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F OCUS - American Foreign Service Association

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development and governance priorities, and monitor the<br />

many U.S.-sponsored development activities in their<br />

province.<br />

Our officers are uniquely effective. Unlike in Iraq —<br />

where the PRTs have large civilian contingents, including<br />

contractors as well as civilians from other agencies — in<br />

Afghanistan personnel from the <strong>Foreign</strong> and Civil <strong>Service</strong><br />

are the only nonmilitary representatives at their PRTs. As<br />

such, they wield great responsibility, often at reasonably<br />

junior ranks. Among the few civilians assigned to remote<br />

Forward Operating Bases, each provides a value far in<br />

excess of what could be expected from one person. In one<br />

case we received information that a particular terrorist<br />

group was so concerned over the impact that one officer<br />

was having that they issued orders to kill the individual (in<br />

response, we took appropriate steps).<br />

Our opponents are right to be afraid. By openly and<br />

persuasively engaging tribal leaders, we are able to convince<br />

them that sending their daughters to school is a<br />

good thing and that it is better that their young men build<br />

roads rather than behead road builders. By their efforts,<br />

our people are at once helping Afghanistan and countering<br />

the insurgency.<br />

While military personnel do engage in these tasks,<br />

they recognize the expertise that civilians bring — and<br />

want more. Last fall, we began examining how to bolster<br />

the civilian presence at our PRTs. Some argued for a<br />

replication of the model that has proven successful in<br />

Iraq, where the PRTs have a robust civilian presence.<br />

This approach was rejected, however, primarily because<br />

PRT bases in Afghanistan are small, so adding extra civilians<br />

would not only increase the logistical burden but<br />

transform a compact, well-running institution into a larger,<br />

less nimble bureaucracy. Additionally, very few of the<br />

Afghanistan PRTs are based at or near major military<br />

facilities. In any case, there simply aren’t the spare bodies<br />

to go around.<br />

“PRT Plus”<br />

Instead, it was decided that the same effect could be<br />

achieved by adding State and USAID personnel to the<br />

embassy and to the brigades that oversee the PRTs.<br />

After some interagency polishing locally, Embassy<br />

Kabul’s “PRT Plus” concept was approved by Washington<br />

and will be funded through a supplemental to be<br />

implemented as soon as funding is available.<br />

In addition to quantity, we also focused on quality<br />

34 FOREIGN SERVICE JOURNAL/JULY-AUGUST 2008<br />

F <strong>OCUS</strong><br />

through changes in focus, planning and training. An<br />

important step occurred earlier this year when the<br />

embassy’s State PRT office was given the interagency<br />

lead for local governance, a key element in our effort to<br />

connect the Afghan people to their government. This<br />

transformed the office from an operational shop into a<br />

policy section. The embassy’s hard-working political section<br />

is primarily focused on issues of national governance.<br />

The PRT section, which directly controls the officers<br />

deployed to the provinces, is able to reach much deeper<br />

into the local level, developing an expertise that is difficult<br />

for a Kabul-based officer to master.<br />

Innovative work is also taking place in terms of our<br />

counterinsurgency effort in Afghanistan. USAID staff<br />

working with U.S. forces are successfully integrating<br />

development interventions into combat planning and<br />

operations, which is helping achieve greater success for<br />

the “clear, hold, build” counterinsurgency strategy in<br />

remote and insecure areas. This has had great success in<br />

mitigating negative reactions following combat operations.<br />

Civilian advisers follow the forces, assisting to<br />

repair damage and implementing quick-impact projects<br />

that make an immediate and measurable difference in<br />

the lives of local residents. Examples include “microhydro”<br />

projects, small hydroelectric facilities that can<br />

bring power to a village for the first time in its history.<br />

Such seemingly small steps can make the difference in<br />

determining whether a village supports the insurgents or<br />

turns toward the government.<br />

We are also making strides in preparing our people for<br />

working closely with the military in a foreign environment.<br />

State’s Office of the Coordinator for Stabilization<br />

and Reconstruction and USAID’s Office of Military<br />

Affairs have broken new ground as they work to refine<br />

the three-week training course for incoming civilian PRT<br />

staff. The course, conducted at Ft. Bragg, brings together<br />

the military and civilian elements of each team.<br />

Additionally, we have focused on promoting continuity,<br />

to ensure that we do not repeat the Vietnam-era syndrome<br />

of fighting a series of “one-year wars.” The first<br />

step was taken when the State PRT offices became interagency<br />

lead for local governance. Our next effort<br />

involved the dispatch of S/CRS teams to each of the U.S.led<br />

PRTs. These teams drew on proven private-sector<br />

strategic planning instruments, already used extensively<br />

by the military services and intelligence community, to<br />

design, test and validate an integrated planning process.

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