support, but found few tactical targets-<strong>the</strong> air campaign had worked. The greatest threat to ground troops that day was friendly fire. On <strong>the</strong> first day <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Battle <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Somme in World War I, British casualties amount- ed to 57,000, including 20,000 killed. On <strong>the</strong> first day <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Gulf War ground attack, Coalition casualties totaled 14, including 3 killed. Over <strong>the</strong> next several days <strong>the</strong> <strong>Air</strong> <strong>Force</strong> focused its attention on battering <strong>the</strong> Republican Guard divisions held in reserve in sou<strong>the</strong>rn Iraq and inter- dicting <strong>the</strong> flood <strong>of</strong> Iraqi units retreating from Kuwait. The most visible <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong>se efforts was <strong>the</strong> bottleneck created on <strong>the</strong> highway northwest out <strong>of</strong> Kuwait City, in what was called <strong>the</strong> “highway <strong>of</strong> death.” The strategic bombing campaign continued through <strong>the</strong> one hundred hours <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> ground <strong>of</strong>fensive, including a last effort to destroy Saddam Hussein’s bunker sanctuaries. Early in <strong>the</strong> morning <strong>of</strong> February 28 President Bush and <strong>the</strong> Coalition unilaterally declared a cease fire. Despite flying 37,567 combat sorties, <strong>the</strong> <strong>Air</strong> <strong>Force</strong> lost only 14 aircraft to hostile action (all from ground fire)-testimony to <strong>the</strong> pr<strong>of</strong>essionalism, training, technolo- gy, leadership, and doctrine <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> post-Vietnam U.S. <strong>Air</strong> <strong>Force</strong>. The Future With <strong>the</strong> end <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Cold War, <strong>the</strong> <strong>Air</strong> <strong>Force</strong> adopted a new doc- trine-Global Reach-Global Power. Released in June 1990, it prompted <strong>the</strong> first major <strong>Air</strong> <strong>Force</strong> reorganization since March 1946. Under Chief <strong>of</strong> Staff General Merrill McPeak, Strategic <strong>Air</strong> Command and Tactical <strong>Air</strong> Command were deactivated on June 1, 1992. Many <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong>ir assets were incorporated into <strong>Air</strong> Combat Command, headquartered at Langley <strong>Air</strong> <strong>Force</strong> Base in Virginia. The new organization represents <strong>the</strong> “global power” portion <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> new <strong>Air</strong> <strong>Force</strong>, controlling ICBMs; command, con- trol, communication, and intelligence functions; reconnaissance; tactical airlift and tankers; fighters; and bombers. <strong>Air</strong> Mobility Command and its in-flight refueling assets headquartered at Scott <strong>Air</strong> <strong>Force</strong> Base in Illinois, replaced Military <strong>Air</strong>lift Command as <strong>the</strong> “global reach” portion <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> <strong>Air</strong> <strong>Force</strong>, controlling strategic airlift and tanker forces. Global Reach-Global Power and a new doctrinal manual issued in March 1992, AFM 1- 1 , Basic Aerospace Doctrine <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> United States <strong>Air</strong> <strong>Force</strong>, represent an <strong>Air</strong> <strong>Force</strong> committed to matching aerial forces with changing circumstances, drawing on nearly 100 years <strong>of</strong> experience. The Gulf War, like previous wars, demonstrated that <strong>the</strong> technology, lead- ership, training, strategy, and tactics employed for a specific set <strong>of</strong> condi- tions and circumstances in one war will not necessarily guarantee success 81
in <strong>the</strong> next. An innovator behind fighter tactics in <strong>the</strong> Vietnam War, Colonel Robin Olds, concluded from his own experience that “no one knows exactly what air fighting will be like in <strong>the</strong> future.” The U.S. <strong>Air</strong> <strong>Force</strong> proved decisive to victory in World War I1 and in <strong>the</strong> Gulf War and to separation from <strong>the</strong> limited conflicts in Korea and Vietnam. Future conflicts will bring new challenges for air power in <strong>the</strong> service <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> nation. 82
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A Concise History of the U.S. Air F
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The Genesis of American Air Power T
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vivid contrast to aerial achievemen
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For sale by the US. Government Prin
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In the United States an outpouring
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commander, General John Pershing, c
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Early Military Aviation Leaders The
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served him well at St. Mihiel in Se
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No one in the Air Service was parti
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direct or indirect support of other
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Interwar Aircraft In amazing techno
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AF) on March 1, 1935. This first Am
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World War 11-Global Conflict Despit
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35 percent of America’s total inv
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Principal American participants at
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ought to bear against attacking fig
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scheduled by the Allies for late sp
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