F OCUS - American Foreign Service Association
F OCUS - American Foreign Service Association F OCUS - American Foreign Service Association
Center, that the TTP is bound to refocus on Afghanistan “if and when its position strengthens in the FATA and the NWFP.” The real question is whether the ongoing insurgency in Pakistan will convince its military and intelligence authorities to renounce their support for the Taliban in Afghanistan. The militants have now clearly turned to attacks against domestic military organizations. As Abbas notes, “of the 56 suicide bombings in Pakistan in 2007, 36 were against military related targets, including two against the ISI; two against the army headquarters in Rawalpindi; one aimed at the air force in Sargodha; and one directed at the facility of the Special Service Group in Tarbela.” Yet Pakistan seems to be still supporting the Quetta Shura — the Afghan Taliban’s most important leadership council, headed by Mullah Omar — as well as its traditional protégés such as the Haqqani family (Jallaluddin and his son Sirajuddin) and Gulbuddin Hekmatyar. Mullah Omar himself has highlighted divergences between the two movements, saying that the struggle was in Afghanistan, not in Pakistan. Though partially overlapping, the two insurgencies are clearly going in different directions: one is targeting Pakistan or, more precisely, army units suspected to have been involved in the July 2007 assault against the militants who had found refuge in the Red Mosque in Islamabad; the other is targeting Afghanistan. There is every reason to believe that if eliminating the former has at last become a priority for the Pakistani military, the latter is still considered legitimate and worth supporting. Potential Impact of the Pakistani Elections In this context, the results of the March Pakistani elections could have a significant impact. They brought to power the Pakistan People’s Party in Islamabad and the Awami National Party in the NWFP, a Pashtun-majority province bordering Afghanistan. Both organizations were cooperating even before the elections to bring about a positive change in relations between the two countries. The late former Pakistan prime minister and PPP chief Benazir Bhutto had met Pres. Karzai only a few hours before she was murdered; and ANP leader Afsandyar Wali Khan maintains excellent relationships with the Afghan leadership. Most mainstream political parties, including the PPP and the ANP, focused their electoral campaign on the maintenance of peace and gained a clear popular mandate on that basis. 44 FOREIGN SERVICE JOURNAL/JULY-AUGUST 2008 F OCUS They will, however, be constrained on two sides. Peace has been understood by the electorate as a rejection of Musharraf and his allies’ strategies. But the U.S. is unlikely to accept any deals like those made by the Pakistani president between 2004 and 2006, which led to the consolidation and strengthening of the Taliban in the FATA. Eliminating al-Qaida and its allies remains an American priority, so the new Pakistani government risks facing considerable pressure from Washington if its policies fail to deliver on this front. The second difficulty will be related to the evolution of civil-military relations in Pakistan itself. Although the present chief of army staff, General Pervez Kiyani, observed a surprising neutrality in the February elections — indicating an interest in restoring the military’s public image and professionalism — it remains unclear whether he is ready to accept a more decisive role in the definition of Pakistan’s national interest and the formulation of its security policies. More specifically, though he seems willing to combat terrorism on Pakistan’s soil, it remains unclear whether he will also be willing to stop Islamabad’s support for the Taliban in Afghanistan, which he previously orchestrated as director general of the ISI. In short, there is a total asymmetry of priorities among the three main actors on the Pakistani side of the equation. The political parties want a normalization of relations with Afghanistan, are willing to bring peace to the area and, reflecting the views of the electorate, do not necessarily see the fight against al-Qaida as a priority. For the U.S., by contrast, eliminating that group prevails over every other consideration. Despite official rhetoric, even stability in Afghanistan is secondary to this primary focus; or, more precisely, stability in Afghanistan is important only to the extent that it is a precondition to preclude its becoming again a sanctuary for al-Qaida. Finally, the Pakistan Army wants a degree of normalization with Afghanistan, but is not necessarily ready to renounce the means of pressure on the Afghan government that the Taliban constitutes. It also sees the fight against al-Qaida essentially as a means to buy Western good will. The outcome will depend on the compromises reached among these three actors. The various statements by the new Pakistani government announcing that the border fight against the Taliban will continue certainly reflect a realization that there is no going back as far as the Pakistani Taliban is concerned. But that is not an indication that Pakistan will change its strategy in Afghanistan itself.
