F OCUS - American Foreign Service Association
F OCUS - American Foreign Service Association F OCUS - American Foreign Service Association
development and governance priorities, and monitor the many U.S.-sponsored development activities in their province. Our officers are uniquely effective. Unlike in Iraq — where the PRTs have large civilian contingents, including contractors as well as civilians from other agencies — in Afghanistan personnel from the Foreign and Civil Service are the only nonmilitary representatives at their PRTs. As such, they wield great responsibility, often at reasonably junior ranks. Among the few civilians assigned to remote Forward Operating Bases, each provides a value far in excess of what could be expected from one person. In one case we received information that a particular terrorist group was so concerned over the impact that one officer was having that they issued orders to kill the individual (in response, we took appropriate steps). Our opponents are right to be afraid. By openly and persuasively engaging tribal leaders, we are able to convince them that sending their daughters to school is a good thing and that it is better that their young men build roads rather than behead road builders. By their efforts, our people are at once helping Afghanistan and countering the insurgency. While military personnel do engage in these tasks, they recognize the expertise that civilians bring — and want more. Last fall, we began examining how to bolster the civilian presence at our PRTs. Some argued for a replication of the model that has proven successful in Iraq, where the PRTs have a robust civilian presence. This approach was rejected, however, primarily because PRT bases in Afghanistan are small, so adding extra civilians would not only increase the logistical burden but transform a compact, well-running institution into a larger, less nimble bureaucracy. Additionally, very few of the Afghanistan PRTs are based at or near major military facilities. In any case, there simply aren’t the spare bodies to go around. “PRT Plus” Instead, it was decided that the same effect could be achieved by adding State and USAID personnel to the embassy and to the brigades that oversee the PRTs. After some interagency polishing locally, Embassy Kabul’s “PRT Plus” concept was approved by Washington and will be funded through a supplemental to be implemented as soon as funding is available. In addition to quantity, we also focused on quality 34 FOREIGN SERVICE JOURNAL/JULY-AUGUST 2008 F OCUS through changes in focus, planning and training. An important step occurred earlier this year when the embassy’s State PRT office was given the interagency lead for local governance, a key element in our effort to connect the Afghan people to their government. This transformed the office from an operational shop into a policy section. The embassy’s hard-working political section is primarily focused on issues of national governance. The PRT section, which directly controls the officers deployed to the provinces, is able to reach much deeper into the local level, developing an expertise that is difficult for a Kabul-based officer to master. Innovative work is also taking place in terms of our counterinsurgency effort in Afghanistan. USAID staff working with U.S. forces are successfully integrating development interventions into combat planning and operations, which is helping achieve greater success for the “clear, hold, build” counterinsurgency strategy in remote and insecure areas. This has had great success in mitigating negative reactions following combat operations. Civilian advisers follow the forces, assisting to repair damage and implementing quick-impact projects that make an immediate and measurable difference in the lives of local residents. Examples include “microhydro” projects, small hydroelectric facilities that can bring power to a village for the first time in its history. Such seemingly small steps can make the difference in determining whether a village supports the insurgents or turns toward the government. We are also making strides in preparing our people for working closely with the military in a foreign environment. State’s Office of the Coordinator for Stabilization and Reconstruction and USAID’s Office of Military Affairs have broken new ground as they work to refine the three-week training course for incoming civilian PRT staff. The course, conducted at Ft. Bragg, brings together the military and civilian elements of each team. Additionally, we have focused on promoting continuity, to ensure that we do not repeat the Vietnam-era syndrome of fighting a series of “one-year wars.” The first step was taken when the State PRT offices became interagency lead for local governance. Our next effort involved the dispatch of S/CRS teams to each of the U.S.led PRTs. These teams drew on proven private-sector strategic planning instruments, already used extensively by the military services and intelligence community, to design, test and validate an integrated planning process.
