A Concise History of the US Air Force - Air Force Historical Studies ...
A Concise History of the US Air Force - Air Force Historical Studies ...
A Concise History of the US Air Force - Air Force Historical Studies ...
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tionally-televised attack by two F-l17A Nighthawks on <strong>the</strong> so-called<br />
AT&T communications building in downtown Baghdad. <strong>Air</strong> <strong>Force</strong> and<br />
Navy cruise missiles hit additional targets, including government build-<br />
ings and power plants. It was <strong>the</strong> beginning <strong>of</strong> a thirty-eight day aerial<br />
<strong>of</strong>fensive consisting <strong>of</strong> four phases: a strategic campaign against Iraq, an<br />
air superiority campaign, an effort to weaken Iraqi ground units in<br />
Kuwait, and, eventually, close air support for <strong>the</strong> ground <strong>of</strong>fensive. Over<br />
2,000 combat aircraft in <strong>the</strong> Coalition inventory struck targets in all four<br />
components to be struck simultaneously. Contrasted sharply with <strong>the</strong> 12<br />
sorties Eighth <strong>Air</strong> <strong>Force</strong> launched on August 17, 1942, in its first strike<br />
against German targets in World War 11, <strong>the</strong> Coalition flew 2,759 combat<br />
sorties on day one <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Gulf air <strong>of</strong>fensive.<br />
The air war defied easy analysis because <strong>of</strong> simultaneous strikes<br />
against targets in all <strong>of</strong> Warden’s concentric rings. In past wars identifi-<br />
able campaigns were mounted against various kinds <strong>of</strong> targets-ball<br />
bearing, aircraft assembly, oil production, transportation, irrigation,<br />
power dams, or interdiction, but in <strong>the</strong> Gulf War such attacks and more<br />
were mounted concurrently. Unlike AWPD planners <strong>of</strong> 1941, Gulf War<br />
planners did not have to choose between target categories-<strong>the</strong>y selected<br />
targets from among all categories. Coordinating <strong>the</strong> two or three thousand<br />
sorties required per day was <strong>the</strong> responsibility <strong>of</strong> Lieutenant General<br />
Charles Homer, <strong>the</strong> Joint <strong>Force</strong> <strong>Air</strong> Component Commander (JFACC).<br />
He controlled all aircraft in <strong>the</strong> <strong>the</strong>ater except those <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Navy in sorties<br />
over water, those <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Marines supporting <strong>the</strong>ir own ground units, and<br />
helicopters flying below five hundred feet. The lesson <strong>of</strong> conflicting<br />
responsibilities, priorities, and command and control represented by <strong>the</strong><br />
“route packages” <strong>of</strong> Vietnam had been learned well. Despite problems<br />
with intelligence and communication between <strong>the</strong> diverse Coalition air<br />
forces, never had <strong>the</strong>re been such a carefully directed air campaign.<br />
78<br />
Lieutenant General Charles<br />
Horner, Joint <strong>Force</strong> <strong>Air</strong> Compo-<br />
nent Commander (JFACC) for<br />
Operation DESERT STORM, ran<br />
<strong>the</strong> coalition air war.