besluita<br />
påa nämdens vägnar i ett visst ärende …".<br />
192 "Kommuner … får efter beslut av fullmäktige lämna över vården av en kommunal angelägenhet … till ett<br />
aktiebolag, ett handelsbolag, en ekonomisk förening, en ideell förening, en stiftelse eller en enskild<br />
individ".<br />
193 See section <strong>Chapter</strong> 3, section 6 with a reference to chapter 11, section 6 of the Instrument of Government<br />
of 1974 which also lays down this principle.
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instrumental changes, in which ample use was made of the different legislative options,<br />
often combining the reorganisation of committees, the delegation of responsibilities, and<br />
the outsourcing of tasks. While a high degree of uniformity and inflexibility hadprevailed in<br />
the organisation of committees until 1991, a multitude of institutional and instrumental<br />
choice and mixes now reigns, often differing from municipality to municipality, going under<br />
different names, and not seldom being repeatedly rethought within a municipality. The<br />
following examples can be only illustrative and selective.<br />
4.4.2 Reorganisation within the traditional model<br />
One group of municipalities have pursued a strategy of re-organising their committee systems<br />
to improve the capacity for making and coordinating policy, etc., to be basically without<br />
abandoning the traditional council system.<br />
For one, since councils are now free to entirely redefine and restructure committee task<br />
assignment and organisational placement, many municipalities now appear to be engaged<br />
in optimising the organisational fit of committees and enhancing coordination between<br />
them.<br />
In some cases an attempt has been made to achieve a kind of hierarchisation among<br />
committees in the obvious intention of improving coordination.<br />
Such an approach can be observed in the municipality of Örebro, where four committees<br />
(children/education, growth/development, community planning, and social welfare) have<br />
been given the "elevated" status of "directing committees called programme committees"<br />
(överordnade nämnder kallade programnämder), to which are "assigned subordinated<br />
committees" (till dessa hörande understtällda nämdner". The "programme committees", in<br />
turn, operate directly under the responsibility of the executive committee (kommunstyrelse)<br />
see Örebro 2003b: 4). In view of the operational autonomy which committees have<br />
traditionally claimed (and which, as was argued earlier, seems to be well entrenched in a<br />
constitutional principle), the organisational scheme that Örebro’s council has adopted in<br />
making copious use of the new organisational freedom appears to be something of a<br />
revolutionary breach with that tradition.<br />
A widely observable approach is to further strengthen the position of the executive committee<br />
and, concomitantly, the leadership of its chairman. In fact, the LGA of 1991 explicitly<br />
stipulates (in <strong>Chapter</strong> 6, section 1) that "The executive committee shall direct and coordinate<br />
the administration of the affairs of the municipality … and shall supervise the ac-
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tivities of the other committees". 194 This again seems to be at odds with the time-honoured<br />
principle of committee decision-making autonomy of the committees. In many municipalities,<br />
councils seek to strengthen executive committees stronger by providing them with an<br />
administrative staff unit (stadskansliet) headed by a chief executive (kommunaldirektör),<br />
who usually, however, lacks any directing power (see Montin 2005: 10).<br />
4.4.3 Internal modernisation<br />
Regarding the internal modernisation of the municipal administrative structures (kontoret,<br />
förvaltningsenheten), the concepts "management by results" (målstyrelse, resultatstyrelse)<br />
and "result units" (resultenheten) have been widely employed (see Montin 1993: 44,<br />
Strömberg/Eigen 1996: 267). First introduced in the 1960s and 1970s, conspicuously antedating<br />
the recent NPM debate, they have certainly been further promoted by the current<br />
movement. Service professionals such as social workers and nurses now share the direction<br />
of the pertinent administrative units with economic and management personnel, complemented<br />
and supported by internal management, monitoring or evaluation units.<br />
4.4.4 Delegation<br />
The LGA of 1991, which allows every committee to delegate (delegering) responsibilities,<br />
including decision-making in individual cases, to single committee members and to municipal<br />
employees is crucial in relieving committees from case-to-case work. In the meantime,<br />
committees have obviously made ample use of this possibility, for instance in the<br />
case of building committees (byggnadsnämder), by extending delegation to the head of<br />
the building administration (bugglovchef) 195 (see also the chapter on planning of this country<br />
report). Whereas delegation has, no doubt, contributed to accelerating and flexibilising<br />
municipal decision-making, it has aggravated the fragmentation of municipal administration<br />
(see Montin 2005: 6).<br />
194<br />
"Styrelsen skall leda och samordna förvaltningen av kommunens … angelägenheter och ha uppsikt över<br />
övriga nämnders verksamhet".<br />
195 For an example see Delegationsordning för byggnamdsnämnden 2004, adopted by the council of the<br />
Municipality of Uppsala, www.uppsala.se/templates/UKPage.asp.
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4.4.5 Re-organisation of committees in terms of the (NPM-driven) purchaser<br />
provider split and outsourcing<br />
While these reorganisation strategies, including delegation, are essentially in keeping with<br />
the basic organisational blue-print of the traditional committee system, another current of<br />
reorganisation was driven by the principles and concepts of new public management<br />
which, in the course of the 1980s, became increasingly dominant in both the international<br />
and national debate about administrative reform (for an international overview see Wollmann<br />
2003a with references, for <strong>Sweden</strong> see, among others, Montin 1993).<br />
At this point it should be recalled that, reflecting the public sector-centred orientation and<br />
profile of <strong>Sweden</strong>’s welfare state, the whole range of public services within the remit of<br />
local government was almost entirely delivered and managed by direct local government<br />
employees. As we have seen, local personnel engaged in the discharge of public services<br />
represented the vast majority of local government employment. This quasi-monopoly of<br />
municipalities in delivering public services (schools, care of the elderly and disabled etc.)<br />
and of counties in the health sector was the point of departure for NPM moves to break<br />
monopolistic structures and introduce competition and market principles into the municipal<br />
sector.<br />
At the core of this strategy is the idea that the institutional unity of commissioning and delivering<br />
functions embodied in the existing municipal administrative structures be broken<br />
down into a "purchasing" and "provider" function. This would help avoid conflicts inherent<br />
in the unified administrative organisation conflicting loyalties between the interests of the<br />
municipality as service producer and the interests of the users and recipients of these<br />
services) by way of two options. First, a functional, organisational, and personnel distinction<br />
can be made between purchasing and providing" committees, and, second, competition<br />
and outsourcing can be introduced by putting the delivery of services up for tender,<br />
with both municipal provider committees and subordinate units and outside being eligible<br />
to tender.<br />
As we have seen, the strategy of outsourcing the conduct of local municipal tasks (lämna<br />
över vården av en kommunal angelägenhet) has been regulated (and, in fact, encouraged)<br />
in <strong>Chapter</strong> 1, section 16 of the Local Government Act. The Act specifies a broad<br />
range of possible addressees and agents of outsourcing, ranging from municipality-owned<br />
corporations (aktiebolag) to private/commercial enterprises (handelsbolag) and individuals
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(enskild individ). 196 The exercise of public authority functions (myndighetsutövning) cannot<br />
be outsourced unless explicitly allowed by law.<br />
Reorganisation of the committee system in terms of a purchaser/provider split<br />
Making use of the organisational freedom granted municipal councils by the Local Government<br />
Act of 1991 (and often politically and ideologically driven by right-of-centre county<br />
majorities in place since the local council elections of 1991), many municipalities have reorganised<br />
their committee systems in terms of a purchaser/provider split.<br />
Under the LGA (chapter 1, section 16), committees in charge of public authority functions<br />
(myndighetsutövning) have generally been excluded from application of the purchaser/provider<br />
split. Public authority functions typically pertain to the application of law in<br />
(as it were, hierarchical) relations between public authorities and citizens. In municipal<br />
reorganisation practice, this holds true for the social assistance/social services, local<br />
planning/building permits, and environmental protection. The committees operating in<br />
these areas continue to be organised in the traditional mode.<br />
By contrast, the typically service-related committees (care of the elderly and disabled,<br />
school, pre-school etc.) have been reorganised by separating the previously unified functions<br />
into two:<br />
- purchasing committees (beställarnämder or uppdragsnämder) supported by a corresponding<br />
administrative unit/staff (sometimes called uppdragskontor) and<br />
- provider committees (produktionsstyrelse) and/or their related administrative units (produktionsförvaltning,<br />
etc.).<br />
One of the best known and much cited examples of municipalities to have introduced a<br />
purchaser provider split is Linköping in the vicinity of Stockholm. 197 Linköping was among<br />
the first Swedish municipalities to embark upon NPM-guided reorganisation in 1992 (under<br />
a liberal-conservative council majority following the council election of 1991).<br />
A quite recent example is Uppsala where a purchaser/provider split model has been in<br />
place since the beginning of 2003. 198 In some cases (for instance in Uppsala) a further<br />
196 See footnote 192.<br />
197 See www.linkoping.se/organisation.<br />
198 See above footnote 197.
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organisational differentiation has been made, on the production side into a production<br />
committee (produktionsnämnd) and a production administrative unit, (produktionsförvalt-<br />
ning). 199<br />
In most municipalities that have adopted the purchaser/provider split in their committee<br />
and administrative system, this has not reduced municipal personnel engaged in service<br />
provision. Instead, it has induced a organisational reshuffle, making production units into<br />
huge municipal agencies.<br />
There are also examples in which an NPM-reform reform of the purchaser/provider split<br />
type has since been abandoned in favour of a return to the traditional organisational<br />
scheme. This occurred, for instance, in the municipality of Nörrkoping, one of the muchhailed<br />
NPM-frontrunners in the early 1990s. 200<br />
Operation of local government through municipally owned corporations<br />
The performance of local government functions by legally, organisationally, and financially<br />
self-standing corporations (aktiebolag) in the sole or majority ownership of municipalities<br />
has, in fact, been since long practised by Swedish municipalities, particularly in the field of<br />
public technical services, such as water supply, sewage, waste treatment, energy etc.,<br />
traditionally core local government responsibilities and activities. In principle they had a<br />
free hand to decide whether to conduct these activities through a commission or a corporation<br />
(aktiebolag) fully or partly owned by the municipality. It has long been the practice<br />
that local politicians, as well as local administrative officials double up as managers (direktör)<br />
of such local corporations (see Norton 1994: 307). As these corporations were organised<br />
as private law companies, they did not fall under the public rules of local government.<br />
They were accordingly free in negotiating salaries with staff and directors and were not<br />
subject to the publicity rules of public authorities nor to the time-honoured freedom of information"principle<br />
guaranteeing public access to administrative files. By the mid-1980s<br />
there were some 1200 municipal corporations (see Montin/Amnå 2000: 8).<br />
The new Local Government Act of 1991 has impinged upon the further development of<br />
the municipal corporations (aktienbolag) in different ways. For one, they were explicitly<br />
addressed in legal provision (chapter 1, section 16) on the outsourcing (lämna över<br />
vården …) of local government functions. It gave further impetus to the employment of<br />
199 See www.uppsala.se/upload/bilder.<br />
200 See www.norrkoping.se/organisation.
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corporations. In fact, their number increased to 1.540 by 1994 (see Montin/Amnå 2000: 8)<br />
and to 1.700 in 2003 (see Regeringskansliet 2004a: 12). While municipal corporations<br />
have come to serve as the organisational form, beyond the traditional technical services,<br />
for a wide range of other municipal activities, such as municipal schools of music, museums<br />
and even purchasing departments (see Strömberg/Engen 1994: 267), their most<br />
common uses are still in housing provision, property management and energy (see Regeringskansliet<br />
2004a: 12).<br />
Although the 1991 legislation more closely defined the purpose and limits of the municipal<br />
corporations and ensured some political control, the increasing "flight" of municipalities<br />
into private-law service provision has doubtless removed public service delivery further<br />
from the political arena (see Bäck 2004: 34). A 1993 amendment to LGA extended some<br />
publicity rules to municipal corporations (see chapter 1, section last paragraph). The<br />
greater public access to the internal operations of the municipal corporations this provided<br />
laid bare financial scandals, underscoring the need for more democratic control of these<br />
"privatised" structures (see Montin/Amnå 2000: 9).<br />
External outsourcing of public services through marketisation<br />
While the purchaser/provider split in the committee system, delegation, and the shift to<br />
self-standing municipal corporations created new administrative flexibility (but, nota bene,<br />
also an additional dose of fragmentation, see Montin 2005) within the purview of local<br />
government, the strategy of externally outsourcing public services and municipal activities,<br />
the key notion and concept of new public management, sought to expose the delivery of<br />
public services, hitherto monopolised by the municipal sector, to competition from nonpublic<br />
actors and enterprises. The Local Government Act of 1991 (<strong>Chapter</strong> 1, section 16),<br />
in regulating and encouraging outsourcing (lämna över) explicitly enumerated "commercial<br />
companies" and "for-profit associations"(handelsbolag, ekonomisk förening), as well as<br />
"not-for-profit, voluntary associations" (ideell förening).<br />
Since the early 1990s, a broad movement developed among <strong>Sweden</strong>’s municipalities,<br />
driven by a number of factors. In 1991 a right-of-centre national government was voted<br />
into office that announced nothing less than a "neo-liberal system change" addressing, not<br />
least, the quasi-monopoly of the public/municipal sector in the provision of the public services.<br />
During the same set of elections, the local council majority in many municipalities<br />
shifted from the Social Democrats to centre-right parties willing to introduce NPM concepts,<br />
including marketisation. The City of Stockholm, then also under right-of-centre rule,<br />
became the flagship of this drive. In 1992, the national government passed legislation<br />
introducing a kind of voucher system in the field of compulsory and secondary education,
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obliging municipalities pay to any non-municipal actors/institutions interested in setting up<br />
independent schools the same amount per pupil as in municipality-run schools.<br />
Since the early 1990s, the rate of change has by and large varied from municipality to<br />
municiaplity and region to region. While in some much publicised municipalities, such in<br />
Täby near Stockholm (see Svensson/Wegener 2000 for a case study) or Nacka, the<br />
whole repertoire of NPM concepts (competitive tendering, vouchers) has been introduced<br />
and is still in operation, while many other municipalities have been much more selective<br />
and restrained.<br />
An empirically informed picture of the degree of external outsourcing can be obtained from<br />
a data collection which is regularly updated and published by the Swedish Association of<br />
Local Authorities (Svenska Kommunförbundet) in cooperation with the Swedish Statistical<br />
Office (Svenska Statistiska Byrån). The data inform about the share of services, measured<br />
by expenditure, which municipalities purchase (commission) from other providers<br />
(other than the municipality itself) in the fields of pre-school (kindergarten), schools (compulsory<br />
and secondary) and care of the elderly/disabled, that is, in traditional core areas of<br />
municipally provided and financed services and activities. A further distinction is made<br />
between services/activities purchased from private enterprises or other non-public (for<br />
instance not-for-profit associations) 201 , and those commissioned from municipality-owned<br />
corporations, State agencies, county councils, and individuals 202 . With regard to the volume<br />
of full-fledged outsourcing, the data on the share of money spent on purchasing from<br />
private enterprises and not-for-profit associations is of particular interest. Unfortunately a<br />
further differentiation between private enterprises and not-for-profit associations cannot be<br />
made on the basis of the available data.<br />
In 2003, the weighted average 203 (see SKF/SBC 2004: 116) rate to which services were<br />
purchased from private enterprises and not-for-profit associations was:<br />
12 (1) per cent in preschool services,<br />
9 (9) per cent with regard to compulsory and secondary schools and<br />
201 Förenigar o övriga företag, see SKF/SCB 2004: 106.<br />
202 Kommunägda företag,stat, enskilda, kommunalförbund och landsting, see SKF/SCB 2004: 106.<br />
203 In the published tables data are given for weighted average (vägt medelvärde) as well as for unweighted<br />
average (ovägt medelvärde), the latter constituting an arithmetic average of all municipalities, the former<br />
an average in which differences in size between municipalities are taken into consideration. The<br />
weighted average is higher than the unweighted average, because, as the detailed figures broken down<br />
by size of municipality show, the share of purchased services is higher in the fewer large and middlesized<br />
municipalities than in the many smaller ones.
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(2) per cent in the provision of care of the elderly and disabled.<br />
The percentage of these services purchased from other public providers, including municipally<br />
owned corporations and other municipalities, was relatively small (indicated in the<br />
above given table by the bold figures in brackets) – with the exception of school services,<br />
where the comparatively high rate of 9 per cent hints at the notable preference of parents<br />
to send their children to school in a neighbouring municipality.<br />
Sorting the available data by size of the municipality and regional location gives a considerably<br />
more differentiated picture. The rate of outsourcing generally increases with the<br />
size of municipality and is relatively high in municipalities located in the metropolitan areas<br />
around Stockholm, Göteborg and Malmö. Three of the often cited frontrunners of NPM-led<br />
administrative modernisation, Nacka, Sollentuna and Täby, are typically located in Stockholm<br />
county (Stockholms län). In 2003, the outsourcing rates for the above three service<br />
fields were (with regard to private enterprises and not-for-profit associations – bold figures<br />
in brackets again for other outsourcing agents): 38 (0), 20 (9) and 40 (2) for Nacka, 56 (1),<br />
20 (9) and 31 (2) for Sollentuna and 71 (2), 21 (9) and 34 (7) for Täby, indicating an advances<br />
stage of outsourcing to private and not-for-profit association providers, with hardly<br />
outsourcing non-private providers (see SKF/SBC 2004: 107).<br />
It can, however, be argued that the percentage of outsourcing has by and large remained<br />
remarkably low, considering the point of departure in the early 1990s, was the much criticised<br />
quasi-monopoly of the municipal sector in the service provision and that the political,<br />
ideological and economic pressure to break up this monopoly and marketise services appeared<br />
compelling.<br />
The may be a number of reasons for this somewhat surprising development (we will be<br />
returning to this in the social policy chapter of this country report).<br />
- First, it should be noted that service provision by private enterprises as well as not-forprofit<br />
associations is quite tightly regulated and controlled by municipalities, as such<br />
providers need to licensed (after their qualification etc. has been checked), and they<br />
operate on the basis of a contract negotiated with the municipalities. Charges to clients<br />
(for instance, an aged person accommodated in a home for the elderly) are fixed by the<br />
government (in accordance with the maximum fee the municipalities may charge). This<br />
service market is, thus a fairly controlled one, which, on the supply side, may, temper<br />
the interest of private or not-for-profit providers to enter that market.<br />
- Second, the interest of municipal employees in maintaining their dominance in service<br />
provision (and thus safeguarding their jobs) is well entrenched in the local arena; on
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average, they not only constitute one third of the entire local work force (see Dellgran/Höjer<br />
2003: 42 f.), but also have considerable clout as a significant segment of the<br />
local electorate. The pace of marketising services formerly delivered directly by the municipality<br />
may also be retarded on the demand side.<br />
5. Concluding remarks<br />
5.1 Multi-functional model of Swedish local government<br />
From the 1950s to the 1970s, <strong>Sweden</strong> developed a welfare state characterised by a division<br />
of labour between a central government responsible for policy-making and legislation,<br />
and local government responsible for implementation. Local government was in charge of<br />
a "local welfare state", with health care being assigned to the counties and most other<br />
functions entrusted to municipalities (see Pierre 1995: "den lokalt staten"). This trend intensified<br />
from the 1980s, when further tasks such as schools and various social services,<br />
were devolved, principally to municipalities). While the redistribution of public functions<br />
involved both devolution, centralisation, and recentralisation, 204 most observers agree that<br />
the net effect was a remarkable degree of de-centralisation (see Premfors 1998, Bäck<br />
2004). <strong>Sweden</strong>’s multifunctional model of local government is thus essentially unparalleled<br />
in Europe – with Germany coming closest to it (see Wollmann 2004, 2002).<br />
5.2 Regulation<br />
During the development phase of the centralist Swedish welfare state, legislation on local<br />
government activities characteristically provided centralist guidance; in the decentralisation<br />
phase since the 1980s framework legislation (ramlag) has been favoured, widening<br />
the scope for interpretation in local government implementation. As a result, national legislation<br />
and related legal provisions pertaining to local decision-making are, generally<br />
speaking, leaner than in continental European countries – with a stronger element of procedural<br />
rather than substantive provisions. While, for instance, procedural provisions predominate<br />
in the Social Service Act of 1982 and the Planning and Building Act of 1987,<br />
204 See Interim <strong>Report</strong> of the so called "Ansvars Komittén" (SOU 2003: 123) published in December 2003<br />
(for this committee see also above footnote 5): "Both in the general public debate and in various research<br />
reports, we often encounter a picture of progressive decentralisation from central to local government.<br />
An examination of actual Riksdag decisions in the period 1970-2003 reveals a somewhat different<br />
picture. Most of the 17 public sector services transferred from central to local and county level<br />
were very small. In the same period, 28 services were transferred from municipalities and county councils<br />
to the central government domain. The decentralisation of responsibility for health and social services<br />
from county council to municipal level is more clear-cut" (SOU 2003: 123 Summary, section 3).
