F OCUS - American Foreign Service Association
F OCUS - American Foreign Service Association F OCUS - American Foreign Service Association
Commission and the Judicial Reform Commission are highly politicized and ineffective; and education, a critical need in a society that has seen two generations come of age without schooling, is limited by Taliban targeting of governmental education efforts. Afghans tell pollsters that an absence of security is their greatest concern, with endemic corruption another chronic and debilitating reality. They are keenly aware that no senior official has been prosecuted for corruption. International funding for development is frequently misdirected. The failure to establish justice not only effectively confers impunity for past crimes; it also leaves the population vulnerable to future abuses, often by the same perpetrators. The inability of Afghan officials to develop effective governance structures at the national and local levels, 26 FOREIGN SERVICE JOURNAL/JULY-AUGUST 2008 F OCUS despite international advice and support, is often perceived as an endemic failure reflecting Afghans’ alleged incapacity to sustain self-government. However, that perspective ignores the nation’s long history as a self-governing entity that was, over much of the 20th century, one of the Islamic world’s more progressive, successful states. In particular, the reign of King Zahir Shah (1933- 1973) was a time of relative peace, economic growth and limited democracy that included a significant place for women to have professional roles in politics, education and commerce. This relatively successful and peaceful period was remarkable in several respects. For much of the post- World War II period, U.S. and Soviet competition for influence in Afghanistan was intense and could have been destabilizing. But rather than suffering the Cold
War turbulence endured by Korea, Vietnam and Nicaragua, Afghanistan deftly managed the competing superpower interests to its advantage. More remarkably, the Afghan government balanced competing ethnic and tribal rivalries, although some minorities, notably the Hazara, suffered persistent neglect. This successful balance entailed blunting the interference of neighboring powers who sought to manipulate clans and local leaders. It was based on appeals to nationhood and, crucially, reliance on a traditional structure of governance that corresponded with local political realities. Decentralization was the key. While the central government addressed national issues related to defense, macrodevelopment, national commerce and provision of vital services, provincial and district governance was left to local leaders whose authority was based on their tribal or ethnic-based political power. There was corruption and in some instances, such as a disastrous drought and famine in the north in the later years of Zahir Shah’s rule, F OCUS the central government failed to respond in a timely and effective manner. But generally the system worked well, allowing cultural and social differences to manifest themselves without interference by the central government. For most Afghans, the king was far away and the village walls were high. The December 2001 Bonn process, which established an internationally supported scheme for post- Taliban governance in Afghanistan, was in many ways a remarkable achievement. A broad international consensus that, crucially, included a U.S.-Iranian-Pakistani understanding, it created the basis for compromise among fractious Afghans aligned largely on the basis of ethnicity, tribe and party identity. But in hindsight, the Bonn plan had a key flaw. Rather than adopt the decentralized model for Afghan governance that had worked well prior to the 1978 advent of the Communist Party’s centralized rule, the Bonn conference endorsed a highly centralized, powerful executive model JULY-AUGUST 2008/FOREIGN SERVICE JOURNAL 27
- Page 1: A TIRELESS “AFSA-CATE” ■ HONO
- Page 6 and 7: CONTENTS AFSA NEWS DISSENTERS HONOR
- Page 8 and 9: Getting History Wrong I was astonis
- Page 10 and 11: Forgetting History The April Cybern
- Page 12 and 13: National Security Infrastructure: D
- Page 14 and 15: Saharan Africa, where the number of
- Page 16 and 17: Association for Diplomatic Studies
- Page 18 and 19: udget of $3.5 million, and a profes
- Page 20 and 21: Pinochet to form a political party
- Page 22 and 23: aircraft was an American flag carri
- Page 24 and 25: of State’s attention to managemen
- Page 26 and 27: In recent months, the growing secur
- Page 30 and 31: of government — notwithstanding t
- Page 32 and 33: setup, relying on elected provincia
- Page 34 and 35: order is a barrier to change, educa
- Page 36 and 37: development and governance prioriti
- Page 38 and 39: 36 FOREIGN SERVICE JOURNAL/JULY-AUG
- Page 40 and 41: institutional memory, as well as th
- Page 42 and 43: ise of the Taliban. This has been b
- Page 44 and 45: Durand Line broke the region’s do
- Page 46 and 47: Center, that the TTP is bound to re
- Page 48 and 49: On Sept. 7, 1948, Secretary of Stat
- Page 50 and 51: ecame increasingly chaotic, with cr
- Page 52 and 53: What I want to get at is a problem
- Page 54 and 55: 52 FOREIGN SERVICE JOURNAL/JULY-AUG
- Page 56 and 57: in turn, the enthusiastic applause
- Page 58 and 59: authority and against the advice of
- Page 61 and 62: AFSANEWS American Foreign Service A
- Page 63 and 64: V.P. VOICE: STATE ■ BY STEVE KASH
- Page 65 and 66: 2008 AFSA CONSTRUCTIVE DISSENT AWAR
- Page 67 and 68: 2008 AFSA CONSTRUCTIVE DISSENT AWAR
- Page 69 and 70: 2008 AFSA OUTSTANDING PERFORMANCE A
- Page 71 and 72: AUSTIN TRACY Scholarship Winners Ho
- Page 73 and 74: AFSA Issue Brief Foreign Service Re
- Page 75 and 76: CLASSIFIEDS JULY-AUGUST 2008/FOREIG
- Page 77 and 78: Cultural Diplomacy’s Finest Hour
War turbulence endured by Korea, Vietnam and<br />
Nicaragua, Afghanistan deftly managed the competing<br />
superpower interests to its advantage. More remarkably,<br />
the Afghan government balanced competing ethnic and<br />
tribal rivalries, although some minorities, notably the<br />
Hazara, suffered persistent neglect. This successful balance<br />
entailed blunting the interference of neighboring<br />
powers who sought to manipulate clans and local leaders.<br />
It was based on appeals to nationhood and, crucially,<br />
reliance on a traditional structure of governance that<br />
corresponded with local political realities.<br />
Decentralization was the key. While the central government<br />
addressed national issues related to defense,<br />
macrodevelopment, national commerce and provision of<br />
vital services, provincial and district governance was left<br />
to local leaders whose authority was based on their tribal<br />
or ethnic-based political power. There was corruption<br />
and in some instances, such as a disastrous drought and<br />
famine in the north in the later years of Zahir Shah’s rule,<br />
F <strong>OCUS</strong><br />
the central government failed to respond in a timely and<br />
effective manner. But generally the system worked well,<br />
allowing cultural and social differences to manifest<br />
themselves without interference by the central government.<br />
For most Afghans, the king was far away and the<br />
village walls were high.<br />
The December 2001 Bonn process, which established<br />
an internationally supported scheme for post-<br />
Taliban governance in Afghanistan, was in many ways a<br />
remarkable achievement. A broad international consensus<br />
that, crucially, included a U.S.-Iranian-Pakistani<br />
understanding, it created the basis for compromise<br />
among fractious Afghans aligned largely on the basis of<br />
ethnicity, tribe and party identity.<br />
But in hindsight, the Bonn plan had a key flaw. Rather<br />
than adopt the decentralized model for Afghan governance<br />
that had worked well prior to the 1978 advent of the<br />
Communist Party’s centralized rule, the Bonn conference<br />
endorsed a highly centralized, powerful executive model<br />
JULY-AUGUST 2008/FOREIGN SERVICE JOURNAL 27
Change language