A Concise History of the US Air Force - Air Force Historical Studies ...
A Concise History of the US Air Force - Air Force Historical Studies ...
A Concise History of the US Air Force - Air Force Historical Studies ...
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noticeable <strong>of</strong> which was more realistic, and thus more dangerous, combat<br />
training. In combat simulations <strong>Air</strong> <strong>Force</strong> pilots flew as aggressors em-<br />
ploying enemy tactics. By 1975 <strong>the</strong>ir training had evolved into Red Flag<br />
at <strong>the</strong> U.S. <strong>Air</strong> <strong>Force</strong> Weapons and Tactics Center at Nellis <strong>Air</strong> <strong>Force</strong><br />
Base in Nevada, in which crews flew both individual sorties and forma-<br />
tions in realistic situations, gaining experience before <strong>the</strong>y entered actual<br />
combat.<br />
The vulnerability <strong>of</strong> air bases to enemy attack and sabotage had<br />
long been <strong>the</strong> Achilles heel <strong>of</strong> land-based air power. In western Europe,<br />
living under <strong>the</strong> threat <strong>of</strong> a massive Warsaw Pact air <strong>of</strong>fensive and land<br />
invasion, <strong>the</strong> U.S. <strong>Air</strong> <strong>Force</strong> spearheaded an active program to improve<br />
<strong>the</strong> survivability and readiness <strong>of</strong> air bases. The effort was marked by <strong>the</strong><br />
construction <strong>of</strong> thousands <strong>of</strong> reinforced concrete aircraft shelters and<br />
o<strong>the</strong>r hardened facilities, alternate runways, rapid repair elements, chem-<br />
ical weapons protection, and a host <strong>of</strong> o<strong>the</strong>r defensive measures.<br />
The <strong>Air</strong> <strong>Force</strong>’s post-Vietnam rebuilding also involved applying<br />
improved technology. The battle for control <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> skies over North Viet-<br />
nam underscored <strong>the</strong> need for a dogfighting aircraft that featured maneu-<br />
verability before speed-one armed with missiles and cannon. Begun in<br />
<strong>the</strong> late 1960s and operational in <strong>the</strong> mid-l970s, <strong>the</strong> F-15 Eagle and <strong>the</strong><br />
F-16 Fighting Falcon filled this need. The struggle against radar-guided<br />
antiaircraft artillery and surface-to-air missiles in Vietnam encouraged<br />
<strong>the</strong> <strong>Air</strong> <strong>Force</strong> to pursue stealth technology utilizing special paints, mate-<br />
rials, and designs that reduced or eliminated an aircraft’s radar, <strong>the</strong>rmal,<br />
and electronic signatures. Operational by October 1980, both <strong>the</strong> B-2<br />
stealth bomber and <strong>the</strong> F-117 Nighthawk stealth fighter featured detec-<br />
tion avoidance.<br />
O<strong>the</strong>r Vietnam War technologies included precision guided mis-<br />
siles and bombs. From April 1972 to January 1973 <strong>the</strong> United States used<br />
over 4,000 <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong>se early “smart weapons” in Vietnam to knock down<br />
bridges and destroy enemy tanks. Continued development <strong>of</strong> laser-guid-<br />
ed bombs and electro-optically-guided missiles <strong>of</strong>fered <strong>the</strong> prospects <strong>of</strong><br />
pinpoint, precision bombing on which traditional <strong>Air</strong> <strong>Force</strong> doctrine rest-<br />
ed-<strong>the</strong> destruction <strong>of</strong> chokepoints in an enemy nation’s industrial web<br />
with economy <strong>of</strong> force and without collateral damage. These technolo-<br />
gies, which afforded a strike precision far beyond that available to earli-<br />
er air power thinkers, sparked a revision <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> traditional doctrine <strong>of</strong><br />
strategic bombing. This revision took two forms. First, <strong>the</strong> <strong>Air</strong> <strong>Force</strong>, to<br />
overcome numerically superior Warsaw Pact forces, cooperated with <strong>the</strong><br />
Army in updating <strong>the</strong> tactical doctrine <strong>of</strong> <strong>Air</strong>Land Battle promulgated in<br />
Field Manual 100-5 in 1982. The <strong>Air</strong> <strong>Force</strong> would make deep air attacks<br />
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