A Concise History of the US Air Force - Air Force Historical Studies ...

the spread of Communism brought about America’s involvement in
Vietnam. When President Kennedy declared that the United States would
“pay any price, bear any burden, meet any hardship, support any friend,
oppose any foe to assure the survival and the success of liberty,” the stage
was set. The Taylor-Rostow mission of October 1961 investigated the sit-
uation in South Vietnam and proposed the use of American air power
against North Vietnam. Between 1965 and 1974 the United States would
drop three times as many bombs in Southeast Asia as it did in all of World
War 11, but victory would prove even more elusive than in the Korean
War.
Driven by its nuclear strategic bombing doctrine, the Air Force
was ill-prepared for a limited war in Vietnam. Air Force training, tech-
nology, and strategy focused on general nuclear war with the Soviet
Union. F-105 Thunderchief “fighters” had been designed to carry tacti-
cal nuclear weapons in an internal bomb bay, but were forced into use in
Vietnam carrying 750-pound high-explosive bombs. F-104 Starfighters,
the fastest fighters in the world, were designed to intercept Soviet bomb-
ers, but lacked the range and dogfighting ability to compete for air supe-
riority over North Vietnam. Fortunately for the Air Force, the Navy had
begun the development of two superb fighter-bombers, the F-4 Phantom
I1 and the A-7 Corsair 11, better suited to combat, although the absence of
a machine gun in the former aircraft limited its usefulness as an air supe-
riority fighter until the arrival of the gun-equipped E model.
U.S. Air Force aircrews flew combat missions in South Vietnam
before 1964, but only if accompanied by South Vietnamese aircrews. The
Gulf of Tonkin incident involving the Navy destroyers C. Turner Joy and
Maddox in August 1964 resulted in a nearly unanimous Congressional
vote of support for President Johnson “to take all necessary measures to
prevent further aggression.” As in Korea, however, there would be no
declaration of war. Neutral sanctuaries in Laos and Cambodia would be
off-limits to aerial attack for much of the conflict. Targets close to China
and in Hanoi and Haiphong would also be off-limits for fear an expand-
ed fight would lead to a direct confrontation between the United States
and the Soviet Union and China, with the possible result of a nuclear
holocaust. Vietnam would be another limited war. National objectives
were, for the military, exasperating: “Don’t lose this war, but don’t win it,
either.” As President Johnson stated: “. . . not now, or not there, or too
much, or not at all.” The strategy was designed to hold off North Vietnam
until South Vietnam became a viable nation able to defend itself. The Air
Force would fight two wars-one against internal subversion by South
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