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other national legislation (such as the Environmental Code of 1999) contain substantive<br />
prescriptions addressed to local government. A recent study by a government agency<br />
(Statskontoret) shows that the impact of national legislation on local government is considerably<br />
lower where procedural provisions predominate (as in planning law), but is far<br />
greater in the case of substantive regulation (as in environmental law) (see Bäck 2004: 12<br />
with reference to the study and findings by Statskontoret 2003).<br />
5.3 Finances<br />
<strong>Sweden</strong>’s local government model, rooted in a principle going back to the introduction of<br />
the modern local government system in 1862, also differs from that of other countries in<br />
that, expenditures are covered by revenues of which some 80 per cent stem from local<br />
taxes levied by the local authorities themselves, the rest coming from State grants. Furthermore,<br />
in the course of decentralisation since the 1990s, general central government<br />
grants to local authorities have increased while earmarked grants have decreased. However,<br />
that the budgetary autonomy of the local authorities has been significantly curtailed<br />
by the fact that some 80 per cent of the local government tasks are mandatory, prescribed<br />
and regulated by national legislation and other legal provisions. Nonetheless, it would be<br />
false to conclude that local political actors have been reduced "to local administrators"<br />
(Petersson et al. 2004: 9).<br />
5.4 Supervision<br />
Particularly as a result of decentralisation since the 1980s, the procedures and tools for<br />
central government supervision of local authorities are remarkable in that local authority<br />
decisions do not require the approval of central government (for instance, since 1987, in<br />
urban planning) nor has central government (officer any agency or regional office) the<br />
power to nullify or change any decision (with few exceptions in the field of local planning,<br />
see chapter 2 of this report). In the event of dispute, central government must take recourse<br />
to the courts. These limited powers of State administrative overview are probably<br />
due, as we have seen, to the venerable constitutional principle that no authority, political<br />
or administrative, may intervene to quash decisions made by another administrative body<br />
except by initiating judicial review (chapter 11, article 7 of the Instrument of Government of<br />
1974. 205 State authorities are largely reduced to voicing and possibly publicising their criticism.<br />
Needless to say, they may also resort to other, informal ways of bringing their position<br />
to bear, including informal "arm-twisting".<br />
205 See above footnote 201.
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5.5 Monitoring, evaluation<br />
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In line with <strong>Sweden</strong>’s evaluation culture, which dates back to the 1960s and earlier (see<br />
Wollmann 2003a: 250 with references), and probably as a reaction to the absence of<br />
stringent sanction-clad forms of administrative supervision, various types of indicatorbased<br />
monitoring systems have been developed to provide information on the performance<br />
particularly of local government institutions and actors. A striking example is the data<br />
base compiled by the Swedish Association of Local Authorities (SKF) in cooperation with<br />
the Statistical State Office, SCB, focusing on key indicators (nykeltal) of local government<br />
expenditures (costs) and published in annual reports since 1987 (see SKF/SCB 2004, as<br />
already mentioned in this chapter).The purpose of these and similar performance indicator-based,<br />
bottom-up local authority schemes (see Strid 2004) isintermunicipal comparative<br />
benchmarking. Another data-base has been promoted by the Ministry of Finance. 206<br />
Finally, some central agencies, such as the National Social Service and Health Board<br />
(Socialstyrelse) have, upon the advice of central government, stepped up their supervisory<br />
activities by building up their own data files and information, drawn, not least, from<br />
"on site" inspections.<br />
In the early 1990s, in response to the acute economic and budgetary crisis, the Lindbeck<br />
Commission of the traditional SOU, 207 was set up, named after its chairman, an eminent<br />
market-liberal economist. Its recommendations included establishing "a national service<br />
for auditing municipalities with the task of surveying municipal self-audits and counting for<br />
the efficiency review of municipal operations" (quoted from Solli et al. 2005: 17) – unmistakably<br />
alluding to Great Britain’s best value regime (see Wollmann 2004: 644 ff. with references).<br />
But the explicit recommendation to set up a centralist "national service of auditing<br />
municipalities" (in analogy to Britain’s Audit Commission) has yet to materialise.<br />
Notwithstanding the advances and expansion of indicator-based monitoring in <strong>Sweden</strong>’s<br />
intergovernmental space, the political and practical use of such indicator-based monitoring<br />
has been largely bottom up in nature and, in line with the country’s decentralist tradition<br />
and political culture, beyond central government control or top-down sanctioning powers.<br />
Thus, indicator-based monitoring, as it has evolved in <strong>Sweden</strong>, is still worlds apart from<br />
the centralist, top down profile characteristic of Britain’s best value regime. Hence it<br />
seems empirically hardly warranted, if not erroneous to see any "clear kinship" or" tydligt<br />
släktskap", as it is suggested Solli et al. 2004: 20 and Solli et al. 2005: 20.<br />
206 For an attempt to pull the sundry data bases together see www.KFAKTA.se compiled and managed by<br />
Leif Johannson, Statsvetenskapliga institutitonen, Lunds universitet.<br />
207 Statens offentliga utretningar, see also above footnote 204.
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5.6 Institutional reforms and administrative modernisation<br />
Particularly since the early 1990s, following the adoption of the Local Government Act of<br />
1991 giving local councils, fullmäktige, a free hand in organising their committees, administrative<br />
structures, and staff) municipalities have seen a dramatic change in their entire<br />
organisational setting (see Montin 1993, Bäck 2004). Many municipalities completely revamped<br />
the traditional committee structure to adapt to new responsibilities, for instance in<br />
the field of local employment policy. Second, under the conceptual guidance of new public<br />
management, a number of municipalities introduced a purchaser/provider split in the organisation<br />
of their committees, splitting unitary committees in two, one for purchasing funtions<br />
(uppdrag) and the other for provider (produktion) functions. Thirdly, a considerable<br />
number of municipalities began outsourcing (lämna över) the delivery of social services,<br />
such as care of the elderly and disabled (äldreomsorg, handikappomsorg) and compulsory<br />
and secondary education and pre-school services, to non-public, private-commercial<br />
and not-for-profit, voluntary providers. However, as we have seen in the preceding section,<br />
the average outsourcing rate has been about 10 per cent. In sum, <strong>Sweden</strong>’s municipalities<br />
have pursued a modernisation strategy combining traditional elements, with the<br />
municipal operations and services remaining within the institutional remit of local government,<br />
with market-oriented elements in an overall and moderate balance (see Pollitt/Summa<br />
1997, Wollmann 2003a with references).<br />
5.7 Intergovernmental coordination<br />
On the issue of intergovernmental coordination, <strong>Sweden</strong>’s presents an ambivalent, if not<br />
contradictory picture.<br />
On the one hand, according to the multi-purpose/multi-functional model of the local welfare<br />
state, municipalities are politically, administrative and functionally expected to play a<br />
key crucial role in coordinating the implementation of diverse sectoral policies assigned to<br />
them in the intergovernmental setting (see Wollmann 2004, 2002). On the other hand, the<br />
sectoralisation of policy making and implementation, often referred to in Swedish as stuprör<br />
(literally drainpipe: in English parlance silo or pillar) manifests itself not only as vertical<br />
sectoralisation on the level of the ministries and central agencies (myndigheter), but<br />
also as horizontal sectoralisation, between and among municipal committees and administrative<br />
units. Operating on the traditional principle of broad autonomy, also from the relevant<br />
ministries, central agencies have often been seen as particularly prone to such vertical<br />
sectoralisation or "pillarisation". At the same time, sectoral committees and the associated<br />
administrative staff at the municipal level have tended to counteractcross-cutting coordination<br />
by the council.
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In view of this predicament in coordinating <strong>Sweden</strong>’s intergovernmental system, it comes<br />
as no surprise that the high-level commission (SOU 2003: 123), revealingly shortnamed<br />
ansvarskomittén commission on – intergovernmental – responsibilities) has given prime<br />
attention to the issues of intergovernmental coordination (for the interim report see 2003a,<br />
2003b). Interestingly enough, the Commission’s interim report of December 2003 presented<br />
two options: radical decentralisation to give municipalities a key role in intergovernmental<br />
coordination, and distinct (re-)centralisation of <strong>Sweden</strong>’s intergovernmental<br />
system. The commission’s secretariat was put in charge of elaborating the two scenarios.<br />
The final word is still to come.<br />
5.8 Europeanisation<br />
<strong>Sweden</strong>’s accession to the European Union in 1995 has had a significant impact on important<br />
dimensions of the country’s intergovernmental setting and institutions, both in the<br />
anticipatory changes preceding accession and afterwards. They include major changes in<br />
the country’s traditional court system as early as the 1970s, with the extension of judicial<br />
review of municipal council administrative decisions) and, more recently, moves towards<br />
creating larger regions, and thus redrawing the historical boundaries of counties created in<br />
1634. The concept still underlying <strong>Sweden</strong>’s traditional local government model, and<br />
widely espoused by local politicians and employees, is that municipal services, including<br />
public utilities (water supply, sewerage, waste treatment, energy) should in principle be<br />
directly provided by municipal personnel or that service delivery should at least remain<br />
within the political remit and under the control of the municipal council. The market liberalisation<br />
policy firmly pursued by the European Commission is accordingly bound to have<br />
palpable effects on <strong>Sweden</strong>’s this model, both in service delivery and public utility production.<br />
Given the marked conceptual and institutional similarities between the Swedish and<br />
German local government models with respect to social services delivery and public utilities,<br />
the strong impact that EU market liberalisation policy and the advent of competition<br />
from internationally and nationally operating private and public corporations have already<br />
had on German local government (see Wollmann 2002) is likely to manifest itself in <strong>Sweden</strong>,<br />
too, although, somewhat surprisingly, this discussion appears not yet to have taken<br />
centre stage in <strong>Sweden</strong>’s municipalities.
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Subchapter 4.2: local social policy<br />
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6. The development of <strong>Sweden</strong>’s local welfare state<br />
The preceding subchapter (pages 259 following) provided an overview of the development<br />
of Swedish local government from its beginnings in medieval times to the key role it has<br />
come to play in the build-up and implementation of the welfare state. In the course of this<br />
development, a typical division of labour has taken shape between central and local government<br />
– with the former resuming responsibility essentially for welfare state policy<br />
through national goal setting, legislation and policy programmes and local government<br />
being charged with the task of administering and financing the welfare state. Within twotier<br />
local government system comprising counties and the municipalities, the former have<br />
been primarily assigned tasks in the public health system, while municipalities have been<br />
put in charge of all other responsibilities in <strong>Sweden</strong>’s advanced and extended welfare<br />
state. Since 1862, when <strong>Sweden</strong>’s modern two-tier local government system was established,<br />
counties and municipalities have levied their own taxes to finance their functions.<br />
Only some 20 per cent of the public service are employed by central government,<br />
whereas about 80 per cent work for local government. It is thus no exaggeration to call<br />
Swedish local government, particularly at the municipal level, the "local State" (den lokala<br />
staten, see Pierre 1994).<br />
<strong>Sweden</strong>’s welfare state developed a public sector orientation with local government exercising<br />
a monopoly in the delivery of welfare state services. A number of historical particularities<br />
contributed significantly to <strong>Sweden</strong>’s public profile. One developmental thread<br />
reaches back to the mid-16 th century when, under Gustaf Vasa, <strong>Sweden</strong> converted to<br />
Protestantism, evicting and virtually expropriating the Roman Catholic Church (see Lundström/Svedberg<br />
2003: 223), setting <strong>Sweden</strong> apart from Catholic countries, particularly in<br />
Southern Europe and Germany, where the subsidiarity principle practised by the Catholic<br />
Church became a pivotal element in the development of the welfare state and particularly<br />
service provision (see Henningsen 1986: 89). Although the Protestant Church fulfilled<br />
early social functions in rural (ecclesiastical) parishes (socken) until the mid 19 th century<br />
took over, but being established as <strong>Sweden</strong>’s State Church, these activities were, as it<br />
were, public. In 1862, when the modern two-tier local government system was introduced,<br />
these social functions of the Protestant Church were turned over to rural municipalities<br />
(landkommuner) created on the territorial format of the parishes. Ever since, the Protestant<br />
Church has played no significant role in the social policy field, certainly worlds apart<br />
from the subsidiarity principle operating in Catholic countries.
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Another salient developmental strand dates back to the 1930s, the formative years of<br />
<strong>Sweden</strong>’s modern welfare state, when a "hidden contract" (see Wijkström 2000: 163 f.)<br />
between the government and non-public societal associations constituting the voluntary<br />
sector arose, instituting a sort of division of labour assigning the provision of social services<br />
almost entirely to the State, the public sector, while the voluntary sector concentrated<br />
on political advocacy, cultural and leisure time activities. The ensuing almost monopolistic<br />
predominance of the public sector in the delivery of public/social services prevailed<br />
until the 1990s and has been challenged only recently in the critical reappraisal of<br />
the welfare state that has found a place on the political agenda, including that of Social<br />
Democratic governments.<br />
Local government concern for the local poor has a long local tradition, reaching back to<br />
the historically rather sparse urban municipalities (stad) and rural ecclesiastical parishes<br />
(socken) in the charge of the Protestant State Church. After the local government reform<br />
of 1862, responsibility for the local poor passed from the Church to the new municipalities<br />
(landkommuner) (see Häggroth et al. 1993: 4). In 1918 a new law was adopted on poverty<br />
care (fattigvård), which was replaced by legislation in 1957 (see Henningsen 1986: 118)<br />
before beign integrated as social assistance (bistånd) in the Social Services Act (Socialtjänstlag)<br />
of 1982.<br />
The provision of social services by local government has a similarly long tradition and history.<br />
Until 1862, this was the job of urban municipalities (stad) and ecclesiastical rural parishes<br />
(socken) in the responsibility of the Protestant State Church. After 1862, social services,<br />
including education, were transferred to the newly created local governments. After<br />
the turn of the 20 th century, pertinent national legislation was adopted (see Strömberg/Westerståhl<br />
1984: 13). In 1913, the first national law on social care was passed,<br />
which focused on alcohol abuse – reflecting the political attention that alcoholism attracted<br />
at that time (see Henningsen 1986: 91). As already mentioned, the new law on poverty (of<br />
1918) was adopted in this period. During the expansive build-up of <strong>Sweden</strong>’s post-wear<br />
welfare state in the 1950s and early 1960s, a round of sectoral legislation on local social<br />
policy responsibilities came into effect – with the 1954 act on the treatment of alcohol and<br />
substance abusers (cautiously labelled "soberness care", nykterhetsvård) (see Henningsen<br />
1986: 126), an act on social assistance in 1957 replacing the previous "poor relief"<br />
(fattigvård) by the concept of "bistånd" and an act on child and youth welfare in 1961.<br />
After a legislative process lasting 13 years, a new Social Service Act (Socialtjänstlag) was<br />
finally adopted in 1982, consolidating the previous sectoral laws into a single act (see<br />
Henningsen 1986: 130).<br />
In the course of the decentralisation central government embarked upon from the mid-<br />
1980s in the face of mounting criticism of what was seen as an overly centralist baseline
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of <strong>Sweden</strong>’s post-war welfare wtate (see Premfors 1991, 1998), the scope of municipalities’<br />
functional and financial responsibilities was widened still further, notably to include<br />
compulsory and secondary schools in 1992 and enlarged competencies in the care for the<br />
eldery under the Old Age Reform (Älderreform) of 1992.<br />
Finally, municipalities have a long tradition the provision and production of public utilities<br />
(water, sewage, energy, transport, waste treatment, etc.).<br />
In view of the rapid expansion of Swedish government after 1945 and the key role local<br />
government came to play, and of the rapid industrialisation and urbanisation during this<br />
period, it should be recalled that <strong>Sweden</strong> wasa comparative late-comer to industrialisation,<br />
urbanisation and a highly developed welfare state. Well into the first decades of the<br />
20 th century, <strong>Sweden</strong> remained a largely rural, under-industrialised country with widespread<br />
poverty, particularly outside the sparse urban areas, which triggered large-scale<br />
emigration, primarily to the USA, throughout the late 19 th century; almost one quarter of<br />
the population emigrated in the course of 50 years (see Henningsen 1986: 90).<br />
7. The relevant social policy actors in the intergovernmental space<br />
Ministry of Health and Social Affairs (Socialdepartementet)<br />
In line with the relatively small size of central government ministries in <strong>Sweden</strong>’s government<br />
tradition, the Ministry of Health and Social Affairs (Socialdepartementet) has a staff<br />
of some 200 of whom 20 are political appointees and 180 non-political officials (see Regeringskansliet<br />
2005). The Socialdepartementet is supported by 17 agencies. The government<br />
decides on objectives, guidelines and resource allocation for agency activities,<br />
but, in accordance with the traditional independence which such agencies (myndigheter,<br />
verketer) possess in <strong>Sweden</strong>’s constitutional and administrative tradition, does not decide<br />
how they are to apply a law or interfere with concrete decisions on different matters.<br />
Agency level: National Board of Health and Welfare (Socialsystrelse)<br />
One of these agencies is the National Board of Health and Welfare (Socialstyrelsen). In<br />
the first place it supervises the activities of municipalities, particularly in the provision of<br />
social services, and of counties (landsting kommuner), especially in health care provision.
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Regional/county level<br />
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On the regional/county level, county administrative boards (länsstyrelsen) bear operational<br />
responsibility for supervising service provision by both municipalities and county<br />
councils (see Socialstyrelsen 2003a: 1).<br />
These supervisory powers have been strengthened by the 1998 amendment to the Social<br />
Services Act (see chapter 13 of this Act). In line with this policy, Socialstyrelsen and<br />
länsstyrelsen have been commissioned by the government to develop and intensify supervision.<br />
The aim is to systematise social supervision work in a uniform way (see Socialstyrelsen<br />
2000: 4). The results of annual supervisions are published (see Socialstyrelsen<br />
2000: 4 f.).<br />
In a later section of this chapter, the extent, tools, and consequences of the supervision<br />
exercised by Socialstyrelsen and länsstryrelser will be treated in more detail.<br />
8. The scope of responsibilities of <strong>Sweden</strong>’s municipalities<br />
Before discussing the provision of social services, with the focus on care of the elderly<br />
(äldreomsorg), and social assistance (bistånd) it is useful to recall the unusually broad<br />
repertoire of tasks entrusted to <strong>Sweden</strong>’s municipalities (already dealt with in more detail<br />
in chapter 1 this country report).<br />
Traditionally, two types of local government responsibility are distinguished: general competencies<br />
(allmän kommunal kompetens) and special competencies (speciell kommunal<br />
kompetens). The former follow from the general competence clause spelt out in chapter 2,<br />
section 2 of the LGA 1991, according to which local authorities "may themselves attend to<br />
matters of general concern (av allmännt intresse) which are connected with the area of<br />
the municipality or county council and which are not attended to solely by the state, another<br />
municipality, another county council or some other body". 208 They are largely identical<br />
with the so called discretionary tasks. By contrast, the special responsibilities regulated<br />
by specific (sectoral) acts of legislation and are largely mandatory.<br />
Mandatory tasks include (see Regeringskansliet 2004: 11),<br />
208 Local Government Act of 1991, chapter 2, § 1: "Kommuner och landsting får själva ha hand om sådana<br />
angelägenheter av allmänt intresse som har anknytning till kommunens eller landstingets område eller<br />
deras medlemmar ...".
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- a broad repertoire of social services (care of the elderly, care of disabled persons, individual<br />
and family care, including social assistance – bistånd).(as regulated by the Social<br />
Services Act, Socialtjänstlag)<br />
- education (pre-school, compulsory and upper secondary education),<br />
- planning and building,<br />
- environmental and public health protection,<br />
- public utilities (water and sewage, waste management).<br />
Discretionary tasks include<br />
- leisure and culture,<br />
- public utilities (such as technical services, energy etc.).<br />
The functional weight of these different responsibilities within the gamut of municipal tasks<br />
is well indicated by their share in municipal spending and personnel.<br />
Municipal expenditures (total 420 billion SEK in 2003 after 346 billion SEK in 1999, see<br />
SCB 2005: 447; figures for 2002 from SLF/LF 2004: 9) is distributed as follows:<br />
- 29.8 per cent on education (= 18.4% compulsory school + 7.2 % upper secondary<br />
school + 4,2 other educational activities),<br />
- 12 per cent on pre-school activities and care of schoolchildren,<br />
- 20.1 per.cent on care of the elderly,<br />
- 9.8 percent on care of the disabled,<br />
- 4.4 per.cent on individuals & family care (including social assistance, bistånd),<br />
- 5.9 per.cent on business activities and<br />
- 15.6 per cent on other activities.<br />
Municipal personnel (total 782.000 municipal employees in 2003 after 753.000 in 1997,<br />
see SCB 2005: 311; data for 2003 from SKF/LF 2004: 10) are distributed as follows:<br />
- 23 per cent education (compulsory and secondary school)<br />
- 16 per cent pre-school)<br />
- 36 per cent in care services,
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- 16 per cent in pre-school,<br />
- 13 per cent in technical services,<br />
- 9 per cent in administration and<br />
- 3 per cent in recreation and culture.<br />
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In interpreting these data, two major reforms from the 1990s should be kept in mind which<br />
gave education in the wider sense a prevalent position in the profile of municipal tasks in<br />
terms of both spending and personnel.<br />
First, compulsory and secondary schools were transferred to municipalities in the early<br />
1990s.<br />
Second, although <strong>Sweden</strong> went through a deep economic and budgetary crisis, the public<br />
commitment in child care was significantly broadened in 1995 when municipalities were<br />
assigned an enhanced obligation to provide day care for all children between the ages of<br />
1 and 12 whose parents work or study. In 1998, this obligation was extended still further,<br />
as municipalities were now required to make childcare available to all children, regardless<br />
of whether the parents are employed or not (see Welfare Commission 2002: 99). Thus,<br />
despite the overall tendency of the 1990s to cut public spending, the period experienced<br />
"both greater universalism and greater resource depletion" (Palme 2002: 4) – in an obvious<br />
attempt to buttress employment policy. At the same time, the 1998 legislation transferred<br />
child care from the social services remit to education, thus stressing the educational<br />
role of child care. Consequently, the term day-care centre was replaced by pre-school.<br />
As a result of these major changes, education (including pre-school services) predominates<br />
in the task profile of local government (with some 40 per cent in both spending and<br />
personnel).<br />
After the definitional, legal, and institutional transfer of childcare from social services to<br />
pre-school education, the social services are now made up of<br />
- care of the elderly (äldreomsorg) and care of disabled persons (handikappomsorg),<br />
- individual and family care (individ- och familjeomsorg, mostly as IOF), which includes<br />
social assistance (bistånd).<br />
Although they seem to have lost significance in terms of spending and personnel, they<br />
continue to be classical functions of municipal government and arguably give a seeper
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insight into the political and administrative operation of local government than any other<br />
field. They are to be dealt with in more detail.<br />
9. Care of the elderly (äldreomsorg)<br />
9.1 Regulation and scope of care of the elderly<br />
Care of the elderly <strong>Sweden</strong>’s policy is among the most telling policy fields in realisation of<br />
the social democratic welfare state regime (as characterised by Esping-Anderson in a<br />
somewhat ideal-type manner, Esping-Anderson 1990: 28), designed to provide comprehensive,<br />
egalitarian coverage of the individual’s life risks, consequently relieving the family<br />
and society (see Timonen 2003: 15). In translating this principle, care of the elderly policy<br />
has sought in principle to provide social services, such as housing accommodation<br />
("homes for the elderly"), to all elderly persons regardless of their individual financial situation.<br />
In the course of the 1980s, a controversy arose between counties (responsible for health,<br />
including hospitals) and municipalities (in their general responsibility for care of the elderly)<br />
with regard to their financial burden from the sickness costs of the elderly. This conflict<br />
was intensifying with the rapid ageing of the population. The crux of the matter was<br />
that counties, being functionally and financially responsible for hospitals and thus for the<br />
in-patient treatment of the elderly, were eager, in order to control their costs, to make the<br />
period of acute hospitalisation as short as possible, discharging patients at the earliest<br />
convenience, while municipalities were wary of assuming the care of elderly persons who,<br />
while no longer in need of acute hospital treatment, need of post-hospital, perhaps longterm<br />
medical care. For municipalities, the financial issue was further aggravated when<br />
counties began charging municipalities for patients they could have discharged on a narrow<br />
definition of "acutely needed hospitalisation", but were unable to do so because the<br />
municipalities could not provide adequate service (for instance a nursing home place) in<br />
sufficient number and quality.<br />
The important reform of 1992, called the Ädelreformen (age reform) aimed to settle this<br />
problem by explicitly enlarging municipal responsibilities in the provision of care of the<br />
elderly, particularly for people in the post-acute hospitalisation phase still requiring medical<br />
care, as well as to those with incurable diseases that cannot be treated in hospitals<br />
(see Bäck 2004). Thus, municipalities have become comprehensively responsible for<br />
health care, except medical treatment (for the following see Socialstyrelsen 2000: 2).