The effort led to better civil-military integration, as well as a long-term planning document that provides guidance and continuity for new teams. Finally, while the military and civilians train together, they do deploy on slightly different cycles. When a new team arrives, it overlaps with the existing PRT, whose military elements depart after several weeks, leaving the civilians in place for up to three months. The resulting overlap promotes continuity and flattens the learning curve as new teams come into the country. Key Challenges Remain Despite our overall success, several key challenges remain. First and foremost is staffing. Given our goal of sending all of our officers to 44 weeks of either Pashto- or Dari-language training, and the fact that PRTs are oneyear assignments, recruiting is a year-round job. Additionally, the rigors of PRT life are such that we must be highly selective during the hiring process. Finally, we face the reality that as “the other war,” we are in constant F OCUS competition with Iraq for qualified applicants. On a practical basis, our greatest challenge is obtaining funding for our officers. While State personnel bring a wealth of knowledge and experience to the table, they bring little or no money. While our public diplomacy colleagues have worked long and hard to direct grant money to our PRTs, the lack of quick-impact funds has had a significant negative effect on the teams’ ability to do their jobs. We continue to examine new and innovative ways to support our PRT staff. In the six years since the first PRT was stood up, the teams have evolved from an interesting experiment into a key component of our effort to transform Afghanistan. While we have implemented a number of changes over the last year, we do not intend to rest on our laurels and say “good enough.” Working together at the embassy, with the military and with the international community, we will continue our efforts to keep our PRTs at the forefront of civil-military cooperation in a counterinsurgency environment. ■ JULY-AUGUST 2008/FOREIGN SERVICE JOURNAL 35
- Page 1: A TIRELESS “AFSA-CATE” ■ HONO
- Page 6 and 7: CONTENTS AFSA NEWS DISSENTERS HONOR
- Page 8 and 9: Getting History Wrong I was astonis
- Page 10 and 11: Forgetting History The April Cybern
- Page 12 and 13: National Security Infrastructure: D
- Page 14 and 15: Saharan Africa, where the number of
- Page 16 and 17: Association for Diplomatic Studies
- Page 18 and 19: udget of $3.5 million, and a profes
- Page 20 and 21: Pinochet to form a political party
- Page 22 and 23: aircraft was an American flag carri
- Page 24 and 25: of State’s attention to managemen
- Page 26 and 27: In recent months, the growing secur
- Page 28 and 29: Commission and the Judicial Reform
- Page 30 and 31: of government — notwithstanding t
- Page 32 and 33: setup, relying on elected provincia
- Page 34 and 35: order is a barrier to change, educa
- Page 38 and 39: 36 FOREIGN SERVICE JOURNAL/JULY-AUG
- Page 40 and 41: institutional memory, as well as th
- Page 42 and 43: ise of the Taliban. This has been b
- Page 44 and 45: Durand Line broke the region’s do
- Page 46 and 47: Center, that the TTP is bound to re
- Page 48 and 49: On Sept. 7, 1948, Secretary of Stat
- Page 50 and 51: ecame increasingly chaotic, with cr
- Page 52 and 53: What I want to get at is a problem
- Page 54 and 55: 52 FOREIGN SERVICE JOURNAL/JULY-AUG
- Page 56 and 57: in turn, the enthusiastic applause
- Page 58 and 59: authority and against the advice of
- Page 61 and 62: AFSANEWS American Foreign Service A
- Page 63 and 64: V.P. VOICE: STATE ■ BY STEVE KASH
- Page 65 and 66: 2008 AFSA CONSTRUCTIVE DISSENT AWAR
- Page 67 and 68: 2008 AFSA CONSTRUCTIVE DISSENT AWAR
- Page 69 and 70: 2008 AFSA OUTSTANDING PERFORMANCE A
- Page 71 and 72: AUSTIN TRACY Scholarship Winners Ho
- Page 73 and 74: AFSA Issue Brief Foreign Service Re
- Page 75 and 76: CLASSIFIEDS JULY-AUGUST 2008/FOREIG
- Page 77 and 78: Cultural Diplomacy’s Finest Hour
- Page 80 and 81: Lucius Durham Battle, 89, a retired
- Page 82 and 83: ing French and Spanish literature a
- Page 84 and 85: Comforts, that specialized in anima
The effort led to better civil-military integration, as well<br />
as a long-term planning document that provides guidance<br />
and continuity for new teams.<br />
Finally, while the military and civilians train together,<br />
they do deploy on slightly different cycles. When a new<br />
team arrives, it overlaps with the existing PRT, whose military<br />
elements depart after several weeks, leaving the<br />
civilians in place for up to three months. The resulting<br />
overlap promotes continuity and flattens the learning<br />
curve as new teams come into the country.<br />
Key Challenges Remain<br />
Despite our overall success, several key challenges<br />
remain. First and foremost is staffing. Given our goal of<br />
sending all of our officers to 44 weeks of either Pashto- or<br />
Dari-language training, and the fact that PRTs are oneyear<br />
assignments, recruiting is a year-round job. Additionally,<br />
the rigors of PRT life are such that we must be<br />
highly selective during the hiring process. Finally, we<br />
face the reality that as “the other war,” we are in constant<br />
F <strong>OCUS</strong><br />
competition with Iraq for qualified applicants.<br />
On a practical basis, our greatest challenge is obtaining<br />
funding for our officers. While State personnel bring<br />
a wealth of knowledge and experience to the table, they<br />
bring little or no money. While our public diplomacy colleagues<br />
have worked long and hard to direct grant money<br />
to our PRTs, the lack of quick-impact funds has had a significant<br />
negative effect on the teams’ ability to do their<br />
jobs. We continue to examine new and innovative ways<br />
to support our PRT staff.<br />
In the six years since the first PRT was stood up, the<br />
teams have evolved from an interesting experiment into<br />
a key component of our effort to transform Afghanistan.<br />
While we have implemented a number of changes over<br />
the last year, we do not intend to rest on our laurels and<br />
say “good enough.” Working together at the embassy,<br />
with the military and with the international community,<br />
we will continue our efforts to keep our PRTs at the forefront<br />
of civil-military cooperation in a counterinsurgency<br />
environment. ■<br />
JULY-AUGUST 2008/FOREIGN SERVICE JOURNAL 35
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