A Concise History of the US Air Force - Air Force Historical Studies ...

ing at Inchon on September 15, coupled with a U.N. drive north from the
Pusan Perimeter, clearing South Korea of North Korean forces. In early
October the U.N. changed its objective from saving South Korea to uni-
fying all of Korea under a pro-Westem government. Before the end of the
month, as MacArthur’s army approached the Yalu River separating China
from North Korea, signs pointed to probable Communist Chinese inter-
vention. The Air Force switched to interdicting the flow of men and
materiel across the Yalu bridges. The freezing of the Yalu River in
January 195 1, and rules of engagement that forbade American overflights
of Chinese territory on the north end of the bridges, condemned the effort
to failure. B-29s had to fly above 20,000 feet to escape antiaircraft
artillery fire from the Chinese side of the Yalu, but they could not fire
back. That altitude and bombs errantly falling on Chinese temtory
insured little success. Bombing became even more difficult when China
escalated the conflict in November 1950 by sending Soviet-provided
MiG-15 jet fighters, launched from safe sanctuary on lightning attacks
against American aircraft, especially FEAF B-29s. The airspace just
south of the Yalu River in northwestern Korea became known as “MiG
Alley.” The performance advantages of the MiG-15 in speed and altitude
initially held sway over propeller-driven P-5 1 Mustangs (pursuit aircraft
redesignated by the Air Force as fighters in June 1948), jet-powered F-80
Shooting Stars, and even newer F-84 Thunderjets.
Chinese Communist forces counterattacked on November 26,
driving U.N. units back toward South Korea. For the U.S. Air Force, this
meant a genewed concentration on interdiction, combined with a cam-
paign to maintain air superiority against the MiG-15s. Air Force airlift
brought 1,600 tons of supplies to Marines cut off at Changjin (more wide-
ly known by its Japanese name, Chosin) Reservoir and evacuated 5,000
wounded. After retreating, U.N. forces stabilized along the 38th parallel
in early 1951 and the war deteriorated into a series of small, bloody bat-
tles, with no significant movement by either side. War objectives changed
again. Peace talks opened in July 1951. They were backed by a new Ame-
rican strategy to force high rates of attrition on the enemy. It would be up
to FEAF, now under Lieutenant General Otto Weyland, and U.S. naval
aviation to carry the war beyond the front, to pressure North Korea and
China into a ceasefire, substituting air power whenever possible for
ground operations that inevitably resulted in high casualties.
This strategy presented new threats and complications for the Air
Force. Doctrine dictated strikes against the enemy’s industrial fabric, but
the bombing operations of 1950 had destroyed these limited North Kor-
ean targets. Industries supporting the Communist war effort, located in
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