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9.2 Practice<br />
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On the heels of the Ädelreform, municipalities have established special forms of accommodation<br />
for the service and care of older persons in need of particular support. These<br />
facilities include what had previously been known as old people’s homes, service flats for<br />
older people, sheltered housing, and nursing homes, which were transferred to local authorities<br />
from county councils in pursuit of the 1992 reform. In fact, the ownership of nursing<br />
homes was transferred from county councils to municipalities, as along with 55.000<br />
employees working in the primary care (see Trenneborg 1999: 18).<br />
With the concurrence of the county council, a municipality can also take over responsibility<br />
for home nursing in a person’s ordinary accommodation. At the beginning of 1999, over<br />
half of the municipalities had assumed responsibility for domiciliary care. A significant proportion<br />
of care in the final stages of life, care of those with dementia and after-care and<br />
rehabilitation are also in the hands of municipalities (see Socialstyrelsen 2000: 2).<br />
In October 2001, almost 122.000 people aged 65 and over received home help and home<br />
medical care and almost 119.000 received assistance in the form of special accommodation.<br />
These measures embraced about 16 per cent of Swedish old people (that is, over<br />
65). The number (and proportion) of old people receiving care for the elderly was fairly<br />
constant between 1998 and 2001. The majority of resources for old people’s care is spent<br />
on special accommodation (see Socialstyrelsen 2003a: 10).<br />
Until well into the late 1980s, services for the elderly – be they it accommodation in ageappropriate<br />
housing or home services – were, in principle, delivered directly by municipalities<br />
under the quasi-monopoly in public service delivery enjoyed by the public sector in the<br />
Swedish welfare state. But significant changes have occurred since the early 1990s with<br />
the increasing acceptance of NPM-inspired ideas about outsourcing and marketising social<br />
services. This has been evidenced by an increasing number of private-commercial,<br />
but also not-for-profit providers offering such services (see Welfare Commission 2002:<br />
115 ff.; this will be taken up later in this chapter).<br />
9.3 Financing<br />
Following from the universalist principle underlying care of the elderly to provide services<br />
in municipally owned and managed (sheltered, nursing, etc.) accommodation at home to<br />
anybody in need of it regardless of their financial situation, the costs incurred are, first of<br />
all, covered by the municipal budget. However, a kind of means-test is applied, obliging<br />
those who can afford it to pay a fee for services. Faced by mounting costs and a budget-
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ary crisis during the 1990s, some municipal councils obviously raised fees services in order<br />
to refinanced the services provided – putting the financially needy, too, became increasing<br />
pressure. In amending the Social Service Act in 1998 and 2002, the government<br />
reacted to this development by prescribing maximum fees for the services provided by.<br />
The legislative intention was (as Socialstyrelsen puts it in blunt terms in the "user manual")<br />
"to protect the individual from excessively high costs for municipal care (maximum<br />
rate or high costs insurance) and to ensure that all individuals have a minimum sum for<br />
living expenses once all fees are paid, know as a reserve sum (förbehållsbelopp)" (Socialstyrelsen<br />
2002: 22).<br />
The re-financing rate of municipalities, that is, the percentage to which expenses are covered<br />
by fees paid by recipients/users of services shows (for 2003) the following picture<br />
(date from SKF/LF 2004b: 10):<br />
- 32.3 per cent in pre-school,<br />
- 24.8 per cent in care of the elderly,<br />
- 8.7 per cent in cultural & leisure activities,<br />
- 3.8 per cent in education,<br />
- 2.8 per cent in care of the disabled.<br />
Hence, the refinancing rate for care of the elderly is relatively high.<br />
9.4 Care of disabled persons (handikappomsorg)<br />
Regulation<br />
The reform of services for the elderly has been followed by similar reforms concerning the<br />
mentally retarded and psychiatric patients not in need of acute hospital care.<br />
While welfare state entitlements tended to be cut back under the impact of <strong>Sweden</strong>’s deep<br />
economic and budgetary crisis climaxing in 1993, support for people with disabilities saw<br />
a reform thrust – surprising under these circumstances – with significant, not least of all<br />
financial, repercussions for municipalities. The reform of services for the disabled took<br />
effect in 1994, introducing, among other things, special rights for those with the most severe<br />
functional impairments. 209 Through the psychiatry reform that followed in 1995, mu-<br />
209<br />
Act concerning the Support and Service for Persons with Certain Functional Impairments, LSS, and the<br />
Personal Assistance Act, LASS.
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nicipalities were assigned greater responsibility for people with psychiatric impairments<br />
(see Welfare Commission 2002: 112).<br />
Over 14,000 people under 65 were granted home help service by the social services in<br />
their ordinary homes as of October 2001. Almost 5,500 people with disabilities and under<br />
65 lived in special accommodation at that time. Around 75 per cent lived in municipal<br />
housing and the other 25 per cent in privately-run accommodation.<br />
The total municipal expenditure in 2001 for the care and nursing of people with disabilities<br />
was 25.3 billion SEK (Socialstyrelsen 2003a: 5 f.).<br />
10. Individual and Family Care (individ-och familjeomsorg, IOF)<br />
Components of IOF<br />
The municipal service called "individual and family care" (individ- och familjeomsorg, abbreviated<br />
as IOF) covers a basket of services to support, help and protect vulnerable<br />
groups in society by various means. They include a number of interventions which may be<br />
carried out without the consent of the individual, that is, which may be imposed compulsorily<br />
by virtue of the Care of Young Persons Act (LVU) and the Care of Abusers Act (LVM).<br />
The IOF repertoire of comprises the following (see Socialsytrelsen 2001, following data on<br />
2003 from Socialstyrelsen 2003a):<br />
- Individually targeted interventions for children and families (in 2003 about 45,000-<br />
50,000 children and young people received residential care or measures in nonresidential<br />
care.<br />
- Alcohol and drug misusers and individuals with psychosocial problems who need advice,<br />
support and motivation, care treatment (in 2003 more than 20,000 adults with substance<br />
abuse problems and 10,000 adults with other mental and social problems received<br />
care or other measures within social services).<br />
- Family counselling and family law services (in 2003, family law services held cooperation<br />
talks concerning more than 20,000 children, contributed to more than 4,000 legally<br />
binding agreements on custody, accommodation etc.).<br />
- Financial assistance and financial advice which centres on classical social assistance<br />
(in 2003 nearly 237,000 households, about 434,000 people) received financial assis-
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tance for one or more months a year. One third of recipients were children under 18<br />
years of age.<br />
In 2003 municipal spending on IOF, was 4.4 per cent of total expenditure (see the percentage<br />
breakdown of municipal expenditures at the beginning of this chapter), of which<br />
about one third was on cash transfers in social assistance (bistånd) (see SKF 2004: 9).<br />
10.1 Regulation of social assistance (bistånd)<br />
As mentioned in the historical overview at the beginning of this chapter, the functional and<br />
financial responsibility of local government for providing a "net of last resort" to the needy<br />
reaches far back into the history of <strong>Sweden</strong>’s local government. It was regulated by legislation<br />
in 1918, still called "poverty care" (fattigvård) and in 1957, before being integrated in<br />
the Social Service Act (Socialtjänstlag) of 1982, now under the label bistånd.<br />
Regulation and interpretation of social assistance (bistånd) following 1982<br />
Implementation of the Socialtjänstlag of 1982 was marked by controversial interpretations<br />
on the part of three crucial actors, the national government/Socialstryrelsen, the municipalities<br />
and the courts. The controversy offers intriguing insights into a number of basic<br />
issues of central/local government relations and of the degree of autonomy (tight legal<br />
regulation versus political discretion) of local government, and into the position and influence<br />
of the judiciary. This warrants a somewhat detailed treatment of the unfolding and<br />
implications of this controversy (for an overview on sequence of events see Welfare<br />
Commission 2002: 142 f.).<br />
The conflict revolved essentially around two issues.<br />
First, since the legislation of 1982 established the principle that social assistance (bistånd)<br />
should enable the needy to have a "reasonable standard of living" (en skälig levnadsnivå),<br />
the crucial question was whether this gave the citizen concerned an actionable right.<br />
Second, the question arose (and was raised particularly by local authorities) whether the<br />
concept of "arbetslinje", a key element in Swedish labour market policy, can be also applied<br />
by analogy to the provision of social assistance (bistånd). In the labour market policy,<br />
the principle of arbetslinje means that the unemployed are required to make an active<br />
personal effort effort (reskilling, etc.) to maintain themselves "at the disposal of the labour<br />
market" (anställningsbaret). If they fail to meet this activating requirement, unemployment
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insurance benefits may be reduced or terminated. For local authorities, the analogous<br />
application of the basic idea of arbetslinje was attractive as an tool for inducing social assistance<br />
recipients to try to re-enter the labour market as soon as possible and thus exit<br />
the municipally funded social assistance payroll.<br />
There were two phases to the conflict between national local government, essentially<br />
shaped by the changing economic and budgetary context.<br />
The Social Services Act of 1982 was enacted in a period lasting until well into the late<br />
1980s, of quite favourable economic and budgetary conditions. Furthermore, the Social<br />
Democrats returned to power in 1982 under Olaf Palme (after the 1976-1982 intermezzo<br />
of a right-of-centre government) designed a public sector policy (förvaltningspolitik) hinging<br />
on decentralisation (see Premfors 1998). Under these conditions, the stage seemed to<br />
be set for giving municipal councils and social committees significant leeway and political<br />
discretion in applying the act, which was explicitly seen as a framework law (ramlag).<br />
However, tensions at an early stage in local council application of arbetslinje principles,<br />
when, in an administrative decree of 1981, Socialstyrelsen stipulated that, even if a social<br />
assistance recipient failed to comply with the requirement of applying for work and the<br />
municipality chose to cut assistance, the latter "must make sure that the individual does<br />
not suffer want even in a situation of this kind" (quoted from Westerhäll 1988: 262).<br />
However, since the late 1980s and particularly in the early 1990s, when <strong>Sweden</strong> experienced<br />
unprecedented economic and budgetary crisis with unemployment jumping to unheard<br />
of 8.2 per cent (see Palme 2002: 3), diverging interests between central and local<br />
government level in the interpretation and application of Social Assistance Act clashed<br />
openly. Municipalities faced an increasing number of unemployed seeking municipally<br />
financed social assistance, driving up social assistance spending to hitherto unseen levels,<br />
while central government, in an extraordinary measure froze locally levied taxes. Municipal<br />
councils were consequently eager to interpret the key formula of "reasonable standard<br />
of living" restrictively and to make extensive use of the required arbetslinje and of<br />
sanctions. By contrast, the national government was interested to keep social assistance<br />
entitlement at a politically acceptable level and, for the period of acute economic crisis, to<br />
use municipally funded social assistanceto relieve the national benefit scheme.<br />
The administrative courts, played a crucial role in this conflictual situation, since court rulings,<br />
especially by the Supreme Administrative Court provide authoritative and, under<br />
<strong>Sweden</strong>’s doctrine of legal precedent, binding interpretation of the law of the land (see<br />
Westerhäll 1988: 262). During the 1980s and early 1990s, the courts interpreted the crucial<br />
"reasonable standard of living" formula quite generously, which benefited social assistance<br />
applicants and increased the financial burden on municipalities (for details see Wel-
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fare Commission 2002: 142 ff.). As some municipalities did not accept the courts’ generous<br />
interpretation, they were even accused of contempt of court in their narrower understanding<br />
of the law. In the later 1990s, probably in reaction to the budgetary problems<br />
municipalities increasingly faced when applying a wide interpretation of the law, the courts<br />
conspicuously adopted a more restrictive understanding of the controversial provisions. In<br />
the mid-1990s, the Supreme Administrative Court ruled that individuals are required to<br />
participate not only in government labour market programmes but also in municipal programmes<br />
(see Welfare Commission 2002: 143).<br />
Regulation and interpretation following 1998<br />
The Social Service Act (Socialtjänstlag) as amended in 1998 was a compromise between<br />
the two positions. It virtually ratified the practice that had evolved during the late 1990s.<br />
A concession was made to the interest of central government to regulate local authority<br />
decision-making in the social assistance field in greater detail and to tighten administrative<br />
supervision (by Socialstyrelsen and länsstyrelen) of the local authority compliance with the<br />
law and extend judicial review. At the same time the legal position of social assistance<br />
claimants was strengthened – in terms of actionable entitlements. Small wonder that ithe<br />
manual for social assistance claimants amply emphasises this legal entitlement side of the<br />
amendment (see Socialstyrelesen 2002). The interest of central government has been<br />
recognised by distinguishing between "income maintenance" (försörjingsstöd) and what is<br />
called "other forms of support". Income maintenance includes a standard allowance ("the<br />
national norm", riksnorm) set by the government and to be applied equally throughout the<br />
country. This gives the government a tool for centrally regulating an important component<br />
of social assistance.<br />
On the other hand, the "other forms of support", including rent, travel to and from work,<br />
etc. (see <strong>Chapter</strong> 4, section 1 ff. of the Act), are means-tested and left to the municipal<br />
councils to decide (see Welfare Commission 2002: 142). Such local variance is explicitly<br />
made contingent on whether, in the judgement of the local council, "there is a special reason<br />
for it" (om det finns särskilda skäl for detta). This clearly exemplifies the compromise<br />
between the government-defined norm ("riksnorm") of ensuring country-wide generality<br />
and equality and specific local reasons (särskilda skål) for local differentiation and specification.<br />
The original version of the 1998 amendment introducing the distinction between national<br />
norm and special reasons), also laid down that only the application of the riksnorm by local<br />
authorities was subject to judicial review, while their decisions on benefits based on
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"special reasons" was not. On this point, a 2001 amendment of the Social Service Act<br />
introduced an easily overlooked, but conceptually and practically major change: as of<br />
January 1, 2002, social assistance claimants have been able to file administrative appeals<br />
(förvaltningsbesvär) to the county administrative courts not only against local council decisions<br />
on application of the national norm, but also against decisions on discretionary<br />
components supported by "special reasons" (see Socialstyrelsen 2002: 10). What in the<br />
1998 legislation looked like a genuinely local decision has thus also become subject to<br />
judicial review.<br />
Another legislative concession to local authorities and their interest in more extensive and<br />
effective application of the arbetslinje has been made by allowing the local council to require<br />
young adults under 25 to take part in skills enhancement measures, stipulating that<br />
"if an individual declines, without acceptable cause, to participate in work experience or<br />
other skill-enhancing activity, further livelihood support may be refused or reduced" (chapter<br />
4, section 5 of the Social Service Act of 1998). Thus, young adults that claim or receive<br />
social assistance are put under a compelling obligation to comply with the arbetslinje and<br />
have to expect sanctions more severe than for other assistance claimants (see Welfare<br />
Commission 2002: 143). Yet, the "user manual" circulated by Socialstyrelsen for social<br />
assistance claimants noticeably plays down the possible sanction of losing social assistance<br />
benefit: "However the Social Services (Committee of local council, H. W.) must consult<br />
with the employment services (that is the State Employment agencies, AMS and AF,<br />
H. W.) before deciding this. Such decisions may also be appealed through an administrative<br />
appeal" (Socialstyrelsen 2002: 11). It should recalled that, as it was mentioned earlier,<br />
Socialstyrelsen called on local authorities to make sure "that the individual does not suffer<br />
want" in the event of arbetslinje sanctions. In other words, from the basic rules and values<br />
of the Swedish Welfare State it follows that the local council must not in the last resort let<br />
a social assistance recipient suffer hardship, even if sanctioned under the arbetslinje regime.<br />
The controversy about the interpretation and application of social assistance<br />
(bistånd): a case in point<br />
Apart from the often divergent political and budgetary interests of central and local government<br />
actors that have driven conflicts and the legislative comprises finally reached, the<br />
controversy about whether, to which extent, and how the provision of social assistance<br />
should be regulated by legislation and subject to judicial review can be seen in a larger<br />
context which allow insights into basic cultural and even philosophical premises and foundations<br />
of <strong>Sweden</strong>’s body politic and how they compare with other countries and legal etc.<br />
cultures. Two distinctly, if not fundamentally different principles and logics in conceptually
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grounding and legitimising decision-making by public bodies can be juxtaposed. One is<br />
rooted in a legal rationality and the other premised in a political rationality (for a very<br />
stimulating and insightful debate on this see Montin 1993: 15 ff.). As we have seen in the<br />
preceding chapters of this country report, a distinction can be drawn between lawgoverned<br />
administration (lagstyrd förvaltning) and popularly controlled administration<br />
(folkstyrd förvaltning) (see Petersson/Söderlind 1992: 14, see also Montin 1993). In other<br />
words, administration based on a legal rationality or law-governed can be identified essentially<br />
with the rule-of-law tradition of the continental European, not least of all German<br />
government and legal systems, strongly influenced by Roman law thinking. In this view,<br />
administrative decision-making is regulated in detail by generalist, codified legislation legislation<br />
subject to legalistic review by the courts. By contrast, the popularly controlled or,<br />
to put it slightly differently, "politically accountable" administrative body is meant to make<br />
decisions "case by case", each on its merits and for individual "reasons", legitimated and<br />
held accountable by the local political context, and thus based on political legitimacy<br />
rather than, at least primarily, on legal legitimacy.<br />
In this interpretation the conflict about if, how and to which extent decision-making by<br />
Swedish municipal councils on social assistance can be seen as typical of the conflict<br />
between generalist legal prescription designed to ensure country-wide equality and caserelated<br />
reasonableness in the interest of individual justice (with specific reference to the<br />
implementation of the Social Services Act see Petersson et al. 1999: 68 footnote 11). The<br />
gradually extension of rule-of-law regulation judicial review in this field pose the key dilemma<br />
that the gain in egalitarian justice and judicial protection offered by expansion of<br />
rule-of-law regulation the concomitant juridification (see Montin 1999: 44) of local government<br />
decision-making curtails the traditional self-determination of local government and<br />
locally defined and accountable reasonableness.<br />
10.2 Practice<br />
In 2001, about 253,000 households (with 470,000 people, over 5 per cent of the Swedish<br />
population) received social assistance (bistånd) at some time during the year, at a cost of<br />
8.7 billion SEK. 14 per cent went to refugees. Each recipient household received on average<br />
approximately 6.000 SEK per month for almost six months (see Socialstyrelsen<br />
2003a: 2). In 2003 the number of households receiving social assistance for one or more<br />
months a year declined slightly to 237,000 households (with about 434,000 people). One<br />
third were children under 18 (see Socialstyrelsen 2003b: 1).<br />
Whether and how social committees and their personnel are ready to combine the provision<br />
of social assistance benefits (bistånd) with employment-related activities as sug-
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gested by the arbeitslinje mechanism appears to vary greatly among municipalities (later<br />
in this chapter we will return to the unemployment-related initiatives and activities of the<br />
municipal councils in more detail).<br />
A recent study notes that the in municipal social services staff frequently adopt an administrative<br />
stance, focusing on the administrative processing of social assistance applications,<br />
rather than an outreach attitude (see Hansson/Svensson 2005: 31), 210 encouraging<br />
and persuading recipients to participate in training measures and the like. During the late<br />
1990s, many municipalities also interpreted the law restrictively, often rigorously applied<br />
the local version of the arbetslinje (see Salonen/Ulmestig 2004:36 ff.). 211<br />
The evidence available suggest that practice varies strongly from municipality to municipality<br />
in whether and how often local councils make use of the arbetslinje sanction, reducing<br />
or cutting off social assistance benefit where recipients fail to participate in labour<br />
market measures. In some municipalities a rather rigorous line appears to be followed,<br />
often continuing the practice of the late 1990s. In most cases, practice appears to be lenient<br />
rather than strict, although there seems to be a widely shared conviction that arbetslinje<br />
pressure should be exerted if and when local staff suspect recipients are engaged in<br />
undeclared employment svartjobb) (Solonen/Ulmstig 2004: 37).<br />
Section: social services<br />
11. Re-organisation of social services<br />
Some of these organisational issues dealt with in this section have already be touched<br />
upon in the introductory chapter of this country report. But it seems advisable to take them<br />
up in the context of local social services because this is the local policy field where reorganisation<br />
since the early l990s has probably had the greatest effect.<br />
Until the late 1980s, the organisational and operational model of <strong>Sweden</strong>’s local government<br />
in the social services field (including IOF and care) under the previous Local Gov-<br />
210 The study was carried out by two officials of the staff unit (stadskansliet) of the city administration of<br />
Göteborg and was meant to evaluate the operation of social services in the city districts (stadsdelar).<br />
211 In early 2002 an evaluation study based on questionnaires and telephone interviews in 70 per cent of all<br />
280 Swedish municipalities examined the extent, forms, involvement etc. of local labour market programmes/measures<br />
started and conducted by local authorities. See Salonen/Ulmestig 2004. Besides<br />
other valuable information (which will be taken up later in this chapter), the interviews with local actors<br />
give valuable insight into how the arbetslinje has been applied by local authorities in the recent years. Inter<br />
alia, some interviews shed light on local practice prior to the legislation of 1998 in terms of strict handling<br />
of the arbetslinje and its sanctions (see Salonen/Ulmestig 2004: 36 ff.).
