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setup, relying on elected provincial and local leaders and, at the national level, a parliamentary system with a more ceremonial president and a government composed of competent technocrats reporting to a strong and popular prime minister. An Optimistic Scenario Empowering the national parliament would entail risks. It is likely that any legislature would reflect Afghanistan’s ethnic and tribal mosaic, though it is possible that ideology would manifest itself in the representation of some urban populations, as was true of Afghan parliaments prior to the communist coup of 1978. But a loya jirga could address this concern by authorizing a new parliamentary election based, at least in part, on a party system. Formed on the basis of elections far better organized than in 2005, a parliamentary system would afford the prospect of political leadership more closely reflecting the aspirations of the people and more accountable to them. Formation of political parties would also increase democratization of the parliament by reaching, over time, across ethnic and cultural lines that currently form the basis of power blocs. A new loya jirga could help ensure a more representative body by establishing literacy requirements and, more crucially, by setting strict qualifications — for both individuals and parties — for participation in a new parliamentary election. In the lead-up to the 2005 parliamentary balloting, the Afghan Election Commission vetted candidates to screen out those with criminal or violent backgrounds. After initially ruling that 208 of more than 2,500 candidates should be disqualified, it ultimately succumbed to pressure and barred only 11. Even the 208 initially identified represented only a small fraction of those whose candidacy should have been challenged. Constitutional prohibitions barring those guilty of certain human rights abuses were ineffective because the absence of a functioning justice system meant that perpetrators had never been convicted. Inasmuch as there is still no real progress in the judicial sector toward the identification, prosecution and conviction of those guilty of grave human rights abuses and other crimes, it would be necessary to invest a new election commission with quasi-judicial powers, 30 FOREIGN SERVICE JOURNAL/JULY-AUGUST 2008 F <strong>OCUS</strong> Pres. Karzai's skills as a politician and his standing as a Pashtun leader are on the line. enabling it to exclude the clearly corrupt and the worst abusers. To be effective and credible, the commission would have to be composed of outstanding individuals whose reputation for integrity would imbue it with the requisite authority. Adequate international support for this body would be vital, but its character and composition would need to be indisputably Afghan. This election commission or a separate, similarly empowered body could also set terms for political participation in parliamentary and other elections by former Taliban members. Such a commission would relieve Pres. Karzai of this politically explosive burden. Ideally, the loya jirga that would constitute and compose this commission or commissions should itself include tribal and ethnic leaders and other individuals who have standing with the Taliban. The concept would be similar to an effort, proposed but never implemented, to lure supporters of the Mohammad Najibullah regime in 1989 into a successor government by inviting “good Muslims” from the former’s ranks. Realistically, convening an authentic loya jirga prior to the 2010 parliamentary elections may not be feasible. But it is essential that, at a minimum, the parliamentary elections be properly prepared. Whether formed and empowered by a loya jirga, a much more legitimate basis, or by action of the Afghan government and international donors, an election commission with broad powers and a clear mandate to rule on prerequisites for candidacy are needed, to ensure that the parliament emerges as a credible institution capable of balancing the power of a very strong presidency. In the final analysis, Afghanistan remains a victim of international intervention that has empowered some of the worst elements of society and trapped its people in a foreign-made political system that ignores their history, tradition and political realities. While some of this intervention has been well meaning, much of it has been selfserving, reflecting the national ambitions and interests of other countries. Afghanistan was the first victim of Taliban misrule and al-Qaida brutality. It deserves another chance in a new political system mandated by a traditionally organized loya jirga that reflects the nation’s history and reality and is perceived by Afghans as legitimate. ■