Heading toward Normalization? A complete normalization of relations between Afghanistan and Pakistan will necessarily require a complex set of compromises as well as deeper structural changes. The first priority is obviously to lessen tensions between the two countries. Relations have improved since 2007, but are still far from healthy. Mutual recognition of the current border between the two countries, requested by Islamabad but refused by Kabul, is probably impossible in the short term because it is unacceptable to the Afghan Pashtun population. However, should the Afghan government be politically strengthened, it could then explore the feasibility of a “soft border” between the two countries, where people on both sides could move freely as they have done historically. Ultimately, Pakistan will have to be given the security guarantees that it has been seeking since its independence in 1947; in particular, the assurance that Afghanistan will never enter an alliance with India directed against Pakistan, nor try to mobilize the substantial Paki- F OCUS stani Pashtun minority against Islamabad. Normalization of relations with Afghanistan will therefore be a bilateral process, but one that is highly dependent on a complete normalization of Islamabad’s relations with India. The U.S. should expect to play no more than a facilitating role, helping to diminish Pakistani anxieties by using its influence with both Afghanistan and India. The Bush administration’s controversial 2005 decision to help Pakistan modernize its army, expressed in U.S. willingness to sell F-16 fighter planes to Islamabad, could also be used to induce it to adopt a more conciliatory attitude toward Afghanistan. Such assistance, however, must be conditional. Before the sale of F-16s, Pakistan must clearly renounce all ties to the Taliban and their allies, and hand over the leadership of the Taliban and al-Qaida in order to prove its good faith. The modernization of its army could be the reward, but it cannot be a prerequisite. Throughout this process, the sequencing will be as important as the content of any potential agreement. ■ JULY-AUGUST 2008/FOREIGN SERVICE JOURNAL 45
- Page 1: A TIRELESS “AFSA-CATE” ■ HONO
- Page 6 and 7: CONTENTS AFSA NEWS DISSENTERS HONOR
- Page 8 and 9: Getting History Wrong I was astonis
- Page 10 and 11: Forgetting History The April Cybern
- Page 12 and 13: National Security Infrastructure: D
- Page 14 and 15: Saharan Africa, where the number of
- Page 16 and 17: Association for Diplomatic Studies
- Page 18 and 19: udget of $3.5 million, and a profes
- Page 20 and 21: Pinochet to form a political party
- Page 22 and 23: aircraft was an American flag carri
- Page 24 and 25: of State’s attention to managemen
- Page 26 and 27: In recent months, the growing secur
- Page 28 and 29: Commission and the Judicial Reform
- Page 30 and 31: of government — notwithstanding t
- Page 32 and 33: setup, relying on elected provincia
- Page 34 and 35: order is a barrier to change, educa
- Page 36 and 37: development and governance prioriti
- Page 38 and 39: 36 FOREIGN SERVICE JOURNAL/JULY-AUG
- Page 40 and 41: institutional memory, as well as th
- Page 42 and 43: ise of the Taliban. This has been b
- Page 44 and 45: Durand Line broke the region’s do
- Page 48 and 49: On Sept. 7, 1948, Secretary of Stat
- Page 50 and 51: ecame increasingly chaotic, with cr
- Page 52 and 53: What I want to get at is a problem
- Page 54 and 55: 52 FOREIGN SERVICE JOURNAL/JULY-AUG
- Page 56 and 57: in turn, the enthusiastic applause
- Page 58 and 59: authority and against the advice of
- Page 61 and 62: AFSANEWS American Foreign Service A
- Page 63 and 64: V.P. VOICE: STATE ■ BY STEVE KASH
- Page 65 and 66: 2008 AFSA CONSTRUCTIVE DISSENT AWAR
- Page 67 and 68: 2008 AFSA CONSTRUCTIVE DISSENT AWAR
- Page 69 and 70: 2008 AFSA OUTSTANDING PERFORMANCE A
- Page 71 and 72: AUSTIN TRACY Scholarship Winners Ho
- Page 73 and 74: AFSA Issue Brief Foreign Service Re
- Page 75 and 76: CLASSIFIEDS JULY-AUGUST 2008/FOREIG
- Page 77 and 78: Cultural Diplomacy’s Finest Hour
- Page 80 and 81: Lucius Durham Battle, 89, a retired
- Page 82 and 83: ing French and Spanish literature a
- Page 84 and 85: Comforts, that specialized in anima
- Page 86 and 87: Washington, D.C., in 1941. There sh
- Page 88 and 89: losing a battle with cancer. Born i
- Page 90 and 91: Leasing and Management of Exception
- Page 92 and 93: 90 FOREIGN SERVICE JOURNAL/JULY-AUG
- Page 94: Seven months ago, I was living in a
Heading toward Normalization?<br />
A complete normalization of relations between<br />
Afghanistan and Pakistan will necessarily require a complex<br />
set of compromises as well as deeper structural<br />
changes. The first priority is obviously to lessen tensions<br />
between the two countries. Relations have improved<br />
since 2007, but are still far from healthy.<br />
Mutual recognition of the current border between the<br />
two countries, requested by Islamabad but refused by<br />
Kabul, is probably impossible in the short term because it<br />
is unacceptable to the Afghan Pashtun population.<br />
However, should the Afghan government be politically<br />
strengthened, it could then explore the feasibility of a “soft<br />
border” between the two countries, where people on both<br />
sides could move freely as they have done historically.<br />
Ultimately, Pakistan will have to be given the security<br />
guarantees that it has been seeking since its independence<br />
in 1947; in particular, the assurance that Afghanistan<br />
will never enter an alliance with India directed<br />
against Pakistan, nor try to mobilize the substantial Paki-<br />
F <strong>OCUS</strong><br />
stani Pashtun minority against Islamabad. Normalization<br />
of relations with Afghanistan will therefore be a bilateral<br />
process, but one that is highly dependent on a complete<br />
normalization of Islamabad’s relations with India.<br />
The U.S. should expect to play no more than a facilitating<br />
role, helping to diminish Pakistani anxieties by<br />
using its influence with both Afghanistan and India. The<br />
Bush administration’s controversial 2005 decision to help<br />
Pakistan modernize its army, expressed in U.S. willingness<br />
to sell F-16 fighter planes to Islamabad, could also be used<br />
to induce it to adopt a more conciliatory attitude toward<br />
Afghanistan.<br />
Such assistance, however, must be conditional. Before<br />
the sale of F-16s, Pakistan must clearly renounce all ties to<br />
the Taliban and their allies, and hand over the leadership<br />
of the Taliban and al-Qaida in order to prove its good faith.<br />
The modernization of its army could be the reward, but it<br />
cannot be a prerequisite.<br />
Throughout this process, the sequencing will be as<br />
important as the content of any potential agreement. ■<br />
JULY-AUGUST 2008/FOREIGN SERVICE JOURNAL 45
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