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ernment Act was characterised essentially by two basic principles (for details see chapter<br />
1 of this country report with references):<br />
- Following the general organisational scheme of local government, in terms of the classical<br />
arrangement of elected council (fullmäktige), executive council (kommunstyrelse),<br />
and ordinary sectoral committees (nämnder) the sectoral political decision-making body<br />
on social services was the social services committee (socialnämnd), supported and<br />
served by a professional staff in an administrative unit, mostly called kontor.<br />
- In line with the principle underlying <strong>Sweden</strong>`s post-war welfare state at large, the social<br />
services (care of the elderly, disabled persons, etc.) were to be delivered essentially by<br />
the public sector, that is, directly by municipal employees, professional staff of the administrative<br />
unit(s) (kontor) assigned to the social service committee (socialnämnd) or in<br />
municipal facilities such as homes for the elderly and other municipal services like<br />
domicilary care.<br />
Until the late 1980s the local government was largely organised on the same lines in all<br />
the country’s municipalities, especially since the sectoral structure of local committees<br />
was substantially determined by national legislation.<br />
Following adoption of the new Local Government Act in 1991, which gave the municipal<br />
council a free hand in organising its work, the organisational landscape of Swedish local<br />
authorities has changed dramatically. The previously uniform organisational blueprint has<br />
given way to a bewildering plurality and variety of organisational schemes – varying from<br />
municipality to municipality and often with varying terminology (for details see chapter 1 of<br />
this country report).<br />
Besides giving the municipalities new freedom in organising their activities, the new legislation<br />
reflected two different reform perspectives. On the one hand, it adapted and flexibilised<br />
the committee system within its traditional format. By enabling committees to delegate<br />
business even to individual municipal officials, the LPA (chapter 8, section 33,<br />
delegering av ärenden inom en nämnd) pursues such traditional reform. But the 1991 LPA<br />
drew on new public management ideas, then omnipresent also in <strong>Sweden</strong>’s modernisation<br />
debate, stipulating that that municipal councils (fullmäktige) may outsource local government<br />
matters (lämna över vården av en kommunal angelägenhet) to external, also<br />
private actors (chapter 3, section 16 LGA) – with the important proviso that this was not<br />
allowed with regard to public authority functions (myndighetsutövnig).
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11.1 Traditional reforms<br />
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In a reform approach that can be termed traditional because it remains in principle within<br />
the traditional organisational scheme, in contrast to reforms inspired by new public management<br />
notions that intentionally abandoned the traditional blueprint (see Wollmann<br />
2004), a broad spectrum of institutional reorganisation has taken place in local government<br />
delivery of social services, including care of the elderly, and in the bundle of individ<br />
ouch familje (IOF) tasks. While these responsibilities had previously been discharged under<br />
the joint roof of the social committee (socialnämnd), they have now been partly assigned<br />
to different committees and related administrative units. In some municipalities the<br />
institutionalisation of IOF has been organisationally adapted to enhance municipal involvement<br />
in labour market issues, not least of all in meeting arbetslinje requirements and<br />
in related activities in handling social assistance applications (for details see later in chapter<br />
on local unemployment-related activities).<br />
While retaining the traditional format of committee and administrative staff work, important<br />
changes were effected in internal operation by introducing or stepping up the application<br />
of management principles, such as management by objectives, profit-centres and performance-based<br />
financing systems (see Welfare Commission 2002: 115; Montin 1993). In<br />
many cases this resurrected earlier efforts since the 1960s to modernise the operation of<br />
municipal administrative units (see Brorström/Rombach 2004). The delegation of case-tocase<br />
decision-making from the committee to the administrative staff was encouraged and<br />
formalised by the new provision of the LGA (delegering av ärenden inom en nämnd).<br />
These multifarious reorganisational measures within the traditional committee system<br />
have had a far-reaching impact, described as follows by Socialstyrelsen: "Several large<br />
municipalities with decentralised organisations have centralised decision-making functions<br />
and activities. Others have abolished their social welfare committees and have centralised<br />
responsibility to the municipal executive boards. Some merge committees such as the<br />
social welfare committee and the local employment services committee. For individ och<br />
familj this enables centralisation and greater concentration on specified target groups and<br />
methods. Large municipalities earmark special resources and skills for specific needs.<br />
Here close interaction can be seen, leading to heightened professionalism in social work.<br />
Perhaps it is possible to speak of a knowledge trend, in which quality work and knowledge<br />
enhancement are taking a more centre-stage position in municipal social work, at the<br />
same time as the number of social workers with Master’s degrees and other further training<br />
is growing.<br />
Small municipalities are naturally much less well equipped than their larger counterparts<br />
to offer a wide range of specialised measures on home ground or to possess expertise in
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issues that do not often arise. However, the need and demand for this have increased.<br />
The strategy used by small municipalities to deal with this situation seems to entail entering<br />
into networks with other municipalities and sometimes more formalised partnerships<br />
for joint projects and activities. Joint R&D units are also established for more intermunicipal<br />
scientific support in developing, following up and evaluating and for joint further<br />
and continuing training" (see Socialstyrelse 2003a: 5).<br />
11.2 NPM-inspired re-organisation<br />
Two conceptual approaches can be discerned in NPM-derived reform strategies to reorganise<br />
local government activities in the social services. For one, NPM aims at establishing<br />
a conceptual and institutional distinction in the provision of services between "purchaser"<br />
and "provider" functions within the committee system (see Montin 1993). For the<br />
committee system of Swedish local government, with its traditionally heavy load in social<br />
service provision, this entails the institutional and functional separation into two bodies, a<br />
purchasing and a providing/producing function. One might speak of internal outsourcing.<br />
At the same time, existing administrative staff would accordingly be split up into two units<br />
– one assigned to the purchasing committee and the other to the providing/production<br />
committee.<br />
The second NPM approach seeks to break up the existing quasi-monopoly of the municipal<br />
sector in the provision of services by introducing the principle of marketisation. This<br />
involves mandatory competitive tendering for the delivery of services, establishing (quasi-)<br />
market competition in which outside, private for-profit and not-for-profit organisations and<br />
enterprises ("external outsourcing"), as well as the internal municipal production units can<br />
take part.<br />
Introduction of the purchaser/provider split in the committee system<br />
Generally speaking, in pursuance of the NPM-inspired purchaser/provider split concept<br />
the previous unitary function of committees was divided into two, namely<br />
- the purchasing committee (beställarnämnder or uppdragsnämnder), supported by a<br />
corresponding administrative unit (uppdragskontor) and<br />
- provider units (produktionsstyrelse).
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In some municipalities, like Uppsala, a further institutionally differentiation consistent with<br />
this organisational logic has been made on the provider side, with the establishment of a<br />
production committee (produktionsnämnd) and a production administrative unit (produk-<br />
tionsförvaltningar). 212<br />
11.3 Outsourcing the delivery of services to outside providers<br />
The public sector came to enjoy a quasi-monopoly in the delivery of public services in the<br />
postwar Swedish welfare state, while for historical reasons, as we have seen, the subsidiarity<br />
principle allowing the involvement of non-public voluntary institutions and private providers<br />
found almost no application. In the local (welfare) state, too, the municipal sector<br />
accordingly predominated, with social services being almost entirely delivered directly by<br />
the municipality. It became the firm conviction of most relevant actors that social services<br />
should be delivered essentially by the public sector, that is, directly by local government<br />
personnel in what was seen almost a trademark of the Swedish model.<br />
The outsourcing of local government functions to external, private providers has been<br />
explicitly ruled out by the LGA (chapter 3, section 16) where public authority functions are<br />
involved (myndighetsutövning). A significant share of the responsibilities within the IOF<br />
task bundle of that have essentially to do with applying the law can be considered public<br />
authority functions (myndighetsutövning). (For the analogous case of development control<br />
and planning see chapter 2 of this country report).<br />
During the 1990s, the international "tidal wave" of discussion about New Public Management<br />
as a concept and tool for administrative reform finally reached <strong>Sweden</strong>, as well (see<br />
Montin 1993). It was taken up in many municipalities, not least of all in the hope that reforming<br />
their organisational structures would make local government more efficient and<br />
cut costs. Such NPM-guided reform strategies were embarked upon particularly in municipalities<br />
where the 1991 elections had installed a centre-right majority in local councils<br />
(for a case study on the municipality of Täby, in the vicinity of Stockholm, see Svensson/Wegener<br />
2000).<br />
Apart from conceptual and ideological reasons, it seems to have been the sheer need<br />
local authorities for additional and new providers to meet the service demands imposed by<br />
the major reforms of the early 1990s, particularly the Ädelreform and subsequent reforms<br />
of care for the disabled. In this situation they simply did not have enough families (hou-<br />
212 See www.uppsala.se/upload/bilder.
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sing) and personnel of their own (see Swedish Association of Local Authorities 1999,<br />
Trenneborg 1999: 19).<br />
The provision of care of the elderly and of other social services has hence been opened<br />
up to new providers/producers of services. New providers – private enterprises, cooperative<br />
associations, insurance companies etc. – have made their entry into the service arena<br />
with new business concepts. "Opening up the elderly care field for private (for profit) providers<br />
is in fact promoted both by central and local governments in <strong>Sweden</strong>, as a vital cost<br />
containment strategy through market competition" (Socialstyrelsen 2004: 4).<br />
Under existing rules and practice, the services available from providers are decided on<br />
and financed by local authorities. In this sense, local authorities purchase the services<br />
from the private providers and, at least ideally, control their conduct and performance.<br />
Thus, private providers operating under this system are also subject to the "maximum fee"<br />
rule of the 1998 legislation (referred to earlier in this chapter). is the market is accordingly<br />
not actually free: it is a special market where conditions are still largely set by local government.<br />
Rate of outsourcing and marketisation<br />
Given the point of departure for the reorganisation of social service delivery, namely the<br />
quasi-monopoly of the municipal sector until well into the late 1980s, the process of outsourcing<br />
which has set in since the early 1990s has certainly been significant, if not dramatic.<br />
This is particularly true for the kick-off phase in the early 1990s; while developments<br />
have since tapered off.<br />
An instructive impression of the process and results of outsourcing and marketisation can<br />
be gained from the websites of a number of municipalities that have been (meanwhile<br />
highly publicised, also self-publicised) front-runners in outsourcing and marketisation,<br />
such as Linköping, Nacka and Täby, 213 all typically located in the Greater Stockholm region.<br />
(For an informative case study on Täby see Svensson/Wegener 2000 where the<br />
combination of various strategies, including competitive tendering, vouchers, etc. is analysed).<br />
As we have seen in chapter 1 of this country report, a more comprehensive, albeit analytically<br />
selective overview can be obtained from the data compiled by the Swedish Association<br />
of Local Authorities (Svenska Kommunförbund) jointly with the Swedish Statistical<br />
213 See www.linkoeping.se, www.nacka.se, www.taeby. se.
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State Office (Statistisk Centralbyrån). This huge data collection has been put together<br />
since 1987 offering key indicator-based (nyckeltal) on each each of the 280 Swedish municipalities.<br />
Its annual reports ("What do the activities in your community cost?" 214 offer a<br />
unique source of cross-municipality information and longitudinal data (for the most recent<br />
edition of the report see SKF/SCB 2004 whose data will be drawn on in the following).<br />
For assessing the rate of social services outsourcing/marketisation, this regularly updated<br />
data collection offers relevant information in that in one section contains data on the percentage<br />
of the services purchased by the municipality from other providers. Regarding the<br />
information on care of the elderly (äldreomsorg) and individual and family care (individoch<br />
familjeomsorg) on which our account focuses, the following qualifications need to be<br />
made:<br />
- Generally speaking, the data base referred to is restricted to the expenditure side of<br />
services. They do not inform about the number of institutions, recipients, etc. involved.<br />
Hence, the percentage data inform about the share of purchased services as compared<br />
to the total spending on the respective service.<br />
- In the available data source there is only combined information on care of the elderly<br />
(äldreomsorg) and care of disabled (handikappomsorg). Thus, the information on "care<br />
of the elderly" cannot be separated out.<br />
- With regard to information on individ- och familjeomsorg (IOF), the additional problem is<br />
that spending on service provision (within IOF) and the cash payment/transfer payment<br />
side of social assistance (bistånd) are lumped together. A reliable estimation is that, on<br />
average, transfer payments constitute about one third of spending on IOF. This needs<br />
to be taken into account in interpreting the data.<br />
- It should be added that the available data allow an interesting differentiation in that a<br />
distinction is made between two groups of institutions from which municipalities buy<br />
services: – private providers and not-for-profit associations, on the one hand, and other<br />
public providers, including other municipalities, and municipally owned corporations on<br />
the other. While a further differentiation between private and not-for-profit associations<br />
(which would be interesting indeed) cannot be made, the available distinction allows<br />
forms of private outsourcing, including non-profit associations, to be distinguished from<br />
public outsourcing to municipal corporations, other municipalities, etc. This distinction<br />
between private and public outsourcing is made in the following account. In the data<br />
214 Vad kostar versamheten i Din kommun?
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given below, the percentage relating to public outsourcing will be added in bold letters<br />
in brackets.<br />
Keeping these qualification and explanations in mind, the national weighed average (hela<br />
riket: vägt medelvärde) rate of outsourcing in 2003 was (see SKF/SCB 2004: 116):<br />
- 10 per cent (2 per cent) for care of elderly plus care of disabled,<br />
- 16 per cent (7 per cent) for individual and family care.<br />
As the data are also available for each of the 280 municipalities, they allow an instructive<br />
differentiation, particularly by size and regional location, as we have seen in chapter 1 of<br />
this country report. Given the more detailed account already given, an examination of the<br />
data for the municipality of Täby, one of the frontrunners of outsourcing and marketization<br />
suffices for present purposes. In Täby the outsourcing rate in 2003 was 34 per cent (1 per<br />
cent) for care of the elderly/disabled and 38 percent (7 percent) for individual and family<br />
care, see SKF/SCB 2004: 107).<br />
With due allowance for the above reservations, interpretation of the available data suggests,<br />
in sum, that the percentage of private outsourcing of the services concerned has<br />
remained remarkably low on the national average, that is, in the bulk of the municipalities.<br />
After rising relatively fast, the outsourcing rate seems largely to have stagnated since the<br />
late 1990s. Striking exceptions to this general picture can be found particularly in a set of<br />
densely populated and relatively affluent municipalities in the hinterland of the three metropolitan<br />
cities Stockholm, Göteborg and Malmö and in these cities themselves.<br />
This relatively low rate of outsourcing may come as a surprise, particularly considering the<br />
at times momentous political impetus and ideological fanfares with which the NPMinspired<br />
marketisation and outsourcing message and movement has made its entry into<br />
Swedish municipalities since the early 1990s. This may be due to a number of factors.<br />
First, the opening of the "service market" may finally have proved not attractive enough for<br />
private investors and providers in the care of the elderly and disabled market segment,<br />
and not least of all in sheltered and nursed accommodation and home care, since this is<br />
still a controlled market, operating under the maximum fee rule applicable also for privately<br />
provided services.<br />
Second, local residents dependent on such services may, at the end of the day, be more<br />
satisfied with the services directly provided by the municipality than was feared by some<br />
and hoped by others during the turbulent 1990s.
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Third, it should not be overlooked that the Swedish welfare state – which to a significant<br />
extent is a local welfare state – is culturally as well as politically and sociologically well<br />
entrenched at the local level and among local actors who, after all, have to make the decisions<br />
about whether services should be outsourced or not. The phalanx of social workers<br />
who make up almost one third of the entire body of local government employees are likely<br />
to play a far from minor role in defending the status quo in social service provision, perhaps<br />
motivated not only by honourable professional concerns but also by an interest in<br />
maintaining their personal status and safeguarding their jobs (see Dellgran/Höjer 2005:<br />
46).<br />
12. Personnel<br />
Of the some 540,000 full-time equivalent employees of municipalities in 1998, about 32%<br />
(or 188,000) worked in the social services sector, and 23 per cent in school/education,<br />
and 19 per cent in pre-school. So, unless school and pre-school are taken together, the<br />
social services make for the largest personnel component in municipalities. In 1998, about<br />
90 per cent worked in care of older people and disabled persons and about 10 per cent<br />
(or 18,000) in individual and family care (IOF) (see Socialstyrelse 2000: 3). About half of<br />
those employed in IOF are social workers. 215 Some 90 per cent of employees in the social<br />
services are women; and no less than 94 per cent of registered! 216<br />
Available data indicate significant differences in the qualificational profile between social<br />
workers engaged in social care of the elderly and handicapped and those working in individual<br />
and family care (IOF). The latter have fewer occupational years, hold significantly<br />
fewer masters degrees and are slightly less well paid (see Dellgran/Höjer 2003: 44).<br />
The professionalisation of social work is of relatively recent date. In 1964, educational<br />
programmes for social workers were accredited with the status of higher education in<br />
<strong>Sweden</strong>. In 1977, another major reform followed, integrating the six state-run schools of<br />
social work into the university structure. As a result of this reform, social work was also<br />
given the status of a research discipline. The first chair of generic social work was established<br />
in the Department of Social Work at Göteborg University (see Gynnerstedt/Höjer<br />
2004: 204).<br />
215<br />
See Socialstyrelsen 2003a:1: of the 19,500 persons employed in 2002 in IOF about 9,000 were social<br />
workers.<br />
216 See Socialstyrelsen 2000: 6 for details and references.
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The professionalisation of social workers and the massive influx of freshly trained graduate<br />
staff into local social administration took place in a period when <strong>Sweden</strong>’s local government<br />
was undergoing a sweeping transformation from lay to professional administration,<br />
with rapidly expanding administrative structures and personnel. It is worth bearing in<br />
mind (for more details on this development see chapter 1 of this country report) that this<br />
unprecedented expansion of local government tasks and ensuing rapid expansion in local<br />
professional personnel took place in the political, ideological and cultural environment of<br />
the 1960s and 1970s in which the planning discourse, spilling over from the US since the<br />
mid-1960s, advocating modern planning techniques (PPBS, MbO and the like) and the<br />
scientification of policy-making (not least by way of evaluation), was taken up in <strong>Sweden</strong><br />
probably more intensively than in most other European countries in what was termed a<br />
"scientific revolution" (Björn Wittrock).<br />
Recalling chapter 1 of this report, it may plausibly be argued that, under the influence of a<br />
singular constellation of factors (unprecedented growth of the public sector and public<br />
sector personnel between the 1950s and 1970s, reconstruction of municipal administration<br />
on entirely redrawn territorial structure after 1974, the "scientific revolution" of the<br />
1960 and 1970s, the professionalisation of future administrative elites), a generation of<br />
political and administrative actors were recruited into <strong>Sweden</strong>`s municipal sector. The<br />
generation cohorts in their twenties that entered public/municipal administration in great<br />
numbers in the 1960s and 1970s have kept moving up the hierarchy over subsequent<br />
decades – with many of them having reached high level positions and continuing to be the<br />
"modernisers" they were trained to be in their formative years during the 1960s and<br />
1970s.<br />
These "scientific" ideas have recently been echoed when Socialstyrelse calls for the "development<br />
of knowledge in the social services" (see Socialstyrelsen 2003a: 10), pointing<br />
out that the "government commissioned the National Board of Social Welfare in 1999 to<br />
produce a special development programme – National Support for the Development of<br />
Knowledge in the Social Services. The directive stressed the necessity of working more<br />
than at present towards systematic testing and evaluation of methods and ways of working.<br />
The purpose of the programme is to create and reinforce structures for systematic<br />
generation of knowledge and its dissemination in various areas of higher education, research<br />
and practice" (Socialstyrelsen 2003a: 12).
