F OCUS - American Foreign Service Association
F OCUS - American Foreign Service Association F OCUS - American Foreign Service Association
ise of the Taliban. This has been brilliantly documented by two Pulitzer Prize–winning writers: New America Foundation president and New Yorker staff writer Steve Coll and McClatchy newspapers’ foreign editor Roy Gutman, among others. It is thus quite rational for Afghans to be skeptical about the depth of Western commitment to their concerns — as opposed to Western interest in dealing with the threat from al- Qaida. And as long as they remain doubtful, they will not throw their support fully behind Afghanistan’s transformation. It is therefore very important that NATO members signal, by both word and deed, that there will be no going back to the past. While NATO’s April 3, 2008, Bucharest Summit Declaration used the right words, Afghans will judge NATO mainly by its deeds. 40 FOREIGN SERVICE JOURNAL/JULY-AUGUST 2008 F OCUS The issue of poppy eradication has also become a point of friction between various NATO members and the government of Afghanistan. Here, they are following a fundamental lesson set out more than 20 years ago in a very different context by a great American. In 1986, the Nobel Prize-winning physicist Richard P. Feynmann was appointed to the commission that investigated the Jan. 28, 1986, loss of the Challenger space shuttle. His minority report made powerful reading when it was published, and its conclusion speaks to issues well beyond the realms of physics and engineering. “For a successful technology,” he wrote, “reality must take precedence over public relations, for nature cannot be fooled.” The Afghans cannot be fooled, either. NATO’s ability to match their needs with realistic responses will be an accurate measure of that institution’s value in the post–Cold War world. ■
F OCUS ON A FGHANISTAN THE PAKISTAN PIECE OF THE PUZZLE Almost seven years after 9/11 and the U.S. invasion of Afghanistan, the role of Pakistan in the imbroglio remains murky. Relations between Afghanistan and Pakistan have been largely antagonistic since Pakistan gained independence in 1947 — with the exception of the five years of Taliban rule between 1996 and 2001. In 2001, the U.S. demanded that Pakistan renounce the Taliban, whose rise to power was facilitated by Islamabad, and refrain from installing Afghan leaders of its own in Kabul. Convinced, however, that the American presence in the region would not last, Pakistan embarked on a dual-track policy — providing sanctuary to the remnants of the Taliban on one side of the border, while officially supporting the transitional Afghan government on the other. Until 2005, Islamabad refrained from any serious interference, helping in the organization of the October AFGHANISTAN’S CONTENTIOUS RELATIONSHIP WITH ITS NEXT-DOOR NEIGHBOR IS A CRITICAL ELEMENT IN ITS CONTINUING TROUBLES. BY FREDERIC GRARE Frederic Grare is a visiting scholar at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, where he leads a project assessing U.S. and European policies toward Pakistan. A leading expert and writer on South Asia, security issues, Islamist movements and sectarian conflict in Pakistan and Afghanistan, he edited the volume, India, China, Russia: Intricacies of an Asian Triangle (India Research Press, 2005). 2004 presidential elections in the Afghan refugee camps, as well as the September 2005 parliamentary vote. Relations began deteriorating again in late 2005 with the resurgence of the Taliban in the Afghan provinces bordering Pakistan. In March 2006, the two countries’ presidents, Hamid Karzai and Pervez Musharraf, traded accusations of interference in each country’s affairs. The antagonism reached a new peak in May 2007, when Afghan demolition of a fence erected by Pakistan on the border as a result of American pressure prompted a series of clashes in which more than 50 Afghan civilians and officers were killed. During the past year, relations have improved somewhat but remain tense. Normalization of the Pakistan-Afghanistan relationship is an essential element in bringing about a stable and developing Afghanistan. To understand how that might be possible, it is necessary to look closely at Islamabad’s policy toward Afghanistan and what shapes it. Threat Perceptions The row over the countries’ border is a paradox: Kabul constantly accuses Islamabad of violating a border that Kabul itself does not recognize. Indeed, this dispute is at the core of the complex and unstable bilateral relationship. Imposed by British colonialists in 1893 after two wars to conquer the Afghans produced a stalemate, the JULY-AUGUST 2008/FOREIGN SERVICE JOURNAL 41
- Page 1: A TIRELESS “AFSA-CATE” ■ HONO
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- Page 10 and 11: Forgetting History The April Cybern
- Page 12 and 13: National Security Infrastructure: D
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- Page 61 and 62: AFSANEWS American Foreign Service A
- Page 63 and 64: V.P. VOICE: STATE ■ BY STEVE KASH
- Page 65 and 66: 2008 AFSA CONSTRUCTIVE DISSENT AWAR
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ise of the Taliban. This has been brilliantly<br />
documented by two Pulitzer<br />
Prize–winning writers: New America<br />
Foundation president and New<br />
Yorker staff writer Steve Coll and<br />
McClatchy newspapers’ foreign editor<br />
Roy Gutman, among others.<br />
It is thus quite rational for Afghans<br />
to be skeptical about the depth of<br />
Western commitment to their concerns<br />
— as opposed to Western interest<br />
in dealing with the threat from al-<br />
Qaida. And as long as they remain<br />
doubtful, they will not throw their<br />
support fully behind Afghanistan’s<br />
transformation. It is therefore very important that NATO<br />
members signal, by both word and deed, that there will be<br />
no going back to the past. While NATO’s April 3, 2008,<br />
Bucharest Summit Declaration used the right words,<br />
Afghans will judge NATO mainly by its deeds.<br />
40 FOREIGN SERVICE JOURNAL/JULY-AUGUST 2008<br />
F <strong>OCUS</strong><br />
The issue of poppy<br />
eradication has also<br />
become a point of<br />
friction between various<br />
NATO members and the<br />
government of<br />
Afghanistan.<br />
Here, they are following a fundamental<br />
lesson set out more than 20<br />
years ago in a very different context by<br />
a great <strong>American</strong>. In 1986, the Nobel<br />
Prize-winning physicist Richard P.<br />
Feynmann was appointed to the commission<br />
that investigated the Jan. 28,<br />
1986, loss of the Challenger space<br />
shuttle. His minority report made<br />
powerful reading when it was published,<br />
and its conclusion speaks to<br />
issues well beyond the realms of<br />
physics and engineering. “For a successful<br />
technology,” he wrote, “reality<br />
must take precedence over public<br />
relations, for nature cannot be fooled.”<br />
The Afghans cannot be fooled, either. NATO’s ability<br />
to match their needs with realistic responses will be an<br />
accurate measure of that institution’s value in the<br />
post–Cold War world. ■
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