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order is a barrier to change, education,
economic betterment and human
rights. We cannot defeat this
tactic by combat power alone.
Instead, we have capitalized on
our asymmetric advantage, the
ability to offer both a better today
and a better tomorrow. The
United States is the largest donor
to Afghanistan, carrying out comprehensive
sector programs in agriculture
and alternative development, infrastructure
(roads and power), health, education, economic growth,
good governance and the rule of law.
In 2001, fewer than one million boys and no girls
attended school in Afghanistan. Now, six million children
(40 percent of them girls) regularly go to school. Infant
mortality has been slashed. Eighty percent of all Afghans
now have access to medical care. Licit exports have
increased nearly 600 percent. The extent of paved or
improved roads has been doubled to 40,000 kilometers.
Each road brings development and stability: as the saying
goes, “Where the roads end, the Taliban begins.”
While worthwhile, it is a tremendous effort that often
seems to proceed at a glacial pace.
We are not alone in this fight. In addition to NATO/
ISAF, the U.N., the Red Cross and a slew of nongovernmental
organizations are on the ground. Unfortunately,
however, many of these entities approach the complex
Afghan environment the same way they have a dozen
other conflict zones, regardless of whether their methods
are appropriate or effective under the circumstances.
Seeing this, the United States decided that a new
approach was needed, and thus the Provincial
Reconstruction Team concept was born.
A Unique Institution
Since their inception, PRTs have proven effective in
supporting the spread of governance and development in
Afghanistan. The first PRT was stood up in Paktia
province in a traditional mud compound in 2002. Since
then, 25 additional teams (11 U.S.-led and 14 non-U.S.)
have been deployed throughout the country, mostly on
small Forward Operating Bases located in provincial capitals.
The U.S.-led teams combine civilian and military
personnel who focus on governance, development and
security.
32 FOREIGN SERVICE JOURNAL/JULY-AUGUST 2008
F OCUS
The integration of
civilians is one of the
major differences between
the American effort and
those of our allies.
These civil-military teams work
with the Afghan government, civil
society, Afghan and coalition security
forces, and the international
community. Because the country’s
provinces differ greatly in terms of
ethnic and tribal mix, level of security
and economic development,
there can be no “cookie cutter”
approach. That said, each PRT has
a similar mandate: to extend the
reach of the Afghan government, carry out reconstruction
projects and help build up local security forces.
Ten of the 12 U.S. PRTs are located in Regional
Command East under the control of Combined Joint
Task Force 101. The 101st also commands U.S. and
coalition combat forces within its area of responsibility.
Subordinate brigades coordinate the actions of both the
PRTs and the combat units. It should be emphasized,
however, that the PRTs are separate entities from the
combat, or “maneuver” units.
The PRTs have national identities, as well. Eleven of
the 12 U.S. PRTs are military-led and have a handful of
civilian officers — one each from State, USAID and
USDA. The civilians are equal members of the PRT’s
integrated command team. The military commander has
final authority on all security matters, but the civilians
take the lead on governance and development. By contrast,
some non-U.S. PRTs are led by senior civilians with
a sizable non-military staff, or by the military with civilian
development advisers from the host country.
There are also philosophical differences. U.S. PRTs
are integrated civil-military counterinsurgency units.
Other nations view PRTs either as development agencies
with a military component for security, or as agencies that
only provide security training. We believe that the U.S.
model is the most effective, and some of our allies seem
to be coming around to this view. There is a growing
recognition by our British and Canadian colleagues
(among others) that “the Americans seem to have caught
on to something.”
The integration of non-military personnel is one of the
major differences between the American effort and those
of our allies. While other nations also assign civilians to
their PRTs, the two sides often operate in virtual isolation
from each other. In some non-U.S. PRTs, the relationship
between them borders on hostility. In contrast, vis-