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13. Administrative supervision of local government social service functions<br />
by central government<br />
Socialstyrelsen and the county administrative board (länsstryrelser ) have a joint duty to<br />
supervise the work of municipal social services. Socialstyrelsen has general responsibility<br />
at the national level, but neither Socialstyrelsen nor the ministry have the right to contest<br />
supervisory decisions taken by länsstyrelsen. This probably follows from the timehonoured<br />
constitutional principle, confirmed in chapter 11, section 7 of the Instrument of<br />
Government of 1974, that the decision of an administrative body on a concrete case cannot<br />
be interfered with by any other body, except through judicial review.<br />
Länsstyrelsen supervises both municipally and privately run social services. These supervisory<br />
powers were strengthened by the 1998 amendment to the Social Services Act (Socialtjänstlag,<br />
chapter 13). Under the new provision, länsstyrelsen has the right to inspect<br />
all social service activities within the county whether they are municipally or independently<br />
run. This includes unannounced visits. Länssstyrelsen has the right to take action against<br />
unfair practices, regardless of whether by a municipal or independent organisation (see<br />
Socialstyrelsen 2002: 27).<br />
More recently this supervision has been stepped up, as Socialstyrelsen and länsstyrelsen<br />
have been commissioned by the government to develop and strengthen supervisory procedures<br />
tools. The aim is to systematise social supervision work in a uniform way (see<br />
Socialstyrelsen 2000: 4).<br />
Since the late 1990s, Socialstyrelsen has published annual reports on the annual supervisions<br />
(for examples see Socialstyrelsen 2000: 4 f., 2003a: 5). 217<br />
This more stringent supervision has aroused protest (first of all, understandably, on the<br />
part of local authorities) and concern about progessing centralisation (not least on the part<br />
of academic observers); but it should be kept in mind that, in exercising their supervisory<br />
powers, both Socialstyrelsen and the county administrative board have remarkably little<br />
scope for applying sanctions against local authorities. As a rule, they are limited to public<br />
criticism (for instance in the annual reports, nota bene, in general form, without naming<br />
any names) and other forms of persuasion – or perhaps some informal "arm-twisting". But<br />
it probably also follows from the above-mentioned constitutional principle that neither So-<br />
217 See, for instance, Socialstyrelsen 2003a: 10 "In the County Administrative Boards’ inspections for 2001,<br />
shortcomings were noted in 42 percent of the investigations in the supervision area ‘the child’s best interest’<br />
… A shortage of relief placements in the form of support families and short-term homes was also<br />
reported …".
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cialstyrelsen nor the county administrative board may intervene directly in a decision<br />
taken by the local authority, for instance to nullify or modify it.<br />
Although central government supervision of local social services authorities has been<br />
stepped up – with indicator-supported monitoring and "on site" inspection playing an increasing<br />
role – the Swedish procedure and style of administrative supervision is still<br />
worlds apart from the centralist auditing and inspection system of the British best value<br />
regime. In our comparative assessment it would seem mistaken to perceive a "clear kinship"<br />
(tydligt släktskap) (as Solli et al. 2005 and Solli 2004: 20 claim) between Swedish<br />
indicator-based monitoring and the British best value regime.<br />
14. Judicial review<br />
In a development running largely parallel to the advances of a rule-of-law mode of regulation,<br />
the judicial review of decisions taken by local councils in social service matters has<br />
been made more comprehensive and gaps in judicial review have been filled or narrowed.<br />
As we have seen, the legal and judicial controversies of the 1990s showed that, in view of<br />
the scope of interpretation the framework law of 1982 left municipalities, it was the courts<br />
that ultimately interpreted law in rulings on cases brought before them by social service<br />
claimants dissatisfied with council decisions. A body of precedent cases has emerged<br />
which is, formally speaking, binding only in the individual case, but which has gained<br />
quasi-binding authority. The legislation of 1998 and some subsequent amendments<br />
emerged from a kind of tug of war between local authorities, (which went as far as risking<br />
to be reproached of "contempt of court") and courts that, on the basis of the somewhat<br />
precarious practice that evolved. With regard to pending legal issues, the legislation essentially<br />
did three things. On the one hand, it confirmed the right of social service claimants<br />
to take legal action. Furthermore, the range of the decisions taken by local councils,<br />
was extended; for instance, while council decisions on discretionary components of social<br />
assistance (bistånd) 218 were taken out of judicial review and protection, judicial review was<br />
restored in the 2001 amendment as of January 1, 2002 (see Socialstyrelsen 2002: 8).<br />
The legal appeal which a social service claimant may lodge against a decision taken by<br />
the local council is an administrative appeal (forvaltningsbesvär) before the county administrative<br />
court (länsrätterna). (see on this also chapter 1 the country report). Unlike in other<br />
administrative court systems where the courts may only nullify the administrative decision<br />
at issue but not substantively change it, the Swedish county administrative courts can do<br />
218 See Social Services Act, chapter 1, section 1.
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exactly this, thus eventually making a substantive decision in lieu of that made by the<br />
original administrative decision maker (see Petersson et al. 1999: 70). Another peculiarity<br />
of the Swedish legal and judicial system, demonstrated in application of the Social Assistance<br />
Act, is that the distinction between "legal prescription" and "reason/reasonableness"<br />
(skål, skälig) is often blurred, both conceptually and practically. Thus the judge is called<br />
upon to enter legally unmapped terrain to make a decision which often enough amounts to<br />
what he or she deems to be "reasonable" (see Petersson et al. 1999: 68; footnote 11).<br />
It should be added the "legality appeal" (överklaga, laglighetsprövning) or appeal on questions<br />
of law which, in a tradition reaching back to 1862, can be brought before the county<br />
administrative court by every "member" of municipality to review the legality of a council or<br />
committee decision (see Local Government Act 1991, chapter 10) (see also chapter 2 of<br />
the country report), is explicitly ruled out by the Social Service Act.<br />
In the judicial practice of the county administrative courts (there are 21, one in each<br />
county) the number of administrative appeals (forvältningsbesvär) appears to be relatively<br />
small. Among the total number of appeals heard by county courts within the broad spectrum<br />
of their jurisdiction, administrative appeals against decisions relating to the Social<br />
Services Act amounted to less than 10 per cent (between 1999 and 2003) (see Domstolsverket<br />
2003a: table 2.3 with a detailed statistical data). The decisions taken by county<br />
administrative courts were appealed to the higher administrative court (kammerrätter) in a<br />
about a quarter of cases (see Domstolsverket 2003a: table 2.5).<br />
15. Intergovernmental cooperation in the social and health services<br />
The Ädelreform of 1992 and the subsequent reforms on disability care which entailed a<br />
significant transfer of operational and financial responsibilities from counties to municipalities,<br />
did not have the expected success. It proved impossible to resolve crucial demarcation<br />
issues between the responsibilities of the important actors involved, that is, particularly<br />
municipalities, but also counties and the social security fund. Co-ordination remained<br />
a critical problem. As the ageing of society continued unabated, a mounting number of old<br />
people needed pre- and post-medical care imprecisely at the critical interface between<br />
acute hospitalisation, rehabilitation and, in the case of incurable diseases and frailty, longterm<br />
care. In view of the similarly increasing number of people on sickness leave, the<br />
need for institutional and cooperative meshing of unemployment and labour market policy<br />
became more and more urgent (see Bäck 2004).<br />
Against this backdrop, legislation was introduced in 1994 on an experimental basis to test<br />
new institutionalised forms of cooperation between municipalities, counties and the social
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security fund. Municipal social services, county health care, and the social security fund<br />
were allowed to set up a joint body and pool their financial resources hitherto spent in<br />
each separate institutional setting and it obedience to separate conceptual logics. The<br />
joint board comprised representatives of the three partners with a representative of the<br />
county labour board sitting in (see Hultberg et al. 2002: 1). Throughout the country, such<br />
experimental arrangements were put in place in eight areas, one being Hissingen, made<br />
up of four districts of Göteborg.<br />
The experimental projects covered a range of activities such as general health promotion,<br />
medical rehabilitation of long-term patients, as well as projects to improve employment<br />
opportunities for persons unemployed for various reasons. In keeping with their experimental<br />
logic, the projects were evaluated individually and on a national scale (see Hultberg<br />
et al. 2002).<br />
On the basis of positive experience and evaluation findings, further legislative steps were<br />
undertaken to encourage and enable local actors to engage in, and improve their coordinated<br />
and co-financed activities at the interface of social services, health care and<br />
labour market policy.<br />
In 2003, a law was passed on the financial co-ordination of resources for rehabilitation<br />
between the Social Security Fund, the county labour office, municipalities and counties 219 ,<br />
which was superseded in 2004 by the legislation on financial co-ordination of resources<br />
for rehabilitation, 220 which came in effect on January 1, 2005.<br />
The explicit aim of the recent legislation is to achieve financial co-ordination in order to<br />
more effectively address the clientele and assist them to improve their ability to seek and<br />
take up gainful employment. Organisationally, a cooperation body (samordningsförbund)<br />
is to be created funded half by the social security fund and a quarter each by the municipalities<br />
and counties involved. The county employment office (länsarbeitsnämden) is represented<br />
on the board (förbundsstyrelsen) to be chaired by the head of the employment<br />
office (länsarbetsnämdens chef) or somebody else from that agency.<br />
219<br />
Lag om finansiell samordning av rehabiliteringsinsatser mellan allmän försäkringskassa, länsarbetsnämd,<br />
kommun och landstilng.<br />
220 Law (2004: 793) om finansiell samordning av rehabiliteringsinsatser.
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Mention should also be made of the legislation on the formation of joint county and municipal<br />
council committees in the field of care, particularly of substance abusers, children<br />
and families 221 (see Socialstyrelsen 2003a: 6).<br />
The need for more intensive co-operation between the two levels of local government has<br />
recently been also politically signalled and practically underpinned by the decision of the<br />
two local government groupings, the association of municipalities (Svenska Kommunförbund)<br />
and the association of counties (Landstingförbund) to merge their organisations in a<br />
first step before creating a new, unified association in 2007. For the first time in 2003, the<br />
two associations, published a joint annual report (Årsredovisning 2003) in which they the<br />
stress the need to co-operate, not least of all in the field of health care (see SKF/LF 2003).<br />
16. Voluntary sector<br />
Until recently, the provision of social services and related charitable activities were dominated<br />
by the public sector as was (correspondingly) marked by the absence of voluntary,<br />
that is, non-public, essentially not-for-profit, civil society-based organisations.<br />
The reasons for this traditionally all but marginal role of voluntary organizations in the provision<br />
of social services, which stands in conspicuous contrast to Anglo-Saxon and continental<br />
European countries (see Wijkström 2000, Lundström/Svedberg 2003), lie in certain<br />
institutional and cultural particularities of <strong>Sweden</strong>`s history (see also the introduction to<br />
this chapter).<br />
For one, they can be traced back to the "pro-State tradition", which took shape as early as<br />
the 16 th century and the Reformation, when the Catholic church was expropriated along<br />
with its social responsibilities (see Lundström/Svedberg 2003: 223). Another important<br />
event was the establishment of modern local government by the reform of 1862, when the<br />
new "public" kommuner were separated from the ecclesiastic parishes, assuming the latter’s<br />
social responsibilities (see Häggroth et al. 1993: 3). Finally, a "hidden social contract"<br />
was made between the advancing welfare state in the 1930s and the voluntary and notfor-profit<br />
organisations in reaching a "division of functions" according to which the "state,<br />
through central and local government, was supposed to take care of such as areas as<br />
military defence, health care, social services and primary and university education"<br />
(Wijkström 2000: 163 f.), while the voluntary organisations were to provide the institutional<br />
frame for citizens to pursue their political, cultural, and leisure, etc. interests. In addition,<br />
many Social Democrats and trade-unionists found that voluntary organisations smacked<br />
221 Lagen om gemensam nämnd inom vård- och omsorgsarbetet.
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of the charitable tradition of the poor law sort, which they were determined to leave behind<br />
(see Wijkström 2000: 164).<br />
This historical background surfaces in the organisational and activity pattern which <strong>Sweden</strong>’s<br />
voluntary sector has shown until recently, setting it distinctly apart from most Anglo-<br />
Saxon and continental European countries. While the sector was by no means smaller<br />
than in other countries, if measured, for instance, by its economic importance (with operating<br />
expenditures at 4.1 per cent of GNP in 1992, compared to Great Britain and Germany<br />
with 4.8 percent and 3.6 per cent, Lundström/Svedberg 2003: 220), its activity profile was<br />
distinctly different. Being typically membership-based rather then service-oriented, it has<br />
been primarily concerned with representing and promoting member interests, focusing on<br />
public issues like ecology, feminism, etc. (see Wijkström 2000: 165). The share of social<br />
service-related activities has been accordingly small (cf. Salamon/Anheier 1997: 164,<br />
Wijkström 2000: 164 ff.). In <strong>Sweden</strong> only 26 % of the total number of volunteers are active<br />
in the fields of health care, social service and education as compared to 62 % in the U. K.,<br />
and58% in Germany (Wijkström 2000: 170). Consequently and typically, <strong>Sweden</strong>’s nonprofit<br />
sector has been least dependent on government revenue sources: 29%, compared<br />
to France 59%, U. K. 40%, and Germany 68%, the latter figure reflecting the eminent role<br />
non-public, not-for-profit welfare organisations traditionally play in Germany in the delivery<br />
of social service (see Wijkström 2000: 175).<br />
In a development which set in during the 1980s and gained momentum during the 1990s,<br />
voluntary non-profit organisations have found increasing recognition and factual importance<br />
in the provision of social services. Several factors appear to be at work. For one, as<br />
the old welfare state and its quasi-monopoly in the delivery of public services has been<br />
questioned even by its former Social Democrat advocates, voluntary organisations and<br />
actors have been politically re-appraised and even "welcomed back". This has been evidenced<br />
by a flow of government reports (SOU’s) emphasising the new role of the voluntary<br />
sector in the provision of services (Wijkström 2000: 183). Since the beginning of the<br />
1990s, many municipalities have begun to outsource the services to external providers,<br />
creating a new "market" which voluntary organisations, too, have been entering. By the<br />
same token, fast expanding groups in the Swedish non-profit sector during the 1990s are<br />
typified by neo-cooperatives, kindergartens run by parent cooperatives, or a group of former<br />
drug abusers starting a rehabilitation centre based on self-help and joint ownership<br />
(Wijkström 2000: 167).<br />
During the 1990s, non-profit organisations working in the social area gained greater attention<br />
and significance than before, both as partners for municipal social services and as<br />
direct providers, this trend continuing into the early 2000s. Both ideological and economic<br />
considerations underlie this development.
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Contributions from voluntary organisations and individuals play a decisive role for important<br />
sectors of the social services. The actual work is done by salaried employees or by<br />
unpaid volunteers. In 1997, an estimated 7,000-10,000 people were employed in organisations<br />
engaged in social and humanitarian work. It is reckoned that about half a million<br />
people in <strong>Sweden</strong> received help and support through volunteer organisations at least<br />
some time during that year, and about one Swede in five aged 16-74 is estimated to have<br />
contributed with unpaid work (see Socialstyrelsen 2003a: 11 f.).<br />
Section: local employment measures<br />
17. The engagement of municipalities in labour market activities<br />
17.1 The State Labour Market Administration – the dominant actor in national<br />
labour market policy<br />
Labour market policy is perceived and pursued as a prime national responsibility of central<br />
government in <strong>Sweden</strong>’s welfare state. In 1948, a labour market administration was put in<br />
place to conduct and implement labour market policy, as a key institutional pillar of the<br />
emergent welfare state exceptional in <strong>Sweden</strong>’s intergovernmental setting for a number of<br />
reasons:<br />
- On the national level, a central agency (myndighet), the National Labour Board (Arbetsmarknadsstyrelsen,<br />
AMS) was set up alongside the National Labour Administration<br />
(Arbetsmarknadsverket, AMV), acting on behalf of parliament and the government and<br />
reporting to the Ministry of Industry, Employment and Communications (Näringsdepartementet)<br />
as the key player in national labour market policy making. While AMS shares<br />
the traditional institutional and political autonomy of <strong>Sweden</strong>’ central agencies, its position<br />
has been even stronger and more independent because, since 1948, it has been<br />
rooted in the country’s corporatist structure, giving the trade unions a majority influence<br />
over the agency from the beginning. Furthermore, in a departure from the principle that<br />
central agency personnel of were "classical" civil servants, the staff recruited by AMS<br />
was expected primarily to be dedicated to the cause of labour market policy and politically<br />
close to the trade unions (see Rothstein 1996: 106 ff.). In fact, AMS has been<br />
deemed the most independent and powerful of the country’s central agencies (see<br />
Rothstein 1985).<br />
- Second, while in most other policy areas central agencies, let alone ministries, have<br />
regional or local field offices of their own, the implementation of most welfare state policies<br />
being left to local government, particularly to municipalities, the AMS is practically
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the only central agency to have a full-fledged hierarchical chain of administrative units<br />
of its own down to the local level.<br />
- On the county level (21) county labour boards (länsarbetsjnämnd, LAN) have been established,<br />
while 320 employment services, at least one in eachof the 280 municipalities,<br />
act as local field offices of the national labour administration in charge of implementing<br />
labour market policy on the local level.<br />
- Resulting from this quite unique constellation of factors (full-fledged vertical organisational<br />
structure, a definite policy mission, dedicated personnel, etc.) AMS has gained an<br />
independent inter-organisational and inter-governmental status with a specific vertical<br />
structure, organisational culture and policy logic which, besides providing the basis for<br />
AMS’ institutional and political strength as a powerful labour policy player, foster a particularly<br />
pronounced sectoralised and isolated policy and action pattern (called sometimes<br />
stuprör = drainpipe in Swedish and "pillar" or "silo" in English), raising conceptual,<br />
institutional, and cultural obstacles to cooperation and co-ordination with other policy<br />
areas and actors, not least of all with local councils.<br />
Without going into greater detail on <strong>Sweden</strong>’s national labour market policy, mention<br />
needs to made of the arbetslinje principle as one of its basic and characteristic guidelines.<br />
It hinges on the idea that the people registered with the AF as unemployed and receiving<br />
unemployment benefit 222 are obliged to engage in skill-enhancing activities (kompetenshöjande<br />
verksamhet) to maintain and improve their employability (anställningsbaret).<br />
Failure to meet these arbetslinje requirements (for instance, to take part in training or requalification<br />
measures, or to report regularly to AF) may be sanctioned by the AF by cutting<br />
off or reducing unemployment benefit (so that the unemployed has to seek social assistance<br />
(bistånd) administered and financed by municipal councils in their responsibility<br />
for individual and family care (IOF).<br />
17.2 Initiatives of the national government to involve municipalities in labour<br />
market policy measures<br />
Under pressure from the economic and budgetary crisis, central government has taken<br />
steps since the mid-1990s to involve municipalities in labour market activities.<br />
222 In <strong>Sweden</strong> there are two types of unemployment benefit. For trade union members (the majority of the<br />
workforce) it is administered (under the label a-kassa) by the trade unions, and for non-trade union<br />
members (the minority) by the State Employment Service (AMS) (under the label KAS). The Employment<br />
Service is in charge of assisting all unemployed, regardless whether a-kassa or KAS recipients in<br />
finding jobs (see Clasen et al. 1998: 54).
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First, in 1996 a "youth guarantee, age 20-24" 223 was introduced. It was intended to improve<br />
the chances young adults (20-24) to findi work or begin studies and help them<br />
achieve economic self-sufficiency immediately or in the near future. Central government<br />
pays municipalities 150 SEK per day to cover the costs of each programme participant<br />
(for some programme details see Swedish Institute 2001). The programme peaked in<br />
1997 (when reaching 5,500 young people) but has since levelled off (see SCB 2005: 330).<br />
Second, another national programme for local government employment measures was<br />
launched in 1997 under the heading "municipal youth programme" 224 (for the under-20s)<br />
(for details on the programme see Swedish Institute 2002, see also Montin 1999: 44). The<br />
programme was started in 1997 with a fairly high volume (reaching some 14,000 young<br />
people in 1997), but has been strongly reduced since then, with only 3000 participants in<br />
2003 (see SCB 2005: 300).<br />
Also in 1997, a new body was created, the County Labour Board (Arbetsmarknadsnämnden,<br />
AMN) which, initially established on an experimental basis, was intended to promote<br />
cooperation between AMS and local actors, particularly municipalities. For this purpose,<br />
a joint body was put in place comprising representatives of the County Labour<br />
Board (LAN), the Employment Service (AF), municipalities, trade unions, and business. It<br />
was a kind of hybrid organisation (see Montin 1999: 46) designed to institutionalise interorganisational<br />
and inter-level cooperation. Recent legislation, in effect since January 1,<br />
2005, has strengthened the status of AMN. 225 Apparently in response to criticism by local<br />
government representatives, who had called AMN’s role hardly more than symbolic (see<br />
SLK 2002), the new legislation stipulates that LAN must let AMN decide questions "which<br />
they can judge best". 226<br />
17.3 Bottom-up local government initiatives<br />
Impulses and motivation for local government engagement<br />
Since the mid-1990s, municipalities have manifested an increasing readiness and interest<br />
to engage in employment-related activities.<br />
223 Ungdomsgaranti för undgomar 20-24 år.<br />
224 Kommunalt program för ungdomar under 20 år.<br />
225 See Förordning (2001: 623) med instruktion för Arbeitsdmarktnadsverket.<br />
226<br />
Länsarbetsnämnden skall överlåta åt arbeitsmarknadsnämden att besluta i frågor som nämnden lämpligen<br />
bör prova", § 36.
