A Concise History of the US Air Force - Air Force Historical Studies ...

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MacArthur advised Congress that “there was no substitute for victory,” and contradicted national policy. On April 11, 1951, President Truman fired MacArthur, replaced him with Matthew Ridgway, and in the process changed the nature of air warfare in Korea. The Air Force would still interdict the flow of supplies to Chinese units along the 38th Parallel and provide close air support to U.N. forces opposing them, but it would now also pressure the enemy into a settlement by inflicting maximum losses of men and materiel. The “police action” had become a war of attrition. The Fifth Air Force’s new commander, Lieutenant General Frank Everest, believed that interdiction was key to reducing the impact of Chinese offensives and U.N. ground losses. MiG-I 5s outnumbered F-86 Sabres over North Korea by five-to-one in 1951. Thus the Air Force’s losses climbed as B-29s operated mainly at night. Complicating its air superiority campaign were air bases which the Chinese tried to build in North Korea to support their own forces and which FEW was compelled to target. F-86s engaged MiGs in air-to-air combat and B-29s cratered the air bases’ runways, forcing Communist jets to continue flying out of China and limiting their ability to challenge because of their short range. However, any bomb damage was quickly repaired by enemy labor units and necessitated continuous return missions. Interdiction, although cost- ly, racked up long lists of destroyed trucks, trains, rail lines, and bridges, including the heavily-defended Yalu crossings. Nonetheless, supplies still reached Communist front lines in quantity by night. Medal of Honor recipient Captain John Walmsley, Jr., of the 8th Bombardment Squadron gave his life using his searchlight-equipped B-26 as a beacon to direct other B-26s while they bombed an enemy supply train on September 14, 1951. As it had in Operation STRANGLE in Italy during World War 11, the Air Force learned that no air campaign was tougher than interdiction. By the spring of 1952 the Chinese had won the battle of interdiction and the Americans had failed in their attrition strategy along the 38th Parallel. Communist representatives, first at Kaesong and then at Pan- munjon, stalled peace talks and demanded mandatory repatriation for prisoners-of-war. General Weyland proposed to break the impasse by expanding the air war against North Korea. As U.N. casualties climbed and negotiations dragged on, the new American commander in Korea, General Mark Clark, accepted Weyland’s proposal. In June 1952 he ordered the bombing of the Suiho Hydroelectric Complex, previously “off limits” and one of the largest facilities of its type in the world. It was a major exporter of electricity to Chinese industries across the border. A four-day onslaught over Suiho and other hydroelectric plants cost North Korea 90 percent of its power system. Through the remainder of 1952, the 49
Air Force attacked 78 cities and towns identified as supportive of a num- ber of military functions, chiefly supply; however, to limit civilian casualties and weaken morale it alerted their inhabitants. In Korea, as in World War 11, the bombing of critical targets at- tracted the enemy’s air force into the sky, where it could be engaged. Intelligence revealed that China had a thousand MiGs ready for combat and Fifth Air Force fighter squadrons, for the first time in the war, did not have to go hunting-the “game” came to them. A new version of the F-86, the F model, gave Air Force pilots superior performance to go along with their better training and tactics. In May and June 1953 the F-86Fs achieved a 133-to-1 advantage in combat kills over the MiGs. Individual scores rose, with Air Force Captain Joseph McConnell, a B-24 navigator in World War 11, topping all pilots with 16 confirmed victories in only four months. Three developments in 1953 brought peace to Korea. In March Soviet Premier Joseph Stalin, a major obstacle, died. In May, Air Force bombers increased the frequency of their attacks again, striking North Korean irrigation dams that, when breached, washed away railroads and highways and threatened the nation’s rice crop. At the direction of Presi- dent Dwight Eisenhower, Secretary of State John Dulles asked Indian Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru to warn China that the United States intended to use tactical and strategic nuclear weapons and might unleash SAC against Chinese cities if a settlement was not forthcoming. On May 27, 1953, China agreed to an armistice in Korea. It went into effect on July 27. The Korean War should have taught the United States that nuclear weapons had limited use in conventional wars, but the appeal of the new hydrogen bomb, first tested in November 1952, and plans for a new all-jet intercontinental bomber, the B-52, continued to dominate strategic thinking. TAC sought a new generation of fighters (the “century series,” including the F-100 Super Sabre, F-101 Voodoo, F-102 Delta Dagger, F-104 Starfighter, F-105 Thunderchief, and F-106 Delta Dart) with supersonic speeds, but also adapted them to cany tactical nuclear weapons. The Air Force realized that while turbojet technology was the future, it alone was no substitute for good training, tactics, and aggres- siveness. Military casualties in Korea of over two million for both sides, including more than 54,000 dead Americans, belied the judgment that this was a “limited” war-Americans learned firsthand the costs of war in Asia. Air Force aircraft had dropped 476,000 tons of explosives to achieve a standoff. Korea exposed the Air Force to the reality of post- 50
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A Concise History of the U.S. Air F
Page 4 and 5: The Genesis of American Air Power T
Page 6 and 7: vivid contrast to aerial achievemen
Page 8 and 9: For sale by the US. Government Prin
Page 10 and 11: In the United States an outpouring
Page 12 and 13: commander, General John Pershing, c
Page 14 and 15: Early Military Aviation Leaders The
Page 16 and 17: served him well at St. Mihiel in Se
Page 18 and 19: No one in the Air Service was parti
Page 20 and 21: direct or indirect support of other
Page 22 and 23: Interwar Aircraft In amazing techno
Page 24 and 25: AF) on March 1, 1935. This first Am
Page 26 and 27: World War 11-Global Conflict Despit
Page 28 and 29: 35 percent of America’s total inv
Page 30 and 31: Principal American participants at
Page 32 and 33: ought to bear against attacking fig
Page 34 and 35: scheduled by the Allies for late sp
Page 37 and 38: Despite heroic efforts to restore p
Page 39 and 40: Molding the Line in the Pacific Top
Page 41 and 42: America’s Air War in Asia Right,
Page 43 and 44: Hansell’s XXI Bomber Command, the
Page 45 and 46: nance, radar, jets, rockets, and a
Page 47 and 48: The newly independent U.S. Air Forc
Page 49 and 50: In addition, vast distances to targ
Page 51 and 52: Principal American air commanders a
Page 53: Korean War fighters. North American
Page 57 and 58: Atlas, lef, and Titan I, right, int
Page 59 and 60: off at a moment’s notice; another
Page 61 and 62: Union. A more capable SR-71 Blackbi
Page 63 and 64: clude, “We’re eyeball to eyebal
Page 65 and 66: Vietnam-based Viet Cong, the other
Page 67 and 68: ombed, the two most famous were the
Page 69 and 70: Transport Aircraft in Vietnam The U
Page 71 and 72: The Tet offensive proved a military
Page 73 and 74: The Lockheed SR-71 Blackbird strate
Page 75 and 76: meant that warheads could be smalle
Page 77 and 78: Beginning in March 1985, Soviet Com
Page 79 and 80: on an enemy army to isolate it on t
Page 81 and 82: America’s Air War in the Gulf
Page 83 and 84: tionally-televised attack by two F-
Page 85 and 86: 2 percent of combat sorties. Their
Page 87 and 88: in the next. An innovator behind fi
Page 89: Hallion, Richard P. Rise of the Fig
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