he United States is currently employing all elements of national power to help Afghanistan overcome the legacy of three decades of war and to keep it from ever again serving as a launching pad for terrorism. For those of us here, every day is a 9/11 anniversary. As a constant reminder of our task, two small memorial stones in front of Embassy Kabul mark the resting place of rubble from the Twin Trade Towers. Our strategy is focused on three main efforts: improving security, fostering economic development and strengthening governance. Our challenges are formidable. By comparison with Iraq, Afghanistan is larger and more populous, possesses a forbidding topography and a monumental narcotics problem, and is profoundly poor. The effort is made even more difficult by the lack of infrastructure and by weakened and distorted societal institutions. Finally, we face a hodgepodge of insurgent groups, including the Taliban, derivative Soviet-era resistance groups, crossborder tribes and al-Qaida. While our goal is to help build Afghanistan into a F <strong>OCUS</strong> ON A FGHANISTAN PRTS INAFGHANISTAN: A REPORT FROM THE INSIDE T Bruce Rogers is director and Robert Kemp is deputy director of the Provincial Reconstruction and Local Governance Section in Embassy Kabul, while Jim Hope is director of the USAID PRT Section there. THE CHALLENGES FOR AMERICAN POLICY IN AFGHANISTAN, WHERE THE PROVINCIAL RECONSTRUCTION TEAM CONCEPT WAS BORN, REMAIN FORMIDABLE. BY BRUCE ROGERS, JIM HOPE AND ROBERT KEMP nation that can serve as a force for regional stability, warfighting is still a major part of our activity. Approximately 28,000 U.S. troops, split between Operation Enduring Freedom and the International Security and Assistance Force, and 28,000 NATO/ISAF troops are deployed around the country to fight the insurgency and provide the security necessary to ensure the furtherance of governance and development. Combat power alone, however, will not lead us to our desired end-state. Its role is to separate the population from the insurgents, providing space for the extension of good government, provision of essential services and stimulation of economic development — our most potent weapons. Our Asymmetric Advantage There has been much ink spilled over the last seven years about how the enemy wages “asymmetric warfare” against us. In his book The Utility of Force: The Art of War in the Modern World (Vintage, 2008), British General Rupert Smith notes that asymmetry simply means that one side doesn’t play to the other side’s strengths. It is, moreover, a strategy that both sides can employ. For their part, the insurgents use terror to bring about their dark vision of an order imposed by the gun according to half-understood tenets of Islamic law. This JULY-AUGUST 2008/FOREIGN SERVICE JOURNAL 31
Page 1: A TIRELESS “AFSA-CATE” ■ HONO
Page 6 and 7: CONTENTS AFSA NEWS DISSENTERS HONOR
Page 8 and 9: Getting History Wrong I was astonis
Page 10 and 11: Forgetting History The April Cybern
Page 12 and 13: National Security Infrastructure: D
Page 14 and 15: Saharan Africa, where the number of
Page 16 and 17: Association for Diplomatic Studies
Page 18 and 19: udget of $3.5 million, and a profes
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Page 22 and 23: aircraft was an American flag carri
Page 24 and 25: of State’s attention to managemen
Page 26 and 27: In recent months, the growing secur
Page 28 and 29: Commission and the Judicial Reform
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Page 34 and 35: order is a barrier to change, educa
Page 36 and 37: development and governance prioriti
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Page 40 and 41: institutional memory, as well as th
Page 42 and 43: ise of the Taliban. This has been b
Page 44 and 45: Durand Line broke the region’s do
Page 46 and 47: Center, that the TTP is bound to re
Page 48 and 49: On Sept. 7, 1948, Secretary of Stat
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Page 52 and 53: What I want to get at is a problem
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Page 56 and 57: in turn, the enthusiastic applause
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Page 61 and 62: AFSANEWS American Foreign Service A
Page 63 and 64: V.P. VOICE: STATE ■ BY STEVE KASH
Page 65 and 66: 2008 AFSA CONSTRUCTIVE DISSENT AWAR
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Page 69 and 70: 2008 AFSA OUTSTANDING PERFORMANCE A
Page 71 and 72: AUSTIN TRACY Scholarship Winners Ho
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Page 77 and 78: Cultural Diplomacy’s Finest Hour
Page 80 and 81: Lucius Durham Battle, 89, a retired
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ing French and Spanish literature a
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Comforts, that specialized in anima
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Washington, D.C., in 1941. There sh
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losing a battle with cancer. Born i
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Leasing and Management of Exception
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Seven months ago, I was living in a
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