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The main reason has been the increasing number of people applying for municipally financed<br />
social assistance (bistånd) and the interest of local authorities to make every effort<br />
to get as many social assistance claimants as possible in work in order to ease the financial<br />
burden of social assistance spending. The basic financing formula of <strong>Sweden</strong>’s social<br />
assistance scheme was thus instrumental in committing and virtually tying municipal<br />
councils to labour market-oriented activities. Further impetus comes, no doubt, from the<br />
basic political responsibility that local authorities have, by tradition and by virtue of the<br />
general competence clause of local government legislation to tackle urgent local problems.<br />
Social assistance recipients are a very heterogeneous group.<br />
- The largest group is made up of unemployed still registered with the State labour market<br />
administration (AF) as being "at the disposal of the labour market" (anställningsbaret)<br />
but who have lost their unemployment benefits as an arbetslinje sanction. In 2003<br />
the registered unemployed comprised some 43 per cent of social assistance claimants.<br />
Their high number and percentage apparently reflects recent State labour market administration<br />
policy to stiffen application of the arbetslinje principle, for instance by tightening<br />
the requirement for the unemployed to report regularly to AF and sanctioning<br />
non-compliance with requirements by loss of unemployment benefit for still registered<br />
unemployed persons. Whereas such policy and practice relieves unemployment insurance<br />
funds and government resources, it shifts the financial burden to municipal coffers.<br />
- Furthermore, a crucial group are young people under 25 years of age who often never<br />
held a job, because of low education and little or no training.<br />
- Another significant group among social assistance recipients are drug users and other<br />
"disturbed" people out of touch with the "working world" who need elementary vocational<br />
training.<br />
- Lastly, an increasingly large and precarious group of social assistance recipients are<br />
asylum-seekers and immigrants, who often need basic instruction in Swedish. Their<br />
share in social assistance spending is about 14 percent (see Socialstyrelsen 2003a: 2).<br />
In total, about 253,000 households, with 470,000 people – over 5 per cent of the Swedish<br />
population, received social assistance (bistånd) at some time during 2001, at a cost of 8.7<br />
billion SEK.
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In addition to the burden of social assistance spending, municipal authorities were motivated<br />
to engage in employment policy by the important role they play as employers. After<br />
all, an average one third of the local labour force is employed by local government. When<br />
in April 2003 local authorities were confronted with massive strikes of their employees<br />
spearheaded by the Swedish Local Government Employees Union (Svenska Kommunalarbetareförbundet,<br />
abbreviated as Kommunal), they were somewhat nonplussed if<br />
not alarmed at what was described as "the biggest labour conflict in the municipal and<br />
county sector in modern times" in the recent joint annual report by the two local government<br />
associations (SKF/KF 2003: 12 227 ). This strike "in their own house" probably did<br />
much to alert them to the employment issue not only in their own employer (arbetsgivare)<br />
role, but also beyond.<br />
Lastly, local authorities may have been prompted to step up their engagement in employment<br />
activities as the national government showed signs of reducing its national programmes,<br />
evidenced by the significant reduction of job creation measures in its labour<br />
market policy programme (konjunkturberoende program) from 191,000 in 1997 to 91,700<br />
in 2003 (see SCB 2005: 330).<br />
Municipal strategies and programmes in employment policy<br />
In recent years, Swedish municipalities have taken up the issues of local employment<br />
policy in a remarkable broad front. In fact, according to a recent study (see Solonen/Ulmestig<br />
2004), 228 "most municipalities have in the past 10 years created an arsenal<br />
of activities and measures to deal with employable people (arbetsföra personer) that seem<br />
to be not sufficiently assisted by the normal unemployment policy" (Solonen/Ulmestig<br />
2004: 94). Indeed, "a sensational variation (uppseendeväckande variation) between the<br />
approaches of the municipalities to tackle the unemployment issue for people on social<br />
assistance" was noted in the study (Solonen/Ulmestig 2004: 84). A total of 527 local labour<br />
market programmes (as of 2002) was identified in 168 municipalities (Solonen/Ulmestig<br />
2004: 68 ff.). A number of local councils and committees adopted local<br />
programmes and strategies forumaling aims and objectives and identifying priority target<br />
groups and main measures (see an instructive example in the municipality of Örebro, see<br />
Örebro 2005 with a local programme in which a virtual "system" of related local government<br />
measures is laid down).<br />
227 "… den störrsta konflikten I kommun- och landstingssektorn i modern tid".<br />
228 For this study see above footnote 5.
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Reflecting the heterogeneity of the clientele addressed by municipal employment strategies<br />
and measures, local employment activities comprise a broad gamut of measures and<br />
projects, ranging from vocational training and reskilling to elementary training projects to<br />
regain working discipline, drug consultancy, and language course for immigrants.<br />
Application of the local variant of the arbetslinje priniciple<br />
As described in the section on individual and family care (IOF) and social assistance<br />
(bistånd), some conflict and tension emerged during the 1990s between central government<br />
and municipalities about the question whether and to what extent municipalities<br />
could apply a local variant of the arbetslinje principle in bistånd decisions under the Social<br />
Service Act. Some municipal councils tended to be severe in their application of the principle.<br />
The act as amended in 1998 laid down the rigorous use of the arbeitslinje concept<br />
with regard to social assistance claimants under 25, threatening the loss of bistånd in the<br />
event of non-compliance. 229<br />
As to whether and how social committees and administration units have made use of the<br />
arbetslinje principle and its sanctions in processing social assistance applications, the<br />
available evidence (see Solonen/Ulmstig 2004) shows considerable differences between<br />
local authorities. In some municipalities apparently a rather rigorous line is followed, often<br />
continuing the practice of the 1990s. In most cases, however practice appears to be lenient<br />
rather than strict. It should be recalled that, in municipal social administrative units,<br />
decisions on bistånd mostly lie in the hands of social workers, who see themselves first of<br />
all as advocates of the needy rather than as executives of labour market policy or even –<br />
with regard to cutting assistance payments in obedience to the arbetslinje – budgetary<br />
policy. There seems to be wide agreement among local actors, though, that arbetslinje<br />
pressure and, if necessary, sanctions should be brought to bear if and when there is evidence<br />
that a bistånd recipient is engaged in parallel undeclared employment (svartjobb)<br />
(Solonen/Ulmstig 2004: 37).<br />
Institutionalising local employment policy<br />
As we have repeatedly seen in this and previous chapters, the wave of reorganisation that<br />
has seized municipal councils and committees since the early 1990s has included ex-<br />
229 See chapter 4, section 5 of the Social Service Act of 1998: "If an individual declines, without acceptable<br />
cause, to participate in work experience or other skill-enhancing activity, further livelihood support may<br />
be refused or reduced".
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tended efforts to institutionalise the new local employment policy functions. Again, a perplexing<br />
variety of institutional options has ensued.<br />
A number of organisational patterns stand out:<br />
- One variant is to create a self-standing administrative unit directly related to and reporting<br />
to the executive committee (kommunstyrelesen).<br />
- In another variant, employment-related activities are combined with the traditional responsibility<br />
for individual and family care (IOF), that is, also with the social assistance<br />
(bistånd) function under the umbrella of same committee. For example, the municipality<br />
of Mölndal has established a new committee that merges labour market and the social<br />
assistance functions (arbets- och famijestödsnämnd), together with a new, integrated<br />
administrative unit (arbets- och familjestodsförvaltning). 230<br />
- Still another organisational strategy is to place labour market and adult education responsibilities<br />
in charge of a single committee on adult education and employment (vuxenutbildnings-och<br />
arbetsmarknadsnämnd). This has recently been done by the municipality<br />
of Örebro. In the general reorganisation scheme, this new committee has been<br />
hierarchically subordinated to a comprehensive "cconomic growth and development<br />
committee" (see Örebro 2003a: 4, 2003b). 231 In Uppsala an "adult education and labour<br />
market committee" has also recently been established. 232<br />
According to the recent study mentioned above (see Solonen/Ulmestig 2004: 73), about<br />
82 per cent of all municipalities have meanwhile taken organisationally cognizance of their<br />
labour market responsibilities by institutionalising one way or another. The study shows<br />
that 38 per cent of municipalities have set up self-standing administrative units (arbetsmarknadsenhet)<br />
directly under the executive board (kommunstyrelsen), while 28 per<br />
cent have assigned employment policy issues to the social committee (socialnämnd). 9<br />
per cent of measures were carried out by organisational units jointly formed by the municipality,<br />
AF, the county council (landsting) and the Social Security Fund (försåkringskassa)<br />
(Solonen/Ulmestig 2004: 73).<br />
230 See www.molndal.se/kommun/img/organisationsplan. In Mölndal a subunit has been put in place within<br />
the administrative unit ("labour market and integration section") "to combat the effects of unemployment<br />
on the individual and to also keep down the municipal costs that come with unemployment. The purpose<br />
also is to coordinate and administer the local government’s job creation measures and the related job<br />
positions in the administration".<br />
231 For the organisational chart see www.orebro.se.<br />
232 See www.uppsala.se/upload/bilder.
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17.4 Expenditures and coverage of municipal employment policy<br />
In 2002, total municipal spending on labour market activities, not counting social assistance<br />
payments, was estimated at about 1 billion SEK, about € 100 million (according to<br />
Solonen/Ulmestig 2004: 85).<br />
The data provided by SKF/SCB 2003: 233 ff. (in the chapter on expenditures on IOF), give<br />
figures on average municipal per capita spending on labour market measures. A distinction<br />
is made between the total net amounts (after deducing external contributions, particularly<br />
from government programmes).<br />
In 2003 total spending per inhabitant was 592 SEK – the net amount being 290 SEK.<br />
Compared with per capita spending by municipalities on other social service fields in 2003<br />
(700 SEK on social assistance (bistånd) and 347 SEK on adult drug abusers), 290 SEK<br />
can be considered a quite significant figure (see SKF/SCB 2003: 244).<br />
There are significant differences between municipalities depending on their regional location.<br />
While net per capita spending on local unemployment measures is below average in<br />
many cases in prosperous Stockholm county, it is much higher in others. Malmö deviates<br />
conspicuously deviant case with net per capita spending of 1.319.SEK. There seems to<br />
be no clear correlation between the labour market engagement of a municipality as indicated<br />
by its organisational and programmatic commitment and its net spending on labour<br />
market programmes. While Örebro (509 SEK) is clearly but not strikingly above the national<br />
average, the figure for Mölndal (217 SEK) is below average.<br />
Labour market programmes and measures pursued by local governments in 2002<br />
reached a total of 13,479 people in 2002, of whom 7,167 were social assistance recipients<br />
(Solonen/Ulmestig 2004: 69). On the one hand, the coverage may appear quite limited<br />
compared to the total number of social assistance recipients (some 230,000 households<br />
in the early 2000s) and compared to the some 116,000 unemployed involved in national<br />
employment measures in 2002 (see Solonen/Umestig 2004: 35, also SCB 2005: 330). On<br />
the other hand, it can be seen as a remarkable (first?) step by municipalities to create a<br />
kind of "second labour market" and local variant of an activating labour market policy in a<br />
period when central government appears to retreating from such labour market measures.
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Subchapter 4.3: local planning<br />
Section: local planning<br />
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18. General profile of <strong>Sweden</strong>’s legal system<br />
<strong>Sweden</strong>’s legal system has been shaped by two different currents, lending it a somewhat<br />
"hybrid" aspect (see Newman/Thurnley 1996: 35). On the one hand, it originated from the<br />
12 th century on from regional laws (landskapslagar) in effect in the various lands then<br />
making up <strong>Sweden</strong> until superseded from about 1350, by one common law for rural areas<br />
and one for townships, both strongly based on Germanic notions and rooted in an agrarian<br />
society (see Cronhult 1996: 36). During the 16 th and 17 th centuries, <strong>Sweden</strong>’s legal<br />
development was increasingly influenced by the continental law tradition and Roman law.<br />
Following the formation of the Swedish State in the 1520s with Gustaf Vasa ascending the<br />
throne, and during <strong>Sweden</strong>’s rise to great power status in the 17 th century, lawyers, often<br />
aspiring to positions in the growing State administration, sought their training and education<br />
in continental European universities, particularly in Germany, which fostered the<br />
transfer of continental European legal thinking, not least as regards the systemisation and<br />
codification of law. At the beginning of the 18 th century, during <strong>Sweden</strong>’s so called "Era of<br />
Liberty", a legal code, the Law Book, was adopted after intensive preparation that became<br />
the country’s first comprehensive codification of legal provisions, called Sveriges Rikes<br />
Lag (The Law of the Realm of <strong>Sweden</strong>). The law collection was divided by subject matters<br />
into books (balkar), one of which was on the construction of buildings. 233 It is just another<br />
example of <strong>Sweden</strong>’s adherence to tradition that the 1734 Law Book still forms the basis<br />
of the country’s current, semi-official collection of laws of the Realm of <strong>Sweden</strong> (see Kabir<br />
2001).<br />
Hence, two currents and strands of legal thinking and principles have come to characterise<br />
<strong>Sweden</strong>’s legal tradition and system.<br />
On the one side, there is a layer and structure of statute law, legislated and codified legal<br />
provisions in, as it were, the continental European tradition. This emphasis on legislated<br />
law has been reinforced by the time-honoured principle of the rule of law whose origins<br />
can be found in Magnus Eriksson’s Code, an early 14 th century constitution, which is expressed<br />
in the old adage "country shall be built with/on law" (land skall med lag byggas)<br />
(quoted from Norton 1994 295) and which has been confirmed by the Instrument of Go-<br />
233 In mirroring the rural setting of then contemporary <strong>Sweden</strong>, the 1734 legislation, among others, lay<br />
down: "Should the farmer require several houses, he is free to erect a house as he pleases" (Ch. 2, sec.<br />
1, quoted from Warnling-Nerep 1994: 396).
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vernment of 1974 stipulating that "public power shall be exercised under law" (den offentliga<br />
makten utövas under lagarna). However, <strong>Sweden</strong>’s allegiance to constitutional<br />
tradition is also evidenced by its renunciation, since 1766 when the principle "constitutional<br />
laws" was laid down, of a formal constitution in the sense of a single legal document<br />
that can be amended only a by a qualified parliamentary majority, The country has relied<br />
on a succession of four constitutional laws, the Instruments of Government (Regeringsform),<br />
which, although they can be amended by a simple parliamentary majority, require<br />
adoption by both the incumbent and the succeeding parliament).<br />
On the other hand, <strong>Sweden</strong>’s legal system has maintained its common law tradition based<br />
on legal practices and judge-made law and governed by the cultural notion that "just" and<br />
"correct" actions by individuals and government are grounded in their "reasonableness",<br />
to be ascertained, in the last resort, by the common law judge, rather than in their legal<br />
definition (see Petersson et al. 1999: 70).<br />
Hence, thanks to its historical connections with the continental European law tradition and<br />
the imperatives of the rule of law, the <strong>Sweden</strong> legal system partakes in both of the ontinental<br />
European legal space and, particularly more recently, in the Anglo-Saxon law tradition,<br />
which, at least in its origins and earlier phases, has been based on common law and<br />
hence on judge-made rather than statute law. In fact, there was never any full-fledged<br />
reception of Roman law <strong>Sweden</strong> nor completed acceptance of thecodification principle.<br />
Swedish legislation has been "leaner" and more pragmatic than its continental European<br />
counterparts, and judge-made law, operating with judicial precedent, has become an important<br />
complementary legal source. In view of this development, <strong>Sweden</strong>’s legal system<br />
has staked out its "own path" (Newman/Thurnley 1996: 35), occupying "a half-way house<br />
between the Continental European and Anglo-American systems" (Swedish Institute<br />
1996: 1).<br />
18.1 The legal regulation of public, particularly local government activities<br />
Two aspects deserve to be highlighted<br />
First, the regulation of local government activities by parliamentary legislation and government<br />
ordinances is arguably "leaner" and less detailed in <strong>Sweden</strong> than in many other,<br />
notably continental European countries. This was probably even true when <strong>Sweden</strong> set<br />
out to develop an advanced welfare state after 1945 until well into the 1980s, when most<br />
policy implementation was assigned to local government in a strongly centralist manner.<br />
Since the 1980s, detailed, top-down legislation has been largely replaced, by framework<br />
legislation (ramlag)s, to a large extent procedural rather than substantive, and leaving
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local authorities considerable scope of interpretation and definition in implementation. At<br />
the same time, this means that, local authorities being subject to judicial review, judicial<br />
decisions and legal precedent can play a considerable role in interpretation and definition.<br />
Second, under <strong>Sweden</strong>’s constitutional system, municipalities and counties handle all the<br />
responsibilities entrusted to them in their capacity as local self-government bodies, operating<br />
through elected councils. This applies to the general tasks (following from the general<br />
competence clause) and to the special tasks assigned to them by special legislation, such<br />
as the Planning and Building Act, of 1987 or the Social Services Act, of 1982. Inherently<br />
contradictory is the interpretation of local council decisions as "law-governed administration"<br />
(lagstyrd förvaltning) prescribed by national legislation and as "popularly controlled<br />
administration" (folkstyrd förvalting) exercised by locally elected councils that are democratically<br />
and politically accountable to the local electorate (for this distinction see Petersseen/Söderlind<br />
1992: 14 and Montin 1993: 19). This distinction and concomitant conflict<br />
have far-reaching historical, political and administrative implications, reaching back as<br />
they do to the 16 th century debate on the status of local government vis-à-vis the State:<br />
whether in the conservative understanding local government is an integral part of the<br />
State or a societal institution deriving from the local community whence it draws its legitimacy<br />
(see chapter 1 of this country report). From a political and administrative point of<br />
view, the issue is whether, in obedience to the "political (folkstyrd) legitimacy and rationality",<br />
local councils are autonomous in their decision making, outside the jurisdiction of the<br />
courts, or whether, in obedience to "legal (lagstyrd) rationality", the courts have an authoritative<br />
final word (for the discussion of "political" versus "legal rationality" see also Montin<br />
1993: 19).<br />
Cases in point have arisen with regard to application of the "Planning and Building Act"<br />
concerning council discretionary powers in planning and the issuance of individual building<br />
permits (see later in this chapter). The controversy has come even more clearly to the<br />
open in application of the Social Services Act (Socialtjänstlag) under which local councils<br />
allocate social assistance (bistånd) to provide recipients with a "reasonable standard of<br />
living" (en skälig levnadsnivå) (see chapter 3 of this country report).<br />
18.2 (Local) Administration and judicial review<br />
A crucial point of departure for the development of <strong>Sweden</strong>’s administrative law and administrative<br />
judicial procedures is that originally the king and later the government has<br />
been considered the head of the administrative hierarchy. In administrative matters, the<br />
king, and subsequently the government, was both supreme public authority and supreme<br />
judge (until recently one normally spoke of the citizens’ right to "go to the king" when judi-
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cial remedy in administrative matters was sought, see Sterzel 1994: 74). In keeping with<br />
this intra-administrative handling of administrative appeals, county administrative boards<br />
(länsstyrelsen), that is, regional State field offices, also served as administrative courts of<br />
first instance until the 1970s. In sum, <strong>Sweden</strong> did "not have a strong tradition of judicial<br />
review" (Petersson et al. 2004: 7), measured by the rule-of-law requirement of independent<br />
administrative courts.<br />
If fact, it was this very gap in <strong>Sweden</strong>’s traditional administrative judiciary that led to much<br />
publicised court proceedings before the European Court in Strasbourg, which prompted<br />
the Swedish government and parliament to provide for judicial review of administrative<br />
acts through a full-fledged system of administrative courts in three instances (see Domstolsverket<br />
2003a: 19 ff.), including 24 county administrative courts (länsrätter) (replacing<br />
the county administrative courts), 4 administrative courts of appeal (kammarrätt), and the<br />
Supreme Administrative Court (Regeringsrätten). The traditional names point to the historical<br />
origins and at original embeddedness in the context of king and government).<br />
Unlike the kommunalbesvär which, as an actio popularis, can be filed by any "member" of<br />
a municipality whether impaired in his/her individual rights or not, a forvaltingsbesvär can<br />
be lodged only by somebody claiming infringement of his/her individual rights. Another<br />
important difference between the kommunalbesvär, in which the administrative court can<br />
only review the legality of the challenged local decision (laglighetsprövning), and the forvaltningsbesvär<br />
is that in the latter type of complaint, the court can rule on the legality and<br />
the merits (particularly the reasonableness) of the administrative decision. In so doing, the<br />
court is empowered not only to quash the local government decision, but also to alter its<br />
material content (see Petersson et al. 1999: 70).<br />
Of the some 94.000 cases brought before the county administrative courts (länsrätter) in<br />
2003, some 18.000 concerned social service legislation, 16.000 social security matters,<br />
and 15.500 local taxation, while about 20.000 were about "other matters" (which included<br />
kommunalbesvär – in a not specified number) (see Domdolsverket 2003a: 16).<br />
19. The development of planning and building legislation<br />
19.1 History up to the 1980s<br />
<strong>Sweden</strong> has a fairly long history of planning legislation. The National Building Statute of<br />
1874, to the first piece of legislation to address town planning in <strong>Sweden</strong>, was limited to<br />
setting safety and other standards in buildings to be constructed, but ignored urban devel-
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opment which was largely unregulated (see Khakee 1979: 59 ff.). A new Town Planning<br />
Act was adopted in 1907 (see Boverket 2003b: 1).<br />
It was not until 1947 that a new Building Act was adopted, which brought two main<br />
changes. First, the new legislation granted local government the monopoly of physical<br />
planning. This meant that municipalities took full responsibility for land use and spatial<br />
planning within their territory. Second, the new legislation introduced a two-stage local<br />
planning process. It envisaged comprehensive physical plans, that is, regional plans and<br />
master plans, which came into force only upon ratification by central government, as well<br />
as detailed development plans, that is, town plans and building plans. The crucial point<br />
was that landowners were deprived of their previous right to build freely, instead they<br />
could build only if and when a plan was decided by the municipal council and put in effect<br />
(for details see Khakee 1979: 63 f.). Simultaneously with adoption of the 1947 Building<br />
Act, the central government launched a housing programme to eliminate the housing<br />
shortage, keep housing costs at a reasonable level, and discourage speculative building<br />
amidst the country’s accelerating urbanisation (see Khakee/Low 1999: 9).<br />
Thus, the planning system was meant to be an integral component and tool in the Social<br />
Democrat-led build-up of the Swedish welfare state and was tied associated with the ambitious<br />
national housing policy. Land-use planning measures included land purchase<br />
grants provided by central government so that local governments could buy land for future<br />
development; municipal land banks created with the help of central government grants;<br />
special central government loans for municipalities to purchase land that could then be let<br />
with site-leasehold rights: municipal pre-emptive purchase gave the municipalities the<br />
right to buy the land in the place of the original purchaser (see Khakee/Low 1999: 1999:<br />
9).<br />
19.2 The Planning and Building Act (PBL) of 1987<br />
In the late 1970s and 1980s, the existing planning system was increasingly criticised on a<br />
number of scores. First, from a planning perspective it was questioned because of the<br />
inflexibility of the rigid master plan approach. Second, the centralism of the post-war planning<br />
system came under attack along with the general call, since the 1980s, for decentralisation<br />
by enlarging the autonomous decision-making powers of the municipalities.<br />
After a protracted and controversial legislative debate (see Newman/Thornley 1996: 210<br />
ff. with references) a new Planning and Building Act (Planering- och Byggnad Lag, PBL)<br />
was passed, coming into force on July 1, 1987.
