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A Concise History of the US Air Force - Air Force Historical Studies ...

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tionally-televised attack by two F-l17A Nighthawks on <strong>the</strong> so-called<br />

AT&T communications building in downtown Baghdad. <strong>Air</strong> <strong>Force</strong> and<br />

Navy cruise missiles hit additional targets, including government build-<br />

ings and power plants. It was <strong>the</strong> beginning <strong>of</strong> a thirty-eight day aerial<br />

<strong>of</strong>fensive consisting <strong>of</strong> four phases: a strategic campaign against Iraq, an<br />

air superiority campaign, an effort to weaken Iraqi ground units in<br />

Kuwait, and, eventually, close air support for <strong>the</strong> ground <strong>of</strong>fensive. Over<br />

2,000 combat aircraft in <strong>the</strong> Coalition inventory struck targets in all four<br />

components to be struck simultaneously. Contrasted sharply with <strong>the</strong> 12<br />

sorties Eighth <strong>Air</strong> <strong>Force</strong> launched on August 17, 1942, in its first strike<br />

against German targets in World War 11, <strong>the</strong> Coalition flew 2,759 combat<br />

sorties on day one <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Gulf air <strong>of</strong>fensive.<br />

The air war defied easy analysis because <strong>of</strong> simultaneous strikes<br />

against targets in all <strong>of</strong> Warden’s concentric rings. In past wars identifi-<br />

able campaigns were mounted against various kinds <strong>of</strong> targets-ball<br />

bearing, aircraft assembly, oil production, transportation, irrigation,<br />

power dams, or interdiction, but in <strong>the</strong> Gulf War such attacks and more<br />

were mounted concurrently. Unlike AWPD planners <strong>of</strong> 1941, Gulf War<br />

planners did not have to choose between target categories-<strong>the</strong>y selected<br />

targets from among all categories. Coordinating <strong>the</strong> two or three thousand<br />

sorties required per day was <strong>the</strong> responsibility <strong>of</strong> Lieutenant General<br />

Charles Homer, <strong>the</strong> Joint <strong>Force</strong> <strong>Air</strong> Component Commander (JFACC).<br />

He controlled all aircraft in <strong>the</strong> <strong>the</strong>ater except those <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Navy in sorties<br />

over water, those <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Marines supporting <strong>the</strong>ir own ground units, and<br />

helicopters flying below five hundred feet. The lesson <strong>of</strong> conflicting<br />

responsibilities, priorities, and command and control represented by <strong>the</strong><br />

“route packages” <strong>of</strong> Vietnam had been learned well. Despite problems<br />

with intelligence and communication between <strong>the</strong> diverse Coalition air<br />

forces, never had <strong>the</strong>re been such a carefully directed air campaign.<br />

78<br />

Lieutenant General Charles<br />

Horner, Joint <strong>Force</strong> <strong>Air</strong> Compo-<br />

nent Commander (JFACC) for<br />

Operation DESERT STORM, ran<br />

<strong>the</strong> coalition air war.

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