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Center, that the TTP is bound to refocus on Afghanistan
“if and when its position strengthens in the FATA and the
NWFP.”
The real question is whether the ongoing insurgency in
Pakistan will convince its military and intelligence authorities
to renounce their support for the Taliban in
Afghanistan. The militants have now clearly turned to
attacks against domestic military organizations. As Abbas
notes, “of the 56 suicide bombings in Pakistan in 2007, 36
were against military related targets, including two against
the ISI; two against the army headquarters in Rawalpindi;
one aimed at the air force in Sargodha; and one directed
at the facility of the Special Service Group in Tarbela.” Yet
Pakistan seems to be still supporting the Quetta Shura —
the Afghan Taliban’s most important leadership council,
headed by Mullah Omar — as well as its traditional protégés
such as the Haqqani family (Jallaluddin and his son
Sirajuddin) and Gulbuddin Hekmatyar.
Mullah Omar himself has highlighted divergences
between the two movements, saying that the struggle was
in Afghanistan, not in Pakistan. Though partially overlapping,
the two insurgencies are clearly going in different
directions: one is targeting Pakistan or, more precisely,
army units suspected to have been involved in the July
2007 assault against the militants who had found refuge in
the Red Mosque in Islamabad; the other is targeting
Afghanistan. There is every reason to believe that if eliminating
the former has at last become a priority for the
Pakistani military, the latter is still considered legitimate
and worth supporting.
Potential Impact of the Pakistani Elections
In this context, the results of the March Pakistani elections
could have a significant impact. They brought to
power the Pakistan People’s Party in Islamabad and the
Awami National Party in the NWFP, a Pashtun-majority
province bordering Afghanistan. Both organizations were
cooperating even before the elections to bring about a positive
change in relations between the two countries. The
late former Pakistan prime minister and PPP chief
Benazir Bhutto had met Pres. Karzai only a few hours
before she was murdered; and ANP leader Afsandyar Wali
Khan maintains excellent relationships with the Afghan
leadership. Most mainstream political parties,
including the PPP and the ANP, focused their electoral
campaign on the maintenance of peace and gained a clear
popular mandate on that basis.
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They will, however, be constrained on two sides. Peace
has been understood by the electorate as a rejection of
Musharraf and his allies’ strategies. But the U.S. is unlikely
to accept any deals like those made by the Pakistani
president between 2004 and 2006, which led to the consolidation
and strengthening of the Taliban in the FATA.
Eliminating al-Qaida and its allies remains an American
priority, so the new Pakistani government risks facing considerable
pressure from Washington if its policies fail to
deliver on this front.
The second difficulty will be related to the evolution of
civil-military relations in Pakistan itself. Although the present
chief of army staff, General Pervez Kiyani, observed
a surprising neutrality in the February elections — indicating
an interest in restoring the military’s public image
and professionalism — it remains unclear whether he is
ready to accept a more decisive role in the definition of
Pakistan’s national interest and the formulation of its security
policies. More specifically, though he seems willing to
combat terrorism on Pakistan’s soil, it remains unclear
whether he will also be willing to stop Islamabad’s support
for the Taliban in Afghanistan, which he previously orchestrated
as director general of the ISI.
In short, there is a total asymmetry of priorities among
the three main actors on the Pakistani side of the equation.
The political parties want a normalization of relations with
Afghanistan, are willing to bring peace to the area and,
reflecting the views of the electorate, do not necessarily
see the fight against al-Qaida as a priority. For the U.S., by
contrast, eliminating that group prevails over every other
consideration. Despite official rhetoric, even stability in
Afghanistan is secondary to this primary focus; or, more
precisely, stability in Afghanistan is important only to the
extent that it is a precondition to preclude its becoming
again a sanctuary for al-Qaida. Finally, the Pakistan Army
wants a degree of normalization with Afghanistan, but is
not necessarily ready to renounce the means of pressure
on the Afghan government that the Taliban constitutes. It
also sees the fight against al-Qaida essentially as a means
to buy Western good will.
The outcome will depend on the compromises reached
among these three actors. The various statements by the
new Pakistani government announcing that the border
fight against the Taliban will continue certainly reflect a
realization that there is no going back as far as the Pakistani
Taliban is concerned. But that is not an indication that
Pakistan will change its strategy in Afghanistan itself.