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- In line with the political purpose of further strengthening the planning autonomy of the<br />
municipalities in the exercise of their "planning monopoly" (planmonopol, see Boverket<br />
2003b: 2) the new legislation was designed as "framework law" (ramlag) with widened<br />
scope for local decision-making. At the same time, the previously required approval by<br />
central government was dropped and the latter’s right to intervene was reduced to few,<br />
narrowly circumscribed conditions affecting "national interests" (riksintressen) in local<br />
plans.<br />
- In principle, a two-stage local planning system was established, that is, the municipal<br />
comprehensive plan (MCP), oversiktsplan, and the binding detailed development plan,<br />
detaljplan, which was to serve as the regulatory basis for issuance of a building permit<br />
(bygglov).<br />
The new Planning and Building Act was passed at a time in the mid-1980s when <strong>Sweden</strong><br />
was experiencing a hectic building boom – with a dramatic shift from the earlier predominance<br />
of publicly controlled and financed building and housing corporations to a huge<br />
influx of investment by banks and financial institutions (see Newman/Thornley 1996: 213).<br />
The period was characterised by the emergence of what came to be called "negotiation<br />
planning", in which projects were defined and practically decided in negotiations between<br />
investors and local authorities, before being formally set out (and as it were, ratified) in the<br />
corresponding planning documents and planning decisions then taken by the local authorities<br />
(see Khakee/Elander 2001: 235).<br />
19.3 Amendments of the PBL since 1994<br />
The right-of-centre government voted into office in 1991 made it a point to further deregulate<br />
existing planning law and to further change national housing policy (see Newman/Thornley<br />
1996: 216). A commission was set up, which came out with recommendations<br />
for streamlining building permission procedure. It also suggested that building permits<br />
should not be needed when and where a detaljplan (detailed development plan,<br />
DDP) existed.<br />
In June 1994, parliament extensively amended the PBL with effect from July 1, 1995 (see<br />
Boverket 2000: preface, for an update English language version of the collection of the<br />
existing pertinent laws and ordinances see Boverket 2005). The amendments pertained<br />
particularly<br />
- to chapter 3 ("demands on buildings" by deleting an array of requirements, Boverket<br />
2005: 20 ff.),
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- to chapter 8 (on building permits, see Boverket 2005: 64 ff.), 234 and<br />
- copiously to chapter 8, processing of permits (see Boverket 2005: 73 ff.).<br />
While legal requirements that need to be checked by the local authority prior to the issuance<br />
of a building permit and the decision-making process on a building application has<br />
been relieved of ex ante controls, responsibility for compliance with safety rules (and the<br />
costs of consultancy) have been shifted to the builder and investor.<br />
To broaden the review of planning legislation, another commission was set up (se<br />
dir.2000: 97) 235 with the mandate to make recommendations to make the planning process<br />
more efficient and enhance citizen participation (rättssäkerhet och medborgerligh influytande).<br />
In April 2004 the commission issued an interim report (SOU 2004: 40). 236<br />
19.4 Environmental Code<br />
In the second half of the 1990s, the Social Democratic government, which had been returned<br />
to power in 1994, proceeded to integrate physical planning still more strongly into<br />
environmental policy. Thus, the new Swedish Environmental Code, EC (miljöbalken),<br />
which was adopted in 1998 and came into force on 1 January 1999, 237 was designed to<br />
consolidate and integrate some 15 pieces of pertinent legislation (see Regeringskansliet<br />
2004b: 1) and, particularly chapters 3 and 4, serves as "a kind of umbrella legislation for<br />
the PBA" (Boverket 2003b: for an English language collection with the integrated chapters<br />
from the Environmental Code, see Boverket 2005). The latter contains special provisions<br />
on the management of land and water for certain areas in <strong>Sweden</strong>, listing geographical<br />
elements (like rivers, sea shore areas etc.) that are considered to be of national interest<br />
(riks intressen). Furthermore, the national government is given the power to issue environmental<br />
standards with which municipalities are obliged to comply in their planning decisions<br />
(chapter 5).<br />
234 So, under certain conditions, "the municipality may decide to put aside the requirement of a building<br />
permit or decide ..." (chapter 8, section 1), thus widening the "discretion" of the council.<br />
235 www.sou.gov.se/pbl<br />
236 See www.regeringen.se/sb/d/119.<br />
237 For an English translation of the Environmental Code see www.sweden.gov.se/sb/d.
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20. Intergovernmental actor setting in planning and development control<br />
20.1 National government level<br />
In the national government, the Ministry of the Environment (Naturvårdsverket) is responsible<br />
for environment, planning and building. In line with <strong>Sweden</strong>`s governmental tradition,<br />
the ministry is remarkably small, with no more than 125 officials and employees (see<br />
Boverket 2003a: 1). The ministry exercises regulatory powers by issuing ordinances<br />
(förordning), for instance, "on technical requirements for construction works" and "environmental<br />
quality standards on ambient air" (see Boverket 2005: 117 ff., 45 ff.) or "concerning<br />
environmentally hazardous activities". 238<br />
Furthermore, the Ministry may issue steering documents and guidelines, which are, however,<br />
interpreted and applied mainly at the municipal level (see MEFN 2004: 24). In exercising<br />
supervision over local authorities in its jurisdiction, the ministry cannot intervene<br />
directly, except under narrowly circumscribed conditions to ensure the implementation of<br />
national interests (riksintressen) in environmental protection.<br />
Regional planning by central government?<br />
In an effort to guide the build-up of the welfare state from the centre and reflecting the<br />
prevailing notions of comprehensive planning, the National Physical Planning of 1972 introduced<br />
a system of physical plans with a strict hierarchy of national, regional and local<br />
plans (see Khakee/Low 1999: 20). Consequently, the massive territorial reform of municipalities<br />
completed in 1974 also sought to develop a regional structure comprising three<br />
categories of centre: primary centres, regional centres and municipal centres. Besides the<br />
three metropolitan areas (Stockholm, Göteborg, Malmö), 23 cities or towns (one in every<br />
county) were designated as primary centres. However, a physical plan for the whole country<br />
did not materialise, and the central locality concept proved to be short-lived in regional<br />
policy revolving was (see Khakee/Low 1999: 21 ff.). In a general policy shift since the<br />
1980s, away from the post-war central government guidance of the national development<br />
towards decentralised development, the government resorted to formulating guidelines for<br />
designating land for different types of urban expansion, as well as for rural activities and<br />
preservation. The implementation of these guidelines was, however, subject to negotiation<br />
between national and local government as well as private interests, with municipal autonomy<br />
rather than cooperation coming to characterise the interest of municipalities in regional<br />
development (Khakee/Low 1999: 22).<br />
238 See www.internat.naturvardsverkert.se/documents.
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Although there has been no a national regional planning concept, let alone a system of<br />
hierarchically binding regional planning since the 1980s, central government does, of<br />
course, pursue economic, transport, and infrastructure policies with regional implications.<br />
Moreover, national environmental protection policy, "armed" with the Environmental Code<br />
of 1999, has given central government strong leverage in determining regional development.<br />
20.2 National Board of Housing, Building and Planning (Boverket)<br />
The Ministry of the Environment, along with five other ministries, is supported by a central<br />
agency (verket), the National Board of Housing, Building and Planning (Boverket) with a<br />
staff of 165 (see Boverket 2003a: 1). In accordance with <strong>Sweden</strong>`s administrative tradition<br />
(see the chapter 1 of this country report), Boverket operates in considerable independence<br />
of the ministry. Boverket may issue special binding regulations (foreskrift) pursuant<br />
to a statute or ordinance. Furthermore, the agency may issue non-binding "general advice"<br />
(allmäna råd) to local authorities. With regard to the local planning process,<br />
Boverket’s remit is described in the PBL of 1987 (chapter 1, section 8) as "general responsibility<br />
for the supervision of planning and building activities throughout <strong>Sweden</strong>"<br />
which, with narrowly defined exceptions, does not imply direct intervention, either.<br />
20.3 Counties, regions<br />
On the regional level <strong>Sweden</strong> is divided into 21 counties (län). The Swedish county has,<br />
since the introduction of modern local government in 1862, a dual political and administrative<br />
structure (for details see above pages 276 following).<br />
- On the one hand, it is the unit of regional State administration under county administrative<br />
boards (länsstyrelsen), whose members are appointed by county councils<br />
(landsting) and headed by a governor (länshövding) appointed by central government.<br />
- On the other hand, counties are territorial units of county self-government (län sälvstyrelse)<br />
under elected county councils (landsting fullmäktige). Within <strong>Sweden</strong>’s two-tier<br />
local government structure of counties and municipalities, the former’s prime tasks lie in<br />
health care; they have no formal responsibility for or influence on municipal physical<br />
planning.
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Leaving aside the administrative-executive functions of county administrative boards<br />
(länsstyrelse), the boards as regional State authorities exercise a number of functions<br />
affecting the planning responsibilities and activities of municipalities):<br />
- As regional State authorities, county administrative boards (länsstyrelse) are expected<br />
to ensure that national interests (riks intressen) are taken into account in planning, that<br />
laws are implemented, and that government directives are followed. The implementation<br />
of national policy on regional development, transport, and the environment is the<br />
responsibility of the county administration (see MENFA 2004: 24). In recent years, the<br />
regional awareness of county State agency actors has grown because members of the<br />
county administrative board (länsstyrelse) previously named by central government<br />
have been appointed by the county councils since the 1970s; they have accordingly<br />
come to see themselves as advocates of their region/county rather than as representatives<br />
of the State.<br />
- According to the PBL (chapter 1, section 8), the county administrative board "is responsible<br />
for the supervision of planning building activities in the county and shall co-operate<br />
with the municipalities in the planning work". To handle this "supervisory" function in<br />
municipal planning, the county administrative board has been given significant procedural<br />
rights, regulated in detail by the PBL, in the exercise of which the länstyrelse is<br />
called upon to take special note and account of the "general/public interests" (riksinteressen)<br />
of the State, especially as laid down by the Environmental Code of 1999. The<br />
same applies to with respect to national policy on regional development, transport, etc.<br />
Furthermore, by explicit legislative mandate, the county administrative board is expected<br />
to ensure inter-municipal (and trans-municipal) co-operation in planning procedures.<br />
- As a rule, the county administrative board informs, admonishes, and persuades, leaving<br />
the final decision to the municipal council. Under narrowly defined conditions, however,<br />
the county administrative board may also intervene to nullify a municipal plan adopted<br />
by a municipal council (for detail see below). This is a remarkable exception to the rule<br />
and principle underlying the 1987 legislation of municipal independence of State control<br />
in the exercise of their planning monopoly.<br />
- Furthermore, the county administrative board decides on administrative appeals lodged<br />
against decisions taken by local authorities on building permits. This constitutes an intra-administrative<br />
complaint procedure; the power of judicial review, formerly vested in<br />
the county administrative board (in its quasi-court capacity) was transferred to the<br />
county administrative courts in the 1970s.
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In performing this relatively broad repertoire of functions, with significant time demands<br />
particularly through repeated participation in local planning processes, the county administrative<br />
board is supported by administrative units and full-time staff. A case in point is the<br />
planning department with professional planners.<br />
20.4 Regional planning on the regional/county level?<br />
As we have seen, central government efforts in the 1970s to establish a hierarchically<br />
binding system of regional planning came to nothing, giving way to a decentralised approach<br />
that gave municipalities broad autonomy in regional planning through intermunicipal<br />
and trans-municipal cooperation.<br />
- Reaching back to the 1970s, some steps were taken in metropolitan areas to institutionalise<br />
regional planning. In 1971, a regional planning authority was established in the<br />
Stockholm metropolitan region of, comprising the City of Stockholm itself and some 27<br />
suburban municipalities with responsibility for public transportation, housing, etc. (see<br />
Khakee 1979: 63). Similar self-standing planning organisations were founded in the<br />
metropolitan areas of Göteborg and Malmö which are, however, still in a formative<br />
rather than operative stage.<br />
- In the late 1990s, as the issue of regionalisation entered the political agenda in view of<br />
the increased European role of regions, central government embarked upon a policy<br />
move which, as far as regional planning is concerned, was meant to strengthen the regional<br />
planning function of the county councils (landsting, that is the counties as selfgovernment<br />
units!) by devolving related tasks in regional economic development etc.,<br />
from the State – hitherto exercised by the regional State authority (länsstyrelesen) – to<br />
the county council. One institutional option, introduced on an experimental basis, was to<br />
merge existing counties. The new regions (that is, enlarged counties) of Västra Götaland<br />
with Göteborg as its core and and region Skåne were created – as the new territorial<br />
basis for both regional/county self-government State administration, the latter<br />
stripped of its responsibilities in regional development etc. (For detailed analyses focusing<br />
on Västra Götaland see Nilsson ed. 2004). The other organisational approach was<br />
to encourage municipalities to form "cooperation bodies" (samverkanorgan, kommunalförbund),<br />
which were also "rewarded" by the devolution of regional economic development<br />
responsibilities from regional State authorities (länsstyrelsen) (see Morck<br />
2004, see also above pages 278 following). It remains to be seen whether and to which<br />
degree inter-municipal and trans-municipal planning have been enhanced.
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- Finally mention should be made of a provision of the PBL of 1987 (<strong>Chapter</strong> 7, section 1)<br />
according to which the government "may appoint a regional planning body to be responsible,<br />
either for a limited period or until further notice, for the exercise of such work<br />
(regional planning)". Important modifications were added, however:, such regional plans<br />
were not be binding and, "if the affected municipalities are generally opposed to the<br />
formation of a regional planning body, the body shall not be formed". Available information<br />
suggests that the establishment of such planning bodies has not yet become practicable.<br />
In conclusion, it should be stressed that none of these variants of regional/county planning<br />
are to be binding on municipalities in the exercise of their planning monopoly. They are<br />
meant to enhance the potential of intermunicipal and intergovernmental communication,<br />
cooperation and coordination.<br />
21. Physical planning in the municipalities<br />
Physical planning has been a municipal task since the legislation of 1947 in what came to<br />
be called a "planning monopoly" curtailed until 1987 by the requirement of State approval.<br />
The exercise of this crucial local government function is currently governed by by two<br />
main pieces of legislation, the Planning and Building Act (Planering- och Byggnad Lag –<br />
PBL) of 1987, which has seen a number of important amendments, and the Environmental<br />
Code (Miljöbalkar) of 1999 – which habe been integrated (see Boverk 2005 for an<br />
updated English language collection of the updated version. In the following the legislative<br />
provisions will be quoted from this quasi-official translation).<br />
In the introductory paragraph, the goal of the PBL reads programmatically as follows:<br />
"The Act contains provisions on the planning of land and water areas as well as building.<br />
The provisions aim, with due regard to the individual’s rights to freedom, at promoting societal<br />
progress towards equal and good living conditions (jämlikt samhälle) and a good<br />
and lasting sustainable environment for the benefit of the people of today’s society as well<br />
as of future generation".<br />
The Environmental Code of 1999 follows suit, not less programmatically, in its introductory<br />
paragraph:<br />
"The purpose of this Code is to promote sustainable development which will assure a<br />
healthy and sound environment for present and future generations. Such development will<br />
be based on recognition of the fact that nature is worthy of protection and that a right to
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modify and exploit nature carries with it a responsibility for wise management of natural<br />
resources".<br />
While both acts are strongly committed to environmental protection and sustainable development,<br />
they differ greatly in all complementarity in legislative technique and strategy.<br />
In line with the general purpose of decentralising decision-making, the PBL can be described<br />
intent on "procedural steering", laying down the legal procedures for local authorities<br />
to follow in decision-making on planning and development control. By contrast, the<br />
Environmental Code is primarily concerned with "substantive steering" (on the distinction<br />
between "procedural steering" versus "steering by contents" see also Back 2004 with references).<br />
This distinction comes to the fore because local authorities have remarkably<br />
broad procedural discretion in exercising their planning monopoly, while in environmental<br />
protection central government intervenes rigorously in the last resort in the substantive<br />
defence of national interests (riksinteressen).<br />
In decisions on physical planning and development control, the municipal council is called<br />
upon and empowered to weigh public and private interests (chapter 1, section 5 PBL) 239<br />
(see Boverket 2003b: 2).<br />
After an abortive attempt in the 1970s, <strong>Sweden</strong> has had no system of "higher level" planning<br />
(national or regional) hierarchically binding on local government planning.<br />
21.1 Municipal comprehensive plans (MCP) (översiktsplan)<br />
In keeping with the two-phase model of municipal physical planning, which goes back to<br />
the beginning of the 20 th century, the PBL of 1987 (chapter 1, section 3) states that "each<br />
municipality shall prepare an up-to-date comprehensive plan covering the entire municipality.<br />
The comprehensive plan shall provide guidance for decisions about the use of land<br />
and water areas and on the development and preservation of the built environment. The<br />
comprehensive plan is not binding for authorities or individuals. The municipal council<br />
shall, at least once during its term of office, make a decision on the issue whether the<br />
comprehensive plan is to up-date" (chapter 4, section 14).<br />
239<br />
"Where issues are addressed under this Act, consideration shall be given to both public and private<br />
interests, unless otherwise prescribed".
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Procedure for elaborating and adopting a MCP<br />
In a MCP, local authorities set out (chapter 4, section 1)<br />
- "the fundamental features of the envisaged use of land and water areas,<br />
- the municipality’s conception of the development and preservation of the built environment,<br />
- the course of action which the municipality intends to take in order to satisfy the specified<br />
national interests and to observe environmental quality standards"<br />
In principle, every municipal council is expected and obliged to adopt a MCP covering its<br />
entire territory.<br />
The legislation on MCPs places much emphasis on the participation of social groups and<br />
local residents which, reflecting the pronounced participatory demands in the political debates<br />
of the 1980s preceding adoption of the new legislation. At the same time, the involvement<br />
of the county administrative board as the regional State agency in local planning<br />
is writ large.<br />
The legislation provides for two stages in elaborating MCPs:<br />
- First, consultation takes places in keeping with the time-honoured Swedish "remittance"<br />
practice according to which all relevant social organisations, interest groups and concerned<br />
individuals are called upon to comment on the draft plan (see chapter 4, section<br />
4 PLB). Furthermore, neighbouring municipalities and, last but not least, county administrative<br />
boards take part in this remittance round.<br />
- Second, another round of public discussion called public inspection is prescribed in<br />
which the advanced version of the draft plan, possibly revised as a result of the consultation<br />
round, is presented by local authorities for public discussion in which everybody<br />
can take part and submit written comments.<br />
In the procedural choreography of both public participation rounds, the county administrative<br />
board (länsstyrelse) is assigned a prominent role as regional representative of the<br />
State and particularly as advocate of national interests (riksinteressen), primarily in environmental<br />
matters. Furthermore, great emphasis is placed on coordination with other municipalities.
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The involvement of the county administrative board is spelt out in considerable detail for<br />
the different phases of the planning process.<br />
- During the consultation or remittance stage (see chapter 4, section 3 PBL), its task is to<br />
"safeguard and co-ordinate the national interests (riksinteressen)". The board "shall (1)<br />
... give advice relative to national interests (riksinteressen) ... and such environmental<br />
issues and risk factors that warrant attention when decisions are made on the use of<br />
land and water areas, (2) promote compliance with national interests (riksinteressen) in<br />
according with ... the Environmental Code ... and the observation of environmental quality<br />
standards, (3) promote a suitable co-ordination of the use of land and water areas<br />
which concern two or more municipalities".<br />
- On the basis of the consultation round, the county administrative board formulates a<br />
review statement assessing the current version of the draft plan which feeds into the<br />
subsequent round of public inspection and discussion.<br />
At the end of the two rounds of public participation and discussion, it is up to the municipal<br />
council, in accordance with local autonomy and planning monopoly, to decide freely which<br />
recommendations and objections, including those of the county administrative board, are<br />
to be followed or discarded. However, in recognition of the county administrative board’s<br />
continuing role,, the municipal council is required to append the review statement by<br />
board and, if the latter disagrees with any points in the final version of the local plan, "an<br />
entry of the disagreement shall be made in the plan" (<strong>Chapter</strong> 4, section 2 PBL), to document<br />
the dissent and make it known to the local public.<br />
However, the MCP does not require approval by the State or its regional representative<br />
nor is there any procedure for the latter to intervene post facto. Hence, a MCP may run<br />
counter to explicit national interests (riksinteressen). But because it is not binding, the<br />
fallout from such deficiency is negligible. As soon as a detailed development plan (DDP),<br />
(detaljplan) is tabled that continued to ignore national interests, the local council can face<br />
rigorous intervention by the State through its regional representative (see below).<br />
As the 2002 MCP for the Municipality Örebro (Översiktsplan för Orebro kommun) shows<br />
that, while municipalities have made ample use of their planning competence to define<br />
their own development goals, etc., plans and descriptions (see Örebro 2002b: 35 ff.) evidence<br />
the great influence that the national interests communicated and ultimately imposed<br />
by county administrative boards in the remittance procedure have had on urban<br />
planning by singling out important sections and sites under the aspect of national interests,<br />
ranging from natural resources, water reservoirs, green zones, cultural preservation<br />
etc.
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21.2 Detailed Development Plans (DDP) (detaljplan)<br />
<strong>Chapter</strong> 1, section 3 of the 1987 PBL defines the detailed development plan (detaljplan)<br />
as follows: "The regulation of land use and building within a municipality is exercised<br />
through detailed development plans. A detailed development plan may cover only a limited<br />
part of a municipality".<br />
In Swedish legal thinking the right of landowners to build on their land is assumed not to<br />
exist prior to the decision by the local council to allow and admit such development by way<br />
of a planning decision, particularly by adopting a DDP. Whereas the right to build on one’s<br />
land was considered inherent in land ownership until 1947, this legal title was abolished<br />
by the 1947legislation to be replaced by the right of the public sector, that is, of municipalities<br />
to grant the right to building by an act of public planning.<br />
Under its planning monopoly, the municipality may thus in principle decides whether an<br />
area or site can be developed or not. On the other hand, the wording of chapter 5, section<br />
1 arguably suggests that, under certain conditions, the municipal council is legally obliged<br />
to accept and "declare" the "suitability of a site for development". The crucial passage<br />
reads: "The examination of the suitability of a site for development and the regulation of<br />
the design of the built environment are carried out through a DDP for<br />
- new continuous development (sammenhällen bebyggelse),<br />
- a new individual building, the use of which will cause a significant impact on surroundings<br />
or which is to be located in an area where a considerable demand exists for building<br />
sites,<br />
- built environment which is going to be altered or preserved, if the regulations should be<br />
based on an overall perspective (ett sammenhang)".<br />
Given the local regulatory powers vested in municipal councils by virtue of their planning<br />
monopoly, the DDP has a strong legal status, more or less determining the right to build in<br />
areas where it is required. It is binding. Minor deviations (mindre avvikelse) are allowed,<br />
but only if compatible with the purpose of the plan (förenlig med planens syfte). A DDP<br />
gives the municipality a specific right to expropriate land needed for streets, parks and<br />
other public areas (see Boverket 2003b: 4).<br />
The right to build granted by the detailed development plan is subject to a time limit (chapter<br />
5, section 5 PBL) within which the prospective builder has to make use of the building<br />
permission if it is no to lapse (implementation period, genomförandetid). This provision
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also points to the underlying legal understanding that that the right to build is not inherent<br />
in ownership of land, but granted by an act of planning. The legislation sets this implementation<br />
period at between 5 and 15 years and leaves it to the municipal council to fix the<br />
period in the specific DDP.<br />
The DDP strongly protects building rights, but only for the duration of the implementation<br />
period (genomförandetid). If the municipality wants a revision of the plan within that timelimit,<br />
property owners are entitled to compensation (ersättning). After expiry of the timelimit,<br />
the DDP is still valid if the municipality so decides. However, after the lapse of the<br />
time-limit, the plan can be revised at any time. A property owner then retains the building<br />
right for a new building that is equal to the existing building (see Boverket 2003b: 4).<br />
The right to build/develop may be linked with the duty to pay development costs or with<br />
other obligations. Sometimes such costs are determined as fixed charges for streets, water<br />
and sewage, sometimes – especially in the case of extensive development – they are<br />
set by negotiation under a special development agreement (exploateringsavtal). There are<br />
no public taxes for development as such, only for development profits (see Boverket<br />
2003d: 1).<br />
A complete DDP consists of a plan report (planbeskrivning) and an implementation report<br />
(genomförandebeskrivning). In addition, a DDP is to be based on a programme indicating<br />
the starting points (utgångspunkt) and objectives (mål) of the plan.<br />
An environmental impact assessment, EIA, (miljökonsekvensbeskrivning) needs to be<br />
undertaken if the plan permits land use with considerable impact (betydande inverkan) on<br />
the environment (see Boverket 2003b: 4). EIA has meanwhile been stipulated as an almost<br />
regular procedure (chapter 5, section 18). 240<br />
A DDP need not conform with the municipal comprehensive plan (översiktsplan).<br />
For limited areas of its territory not covered by a DDP, the municipal council may adopt<br />
area regulations (omradesbestämmelser) "in order to ensure the purpose of the compre-<br />
240 "An environmental impact report shall be prepared if the authorized use of land, buildings or other constructions<br />
in a detailed development plan may cause a significant impact on the environment, human<br />
health or on the management of land, water or other resources".
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hensive plan or for safeguarding national interests (riksinteressen) in accordance with ...<br />
the Environmental Code" (<strong>Chapter</strong> 5, section 16). 241<br />
Procedure of elaborating and adopting DDPs<br />
Arrangements for the elaboration and adoption of DDPs are practically identical with those<br />
for MCPs.<br />
DDPs procedure also involves two rounds, remittance process and public inspection, with<br />
county administrative boards playing a similarly prominent watchdog role, particularly with<br />
regard to compliance with national interests.<br />
21.3 Organisation of urban planning<br />
Planning decisions are, in principle, taken by the elected municipal council. As stipulated<br />
by the PBL (chapter 1, section 7), "in each municipality there shall be at least one Committee<br />
responsible for the municipality’s tasks concerning building and development issues<br />
and having primary responsibility for the supervision of building activities".<br />
Following the adoption of the Local Government Act of 1991, which gave municipal councils<br />
a free hand in organising their committees, and in response to a new provision (chapter<br />
3, section 16) of the Local Government Act which regulates and encourages the outsourcing<br />
of local government tasks (see chapter 1 of this country report), physical planning<br />
and development control have also seen a range of organisational changes and<br />
forms.<br />
As the Local Government Act (chapter 3, section 6) also stipulates, such outsourcing is<br />
not permitted for local government functions that relate to the exercise of public authority<br />
(myndighetutövning), that is, to the application of law and legally mandated public functions.<br />
For planning and development control, this means that not only the issuance of<br />
building permits has to be considered a public authority function that cannot be outsourced;<br />
certain key elements of the planning process, such as the remittance and public<br />
inspection processes must also be considered as such. Hence, the outsourcing concept<br />
appears to have limited application in planning.<br />
241 For details see the guidance (vägledning) published by Boverket 2003c "to stimulate the area regulation<br />
in municipal control of land use". Boverket observes that "despite their potential area regulations are seldom<br />
used".
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As a rule, responsibility for planning and development control, including the issuance of<br />
building permits lies with the building committee (byggnadsnämden), while, in line with the<br />
traditional assignment of administrative units and staff (kontoret) to sectoral committees,<br />
planning and development control administrative functions are entrusted to the building<br />
administration (byggnadskontoret).<br />
In some municipalities, for instance in Sollentuna in the vicinity of Stockholm (see Newman/Thurnley<br />
1996: 219), the technical components of urban planning have been outsourced<br />
by buying certain services from private offices and project groups by competitive<br />
tender, whereas the participatory mandate of the remittance procedure in the planning<br />
process is in the direct responsibility of municipal pesonnel.<br />
21.4 Supervision of planning decisions by State authorities<br />
While the PBL of 1987 abolished the principle that municipal plans required approval by<br />
the State, State authorities are given the right to intervene once the DDP has been<br />
adopted by the municipal council, a remarkably direct and rigorous provision in the light of<br />
the autonomy that local councils otherwise enjoy. Thus, chapter 12, provides the county<br />
administrative board to examine and eventually nullify a DDP if, in the borad’s view it<br />
- does "not satisfy a national interest (riksinteresse) within the scope of ... the Environmental<br />
Code,<br />
- regulates matter on the use of land and water areas affecting more than one municipality<br />
in a way that does not provide a suitable co-ordination,<br />
- ... leads to a built environment that is unsuitable with regard to the health of residents<br />
and others or the need for protection against accidents".<br />
If a municipal council chooses to ignore concerns about compliance with public interests<br />
expressed by the county administrative board during the remittance process, the board<br />
has the right to defend these public interests by simply nullifying the plan.<br />
Under similar conditions, particularly disregard of national interests and failure to coordinate<br />
with other municipalities, central government may also intervene once the plan is<br />
adopted with a so-called "planning injunction" requiring the municipality to amend or annul<br />
a DDP (chapter 12, section 6).
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The municipality concerned can lodge an appeal with the administrative court of appeal<br />
against nullification of a plan by the county administrative board or a central government<br />
planning injunction.<br />
But even if this right of the county administrative board to examine and nullify a DDP<br />
adopted by the council is rarely exercised, its very existence is bound to strengthen the<br />
standing and influence of the county administrative board and of its advocacy role.<br />
21.5 Ex post judicial review<br />
According to chapter 13, section 1 of the PBL, adoption of a DDP falls under the procedure<br />
of the Local Government Act of 1991 (chapter 10, section 1) (the time-honoured<br />
"kommunalbesvär", see chapter 1 of this county report) under which "any member of the<br />
municipality" may challenge a decision of local government on legal grounds by appealing<br />
to the county administrative court.<br />
Section: issuance of building permits<br />
22. Issuance of building permits<br />
22.1 Regulation<br />
As to the issuance of building permits (bygglov) it should be recalled that in the Swedish<br />
understanding of planning and building law, the right to build is not inherent in the individual’s<br />
property rights, but is generated by the council’s decision to give owners the right to<br />
develop their sites. Thus, the detailed development plan, DDP (detaljplan), passed by the<br />
municipal councils in exercising its local regulatory powers has legal force in determining<br />
where, what and how can be built in the area concerned.<br />
When a DDP is adopted, the owner of a suitable site (bidad festighet) within the plan area<br />
has the right to obtain a building permit if the structure is in accordance with the DDP and<br />
construction satisfies the requirements. If an application is refused, the owner has the<br />
right to compensation for losses, provided that the application has been made within the<br />
prescribed implementation time (genomförandetid) set in the DDP (see Boverket 2003d:<br />
1).
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Under an existing DDP, a building permit may be issued for measures that involve minor<br />
deviations (mindre avvikelse), but only if they are compatible with the purpose of the plan<br />
(förenlig med planens syfte) (chapter 8, section 11).<br />
Furthermore, building permits may be granted by the municipality even in the absence of<br />
a DDP if this is considered appropriate and is in accordance with (i överenstämmelse<br />
med) the municipal comprehensive plan (översiktsplan) (see Boverkets 2003d: 1). In this<br />
regard, chapter 8 section 11 suggests a flexible set of conditions under which the municipality<br />
is to approve a building application "within an area not covered by a DDP".<br />
22.2 Organisation<br />
As we have seen, notwithstanding the significant organisational change to the local committee<br />
system under the new Local Government Act of 1991, the building councils<br />
(byggnadnämnder) have mostly continued perform their traditional combined functions<br />
planning and development control in accordance with the organisational blueprint still underlying<br />
the PBL (see chapter 11 with an explicit regulation of the building committee).<br />
Similarly, the NPM-induced distinction between purchaser and provider has had little practical<br />
relevance, since development control, in particular, typically concerning building applications,<br />
is a typical public authority function (myndighetsutövning) explicity excluded<br />
from outsourcing (lämna över) (see chapter 3, section 16 LPA).<br />
Municipalities have thus largely continued to carry out their tasks in development control<br />
in the traditional organisational scheme under which political responsibility lies with the<br />
council (fullmäktige) and the building committee (byggnadsnämnd) assisted by an administrative<br />
unit and staff (byggnadskontoret or buggnadsförvaltning). 242<br />
In the past, there has been a tendency for many day-to-day decisions on development<br />
control, for example on building permits, to be not only prepared but also practically made<br />
by the administrative and technical staff of the building committee rather than the committee<br />
itself, which merely rubber-stamped them. This development has recently accelerated<br />
and been formalised by the concept of delegation introduced by the LGA of 1991 (chapter<br />
6 section 33). In regulating the "delegation of matters within the committee system"<br />
(delegering av ärenden inom en nämnd) the municipal employee (anställd hos kommunen)<br />
is explicitly mentioned as a possible delegate". In reaction to the provisions of the<br />
LGA, the PBL has been amended to exclude such delegation for, inter alia, "decisions on<br />
matters of principal nature or otherwise great importance" (chapter 11, section 3).<br />
242 See the organisational scheme of the Municipality of Uppsala, www.uppsala.se/upload/Bilder.
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In the meantime, municipal councils have made ample use of the delegation provision in<br />
passing detailed delegation catalogues 243 in order, as in the case of the municipality of<br />
Uppsala, to "relieve the committees of so called routine matters". 244 Such a delegation<br />
catalogue typically provides a detailed list of decisions on development control to be taken<br />
under the PBA, assigning them to different actors, including the head of the municipal<br />
building section (bygglovchef), the city architect (arkitekt) and the department head<br />
(stadsbygnadsdirektör). 245<br />
22.3 Procedure in development control/building permission<br />
Regulatory basis of municipal council/committee development control<br />
As already mentioned, the regulatory basis municipal council/committee decisions on<br />
building applications ranges from<br />
- strict application of the detaljplan, DDP, which provides stringent local regulation,<br />
- to minor deviations (mindre avvikelse) if compatible with the purpose of the DDP<br />
(förenlig med planens syfte) – in which the local decision-maker has considerably wider<br />
discretion amounting almost to planning power, and<br />
- the granting of building permission even in the absence of a DDP, if this is in accordance<br />
with (i överenstämmelse med) the municipal comprehensive plan (översiktsplan)<br />
– in which case the local decision-maker practically exercises planning power.<br />
Institutional assignment of the decision-making power<br />
In principle, the decision-making power in the development control process lies with the<br />
council (fullmäktige).<br />
While under the Local Government Act of 1991, the council has a free hand to organise<br />
the committee work, the responsibility for planning and development control generally<br />
243 For an instructive example see Delegationsordning för byggnadsnämden, adopted by the municipal<br />
council of Uppsala in 2004, see www.uppsala.se/upload/bilder.<br />
244<br />
Syftet med delegation är att avlasta nämndens så kallade runinärenden", quoted from Delegationsordning<br />
... see preceding footnote.<br />
245 or an example the organisational scheme of Uppsala, see www.uppsala.se.
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continues to be assigned to the building committee (byggnadnämdn), as also provided for<br />
by the Planning and Building Act (PBL) as amended to take account of the 1991 LPA. The<br />
council and committee are supported by the administrative staff of the municipal building<br />
unit (byggnadkontoret, byggnadförvalting).<br />
While even prior to the legislation of 1991, routine decisions on building applications were<br />
generally taken by the administration and merely formally approved by the committee, the<br />
new legislation has introduced the tool of delegation, allowing the committee to transfer<br />
certain decision-making powers to administrative staff, specified in the respective delegation<br />
order. In many ways, such delegation orders have formalised and, as it were, legalised<br />
previous practice.<br />
- Routine decisions are hence usually delegated to an official such as the head of the<br />
building unit (byggadchef). If the application is approved, the decision is final. If it is refused<br />
by staff, the decision goes to the committee (which happens in only a small percentage<br />
of decisions).<br />
- In the case of minor deviations, the committee decides. If the matter is controversial in<br />
the committee, it goes to the full council (fullmäktige).<br />
- Major and politically controversial and loaded decisions fall to the full council.<br />
Application procedure<br />
Until 1994 the application procedure antecedent to the decision proper was regulated in a<br />
detailed manner. Designed as a priori control, it laid down a catalogue of legal, technical<br />
etc. requirements to be complied with by the applicant. Under this ex ante control system,<br />
the building applicant had to pay a handsome) fee to local authorities.<br />
The 1994 amendment to the PBL significantly changed application procedure. The underlying<br />
idea was to de-regulate the application process, replacing ex ante control by a system<br />
in which the investor/builder bears responsibility for compliance with the essential<br />
requirements. Prior to the decision on the application, he/she has to submit a certificate<br />
from a publicly licensed expert to the municipal authority to the effect that the requirements<br />
have been fulfilled. The investor/builder has to pay the fees charged by the private<br />
consultant/expert, whereas local authority charges are negligible. 246 At the end of the day,<br />
246 On the other hand, there has been a corresponding reduction in the fees previously charged to "selffinance"<br />
administrative activities (see City of Göteborg 1995: 43).
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the new procedure is more costly, particularly for the private builder who needs an often<br />
expensive expert, while professional investors have such experts on the payroll anyway. 247<br />
Remit procedure, participation<br />
Before an application is approved, the building bommittee, or the administration acting on<br />
its behalf "shall inform the known parties, co-operative housing association members, tenants<br />
and residents who are affected ... of their right to comment on the application" (chapter<br />
10, section 22). Similarly it is stipulated that "if the measure deviates from a detailed<br />
development plan or area regulation or will be carried out within an area which is not covered<br />
by a detailed development plan ... the Building Committee shall inform known affected<br />
parties and known co-operative tenant owners, tenants and affected resident".<br />
Furthermore, the county administrative board (länsstyrelse) is the public institution, that<br />
needs to be involved and consulted in the application process through its professional<br />
staff.<br />
Negotiation planning, development agreements<br />
Last but not least, the building application process is the arena in which the development<br />
costs and other obligations accruing to the applicant from the project are discussed and<br />
settled between investor/builder and local authority. Sometimes such costs are determined<br />
as fixed charges for streets, water and sewerage.<br />
Especially in cases of extensive development, they are determined by negotiation ("negotiation<br />
planning") resulting in a special development agreement (exploateriongsavtal) (see<br />
Boverket 2003d, Kalbro/Mattsson 1995: 77 ff.).<br />
22.4 Ex post control by State authorities<br />
As a rule, State authorities are not involved in the building permit process. However, in<br />
analogy to the control mechanisms set out in chapter 12, section 4 with regard to detailed<br />
plans, the county administrative board may intervene under the same, narrowly circumscribed<br />
conditions – disregard of national interests and failure to co-ordinate with other<br />
247 Interview with Stina Ejderoth-Linden, chief architect in the planning department the City of Göteborg.
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municipalities (see chapter 8, section 28) – to the point of nullifying the decision on the<br />
permit.<br />
22.5 Ex-post judicial review<br />
According to chapter 13, section 2 of PBL, decisions by local government on building<br />
permits can be appealed to the county administrative board. Such an appeal can be filed,<br />
first of all, by the investor/builder whose application has been turned down, but also by all<br />
third parties involved in the application process.<br />
Against the decision of the county administrative board, the applicant may appeal to the<br />
administrative court of appeal if the decision concerns "a building permit ... in an area<br />
covered by a detailed development plan" (chapter 10, section 4). In other words, only an<br />
applicant whose right to build clearly follows from a detailed development plan also has<br />
the right to pursue this before the court. If he claims to have such a building right without a<br />
plausible basis in the detailed plan, he cannot take the matter to the court.<br />
23. Summarising remarks<br />
The system of physical planning put in place by the PBA of 1987 and embedded in the<br />
Environmental Code of 1999 exhibits a remarkable degree of decentralisation on a number<br />
of scores.<br />
First, the influence of the national government and its subnational actors essentially operates<br />
through legal regulation (particularly by means of the PBA and the EC) and consulting,<br />
advocacy and persuasion addressing municipal government decision-makers, while,<br />
in the absence of ex-ante approval requirements and relatively weak ex-post control<br />
mechanisms, their direct instrumental leverage is quite limited. Hence, the Swedish planing<br />
system hinges crucially on the concept that important national goals are laid down by<br />
national government in legislation, while municipalities enjoy a broad autonomy in implementing<br />
them, on the key assumption that <strong>Sweden</strong> has "independent municipalities with a<br />
sense of responsibility towards national objectives" (Boverket 2003b: 3).<br />
Furthermore, the very regulatory provisions meant to guide and bind municipal decisionmakers<br />
in both procedural and substantive terms can be often seen as framework law<br />
rather than detailed prescriptions giving decisions-makers "full discretion as to how to decide"<br />
(Westerlund 1994: 406). Thus, while largely relying on legal regulation to guide and<br />
steer local government decision-making, the Swedish planning system typifies the Swed-
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ish legal system as a whole, both embracing the continental European codification principle<br />
and leaving considerable leeway to political and administrative decision-makers. This<br />
political quality of the local decision-making, which defies the strict legal determination and<br />
application fundamental to the continental European understanding, appears to be fostered<br />
by the fact the planning and building permission decisions in <strong>Sweden</strong> are vested in<br />
the local council and sectoral committee as institutions of local self-government, ultimately<br />
guided by their political accountability to the local electorate than by strict "obedience to<br />
the law of the land". Swedish local authority decision-making on planning and building<br />
permission is thus close to the British/English system than to continental European systems.<br />
This may be seen as yet another expression of what has been called a "half way<br />
house between the Continental European and Anglo-American systems" (Swedish Institute<br />
1996: 1). In still another dimension these institutional arrangements in intergovernmental<br />
relations may well point to a particular cultural feature of the Swedish, and more<br />
generally, the Scandinavian political system at large, namely that it relies more on mutual<br />
trust rather than on legal/instrumental control.